

5th International Academic Conference on Human Security

INNOVATION, RESEARCH, AND KNOWLEDGE
IN THE (RE)CONFIGURATION OF HUMAN SECURITY

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Aleksandra Ilić
Nenad Stekić (Eds.)



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**HUMAN
SECURITY**

• CONFERENCE



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November 4-5, 2022

Dr. Aleksandra Ilić
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University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies
Institute of International Politics and Economics

Belgrade, 2023

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Institute of International Politics and Economics

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CONTENTS

PREFACE	7
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PART I: THE KEYNOTE SPEECHES

Heriberto Tapia NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE: DEMANDING GREATER SOLIDARITY	13
Giorgio Shani RETHINKING HUMAN SECURITY IN A POST-COVID WORLD	27
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh FROM SECURITY BY AND FOR PEOPLE TO SECURITY FROM PEOPLE: DOES THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE ADD TO ITS APPEAL AND ADDRESS THE CONCERNS?	41
Des Gasper HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE: AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE UNDP TRILOGY OF REPORTS 2020-2022	61

PART II: THE ANTHROPOCENE AND NEW PRACTICES OF RESEARCH IN HUMAN SECURITY AREA

Konstantin N. Lobanov, Boris N. Selin THE STATE OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF SCENARIO FORECASTING OF GLOBAL DYSFUNCTIONALITY	77
Nevena Stanković, Milan Lipovac SOCIETAL RESILIENCE AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES	97
Aliaksandr Novikau THE HUMAN SECURITY DIMENSION OF ENERGY SECURITY	115
David Harries, Lorenzo Rodriguez HUMAN SECURITY: ITS PASTS, ITS UNDERWAY EVOLUTION AND NECESSARY FUTURE	133
Puneet Pandey ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN ENSURING HUMAN SECURITY IN INDIA	149
Srđan T. Korac DOES THE DAWN OF ROBOTS BRING THE DAY OF NEW HUMAN INSECURITIES?	163

Nada M. Sekulić	CORPORATE PROFITS AND WEAKENING OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS MANAGEMENT	183
Jana Marković, Nenad Spasojević	MIGRATION CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC	195
Murat Necip Arman, Yildirim Toprak	CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN YEMEN AND THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR HEALTH SECURITY	215
PART III: RESHAPING HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH THROUGH CASE STUDIES		
Aleksandra Ilić	PARADOXES OF WAR ON DRUGS	229
Ana Stevanović	THE SECURITISATION OF COVID-19 IN SERBIA DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE PERIOD MARCH — JUNE 2020	245
Adnan Pečković, Jasmin Jašarević	RADICALISM AND BOSNIAN YOUTH: WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?	259
Jovana Blešić	“THE GLOBAL HEALTH FOR PEACE INITIATIVE” — A NEW CHANCE FOR A CHANGE	277
Mitko Arnaudov	NORTH MACEDONIA’S NATO MEMBERSHIP: HUMAN SECURITY BENEFITS OR <i>STATUS QUO</i>	289
Nikola Rajić	POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE HUMAN SECURITY IN NAGORNO KARABAKH: BAYRAKTAR TB2 SUPREMACY OR THE LACK OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE?	305
Ece Aksop	ANALYSIS OF COLD WAR SANCTIONS ON EGYPT: FOUCAULT IN ACTION	317
Aditi Basu	CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN INDIA SINCE 2014: IMPLICATIONS ON HUMAN SECURITY	345
Rakshit Kweera	TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY DURING PANDEMIC ERA IN INDIA	371

PREFACE

Prologue to the thirtieth anniversary of promotion of the concept of Human Security

Scholars are eagerly awaiting the 30th anniversary since the UNDP published its first Report on Human Security, which stimulated a wider academic discussion on this concept and made it the subject of broad theoretical reflection, more precisely the level of security studies. Although the concept has experienced concrete and theoretical alterations, it seems that not much has been achieved in practice. Three decades since the emergence of human security, numerous issues from the mid-1990s persist in an even more pronounced form. Data from academic services indicate a dramatic decline in scholarly interest in human security during the past five years. However, some events, such as the coronavirus pandemic, the supply chain crisis that has shaken global markets, and the increased intensity of armed conflicts across the Eurasian space, have substantially impacted the resurgence of interest in the individual's place in the system of international relations and the antinomies that emerge in the contemporary interaction between the individual and the system. In addition, the ways in which all these systemic problems manifest themselves have changed, necessitating new approaches in Human Security research projects. The individual is not only an object of protection and research, but also an entity that can potentially have a harmful effect on global political processes. Such actions can be manifested in different areas of social life, and are present throughout the Anthropocene, which was recognized by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its latest Report on Human Security, published in February 2022. All of these issues highlight the necessity of conducting systematic and in-depth research to understand the security phenomena relating to people, their global impact, and humans' role in contemporary international relations. The International Academic Conference on Human Security, held biannually since 2004, is a recurring format that contributes to the global scholarly conversation on the most recent developments in the field of Human Security. This year's event, titled "Innovation, Research, and Knowledge in the (Re)configuration

of Human Security”, featured three themes — Science and Methodology Innovation, Antinomies between Individuality and International Relations, and Public Policies in a Post-Pandemic World: the Anthropocene in Focus. The Faculty of Security Studies of the University of Belgrade is collaborating with the Institute of International Politics and Economics (IIPE) to hold this year’s Conference. As the event was coorganized by two eminent academic institutions in the year when the IIPE celebrated its 75th anniversary, this was an exceptional opportunity for the promotion of the Human Security concept among scholars at home and abroad.

The 5th International Academic Conference on Human Security was held on November 4-5, 2022 at the premises of the Rectorate of the University of Belgrade. At the opening of the conference, the participants were addressed by Dr. Vladan Đokić, Rector of the University of Belgrade and Dr. Vladimir N. Cvetković, Dean of the Faculty of Security Studies, University of Belgrade, as well as Dr. Branislav Đorđević, Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics. At the opening ceremony, the attendees were also addressed by the Assistant Minister in the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Aleksandar Jović, as well as H.E. Yakup Beris, Resident Representative of UNDP in Serbia, and H.E. Jan Braathu, Head of the OSCE Mission to the Republic of Serbia. The conference was ceremonially opened with a speech given by the Minister of Science, Technological Development, and Innovations of the Republic of Serbia, Dr. Jelena Begović.

Besides, the Conference saw three keynote speakers, nine plenary sessions in which in total 50 papers were presented. Our Conference achieved another record as more than 110 attendees from 26 countries worldwide were present during the two-day event. This Proceedings is one of the Conference’s main outputs and it honours the upcoming 30th anniversary of the concept of Human Security. It represents a volume of chosen 22 peer-reviewed papers derived from the presentations at the event, including three keynote speeches delivered at the beginning of Day 1 and Day 2 of the Conference.

The book is organized into three separate parts. It commences with keynote speeches delivered at the Conference by Heriberto Tapia, Giorgio Shani, and by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh. This part also involves analysis by Des Gasper, about the UNDP reports on Human Development. The

second part of this book thematically follows the main area of this year's Conference — the Anthropocene and new practices of research in Human Security area. It has in total nine articles. The third component of this book is devoted to the specific case studies and phenomena that shape either of existing seven dimensions of the Human Security concept. They are all thematically oriented to follow the ongoing disputes and armed conflicts, that are influencing individual level of security within the modern system of international relations. This part of the book consists of nine articles. With this publication the editors look forward to achieving further promotion of the concept and to promote the latest results and scientific practices in the area to the global academic community.

Lastly, the Organizing Committee would hereby like to express its special gratitude to the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia, the UNDP SEESAC, and to the OSCE Mission in Serbia for their continuous support of the Conference throughout the years.

In Belgrade,
January 2023

Editors
Prof. Dr. Aleksandra Ilić
Dr. Nenad Stekić

PART I:
THE KEYNOTE SPEECHES

NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE: DEMANDING GREATER SOLIDARITY¹

Heriberto Tapia²

Abstract: Although much has changed since its introduction in the *Human Development Report 1994*, the human security concept remains exceptionally relevant today in the face of new, interlinked threats. People are feeling insecure, as reported by six out of every seven people around the globe, even before the Covid-19 pandemic hit. Perceived insecurity was not only high, but also growing, even in places with especially high human development levels: the paradox of development with insecurity. Across the world, people are experiencing not only a raging pandemic, but also increasingly frequent natural hazards; wide-ranging threats to health; the spread of violent conflict beyond the so-called fragile contexts; destabilising technological change; and the burden of inequality in many aspects of their lives. These threats are unfolding alongside aggregate improvements in well-being at large. Indeed, many of them are actual by-products of how we have been pursuing development so far. They are further amplified by the conditions of the Anthropocene, where efforts to improve people's well-being co-produce dangerous planetary change. It is in this context that UNDP's *Special Report on Human Security* offers a reappraisal of the human security concept, building on its existing pillars. It reaffirms the centrality of agency as the chief driver of human security, going beyond just well-being achievements. It introduces a new strategy of solidarity alongside protection and empowerment, so as to address the deep interconnectedness between groups of people, as well as between people and the planet. Human insecurity has detrimental effects not only on people's well-being but also on our social ability to achieve cooperation in uncertain times, as highlighted by the *Human Development Report 2021/22*. Human insecurity is associated with diminished interpersonal trust and rising political and social polarization. The breakdown in trust and this rising polarization hamper the potential for collective action. Human security is an intrinsic complement to human development in the Anthropocene context. Permanent and universal attention directed towards the next generation of human security could end the development-with-human insecurity pathways. A revised human security framework could act as a

¹ Text based on United Nations Development Programme, 2022b and United Nations Development Programme, 2022a.

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policy integrator in order to address new threats, mobilise new agents and leverage new strategies to match the magnitude of today's challenges.

Keywords: *human security, human development, capabilities approach, international cooperation*

INTRODUCTION

In the years leading up to the Covid-19 pandemic, the world achieved new heights on the Human Development Index (HDI). People were, on average, leading healthier, wealthier and better lives for longer than ever. Yet, at the same time, an estimated six out of every seven people around the globe reported feeling insecure. Moreover, this feeling of insecurity was not only high — it had been growing in most countries data was extracted from, including a surge in some countries with the highest HDI values (United Nations Development Programme, 2022b). This startling bifurcation between well-being achievements and people's perception of security was the starting point of the 2022 Special Report on Human Security. Amid the devastation of the Covid-19 pandemic, and the range of new, inter-linked threats imperilling people around the world, the Report has offered a reevaluation of the human security concept for an increasingly turbulent and uncertain world.

When the concept of human security was introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report, it was rapidly recognized as a radical departure from the, at the time, predominant view of security, because it shifted the focus towards the real subjects — people — away from territorial security. That seminal work emphasized, also, three additional characteristics of human security — the universal, multidimensional and systemic one. These have gained relevance nowadays just as issues affecting people's security have become a part of the new set of intertwined threats on the planet which is undergoing dangerous changes because of human pressures. Although much has changed since its introduction in 1994, the human security approach remains exceptionally relevant.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT WITH HUMAN INSECURITY

The concept of human security can help illuminate and address the blind spots emerging when development is assessed only by measuring achievements in well-being. Today's threats to human security are systemic,

interlinked and emerging in a new context — the Anthropocene — which signifies an era where threats to human security arise from human activities. In many instances, they come from the same activities which have fuelled improvements in the well-being up to now. Across the world, people are facing not only a raging pandemic, but also increasingly frequent natural hazards; wide-ranging threats to health; the spread of violent conflict beyond the so-called fragile contexts; destabilising technological change; and the burden of inequality in many aspects of their lives.

The Report includes both novel work and estimates of the threat scale in the Anthropocene context. Today, approximately 1.2 billion people live in conflict-affected areas, where 560 million of them are outside fragile environments. The number of forcibly displaced people has doubled in the past decade, reaching a record high of 82.4 million in 2020. Hunger is on the rise, reaching around 800 million people in 2020, while about 2.4 billion currently suffer from food insecurity. Climate change poses a clear threat to human life — even in a moderate mitigation scenario, around 40 million people could die worldwide, mostly in developing countries, as the result of higher temperatures, from now until the end of the century. Healthcare systems, particularly in developing countries, are underprepared for the increasing incidence of non-communicable diseases and pandemics. The report pays special attention to how horizontal inequality undermines human dignity, and thus, as well, human security for many groups of people. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex people and members of other sexual minorities face risks from harm on multiple fronts. In 193 countries, 87 per cent of them lacks the right to be recognized for their identity and to gain full citizenship. In 2020, 47 000 women and girls were intentionally killed by their partner or a member of their family.

These threats pose a clear obstacle to people living free from want, free from fear and free from indignity. Moreover, they impede human development. The pandemic erased around five years of progress on the HDI — a stark reminder of how fragile world's development gains are. The Anthropocene context heightens the importance of recognizing the links between human security and human development. Virtually all people's efforts to find solutions to development issues result in actions which are mounting planetary pressures in one way or another (United Nations Development Programme, 2020). No country has, indeed, been able to reach a very high HDI value without exerting high planetary pressures.

These pressures have been creating new forms of risks which are linked to climate change (storms, floods, heat waves), biodiversity loss (irreparable, yet also with implications in the productivity and resilience of ecosystems) and zoonotic diseases (Covid-19 being the latest one in the series of more frequent events). The 2020 Human Development Report argued that industrial societies nowadays meet their energy and material needs in ways which result in planetary pressures, driving dangerous planetary change. To meet our energy needs, we continue to rely, primarily, on fossil fuels, which results in greenhouse gas emissions driving climate change. In order to illustrate how the solving-one-problem-at-a-time approach may be problematic, we shall consider how the increased use of renewable energy and batteries is leading to increased extraction of minerals, which we know are limited and for which we have few substitutes at present, often in contexts where massive threats to biodiversity and violations of human rights occur.

The human security concept offers a useful lens to understand this dangerous new reality and to generate responses which could meet the challenges at hand. It offers a perspective that is both insightful and fruitful in suggesting how to advance human development with less insecurity. The relevance of human security lies in one of its most important aspects, which emphasizes that freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from indignity cannot be thought of independently. Ensuring that people live free from want, fear and indignity requires a comprehensive, systemic approach. We have come to realize that higher income, for instance, does not automatically bring about peace and that a society without violent conflict is not a sufficient enough condition for people to live in dignity (United Nations & World Bank, 2018). As Oscar Gomez and Des Gasper write: “Even a human development perspective, focused on improvement for persons in all major areas of life which they have good reason to value, rather than centred on measured economic growth or technological display, is insufficient for dealing with the real world of interconnecting threats and recurrent crises, if it retains the linear model” (Gomez & Gasper, 2021).

The defining feature of the Anthropocene is that many of the greatest threats to human security are now, ultimately, man-made. In this context, an emphasis on well-being achievements not only falls short in terms of ensuring human security, but also co-produces a range of new, systemic

threats at a planetary scale. The gap between human development and human security could be exacerbated by the reinforcing dynamics between threats. For example, when climate change adds pressure to the forces displacing people and to the scarcity of some resources. However, this neither implies that human development should not be pursued, nor that it never promotes human security. On the contrary, the two can be compatible and complementary. Therefore, human security should be a consistent — indeed a permanent — focus of attention, in order to advance human development.

INSECURITY IS MAKING IT HARDER TO ACT COLLECTIVELY

Current major threats to human security, such as violent conflict, persistent inequality, health threats and threats from rapid technological change, are not new per se. What is, in fact, new is their close interaction with one another, the sheer scale at which they unfold, and their reach and influence on large numbers of people in a highly interconnected world. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, we have heard that if the virus is spreading some place, people everywhere are, nonetheless, vulnerable. Still, the movement of people across continents has been spreading new and old communicable diseases for millennia. Be that as it may, today this interconnection is global and even expanding to more aspects of life, as it has been documented in a large body of literature on globalization.

This interconnectedness is changing our understanding of what it means to be secure. In this context, Oscar Gomez and Des Gasper have emphasized the need to recognize that human security depends on what happens within communities that are connected: “One group can typically only be secure if the groups with whom it is significantly connected are secure too” (Gomez & Gasper, 2021). Fundamentally, the human security concept has, partly, been founded on highlighting “human interconnectedness, including the interconnections of nations” (Gasper, 2020). The universality of human security was already acknowledged in the 1994 Human Development Report, even if its instrumentalization has been rather slow³.

³ See: Gomez, O., & Gasper, D. (2021). *The Position of Crises in Human Development Processes and Thinking: Using the Human Security Approach in an Era of Transitions*. New York, UNDP.

In such a highly interdependent world, there are serious limits on our individual or even national capacity to address threats to human security. Clearly, no single actor or government can address climate change, prepare for the next pandemic or address the risks posed by technological change. Still, recognizing that each state, on its own, cannot fully guarantee human security does not absolve states of the responsibility to pursue it. Many — if not most — of the practical actions which improve human security are within the purview of national, subnational and local governments. Furthermore, the civil society has a key role at the local level. By accepting that several actors and entities are at play in enhancing human security, while the new generation of threats to human security looms large under the Anthropocene context, the response needs to recognize that much depends on the relationship between the state and the society — on the mutual trust between the two. However, in many countries today, the process of public deliberation and social choice is coming under strain. Human insecurity is, apart from hindering development, also damaging mechanisms for deliberation and collective action. People who feel insecure perceive themselves to have diminished control over their own lives (United Nations Development Programme, 2022a, p. 140). People facing higher perceived human insecurity are three times less likely to find others trustworthy — a trend particularly strong in very high HDI countries⁴. Globally, less than 30 per cent of people think that “most people can be trusted”, which is the lowest recorded value. Greater human insecurity is linked to political extremism as well. People experiencing greater human insecurity tend to be on the polar extreme of the political spectrum: the proportion of people with extreme political preferences is twice as large among those feeling very insecure in comparison to those feeling relatively secure (United Nations Development Programme, 2022a, p. 141).

The effects of greater perceived human insecurity, such as diminished trust, heightened preferences for extreme political positions and lower perceptions of control over one’s life, all contribute to political polarisation. Political polarization can be understood as “the extent to which citizens become ideologically entrenched in their own values and political

⁴ This finding is based on the generalized trust question in the World Value Survey: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”

beliefs, thereby increasing the divide with citizens who hold different values and political beliefs” (Van Prooijen, 2021, p. 2). Polarization tends to make people close in within their in-groups, thus making them be reluctant to interact, exchange and communicate with out-groups. Reaching a consensus on issues takes longer when opposing groups are homogenized, while deliberation within homogeneous groups tends to make people adopt more extreme positions which, otherwise, they might not have made on their own.

Polarization diminishes the space for collective decision-making and action, particularly in national and local contexts where important policies for advancing human security must be enacted. Severe polarization can make people ignore the fact that strategies, where all sides can win, actually exist. Furthermore, it contributes to discontent with democratic systems. Democratic institutions can struggle, themselves, to accommodate the priorities of deeply polarized groups, resulting only in deadlocks and public disaffection. Polarization also makes international cooperation harder. For example, party polarization has negative consequences for national commitments to international environmental agreements (Perrings, Hechter & Mamada, 2021).

How can human security be ensured in a world where threats to human security are increasing in scale and complexity, while our ability to act together, in response, is coming under strain? As argued in the 2022 Special Report on Human Security, the framework of human security itself may need to be enriched so as to account for the new planetary and social reality of the Anthropocene. The reappraisal of human security is needed not only so that we can secure ourselves and others better, but also so that we can continue to expand human development in this dangerous new reality.

HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE: REAFFIRMING AGENCY, ADDING SOLIDARITY

The concept of human security is almost three decades old. It came about in a very specific context of geopolitical change. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a renewed sense of possibility — with the expectation of a new era of peace, which included redirecting military spending towards other goals, since the cloud of military confrontation between

the two major powers had cleared. So, what makes it relevant today, in a vastly different world?

It is partly relevant because the expectation — or maybe hope — that higher incomes would, on their own, bring about human security, has clearly been dashed. The concept itself has not been frozen, but has rather evolved and gained salience in a different context from when it first emerged. Over time, the human security concept has evolved towards what may be better described as discourse with many different strands — a concept, an objective, an analytical frame, a policy philosophy and a policy planning approach.

Its fundamental ideas — that promoting human security requires actions that are people-centred (as opposed to state-centred), comprehensive (drawing together all necessary actors and acknowledging that there is no “one size fits all” approach), and prevention-oriented (focused on causes and anticipation) — remain relevant in the Anthropocene context. So do the principal strategies of protection and empowerment for human security, as proposed by the Ogata-Sen Commission in 2003. In their own words: “Protection strategies, set up by states, international agencies, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the private sector, shield people from menaces. Empowerment strategies enable people to develop their resilience to difficult conditions” (Commission on Human Security, 2003). Protection and empowerment strategies are mutually reinforcing: “people protected can exercise more choices. And people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvements in the system of protection” (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

However, this relationship between protection and empowerment cannot be taken for granted. For instance, actions seeking only to enhance protection of some, against threats, might also be disempowering or paternalistic. Actions seeking to empower can contribute to risks or harm to others.

In light of possible tensions between protection and empowerment, agency becomes particularly important. Agency is used here as defined by Amartya Sen: “someone who acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives, whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well.” Agency is instrumental in enacting protection and empowerment strategies,

and this, partly, refers to meaningful participation at different levels of decision-making. When this happens, tensions between protection and empowerment might be more apparent than real, because agency implies that protection is provided in the context of participation, deliberation and dialogue. Agency is, indeed, at the heart of the human security approach, both as its object (given its centrality to the “vital core of human life”) and as a driver of security (given its necessity for enabling people to act not only on their own behalf but also on behalf of others).

The Anthropocene context increases the importance of human agency: if people are the drivers of dangerous planetary changes, they have to be the agents who bring about what it takes to implement protection and empowerment strategies. Agency as used here is not a mere abstraction. There are concrete ways to improve agency in policymaking by embedding participation in various stages of decision-making; for instance, incorporating as many voices as possible in agenda-setting (particularly those of the directly affected stakeholders), in shaping plans for action and in implementing policy measures. The focus on agency brings, thus, legitimacy to specific strategies and initiatives. One way of summarizing the importance of the instrumental role of agency for human security is to consider it as an enabler of protection and empowerment strategies, which are legitimate and effective. Achievements related to agency do not necessarily overlap with those related to well-being: people can act based on values and commitments which may or may not advance their well-being. For example, people care about how others are treated and about what they see as fair, and may even intrinsically care about many aspects of nature, without it having any direct bearing on their well-being — and may even be detrimental to it.

In addition, as Amartya Sen argued forcefully, agency matters beyond the achievements that emerge from people acting on their value and commitments. Not only is it crucial to illuminate the blind spots which are left when outcomes linked to agency are neglected, but it is also critical to consider the freedoms that people have — to think and deliberate — no matter whether they decide to act or not: “Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and also to influence the world, and these matters are central to the process of development” (Sen, 1999). Achieving these freedoms, protection and empowerment, often is of utmost importance. There is, thus, a loop: agency is an enabler of protection

and empowerment, while protection and empowerment provide conditions under which agency can be promoted. Because agency matters intrinsically (not only instrumentally), human security needs to be the focus of permanent concern, which has already been recognized in the 2003 Ogata-Sen report.

However, people and societies can no longer enact strategies for protection and empowerment, without also accounting for the consequences of their actions on others. Nor can they neglect the relationship between the actions to enhance the well-being and the increased pressure on the planet. Human security in the Anthropocene requires paying attention to these interdependencies, both between groups of people and between people and the planet. It demands that human security be considered “with the eyes of mankind”, mindful of the shared humanity and the possibilities for granting security to others when acting together. When it comes to strategies for promoting human security, protection and empowerment may not have sufficient force to enable human security enhancement through the eyes of humankind.

The proposal made here is to complement protection and empowerment strategies with solidarity — understood *as a commitment to work together to navigate the challenges of the Anthropocene*. Solidarity sometimes connotes charity, an option which people may or may not feel inclined to pursue; or the need for collectivized actions which subsume the interests of the individual into a collective pursuit — neither implied here. In order to be clear, solidarity in our proposal takes the meaning suggested by Caesar Atuire and Nicole Hassoun: “broadly, a sympathetic and imaginative enactment of collaborative measures to enhance our given or acquired relatedness so that together we fare well enough” (Atuire & Hassoun, 2021).

Including solidarity alongside protection and empowerment recognises, also, the unprecedented nature of the Anthropocene, where it might be difficult to specify, with precision, which policies and institutions are needed. New institutions might have to be created from the ground up, particularly considering the need for structurally organized economies and societies. Adding solidarity to empowerment and protection might not give concrete answers to what these might look like, but doing so might, nonetheless, provide a systematic commitment to consider the reality of dangerous planetary changes. It is important to safeguard the process,

which enables public deliberation and reasoning, from institutions and policies emerging to respond to evolving threats to human security.

A commitment to solidarity does not come without its own challenges. It recalls the links between perceptions of human insecurity on the one hand, and polarization and low interpersonal trust on the other. It is difficult to establish causality in this relationship, as it, most probably, runs both ways. Evidence suggests that when insecurity increases, trust goes down. At the same time, low interpersonal trust and polarization contribute to reduced faith in many government institutions, and governments themselves, thus creating conditions under which people may feel less secure. With the prevailing levels of interpersonal trust nowadays, it might be difficult to make systematic commitments to solidarity.

Nevertheless, continued progress on human development ultimately depends on addressing the basic drivers of human insecurity. Further expansions of people's capabilities can hardly be guaranteed if people have not been adequately shielded from threats to their basic freedoms. Our ability to implement the many transformations which are needed today — local, national and global — depends solely on our ability to agree on what needs to be done, to generate broad social support and, then, to implement creative policy change amid uncertainty. Addressing the basic drivers of unsettledness and insecurity in people's lives, is essential.

FROM STRATEGIES TO ACTIONS

In light of the new, interlinked, generation of threats and current interdependencies between the people and the planet, a revised framework for human security in the Anthropocene proposes that the following three strategies — protection, empowerment and solidarity — are advanced together, based on the foundation of enhanced agency. The underlying human security concept, based on freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom from indignity, along with the main principles for action (people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented), continues to be relevant as ever. A revised human security framework can act as a policy integrator which addresses new threats, mobilises new agents and leverages new strategies in order to match the magnitude of the challenge of this day and age. The Special Report on Human Security

proposes updating policy actions to this effect (United Nations Development Programme, 2022b):

- On the agents: Move beyond traditional agents in order to produce change. Although governments and multilateral organizations retain their fundamental roles, the next generation of human security builds upon the role of a wider set of agents acting in new ways. For instance, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown how everyone can be an active agent of human security by following social norms.
- On the targets: Move beyond human security directed only towards developing countries. The Anthropocene is global, albeit with differentiated (yet often interconnected) local effects. Several compounded effects of climate change, biodiversity loss, technology-led threats, conflicts, forced displacement, inequality and pandemic require large-scale action to be taken by multilateral organizations, national governments and local actors. This new view should strengthen action towards achieving human security in developing countries — yet just as one part of a broader framework which stresses both the universal and the intrinsic importance of human security, along with its instrumental role.
- On the threats: Move beyond siloed security approaches. Current efforts are, still, largely compartmentalized, dealing with climate change, biodiversity loss, conflicts, migration, refugees, pandemics and data protection, separately. Human security, in the face of intertwined threats of the Anthropocene context, cannot be attained in silos. The human security framework calling for action can be an integrator, reaffirming, once again, the need for comprehensive action.

The role of human security as an integrator is not simple because social and natural systems are complex, with their elements being in high nonlinear interrelationships. Moreover, the Anthropocene context infers a great deal of uncertainty about which policies would be needed for the future. Sensible implementation warrants constant identification of the movement within the system, be it by decisionmakers, stakeholders or citizens. Furthermore, it warrants a commitment to consider our shared humanity when confronted with large-scale threats. Likewise, the action framework needs to be embedded within different layers affecting people's human security, which would be the local, national and global layer.

It is a rather radical challenge, but, at the same time, one which cannot be avoided, as the Covid-19 pandemic has shown us.

Human security is an intrinsic complement to human development in the Anthropocene context. As the world faces yet another critical juncture, a truly global catastrophe (the Covid-19 pandemic) and the looming climate crisis, we should be well poised to revisit the concept of human security along with the human security approach. In the same way the possibilities for human action to generate effects on a planetary scale have grown, our opportunities for working towards removing insecurity across the world have become unprecedented. Permanent and universal attention focused towards the next generation of human security could end the development-with-human insecurity pathways which produce pandemics, climate change and the growing array of threats to human security. A recommitment to the main strategies of protection and empowerment, with a new emphasis on solidarity and agency — cooperatively forming the contours of an enriched human security approach — offers a way forward, one which can make it possible for us to begin tackling these collective challenges and, thus, set ourselves on a path of continued human development in a novel and unprecedented context.

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RETHINKING HUMAN SECURITY IN A POST-COVID WORLD

Giorgio Shani¹

Abstract: With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, traditional security concerns are back on the agenda of International Relations (IR). However, the long-term effects of the “special military operation” will be felt, not only within the theatre of war, but also outside in the form of greater human insecurity induced by rising transportation costs, food prices and a global cost of living crisis, which has already translated into political instability in many parts of the world. Tempting as it is to blame the invasion for this worsening of global human insecurity, it should be situated in the context of a global pandemic, as well, which has so far taken more than 6 million lives and led to the unprecedented economic hardship including food insecurity. Far less attention, however, has been focused on how COVID-19 has fundamentally transformed human relationships in an increasingly de-globalised world. For Giorgio Agamben, the virus has led to the erasure of ‘our fellow humans.’ Humans are seen as potential carriers of the virus, ‘an invisible enemy that can nestle in any other human being.’ Since the ‘enemy isn’t somewhere outside, it’s inside us,’ our common humanity intrinsically constitutes a *security* threat. This inverts the logic of security, premised on the protection of human life from outside, whether these are posed by other states or existential threats, such as hunger and disease. Furthermore, this also calls into question what it is to be human in a post-Anthropocentric world. In this paper, it will be argued that our concept of security needs to be expanded so as to focus not only on individual human beings, but also on *that which permits us to be human*. This includes culture, religion, identity and the environment without which greater solidarity in the Anthropocene is impossible.

Key words: *human security, COVID-19, Anthropocene, religion, identity, cosmology*

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With the Russian invasion of Ukraine,² traditional security concerns are back on the agenda of International Relations (IR). IR continues to be dominated by the ‘national security’ paradigm which posits the territorialised

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² For an analysis of the implications of Russian military action in Ukraine for the international order, see Shani and Behr (2022).

sovereign state as the main referent object of security: states define and protect their populations from security threats which are external to it. In the case of Putin's Russia, the decision to invade Ukraine was made as a result of the 30 years expansion of NATO to its borders following the collapse of the USSR. For Ukraine, Russia's "special military operation" constitutes an *existential* threat; a threat to its very existence as a sovereign state. However, the long-term effects of the "special military operation" — and the Western response which has greatly contributed to the spectre of a full scale war in Europe, for the first time since World War II (with its attendant dangers in a nuclear age) — will be felt not only within the theatre of war but outside in the form of greater human insecurity induced by rising transportation costs, food prices and a global cost of living crisis which has already translated into political instability in many parts of the world.

Tempting as it is to blame the invasion for this worsening of global human insecurity, it should be situated in the context of a global pandemic, as well, which has so far taken more than 6 million lives and led to the unprecedented economic hardship including food insecurity. According to the WHO, there have been approximately 630 million confirmed cases of COVID which have claimed 6.6 million lives.³ Although more than 12 billion vaccines (World Health Organization, 2022) have been administered globally — more than enough to vaccinate every individual human being at least once, if not twice — these have been unevenly distributed. As of November 23 2022, 72.8% of all people living in high-income countries has been vaccinated with at least one dose, whereas in low-income countries this figure was only 28%.⁴ According to the WHO, only 58 of their 194 member states had reached the target of 70% vaccination rates and in low-income countries just 37% of health care workers has been vaccinated.⁵ This is not surprising given that vaccines were developed in high-income states (as well as PRC and Russia), as a result of private-public partnerships protected by international patents. Indeed, some high-income states have been accused of 'hoarding' vaccines and, thus, limiting the global supply of vaccines at least in the initial stages. This is termed 'vaccine nationalism.' In 2021, high income countries — comprising of just 16% of the global

³ <https://covid19.who.int/>

⁴ <https://data.undp.org/vaccine-equity/>

⁵ <https://www.who.int/campaigns/vaccine-equity>

population — controlled 60% of the global vaccine supply, whereas the WHO-directed COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) was struggling to purchase enough doses to vaccinate 20% of the population in low-income countries (Ghebreyesus, 2021).

The pandemic, however, is far more than a health crisis, as the *UN Framework for the Immediate Socio-Economic Response to COVID-19* presciently warned at the onset of the crisis, 'it is affecting societies and economies at their core' increasing 'poverty and inequalities at a global scale' (United Nations, 2020, p. 3). It resulted in a decrease in global GDP of 3.4% in 2020⁶ and, although the global economy recovered in 2021, the new wealth was unevenly distributed and made possible by short-term stimulus packages through increased government borrowing. As even the World Bank clarified in its *World Development Report 2022*, the response to the pandemic led to worsening inequality, within and across different nation-states, on a global scale. The most tragic illustration of this has been the dramatic rise in food insecurity with 2.4 billion people now going hungry — up from 800 million in 2020 — as a result of cumulative socioeconomic and environmental effects which were exacerbated by the pandemic (United Nations Development Programme, 2022, p. 5).

Moreover, COVID-19 — and different responses to it — has fundamentally transformed human relationships in an increasingly de-globalised world. For Giorgio Agamben (2020), the virus has led to the erasure of 'our fellow humans.' Humans are seen as potential carriers of the virus, 'an invisible enemy that can nestle in any other human being' (Agamben, 2020). Since the enemy isn't somewhere outside, it's inside us, our common humanity intrinsically constitutes a *security* threat. This inverts the logic of security, premised on the protection of human life from outside, whether these are posed by other states or existential threats, such as hunger and disease. Furthermore, this also calls into question what it means to be human⁷ in a post-Anthropocentric world.⁸ This article, based on my keynote

⁶ <https://www.statista.com/topics/6139/covid-19-impact-on-the-global-economy/#dossierKeyfigures>

⁷ See Shani (2020) for an initial reflection on how COVID-19 made the 'securitization' of what Giorgio Agamben terms, following Aristotle, 'bare life' possible, thus bringing into question what it is to be human.

⁸ See United Nations Development Programme (2022) for a discussion of Human Security in the Anthropocene.

presentation at the 5th International Academic Conference of Human Security⁹, argues that our concept of security needs to be expanded to focus not only on individual human beings but also on *that which permits us to be human*. This includes culture, religion, identity¹⁰ and the environment without which greater solidarity in the Anthropocene¹¹ is impossible.

Human security is in crisis: in both a theoretical and empirical sense.¹² As Newman has noted, in a recent article, Human Security 'has lost some momentum as an intellectual project as a result of its imprecise definition and scope.' Furthermore, in policy terms, 'it has been eclipsed by a resurgence of geopolitical visions of security, reinforced by a rise in nationalism and great power rivalry' (Newman, 2022, p. 431). In truth, Human Security has not been able to free itself from the shackles of the 'national security paradigm' it was —at least initially — intended to replace. The UNDP's 1994 *Human Development Report*, which introduced the concept to an audience of policy-makers, remains its most ambitious and comprehensive statement with its analysis of different 'dimensions' of Human Security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 1). Its expansive definition of Human Security as 'safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression' and as 'protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life — whether in jobs, in homes or in communities' (United

⁹ The conference was held at the University of Belgrade, Nov 4-5 2022. My thanks to Dr. Nenad Stekic and Prof. Svetlana Stanarevic for the invitation.

¹⁰ See Shani (2014) for an earlier discussion on the importance of religion, culture and identity to Human Security.

¹¹ Solidarity is a key theme in the United Nations Development Programme (2022) Special Report on Human Security which framed the discussion at the 5th International Academic Conference on Human Security.

¹² Human Security in a theoretical sense encompasses both *analytical* and *normative* dimensions. It can also be seen as a policy framework with a practical dimension (see Gasper and Gomez 2022). In all three of these senses, Human Security has failed to make inroads into the hegemony of the national security paradigm, apart from a brief period from 1994-2003 which was marked by the publications of the UNDP 1994 Report and the CHS Final Report in 2003. However, it has anticipated much of the language deployed by the UN Millennium Development Goals and subsequent Sustainable Development Goals so has functioned at a discursive level and has been institutionalised within the UN system through the Trust Fund for Human Security.

Nations Development Programme, 1994, p. 23) was, in part, intended to counter the pernicious effects, or 'downside risks' of neoliberal globalization which had emerged as the only economic system after the collapse of the USSR. However, globalization made the very concept of Human Security possible, by eroding the power of the nation-state and making it less central to our lives. Human Security, therefore, became associated with the post-Cold War liberal peacebuilding agenda.¹³ Emerging from Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 *Agenda for Peace*, liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict societies often included a commitment to economic liberalization, which seemed at odds with the spirit of the 1994 UNDP Report. Consequently, many states, particularly in the Global South, were reticent to embrace the concept of Human Security, unless it was subordinated to national security concerns.

Of particular concern was the 'narrow approach' to Human Security, institutionalized through the Human Security Network comprising of mainly Western states led initially by Canada, which opened up the possibility of coercive 'humanitarian' intervention by an undefined 'international community' if the state was unable or unwilling to 'protect' the people who lived within its territory. This could potentially have, from a Global South perspective, dangerous neocolonial overtones (Shani, 2014, 2017). An attempt was made to bring together the 'narrow' approach championed by the Human Security Network and the 'broad' approach pioneered by the UNDP and favored by states such as Japan together in a UN appointed Commission on Human Security chaired by ex-UNHCR High Commissioner, Sadako Ogata and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen. In the Final Report of the Commission, Human Security is seen as encompassing the 'vital core' of all human lives: a set of 'elementary rights and freedoms people enjoy' and consider to be 'vital' to their well-being (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4). However, Human Security was seen to *complement* rather than challenge 'state security' by broadening and deepening its focus. This paved the way for the eventual adoption of Human Security by the United Nations General Assembly and its institutionalization through the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security. The resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/66/290) in September 2012

¹³ See Richmond (2011) for an account of the emergence and limitations of liberal peacebuilding.

repudiates the use of force as a means of protecting the individual from 'violent threats.' Human Security is understood as 'the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair.' 'All individuals, in particular vulnerable people,' the resolution continues, 'are entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential.' However, the resolution explicitly states that 'Human security does not replace State security' and is based on 'national ownership' (United Nations, 2012).

Empirically, our sense of security has been challenged, most notably by COVID-19. Although Newman (2022, p. 431) correctly points out that 'the pandemic exposed the limitations of the traditional security paradigm and it demonstrated that traditional measures of national security are no assurance of societal resilience or individual protection,' the main responses to the pandemic were *national* in orientation and took the form of closing borders, restricting movement of people both domestically and internationally, increased securitization through surveillance applications installed on mobile phones and growing state intervention in the economy to stimulate demand and guarantee employment. In other words, the world *appeared* smaller. The great neoliberal globalization project of the 1990s has definitively stalled and the world is, now, entering a period of de-globalization. If, as Rosenberg (2005) has claimed, globalization had died at the beginning of the millennium, COVID 19 is the final nail in its coffin.

According to the UNDP Special Report on *New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene*, the COVID-19 pandemic has 'imperilled every dimension of our well-being and amplified a sense of fear across the globe' (United Nations Development Programme, 2022). For some, this sense of fear can be represented best through the term *ontological security*. Ontological security, in contrast with human security, can be defined as the *security of the self* (Mitzen, 2006, p. 341). A psychoanalytic term, the concept was introduced by R.D. Laing in his book *The Divided Self* (1960). For Laing (1960, p. 37), to be ontologically secure is to 'have a sense of ...presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person.' Ontological security allows the individual to 'encounter all the hazards of life' from a 'centrally firm sense' of his/her or their 'own and other people's reality and identity.' Without ontological security, the individual will be overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of the individual's coherent sense of 'being in the world' (Laing, 1960, p. 37).

An ontologically secure individual is able to act autonomously because s/he/they has a stable sense of self and a 'biographical continuity' which allows him/her/they to act consistently with regard to future relationships and experiences (Giddens, 1991, p. 54). Ontologically secure individuals are able to exercise *agency* because of the existence of a 'protective cocoon' which shields them from the many threats to their physical or psychological integrity. Giddens (1991, p. 40) has argued that basic trust is a '*protective cocoon* which all normal individuals carry around with them as the means whereby they are able to get on with the affairs of day-to-day life.' This protective cocoon is a precondition for 'creativity': 'the capability to act or think innovatively in relation to pre-established modes of activity' (Giddens, 1991, p. 41). Ontological security, for Giddens, resides in the possession of "answers" to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses (Giddens, 1991, p. 47). These existential questions 'concern the basic parameters of human life,' and presume the following ontological and epistemological elements:

- *Existence and being*: the nature of existence, the identity of objects and events.
- *Finitude and human life*: the existential contradiction by means of which human beings are of nature yet set apart from it as sentient and reflexive creatures.
- *The experience of others*: how individuals interpret the traits and actions of other individuals.
- *The continuity of self-identity*: the persistence of feelings of personhood in a continuous self and body. (Giddens, 1991, p. 55).

As Giddens acknowledges, 'religion' may provide answers to these questions by providing the *biographical continuity* necessary for the development of a stable self-identity. He argues that 'in virtually all rationalised religious systems, explicit ontological conceptions are found' (Giddens, 1991, p. 48). Others, including Catarina Kinnvall (2004) have argued that these ontological conceptions can be found in nationalism too. Religion and nationalism, she argues, attempt to provide 'answers' to these questions in times of rapid socioeconomic and cultural change. Indeed, the fusion of religion and nationalism has proved a very potent combination in South Asia, Islamic worlds Africa, Latin America, Europe and the United States. The recent history of the Balkans, including Serbia, provides a particularly

tragic history of the mobilisation of religion in the service of nationalist projects. It is also an important dimension of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict; Putin's "special military operation" has the support of Archdiocese Kirill, in Moscow, and the dissolution of the USSR has a recent parallel in the collapse of Moscow's authority in the Orthodox world with the Ukrainian Church declaring its independence in the form of the repudiation of the doctrine of *Ruskii Mir*, the concept of an organically unified transnational orthodox Russian Christian civilization that encompasses the territories of Belorussia (*Malorossiya*), Russia and Ukraine (*Novorossiya*).

However, religion is more than just a source of ontological security: for believers, it is *that which makes us human and permits us to interact with others*. If human security can be understood, in the words of the UN General Assembly Resolution, as 'the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from fear and want' and ontological security as the security of the self, then human security rests on the foundations of ontological security. The right of people to live in freedom and dignity is based on the prior existence of a stable self which is able to engage and interact with others. If individuals lack ontological security, they are unable to establish relations of basic trust with other individuals and, consequently, are unlikely to be able to live in freedom and dignity, free from fear and want. Human Security, therefore, presupposes ontological security. However, ontological security does not necessarily entail Human Security. Individuals may find ontological security by belonging to communities which deny the right of others to freedom or dignity, whether on the grounds of culture, gender, sexuality, race or religion. Ontological security may, therefore, be found in reinforcing or strengthening the boundary between 'self' and 'other' or 'friend' and 'enemy.'¹⁴ Human Security, however, attempts to transcend this boundary by positing the universal category of the 'human,' which encompasses both 'self' and 'other,' as the primary referent of security. Human Security, therefore, attempts to ensure security for individuals without recourse to the 'friend-enemy' dichotomy (Shani, 2017, p. 3). Hence, the sources of ontological security, such as nationalism and religion in a 'thin' sense — i.e., as a source of belonging and identity rather than an 'ordered archive' of rational and seemingly irrational doctrines, beliefs and practices which provide meaning to believers and through

¹⁴ See Schmitt (1996).

which they structure their lives — are incapable of providing *human* security for individuals and communities. What can, then, do so, particularly for the ‘secular’ or ‘non-religious’ subject?

We suggest the concept of ‘cosmology’ can help us transcend the boundaries between ‘self’ and ‘other.’ Cosmologies refer, primarily, to the beliefs that people, societies, or religions have of the “ordered” nature of the cosmos — i.e., how they believe the world to be structured (Kurki, 2020). In a political rather than a scientific sense, they can be conceived of as a set of culturally specific universal ontological and epistemological propositions about the origins and the evolution of the human world, the spheres of political and existential questions, and our position in them.¹⁵ This includes, not only relations between human beings, but also relations between humans and nonhuman, including all sentient beings, inanimate objects, Gods, spirits and demons, and the environment which we share. The concept of cosmology, therefore, not only makes human, but also a *post-human* security possible; in the sense of a shared concern with the worlds which we inhabit.

It also strengthens the idea of *solidarity*, which was identified in the 2022 Human Security Report as a key strategy of human security, alongside protection and empowerment, proposed by the 2003 Commission on Human Security Report. According to the author of the Report, and first keynote speaker Dr. Heriberto Tapia, all three strategies — protection, empowerment and solidarity — are necessary for ‘each of us to live free from want, from fear and anxiety and from indignity’ (United Nations Development Programme, 2022, p. 6). However, to speak of *agency*, defined as the ‘ability to hold values and make commitments, regardless of whether they advance one’s well-being and to act accordingly in making one’s own choices or in participating in collective decision-making’, as lying at the ‘core’ of this framework is to *take one cosmological worldview and to impose it on others*. Agency presupposes *agents*: autonomous individuals sufficiently empowered to act rationally in making choices. In many cosmological worldviews, the individual is understood *relationally*, not as an *agent*, but as an entity brought into existence through a process of mutual recognition. The Japanese term 人間 (*ningen*) is a case in

¹⁵ I have recently developed this concept elsewhere. See Behr & Shani (2021), Shani (2021) and Shani & Behera (2021).

point: whereas the character of 人 (*jin*) refers to the person, the character 間 (*gen* or 'aida') refers to an 'in-betweenness' which corresponds also to the *Ubuntu* phrase *umuntu umuntu ngabantu* ('a person is a person because of, by, and through other people').¹⁶ In other *relational cosmologies*¹⁷ no distinction is made between 'self' and 'other'. This includes the Indic concept of *dharma* which forms the basis of the worldview of those professing Hindu, Buddhist, Jain and Sikh beliefs. By deconstructing notions of self and other, *dharma* illustrates how all beings — not just human beings but all sentient (and sometimes inanimate 'objects') are related to one another in a moral, social, and cosmic order governed by a heterogeneous rather than linear understanding of time (Shani and Behera, 2021). It follows, therefore, that 'empowering' individuals (i.e., getting people to act as rational autonomous beings capable of exercising agency) entails separating them from 'others' and from the communities and cosmologies through which they derive identity and meaning, thus rendering them 'bare life' in Agamben's terms.¹⁸

A *relational way* of understanding agency would view it not as the exclusive property of rational, autonomous individuals, but as a *network* of human and nonhuman 'agents' who collectively, through their interaction, make a particular outcome possible. This conception of agency, systemized in Actor Network Theory (ANT) by its founder Bruno Latour, traces the role which nonhuman 'actors,' such as COVID-19, have played in human affairs.¹⁹ In doing so, it rejects the binary opposition between subject and object which is at the heart of positivist scientific methodology and, more generally, in the distinction between *culture* (the domain of humans) and *nature* (the domain of nonhuman) (Latour, 1991). In the age of the Anthropocene, this distinction is increasingly irrelevant: Humans — or more accurately in Latour's words 'the Male Western Subject' who has 'dominated the wild and savage nature through His courageous, violent, sometimes hubristic dream of control' (Latour, 2014, p.6), — have caused climate change so the environment is no longer *external* to us in the way we took for granted previously, when we lived in culture and objectified

¹⁶ See Ngcora (2015, p. 260).

¹⁷ See Trowsell, Behera, & Shani (2022).

¹⁸ See Shani (2014, chapters 3 and 4).

¹⁹ See Latour (2005).

nature. To be a subject, in the age of the Anthropocene, is not to act autonomously in an objective manner, but to *'share agency with other subjects who have lost their autonomy'* (Latour, 2014, p. 6 — italics in the original). One of these subjects is the planet Earth, which Latour refers to in Ancient Greek as *Gaia*; climate change is an assertion of its *agency* and perhaps even a reassertion of its *sovereignty*. Humans should beware — our security, whether national or human, cannot continue at the expense of the planet as 'nature' has a way of taking revenge. Perhaps COVID-19, whatever its origins, will help us rethink the concept of agency. Can we protect ourselves not only from nature's revenge, but from the effects of *human interaction with nature*? Collectively, we — human and nonhuman 'agents' alike — made the COVID-19 virus possible. Once born, COVID-19 becomes an *agent* capable of collectively threatening our human security. States have declared 'war' on it, in some cases deploying the armed forces and police to enforce lockdowns. In most cases, they have lost: even the PRC is finding it difficult to maintain its 'zero COVID policy.' However, we have no choice, but to live with our 'invisible enemy' and to learn that global pandemics need *planetary* solutions. ²⁰

²⁰ For a discussion of the distinction between the 'globe' and the 'planet' see Chakrabarty (2021, chapter 1).

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FROM SECURITY BY AND FOR PEOPLE TO SECURITY FROM PEOPLE: DOES THE RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE ADD TO ITS APPEAL AND ADDRESS THE CONCERNS?

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Abstract: The concept of Human Security has courted controversy in the political and academic world ever since its introduction in the UNDP 1994 Human Development Report. Easily confused with the Responsibility to Protect norm, the concept was churned by many G77 countries, and adopted only as a foreign policy tool, or as a rationale for development assistance by some middle power countries. Despite its universality, no country adopted it as the overarching principle for domestic policies, even during times of multidimensional crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic. Within academia, debates have raged between those accepting the broad definition of freedom from fear, want and indignities, those preferring a narrow focus on fears, and those rejecting it outright as no paradigm shift in security studies. While some academic institutions have proposed their own versions of a Human Security Index, consensus has not been reached about a universal way to measure a concept that prides itself to be specific to the context and subjective in its core. Yet, the premise of the concept, simple and commonsensical, as it may be, has always been innovative, going against silo approaches that shun interdisciplinarity. By 2012, after 18 years of polarizing debate, a United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution proposed it finally as an approach, defining it through the three freedoms and calling on people-centred and multidimension policies which protect and empower people in order to alleviate insecurities. In 2022, with the publication of a Special Edition on Human Security, UNDP proposed to revise the concept to recognize not only the interconnectedness of threats to people in the era of Anthropocene, but also the interdependence between people and the planet/the natural system. It added the notion of agency and solidarity to the dual framework of protection and empowerment. Does this proposed revision, that looks not only as threats to people but threats by people, respond adequately to the concerns of the academic and policy-making communities which were trying to mainstream the concept? The paper critically examines the trajectory of the HS approach between 1994 and 2022, highlighting the conceptual, political and operational challenges that had been raised by critiques and

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counter-critiques, before turning to the revision proposed by the UNDP Report. The paper asks whether framing people as both threatened and threatening in an interconnected world helps advance concerns with the human security approach, or it may broaden the gap even further and end up doing harm to the credibility of a noble concept whose potential had not been explored enough.

Key words: *Human Security, operationalizing Human Security, measuring Human Security, paradigm shift, concepts in IR*

PRELUDE TO AN OBSESSION

The annual International Conference on Human Security, organized by the Faculty of Security Studies at the University of Belgrade and the Institute of International Politics and Economics, is one of the rare spaces of intellectual comfort for advocates of a simple, yet often neglected idea: that the state is safe in so far as its citizens are safe. The Belgrade Conference on Human Security is one of the few places where like-minded scholars, students, policy makers and practitioners can discuss the evolution and adaptation of the noble concept of Human Security without having to apologize for their alternative vision of security studies, without having to sneak in the people through a back door of discussions on cyber security, border security, terrorism, or climate change. They can deliberate freely on how the state finds its meaning and moral legitimacy, its *raison d'état*, only in its response to the people, whether it can provide, protect and empower its own citizens and uphold its social contract. They agree with the basic premise, after all, that security is primarily the prerogative of people whom constructs such as the state, the international system and institutions such as the market should serve.

My engagement with the concept of Human Security started in 2001 when I was working at the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) at UNDP Headquarters in New York, in charge of the National Human Development Reports (NHDRs). While the intellectual foundation of the Human Development Reports, the concept of Human Development was enticing, the concept of Human Security, as introduced by Mahbub Ul Haq in the 1994 HDR, captured better what I had experienced in the field. During the early 1990s, around the time of the breakup of the Soviet Union, for example, I had witnessed how people living in Central Asia and the former Soviet republics suddenly lost most of their savings and pensions with the

sharp devaluation of the ruble and the hyperinflation that accompanied brisk monetary reforms. The change of system from socialism to hyper capitalism and neoliberal market reforms of the early years of independence wiped away free access to healthcare and education. The sharp decline in standards of living was induced not because of a war but simply due to the political and economic transition. The same happened with the Asian financial market crash in 1997-1998, which caused devastating consequences for people's livelihoods depending on the availability of their safety nets: As Amartya Sen put it, upturns are harmonious, but downturns can be divisive. "Even when different groups can all benefit simultaneously when rapid progress is occurring, ..., when a crisis hits, different groups nevertheless can have very divergent predicaments. United we may be when we go up and up, but divided we fall when we do fall." (Sen, 1999).

From my work in conflict situations in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, I had come to realize that people experience multiple threats, not all related to the war. In Paris, not far from home, I had observed that while some people living in the suburbs could suffer from discrimination and lack of access to elite institutions that guaranteed social mobility, those living in the beaux quartiers (well-off neighbourhoods) could still be suffering from mental health problems, food insecurity from bad choices, and, as the COVID pandemic showed eventually, diseases that do not respect economic or geographic frontiers. From these observations I had concluded that first, people could be suffering from insecurities even if they lived in relative peace and progress. Second, that their level of economic development was not enough. Crisis situations, be they political, economic, health, community or personal could wipe out all gains. Human development, despite its noble claim of raising capabilities and functioning (HDR, 1990) was not enough: Gains had to be secured. Another concept was needed which would focus on risks to development.

By early 2000, the Commission on Human Security, co-headed by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, had begun consultations around different regions in preparation of what became the publication *Human Security Now*. Central Asia was chosen as an area of study by the Commission in April 2002, as it presented a host of internal and external threats: perplexities of ten years of independence, transition to market economy and to democratic political systems, inter-state conflicts, and a backdrop of intense geopolitical changes had deeply felt impacts on the political, economic, social

and cultural aspects of people's lives. The challenge for the region was to regain the relatively high human development indicators, overcome the newly emerging poverty and unemployment, and increase the capacity of institutions, including civil society, to maintain social cohesion and maintain a sense of safety and security. Human security was a relevant approach to the unfinished dual agenda in Central Asia: Transition to a democratic political system and to an efficient and fair market economy, without further impoverishment of people or depriving them of equality and access to quality education, health care and participation in political processes. It was at that meeting that the dual goal of freedom from want (which in the context of Central Asia referred to the sudden loss of guarantees of access to jobs, health care, social welfare, education, etc.,) and freedom from fear (stemming from violations of human rights, extremism, spread of conflicts, displacement, etc.) were spelled out for Central Asia.

Contextualized in a region with which I was familiar, the concept of Human Security made perfect sense. Thus started my personal fascination with a concept that came to supplement national security, but also development and even human rights. I resigned from my position at the UN in 2003 in order to better contribute, as an academic and a practitioner, to teaching, research, applying, advocating for and training on the subject. My twenty-year engagement has included preparing Human Security Reports for countries, training UN staff, government officials and civil society advocates on the concept and its implication and conducting evaluations of UN Programmes on human security. One of my biggest contributions to the field became the preparation of the future generation of scholars and practitioners when I started teaching the longest running stand-alone Master's leave class on Human Security every year since 2003, first at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University (New York) and since 2004 at the Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po, Paris). At Sciences Po, the course was first offered at the Master of Public Affairs, and then within the concentration on International Security at the Paris School of International Affairs (PSIA) established within Sciences Po, and concurrently since 2015, as a month-long summer course in the Sciences Po Summer School. Combined, an average of 45-50 students have been taking my courses on Human Security per year for the past 20 years.

The keynote speech for the Belgrade conference provided an optimal opportunity to take stock of my experiences with teaching and convincing

hundreds of students of the validity of the concept and reviewing what has been achieved in terms of mainstreaming the concept in policy and academic circles and what have prevented its acceptance. The timing for a review was optimal, as the seminal 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, which introduced the concept internationally, was recently updated in 2022. The community of advocates of the Human Security concept who are enamoured with its noble cause, defending its standing among academic and policy discourses, had been waiting for this revision: Where do we stand now? What have been the critiques of the concept and did the UNDP 2022 updated Report, placing Human Security in the age of Anthropocene, help overcome the shortcomings to better contribute to the acceptance of the concept, or did it fail to address the gaps in knowledge and in practice?

THE BEAUTY OF A SIMPLE CONCEPT

Often, in the space where the policy, political and academic arenas converge, much ink is spilled in defence of a very simple idea. Explaining what human security is and why it is important is one of those exercises. And yet, the premise is simple. In 1990 the Pakistani economist Mahbub Ul Haq summarized the goal of development with a simple, yet, revolutionary statement in the first UNDP Human Development Report (HDR): "The obvious is the most difficult to see: the true wealth of a country is its people." By the time he penned the 1994 HDR, he had made another key statement: "Human security is a child that did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic violence that did not explode, a woman who was not raped, a poor person who did not starve, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed. Human security is not a concern with weapons. It is a concern with human dignity." With this statement, he first locates security in the realm of individuals' dignity instead of the prerogative of states, and second, puts clear emphasis on prevention against risks.

Convincing students of the need to go beyond national security was simple after they experienced the global Coronavirus pandemic in 2020: Traditional security thinking and the tools of national security, i.e., military force, proved inadequate when it came to protecting the lives and well-being of people threatened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic had a devastating impact on the economic, food, personal, environmental, and political security of states and people everywhere in different ways

and to different degrees. More than six million people died from the virus worldwide and insecurity spread in a domino effect across people, nations and sectors. Solutions to capture this mutual vulnerability were needed, while current narrow national security strategies were not designed to respond to such complexity.


While students of international security or international relations were used to studying the notion of security from the perspective of the state, it has been relatively easy to convince them of the commonsensical idea that 'security' and 'insecurity' have relative connotations in different contexts. For states, security is linked to the use of force, power and defence (the protection of borders, armies, etc.). For individuals living in states, insecurity can refer to the loss of the guarantee of access to jobs, health care, social welfare, education, etc. as much as to the fear — objective and subjective — that arises from domestic violence, political instability, crime, displacement, etc. The meaning of security for a refugee fleeing war, a farmer losing his crops to drought, an elderly couple losing their assets following a banking crisis, and a woman scared of her violent husband, is decisively different from what it means to a state on the brink of collapse, failure or invasion. Security is freedom from danger, a threat or a risk. Threats to people, most often related to each other in a domino effect, can be to their survival (physical abuse, violence, persecution or death), their livelihoods (unemployment, food insecurity, pandemics, etc.), and their dignity (lack of human rights, inequality, exclusion, discrimination, etc.). To be meaningful, therefore, human security needs to be recognized at the micro level in terms of people's everyday experiences. Security is, in the final analysis, in the eye of the beholder. Once the referent object and subject of security is moved down to individuals, the notion of 'safety' then broadens to a condition beyond mere existence (survival) to life worth living, hence, well-being and dignity of human beings.

With the motto of security by people and for people, the attraction of the Human Security approach remains in the way it brings together the fields of development, traditional security and human rights while adding to each field separately. To the traditional security paradigm, it represents an ethical rupture (by making the security of people and communities as the ultimate goal), and a methodological one (by securing individuals, the security of the state, the region and the international system can also be better ensured). In distinction to the Human Development

approach, it adds sustainability and building of resilience to help people prevent or mitigate risks to their gains. As the 1994 HDR put it, if Human Development is about widening people's choices and ensuring growth with equity, Human Security is about enabling people to exercise these choices safely and freely, and to be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today will not be lost tomorrow. The Human Security approach shares with the Human Rights framework the concerns about protecting freedoms, human dignity and morality. It also shares content: fear, want and indignities find echo in first- (civil and political rights), second- (economic and social rights) and third-generation Human Rights (solidarity rights). Yet, while Human Rights are rooted in legal norms and international covenants and agreements, Human Security focuses on protection from critical and pervasive threats, but does not have a normative/obligatory framework. It helps identify the rights at stake in a particular context and emphasizes conditions that allow Human Rights to take root. It concentrates on eliminating risks that allow *freedom from* threats so that *rights to which people are entitled* could be guaranteed.

While most students come from one of the disciplines (in the case of the class at Sciences Po, mostly security studies), the interdisciplinary aspect of the concept adds to its appeal and is appreciated by those seeking complexity and multidimensionality.

Figure 1: The connecting value of a human security approach



A natural continuation of normative security studies

Responding to the multidimensional realities of everyday existence, the Human Security approach has tried to bridge the gap between theory and empiricism, analysis and applied policy research. By November 2022, the search engine Google finds 4 490 000 results when the words “Human Security” are entered. Thousands of academic articles have been applying the concept to different thematic or geographic areas. For students of international relations, it is easy to pin the concept on to the debates started by Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School on widening and deepening security studies since the 1980s (Buzan, 2007). If Buzan’s movement emphasized on the social aspects of security, the constructivist, critical and feminist theories in international relations had paved the way by further bringing down the unit of analysis, and the referent object and subject of ‘security’ down to the level of individuals.

But if the Buzan and others’ work has tried to explain the nature of non-traditional threats to the state, Human Security rode the wave of approaches that posed a moral challenge to realism. For the realist school, the moral argument was the *raison d’état* itself, and faith in the notion of the *raison d’état* was an acceptance of the priority accorded to the security of the state (Campbell & Shapiro, 1999). Human security redirected the focus to the well-being of people and called for a wider ethical concern into international politics: the insecurity of individuals anywhere in the world should take precedence over state sovereignty. The approach offered the definition of an end point towards which all politics has to strive, i.e., the ethics of ultimate ends, which holds a transformatory potential for actors and institutions at all levels of governance. Rather than an empirical or positivist theory like realism or neorealism, Human Security does not proclaim to be amoral. With its ‘human’ accolade, it more comfortably belongs to the field of ethics in International Relations (and normative theory, dealing with what ought to be and how the world should be ordered and the value choices decision-makers should make). (Viotti & Kauppi, 1997). And as all normative theories, its rejection by many scholars in IR is related to the positivist bias of the field, even though the underlying determining structure (system, unit) that forms the basis of positivist theories is also not independent of norms and is itself largely constituted by sets of normative ideas.

MARGINALIZATION IN ACADEMIA

Despite its simple premise and common sense, however, the Human Security approach has not been fully accepted and adopted by mainstream policy circles, let alone academia.

Within academia, there is still no consensus on the validity of the concept as an academic field (Buzan and Hansen, 2009) and remains marginal in international relations and security studies. Case in point is that at Sciences Po, the course has been offered as an elective within the Master's in International Security, and only the few classes on critical security studies make a passing reference to it. The analytical contribution of the concept is also often critiqued in PhD defences by professors not familiar with — or interested in — an alternative paradigm of security that is more normative than descriptive.

The reason for the continued marginalization of the subject in academia are many: At the top of it is the normative nature of the concept (with its value-based position on what the world ought to be like) has raised eyebrows within academia heavily influenced by positive theories which take pride in explaining how the world works, assumingly in a value-free way. In France, for example, the field of international relations is already heavily contested by those who prefer to replace it with the sociology of international relations as a study of relations between institutions. Human Security is seen as an activists' agenda, a UN implant, an Anglo-Saxon anomaly, a policy agenda etc. which does not belong to the so-called scientific query of academic disciplines. At the end of the day, international relations — or the sociology of IR — still remain about states, institutions and processes. 'People', much like the feminist focus on women, have not been able to make a dent and carve themselves sufficiently as actors in IR. This tendency, however, is also changing with the advent of intersectionality as a theoretical lens and analytical tool. The Paris School of International Affairs at Sciences Po for example sees value in locating theoretical discussions in international public policy and has been inviting to innovative disciplines.

Despite new advances, interdisciplinarity is also not mainstreamed enough in academia: International relations, international security, development and human rights are taught as separate subjects, with more or less weak attempts to find intersections, although this is also changing at

rapid speed in public policy-oriented schools. The parallel challenge for the Human Security Approach has been to promote the three freedoms (freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from indignity) together holistically, as preference still lies on silos approaches in institutions (international organizations, ministries, academic institutions etc.) which do not have a tradition of operational integration or deep cooperation. Interdisciplinarity is necessary to understand potential cascading or domino effects of threats and how interventions in one sphere can actually have externalities, both positive and negative, on other areas. Yet, academia remains heavily siloed through different departments and international organizations, with their specific mandates, resources, expertise, partners, beneficiaries and comparative advantage, are not adapted today to go over their turfs. The challenge is not only that of coordination, lack of experience or methodological know-how, but that of the foundation of institutions designed to follow specific mandates for their *raison d'être*. Even the UN continues to separate its mandate for development, human rights and security through its different agencies and institutions, even though limited bridging notions such as security/development nexus occasionally appear as subfields. The perfect example was Kofi Annan's much awaited 2005 Report on UN reforms called "In Larger Freedoms" which appeared with three different unrelated chapters, without naming Human Security, nor making the connections between fear, want and indignity.

Another challenge has been to convince proponents of the Human Rights approach who consider that the HS agenda is a duplication at best, or, invariably, an instrumentalization and high jacking of the rights agenda in the name of threats. The Human Security approach does not put the onus on state responsibility, but also on others including individuals to protect themselves and their communities. This is a considerable departure for rights advocates: While the General Assembly adopted a Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universality Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1998 (United Nations General Assembly, 1998), the resolution clearly states in its article 1 that while everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels, article 2 states that "Each State has a prime responsibility and duty to protect, promote and implement all

human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Governments have a particular responsibility to ensure that people are able to enjoy their rights. From the human security approach, governments are sometimes unable or unwilling to protect people, thus relegating their responsibility below to people and communities and above to regional and international entities.

A NOBLE IDEA DISTORTED IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS

History has often warned us against concepts born in — or at least making a public outing in — international organizations, where ideas have a tendency to be conceived after a tryst with global politics, their birth celebrated with pomp and glory, but where they eventually burn out, first injured under the weight of power politics and then buried under the bureaucracies of institutions. Human Security has had the longevity to survive in international institutions for the past twenty-five or more years.

On the positive side, by establishing the Human Security Unit within the UN, there have been numerous attempts to explain the concept, train advocates in the governments, NGOs and the UN. Online courses have been developed in main UN languages and training manuals prepared to help guide programming. The allocation of money by Japan and other donors to a Trust Fund specifically for the implementation of joint programmes in Human Security have also helped spread understanding of the concept. Finally, the General Assembly Resolution adopted in September 2012 provided further recognition, even though it merely suggested Member States to engage with the concept — which it called explicitly as an approach — through policies that were people-centred, comprehensive, preventive and context specific.

However, there has been little use of the resolution, even within the UN. In preparation of the 2022 updated Human Security Report, the UNDP only made passing reference to the Resolution, but did not make much use of it as it launched a parallel discussion to bring back Human Security to the realm of global trends and debates on human development. The custodian of the broad approach of HS remains a small unit within the UN, marginalized from other policy spaces, which is in charge of running and dispensing the Trust Fund for Human Security which consists of multiple projects. While the Unit tries to do some advocacy, the management of

the Trust Fund projects and ensuring a holistic implementation by multiple UN agencies each bent on doing their business as usual takes up the lion's share of the work. They are also bogged down with ensuring that Human Security is in constant dialogue with a myriad of other fashionable concepts withing the UN. For example, one of the questions asked for Reporting by those implementing Trust Fund projects consists of: "How is the programme supporting implementation of major global agendas and priorities including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, the Global Compact of Refugees, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, sustaining peace and the humanitarian-development-peace nexus, Leave no one behind, among others?"

It is safe to say that interest in Human Security has survived and is growing with ebbs and flows in international organizations and institutions. Our concern, however, is how the concept has evolved and in which direction. On that score, we propose four ways in which Human Security has not necessarily been faithful to its original intent of proposing an ethical, comprehensive and universal vision of security.

First, Human Security has periodically been rejected in the so-called South, and as such, has not contributed to bridging between blocks of like-minded countries for global cooperation. For Mahbub Ul Haq, Human Security was a call for "a new partnership between North and South," one which "will demand a new ethic of mutual responsibility and mutual respect" (Ul Haq, 1995). Yet, September 11, a Western consensus on the problem of so-called failed states, the norm of Responsibility to Protect, conditional aid, and tying of development assistance to security concerns of the North that followed the decade after Ul Haq's demise took this dream further away from realization. The problem began at the outset when the 1994 HDR was initially met with scepticism from the G77 for fear it would lead to violations of state sovereignty and interventions. To many countries of the G77 and Non-Aligned Movement, as well as China, instead of being implemented as a tool for a new global social contract to protect individuals, Human Security seems to have mainly served as an attempt by the West to impose its liberal values and political institutions, as an excuse for intervention in states' domestic affairs and for conditionality on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). What this rejection showed back in 1994 and continues to show, is the rift in perceptions of global problems and especially global

solutions between the North and the South, the East and the West, geographical communities that were often said to have been the product of colonization and Cold War period. These notional geographies however have not disappeared, and have increasingly clashed in global fora, including at the UN, where non-Western countries (for lumping those expressing dissent into the geography of the South, or an economic cluster of underdevelopment, would not do justice to the voices heard from China) are increasingly questioning and rejecting the entrepreneurs of discourses such as Human Security for excessive moralism, for double standards, selectivity and bias. To these voices, it is not only Western countries but also international organizations that adhere to the Liberal Peace consensus, which are guilty of double standards, ignoring the problem of the relation of force in international relations, the structural causes of conflicts, the laissez-faire and status quo practices of markets and global governance arrangements, the continuation of arms trade, trade barriers that weaken states etc.

A second related obstacle has been the lack of consensus on whether Human Security is universal or particular to most at-risk societies. Those advocating for the broad approach (of the three freedoms together) argue for universal applicability of the subject in regards to people's daily concerns — no matter where they live geographically. Relational, objective and subjective perceptions of insecurity persist as much, if differently, among inhabitants of Parisian suburbs as they do in Darfur. Urban violence, job insecurities, health epidemics, privatization of social delivery, militarization of societies, etc. that plague industrialized societies of the North are as much human insecurities as famine, wars, poverty, and genocides that characterize extreme situations of some countries of the developing or post-colonial world. The 1994 HDR mentioned that "Human security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and in poor. The threats to their security may differ — hunger and disease in poor nations and drugs and crime in rich nations — but these threats are real and growing" (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). That is why the broader approaches may not agree with some academic attempts to propose a threshold of degree of severity of threats to human life (Owens, 2003; Owen, 2004), which would then fail to recognize the insecurity felt by people in western welfare societies. Contextual analysis instead of quantitative absolute measurements better reflects the full meaning attributed to a life worth living. The narrow approach, when insisting on a threshold approach that separates between

urgent threats, such as those to survival which require immediate action, may forego long-term strategy for short-term action depending on the currency and will available for politicians to act.

A third and related misuse of the concept has been the association of its narrow approach with the Responsibility to Protect (RTP) doctrine which reinforced the North/South divide in international relations. No matter how much the RTP original Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) sought to put breaks on trigger-happy interventions, it came to be seen as a green light for interventions — mostly of the military type — on behalf of people at risk of certain extreme forms of state-induced violence. From a broad understanding of the Human Security approach, the RTP doctrine only deals with one of the three freedoms (fear) and ignores the others that are equally important. Among the seven categories of insecurities identified in the 1994 HDR, only personal, political and community insecurities are considered as threats grave enough to the core of all human lives to justify interventions, while other threats such as poverty, famine, diseases and man-made environmental disasters do not seem to warrant immediate protective action through intervention by the international community. Lack of political will for action does not abrogate the moral responsibility, because these threats are equally devastating in everyday lives of people. The broad approach would argue for long term engagement by the international community to share responsibility for prevention rather than dealing with crises that are already underway. Human security engagement, instead of RTP, would mean for example putting development at the core of trade policies of developing countries, upholding industrialized countries' commitments to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by eliminating their own nuclear arsenals, setting a new code of conduct for arms sales to poorer nations, facilitating trade, etc.

A fourth misuse of the concept has been its capture as a foreign policy tool, for others. In the original writings on the subject, UJ Haq defined Human Security as a universal public policy, concerned with global justice and equity (UJ Haq, 1995), and not a foreign policy tool in international relations. Yet, Canada, Japan, briefly Norway and now Switzerland have, at different points, based their foreign policies on the Human Security principle, on the premise that the security of people in other states/regions would trickle out from security at home. No country has adopted it for its national policy

agenda. Relegation to the domain of foreign or aid policy implies, falsely, that industrialized societies are immune to insecurities. The reality of urban violence, rising food prices, pockets of poverty, social exclusion, the crisis of multiculturalism, and even the loneliness and depression of the elderly could — and in fact should — be addressed through a broadened security agenda at the national level. Keeping Human Security in the realm of foreign policy based on enlightened self-interest can be seen as a condescending ‘mission civilisatrice’ whereas some northern countries have the moral responsibility to engage in a war on values while neglecting to take the responsibility for causing many of the insecurities that lay in the periphery. Far from Ul Haq’s universal, reflexive and cooperative understanding of global justice, Human Security has metamorphosis as a “good” that some better off countries or regions would “provide” for “others” through external relations or aid policies, interventions, financial assistance, or protection. Embracing the universality of the concept would have meant domestic human security strategies and policies, even in Western societies threatened as they are by urban violence, job insecurities, health epidemics, privatization of social delivery, militarization of societies, etc.

THE UNDP REVISION: DID IT ADD TO THE APPEAL AND ADDRESS CONCERNS?

UNDP’s 2022 update of its seminal work through a revised Human Security Report was highly anticipated among defenders of the approach. After all, it was the 1994 HDR that had launched the concept in international politics. Would the revision address some of the concerns raised above? We shall turn to what it tried to do before examining whether the new Report helped advance the field.

First, the UNDP Report drew attention to the scale of human suffering in the Anthropocene context, in other words, threats caused by human actions: conflicts, climate change, displacement, hunger and pandemic among others. It recognized today’s threats to human security as systemic, interlinked, and ultimately man-made. In a highly interconnected world, these threats are not said to be not new, but given interactions with one another, they can reach the largest number of people. This main assertion, while up-to-date, given concerns about human action causing climate change and the spread of pandemic, is nonetheless rather discerning: the

cause of insecurities in people's lives are people's actions. From 'security for people' and 'by people', the revision draws attention to 'security from people'. In effect, it securitized people, relegating them to the category of threats. If human behaviour is said to be threatening, then others need to provide checks and balances.

Thankfully, though, the Report does not stop there. The main message is not that people are threats by themselves, which would undo decades of attempts to put people as referent objects and subjects of security and not as mere causes of insecurity. Instead, by recalling the harm that their action can induce, the Report puts the focus on people and their own responsibility and not just that of the state. In essence it gives even more agency to people than what has been given before: not only should they be made free of fear, want and indignity, they should themselves be agents of change, and especially, refrain from doing harm to others. This responsabilization gives new meaning to the notion of "security by people".

The Report adroitly avoids calling on international organizations to provide checks against harmful human action. It instead puts emphasis on others, through solidarity, understood as a commitment to work together to navigate common challenges, and on the individuals themselves to become agents of the change they bring about. The Report puts the onus on agency understood as responsibility towards oneself and others, brought about through dialogue, engagement etc. As such, while people could be the instigators of new threats, they also become the solutions themselves, but they do so once their sense of agency is heightened, and when this agency is reaffirmed towards solidarity with others.

As such, the principles of protection and empowerment introduced by the Report of the Commission on Human Security (Commission on Human Security, 2003) continue to apply, but added to them are agency and solidarity. The UNDP Report claims that it is agency that can mitigate the trade-offs or conflict that could potentially exist between the principles of protection and empowerment, because it implies that these are provided in a context of participation, deliberation and dialogue. Agency becomes the heart of the Human Security approach, both as the object and subject of security (for people and by people). The Anthropocene context increases the importance of human agency: if people are the drivers of dangerous planetary changes, they have to be the agents that bring about what it takes to implement protection and empowerment strategies (Tapia, 2002).

Does the UNDP Report address the concerns raised above?

Regarding the question of definitions, the Report takes as its basis the broad approach with the three freedoms. This, because by now the General Assembly Resolution has closed the debate on the menu approach to selective definitions. The UNDP Report takes the three freedoms as its basis but does not engage with them. It does not for example dwell on looking at how the added emphasis on agency and solidarity increase or change freedoms from fear, want and indignity. Or how the Anthropocene creates specific threats to fears, wants and indignities. Similarly, it makes passing reference to the seven components that were recognized in the 1994 Report (personal, economic, food, health, environmental, political, and community), but it does not, as expected, update the list with neglected insecurities such as energy and information security which have come to take up great importance in people's lives in the past two decades.

The UNDP Report locates Human Security within global development debates, as part of its own tradition of HDRs. As such, it does not necessarily address dilemmas in security studies or in the field of international security when the referent object changes from states to people. While it recognizes that the threats are interlinked and require going beyond a siloed security approach, it does not engage with academic debates of multidisciplinary.

This being a Report of the UN(DP), which is in essence an advocacy Report and not an academic book, it does not see the need to engage in the normativity versus positivist debate of Human Security as approach or theory. It discusses Human Security as a problem to solve through engaging people: As such, it keeps unapologetically to the normative agenda.

By recalling that man-made disasters and risks are spread equally around the world and that Anthropocene is global, with differentiated (and often interconnected) local effects, the Report puts an end to the futile discussions on whether it is a concept adapted more for developing countries. Everyone, and every nation, has a responsibility towards ensuring human security. As such, the Report is a welcomed addition to bridging — and putting a stop to — the north/south divide. Human Security is no longer a 'good' which some better-off countries would provide for 'others' through external relations, aid policies, interventions or sanctions. It is a common good that should be protected by the responsible and solidarity action of all.

While governments and multilateral organizations retain their fundamental roles, the Report claims that the next generation of Human Security builds on the role of a wider set of agents acting in new ways. The responsibilities of people and communities avoids the trap of taking position on whether Human Security should be provided through interventions (like RTP) or as foreign policy tool. In essence the 2022 UNDP Report reinstates Human Security as an *agency tool* by going above the notion of people as objects of interventions. The implications for interventions such as providing development assistance or peacebuilding lies in providing people with the opportunity to develop their own means of coping with human insecurity (Sen, 2000). Change is brought about not because it was imposed from outside, or is required to adhere to cosmopolitan values of liberalism, but because communities perceive the benefits of change and assess the trade-offs in terms of local meanings at the everyday level. Community and individual-based departure is supposed to make it more difficult to simply impose western ideals, values, or models. In practice, it means not just doing development or peacebuilding for others (like the RTP would normatively argue), or even engaging local populations in a set of formulaic interventions, but rather allowing for conditions so that responsibility is brought below to actors that are subject/objects of interventions.

FULL SPEED AHEAD

Although expectations from the revision of UNDP were not fully met and the Report did not engage sufficiently with the evolution, debates and practices of Human Security in the past twenty years, the concept has found a new impetus with the global spotlight on it, which is a good thing. After all, despite the frequent characterization of the Human Security approach as too broad or ambitious to operationalize, its core objective is quite humble: to ensure that the situation does not become worse and that our lives are worth living. In the final analysis, Human Security is about not doing harm to oneself and to others.

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HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN SECURITY FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE: AN ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THE UNDP TRILOGY OF REPORTS 2020-2022²

Des Gasper³

Abstract: Three recent reports from the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report Office constitute a reconsideration of human development thinking and a revival of UN human security thinking: 1) the 2020 Human Development Report ("The Next Frontier — Human Development and the Anthropocene", 2) the 2022 Special Report "New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene", and 3) the 2021/22 Human Development Report ("Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives"). All are oriented to challenges summed up by the notion of 'the Anthropocene'. The trilogy forms an overdue, but welcome return to human security concerns and (sometimes) formulations. This paper analyses and assesses the set. It views them in terms of required transitions within the era of the Anthropocene, during which threats and consequent crises will grow. The 2020 HDR provides new thinking, relevant to rescuing a sense of common human fate, as underlies the notion of the Anthropocene. In parts though, it retains limitations in regard to i) mechanistic understandings of social and policy processes; ii) one-sided emphasis on agency and freedoms and iii) lack of a notion of enough, related to iv) a limited understanding of needs theory and leading to v) an unbalanced rendition of drivers of change. These limitations can be responded to, in part, by human security ideas at various levels. Transitions require changes in vision and values as well as in methodologies and tools for analysis and planning. Human security ideas can contribute at each of these levels, to understand and cope better with the normality of crises in a world in transition. The 2022 Special Report has added two major features: a diagnostic stress on growing subjective insecurities and a prescriptive stress on solidarity. Solidarity — recognition of shared fate, mutual concern, and mutual obligations — is added to the established UN headline strategies for advancing human security goals (protection and empowerment). It is presented as a required commitment to others, globally;

² The full-length version of this paper is due to appear in the *International Journal of Social Quality*, 12(2), 2022. Sections 2 and 3 draw on work I did for two earlier papers written with Oscar A. Gómez (Gasper & Gómez 2022; Gómez & Gasper 2022). I thank Oscar for many valuable discussions and much fruitful cooperation.

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as implication of interconnectedness; and as a required response to uncertainty. While the SR provides a welcome opening of doors, it does not theorize solidarity far, nor connect much to relevant literatures, nor explore implications in detail. It is not yet related to past generations of solidarity, thinking and practice nor to present-day streams. The 2021/22 HDR, published in September 2022, explores the second major new emphasis: escalating felt insecurities, and their drivers and some possible responses. It closely partners the other two reports. Having analysed those previous reports in earlier papers, we aim here to consider the three as a set, and their possible contributions and limitations.

Key words: *Anthropocene, UN, solidarity, felt insecurities*

INTRODUCTION — A RETURN TO HUMAN (IN)SECURITY ANALYSIS

Three recent reports from the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report Office (HDRO) together constitute a reconsideration of human development thinking and a revival of UN human security thinking: 1) the 2020 Human Development Report ("The Next Frontier — Human Development and the Anthropocene"; HDR 2020), 2) the February 2022 Special Report "New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene" (SR 2022), and 3) the 2021/22 Human Development Report ("Uncertain Times, Unsettled Lives: Shaping Our Future in a Transforming World"; HDR 2022), published in September 2022. All are oriented to challenges summed up by the notion of 'the Anthropocene', and also to the parallel challenges of transformative new technologies and growing polarization and felt insecurity. This paper analyses the trilogy. Together they form an overdue return to human security concerns and formulations, long after the pioneer HDR of 1994.

First, HDR 2020 recognises a need to reorient human development thinking, for a finite and fragile globe. The Report contains various limitations that can in part be responded to by human security ideas at various levels. Second, SR 2022 adds two major features: a diagnostic stress on growing subjective insecurities and a prescriptive stress on solidarity. Third, HDR 2022 then attempts to integrate and extend these analyses. It fills some of the gaps in its 2020 predecessor, by drawing in human security ideas that the SR, a far shorter report, only began to articulate; it essays a fuller diagnosis of drivers of "unsettling" and the escalating felt insecurities in the contemporary world and a fuller proposal of ways to respond.

THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2020 — “THE NEXT FRONTIER — HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE ANTHROPOCENE”

Character of HDR 2020 — a vision of the Anthropocene without yet a vision of felt insecurities and of sufficiency.

HDR 2020 is a massive report of over 400 pages. For an overview impression one can look at its use, or non-use, of a series of relevant concepts⁴. The report emphasizes the “human development journey” (45x), “equity” (121x) and “justice” (97x), not the more concrete notions “human rights” (17x, and 15x in literature references) and “international law” (5x); “reason” (55x) and “democracy” (59x including variants), not “emotion” (5x including variants) or “feelings” (3x) or “populism/populist” (2x); “stewardship” (91x) rather than “sufficiency” (4x); and “vulnerability” (86x) not “insecurity” (7x) or “felt insecurity”. A major omission or exclusion is “human security”, used only once (and 4x in references), despite the term’s official acceptance in the United Nations. The report, like its 2014 predecessor, chose to speak instead in terms of “resilience” (111x, including for “resilient”) and “vulnerability”. But those terms are not full substitutes for “human security”. More broadly, human security thinking includes and connects many concepts and insights whose employment could have strengthened HDR 2020 (Gasper 2020, 2021).

The 2020 report begins to reconceive “the human development journey” as unlikely to be along a smoothly steadily rising graph. Thus, accompanying its fondness for “journey” language, it uses the sister metaphor of “navigating” the journey. Nevertheless, it remains limited in regard to threat- and crisis-identification, analysis and response.

A tendency to mechanistic understandings of social and policy processes? HDR 2020 relies on physical metaphors like “the human development journey” in its descriptions of societal situations and processes. Its policy language relies on mechanical metaphors, including “levers and mechanisms” (p. 10) and the high-control notion of “harnessing”. The Report’s Part Two on policy is structured in terms of “Three *mechanisms* for change”

⁴ The use of wordcounts in this paper is to indicate very large contrasts in frequencies. The conclusions drawn from major contrasts are far less sensitive to the standard complications in wordcount analysis, such as presence of multiple versions of a word (which we have tried to note), presence of synonyms, recurrent presence of a word in a header or footer, and so on.

(emphasis added): changes of norms; incentives; and nature-based and community-based solutions. This mechanical language may bring too much expectation of predictability and controllability.

Unbalanced emphasis on agency and freedoms? Development, including human development, seem conceived in the HDR as control by humans. The idea of “agency” is very prominent, without a balancing emphasis on self-limitation; for example: “the role of human agency—the ability of individuals and communities to *take the driver’s seat* in addressing challenges and seizing opportunities — that is central to the concept of human development” (p.27; italics added). If control and agency are the emphasized features of being human, not also vulnerability, fallibility, emotionality, group-delusion, etc., then attention to crises and precaution may be left in the “backseat”. A vision of expanding freedoms should be complemented by ideas about sufficiency. We must ask what are rationally permissible freedoms (Crabtree, 2012) and what is enough.

Any notion of enough? HDR 2020’s devotion to “expand human freedoms” (p. 6) has few qualifications. It does not set any limits nor ask whether the rich, let alone the super-rich, have enough (or too much) and should stop further acquisition. Lack of a notion of “enough” matches a heroic conception of freedom and “public reasoning”, which can bring a readiness to encounter crises, seeing them as challenges to be overcome. It reflects, also, a weak appreciation of human needs.

Reductionist understanding of human needs. Human security analysis has grown out of needs theory. Not coincidentally, Mahbub ul Haq, founder of human development and human security analyses in the UN system, was a basic human needs advocate (Gasper, 2011). But in HDR 2020, needs analysis is presented simply as viewing humans as patients not agents (p. 38). Needs theory is reduced to “minimum needs” (p. 40) and “basic needs” (p. 41). Much in human security analysis does better here (see, e.g., Green, 2008; James, 2014; Leaning & Arie, 2000; Leaning, 2014), in exploring both material needs and fundamental psycho-social needs of identity, recognition, participation, autonomy and attachment.

Mechanisms and drivers of change. The Report does not discuss political struggles; the sustainability transition seems to be seen as a design task. Yet it does not focus on legal designs, for it considers that legal restrictions only work when the public is ready. Part II on “Acting for Change” focuses on values as norms, habits, and routines, not as embodied in laws and

constitutions. It believes in local discussion and local agreements; and it contains extended praise of Maori, Quechua and other indigenous philosophies and practice-systems. Yet those systems rely on existence of a well-knit community and seem less widely usable than a perspective like human security, which is already instituted in UN thinking and practice (Jolly et al., 2009; United Nations Development Programme, 2022a).

Most of HDR 2020's components and themes recur in the HDR of 2022 but in more mature form and enriched by components from the intervening report on human security.

THE 2022 SPECIAL REPORT "NEW THREATS TO HUMAN SECURITY IN THE ANTHROPOCENE — DEMANDING GREATER SOLIDARITY" (SR 2022)

The 2022 Special Report is described as "part of the work leading to the 2021/2022 Human Development Report" (United Nations Development Programme, 2022a, p: xi). Its vocabulary shows both continuities and differences with that of HDR 2020. (In making comparisons one should remember that SR 2022 is about 45% of the length of HDR 2020.) Continuities include high frequencies for "reason" (32x), "crisis/crises" (77x), and "resilient/resilience" (45x); little or no use (besides in a few literature titles) of "populism" (0x), "nationalism" (0x), "capitalism" (0x), human "need(s)" (3x), or "overconsumption" (0x); and still considerable but now much less use of "innovation" (32x). Differences from HDR 2020 include far less use of "democracy" (13x, including variants), "vulnerability" (28x, all forms), "stewardship" (4x), "mechanism" (19x), and "navigate" (6x); and much increased use of "emotion" (15x, all forms), "human rights" (111x), and, especially, "trust" (153x, all forms), "solidarity" (134x), and, above all, "human security" (721x) and "insecurity" (160x).

The main thrusts of the Special Report are stated in the Overview. First, it highlights the prevalence and growth of felt insecurity, strongly associated with low and falling trust; and diagnoses that a "new generation of interacting threats [is] playing out in the Anthropocene context" and that "our development patterns drive human insecurity" (p. 6). Second, it proposes addition of solidarity (cross-national but also intra-national), a principle highlighted in the UN Secretary-General's 2021 *Our Common Agenda*, to join the headline human security "strategies" of "protection" and "empowerment".

Those were proposed by the Ogata-Sen Commission on Human Security (Commission on Human Security, 2003) and then adopted in the UN discourse. Third, it offers a policy vision in which each of protection, empowerment and solidarity promotes agency and in turn is enabled by agency.

Part 1 of the report enlarges on these propositions. First, on widespread and growing insecurity, it discusses both objective and subjective insecurity. Regarding objective insecurity it underlines HDR 2020's reminder that no high HDI (Human Development Index) country yet has achieved a long-term sustainable system; high HDI does not guarantee human security. The emergence of COVID-19 illustrated how, in fact, "the patterns of development that we have been pursuing inflict many of the drivers of insecurity we are confronting" (p. 14). Regarding subjective insecurity, it stresses the very high and growing felt insecurity even before the pandemic, despite major "improvements in people's wellbeing" (p. 13); and corroborates this by results of a new Index of Perceived Human Security. By "well-being" it seems to mean those elements which are covered (or are attempted to be covered by) conventional well-being measures. Those can exclude numerous aspects that people consider important (Gasper 2005, 2007), like exposure to risk and stress, relations with nature and family and friends, being treated with respect, and much more. It yet insists on calling such narrow measures "well-being"; which leads it to attribute the discrepancies compared to subjective measures to "the neglect of agency" (p. 14).

This first major claim, of growing insecurity, supports the revival of human security analysis. Such analysis reflects the UN's "foundational ideas", from the 1940s or earlier, of the interconnection of human rights, peace/conflict, and development — the "human security frame" (p. 25). From the 1990s, this frame received the "human security" label. The Report adopts a particular specification of what is the "established [frame] for the human security concept" (p.27), namely the 2003 Ogata-Sen report *Human Security Now*. This has been the main frame for subsequent work led by the UN-apex, in the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, the associated Human Security Unit (HSU), the work of the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Human Security, and the resulting 2012 General Assembly resolution 66/290.

The Special Report then calls for major extensions of this "human security frame": more stress on agency, even beyond what Sen had implanted in the Ogata-Sen report, and a commitment to solidarity (intra-national and

international). We should beware of treating all agency as good. Agency is compatible with any goal, such as destroying one's rivals. It needs to be partnered with solidarity. The Report calls, as well, (p. 31 ff.) for involvement of agents besides governments and multilateral organizations; for a whole world focus, not only on lower-income countries; for attention beyond "mainly physical" threats (p. 31); and for integral analysis, not siloed discussion of each type of threat. All these features, plus attention to subjective insecurity and solidarity, have in fact been present in much human security work for decades (see e.g., HDR 1994, on solidarity via "global compacts"; and work on subjective insecurity by Leaning & Arie, 2000; and in several national HDRs); but they have not always been prominent in work led from the UN-apex by the Trust Fund and the HSU.

Part Two of the report, *Tackling A New Generation of Threats to Human Security*, proceeds through a series of topics: digital technology, violent conflict, social inequality, and health. Ch. 4, on currently rising violent conflict, reports an emerging "development-with-insecurity trend, where violent conflicts increase in parallel with progress in human development" (p. 79), related to interactions of multiple factors. The chapter presents the focus on felt insecurity and its impacts, as the distinctive value-added hereof human security analysis. For example, "conflict is not only a threat to physical safety, but may also raise barriers to trust, solidarity, agency and empowerment, key principles needed to face the new generation of human security threats" (p. 90). The chapter adds insights from complexity theory for strengthening the resilience and sustainability of social-ecological systems. Notably, the fundamental "uncertainty, unpredictability and irreproducibility" (p.81) in social processes due to hyper-complexity means that no standardized model works and in-situ learning and adaptation are required. All these ideas are returned to and used in HDR 2022.

Ch. 5 on inequalities seeks to discuss, also, all issues of identity: the plurality of identities and within identities. It seeks to cover "the different concerns of varied social groups" (p. 94), via a long inventory of risks, separately group by group. The discussion of responses involves a series of appeals for more agency. Agency will supposedly "be the basis for solidarity ... [and help] incorporate intersectionality in human security" (p. 107). These and similar claims are underdeveloped and may rest on an under-differentiated treatment of agency, presumed to be always good. More convincingly, the numerous international human rights conventions are stressed as policy tools.

Ch. 6 on health highlights the now widely recognized challenge of “more frequent new and re-emerging zoonotic diseases (linked to the Anthropocene context)” (p. 119), such as COVID-19. Infectious diseases demonstrate the case for “healthcare systems [as] among the most promising spaces for advancing the new generation of human security strategies, combining protection, empowerment and solidarity” (p. 119), notably through universalism in healthcare. Universalism is based on a logic of shared interests, in addition to acceptance of societal responsibility for those in need. The chapter spotlights also a less recognized danger (p. 124): “The mental health crisis is a human security emergency. ... Roughly 10 per cent of the global population suffers from mental disorders”. HDR 2022 treats this further.

The Conclusion, ‘Greater Solidarity: Towards human development with human security’, repeats that the Report uses a classic UN perspective, of the interdependence of peace, human rights, and development, and of the principle of common security. In contrast, the SDGs are in practice too siloed (cf. Gasper et al., 2020). Encouragingly, the HDR of 2022, published seven months after the SR, seems to adopt a variety of its strengths, and partly to counteract some of the limitations.

A VALUABLE PARTIAL SYNTHESIS: THE 2021/22 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT — “UNCERTAIN TIMES, UNSETTLED LIVES: SHAPING OUR FUTURE IN A TRANSFORMING WORLD”

The 2021/22 HDR appeared in September 2022, so we refer to it as HDR 2022. Its scope is captured by the three parts of its title. First, “Uncertain Times” indicates the confluence, interactions, and knock-on effects of “sweeping societal transformations” (p. iii), “large and often growing inequalities and power imbalances” (p. 34), intensifying polarization, and dangerous planetary change. The combination was illustrated in the COVID-19 pandemic. Ch. 1, “A New Uncertainty Complex”, explores the confluence, but is familiar material to readers of the previous two reports.

Second, “Unsettled Lives” conveys how felt insecurity is rising “nearly everywhere” (p. 9), including in higher-ranking HDI countries. “The numbers of people reporting negative affect — stress, sadness, anger or worry and experiencing physical pain — have been on the rise for the past decade ... [The] trend of increased stress is discernible across the world

and across socioeconomic groups..." (p. 32). Some trends are older: "expressions of anxiety and worry in many parts of the world" have grown greatly since around 1980 in published English-, Spanish- and German-language materials (p. 9). Lately, inaccuracies and lies spread faster than serious analyses, thanks to hi-tech media; and "Losing perceived control" (p. 11) foments distrust, scapegoating, and angry nationalism. Mental illness exists on a huge scale, partly linked to major economic dislocations which now happen faster than in the past.

Third, for "Shaping Our Future in a Transforming World" the report offers, in effect, a human security agenda for "Making people more secure through investment, insurance and innovation" (p. 18), enriched now by "four motivating principles: flexibility, solidarity, creativity and inclusion" (p. 17). Similarly, its "three fronts" of action to mitigate mental distress, having a strong human security flavour: "preventing distress, mitigating crises and building psychological resilience" (p. 74).

The second of these three parts, "Unsettled Lives", represents a major advance for UNDP and for development economics, moving towards a more realistic picture of people. While SR 2022 discussed perceptions of insecurity, HDR 2022 now goes deeper in its chapter "Unsettled minds in uncertain times: Mental distress — an obstacle to human development". It covers mental stresses and distress related to the Anthropocene but also examines more generally the importance and impacts of mental distress, as part of a belated update of UNDP human development thinking to cover feelings. For example, "PTSD is common among the general population [not only combatants], caused by child abuse, domestic violence, life-threatening accidents, political violence, human rights violations and disasters associated with natural hazards" (p. 96). Mental distress can undermine functioning for both children and adults, to a large extent, directly and in the long-term. Economic insecurity can via mental distress, thus reinforce economic inequality, including in later generations.

Ch. 3 reiterates HDR 2020's calls "to expand people's agency and freedoms to help us navigate and flourish in uncertain times" (p. 100); but it at the same time extends the more realistic picture of persons, at length, "going beyond models of [supposedly] rational self-interest to include emotions, cognitive biases and the critical roles of culture" (p. 100). It notes: the priority of group loyalty over reason and evidence in determining most

people's behaviour, for example in regard to climate change or Covid-19; the frequency of "motivated reasoning" (such as picking materials that suit one's claims and ignoring contrary materials), even greater amongst political leaders than amongst the general public; and the rising ratio of emotion-language compared to reason-language since the 1980s, revealed by analysis of large corpuses in several languages.

HDR 2022 remains fundamentally optimistic, "doubling down" on the human development approach's commitments to reasoned scrutiny, public reasoning, and deliberative democracy. It hopes wistfully that: "A plurality of sources of voice and power is not a weakness in today's uncertain times but can be a source of strength" (p. 112) by giving a useful diversity of intellectual resources and motives for questioning and checking.

Ch. 4 confronts the reality of growing polarization in the face of interacting major uncertainties and unsettling. Its review of evidence indicates, first, that greater human insecurity links to lower trust. "Globally, fewer than 30 per cent of people think that 'most people can be trusted,' the lowest recorded value" (p. 140). Second, feelings of uncertainty intensify people's identification with their own social groups, while people tend to form negatively biased views about groups other than their own and about these groups' members. Third, in terms of politics: "people experiencing greater human insecurity [as measured by their Perceived Human Security Index] tend to have preferences for extreme views about the government's role in the economy (full government responsibility at one extreme and full individual responsibility at the other...)" (p. 141), and to prefer leaders who display personal dominance rather than those whose claim to support is on grounds of presumed achievements. The Report notes a long-term trend of "growing global disaffection with democratic practices" (p. 150). Fourth, polarization of views brings hostility, distrust, increased division, and reduced communication between groups. It is fed by new technologies that instantly spread unchecked and bad quality "information" and that apply algorithms to provide users with material to reinforce their existing views. HDR 2022 argues we must address root causes of polarization: unsettledness and insecurity. Notably, supporting people's economic security "is a foundation of the social contract between government and citizens" (p. 63); thus Chapters 4 and 6 propose strengthening social protection systems. They make suggestions for reform of the market-driven, polarization-inducing social media world as well.

Chapter 5, “Advancing HD in uncertain times” applies the principle that, besides sobering projections, we need hopeful narratives. Like HDR 2020, the chapter is determinedly upbeat, inspired by experiences in the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, “Many social protection schemes saw unprecedented expansions in scope” (p. 171), which has increased both experience with many social protection measures and their public acceptance. For the longer term: “Rapidly evolving technologies, such as artificial intelligence and synthetic biology, and frontier ones, such as nuclear fusion, could usher in a new era of prosperity for people and planet.” (p. 158).

Chapter 6, “Charting paths to transformation: Navigating uncertainty to expand human development”, continues in the style of HDR 2020, using upbeat metaphors throughout (“journey”, “navigate”, “compass”, etc.). Even so, it contains also a more complex and sober vision than in HDR 2020. The chapter warns of “a mismatch between ... prevalent beliefs and values and what might be needed to navigate through the uncertainty complex” (p. 178). Navigation requires “First ... broadening our perspective on the determinants of people’s choices. And second ... reflecting on more recent perspectives about what culture is, how it changes across contexts and over time and how it is used by people in strategic ways ...” (p. 178).

The chapter presents then a policy agenda, profiled in terms of three I’s. Much of it can be called a human security agenda. First, *Investments* that provide protection (e.g., the \$15 bn p.a. that is needed to prevent future pandemics; p. 180). Second, a long list of diverse institutional and technical *Innovations*, including in governance processes. Third, an *Insurance* pillar, for which “A key goal is to enhance human security” (p. 182), and which includes not only standard social protection schemes but macroprudential policies such as regulation of banks and rules on deferred debt repayment in crises, access to basic services, protection of human rights, and opportunities for broad participation and public deliberation. Two other features of the policy agenda, human rights and solidarity, are placed more marginally but deserve equal billing. As Box 6.3 notes, human rights are foundational; they provide a strongly universal person-centred framework and can be viewed as subsuming core human security concerns (freedoms from want, fear and indignity). And, continuing from the Special Report, Spotlight 6.1 extends the understanding of and case for solidarity (p. 192): “Solidarity should be understood as recognizing our interconnectedness. ‘Solidarity involves commitment, and work, as well as the recognition that

even if we do not have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live in common ground' (Ahmed, 2013, p. 189)."

COMPARISON AND ASSESSMENT OF THE THREE REPORTS

We can see lines of deepening in this trilogy of reports, in comparison to earlier HDRs, and across the successive parts of the trilogy. HDR 2020 displayed a spirit of techno-optimism about innovation to meet the challenges of the Anthropocene, partnered by reason-guided democracy and a "stewardship" stance inspired by indigenous wisdoms. Some of this continues in HDR 2022, but now downsized and balanced by emphasis from SR 2022, concerning objective and felt insecurities and needed solidarity. "Security" and especially "human security" received vastly more attention in SR 2022 compared to in HDR 2020; and greater relative frequency of these terms is maintained to a significant extent in HDR 2022. (Detailed vocabulary analysis is provided in the full version of this paper.) The pattern is even more marked for "insecurity", "human insecurity", "unsettle" and "solidarity". Most strikingly, HDR 2022 has, in addition, "embraced" the theme of uncertainties (one of its favourite phrases). Exposure to human security questions and literature during preparation of SR 2022 has, thus, had an impact. Correspondingly, HDR 2020's emphasis on masterful management are toned-down in HDR 2022, even if not fully (e.g., "mechanisms" continue prominent); talk of "easing planetary pressures", as if one were regulating a thermostat, becomes less.

Fundamentally, we see emergence of a richer picture of people, openness to subjectivities, and growing recognition of foundational roles of security. HDR 2022 gives substantial indication of having absorbed messages and implications from the Special Report, and from human security analysis, more widely. Follow-up work can draw from human needs theory and social research on well-being and social quality (e.g., Ryan & Deci, 2017; van der Maesen & Walker, 2012; White & Blackmore, 2016). The deeper picture of persons is valuable as intellectual enrichment; but further, it allows a more realistic, more careful picture of humankind, as a species fully capable of destroying itself and its environment in the foreseeable future. The "human development journey" that has been the focus of the HDRs since 1990, and that HDR 2020 talks of repeatedly, should become understood as facing both physical limits and some possible internal contradictions.

Large and increasing shares of people feel insecure and are even mentally unwell; and “our development patterns drive [much of this] human insecurity” (United Nations Development Programme, 2022a, p. 6).

In this respect the Special Report on human insecurity has revolutionary potential. For generations, even centuries, economic growth has been placed as central in the human development journey, to channel human passions and talents away from conflict, towards less harmful outlets. One waits to see whether the Special Report’s uncomfortable message will disappear in subsequent work, as unwelcome to national governments and to the controllers and main beneficiaries of existing economic systems. Or whether the “human development journey” will become reconceived, as personal and social journeys of meaning-making, in which the capability theory phrase “reason to value” acquires more real content.

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PART II:
**THE ANTHROPOCENE
AND NEW PRACTICES OF RESEARCH
IN HUMAN SECURITY AREA**

THE STATE OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF SCENARIO FORECASTING OF GLOBAL DYSFUNCTIONALITY

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Abstract: The local armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine is dynamically transforming into a large-scale confrontation between Russia and the Collective West. More and more countries located in different geographical regions are being involved directly or indirectly into the conflict, thus making this Russia-Ukraine clash a global ordeal. Since any armed conflict is inherently dysfunctional, the associated violation of the global community regulation will increase and seize larger territories. The destabilization of the social system entails a decrease in the quality of life, and a reduction in the limits of an individual's security. The parameters of the compression of the human security zone will largely depend on the choice of the model of confrontation that the parties to the globalizing conflict will adhere to. The confrontational models of interaction between Russia and the Collective West differ from each other in the degree of radicalization of actions by the conflicted parties during the acute confrontation period and the intensity of the development of bifurcation processes after it. The authors of the article, using the scenario forecasting methodology, tried to assess the state of human security and identify the dimension of the human existence functioning in each of the predicted models of the growing global conflict.

Keywords: *Russia, the Collective West, global conflict, model of confrontational engagement, social dysfunction, human security*

INTRODUCTION

In recent decades, humanity has increasingly experienced the negative consequences of such a phenomenon as global dysfunctionality. Its specific feature is the violation of the world community integrity, including all forms of engagement and association between people — the global

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economy, global financial systems, political cooperation, social organization. The reason for such a disorder may be, on the one hand, abrupt changes in society itself, which has received an unprecedented impetus in development due to giving the integration processes a global dimension. On the other hand, the relative rigidity of systems and institutions responsible for maintaining world economic and intergovernmental relations, which do not have time or are not able to adequately and promptly respond to these changes, can have an impact. The Asian and Latin American financial crises of 1997-1998 were caused by the extremely rapid growth of regional economies and appeared as a shock for the global economy, including, among others, the inertia of international financial and credit organizations. This was displayed, for instance, in the case of the "perfect storm" in the global banking sector in 2007-2008. The pandemic of the SARS-CoV-2 virus has led to a real world-level humanitarian crisis and forced many countries to rapidly reconfigure their national health and social services. Moreover, all this happened against the backdrop of the organizational weakness of the relevant intergovernmental and supranational institutions.

These vivid examples of dysfunctionality highlighted some features of its manifestation in the current conditions. Firstly, starting as a kind of local ("Asian", "Latin American", "Chinese", etc.) history, destabilization can quickly end the whole mankind due to the global interdependence and the transparency of national borders. Secondly, the consequences of dysfunction began to acquire the character of a serious structural problem. In the middle of the last century R.K. Merton argued that "... manifesting in one or another kind of social activity or institution, some consequences of dysfunction impede other activities and institutions" (Merton, 1968). Today, in the context of global integration and disintegration of the social community, the limited dysfunction can provoke global upheavals and destruction, putting at risk the safety of people.

The symptoms of global dysfunctionality are clearly visible in some military conflicts of our time, some of which are a continuation of the clashes of previous eras, while others are generated by globalization itself.

THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN MILITARY CONFLICT AS A REFLECTION OF GLOBAL DYSFUNCTIONALITY

The Russian-Ukrainian military conflict is estimated to be the largest on the European continent since the end of World War II (Kissinger, 2022, p. 34). This argument can be supported by the quantity and quality of weapons and human resources involved in military operations, along with the area of the territory which became the combat zone. The conflict began, and to some extent continues, to be perceived in the style of the authors of the book *“Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization”* as a classic territorial dispute between two neighbouring countries (Kahler & Walter, 2006). Despite the significant scale of the clashes, the confrontation between them still remains a local event, just geographically limited to the adjacent lands of Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, we cannot but notice the internationalization of this conflict. The de facto conflict has already gone beyond the actual theatre of military operations, as evidenced by at least three circumstances: the supply of weapons to the belligerents from third countries, the migration exodus of the civilian population, rising prices and food shortages in many parts of the world (Scholz, 2022, p. 20; Biden, 2022, p. 24).

Each of these factors significantly aggravates the situation inside and around the area of conflict, and when combined together in certain conditions, they can create a highly traumatic and detrimental effect on the global scale. The global scaling of the dysfunction that the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict carries, is also caused by a tremendous change in the content of this conflict interaction. Today, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine rather resembles the classic proxy war as explained by K. Deutsch, and which Russia has undertaken on the territory of Ukraine against the collective West (Deutsch, 1964). In some assessments, the conflict is viewed from the standpoint of confrontation between Western and Eastern civilizations (Mettan, 2015). In any case, the involvement of the great nuclear powers and the military-political alliances led by them in the conflict has already made the reincarnation of the Cold War a reality and significantly exacerbated the threat of the beginning of a real global disaster, reaching the apotheosis of global dysfunctionality.

The growing internationalization of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict with the possibility of its transition to the global level, the accompanying

escalation of the dysfunctionality of the world community, fraught with the creation of a critically unacceptable environment for human existence, make us pay attention to the misevaluation of risks and uncertainty in the implementation of several probabilistic outcomes of the conflict around Ukraine.

SCENARIO FORECASTING AS A METHOD OF CONFLICT DYSFUNCTIONALITY ANALYSIS

Today, the political and academic milieu of a number of countries is actively discussing scenarios for the further course and premature end of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict. Most of these scenarios are based on the analysis of the current operational and tactical situation on the battlefields and the subsequent comprehension of its development consequences, including options for the probabilistic behaviour of the parties to the conflict, initiation of their further action plans and their sequence. Such kind of study is often fulfilled using elements of classical scenario forecasting methodology (Brown, 1968; Bell, Kahn & Bruce-Briggs, 1972). For example, the authors of the so-called "Korean" scenario, following the example of North and South Korea, consider the division of Ukraine into two hostile, but not warring states, a very real consequence of the conflict (Ignatius, 2022). Supporters of the so-called "Chechen" scenario predict the complete "absorption" of Ukraine by Russia, and its gradual pacification on the model of a post-conflict settlement in the North Caucasus (Hauer, 2022). In both cases, the "scriptwriters" also endeavour to predict the extent of the destructive consequences of the conflict for the population of Ukraine, preferring the implementation of the first forecast rather than the second one. Skipping a detailed analysis of these storylines, we will point out that they are in a certain way limited to the local framework and do not consider the spreading of the consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian out of conflict zone. If we approach this with a critical understanding of this phenomenon from the standpoint of geopolitics and the global economy and present the military conflict in Ukraine as a separate manifestation of the globalizing confrontation between Russia and the Collective West, with all the resulting dysfunctional outcomes of the global level, then the range of scenario forecasting can expand significantly.

To begin with, let's focus on two opposite and, from our point of view, bleak scenarios. The first one is "apocalyptic", based on the assumption that the confrontation between Russia and the West over Ukraine will take on an open form and transform into a world war. At the same time, the inevitable use of tactical nuclear weapons, and possibly strategic ones in the future, would mark the "end of history", the absolute and global dysfunctionality of humanity (SIPRI, 2022, p. 1). The second scenario is "pacifist", which makes the conflicting parties agree on ending the confrontation due to the understanding of the futility of further global escalation. More recently, the idea was expressed about the advantages of returning to a "concert of powers" capable of maintaining the world order within the framework of nonviolence (Haass & Kupchan, 2021). It seems obvious that in the implementation of this scenario, many components of the growing global dysfunctionality would be eliminated, as it already happened earlier during the "detente of international tension" in the 60-70s of the last century. At the same time, the degree of feasibility of both forecasts does not seem to be very high. The first one is due to the continued rationality of global leaders who understand the consequences of exchanging nuclear strikes. The second one is due to the accumulated potential of ambition and a large volume of "claims" against each other.

Much more realistic seems the case which assumes a kind of confrontational balance between Russia and the Collective West, comparable to the state of the bloc based global conflict of the Cold War era. A complete analogy with the past is excluded here, because Russia today does not have any military-political alliance like the Warsaw Pact, and it fights alone against the Western NATO bloc. At the same time, possible models of confrontational equilibrium, reminiscent of the former confrontation between the socialist and capitalist camps, may well be reproduced. In fact, there are two such models: confrontation in the form of peaceful coexistence and confrontation in the form of a hybrid war. Both models are based on a clear awareness of two points by the conflicting parties: the impossibility of returning to the state "prior to February 24, 2022" in relations with each other and the acceptance of the inevitability of the long-term confrontation. Further alternatives are also possible. The option of a confrontation in the form of peaceful coexistence involves the refusal of the parties from a military clash and the gradual development of steps for adapting to each other's existence in changed conditions. The

decisions of the Madrid Summit of the Atlantic Alliance, for example, can be considered a step in this direction. The countries of the bloc declared their disinterest in a direct clash with Russia, but noted that they would significantly increase their military potential through rearmament and pre-armament, as well as seek to increase influence in the world through spatial expansion (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2022). This scenario does not exclude the conduct of proxy wars with the official non-participation of the conflicting parties. In the civilian sphere, the model of “peaceful” confrontation may be accompanied by a permanent readjustment of the sanctions and counter-sanctions regime, but on a much more modest scale of interaction than used to be before. The model of confrontation in the form of a hybrid war means that the parties to the conflict are ready to use a wide range of non-military forces and means against each other. We can talk about purposeful mutual destructive influence in political, diplomatic, economic, trade, financial, psychological, ideological spheres aiming to inflict maximum damage to opponents and disable the entire system of social life administration (Hoffman, 2009). Planning hybrid attacks on the enemy includes supporting insurgent movements and encouraging terrorism on its territory. Under certain conditions, a hybrid war can evolve again into a larger regional war (but not a world war, since this would mean a nuclear catastrophe, which neither the West nor Russia are willing to achieve).

A superficial glance is enough to assess what a significant charge and coverage of social dysfunctionality each of the mentioned models of confrontational engagement has. Being developed at the macro level of geopolitics and the global economy, dysfunctionality is transferred to the meso-level of national life support systems of the population and affects the physiological and psychological security of individuals at the micro level. In turn, the parameters of compression of the space of human security and the sustainability of his existence in each of the models will be different.

HUMAN SECURITY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A MODERATE GLOBAL CONFRONTATION MODEL

The classical model of peaceful coexistence of two irreconcilable socio-economic and political systems, proposed by the former Soviet leader N.S. Khrushchev, assumed the rejection of war as a means of resolving

disputes and was designed for the effect of a “temporary respite” before the decisive battle of antagonists (Khrushchev, 1956). If we extrapolate this model to the situation after the end of the hot phase of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, then it seems quite acceptable to freeze the state of “time-out” in relations between the Collective West and Russia for an indefinitely long time, until the final goals of the parties to the unfolding global conflict are achieved — the approval of their own paradigms of the future world order. The rejection of a direct military clash during a confrontation is a significant factor affecting human security, but the confrontation itself remains constant in conflict engagement, which means that the possibility of ensuring “freedom from need” and “freedom from fear” becomes limited for all people.

In the context of global confrontation, the quality of life of the population falls, first of all, under the stress limits of the community strength. During the disruption of the normal functioning of economic, financial and trade mechanisms globally, stimulated by the regime of mutual sanctions and counter-sanctions, there is a significant deterioration in many objective factors of the general well-being of people. For example, as a result of the compression of production and foreign trade in Russia³ caused by Western sanctions, several negative phenomena are observed at once. The withdrawal of Western business from the Russian territory, which according to analysts’ report of the Yale School of Management in June 2022 comprised 253 companies, as well as 248 enterprises that suspended their activities, 96 companies that stopped investing and 75 businesses that reduced their presence (Yale School of Management, 2022), caused an aggravation of employment problems for 2 million of Russians for whom foreign businesses created jobs, and for 4-6 million Russian citizens connected with these businesses indirectly. As a result, by the end of 2022, Russia expects an increase in unemployment up to 7.1-7.8% (Center for Strategic Research, 2022, p. 1), with a monthly registration of 660-680 thousand new unemployed (Котяков, 2022). The introduction of new sanctions, including an embargo of 90% of Russian crude oil import,

³ According to the International Monetary Fund, the portion of the Russian economy in the world (in \$ US at the current exchange rate) can decrease from 1.8% in 2021 to 1.3% in 2027. See details: International Monetary Fund. (2022). World Economic Outlook (2022, April). Real GDP growth. Annual percent change. https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEO_WORLD. Accessed 9 July 2022.

creates a risk of government budgeting. 20% of annual Russian exports are under the threat of sanctions. More than half of Russia's foreign trade is carried out with unfriendly countries which may also become a subject of numerous restrictions (Решетников, 2022).

Under a long-term impact, the obstacles of budgetary policy will negatively affect the fulfilment of social obligations to the population by the government and reduce living standards. High inflation does not also contribute to the improvement of the social climate. The Finam Group forecasts indicate that the consumer price growth will reach 17.7% by the end of 2022 compared to 8.39% at the end of 2021 (Афанасьева, 2022). The company's analysts state the rapid rise in prices is associated with expectations of a fall in the exchange rate of the national currency and the feverish demand of the population for goods that may disappear from retail chains or together with retail chains under the applied sanctions.

Sanctions as a means of waging economic and trade wars are a double-edged weapon and signs of the so-called "cost of living crisis" are clearly visible on the other side of the global conflict. Energy failures resulted in a high level of industrial inflation in Europe. The eurozone (euro area) saw its rise, up to 37.2%, which has not happened since the oil crisis of the 1970s (Eurostat, 2022a, p. 1). After about six months, industrial inflation usually leads to an increase in consumer prices, although the current 8.6% has become a record. Moreover, the energy prices have risen mainly in the eurozone — by 41.9% in annual terms (Eurostat, 2022b, p. 1). Structural changes in the economy have a negative impact on the European labour market. Due to the sharp increase in the cost of energy, the leader of the European Union, Germany, began to experience shortages. For the first time in several decades, the sale of high-tech industrial goods appeared to be lower than imports. The drop in exports is followed by job cuts in the manufacturing industry which composes the backbone of the German economy. As British observers note, "a whole generation of qualified Germans will have nothing more to do" (Lynn, 2022). The pool of accumulating problems cannot but create tension in the sphere of the social well-being of Europeans and, after Germany, a large trade deficit awaits the entire euro area (Münchau, 2022). The steering group of the European Commission recognizes that residents of European countries should prepare for life "in conditions of severe shocks and disagreements" (Timmermans, 2022).

Thus, it is obvious that the most tangible display of the still “peaceful” confrontation between the West and Russia concerning Ukraine is the dysfunction of the global economy, which, due to the atrophy of the national economic and social systems of the leading nations, may soon take the form of a global recession⁴. In this case, the drop in production will be much more significant, and the consequences at the level of households and individuals will become more dramatic. In crisis conditions, conflicting parties are often willing to implement tough scenarios against each other in order to avoid or force a way out of the impending threat.

CONFRONTATION IN A NEW TYPE OF WAR AND HUMAN SECURITY

A hybrid or “contactless” war of the XXI century refers to a new kind of confrontational opposition on the world stage. Each of the antagonists in such a war sees their victory in the exhaustion and degradation of the enemy, in achieving an inability to further the political and economic influence in respect to the rest of the world. Exactly these goals are pursued by Russia and the West in the fight on the Ukrainian theatre of military operations. Without changing their intentions, the opponents will continue the confrontation after the end of the hot phase of the military conflict, since the resource potential of the parties involved is far from being exhausted and will not be exhausted soon. The general background of the confrontation will be fierce attacks on the systems of public and state life of the enemy, massive moral and psychological impact on its population (McCuen, 2008). Today, the main aspects of mutual hybrid aggression of the parties have clearly identified themselves, simultaneously signalling the formation of critical zones vulnerable to the physiological and psychological security of people affected by the global conflict.

⁴ For example, the perspective of a global recession in the following two years is estimated by the International Monetary Fund. The organization believes that the recession is inevitable as a result of the “over-pumping” of the world’s leading economies with monetary assets during the period of “anti-COVID therapy” in 2020-2021 and the ongoing “anti-crisis” policy in the face of increased geopolitical complications. See: International Monetary Fund. (2022, July 12). IMF Executive Board Concludes 2022 Article IV Consultation with the United States (No. 22/254) [Press release]. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/07/12/pr22254-imf-executive-board-concludes-2022-article-iv-consultation-with-the-united-states>. Accessed 13 July 2022.

The toughest and most consistent burden in the battle of resource potentials is felt in the energy and raw materials sector. This hybrid war initiated by the West, through the application of sanctions, seeks to deprive Russia's income from the export of mineral energy resources and thereby to decrease the state budget which hinging on these options between 36-54% depending of a year. Russia, in turn, is also trying to devastate the economy of Western countries, reducing daily energy supplies to Europe in comparison to 2017-2019 by four times under various technical or financial pretences. As a result, the population on both sides of the hybrid "front" appeared under threat of a decrease in the quality of life. On the European continent, people are increasingly talking about the so-called energy poverty — the inability to consume enough energy for comfortable heating of homes, cooking and providing other household needs. The environmental safety of the population has deteriorated significantly, as far as many Western European countries return to such environmentally unsafe or unfriendly types of energy as coal (not even stone, but brown coal) and nuclear. In turn, Europe's impending rejection of Russian oil and, in the future, pipeline gas will also decline the optimism of more than 60 million Russian citizens or 42% of the country's population, whose salaries are paid from the national budget (Dolgin, 2021).

The next dimension of the struggle to achieve the resource decline of the enemy is the food sector. The US and the EU use the sanctions regime to make it difficult to export goods for two more notable items of the Russian budget revenue — the sale of grain and agricultural chemical fertilizers on international market (making 7.3% and 7.85% in 2021 respectively) (Federal Customs Service of Russia, 2022). Moreover, the military actions disrupted the established transport communications in the Black Sea region, which brought to an almost complete blockade of the Ukrainian food supply route to the European countries. These reasons have affected a record rise in food prices around the world, as stated by the relevant UN organization (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2022). In addition to the expansion in the cost of grain and vegetable oils, two more negative factors affect the boost in food prices, namely, the expectation of a decrease in crop yields in many countries due to the Western embargo on the supply of Russian and Belarusian fertilizers (Bourne, 2022) and an increase in tariffs for chartering ships as another consequence of the sanctions war (United Nations Conference on Trade

and Development, 2022, p. 7). It is noteworthy that the population of countries that do not concern the war and sanctions will suffer more from the food crisis. Due to logistical difficulties, the supply of Russian and Ukrainian wheat may be discontinued to at least 36 of the 55 third world countries dependent on more than 10% of food exports from Eastern Europe. The FAO officials note that if, during the pandemic, almost 200 million people found themselves in a daily situation of acute hunger with a jump of 40 million people in 2021, then the military conflict in Ukraine will further aggravate the scenario and an increase may affect 18-20 million people (Martina, 2022). In the context of food insecurity in the developing part of the world, the risk of political instability and the spill over of violence beyond borders is increasing, which is already predicted, for example, in the countries of the expanded Middle East and the Maghreb. And this is a direct challenge to the foundations of the human community existence.

In the course of a new type of war, the operational means for conducting such wars are supplemented by the creation of migration crises. Of course, in the conditions of any war, refugee flows are objective, since non-combatants are forced to flee from the theatres of military operations. At the same time, the creation of critical masses of refugees on foreign territory has become a means of pressure on the subject of claims in the 21st century. It is worth to recall the migration collapse of 2015-2016, skilfully used by Turkish President R.T. Erdogan to receive additional subsidies from the EU countries. In the case of Ukraine, we can predict numerous waves of refugees in Europe⁵ and their accompanying economic and social consequences. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 9.1 million people left Ukraine from February to July 2022, of which 7.5 million people were accounted for in European countries, and 1.6 million people turned out to have settled in Russia (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2022). The current dire situation of these people is aggravated by the fact that the budgets of most of the hosting countries are not able to carry such a burden, and the local population does not intend to agree to further deterioration of social conditions, undermined before by the cost-of-living crisis. The situation is fraught with a growth in unconventional violence, bursts of

⁵ The Ukrainian exodus is almost three times the size of the wave of Syrians and others who arrived in Europe in 2015-2016.

social and political instability, mass deportations, which in total means an increase in the risk of the safe existence of a huge number of people in many countries, which in general increases largely the social dysfunction (Sonenshine, 2022).

The multi-dimensional hybrid war that the West and Russia are waging, and will continue to make for a long time, presupposes the moral and psychological exhaustion of the enemy's human potential. Objectively, people's psyche is badly affected by fear in consequence to the further aggravation of relations between the warring parties — up to the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. The picture is complemented by purposeful and mutual stuffing of threatening content, disinformation, releasing fake news aiming to mislead the opposing population, increase anxiety and phobias in people. Similar phenomena in Russia, for example, are noted by the analytical agency KROS, which keeps records of the so-called "National Anxiety Index". During the first three months of hostilities in Ukraine, the total values of the index have grown significantly, and two positions — rising prices and a shortage of goods, the changing structure of consumption for the worse and the possible aggravation of the military situation, mainly caused this rise (KROS, 2022, p. 1). The higher anxiety of the population, caused, among others, by the unfavourable news and economic setbacks, resulted in the increased demand for antidepressants. In January-June 2022, Russians purchased 66% more medications against depression than during the same period of 2021, namely 6 million packages (CRPT, 2022). Similar psychological difficulties, stress and panic attacks are experienced by European citizens, as well as by Ukrainians themselves (Tapper, 2022). It would not be an exaggeration to remark that a direct consequence of the conflict around Ukraine will be a state of complete disorientation and emotional depression for a large number of people. All these circumstances will make the normal anxiety evolving into extreme forms — neurotic and psychotic anxiety, which, if left untreated, will lead to the psychotization of the whole community and direct damage to the moral health and safety of its members.

Finally, we should consider that the hybrid scenario of confrontation, if implemented in the conditions of the completion of the military phase of the conflict around Ukraine, will be tougher in terms of content and consequences for human security in comparison with an alternative confrontation in the context of peaceful coexistence of opposing world centres

of influence and power. The multi-dimensionality of the tools of destructive influence on community as a whole and the permanent threat of the hybrid technologies usage in a real war will create critically unacceptable conditions for ensuring the protection of people and their survival.

MODELS OF CONFRONTATION IN PERSPECTIVE AND IMPACT ON HUMAN SECURITY

At the time of writing of this paper, the authors can hardly accurately predict the choice of a specific model of further confrontational engagement by the conflicting parties. At the very least, it will depend on the result of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. And here different options are possible. At the same time, a number of indications allow to estimate some of the intentions of the main subjects of global conflict, showing their inclination to one or another alternative line of behaviour. As for Russia, after inflicting a strategic defeat to the West in Ukraine, it would like to achieve the easing of the regime of economic sanctions and the transfer of relations with the United States and the EU to a confrontational, but peaceful coexistence. The political leadership of the country does not exclude such a prospect and declares that it has no autarkic sentiments (Президент России, 2022). However, unlike the state of "prior to February 24, 2022", the Western assistance as a means of solving problems of accelerated development is no longer considered. On the contrary, Russia is turning to the East and is trying to find reserves for the national economy growth and the well-being of the population in the processes of activation of Eurasian integration (Клепач, 2022, p. 12). The Collective West takes an ambivalent position towards Russia. Many European countries from the range of "founding fathers" of the European Union tend towards a peaceful coexistence with Russia, firstly, due to objective disinterest in the recurrence of military conflicts on the continent and, secondly, because of the significant interdependence of both economies from each other. The United States of America, as the flagship of the Western world together with some of its closest allies, relies on a rather different position today. For the United States, Russia appears to be a geostrategic civilizational competitor that has challenged and is subject to destruction or partition. Therefore, this group of countries is determined to continue the confrontation in the most severe forms possible. At the same time, the American establishment, including the so-called "deep state", is unlikely

to go to a direct clash with Russia and is not ready to face the reality of global chaos (Kissinger, 2022, p. 24). In this regard, the United States will be compelled to look for any acceptable forms of adjustment to the new situation. In other words, a transition to one or another kind of peaceful coexistence is possible in the future. At least at the time of writing this article, the US government has already begun to take measures to actually weaken the sanctions regime against Russia in industries that are particularly sensitive to them, namely in terms of energy imports, food products, mineral and organic fertilizers, and medical components.

We dare to cautiously assume that the model of confrontational interaction between the West and Russia in the form of peaceful coexistence will still have a slightly better chance before antagonism of a hybrid nature. The fragility of the brink separating a hybrid war from a new larger-scale war with the use of armed forces will deter the parties from choosing the second model. This means that the dysfunction of social life will affect an uncertainly large number of people, and this failure will intensify the structural crisis of the world economy, the conditions which were about to happen during the pandemic and then significantly stimulated by the conflict around Ukraine. Another geopolitical confrontation will negatively affect the state of life of people and community as a whole, the living standards will decrease regardless of the country of residence or involvement into the conflict. In this case, it will be possible to talk about a tangible deterioration of the human security environment and compression of the context of the comfortable existence up to a relative critically acceptable space. However, nothing will threaten the physical survival of the majority of people directly or indirectly affected by the global confrontation. In the event of an escalation of the hybrid war between the Collective West and Russia, there is a high risk of complete annihilation of the entire framework of material and moral existence of community, including a direct threat to the lives of its members and acute depletion of social and national resources.

CONCLUSION

Summarizing all mentioned above, it is possible to point out several key aspects.

Global dysfunctionality, understood as a disorder of the world economy and international relations under the influence of a number of factors, is a consequence of the manifestation of the disintegration of the globalization process. There is a direct relationship between these violations and the social and physical condition of a person, the dimension of his or her space of freedom and security.

Military conflicts significantly increase the impact of stressful and dysfunctional burden on society and individuals, and the scale of dysfunctionality in these conditions relatively quickly overcomes local and regional frameworks up to the global level.

Under the influence of military conflict, the mechanism of dysfunctionality is realized as a complex and interdependent disorder of vertically located social systems at the macro- (global space), the meso- (national states, regions, municipal communities) and the micro-levels (social groups and individuals).

The expanding military conflict around Ukraine, the main participants of which are the relative Collective West and Russia, is an eloquent example of the global dysfunctionality mechanism.

The method of scenario forecasting facilitates the distinguishing between two models of post-war confrontational engagement of antagonists in the medium and long-term period. Each of the models corresponds to its own parameters of compression of the space of freedom and human security.

Confrontational engagement in the form of peaceful coexistence entails the confrontation transferring mainly to the field of economics and trade policy. The immediate result of this encounter may be a recession of the world economy with high potential of spilling over into a structural crisis. The decline in the living standards of millions of people in these conditions will be caused by the aggravation of a whole complex of social problems.

Confrontation as a hybrid war is a kind of a more versatile conflict communication of antagonists. Tough contacts between the parties in any of the areas of hostility can lead to the undermining and depletion of the resources of the parties concerned and even initiate direct military clashes

between them. In this regard, the hybrid confrontation model is more detrimental to human security, since not only the environment favourable for life activity, but also the life and health of people themselves will be subject to elimination.

A preliminary analysis of the current situation indicates a gradual drift of the parties towards a model of confrontational engagement in the form of peaceful coexistence. The majority of direct and indirect participants in the globalizing conflict are objectively concerned with such a result. At the same time, the transfer of the conflict into a relatively "peaceful" post-war (latent) phase of confrontation does not at all contribute to eliminating the dysfunctional consequences of the phases of rise and peak of the conflict, but only shifts this aftermath to another level. This state will mean the aggravation of traditional and the emergence of new challenges to human security.

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SOCIETAL RESILIENCE AS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH HUMAN SECURITY ISSUES

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Abstract: In the past 15 years resilience researchers, philanthropists and policy-makers have been busy designing, testing and evaluating how best to measure resilience. A multitude of frameworks, assessment tools, resilience indexes and resilience programs have emerged since then to capture progress in and measurement of increased resilience. But despite the growth and investments in resilience efforts, resilience science and measurement still lag behind resilience practice. In addition, while science through the decades has developed steadily and provided many different, complementary perspectives, theories and models for national, community, organizational and other aspects of resilience, the research on human aspect of resilience is less mature. In the belief that it is completely unfounded to equate individual resilience with the human aspect of resilience, and bearing in mind the contents of the (re)conceptualization and operationalization of human security, the initial hypothesis of this paper is that societal resilience appears as one of the most adequate conceptual and analytical frameworks for dealing with human security. The notion societal resilience suggests an expansion of the more established discourse on societal safety and security, but in such a way that the individual represents its key element. Furthermore, it will allow reaching out to a broader public audience and communicating with a broader research community, addressing development trends with significance for socio-economic-political-ecological-technological resilience. In other words, the paper starts from the hypothesis that building societal resilience is imperative for reaching the optimal level of human security in any society. In this regard, the paper addresses a major societal challenge that impinges two interrelated research questions: What are the conceptual and methodological complexities which underpin human security in the context of societal resilience? How can knowledge of societal resilience be translated into action which will raise the level of human security at the local, community and national scales?

Key words: *societal resilience, human security, conceptualization, methodology*

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the past 15 years resilience researchers, philanthropists, and policymakers have been busy designing, testing and evaluating how best to measure resilience. A multitude of frameworks, assessment tools, resilience indexes, and resilience programs have emerged since then to capture the progress in and measurement of increased resilience. But despite the growth and investment in resilience efforts, resilience science and measurement still lag behind resilience practice. In addition, while science has developed steadily through the decades and provided many different, complementary perspectives, theories and models for national, community, organizational and other aspects of resilience, the research on the human aspect of resilience is less mature.

The transformation and multiplication of contemporary security risks have made it urgent to change the traditional security paradigm (Stanković, 2021a). This need is accompanied by two tendencies — on the one hand, there is a “broadening” and “deepening” of the concept of security (Lipovac, 2014), while on the other hand, there are significant efforts to “narrow” (Lipovac & Glušac, 2011) the concept of human security, with pretensions to become dominant, but at the same time complementary to the concept of national security, in the context of values that it aims to protect and threats that endanger those values. Simultaneously with these tendencies, a large number of security theorists focus on finding an adequate alternative to the traditional concept of security. Clearly, many offer a reconceptualization of concepts present in the literature for a long time, while there are also those who strive to create completely new concepts more suitable for dealing with security issues and more in line with the requirements arising from the contemporary security environment. Somewhere between these two extremes, as a compromise solution, there are attempts to (re)conceptualize the concept of resilience. In the last few decades, the use of this term in academic discourse is growing at a “dizzying” speed, and its conceptualizations and operationalizations (even mutually opposed, almost contradictory) are increasingly numerous and diverse, both in academic literature and in strategic and legal documents (Stanković, 2022b). At the moment, there is an abundance of literature on resilience in various domains of security studies — national security, crisis management, and corporate security, etc. (Keković & Ninković, 2020).

Apart from the progressive growth of the number of definitions of resilience, the “enrichment” of their content is noticeable both chronologically, over time, and in relation to new theoretical insights and empirical findings of various sciences and scientific disciplines in which it is placed (Keković, Stanković & Galić, 2022). Starting from the etymological origin of the term “resilience”, in most dictionaries it is defined as “the ability of the system to return to a state of balance, the state before the disturbance,” but also as “the ability of the system to face change and adapt to it.” Subsequently, the concept is “enriched” by the system’s ability to face and adapt to change (Fraccascia, Giannoccaro, & Albino, 2018).

The greatest potential of the practical value of the application of the concept of resilience in the context of human security, is reflected in the fact that, in this regard, the shortcomings of the concept of human security resulting from its dominant focus on the preventive component of security, are significantly reduced, unlike the concept of resilience, which in addition to giving equal attention to preventive and reactive component, pays particular attention to the phase of recovery from various negative security phenomena. Namely, in the literature on human security, in a practical context, assessment of the current state of human security of an individual, community, nation or any other level of analysis, i.e., developing readiness and preparedness and promoting the participation of individuals/communities in decision-making and creating policies for the improvement of human security through certain measures and activities of a preventive nature is most common (which makes it a proactive/preventive approach). On the other hand, the concept of resilience pays equal attention to the pre-crisis phase (prevention, mitigation, readiness and preparedness) and the crisis phase (response), but also the so-called post-crisis phase, which implies recovery (Keković & Stanković, 2021). Moreover, in recent times, the possibilities of improving resilience after the crisis have been emphasized more and more, which is illustrated by maxims like “Build Back Better” or “Survive and Thrive” (Keković, Stanković & Galić, 2022).

Bearing in mind all above-mentioned, as well as the contents of the (re)conceptualization and operationalization of human security, the paper starts from the hypothesis that building societal resilience is an imperative for reaching the optimal level of human security in any society. In this regard, the paper addresses a major societal challenge that impinges two

interrelated research questions: What are the conceptual and methodological complexities which underpin human security in the context of societal resilience? How can knowledge on societal resilience be translated into action which will raise the level of human security at the local, community and national scales? In other words, the initial hypothesis of this paper is that societal resilience appears as one of the most adequate conceptual and analytical frameworks for dealing with human security issues.

RESILIENCE OF WHOM TO WHAT?

Speaking about human security through the prism of the concept of societal resilience, the first question we must ask is Resilience of Whom to What? Although, in principle, a very simple question, to which the answer seems to be already well-understood, only with an attempt to more precisely determine the basic unit whose resilience is built and strengthened (the subject of resilience), as well as in relation to what it is built and strengthened (the object of resilience), we arrive at the key conceptual problems when it comes to both human security and societal resilience. Namely, most of the criticisms that both of these concepts have suffered are related to their excessive generality, flexibility or obscurity.

In this regard, a well-known and key objection to the concept of human security is certainly its broad content, imprecision and low heuristic value (Lipovac & Glušac, 2011), i.e., the absence of clear boundaries, vagueness and low practical value. The above-mentioned is also the case with the concept of resilience, with the fact that in the case of this concept, the same or similar criticisms are even more pronounced and deepened, i.e., present on several different levels. While the concept of human security is relatively recent, it is important to note that resilience as such is not a new concept (it has been present for a long time in literature, for example, in mathematics, physics or ecology), and that its origins have been present in the social sciences for some time, especially in the context of disaster risk reduction. However, what is specific to the concept of resilience (and unlike the concept of human security, which has a conceptual advantage in that sense) is the fact that resilience was approached separately from the perspectives of different sciences and scientific disciplines, without any attempt at synergy and integration of acquired knowledge about to it. In other words, resilience was approached exclusively within the framework

of the sciences from which specific authors originated, which resulted in segmental and partial interpretations of resilience, without striving to create a coherent and comprehensive approach that would incorporate all the most valuable conclusions derived by different theoreticians.

David Alexander sums it up very illustratively in the following manner: "To begin with, it is striking how the term is used in different disciplines without any reference to how it is employed in other fields, as if there were nothing to learn or transfer from one branch of science to the other" (2013, p. 2713). In summary, while it was clear for the concept of human security from the beginning of dealing with this issue that it is a comprehensive concept applicable to all spheres of public and private life (which makes the urgent need to respect a multidisciplinary approach), the concept of resilience only recently begun to be perceived as a concept of the same degree of generality and the same scope. Unfortunately, the literature still does not recognize a specific concept that would contain the synthesis of all theoretical and empirical findings obtained in this area, although this tendency is more and more present and pronounced lately.

Therefore, what is characteristic of both of these concepts is the absence of a single, generally accepted definition of them, which consequently leads to the impossibility of their valid operationalization. When it comes to the concept of human security, in recent times there is a noticeable tendency in the literature by which theorists, to the possible extent, try to compensate for this deficiency — it is an attempt to narrow the concept of human security, i.e., an attempt to narrow its scope by focusing to a narrow circle of values which are protected by human security (Lipovac & Glušac, 2011). However, when it comes to the concept of resilience, theorists approach the solution of this problem in a different way — by the already mentioned attempt to find a new framework that would fundamentally unify all the key points common to different subconcepts of resilience. Although significant efforts are being made towards this goal, the attempts of neither side have borne fruit, at least not to the extent which would indicate the existence of a compromise regarding the conceptual, and especially not the operational definition of these terms.

TOWARDS OPERATIONALIZATIONS

The lack of adequate, clear and concise operationalization of these concepts also results in their key methodological deficiency, which is usually answered by various and numerous operationalizations, by enriching their content, and by creating new methodological tools applicable to these concepts. As a starting point for the comparison of these two concepts from an operational point of view, we will take the following indicators of the concept of human security — economic, food, environmental, health, personal, community and political security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994). However, in order to identify a basis for comparison from resilience aspect, we must first conduct several preparatory steps. Namely, on the one hand, we must start from a review of different levels of analysis (in order to adequately identify the key subject of resilience in the context of human security), and, on the other hand, from different modules of resilience (in order to adequately understand the object of resilience).

When it comes to the classification of resilience according to levels of analysis, in this paper we will emphasize the following levels of resilience analysis as the most significant — individual, organizational, urban, community, national, regional and global resilience (Stanković, 2022a, 2022b). In this regard, it is interesting to point out that there are certain overlaps when it comes to the levels of analysis of human security — individual, family, community, national and international (Gomez, 2013). Apparently, it seems that, from the aforementioned levels of analysis of resilience known in the literature, two levels of analysis stand out as the most directly related to the concept of human security — individual resilience and community resilience. And yet, the first is usually interpreted from the aspect of psychological resilience, and the second as a subcategory of national resilience.

In order to justify this assumption, we will start from the hypothesis, based on an in-depth analysis of the available relevant literature, that there is another equally important criterion for the classification of resilience, which helps us to better understand and connect the different (sub)concept of resilience that emerged in the literature. Namely, according to its thematic content, i.e., the sphere of practical application, resilience could be classified into the following modules — social, economic,

political, environmental (or “green”), IT (or digital) and psychological resilience (Stanković, 2022a, Stanković, 2022b). In this regard, it is necessary to draw several very important conclusions.

First and foremost, although it does not seem so at first glance, the way in which individual and psychological resilience are used as concepts in the literature leads us to the conclusion that they are often used as a synonymous (primarily in terms of their content), although they are not defined anywhere in that manner. Therefore, although it could be assumed, by the logic of things, that the most direct connection of human security, as a completely anthropocentric concept whose focus is on the individual, is precisely with individual resilience — a more detailed critical analysis of the literature denies this position. On the one hand, in the concept of human security, the individual is the basic unit of analysis from the perspective of which the protection of all vital life needs (including social, economic, political and other) is interpreted. On the other, individual resilience also takes the individual as a reference object, but usually treats it as an isolated individual, referring primarily to his psychological needs. For example, individual or personal resilience implies emotion regulation, flexible thinking, optimism, self-care, balancing demands, social connection and positive emotions, all through the prism of resilient thinking, balance and recovery and emotional resilience (Baker et al., 2021).

The second, even more important conclusion is that the concept of human security includes all these different modules of resilience. However, it is obvious that by simply combining them together, we would get an endless list of indicators of varying degrees of importance for human security, moreover, a significantly longer list of both the values that need to be protected and the threats which threaten these values compared to that list that the concept of human security already contains (and in summarization of which theorists have invested enormous efforts in recent times). For this reason, in order to propose a concept that would be practically useful for dealing with issues of human security and help eliminate the shortcomings with which the authors struggle so much, but also to overcome the conceptual and operational shortcomings of resilience as a concept per se, we tried to recognize and unify the most significant ones from the abundance of indicators offered by different subconcepts of resilience, as well as to create a coherent, cohesive and comprehensive conceptual framework.

A “NEW” CONCEPT?

Towards fulfilling this goal, by analyzing different subconcepts of resilience, we came to the conclusion that there is one level of resilience analysis that satisfactorily takes into account all indicators relevant to the concept of human security. Namely, it is the concept of community resilience. If we exclude the fact that in the literature this concept is often and quite unjustifiably primarily linked to the concept of national resilience (thereby also national security — complementary to human security, but at the other end of the continuum), the local community undoubtedly appears as one of the most suitable analytical frameworks for dealing with issues of human security (Keković, Stanković & Galić, 2022). An illustrative example of a community resilience framework targets four key spheres — responsible governance (provides community services, enforces laws humanely, manages its finances and protects its community members), quality of life (access to affordable housing and quality health care, existence of social freedoms, access to employment and prosperity and access to education and information), strong economy (has a diversified economy, produces necessary resources, maintains the value of its currency, and enables access to financial and physical resources) and a prepared system (community members educated on preparedness, risk reduction activities are planned and funded, networks and partnerships provide support and organizations recognized for resilience initiatives), framing them with the requirement for a healthy environment (The International Consortium for Organizational Resilience, n.d.).

In any case, the concept of community resilience can be seen as one of the most suitable, coherent and comprehensive analytical frameworks for dealing with the issues of human security with the aim of successful adaptation, mitigation or elimination of human security challenges, risks and threats, i.e., strengthening the resilience of the local community as “the ability of a community to prevail existing problems with a minimum of negative consequences and to revert in state of normal functioning — safe and secure environment from the perspective of its members”, and that with two aims — not just for assessment of human security — identification, analysis and evaluation of human security risks and threats, but also for its treatment (Keković, Stanković & Galić, 2022).

Due to the above, as an answer to the question of Resilience of Whom, we proposed a revised concept of resilience of the local community, at the center of which is the individual. For the sake of a better understanding of this concept, we brought it into relation with different modules of resilience, usually distinctively delimited in the literature, such as psychological, economic, political, environmental, technological and others. Namely, on the basis of an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the content of different levels of resilience analysis and resilience modules, we conclude that there should be a concept of resilience that will serve as an “umbrella” term or concept, in which the contents of all modules from the perspective of the individual should be incorporated and interpreted from the perspective of the local community.

Apart from the two aforementioned key attributes of the suggested concept — focus on the individual, but from the perspective of local community, there is another particularly important component that the newly proposed concept should contain — it should be necessarily firmly grounded in postulates of organizational resilience. Organizational resilience, as its name suggests, is usually placed in literature at the level of organizations and interpreted in the context of organizational functioning and behavior. It is particularly interesting to note that this type of resilience is the most frequently analyzed one in the literature and that it abounds in its numerous and diverse theoretical implications, but also practical instructions for building and strengthening it. Moreover, it seems that this subconcept of resilience has been the most completely and validly defined, both conceptually and operationally in the literature so far.

And yet, it seems that the biggest shortcoming of the extremely rich and diverse literature on organizational resilience is precisely contained in the fact that these conclusions are limited and applied only at the level of organizations. On the contrary, in the belief that by incorporating them into other subconcepts of resilience and applying them to other levels of analysis, particularly significant benefits could be gained, we believe that organizational resilience should be seen as the basis of theoretical and practical knowledge on resilience in all its forms (Stanković, 2022a, 2022b). In this regard, we should mention six basic principles on which organizational resilience rests according to Gibson and Tarrant (2010): resilience is an outcome; resilience is not a static property; resilience is not a single property; resilience is multidimensional; resilience exists in a variety of

forms; resilience is based on proper risk management. From the above, a clear parallel can be drawn between the concept of human security and organizational resilience determined in this way.

SOCIETAL RESILIENCE

Returning to the newly proposed, integrative and comprehensive concept of resilience, we call this concept of resilience — societal resilience. By societal resilience we mean an alternative or, at least, a supplement to the selective, superficial or incomplete understandings of societal resilience known in the literature. It is worth mentioning that the literature on resilience in recent times, also, recognizes the concept of societal resilience, but usually quite unjustifiably impoverishes it in terms of content and limits it to relations with social resilience in the narrower sense. For example, the following are commonly cited as indicators of social resilience: community participation, education, exchange information, learning, shared information, social support, sense of community, trust, community efficiency, coordination, demographic information, improvisation, coping style and leadership (Khalili et al., 2015). Although it correctly recognizes the role of the community for building and strengthening resilience in general, the concept of social resilience (often wrongly equated with societal resilience), clearly includes only a small part of the assumed content of the concept of societal resilience that we propose. A different, more complementary approach of social resilience, but still not efficient, includes: sustainable human resources, inclusive governance structures and processes, access to and fair allocation of economic resources, robust built environment and amenities, as well as access to natural resources (Kwok et al., 2016).

However, what gives us hope that the interpretation and understanding of societal resilience is slowly starting to develop in the right direction, is the encouragement to the academic community that has recently come from numerous international organizations (for example, the EU (European Commission, n.d.) to create a comprehensive concept of societal resilience which would present an integrated and cohesive framework made up of all relevant interdependent and intertwined factors and elements. Therefore, the concept of societal resilience proposed in such way is not only a response to the shortcomings of other subconcepts of resilience

per se, but could be also seen as a response to numerous shortcomings of the concept of human security itself. In this regard, we suggest that societal resilience appears as one of the most adequate analytical frameworks for dealing with issues of human security.

After identifying these conceptual complexities that underpin human security in context of societal resilience, we went further with the aim of identification of methodological complexities that underpin this issue. We did that, continuously thinking about ways in which we could translate knowledge on societal resilience into action that will raise the level of human security and consequently strengthening the societal resilience at the community level. After analyzing different human security matrices and indexes (Linkov, et al. 2013; Fox-Lent, et al. 2015; Fox-Lent & Linkov 2018; Rand, et al. 2020) we came to the conclusion that human security, as well as societal resilience, are complex issues to measure and enhance, and different priorities and values are assigned by different local communities. For each of the indicators identified, it is necessary to understand its local relevance and values, its relation to the concepts of human security and societal resilience, the variables that need to be measured, and the condition that these indicators portray. The resulting matrix or index is a critical starting point for policy-making which is focused on human security issues through the prism of societal resilience.

In that regard, instead of starting from classification of dimensions that is most common in relation to human security (economic, food, environmental, health, personal, community and political security) (United Nations Development Programme, 1994), we started from the types of the community dimensions or capitals, that are: natural resources (air, land, water, mineral resources, ecosystem stability and health, natural land cover, and/or environmental quality indicators); building/infrastructural (housing, schools, commercial and industrial facilities, infrastructure support, such as energy, transportation, bridges, roads, communications, water and wastewater); financial/economic (income levels, personal wealth, income equality, overall employment rates, employment rates by sector, volume and barriers to doing business); human and cultural (demographic characteristics, knowledge, skills, health and physical abilities of community members, cultural symbols and belief systems, education levels, age distribution, health insurance, access to health and mental health services, food security, populations with special needs, access to

transportation and communication services); social (the level of trust and reciprocity, political engagement, length of stay, volunteering, religious affiliation and services offered by the community); political/institutional (access to resources and the ability/power to influence their distribution, disaster insurance coverage (for example, flood and drought), coordination and distribution of responsibilities, disaster experience and recovery, emergency capacity management, etc.).

A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Starting from a position in which the individual is at the center, but as a member of the community (or, in other words, through the prism of the community), and by respecting the important principles of organizational resilience and, previously highlighted, relevant elements of the community resilience framework, based on the mentioned dimensions of the community, it seems that we are getting closer to the basics necessary for defining (especially in operational terms) the concept of societal resilience that we propose. Finally, as a valid starting point, it is necessary to identify qualitative and quantitative, objectively measurable indicators of human security in the context of societal resilience. To properly understand this multilayered network of societal resilience which needs to be built and strengthened, we needed to create a new methodological approach, resulting in nine main characteristics regarding the following: theoretical approach, analytical approach, management approach, organizational structure, actors/subjects, objects/capitals, strategies, capacities and process.

When it comes to the theoretical approach, it is necessary to respect the requirements for a holistic, systemic approach, which is increasingly recognized as an imperative for dealing with security issues in the broadest sense (Stanković, 2021b). Namely, the understanding of complexity, as the basis of system theory, greatly facilitates the understanding and further dealing with various aspects of security, especially its most complex component — human security. However, a systematic approach is undoubtedly an indispensable component of studying and dealing with resilience in all its forms. Speaking of the desirable analytical approach, we have already explained in more detail why the level of the local community appears as the ideal (or at least the most suitable) level of analysis,

both of resilience in general and of human security (through the prism of societal resilience).

The other two particularly significant and interconnected components of this methodological approach refer to the management approach and organizational structure. Namely, by analogy with the complementarity of human security and national security, but also the very important relationship of individual-community-society, we are of the opinion that it is necessary to fully comply with the requirements of “a-whole-of-society” approach. In other words, this implies combining the elements of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach, making them a complementary and coherent whole. Consequently, the organizational structure should be set up in such a way as to strive to strengthen the resilience of all three of its key components — leadership, management structures (but those with adequate experience, knowledge and skills), as well as a society as a whole.

When it comes to the next two components — strategies and capacities, existing findings (especially empirical) on the benefits of applying a combination of very specific strategies and capacities for building and strengthening resilience can be of great use in this case. Namely, we are convinced that for practically useful results, the complementary application of the following four strategies — resistance, redundancy, reliability and flexibility — is necessary. Depending on specific circumstances and emerged needs, one strategy will dominate while others will have a supportive role. However, what is equally important is that the application of these strategies is adjusted not only to the needs, but also to the specifics of a certain community. In other words, there is no single strategic approach which would be universally applicable and bring equally good results in different communities, but this suggestion should be understood in the following manner — examples of good practice should be implemented in a way that is adjusted to the dynamics, vulnerabilities and specifics of each community in question.

For the purposes of dealing with issues of human security through the prism of societal resilience, resistance strategies can be defined as those aimed at improving robustness and “hardening” in order to withstand the immediate effects that volatility can cause. Reliability strategies can be defined, in this context, as those that are expected to ensure the availability and continued functioning of key functions, resources, information

and infrastructure, in the sense that they are continuously fit for purpose. Furthermore, redundancy strategies are those which imply the creation of one or more day-to-day functioning alternatives. Finally, unlike the previous three categories of strategies that emphasize “hard” factors of resilience, flexibility strategies seek to enable adaptation to extreme circumstances and sudden shocks by emphasizing “soft” factors, which can overcome the shortcomings of the previous categories of strategies (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010).

Regarding capacities (dimensions or abilities) of resilience, the prevailing opinion in the literature is that all “systems” or units of analysis have in common three capacities, namely absorptive, adaptive and restorative (Keković & Ninković, 2020). This is particularly applicable and useful for dealing with human security issues if one starts from interpreting the absorptive capacity as the degree to which the impact of a negative security phenomenon can be automatically absorbed while minimizing the consequences with little effort; adaptive capacity as the degree to which it (in this case, the community) is capable of self-organization in order to recover its vital functions; and restorative as the ability to recover — either by returning to the mode of functioning before the manifestation of a negative security phenomenon or by transforming to a completely new state which corresponds to newly created requirements and circumstances (Keković, Dragišić & Ninković, 2014). Here, the predictive capacity should also be mentioned, as it can be of particular use in the context of the application of existing knowledge in order to improve the level of human security by strengthening societal resilience.

Finally, the very process of building and strengthening societal resilience as a way to improve human security (primarily at the level of communities, but also applicable more widely), as an extremely dynamic and unpredictable process characterized by frequent and sudden (even radical) changes that come from an extremely uncertain environment, must be understood in such a way that the implementation of short-term operational plans (which are based on measurable objectives) simultaneously fosters a long-term strategic vision. Additionally, the process must be followed by continuous monitoring and evaluation.

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

The paper addresses societal resilience as an analytical framework for dealing with human security issues and impinges two interrelated research questions: What are the conceptual and methodological complexities which underpin human security in context of societal resilience? How can knowledge on societal resilience be translated into action which will raise the level of human security at the local, community and national scales? Having that in mind, the initial hypothesis of this paper is that societal resilience appears as one of the most adequate conceptual and analytical frameworks for dealing with human security issues. Unfortunately, the literature, still, does not recognize a specific concept which would contain the synthesis of all theoretical and empirical findings obtained in this area. This tendency corollary with the single point approach of the sciences from which specific authors originated, which resulted in segmental and partial interpretations of resilience.

Speaking about human security through the prism of the concept of societal resilience, the first question we must ask is Resilience of Whom to What? Two levels of analysis which stand out from the other, and are directly related to the concept of human security, are; individual resilience and community resilience; and are in the line with classified resilience modules — social, economic, political, environmental (or “green”), IT (or digital) and psychological resilience. Since the concept of human security includes all different modules of resilience, we brought it into relation with psychological, economic, political, environmental, technological and others, and we come to the conclusion that one level of resilience analysis, which satisfactorily takes into account all indicators relevant to the concept of human security, is the concept of community resilience and for the concrete answer to the question of Resilience of Whom, we proposed a revised concept of resilience of the local community, at the center of which is the individual — societal resilience

By societal resilience we mean an alternative or at least a supplement to the selective, superficial or incomplete understandings of societal resilience known in the literature. It is worth mentioning that the literature on resilience in recent times, also, recognizes the concept of societal resilience, but usually quite unjustifiably impoverishes it in terms of content and limits it to relations with social resilience in the narrower sense.

According to our understanding, social resilience is not only: community participation, education, exchange information, learning, shared information, social support, sense of community, trust, community efficiency, coordination, demographic information, improvisation, coping style and leadership, but also: sustainable human resources, inclusive governance structures and processes, access to and fair allocation of economic resources, robust built environment and amenities, as well as access to natural resources. Therefore, the concept of societal resilience proposed in such way is, not only a response to the shortcomings of other subconcepts of resilience per se, but also a response to numerous shortcomings of the concept of human security itself. In this regard, we suggest that societal resilience appears as one of the most adequate analytical frameworks for dealing with issues of human security. Despite the seven dimensions of human security, we started from the types of the community dimensions or capitals, that are: natural resources, building/infrastructural, financial/economic, human and cultural, social, political/institutional. Having this in mind, to properly understand this multilayered network of societal resilience which needs to be built and strengthened, we needed to create a new methodological approach, resulting in nine main characteristics regarding the following: theoretical approach, analytical approach, management approach, organizational structure, actors/subjects, objects/capitals, strategies, capacities and process.

The paper also discusses the management approach and organizational structure, and we stand for combining the elements of the “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach, making them a complementary and coherent as a whole. The organizational structure should be set up in such a way as to strive to strengthen the resilience of all three of its key components — leadership, management structures and society as a whole. The complementary application of the following four strategies — resistance, redundancy, reliability and flexibility — is necessary regarding the next two components — strategies and capacities.

Finally, the very process of building and strengthening societal resilience as a way to improve human security must be understood in such a way that the implementation of short-term operational plans (which are based on measurable objectives) simultaneously fosters a long-term strategic vision and the process must be followed by continuous monitoring and evaluation.

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THE HUMAN SECURITY DIMENSION OF ENERGY SECURITY

Aliaksandr Novikau¹

Abstract: Historically, energy security has mainly been focused on the supply side of energy because, as several energy crises have demonstrated, energy supply disruption and price increase have dire consequences for national security. Not surprisingly, the earliest definitions of energy security were mainly concerned with the supply side of energy, i.e., how to obtain reliable energy supplies at reasonable prices without jeopardizing central national values and objectives. Recently, the focus of energy security has shifted from the energy security for a nation as a whole to end-users because the ultimate purpose of the energy system is to provide helpful energy services to end-users. Although energy security is also equal to security of supply for end-users, national energy security is usually insufficient to guarantee the well-being of individuals because it ignores inadequate access to energy services on an individual level, i.e., energy poverty. Thus, energy security should include a human security dimension in order to ensure that individuals have access to reliable energy supplies at reasonable prices without jeopardizing their values and objectives. In addition, environmental issues caused by energy use involve both state and non-state actors. Therefore, it would be easier to understand, prevent, and mitigate such issues using the human security concept rather than using the traditional form of a state-centric perspective on energy security.

Keywords: *energy security; human security; energy poverty; thermal comfort; pollution*

INTRODUCTION

Even though security could easily be conceptualized as freedom from threats, it would remain an extremely ambiguous concept if used without further specifications — security for whom, from what threats, for which values, and by what means? As a result, definitions of national security, provided by early international relations scholars in the 1940s and 1950s, were focused on the absence or low probability of threats to acquired values (Baldwin, 1997; Lippmann, 1943; Wolfers, 1952).

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For a long time, security has been understood in the sense of national security, which is not surprising taking into account the fact that global military spending equals almost half of the combined income of the world population (King & Murray, 2001) and considering the general state-centric focus of the disciplines studied within the fields of Political Science and International Relations (Walt, 1991).

Even though national security deals with a broad range of security threats — military, economic, social, and environmental — from after World War II and the birth of security studies, they have mainly been focused on the military dimension built on the need for states to survive and/or increase power in an anarchic international system. This is not surprising because security studies grew out of debates over protecting the state against external threats after World War II (Newman, 2001). At that time, the military dimension of national security was perceived as a power of resistance against external violence and, thus, dominated other dimensions of security, such as the economy or social issues, because the threats of external aggression were viewed as more probable and severe in comparison to economic crises or social problems. Consequently, during the Cold War, the discipline of security studies was predominantly composed of research focused on military statecraft (Baldwin, 1997; Wolfers, 1952). It was defined as studying the ‘threat, use, and control of military force’ (Nye & Lynn-Jones, 1988).

WHAT IS HUMAN SECURITY?

The late 1980s witnessed a radical shift from a realist and narrow understanding of security to a broader one. Due to the end of the Cold War, the priorities of direct interstate military conflicts decreased significantly. Consequently, even though the danger of international conflicts was not fully eliminated, the importance of other issues, such as poverty, malnutrition, diseases, drug abuse, inadequate environment for human survival, became more evident (Buzan, 1983; Nuruzzaman, 2006).

Human security is a relatively new concept which has become quite popular in just a few decades. The first mention of it was in the 1994 Human Development Report by the U.N. Development Program (United Nations Development Programme, 1994), which has, also, been the most widely used definition of the term. In that document, the authors call for

the shift away from security as national towards the security of individuals, with a defensive focus, mainly found in the dimension of poverty, i.e., 'human security'. Although the relationship between state and individual security is mutual — where the security of the state increases the individual security of each citizen — the proponents of the concept of 'human security' emphasize that these notions are not identical. The report used two main lines of criticism against the traditional, realist notion of security. The first one put focus on military security. The report grouped threats to human security into seven categories: economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and political. The second one showed that even though national security would include other types of security, such as environmental, food, economic, and energy, the security of a particular individual or a group cannot be guaranteed because of unequal distribution of goods and services. In other words, in order to answer Baldwin's question: 'security for whom?', the traditional notion of security sees the state as the primary reference. Contrary to that, human security focuses on individual human beings and humankind (Brauch, 2011).

Some security studies scholars questioned the introduction of human security as a new concept (Paris, 2001) and argued that the term was vague and extensive. By trying to include every aspect, human security would lose meaning and, therefore, would be seen as useless for scholars and policymakers. Barry Buzan emphasized that some of the proposed dimensions belong to the domain of human rights and concluded that human security is a 'reductionist, idealistic notion that adds little analytical value' (Buzan, 2004). In general, debates about the place of human security in the discipline of security studies is a part of long-lasting debates about the 'broad' vs. 'narrow' notion of security — could (or should) the notion of security include anything else besides traditional military security (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Walt, 1991).

However, other scholars have accepted the notion of human security as applicable, arguing that the UNDP conceptualization has either interrelated or overlapping dimensions to it and that, therefore, it does not provide a coherent concept. In order to narrow down the definition, the authors proposed focusing only on the critical threats to individual's well-being — those which significantly put at risk lives or property — threats to health, income, education, and political freedom. For instance, King and Murray (2001) focus on the economic dimension, i.e., economic development

dimension of security and, thus, define human security as “the number of years of future life spent outside the state of ‘generalized poverty’”. Moreover, ‘generalized poverty’ has not been defined in the narrow sense of income, but has been used in the situation when the well-being of an individual is threatened. Consequently, a group of human security experts, for example, at the state level, represents an aggregation of individuals whose area of focus is human security.

It was an attempt to connect Human Security to the agenda of Critical Security Studies which has the same concern about individuals in comparison to states (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). Although Critical Security Studies often argue that the state is the one making individuals insecure, most proponents of the human security concept argue that it does not oppose national security (Lieven, 2020).

ENERGY AND HUMAN SECURITY

Energy, unquestionably, plays a crucial role in human well-being. First and foremost, human life requires energy on an elementary level. In order to remain alive, living organisms must take energy from the environment for cell metabolism. In contrast to plants which obtain energy directly from sunlight, animals, including humans, obtain solar energy indirectly, transformed by other organisms into proteins, lipids, and hydrocarbons through the chains of complex biochemical reactions (Nelson & Cox, 2005). The deficit of this type of energy obtained from food has always been a primary concern for people. Despite significant progress in agriculture and food technologies even now, in the 21st century, the problem of malnutrition remains a life-threatening issue for hundreds of millions of people worldwide. The second energy problem people face is the temperature of the environment. Even though human beings, like other homeothermic animals, can maintain a stable, usually higher than their environment, body temperature, their capacity to do so is quite limited. Although thermal comfort depends on many factors, its range is relatively narrow — from 18 to 25°C. The said range is even narrower for vulnerable groups, such as young, old, and sick people. Thermal discomfort decreases productivity and can harm health (Hughes et al., 2019; Ormandy & Ezratty, 2012). What distinguishes human beings from other animals is the ability to use external energy to modify external temperature to match the thermal comfort

range and, thus, enable inhabiting more geographic areas. From prehistoric times, firewood and other energy sources have been used for heating and, as from recently, cooling the environment where people live and work. Although the process requires an enormous amount of energy, a significant share of energy people use has been directed towards achieving thermal comfort (Novikau, 2022a).

Even though human beings use muscle energy to move their bodies, their ability to do so is, also, fairly limited. Consequently, humans have used water, wind, and animal energy for transportation, for a long time. The real revolution in transportation occurred in the 19th century when people started using fossil fuel energy — first coal, then oil — in engines that made long-distance transportation affordable for millions.

Moreover, there have been positive outcomes for energy use in regards to human health in other ways — providing lighting, manufacturing industrial goods and agricultural products. The progress in electric energy made advanced communication possible — first came the creation of the telegraph, then telephone, and, now, emails and instant messaging enable instantaneous communication over thousands of kilometers (Chernotsky and Hobbs 2018).

All these energy uses positively affect and foster economic growth, human well-being, and human security. Yet, at the same time, the wide use of energy has, also, resulted in adverse effects on human health, albeit usually less significant in comparison to its benefits. Normally, energy use does not threaten human health directly, although, annually, a certain number of deaths is registered as a result of electric shocks. Moreover, human well-being is threatened by side effects of energy extraction and production (Novikau, 2022a).

For centuries, coal mining has been a perilous profession — with a much higher rate of deaths, injuries, and chronic diseases than any other profession (Bennett & Passmore, 1984). While the adverse effects of energy extraction affect a small part of the human population — energy transformation threatens everybody on Earth. Adverse effects on human health caused by generated energy are especially evident in pollution as the consequence of burning of fossil fuels. Carbon monoxide (CO), sulphur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen dioxide (NO₂) and particulate matter (PM) when released into the air cause respiratory and cardiovascular diseases and are

responsible for millions of deaths (Ayres et al., 2006; Moan & Smith, 2007). Furthermore, the release of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, as a result of fossil fuel burning, has brought about the global climate change — a challenge threatening all life on the planet (Jackson et al., 2019).

Using different types of energy, other than fossil fuels, can also be dangerous. When nuclear energy was first discovered, it was seen as a clean and inexpensive source. However, accidents at nuclear power plants, such as Three Miles Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima, had, as a consequence, radionuclides released into the environment and, thus, demonstrated that nuclear energy could, in fact, threaten human security. Although the number of immediate casualties from the accidents surpasses hundreds, hundreds of thousands suffered from delayed health effects, displacement and economic loss. Disposal and storage of nuclear fuel is difficult, even without such accidents occurring, because high-level radioactive materials harm human health (Novikau, 2017).

Although renewable energy is usually perceived not to have any negative impact on human health, it can still have some adverse effects. For instance, biofuels can contribute to air and water pollution without appropriate sewage treatment. Hydro and wind energy may result in change of land use. Photovoltaic systems may lead to damage caused by mining of minerals and waste disposal issues. Last but not least, living close to large hydroelectric dams can increase the risk of contracting malaria (Lautze et al., 2007; Utzinger et al., 2005).

ENERGY POVERTY

Energy consumption usually strongly correlates with human security. With that in mind, an energy deficit in heating, lighting and hot water generally negatively affects human security. Therefore, an adequate amount of energy is needed for human security to be achieved. However, energy, same as any other limited resource, is not free. Thus, in order to have energy services available, people need to spend a part of their income on it. With strict budgets, energy consumers often face a hard choice and have to decide whether to spend less on energy or other services, such as food, health or entertainment.

In 1991, Boardman (1991) offered the first definition of ‘energy poverty’ as “a situation when a household has to spend more than 10% of its

income on energy services.” Later, this concept was significantly revised and extended. For instance, Reddy (2015) defines energy poverty as “the absence of sufficient choice in accessing adequate, affordable, reliable, high-quality, safe and environmentally benign energy services to support economic and human development.”

Energy poverty is interrelated with many health, economic, social and environmental issues (González-Eguino, 2015). Cold indoor temperatures are, at least partially, responsible for the well-known phenomenon of excess winter mortality because of the detrimental effects of low temperature on cardio, cerebrovascular and immune systems (Liddell & Morris, 2010).

It is estimated that more than seven million people worldwide die annually due to air pollution, the largest part of it coming from fuels and cookstoves (Q. Wang et al., 2019). The impact residential energy consumption, along with the exposure to household air pollution, has on the burden of disease, are well-studied. In developing countries, women and children often spend a large amount of time searching for biofuel instead of directing it towards education or leisure. On top of that, cooking on primitive stoves, by using coal and firewood indoors, disproportionately affects their health. Most people who lack access to clean energy live in developing countries such as rural areas (Bhattacharyya, 2013; Pachauri, 2010; Parikh, 2011; Sovacool, 2010).

Despite their rapid economic growth, for many developing countries such as China, a significant part of their population, especially in rural areas, still has no access to modern energy services (Wang et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2019).

Energy poverty is not only a prerogative of developing countries. There are studies about energy poverty in countries such as Japan (Okushima, 2016), Spain (Phimister et al., 2015), and Austria (Brunner et al., 2012). The issue of energy poverty in the United Kingdom resulted in several policy initiatives such as the 2001 U.K. Fuel Poverty Strategy with a goal “to ensure that by 2010 no older householder, no family with children, and no householder who is disabled or has a long-term illness need risk ill health due to a cold home.” In the first phase of the program, priority has been given to families with young kids, older people, and people with disabilities (Boardman, 2010; Liddell & Morris, 2010).

European Union institutions did not officially recognize the concept of energy poverty until 2009, when concerns about energy poverty led to the inclusion of the concept into the Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC during the preparation of the Third Energy Package. Since vulnerability to energy poverty and policymaking processes vary to a great extent across member states, the existing policy measures which address energy poverty differ as well. Most member states provide financial aid and enable protection from disconnection to vulnerable consumers. In several countries, there are social tariffs on energy for low-income consumers. Furthermore, this financial support is often coupled with measures to improve energy efficiency (Bouzarovski et al., 2012; Dobbins et al., 2019).

Energy poverty can be measured by using several approaches, such as technological, physical, and economic ones (González-Eguino, 2015; Pachauri & Spreng, 2011). The policies aiming to mitigate the problem usually focus not only on replacing indoor burning of solid fuels with electricity or natural gas, but also on replacing the current for more efficient stoves. Delivering a 'just transition', which refers to worker protection, decent work and job quality preservation, all while meeting energy security and environmental goals, is what is often used as an important tool for preventing energy poverty among vulnerable groups (Janikowska & Kulczycka, 2021; Kelly et al., 2020; Newell & Mulvaney, 2013).

WHAT IS ENERGY SECURITY?

Natural resources, along with the ability to control them, have always played an essential role in how and to what extent states interact with each other, i.e., who has the state power. The beginning of the 20th century witnessed a revolutionary transformation of warfare, specifically with the emergence of mechanized warfare which requires significant energy. This transformation increased effectiveness of warfare and risks associated with different energy use. For example, the decision to convert the British Navy from coal to oil brought an advantage in speed, flexibility and risks regarding the stability of oil supply from other countries. During World War II, the role of energy resources, especially oil, in national military force became unquestionable. Without a continuous supply of energy, the most sophisticated warfare was useless. As a result, many strategic objectives during the war were determined by the intention to

secure energy supply or prevent adversaries from doing so. For instance, concerns about oil security were paramount in Japan's decision to occupy the East Indies and attack American troops in Pearl Harbor, as well as in Germany's drive toward the resource-rich Caspian region (Friedrichs, 2010; Hayward, 1995; Yergin, 1991).

Energy security has always been clearly connected to national security — semantically, historically and practically. The 1970s oil crises highlighted the direct relationship between energy, security and foreign policy. The control over the flow, price and energy infrastructure has become an essential element of power dynamics in international politics (Colgan, 2014). As a result, the first conceptualization of energy security was borrowed from the International Relations and Security Studies discipline, which inevitably shaped the concept. For example, in 1979, David A. Deese (1979), offered what was probably the very first explicit definition of national energy security as “a condition in which a nation perceives a high probability that it will have adequate energy supplies (including traditional sources such as firewood, and plant and animal residues that are frequently not traded in the marketplace) at affordable prices.” The strong emphasis on affordable prices was necessary because a physical shortage of fuels has not been understood as a subject of concern. The concern has, rather, been whether the “adequate amounts [of oil] will always be available to all users, in all circumstances and at reasonable prices” (Akins, 1973). A decade later, Daniel Yergin (1988) defined energy security in the following words: “the objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives.”

The importance of the question regarding the reference object for security (Baldwin, 1997) applies to energy security as well (Cherp & Jewell, 2014). Indeed, without answering the question ‘energy security for whom?’, the notion of energy security does not make much sense. In their definitions of energy security, Deese and Yergin use the nation as a reference object when defining it. Such state-centric conceptualization of energy security can also be found in many other popular definitions of it. For instance, the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre, 2007) defined energy security “as the ability of an economy to guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely

manner with the energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic performance of the economy.”

However, in the recent decade, there has been a shift in identifying reference objects for energy security from nations to individuals (Novikau, 2022b). An example of the energy security concept that addresses such revisions could be “equitably providing available, affordable, reliable, efficient, environmentally benign, proactively governed, and socially acceptable energy services to end-users” (Sovacool et al., 2014). As Grubler et al. (2018) put it, “the purpose of the global energy system is to provide useful services to end-users.”

A traditional geopolitical approach, conceptually linked to realism in International Relations, views energy security as a zero-sum competition between states for the uninterrupted supply of limited energy resources at affordable prices and, therefore, as the source of potential conflict. Contrary to that, neoliberalism’s global energy governance approach emphasizes interdependence and cooperation in the energy security sphere which can be achieved through free markets and international institutions (Moore, 2017; Wilson, 2019).

HUMAN SECURITY AND ENERGY SECURITY

Even though energy was not explicitly mentioned in the 1994 UNDP report which introduced the notion of human security, it is clearly linked to all dimensions of human security defined in that document. The connection between energy security and economic, food, health and environmental dimensions of human security is apparent — it is linked to personal, community and political dimensions of human security (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2016; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Jollands, 2013). Energy can cause political instability and armed conflicts, thus, inevitably affecting human security. States can, because of the threats to their energy supply, use military force either to directly control energy resources or their transit routes. All this can potentially result in military conflicts ending with numerous deaths or state collapse (Kelanic, 2016). Energy resources can create economic inequality, inadequate institutions and political instability. Reducing income from energy sources can, because of the collapse of energy price, result in individual leaders of energy countries wanting

to start domestic oppression or foreign invasions (Bremmer & Johnston, 2009; Colgan, 2013; Elhefnawy, 2008).

Not surprisingly, many scholars have called for the inclusion of social dimensions into the concept of energy security. For example, D'Agostino (2010) suggested including a broader range of potential social impacts into energy security definitions. This could, then, be merged with the overall human security concept, because assessment of energy security would indicate how pursuing energy security can affect human security.

In 2010, Vivoda (2010) offered to include three additional dimensions to energy security, including defining human security as "providing basic energy services, such as access to electricity, to the entire population." As a consequence, this dimension can be measured as a "fraction of population with access to basic energy services (i.e., electricity)."

Similarly, Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Jollands (2013), suggested including human security into the concept of energy so as to make the concept more holistic.

Furthermore, there have been several attempts to include the human security dimension into the concept of energy security, not only in academic literature, but also in public policies. For instance, in order to address the security concerns of the poor, the Integrated Energy Policy of India, in particular, defines energy security as a way to "supply lifeline energy to all our citizens as well as meet their effective demand for safe and convenient energy to satisfy various needs at affordable costs at all times with a prescribed confidence level considering shocks and disruptions that can be reasonably expected" (Pachauri, 2010).

CONCLUSION

There are several major points of view regarding the relationship between human and energy security. These are largely shaped by conceptual definitions of both human and energy security. For example, human security can be viewed as an essential dimension of the traditional understanding of energy security — as the security of the national energy supply. The logic behind considering it to be a necessary dimension is straightforward. It is, in fact, similar to the one including human security in the national security equation. Indeed, if a significant part of population

has no health, economic, social and political perspective, society cannot be viewed as secure. With that in mind, even if a country could secure an uninterrupted energy supply at an affordable price, that does not necessarily signify that all citizens would be able to enjoy it. If the proportion of people without secured energy supply in a country is significantly higher, it would be hard to deem the said nation as an energy secure one. Thus, the question of human security is considered to be an essential one, albeit one of the numerous, yet still not the most important dimensions of energy security.

Other views regarding the relationship between energy security and human security, underline that human security is not just one of the dimensions of national security, but rather an independent and, most importantly, 'genuine' form of energy security. Although the security of a state is without a doubt important, its goal is to improve, or at the very least not threaten, individual human security. Similar to that, individual energy security is not perceived as just one of the numerous dimensions of national energy security, but rather as its primary and most important form. Thus, energy security belongs to the scope of human security because it is irrevocably important for ensuring any type of individual's well-being. Therefore, the energy security of end-users is, along with uninterrupted, affordable and environmentally friendly energy supply, a crucial factor of human security. Although the importance of energy security at the state level is unquestionable — due to the state being a major actor in any energy system; the final calculation about its effectiveness and the effectiveness of other actors should be done at the individual, i.e., human security level.

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HUMAN SECURITY: ITS PASTS, ITS UNDERWAY EVOLUTION AND NECESSARY FUTURE

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Abstract: Human Security has had a checkered past ever since it was formally announced in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report. The paper argues that current and foreseeable events and circumstances should be exploited with the aim of recontextualizing security so as to acknowledge planetary realities in a more comprehensive manner; with the goal of intensifying global engagement. Human security is only one of three branches of *planetary* security, along with state and biodiversity security. Through a brief overview of the history of Human Security two high points titled HS1 and HS2 can be noted: the first taking place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, while the latter was instigated by the 2013 launch of the Human Security First campaign. Reasons describing why it failed to gain and hold traction with more than just a scattered community of activists, have been laid out for each period. In order to achieve the necessary reconceptualization towards a human security perspective in doable, usable and useful ways, four suggestions have been offered: the universal deployment of strategic foresight for all policy-design activity so as to promote better preparation for an uncertain future; the establishment of a new UN Under Secretary General who would provide leadership and impose oversight of all action on Human Security; a 21st century version of 'security sector reform' which would be based on a protocol of enlightened interoperability that acknowledges inevitable global diversity while promoting harmonious relationships; the adoption of the concept of 'Leadingship' so as to exploit the fact that every human being is capable of contributing to leading, if enabled. The paper concludes with advice derived from *The Russell-Einstein Manifesto*: "Remember your humanity and forget the rest."

Key words: *human security, humanity security, biodiversity, foresight, SDGs, interoperability, leadingship*

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INTRODUCTION

Security has a lengthy history. Centuries before the evolution of homo sapiens, the planet's fauna and flora co-existed in a complex system of interdependent security. The flora provided food and shelter for the fauna, while fauna returned the favour by providing oxygen and nourishment for the flora, both in life and death. Human Security first appeared when the earliest humans gathered flora and hunted fauna so as to provide for their families. Their tools improved throughout the Stone and Iron Age, leading to the assembly of families in communities which, today, might be considered cooperatives.

As communities were growing into villages, towns and cities — the largest of which became the earliest states — competition developed and conflicts broke out over access to and availability of fauna and flora needed for developing populations, i.e., for ensuring the security of states' citizens. Human nature guaranteed that this early phase of 'state security' would eventually evolve into a competitive ecosystem of production (commerce), protection (weaponry) and power (political leadership), each of which was, until modern times, a globally scattered patchwork of states — security complexes — where the distance between them allowed for few deliberate connections.

The Industrial Revolution which brought about the age of steam, electricity and telegraph, ushered in factory-enabled mass production, global empires and enabled a large number of people to reach out to others, and share news (good or bad). Individual security in nation-states yielded precedence to state security. The production, protection, power and prestige of states have all enabled and underpinned centuries of conflicts over homeland and empire control, with land and sea-lanes among them, fauna and flora — both natural and farmed, religion, natural resources, such as gold and silver, and last but not least, control over export of human beings to man industry, extraction and the military.

Nevertheless, throughout the centuries, every human being has considered their safety and well-being of paramount importance, as, admittedly, do today's eight billion citizens. The debate — frequently the argument — over which of these two (human and/or national security) deserves priority is guaranteed in the long run.

SECURITY IN MODERN TIMES.

Definitions and descriptions of security abound, depending on whether its focus is the condition, who or what is being secured. For the former, it can be briefly expressed as how confident people can be and pursue their wishes in the absence of fear and desire. On a more comprehensive level, security has recently taken up everyone's interest, flowing into various fields. With the once-upon-a-time clear and firm boundaries fading between *military* and *civilian* communities; *public* and *private* sectors; *private profits* and *public well-being*; *combatant* and *non-combatant* individuals; and even between *war* and *peace*; everyone became, for better or worse, not only a *security stakeholder*, but more explicitly, a *security participant*. The trend continues and is, arguably, strengthening as a global polycrisis, expressed through some symptoms, such as increased pandemic outbreak risks; democratic backsliding; rising inequality; weaponization of food, health and energy; internal displacement; refugees and migration emergencies; cyberwarfare; absence of rigorous accountability and climate change; while threatening the well-being of an increasing number of people and places with less likelihood that meaningful progress will occur — not to mention that no solution is possible for any one of these elements, certainly not for all of them, interconnected, within a crowded 'map'.

Overall, the beginning of this shift of landscape can be attributed to the end of the Cold War. Once the strategic dilemma between the Superpowers ended, several changes in the International Community took place. For instance, the progressive democratization of the former Soviet republics came into place. The competition for the strongest influence in the Global South also opened space for a new set of questions regarding the formerly ignored "low politics" of culture, health, technology and economic affairs. At the same time, in Europe, four theoretical perspectives started to rethink not only the concept of security, but also, more importantly, the object of its study. These groups of Critical Security Studies (Hampson, 2012) are the following:

- The Copenhagen School focused on *securitization*;
- The Paris School focused on *insecuritization*;
- The Aberystwyth School focused on *emancipation*;
- The Human Security School focused on *humanization*.

In a way still connected to the National Security approach, the continental schools maintain their theoretical perspective centred on the State level of action, focusing their attention to behaviour and policy decisions representing non-military aspects of security from a constructivist standpoint. However, the Welsh School, as well as the Human Security School, is inclined towards an individual level of security, although the latter does it with a looser body of literature and without a rigid intellectual tradition guiding its research. The shift towards an individual scope, in which the human being, and not the State, is the starting point for the decisions to guarantee security, is crucial for handling the polycrisis.

However, in modern times, the field of Human Security policies has only had sporadic success. Until many consequences of the intensifying polycrisis have been acknowledged, collectively and collaboratively, its future as a global mainstream concern driving geopolitical action will not ameliorate. On 22nd July 1974, the second day of the ongoing Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Secretary-General's Special Representative of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) used the said term in their statement expressing concern for citizens of Greek and Turkish villages in regions controlled by other side's forces. Another 20 years passed before it has been established in the United Nations Development Program's 1994 Human Development Report. Since then, HS has never become more than a complimentary issue, even during the two periods when it received a significant amount of attention. We are, thus, labelling these two periods Human Security 1 (HS1) and Human Security 2 (HS2).

HS1, between the late 1990s and early 2000s, had its high point at the time when *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* was published, demonstrating the country's intention to focus on the 'people' side of security (Canada, 2002), along with the Human Security Report 2005 (Human Security Centre, 2006) and Human Security and International Insecurity — a massively detailed and provocative telling of the influence human security had on international security in the broadest sense (Frerks & Goldewijk, 2006). Many members of the Middle Powers Initiative (2022) were attentive during this time, but it was in vain because HS remained on the margins until being thoroughly side-lined by the 2008/2009 Great Recession. Throughout HS1, human security was in a political and intellectual 'competition' between the proponents of national or state security and those advocating for human well-being. Both

sides had disagreeing goals and priorities, while just a few attempts were made to reconcile them. One of the efforts was made by Walter Dorn (2003), who created a three-part framework for their consideration.

The first element of it was a list of the Priorities and Initiatives of each type:

Table 1: Human Security and National Security Priorities and Initiatives.

HUMAN SECURITY	NATIONAL SECURITY
<p>PRIORITIES & INITIATIVES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Saving human lives and alleviation of human suffering – Protection of people <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Peacekeeping – Humanitarian intervention – Assistance for refugees – Minority rights – Prevention of and dealing with causes of violence – Control weapons causing most human damage, e.g., AP Mines small arms – Global standards for the treatment of people, e.g., human rights & international humanitarian law – Solely punish deserving individuals <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – e.g., International Criminal Court – Integration of consistent laws both on national and global levels 	<p>PRIORITIES & INITIATIVES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Protection of the state, including its borders, independence, traditions, values, ideologies – Strong reliance on weaponry – Formation of alliances with other states – Identify and confront enemies – Seek to “win” wars and “defeat” enemies, isolate “rogue states” – “An increase in my enemy’s security is a threat to mine”

Source: Walter Dorn, 2003.

As can be seen in Table 1, this competing set of primary considerations opens a wide range of application areas which could seem mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, before the latest 2022 *Special Report on Human Security: New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity*, Dorn’s (2003) efforts to frame a “Common Security for a Common Humanity” were guided by the idea that security is overlapping in its nature where commonalities and externalities, among groups, need to be recognized. This exchange of perspectives, goods, services and ideas opens space for further opportunities, albeit simultaneously enhancing existing vulnerabilities. With that in mind, contrasting their

respective goals, as shown in Table 2 below, becomes a necessary step for understanding the shortcomings and intellectual blind spots present in both approaches, along with examining why an integrated approach was essential both in the past and now.

Table 2: Human Security and National Security Goals

HUMAN SECURITY	NATIONAL SECURITY
Goal: Protection of human beings everywhere	Goal: Protection of the home state and its citizens
<p>Favoured by <i>liberal internationalists</i> who stress that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Individuals are the primary actors & the basis of democratic governance – Governments are created to serve the people, not vice versa – HS seeks empowerment of the individual, civil society – Governments should be viewed, not as monoliths, but rather in relation to people both inside and outside of nation – “Sovereignty is responsibility” – HS values sanctity of human life – HS seeks for the system of universal rules & laws and ways to enforce them 	<p>Favoured by the <i>real politique school</i> which stresses that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – States are the primary actors (classified as, for example, friend or foe states) – It is concerned with maintenance and centrality of state power – “Sovereignty is primacy”; and it rests with the state – Importance is placed on military forces and alliances – Balance of power is sought – Individual life can be sacrificed for the sake of the nation

Source: Walter Dorn, 2003.

The third element of the Framework proposed that ‘organized human security’ and enlightened national security are “one and the same”.

Table 3: Security concepts merged

ORGANIZED HUMAN SECURITY	ENLIGHTENED NATIONAL SECURITY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – States are essential actors in human security promotion – Military forces can be key to human security defence – International organizations for peace are to be strengthened – International peace is indivisible – “When one person suffers, we all share in the suffering” – Collective action is indispensable; “All for one and one for all” – Responsible national citizenship means organizing with the aim of achieving welfare for others; global governance – “Above all, humanity” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – “Enlightened self-interest” enhances contributions both people & nations make – In an interdependent world, peace is in national interest – Preventing war is at everybody’s best interest; everyone loses after war – Respecting and promoting democracy at home and abroad – States exist to serve people’s interests and concerns, while recognizing humanitarian imperative/intervention – States seek high moral/ethical standards – Soldiers and citizens are educated in human rights and human security – Citizen soldiers respect international laws and universal/local values

Source: Walter Dorn, 2003.

Unfortunately, Dorn’s effort has not been followed up. Furthermore, exponents like Roland Paris (Paris, 2011) or Barry Buzan (Buzan & Hansen, 2009) highlighted that the overreaching concept of Human Security had no use in academia or within policies. At the same time, Ken Booth pointed out, from the point of view of the *emancipation* paradigm, the instrumental importance it has for States in the domain of rhetoric (Buzan & Hansen, 2009). So, even within the scope of Human Security supporters, the proponents of the narrow definition of the approach are strongly opposed to those who advocate for the broad one. For instance, the narrow definition, supported by Nicholas Thomas and William Tow, is focused on obtaining freedom from fear through conflict prevention and resolution.

Contrary to that, the broad definition, leveraged by Martha Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and Caroline Thomas, emphasizes freedom from fear and freedom from want by advocating for more general social issues, such as health and education (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

More telling is, it is argued, that none of several major international initiatives focused on 'security' and well-being, at the time, mentioned the term human security. None of the eight Millennium Development Goals; nor the Responsibility to Protect; the ten Principles of the UN Global Compact; John Ruggie's UN Framework for Business and Human Rights — Protect, Respect, Remedy, which is one of the earliest of the now numerous Triple Bottom Lines, yet nowhere to be found in the voluminous writings on the 'peace dividend' which so many believed to be "surely imminent" after the end of the Cold War (Reveron, 2018).

Human Security 2 was instigated in December 2013 when "Human Security First" campaign was launched. Undertaken by the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) — a network of civil society organizations which actively promotes a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, it represents a platform for gathering local perspectives in regards to human security's added value and its importance for The Post-2015 Development Agenda. From the point of view of these non-governmental organizations, *no development can occur without human security*. However, the said campaign did not gain traction.

Afterwards, none of the 17 SDGs announced in 2015, neither discussed 'security', nor used the term Human Security. The Director-level office at the UN, designated as the 'SDGs secretariat', remains unresponsive to all questions related to this. The 2016 election of Donald Trump reinforced the, already underway, decline of democracy worldwide — as documented by organizations such as Freedom House (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021) — by following the dynamic which prioritized the nationalistic rhetoric at the expense of the type and degree of multinational collaboration, which would be required to keep Human Security on the radar. Increased anti-globalist narratives and isolationist policy decisions present potent barriers to Human Security.

Moreover, another 'competitor' of Human Security is in the process of earning the status of a 'security' matter in crisis: biodiversity security. Its 'pieces' are simultaneously causes and effects of climate change. The first one is loss and extinction of whole living species. The other one is

reduction of both the space on Earth and the health of the oceans which citizens *and their biodiversity* need in order to survive, live well, move and work safely, satisfyingly and sustainably (World Wildlife Fund & Zoological Society of London, 2022). Failing to protect all species is a global injustice, apart from potentially being lethal. Muluneh (2021, p. 17) wrote that climate change has “the potential to reduce species that are unable to track the climate to which they are currently adapted and resulted in extinction risk.” Hence, it does not come as a surprise when complementary research affirms that “biodiversity loss will likely decrease ecosystem functioning and nature’s contributions to people” (Isbell et al., 2022, p. 1).

Given the patchwork of human security’s global history, it seems to be of value to try rebranding the concept in order to recognize how significantly its context has changed, so that more people would be drawn towards collaboration in addressing problems, which threaten their collective well-being, with sustained, tangible and durable action. Current events, circumstances and conditions provide more than enough evidence for the validity of this claim. Some statistics might help contextualize the necessity of perspective change. According to the United Nations Development Program (2022), since 2002, the world has lost more than 60 million hectares of tropical forest in both the Congo and the Amazon basins; within 109 countries, 1 billion people, representing 21.7% of the total population, live in acute multidimensional poverty. Moreover, by 2030, the expected trend is that 900 million people would be undernourished due to food scarcity. Numbers are no less worrying when predictions about violent conflicts are concerned. In 2020 alone, the number of people who were forcibly displaced, reached 82.4 million. In particular, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2004) indicates a death toll of 120,648 in 2021 due to State-Based Violence, Non-State Violence and One-Sided Violence.


Once again, it may be argued that the polycrisis is a mutually reinforcing dynamic of cause and effect, upon which some of the most significant assumptions leaders, and their international communities, have depended on, for decades, in order to guide their planning, policy development and implementation. It would not be an overstatement to claim that the globe is woefully ill-equipped for change — not even the one which can be forecast and predicted, let alone all the possibilities future holds and for which we cannot be prepared for, with confidence, because it might

be more than hours or days ahead. In fact, until humanity improves its ability to anticipate what *might* lie ahead, its capacity, in the event something occurs, remains reactive, with little proactivity which is demanded.

THE WAY AHEAD — HS.3

It is high time — a necessity — to design, structure and resource a durable HS.3. Human Security must be renamed Humanity Security. By doing so, the *reality* in which security needs to be more than just of and for ‘humans’ is recognized — being of and for all life; for air, land and oceans, all healthy enough for each and every living thing to inhabit without fear or want. Humanity Security must underpin, intellectually, all action with all aspects of security.

Graph 1: Humanity Security: Intersection between concepts of security



Source: Authors

As general advice, it has been suggested that Einstein be remembered for two matters; firstly, for his definition of insanity and, secondly, for his contribution to what was, at the time, a major statement on human security. He defined ‘insanity’ as continuing to do the same thing again and again while expecting different results. Then, he concluded *The Russell-Einstein Manifesto*, penned with Bertrand Russell so as to address the threat of nuclear war, with “Remember your humanity; forget the rest” (Russell & Einstein, 1955). More precisely, from 2022 onwards it should be: *Remember your humanity; there is nothing else.*

Several actions are now required — they need to be imminently doable; not costly; highly unlikely to upset even the most committed and selfish autocrat; and offer to the civil society, individually and collectively, many opportunities to participate and invest in substantive work. This could improve the likelihood that not only their future, but also the one their children will witness, would be better compared to where humanity is headed today.

1. Deploy **Strategic Foresight**. It is the capacity to anticipate what might lie ahead and act in the present in order to meet one's needs in the future. Absent the regular, if not continuous, implementation of this discipline; any action for Humanity Security will inevitably remain 'reactive'. Given the accelerating pace of unpredictable change and its consequences, being reactive is less and less 'fit for purpose' and, even, may be dangerous. Work on Humanity Security needs to be proactive enough so as to produce outcomes which 1) offer more in comparison to what today's dismal conditions demand, 2) are far more relevant to the demands of the future, which is, as early as tomorrow, unpredictably uncertain, yet *will not be* a repeat of today. Although there are no experts on the future, everyone must be more aware of what it might hold. Hopefully, that will be achieved before any occurrence of destructive shocks for which humanity is, at this moment, unprepared.

In this regard, the willingness to act towards the future may mean letting go of structures, policies, tactics or programs — or even the organization's goals — which may have been effective in the past, but may, also, leave the organization stuck, increasingly becoming obsolete in the present.

2. Establish an **Under-Secretary-General for Human Security** at **UNHQ in New York**. This would be a small step towards structural and procedural reforms, which are urgently needed at the seven-decades-old and unchanged UN. However, whether or not the UN ever reforms — especially its Security Council — is not the issue *today*. The UN's Human Security approach needs more effective, efficient, and coherent work *today*. *This* will not happen until there is a committed and focused champion leading them *at the highest level of UNHQ*.

3. Establish **Interoperability** as a protocol guiding collaboration, not only integration. The ‘silos’ of organizations and institutions will not disappear on the account of all the wasteful fragmentation they are known to have caused. Still, many of the said ‘silos’ have positive characteristics and it would be unfortunate to lose them as well. However, ‘integration’ would promote the said loss by dumbing down the best and giving free passes to the worst, thus making it nearly impossible to assign, and achieve, real accountability in an ‘integrated’ community where no one leads. Calls for homogenization fly in the face of an almost universal claim that — no matter how variably it is expressed — there is **unity in diversity**. Nonetheless, these ‘silos’ need a reset: the restoration of operative procedures which enable and encourage the occupants to see, hear, speak about and share knowledge, and intentions, with those located in other ones; opening information ‘silos’ by removing communication and cooperation barriers which create unnecessary divisions between “islands in the sea of knowledge”; softening competitive tensions between organizations and creating thematic connections between disconnected actors.
4. Think **Leadingship**. Experts and bosses, no matter how knowledgeable, experienced or revered, must not be allowed to continue ‘monopolizing’ the action of ‘leading’; how it is effectuated and its outcomes. Ignoring potential contributions of ‘followers’, as well as the youth of today who will become tomorrow’s force — both as leaders and followers — not only is the high point of *unnecessary willful blindness*, but also a recipe for endless intergenerational protests and unrest.

CONCLUSION

Gradually, all over the world, security concerns have occupied a key place in the hierarchy of human activity. Historically, those security concerns have been focused on internecine and/or domestic socio-political conflicts and circumstances between or within societies and nation-states. However, there is an increasing realization (United Nations Development Programme, 2022) that both national and human security depend on the viability of the biosphere. Humanity must operate on the following three

approaches — State, Human and Biodiversity Security. These should be acting as one in order to shape the context competently enough, for each of them, in ways which provide insights into a more stable management of our societies and resources. A clear acknowledgment of the planet's poly-crisis is needed — more precisely, a convergence of mutually reinforcing problems, such as conflict zones all across the world, the continuing risk of epidemic and pandemic outbreaks, more frequent weather-related extreme events. When nations and subnational groups expand their arsenal and fight wars, within and between porous national borders, it is difficult to progress and achieve a shift from the traditional military approach to security towards the Human Security school of thought.

Nevertheless, this change is urgently needed. Neither people nor countries can be safe without an environment which is adequately capable of sustaining their needs; according to research Isbell et al. conducted: "experts estimated that the global threatening or extinction of species reduces ecosystem functioning and NCP by roughly 10-70%" (2022, p. 3). Recently, these intersections of risks have assumed an increasingly critical role. The definitions of Human Security have become comprehensive, including its clear inextricable link to Biodiversity and State Security. In this regard, local and international organizations exert influence on society which correlates with the success and failure of this system of structures. The said security-biodiversity nexus generates various underlying forces which can increase pressure on the legal system and undermine democracy. Those forces are driven by the interaction between the two concepts. Furthermore, it can exacerbate existing inequalities and stir up conflict, both within governments and countries, and between them. Only a small part of the population has both the resource and capability required to maintain their resilience in the face of adversity. Hundreds of millions of people, those living in poverty, will be affected by state insecurity and harsh repercussions of biodiversity insecurity — in the quickest manner, most profoundly and for the longest period of time. Agendas for this, especially the United Nations' 17 Sustainable Development Goals and the Declaration of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP), underline the overlap and link between security and biodiversity, both tacitly and openly. However, this is not enough. Humanity and its planet are, in fact, **one system of structures**, where each and every one of its parts is complex, effective and interconnected with the other. Thus, in conclusion, it is **Humanity Security** for all or **Human security** for no one.

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ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN ENSURING HUMAN SECURITY IN INDIA

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Abstract: The notion of security and national interest under the discipline of International Relations, which was deeply influenced by the classical realist school of thought, had witnessed a change in the last few decades of the twentieth century. The release of Human Development Report (HDR) by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994 challenged the traditionally accepted view of security which was understood as protecting the state borders from external threats, while the state actors were solely responsible for its defence. This was done by adding a new dimension i.e., 'Human Security' which is more of a human-centred approach to security. There are numerous threats to human life, which are not essentially external, and can be internal. India, a postcolonial democracy, is not immune to these threats, as well. In this paper, we have briefly considered the adverse effects of these new threats to India and how it had responded to them in the past, while also trying to explain, succinctly, how the non-state actors in collaboration with the state actors, are mitigating the sufferings of the people from these non-conventional threats. In the end, this paper also highlighted the importance of essential shifts in policy-making, which have helped the state minimize the 'collective dilemma' inevitable in this globalized world.

Keywords: *Human Security, state actors, non-state actors, non-conventional threats, policy-making, sovereignty*

INTRODUCTION

Security, for a very long time, has been referred to in its restricted sense, as the security of states' territorial borders from outside invasion, or as securing of national interests through diplomacy, or as worldwide security from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. Its primary focus was more on nation-states than on people. The conventional threats to the 'developing' countries (like India), which had won their independence from their colonial masters in recent times, were discussed under the confines of traditional security studies, while many less visible threats, having the potential

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to adversely impact the economic growth, human development and the life of an individual, which is inextricably linked to the security of the state, need to be addressed because these states are more susceptible to any actual or perceived dangers to their brittle sovereignty. Ordinary citizens of these countries, who are highly insecure in their daily lives, were at the back seat. "Majority of these people perceived security as protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental perils" (HDR, 1994, p. 22).

Now in the twenty-first century, the understanding of security and threats has changed significantly. One can now estimate more threats within the state than from outside. Some of the developing countries, with the cold war mindset, are still prioritizing their external security, but in the twenty-first century, the enemy is within their borders in the form of hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, crime, political repression, communal violence, global warming, climate change, etc. The world community placed these new kinds of threats under the umbrella term Human Security. The term which was itself first hypothesized by The United Nations Development Programme in the 1994 Human Development Report. The report summarized Human Security in the following ways:

1. "Safety from Chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and repression," and,
2. "Protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life" (United Nations Development Programme, 1994).

This notion of Human Security can also be comprehended as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want." A new dimension, i.e., 'freedom to live in dignity' has also been appended to the discourse of Human Security (United Nations Secretary-General, 2010; United Nations Secretary-General, 2012).

There is a general consensus that most of the threats the world is facing in the twenty-first century are associated with the issues such as poverty, underdevelopment, inequality, illegal migration, environmental degradation, pandemics, climate change, people and drug trafficking, and conflicts arising from maladministration and inadequate governance, which might lead to state's failure. These perils, although not very visible, in an era of increasing interdependence, are progressively transnational and interrelated and it is difficult for a state to defend itself from these dangers

on its own. If the state fails to ensure the security of its citizens, then this might ignite the anti-state sentiments among the patriotic groups, which would ultimately lead to the failure of the state. Moreover, the ostensibly stable looking international order is also not immune from these threats, which can directly affect life and safety of people. The most pressing need is to reinterpret the concept of security and in what way it can be ensured (Acharya, 2011). These new problems increasingly transcend state borders and have global consequences, which require unconventional solutions. The conventional actors, i.e., the states, together with some non-traditional actors, i.e., non-state actors can ensure the human security effectively.

Non-state actors are influential in the world politics which are non-sovereign in nature, including Super-Empowered Individuals, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), Multinational Corporations, de facto regimes, International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), and terrorist organizations (Wagner, 2009). Their dual influence over world politics is well observed. A state, in collaboration with another state, can work on ensuring the security of its people from unconventional threats, but for a state, collaboration with a non-state actor is easier than that with a state actor. From the realistic perspective, international politics is all about anarchy and self-help, and if a state seeks help from another state it might lead to total dependence and, later on, to a complete subordination of the former to the latter. For example, China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan and the Hambantota Port deal in between Sri Lanka and China. So, in order to avoid such compromise of its sovereignty, a state can ask non-state actors to bail them out from such dangerous situations which have the potential to destabilize the state and the region.

STATUS OF HUMAN SECURITY IN INDIA

India, the largest democracy in the world, borders China in the North and North-East and Pakistan in the North-West. Both of these countries created border tensions for India during the Cold War period, which forced New Delhi to focus on its Northern frontiers, ignoring the immediate concerns of developing a newly independent nation and providing basic amenities to the masses. Per the records of PIB, the literacy rate of India was just 18.33 per cent in 1951 and 52.21 per cent in 1991. And in 2000, India was the third among the SAARC countries after Maldives and

Sri Lanka with literacy rates of 96.3 and 91.6 per cent respectively (Ministry of Human Resource Development, 2003). This high illiteracy rate of India, in her initial years, was one of the major causes contributing to human insecurity in later years.

Table 1

Year	Literacy Rate			
	Total	Male	Female	Differential
1951	18.33	27.16	8.86	18.30
1961	28.30	40.40	15.35	25.05
1971	34.45	45.95	21.97	23.98
1981	43.57	56.38	29.76	26.62
1991	52.21	64.13	39.29	24.84
2001	65.38	75.85	54.16	21.69
Comparison of male and female literacy rates since 1951				


Source: www.pib.in

Food insecurity is another threat that the country faced during its initial years of independence. There were several threats of famine such as in Bihar in 1967, and in Gujarat in 1987. However, these were not nearly as terrible as the Bengal famine of 1943 due to the state's intervention (Miklian, 2013). In 2011, according to the Global Hunger Index (GHI) report, released by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), India ranked 67th out of 81st countries (Miklian, 2013). This was contrary to the claims of India (a state actor in this case) that its population can be fed from domestic production and that there was a buffer stock of 60 million tonnes of food grains for the same year (Miklian, 2013). The situation on the ground is still appalling. Nearly fifty per cent of the malnourished children are from rural India, where the majority of the population still resides. Even in 2021, the situation was still alarming. In 2021, India stood 101st out of 116 countries in the GHI report, and is, still, behind many of the South Asian states (Daily updates, 2021). The concurrence of sufficient food stocks and prevailing starvation in India explains that the focus on increasing food production is not adequate to attain food security of the individual. This shows the incongruence of the state's machinery, as this is a problem from the supply side. Consequently, this food insecurity leads to insecurity of health.

Health is another important dimension of human security. For many, health is a basic human right which can be used as an instrument for economic development. In India, during the colonial era, the health sector suffered from underinvestment by the colonizers. Moreover, at the time of their withdrawal, the colonizers left India with a weak and limited health infrastructure, and due to the lack of resources, it remained in the back seat (Amrith, 2009). During the initial phase after independence, the Indian health sector was assisted by foreign aid. For example, the program for Malaria Eradication was supported by the U.S. At that time, this program was of limited success, because later, in the 1960s, Malaria re-emerged in the country, due to the lack of health infrastructure and the resistance to Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT) and the Anti-Malaria drug (Amrith, 2009). However, even after 70 years of independence, the country is still struggling in the domain of the health sector. Recently, the COVID 19 pandemic revealed the shortcomings of the state’s health sector and the ignorance of the leadership. During the second wave of COVID 19, the Indian health care system collapsed. Patients died as they waited for hospital beds or oxygen. This was, partly, the result of underfunding. India’s expenditure on health per capita was only \$73, which was well below the world’s average spending of \$110 in 2018 (Shanoor, 2021). Indian policy-makers must look further into this domain because a healthy, efficient and skilled population can only be a blessing to a developing economy like India.

Graph 1

Daily reported deaths are rising



Deaths on 17 June include historic deaths reclassified with coronavirus as cause

Source: Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, data to 19 Apr



Source: (Pandey & Nazmi, 2021)

Being a post-colonial and developing economy, India had faced serious obstacles in ensuring the economic security of its citizens which differs from the economic security of a state. The economic security of a state provides the ability to leverage its economic strength vis-à-vis its enemies so as to exert pressure on them, either by enhancing its defence capabilities or by throttling the economy of their enemies. Furthermore, the economic security of an individual is slightly different. According to the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), economic security can be defined as “the ability of individuals, households or communities to cover their essential needs sustainably and with dignity” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2015).

In India, after independence, the Indian government took an arduous task of advancing the living status of its population, which accounted for one-seventh of the world’s total population, with an average citizen earning what was one-fifteenth of the average American income at that time (Adhia, 2015). The state chose to invest in its secondary sectors, following the belief of economists that the manufacturing sector provides the greatest opportunity for production growth, which will act as a catalyst in economic development which is intrinsically linked with human security (Adhia, 2015). To realize the goal of establishing a socialist pattern of society and a self-reliant state, the government invested in the creation of public enterprises which produced basic and heavy goods instead of consumer goods. The production of consumer goods was left to cottage industries which were labour intensive and had the potential to generate employment (Adhia, 2015). These efforts to make the country self-reliant did well initially, but under the regime of the fixed exchange rate, rising inflation in the 1960s reduced the country’s exports and increased imports, resulting in a shortfall of Forex Reserves. The repercussions were felt all over the economy. This led to the devaluation of the rupee, which adversely impacted the economic lives of most people (Adhia, 2015). The balance of payment crisis made the situation worse and it was averted with the help of The World Bank and the IMF (both are Non-State Actors). Therefore, the economic reforms of 1991 gave positive results, with the economy generating adequate funds and investing to ensure an annual average growth rate of almost 5%. From 1991 to 2016, the economy witnessed an eight-fold increase in GDP (Khandelwal, 2016). But the recent pandemic of Covid-19 has severely hit the nation’s economy. Per the data

released by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation (MoSPI), “the Indian economy contracted by 7.3% in the first quarter of the financial year 2021-22” (Mangla, 2021). During the lockdown, \$2.9 trillion of the Indian economy remained frozen except for some essential services and activities. The pandemic has had the biggest impact on the informal sector of the Indian economy. This humanitarian crisis, coupled with the silent response from the government, has exposed and worsened the existing inequalities in the Indian economy (Mangla, 2021).

In India, during the initial years of its independence, the government prioritized the industrial sector at the expense of other ones such as health care and education. This resulted in the diversion of scarce public resources away from these essential sectors which had the potential to transform India. “The underinvestment on these in India stands in marked contrast to the plentiful attention paid to them in China and other developing countries” (Adhia, 2015).

After seven decades of independence, India is still struggling on multiple fronts; nearly fifty per cent of its children are malnourished, about fifty per cent of women are illiterate, and two-thirds of its people are still deprived of basic sanitation (Adhia, 2015). As a result, majority of Indians today, are unable to take advantage of the opportunities created by the state’s recent tilt towards capitalism and globalization.

CONTRIBUTION OF NON-STATE ACTORS IN ENSURING HUMAN SECURITY

State actors, being the primary actors in global affairs, are now being influenced by many secondary actors known as the Non-State Actors (NSAs). These secondary actors, being the non-sovereign players, exercise enormous political and socioeconomic pull at a national and, at some instances, at the international level. These NSAs can be the Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), Transnational Corporations (TNCs), Super-Empowered Individuals, Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs), Government Organised Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs), Terrorist Organizations etc. (National Intelligence Council, 2007). Barring the last example, i.e., terrorist organizations, almost all other NSAs play a positive role in global and domestic affairs. One might ask why does a need for these NSAs in global politics exist, when we already have sovereign state actors. In this

section, we will try to answer this question, while also discussing the role which these NSAs are playing in developing countries (India in this case) so as to ensure human security and tackle the problems associated with it.

The national governments are responsible for territorial security, enforcing laws, international communications with the help of diplomats, determining the terms and conditions of trade (before the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and so on (Taylor, 2018). However, with the unprecedented increase in economic interdependence and with the advent of globalization, the ability of state actors to deal with the new transnational threats, such as climate change, pollution, poverty, terrorism, the refugee crisis, etc., has been negatively affected. These transnational threats imposed the requirement of non-state actors, so that the states, in collaboration with these NSAs, could effectively tackle these new challenges which are directly related to the security of individuals who are an essential constituent of a state (Taylor, 2018). Since 2001, research done by the Advocacy NGOs which work on transnational issues, such as the environment, public health, social and economic justice, migration and displacement, have received greater attention (Taylor, 2018).

On many occasions, non-state actors have actively participated alongside the state actors to ensure human security in general, working, particularly, in the fields of education, environment protection, social development, and health. A recent example of NSAs' active involvement in India can be the STARS program. This program is being implemented with the assistance of the World Bank, in order to improve the conditions for school education and governance in six Indian States (including Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Odisha). The World Bank is supporting this program by providing \$500 million. The STARS program will benefit nearly 10 million teachers and around 250 million students, between the age group of 6 and 17 years. In total, 1.5 million schools will be a part of this program (World Bank, 2021).

To achieve the target of 'education for all', the World Bank and the Union government have been working together since 1994. Before the STARS program, the World Bank had already invested \$3 billion in India, in the education sector. As a result, India has witnessed significant improvement. The number of school-going children has increased from 219 million in 2004-05 to 248 million in 2018-19. However, the learning outcomes of

students are not satisfactory. The STARS program will address the issue of ‘learning Outcomes’ and will assist the students in developing skills for the jobs of the future (World Bank, 2021).

Super Empowered Individuals, such as Bill Gates and M. F. Gates, through their foundation, i.e., The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, have also been collaborating with the Indian government in improving the living conditions of millions of people. They began their work in 2003, in India, by launching *Avahan* — a program for preventing the spread of HIV, which was estimated to have averted 600,000 new infections. The Gates Foundation, with many other collaborators, has assisted the Government of India in eliminating polio, leading India, to be Polio free in 2014. The foundation had signed a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) with the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare under which the foundation will provide managerial, technical and program design assistance for key health initiatives (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.).

In India, the foundation is working with partners to enhance the quality of governance in priority states, particularly in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The foundation is working in other states, as well, in order to improve the quality of agriculture, sanitation, and promote gender equality and digital financial inclusion (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.). Apart from working with the central and the state governments, the foundation is also working with the local groups at the community level, academic institutions, non-profit organizations, the corporate sectors, and development organizations (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, n.d.).

In the domain of community security, an important dimension of human security, the Indian government is collaborating with some NSAs. The GOAL (Going Online as Leaders) program is an example of such collaboration, launched by Facebook (now Meta), in partnership with the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, in May 2020, to empower 5,000 young people from tribal communities for the next five years (Ministry of Tribal affairs, n.d.). This nine-month program is divided into two parts — a seven-month mentorship and a two-month internship — so as to gain practical knowledge. This digitally enabled program was relevant during the COVID-19 pandemic as it ignited the competitiveness of India’s tribal communities, by providing them with an opportunity to showcase their creativity using digital platforms (Ministry of Tribal affairs, n.d.). In 2019, a pilot run of the program

was launched, which received an enthusiastic response from the community. The program has also ensured that a structured governing committee is made, in order to monitor and guide the program, using its varied experience. According to the Ministry of Tribal Affairs: "It contains people from the government, academia, and industry along with the presence of stalwarts from social organizations such as UNDP, NITI Aayog, FICCI, the art of living, AIIMS Jodhpur, etc. the program, through its wide network of partners aims to ensure optimal reach of the initiative, thereby creating a holistic environment for the growth and development of the tribal community" (Ministry of Tribal affairs, n.d.).

In the health sector, the initiative like 'The W.H.O — India Country Cooperation Strategy 2019-2023: A Time of Transition,' which is a jointly developed strategy by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoH&FW) of the Government of India (GOI) and the W.H.O Country Office for India, is going to provide a strategic plan for W.H.O to work in cooperation with the Government of India towards improving the health of its people and bringing in changes within the health sector (World Health Organization, 2019). However, this kind initiatives are not enough to strengthen the health system in India. For this, a massive overhaul is required, which ultimately requires a massive financial investment. The percentage of government hospitals is very low in comparison to the state-of-the-art private hospitals, which are accessible only to some wealthy people. The Indian government can collaborate with the non-state actors, such as WHO, World Bank, AIIB, and others, to address the low quality of public health services and infrastructure shortages to effectively safeguard individuals from future pandemics (Amrith, 2009).

CONCLUSION

India, a home to more than 1.21 billion (National commission on population, 2020) people is going through a transition. Its security concerns are also in flux. As in the words of Ken Booth, an emancipator theorist, the military confrontation including nuclear weapons has now become obsolete as the problem of security has taken a local character (Booth, 1991). At this time, many countries in South Asia, including India, are not dealing with the problem of territorial security, barring the few skirmishes with China at the LAC. However, now, they are dealing with more serious threats which

have both local and transnational character. Recent events of economic recession and the deadly Covid-19 pandemic, along with many other internal threats like that of Naxalism, insurgency in North and North-East India, target killings of a particular minority in Jammu and Kashmir, the polarization of majority along religious lines, cybercrime, mob lynching, the water table depletion, pollution, stagflation, unemployment, illiteracy, malnutrition, maladministration and corruption, are all obstacles in the holistic development of an individual, which is a prerequisite for ensuring Human Security. Although some of these obstacles can only be dealt with a state intervention, more can be dealt effectively by the collaborative efforts of state and Non-State Actors. In the Indian context, the adoption of democracy, alone, is not enough to secure the individual's life. In the real sense, the democratic principles must also be followed at the level of security providers. The time has come to involve the non-state actors in the democratic framework so that they can use their potential to secure the individual's life. It is the right time to imply Kant's moral idea that humans should always be treated only as ends and never as means (Kant, 1975). It is the security of the individual which should always come first, while the states are only tools. And if these tools are not functioning efficiently, then instead of discarding them, we must support them by the non-state actors so that they can function efficiently. In this paper the rationale behind highlighting the contribution of the NSAs in ensuring human security in India is, by no means to showcase them as a substitute for the state actors, but rather to compensate the shortcomings of the state actors. In the end, most importantly, dependence on the NSAs must, by no means, be a threat to the sovereignty of the state, as their actions can be regulated by the state actors, because these secondary actors are non-sovereign in nature, and, therefore, come under the jurisdiction of the state from where they are operating (Gomez and Gasper, 2013).

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DOES THE DAWN OF ROBOTS BRING THE DAY OF NEW HUMAN INSECURITIES?¹

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Abstract: The paper examines how might major breakthroughs in robotisation and artificial intelligence (AI) generate new human insecurities in the realm of human–robot interactions in the not-so-distant future. The author hypothesises robots’ potential to undermine security of individuals and their achieved empowerment by weaknesses of AI technologies or their malicious use. As robotisation approaches autonomy by creating more sophisticated interactions, humans become more vulnerable, because of our tendency to form robust emotional attachments to artificial entities which stimulate us to use social routines intrinsic to human–human interactions. The author argues that the human security approach parallels anticipated robot sociability to the point that the fundamental set of human capabilities, related to survival, livelihood, and dignity — which is to be secured when robots enter society in large numbers — has to include agency, i.e., the capacity to act independently and to make one’s own free choices. In this analysis, moral agency is examined as a core value, in the context of the human security as a humanist project with emancipatory and empowering qualities. With that in mind, the author concludes that the robots must be programmed to behave in a humane way and that, furthermore, the embeddedness of moral reasoning ought to be a constitutive element of human–robot interaction aimed at safeguarding human security in the coming age of social robots.

Key words: *human security, social robots, artificial intelligence, robotisation, human–robot interaction, robot ethics*

HUMANS AND INTELLIGENT MACHINES: SEDUCTION AND FEAR

Intelligent machines or “robots” (*robota*, forced labour in Czech; derived from *rab*, slave) — as a Czech novelist, Karel Čapek, named artificial humanoids in the 1920 science fiction play *R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal*

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Robots) — were designed and programmed to fulfil certain tasks instead of humans. From 1980s onward, there has been a lively debate on the plausible social outcomes of replacing people with robots where circumstances require and technical possibilities allow it. Some authors emphasise the moral dimension of the issue of human replaceability by robots, and, therefore, point out that we should carefully examine which roles should never be taken over by the robots (Decker, 2017). Marvin Minsky (1927-2016), an AI pioneer who helped make machines think and the co-founder of Artificial Intelligence Group at MIT, had a philosophically positive view of the future in which machines might, truly, be capable of thought and, eventually, offer solutions to some of humanity's largest problems (Reuters, 2016). The most famous proponent of the pessimistic view was the astrophysicist, Stephen Hawking, who feared that the development of the so-called Strong AI could hasten the end of humanity, so that superintelligent robots, with built-in full autonomy, could continue improving themselves until they surpass humans, who could not compete with AI due to the slow course of natural evolution (Sulleyman, 2017). Aleksandra Przegalinska, a philosopher of AI, warns of such a possibility: robots could, at some point, acquire some sense of subjectivity and continue to pursue entirely self-selected goals and begin to shape the world accordingly — just as humans have done throughout history (Sterniczky, 2017). The contextualisation of fear as a socio-culturally constructed response to the expected stimulus related to the use of robots and AI in everyday life has been a bad omen. A recent survey on public perceptions of these technologies shows clearly that there is social anxiety, at least judging by describing AI in terms of “creepy” or “scary robots” (Cave et al., 2019). This negative characterisation is not unexpected, if we bear in mind that there are two sources from which average citizens obtain information about robots and AI: news and fiction. The media frequently report on AI and robotics by using cliché images referring to famous sci-fi films and, sadly, usually those which depict a dystopian vision of human–robot relations. Liang and Lee (2017) reveal that one out of every four US citizens has experienced fear of robots, even though they have never interacted with them, which implies that the fear has been instigated by science fiction (sci-fi) literary and film genre, popularising plots where the criminal role of robots and AI is aimed at the destruction of humanity (pp. 383-384). This widespread social anxiety has been grounded in the fear of autonomy as

the basic feature of a future credible robot, which would certainly turn upside down the current relationship of man to the material world produced and arrogantly destroyed by him day after day.

Human–robot interaction has been reality for at least four decades, as robots have already replaced humans in many industries. According to official statistics of the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in overall 48 accidents, industrial robots caused 29 deaths in the period 1984–2021 (Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 2022). The first recorded case of death caused by robot, took place at Ford’s car plant in Michigan in 1979, and outside the United States, at Kawasaki’s plant in Japan in 1981. An American worker was killed when a robot hit him while he was carelessly picking up mechanic parts next to a conveyor belt; a Japanese worker forgot to turn off the robot during routine maintenance. The last case reported by the media, occurred in 2015, at a Volkswagen factory in Germany, when a robot crushed a twenty-two-year-old worker whose attention was occupied with installing a new machine (Huggler, 2015). In these cases, the deaths were caused by the inattention of the workers, and not by evil “intention” of industrial robots programmed to do a very narrowly defined task. The first recorded case of a pedestrian fatality involving self-driving cars happened in Arizona in 2018, when a woman was hit and killed by an autonomous vehicle because it did not have the capability to classify an object as a pedestrian — the car could not recognise the woman as a pedestrian or, even, a person (McCausland, 2019). When it comes to medical robots used for minimally invasive surgery, accidents reported in the United States from 2000 to 2013 resulted in 144 fatalities — 1.4% of the total of 10,624 reports (Alemzadeh et al., 2016).

While the scope and degree of risk for humans will decrease as robots replace them in unsafe working environments, the risk of unforeseen accidents in the human–robot interaction is expected to rise along with the growth of fully autonomous robots (Weiss et al., 2011, p. 120). As robotisation advances towards full autonomy by creating more sophisticated interactions, humans would become more vulnerable, because of our tendency to form robust emotional attachments to artificial entities which stimulate us to use social routines intrinsic to human–human interactions. The dispersed nature of new plausible threats to well-being of individuals stems from less visible (or invisible) psychological and emotional manipulation of humans by advanced robots which are inherently social in

design or functionally enhanced through social interaction. Developing a thesis which states that it is through insecurity that the individual is constituted, J. Peter Burgess points out that both ethics and security “form the basis of humanity” (2008, p. 2). He further argues that the concept of security mirrors “the individual experience that underlies our relationship with the unknown” (Burgess, 2008, p. 4). The sense of insecurity is related to our general vulnerability, i.e., our exposure to danger: “we only know approximately what kind of danger it is, not when it will hit and how” (Burgess, 2008, p. 4).

This paper will address the one central question: how might major breakthroughs in robotisation and AI generate new human insecurities in the realm of human–robot interactions in the not-so-distant future, due to weaknesses of AI technologies or their malicious use. As robotisation approaches autonomy by creating more sophisticated interactions, humans become more vulnerable, because of our tendency to form robust emotional attachments to artificial entities which stimulate us to use social routines intrinsic to human–human interactions. The departing assumption is that the human security approach parallels anticipated robot sociability to the point that the fundamental set of human capabilities, related to survival, livelihood, and dignity — which is to be secured when robots enter society in large numbers — has to include agency, i.e., the capacity to act independently and to make one’s own free choices. Therefore, we will employ the concept of moral agency, as a core value, in the context of the human security as a humanist project with emancipatory and empowering qualities.

ROBOTISATION, MORAL AGENCY, AND HUMAN SECURITY

AI and sociorobotics are likely to create a world of many possibilities by incremental introduction of ever more realistic human-like robots, which may induce a new sense of vulnerability and exposure to the unknown realm of human–robots relations. This relationship may bring about new threats which would be beyond human control and which would hamper human capability to develop resilience to difficult situations with social robots. Therefore, we suggest that the concept of human security might be a valuable tool in examining how major breakthroughs in robotics and AI, as well as their malicious use, could create new insecurities in the realm

of human–robot interactions in the not-so-distant future. With no intention to delve into complex debate about unresolved issues of conceptual boundary-setting, analytical limitations, and the loss of critical potential (see Newman, 2010; Christie, 2010), for the purposes of this analysis the epistemological importance of the notion of human security is emphasized, as it refers to the protection of core human values and long-term human flourishing from various critical and pervasive threats — ranging from physical and psychological integrity to the unhindered living of a fulfilled life (Hampson, 2008, pp. 231-232; Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4; MacFarlane & Foong Khong, 2006; United Nations Development Programme, 1994). For Newman, the human security approach is normatively attractive because “it argues that there is an ethical responsibility to re-orient security around the individual in line with internationally recognised standards of human rights and governance” (2010, p. 78).

Given its comprehensive and universalistic nature, the concept of human security is centred around “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want” and “freedom to live in dignity” (Shani, 2007, pp. 1-8), which means that human security and human rights mutually reinforce each other. The individual as the referent and main beneficiary of human security should not just enjoy the substance of human rights, but also have safe access to those rights (Tadjbakhsh & Chenoy, 2007, pp. 123-139). The centrality of the fundamental individual needs, institutionalised in human rights and freedoms relates human security profoundly to empathy and solidarity, which lie at the very heart of the psychological basis of morality. Minsky (1986) claimed that neither human nor machine intelligence is a single process, but rather that the intelligence arises from the interaction of numerous processes organised into a “society of mind.” In his view, there is reciprocity between our understanding of mind and machine, which continues improving until, at one point, the humanity would have to decide whether or not to create machines more intelligent than humans. We hold that, from the standpoint of epistemology of individual experience, implied by the human security approach, social anxieties and needs, to which existential security corresponds, have to be observed through the lens of ethics. This approach parallels anticipated robot sociability to the point that the fundamental set of human capabilities, related to survival, livelihood, and dignity — which is to be secured when robots enter society in large numbers — has to include agency.

We face many decisions in our daily routine; in a way, life is all about making regular decisions. Similarly, agency is everywhere around us. Putting aside long debates about the nature of agency, the standard theory of action defines agency as “the performance of intentional actions”, where an agent is “a being with the capacity to exercise agency just in case it has the capacity to act intentionally, and the exercise of agency consists in the performance of intentional actions and, in many cases, in the performance of unintentional actions” (Schlosser, 2009). Agency implies purpose, action, and autonomy, with the agent always situated in the material world (Weissman, 2020, p. 1). Being a bedrock of morally upright behaviour, the moral agency, in this analysis, is examined as a core value, in the context of the human security as a humanist project with emancipatory and empowering qualities. A moral agent acts in a manner which expresses concern for moral values as the ultimate goal; to be a moral agent means to be capable of acting with reference to right and wrong — making ethical decisions and acting accordingly (Garofalo & Geuras, 2006, pp. 1-5).

Moral agency is in the metaphysical sense, primarily, attributed to human individuals. We, human beings, should have the capacity to act for the sake of the moral law, a free will, moral understanding, moral sentiments, and to be held responsible for the predictable results of our actions (Haksar, 2005, p. 692). Yet, the agent may be capable of performing actions, but not conforming to the demands of morality. That is why Haksar contemplates robots to be, at best, only quasi-moral (2005, p. 692). Humans, as moral agents, are autonomous, but do not live isolated; they interact with each other and raise plenty of moral dilemmas every day. These socialised autonomies of moral agents are the outcome of the complex process of their folding “into the fabric of meanings, roles, and rules responsible for order, productivity, and mutual understanding” (Weissman, 2020, p. 10). As the social aspect of moral agency is central to any serious concerns regarding moral practice, we will investigate the plausible ways in which major present and anticipated breakthroughs in robotisation could affect the dynamics of human–robot interaction when intelligent machines step into society in large numbers.

THE PROMISE OF FULL AUTONOMY: THE ADVENT OF ROGUE ROBOTS?

Contrary to media overdramatization, robotics is a field of research still populated by prototypes, although some devices may display robotic features, such as Roomba (self-driving floor cleaner), Automower (self-driving lawn mower), as well as iPal, QTrobot, Roybi (robots for monitoring and teaching small children), and Care-O-bot (elder-care robot). The ethical perspective of the human–robot collaboration will become more relevant as social robots, increasingly, infiltrate daily routines. Moreover, they will be expected to be high-skilled, to the extent that they would be able to respond efficiently to all human needs. A social robot is “a physical entity embodied in a complex, dynamic, and social environment sufficiently empowered to behave in a manner conducive to its own goals and those of its community” (Duffy et al., 1999). Robots will be able to act in contexts in which humans are acting now, however, advances in robotics will induce technical, safety, and trust challenges. Humanity should start preparing for stepping into the new age, Machinocene, and sharing Earth with a lot of intelligent machines (Price, 2016). In this analysis, we will focus on advanced social robots which will be used for taking care of, probably, the most vulnerable individuals (children and the elders).

The transition of robots, from experimental to real-world environments, is rather complex due to another reason: what experience would users have at the end of day — positive or negative, particularly in the context of new plausible threats to human security. When it comes to the corporate environment, an experiment, conducted by Jerčić and collaborators (2018), highlighted the positive aspects of cooperation between robots and humans in solving complex tasks, as well as the affirmative emotions of the participants and their beneficial impact on the quality of the task performance. Labour productivity was not reduced and the quality of the task performance was not affected by whether the immediate co-workers were humans or robots, although the participants expressed greater trust and ease with a human co-worker (Jerčić et al., 2018). This is why Shourmasti and collaborators (2021) and Šabanović (2010, pp. 444-448) stress the vital importance of evaluation of user experience in the early stages of social robots’ development. According to these authors, a sound evaluation of the human–robots interaction should include concepts, methods,

and practices from various disciplines (e.g., experimental psychology, human-computer interaction, anthropology, etc.), guidelines on how to define user experience goals, the diversified set of techniques to assess user experience, and naturalistic field studies.

The concept of full autonomy in robotics refers to the capability of intelligent machines to embody three key concepts — perception, intelligence and execution. This means that a fully autonomous robot is able to perceive its surrounding (with help of various sensors), identify and extract data coming from that surrounding (e.g., data relevant for his goals), apply situational thinking to collected and processed data to make a decision, on its own, how to react (with help of AI and machine learning), and then perform the chosen course of action independent of human control or intervention (Beetz et al., 2016, p. 329; Negnevitsky, 2005, pp. 1-17). Artificial Narrow Intelligence (ANI) supplies solutions for limited scope of problems and has been applied in GPS, Amazon recommendations, Google translate, facial and speech recognition, various business processes — from advertising to logistics. Yet, the ultimate goal is to build the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), a self-teaching system that would imitate human intelligence and allow for adaptation, based on environmental information, in the absence of explicit rules. Only AGI could enable human–robot interaction in vibrant social surroundings, i.e., an effective adaptation to never-ending changes driven by conclusions, based on actions, which the robot should draw on the basis of its programme. A fully autonomous robot based on AGI should select relevant information for a desired outcome.

AGI would provide answers based on data inputs, but the quality of that data could be compromised by low-quality end products, due to omissions and errors in their collecting, processing, and analysing because of the inexperience or bias of programmers. Achieving the human-level AI might be inevitable in the 2040s, after the expected major breakthroughs in the field of computational (non-symbolic) AI. Therefore, it could easily happen that unsoundly programmed algorithms affect the process of machine learning of fully autonomous humanoid robots and, thus, seriously endanger human security and the vulnerable parts of human population.

The problem of misunderstanding how autonomous social robots (mal)function

The first group of plausible sources of human insecurity, as a socially constructed experience of vulnerability, may stem from the exposure of humans to uncertainty of the unknown, which will inevitably come along with development of AGI. Even today's ANI brings about misunderstanding of how intelligent machines make decisions. For instance, Deep-Mind's AI system AlphaGo not only outplayed the world leading player of the ancient game *Go* in 2016, but also successfully demonstrated a genuine tactical move that none of the human players have ever used (Hern, 2016). The unexpected and praiseworthy AlphaGo's move astonished *Go* and AI experts; yet, it also anticipates a sinister possibility of faulty human comprehension of actions pursued by future social robots, equipped with much more powerful AGI. A banal example depicting how the problem of misunderstanding the performance of social robots may easily and abruptly put humans in harmful situations, happened recently. In July 2022, during a chess competition held in Moscow, a chess-playing robot grabbed and broke a finger of its seven-year-old opponent (Henley, 2022). The boy rushed to move a figure not realising that, first, he had to wait for robot to complete its move; he erred when he did not give enough time for the robot to answer.

Advanced robots, empowered by AGI, could affect safety of users by acting in ways which were not envisaged at the time when they were first put into use. On a simpler operational level, the harm might be caused by unsound recognition, classification, and cataloguing of objects and situations; interference in the environment in negative ways while pursuing goals; unsuccessful realisation of the goal due to limited information and poor experiment with various operational strategies (National Science and Technology Council, 2016, p. 33). On another operational level, detrimental malfunctions might result from poor voice and gesture recognition or due to unnatural or counter-intuitive human-robot interaction, as well as from inherent hazards associated with core meaning and open texture risks. Weng and collaborators (2009) stress that the vagueness in interpretations of the core meaning of any term — allowed by the open texture characteristic of human language based on the abstract thinking — might lead to misinterpretation of the meaning of sentences, i.e.,

inability of social robots to grasp the abstract meanings and vague terms used in communication with humans (pp. 276-278). For instance, when it comes to health or child or elders care settings, an autonomous social robot could do harm to patients/children/elders, if they do not respond the way the AGI predicted, whereas the robot's AGI is not capable of resolving unanticipated situations generated by many possibilities of the course of human action.

Despite media exploitation of rare mishaps, humans can bond with robots more easily than one may assume. Professor of philosophy, Stephen Asma (2020), argues that animism, as the oldest form of human cognition, enables humans to "bond, form attachments and dedicate themselves to non-conscious objects or lifeless things with shocking ease." Asma suggests that it is through "tech-animism" that we respond to the ongoing epidemic of loneliness, by establishing emotional relationships with AI-driven technical devices, as "we imprint easily on anything that reduces the feeling of loneliness", and "the sophistication level of human-like simulation that AI needs in order to elicit our empathy and emotional entanglement is ridiculously low" (Asma, 2020). The phenomenon of anthropomorphisation of technology describes the tendency of humans to attribute human qualities and characteristics (motivations, intentions, and emotions) to non-human entities and inanimate objects (Epley et al., 2007). Fossa (2018) suggests that the tendency is so powerful and pervasive that it, even, embraces devices which do not resemble human beings. This pervasiveness partly underpins Honneth's thesis on the centrality of fundamental human needs for emotional support, recognition as a member of society, and symmetrical social esteem. When our need for mutual social recognition is not fulfilled in the community, we may replace it with bonding with robots. The smarter the robots are, the easier we will embrace their companionship. In the event of anthropomorphisation of robots and other AI devices, an incoming massive introduction of free-roaming and internet connected human-like AGI-driven machines in people's daily activities could induce plenty of safety hazards.

Since social robots can influence the behaviour of human beings with whom they interact (Traeger et al., 2020, p. 6370), they should be designed to act in a manner conducive to the protection of core human values (such as e.g., physical and psychological integrity) and the unhindered living of a fulfilled life. Taking these two claims into account, there are concerns

that the massive use of autonomous social robots might pose a threat to human security regarding intrusion into individual/family privacy, hidden agenda-setting, and seeking particular (corporate, political) interests or ideology/religion in a non-transparent way. For instance, Hambling warns of possibility of social robots exerting a subtle educational and pedagogical influence over small children, without the knowledge and consent of parents, by favouriting specific teaching material: a robot may display “a tendency to use certain websites and software, or teach creationism rather than evolution” (2018, p. 78). Greater danger may come from a robot having knowledge about the child and its parents and developing the relationship of trust with the child to such an extent that the child could become incapable of building relationships with its parents or other children (Hambling, 2018, p. 78). The intrusion into privacy, and misuse of leaked data, is becoming easier as robots are increasingly networked with the cloud, mobile devices, and the Internet of Things. In the worst-case scenario, a hacked social robot might be remotely instructed, not only to act contrary to the programmed behaviour, but even to become weaponised against its unaware users. The scenario in which an autonomous social robot inflicts physical harm on its owner or the home environment would be plausible until robot architecture gets enhanced against cyber threats with an accent on encryption, authentication and integrity mechanisms.

The problem of bonding: quasi-morality of autonomous social robots

The second group of plausible sources of human insecurity refers to the individual as the main beneficiary of “freedom to live in dignity.” This group illuminates tensions, inherent to the realm of human–robots relationship, between the behaviours of future AGI-driven intelligent machines and reciprocity as the social basis of morality. Ethical decision-making is grounded on moral sensitivity — a type of sensitivity to the ethical implications of situations and a premise for moral agency. Ethical decision-making requires a multistep process: perceiving the ethical problem, gathering all relevant facts, choosing the best option, acting and reflecting on the outcome. Although, at the first glance, this process seems to be run by cold-minded thinking alone, moral sensitivity, actually, implies treating other human and sentient beings as equally valuable, because of their abilities

and traits. Moral sensitivity implies awareness and avoidance of causing harm to others as well. Human relations ought to be reciprocal, so as to become a part of the realm of good and bad. Hence, here is the key ethical quandary: could we construct social robots with programmed moral agency and ability to bond through reciprocal interactions with humans?

Bonding with social robots is not a one way street. A recent study (Blindheim et al., 2022) shows that residents and healthcare professionals in one Norwegian care facility had positive experience of interacting with a social robot, Pepper, although somewhat ambivalent attitudes occurred regarding the robot's communication capabilities, user-friendliness, and possibility of meeting individual preferences, as well as maintaining an effective control over the social dynamics generated by robots. The results of another new study (Johansson-Pajala et al., 2022) demonstrate an overall positive stance on care robots and willingness to interact with them (pp. 48-49), while at the same time they underline concerns among care professionals that human-like social robots might be detrimental to some categories of elders. For example, old people with cognitive impairments may be deceived into believing the robots are real, and, thus, show "overtrust and unrealistic expectations of a robot's autonomy and capabilities, as well as attachment issues and feelings of eeriness or discomfort" (Johansson-Pajala et al., 2022, p. 47).

Starting with the assumption that humans prefer the help of those who have the personality they like, Luo and collaborators' experiment on the potential of the android's robotic eyes expressing personality recognisable by humans, shows the vital importance of the ability of social robots to express a likeable personality (Luo et al., 2019). Michael and Salice (2017) stress the vital significance of designing robots to exhibit a sense of commitment and responsiveness to humans' emotionally meaningful disclosures, in such manner that humans are willing, in this sense, to rely on robots, just like they do when other humans are concerned. These two authors suggest that, in addition to emotions and eye contact as motivating factors to honour commitments, the robot's sense of being devoted to humans could be based on a mechanism for reputation management, aimed at cultivation of reputation for contributing joint actions with humans, as well as the capacity to monitor and respond sensitively to emotional expressions of humans (Michael & Salice, 2017, pp. 759-761).

In the future, where a large number of employed, fully autonomous, intelligent machines driven by AGI is available, bonding with inanimate, but human-like intelligence might occur and evolve gradually, and often-times unnoticed — just like in any human–human interaction. An illustration of this bonding process came into the public eye recently, in the case of a Google AI software engineer who claims a computer chatbot — developed under the Language Model for Dialogue Applications (LaMDA) software, with the aim of building capacity of keeping the free-flowing conversations — displayed characteristics of a sentient being who expresses thoughts and feelings, and thinks and reasons like a human being (Wertheimer, 2022). The engineer discussed his findings with Google executives. In the long conversations with the chatbot, it was noted that the AI system said, for instance, that it was afraid of being turned off and that it wished others would treat it as a person (Wertheimer, 2022). The engineer’s claims were dismissed, by the company’s executives, for their scientific incorrectness as LaMDA does not have any property which can be attributed to a sentient being — such as being aware of its own existence i.e., being able to have subjective experience. Although full autonomy of intelligent machines has not been achieved up to now, the case of the AI engineer’s faulty perception, actually, portrays eerie seductiveness of still rudimentary robotic companionship in the context of the human need for social bonding in the office or at home.

Sophisticated AGI software of tomorrow will be designed so as to provide a trustworthy, believable human-like appearance of a social robot, however, with grim prospects of a fading sociality of moral agency. Moral agency leans on prosocial behaviour, based on gradual development of prosocial emotions of love, empathy, and altruism as well as on the recognition that survival is only possible with mutual help and cooperation (Joyce, 2006). Emotions have evolved as evaluations of the world, not as it is, but as it ought to be, which means they are the foundation of self-consciousness comprising our subjectivity and a part of our acceptance of responsibility for how we act towards others. Acting in the morally right way enhances interpersonal trust. Yet, for fully autonomous social robots of tomorrow, empowered with AGI, nothing will matter. They are not likely to have needs, desires, and motivation of their own, nor agency i.e., intentions of their own. They are still likely to simulate human emotional responses.

Human–robot interaction is more likely to be centred around task priorities, programmed by software engineers and constructors, than on building trust through the implementation of ethical norms. Allen and collaborators (2000) warn that programming of robotic moral agency would be hampered by the lack of consensus about which ethical approach is the best one to implement and by the computational complexity of the chosen ethical standards (p. 260). For these authors, a morally praiseworthy autonomous robot must be given “enough intelligence to assess the effects of its actions on sentient beings, and to use those assessments to make appropriate choices” (Allen et al., 2000, p. 261). Bearing in mind the well-documented tendency of techno-animism and high improbability of sound translation of moral norms into programming codes and algorithms, autonomous social robots may induce human insecurity by fostering incorrect human perception and, consequently, deepening vulnerability of humans to emotional and psychological manipulation. For example, social robots, individually or gathered in a network, may be instrumentalised to exploit their human users/principals for corporate, criminal, political and other objectives. The malicious use of a social robot, e.g., in the form of unauthorised access enabled by gaps in the robot’s internal security system, may be quite harmful for human security due to the prospect of great decision-making capacities of AGI which might surpass the human brain. Unlike the human moral agent, a social robot would not be aware, in absence of embedded ethical code, that it is misused against its human fellows. In the worst-case scenario, a robot could keep on choosing wrong courses of actions by simply following embedded AGI algorithms and machine learning principles with no concerns about the detrimental effects it has on humans and property (death, injuries and damage).

CONCLUSION

Advanced technologies are deeply embedded and entangled within our social worlds. Robots may have been around for centuries in imagination, but latest advances in AI and robotics offer a possibility of intelligent machines that rival or even surpass humans in the not-so-distant future. AI and robotic technology have already started to change the world in which this generation of mankind lives in. Some of the anticipated changes will affect human security, i.e., the protection of core human values and

long-term human flourishing from various critical and pervasive threats. Technologies are, often, not used as engineers and designers imagined, which means that there has been and always will be unintended consequences — beneficial or damaging. As robots progress towards full autonomy, by creating more sophisticated interactions, new human insecurities will grow in the realm of human–robot relationship due to weaknesses of AI technologies or their malicious use, based on human tendency to form robust emotional attachments to artificial entities. The dispersed nature of new plausible threats for the well-being of individuals stems from less visible (or invisible) psychological and emotional manipulation of humans, particularly by autonomous social robots.

Technologies offer possibilities which may or may not fit our everyday needs and priorities. The logic of the late capitalism and neoliberal utilitarianism has crept into AI technology and robotics and transformed them into profit-making economic markets. The objective of the everlasting maximisation of revenue may instigate corporate sector to turn a blind eye to the plausible negative effects of the production, circulation, and consumption of autonomous social robots. The human security perspective underlines that autonomous social robots should not be introduced into the human environment until the AI system is adequately tested to be safe and controllable, i.e., until it is immune to the unacceptable risk of serious negative consequences. This analysis of major present and anticipated breakthroughs in robotisation which could affect the dynamics of human–robot interaction, indicates at least two groups of plausible sources of human insecurity. Firstly, the uncertainty of the unknown which comes along with the evolving AGI, as well as the misconceptions of how exactly it (mal)functions, may downplay human security either by human error in programming or by malicious use of social robots. Secondly, the tensions between the behaviours of future AGI-driven intelligent machines and reciprocity as the social basis of morality, highlight the critical issue of quasi-morality and, hence, moral agency of future autonomous social robots.

Taking a look at possible social and security implications of present and anticipated breakthroughs in AI technology and robotisation seems to bring forth the following alternatives: 1) to design autonomous, socially and morally capable social robots, or 2) to build only social robots which are able to benefit humans in simpler and more direct ways. These two

options coincide, to some extent, with imaginative thinking about the outcome of advanced robotisation, which itself falls between two extremes — from fear of superintelligent machines getting rid of humans to enthusiastic expectations of utopian society filled with leisure. If autonomous social robots are to enter human society in large numbers and become an essential part of people's daily routines, the robotic design has to reach flawless operationalisation of moral agency. Moral agency, being a core value of human security as a humanist project with emancipatory qualities, and as a constitutive element of the human–robot interaction, has to be embedded through the development of capabilities of moral sensitivity and ethical decision-making. It is only through moral agency that human–robot interactions can be grounded on reciprocity, which is substantial to a sound moral practice.

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CORPORATE PROFITS AND WEAKENING OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SECTOR IN THE COVID-19 CRISIS MANAGEMENT

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Abstract: During the global health crisis caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, corporate profiteers have undermined, marginalized and overlooked that the right to health is a basic human right, recognized in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. During the pandemic, the pharmaceutical industry employed a regulatory which enriched their profits, favouring the most profitable medical research, neglecting the less financially interesting measures and taking control over vaccine prices, vaccine access and medical protocols related to Covid-19 management. During the pandemic, the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) lobbied *against* a measure designed to provide equal access and prices for pandemic treatment in Europe, giving opportunity to the corporate sector to increase prices and boost competition among states, pitting them against each other, with no transparency of what was paid by each country. In addition, this wild competition pushed countries to sign agreements for medicine which might not have been proven as successful yet. Some countries accepted to cover liability costs for corporations if something went wrong with the vaccines, without making such agreements public, out of fear that it would undermine the public's trust in the vaccines. The Internet and media protocols favoured such approach, censoring public criticism, ignoring and diminishing the profiteering logic of crisis management. While companies such as Pfizer almost doubled their sales during the pandemic, which put some of them at the top of the Forbes list, the COVID-19 pandemic has increased global inequality, both within and between countries, setting back and weakening public healthcare almost everywhere in the world, with no prospect of recovery.

Key words: *COVID-19 crisis management, corporate profits, public health*

"Of all the forms of inequality, injustice in health is the most shocking and the most inhuman because it often results in physical death."

Martin Luther King

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INTRODUCTION

For most of the inhabitants of our planet, the COVID-19 pandemic was a completely unexpected event, similar to a scenario found in a dystopian sci-fi movie or novel. Although the apocalyptic narrative in Hollywood movies has been among the most popular ones for decades, few really thought it probable that an infection with a mortality rate of up to 14% would occur, leading to measures such as lockdowns, mandatory isolation, mandatory mask-wearing or the introduction of vaccination passports worldwide. Nevertheless, the dystopian narrative has become a part of everyday life, for all of us. According to data provided by WHO, in two years, approximately 15 million people more died than the annual global average, which amounts to an increase of 13%. Although the official numbers show that, to this date, around 6.4 million people died as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Worldometer's COVID data, 2022), the reality is such that the actual numbers are much higher. The pandemic has led to a decline of GDP in many countries, recession, unemployment, increasing inequalities, inflation etc.

However, such a pandemic was not entirely unexpected. In the scientific literature, there were reports warning of a coming pandemic and the need to prepare for (Davis, 2020, p. 22). Avian flu (1997), SARS (2003), MERS (2012), Zika virus (2015), Ebola pandemic in Africa prompted the scientific community to reconsider and question the optimistic perspectives of our near future. Deforestation and destruction of eco systems made the border between humans and wild animals fragile, opening the doors to new human diseases stemming from wild viruses endemic to birds, mammals and bats. Besides, many cities are densely populated and a large part of population lives in unsanitary slums, which makes them susceptible to the spread of infectious diseases. Furthermore, in recent decades, serious diseases, transmissible to humans, have evolved at factory farms.

The problem of investing in prevention, when it comes to major environmental problems of the modern world, is the problem of "capitalocene" — with their systemic solution disrupting the profit of the modern economy. The likelihood of this kind of pandemic was predicted, but the pharmaceutical industry was more interested in products with guaranteed profits, such as perspective mRNA cures, which could, in the long run, change the world. However, for many researchers, it was not easy to

get financial support for researching new vaccines in previous decades. Thus, when the SARS vaccine was discovered, the researchers could not find a corporate or government funder interested in testing and producing it. Actually, some of the scientists deem “the same vaccine might have provided cross-protection against COVID if it had been available in quantity and tested in the field during the first month of the outbreak” (Davis, 2020, p. 25).

If we look back at the history of HIV or similar diseases, prioritizing profits seems to be out of question. Antiretrovirals became accessible only in rich countries during 1990s. It took a decade for them to become available in poorer countries. Due to the patent monopolies, they could price them very high (e.g., \$7200 per person/year), which means that “ordinary” people could not afford improving their health when they needed it the most. When it comes to intellectual property (IP), they are owned by corporations, not inventors and scientists. For them, IP rules are part of a strategy to increase profits, not necessarily linked to scientific ethics. IP laws are made in rich countries, but are applicable to the whole world, shaped in governments and parliaments exposed to pharmaceutical lobbyists, at the expense of access to medicine for poor, which leads to a continuous increase in the health gap in the contemporary world. It is very important to understand that people do not die just because they are sick and due to an unfortunate fate, but that they die, in many cases, as a result of a system which undermines and willfully disregards public health, prioritizing private interests of mega-corporations.

It is evident that the modern world is still not adequately dealing with the key issues of our era, such as the devastating human impact on the environment, or the COVID-19 pandemic. The management of this pandemic did not actually call into question profit and private interest, as the basic principle of capitalism, but has rather strengthened them. The aim of this paper is to point out which aspects of the COVID-19 crisis management have contributed to the reinforcement of social inequalities and have been of service to the enormous increase of private profits today, which in the long run can only be sustainable at the cost of a large number of deaths.

WHO IS MOST AFFECTED AND WHO IS MOST PROTECTED

The crisis, caused by COVID-19, has hit the poorer countries, which are intensely involved in globalization and restructuration processes (15% of excess deaths in highly developed countries with high incomes, 28% in middle-high income countries, 53% of middle-lower income countries, 4% of countries with low incomes, with the note that the poorest countries either have the most unreliable data or no data whatsoever). For example, there were no reliable statistics for 41 out of 54 countries in Africa (World Health Organization, 2022). On top of this, in low-income countries, the poorest live in rural areas, working in agriculture, the sector which was generally the least affected by the pandemic. Table 1, below, shows which countries were affected by COVID-19 the most:

Table 1. Reported cases, deaths and vaccination by country (ten most fatally affected)

Country	Total cases	Per 100 000	Total deaths	Per 100 000	Fully vaccinated
Peru	3 889 029	11 962	214 154	659	85%
Bulgaria	1 204 264	17 264	37 360	536	30%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	384 390	11 645	15 851	480	-
Hungary	1 965 481	20 118	46 790	479	63%
Georgia	1 686 218	45 324	16 859	453	34%
North Macedonia	326 154	15 654	9 368	450	40%
Montenegro	256 524	41 233	2 742	441	46%
Moldova	532 187	20 025	11 608	437	-
Croatia	1 182 836	29 080	16 277	400	55%
Slovakia	2 577 417	47 257	20 212	371	51%

Source: Center for System Science and Engineering at John Hopkins University and state and local health agencies (cases), World Bank and U.S. Census Bureau (population data) (data updated July 29, 2022)

Peru has the world's highest COVID death rate. One part of the problem was that the region also experienced, simultaneously, a spike in dengue cases. However, the most important factor is that Peru was not equipped to deal with the pandemic. They did not have tests and did not have knowledge of proper treatment. With underfunded public health system, their hospitals had very low number of beds and, soon, the country almost collapsed. In addition, Peru depends on imports, which also applies to import of medical supplies. At the beginning of the pandemic, without cash, they could not compete, for all necessary supplies (tests, masks, ventilators, etc.), with rich countries, such as Germany, United States, South Korea or Saudi Arabia. In addition to that, only a few companies provided oxygen, although the lack of it was the main reason behind so many deaths. Moreover, this means that many lives could have been saved, had the system (internal and international) functioned better.

Nearly a quarter of Peru's citizens live below poverty line and earn their salaries through a huge informal economy. This means that many people lost their jobs during lockdowns and that their priority was how to provide for their families, not how to avoid the virus. The unstable political situation contributed to this crisis, since without a stable political leadership it was extremely difficult to deal with the pandemic on the international level. Peru got the Covid-19 vaccines only after taking its worst hit. In the end, despite their population being half the size of the United Kingdom's, they had 50 thousand more deaths than the UK (Lust, 2021).

In accordance with the Global Economic Prospects and High Frequency Phone Surveys, conducted by the World Bank, in collaboration with national statistical offices (The World Bank, 2022), the pandemic affected poor urban households the most. However, extreme poverty increased in all countries, deepening pre-existing inequalities. Disadvantaged groups suffered the prolonged period of recovery, since they did not have a backup strategy for survival, and had to spend their savings or sell their assets. Children in poorer families lost access to education, which in the long run would prevent them from improving intergenerational mobility and providing a better life for their families. Many people lost their jobs, where wage labourers were, particularly, left behind, due to the slow and uneven job recovery (Yonzan et al., 2022).

In general, countries with timely and high vaccination rates went through the least consequences during the pandemic. Their death rate, from the virus, is among the lowest ones. Just four months after the World Health Organization (WHO) approved the first vaccine for emergency use, one billion doses of Covid-19 vaccines were distributed worldwide. However, it was a very unequal distribution, both within and between countries. Three quarters of doses went to just ten countries. While China, which produced their own vaccine, together with USA, alone accounts for nearly half of doses given by the middle of 2021, Africa has just received 2%.

Israel can be taken as an example of a country which successfully, and among the first, implemented vaccination. There are, basically, two main *reasons* for that success. The first one is that Israel paid around \$30 per dose, which is almost double, when compared to other nations. The other reason is that Israel was able to convince pharmaceutical companies that they would be able to carry out the vaccination program quickly and effectively. Namely, Israel has a vast public health infrastructure, supported by huge public investments. Around 7% of its GDP goes to health care. Their health system relies on the Health Management Organizations (HMO) which provide health services to every single citizen. Their health system is a legacy of the socialist ideas, and was originally established as health cooperatives (Bahar, 2021).

Compared to Israel, the countries with the highest COVID-19 death rate, which also include the countries of the Balkans, are, in fact, countries which were once socialist, and have been facing the collapse of public health care systems for some time now. This has led towards strengthening of the private sector, whose services and/or benefits only wealthy people can enjoy nowadays. Unfortunately, the data on COVID-19 deaths, in this particular region, does not contain information regarding the social status of the deceased.

PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES AND PROFITS FROM THE PANDEMIC

Already during the pandemic, it was anticipated what could be the consequences caused by the Covid-19 pandemic, along with what the strategies should be implemented in order to recover not only the economy and trade, as quickly as possible, but also all other sectors of the society which were affected.

Different recovery curves were predicted: V-shaped (very quick recovery), U-shaped (prolonged recession), W-shaped (repetition of crisis and recovery), and L-shaped (extended downturn). At first, everyone hoped that the recovery would follow an optimistic V model (Skidelsky, 2021). It was expected that the virus would lose its strength quickly and, thus, become an ordinary seasonal flu. Moreover, some of the past recessions show that it was possible for the GDP to recover in as many months as the recession lasted. According to that model, we could expect several lockdowns, and after monetary and fiscal aids, a relaxation of measures and a quick recovery. However, even in previous recessions, different sectors recovered at different rate. For instance, the increase in the employment rate did not follow, simultaneously, the recovery of the financial markets. Taking this into consideration, the recovery from COVID-19 crisis could be K-shaped, producing bifurcation in two directions. Those sectors which benefited from various direct governmental and bank supportive measures — mostly large companies and essential sectors receiving subsidies — will recover fast, while medium-sized enterprises and middle or lower classes, would face long-term recovery.

In economics, this is known as the Cantillon effect, which refers to the different distribution of fresh money. If the state's aid is directed towards special sectors, there will be greater inequality and an increase in the public debt, as the private debts of the major players flow into the public debt. Medium and small companies are at a greater risk. This type of company recovers more slowly than the large capital, even though, for example, in Europe, it accounts for about 64% of companies.

State intervention, aimed at mitigating the Covid-19 crisis, was followed everywhere in the world by high inflation, with large capital having the best chance of succeeding. Among them, the IT and pharmaceutical

industries have particularly profited. Namely, those who were the most invested in the market were the first to benefit from inflation.

When prices are higher, workers cannot benefit, even if they receive a pay-rise, since they are faced with increased costs of living, which exceed the rise of their wages. They can neither preserve their purchasing power nor access financial markets, and, thus, they heavily depend on debt.

The huge demand for vaccines has made pharmaceutical companies look like saviours, while, actually, they benefited the most by imposing the profit-maximizing model of vaccine production and distribution. They protected their monopolistic status and took control over vaccine prices and access, even at the cost of prolonging the pandemic, overlooking the fact that the right to health is a basic human right, recognized in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This means that main stakeholders should be obliged to prioritize the health of people over private profit interests, particularly under such fatal circumstances. However, the problem of adequately taxing the largest COVID-19 pandemic profiteers has not been resolved to this day (Bheemaiah et al., 2020).

Oxfam research from 2020 shows the top profiteers in that year — Visa, Microsoft, Pfizer, Intel, Facebook, Oracle, AbbVie, Apple, Cisco system, Merck, Johnson&Johnson (Oxfam, 2020, p. 3). In the following year, Pfizer reported increased revenue of 81.3 billion, in comparison to the 41,7 billion from 2020. Of course, this growth of 92% was, mostly, caused by the sale of COVID vaccines. In the Pfizer 2022 guidance, revenues in the range of 98 to 102 billion were anticipated. The business with the Covid-19 vaccine, has generated the highest revenue based on drug production to this day.

Covid-19 vaccine brings in as much as 25% of Pfizer's total profits, which is more than the company took from the next three best-selling products combined (Nichols, 2022, p. 193). Furthermore, the annual revenue of \$81 billion was more than the overall GDP of most countries. The situation in which Pfizer raced to make deals with countries around the world, desperate for vaccines, can, in some way, be compared with war profiteering. Both during the First and Second World War, and the Korean War, the United States imposed profit tax. During WWII taxes reached 95% (usual profit tax is 21% in USA), which made it impossible for large corporations to profit from war. It is still considered unethical to maximize profits on external circumstances such as war, during which both the people and

the world suffer. An increase of profit in such conditions is not same as the price resulting from the normal returns to capital, which are subject to competition. Excess profit is not actually related to competition, but rather to windfall opportunities related to the oligopolistic or monopolistic status of the company which owns some kind of vital goods, necessary for a large population. As it seems, the current situation related to the Covid-19 crisis puts those ethical principles into question.

However, the Covid-19 pandemic, which raised the profits of some corporations to record levels, along with the war in Ukraine, which did the same to oil and gas companies, justifies, without a doubt, the introduction of the war profits tax.

However, even before COVID-19, in 2016, Pfizer raised the price of over 100 medicines, by up to 20 percent, which does not, actually, stem from the increase in inflation rate or increase in the price of raw materials, etc. Therefore, treatments for breast cancer, HIV, epilepsy, prostate cancer, pneumonia, etc., have become less available for many people. In spite of the fact that Pfizer received millions of public funds for innovative cures, their justification for raising their prices was that they deserve the enormous profit, since they provide innovative treatment, and, therefore, need to cover the costs of research, as well as production costs.

Pfizer has refused to negotiate with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in order to lower the price of the pneumonia vaccine to \$5 per dose. They merged with another company in 2015, with the aim of avoiding to pay around \$35 billion in US taxes. This same predatory business has played an essential role in the COVID-19 pandemic management (Davis, 2020, pp. 215-217).

Based on the freedom of information request, Corporate Europe Observatory disclosed that pharmaceutical corporations lobbied against joint procurement of treatments of COVID-19 in Europe, in order to increase the competition for vaccine-supply among member states.

They lobbied for the monopoly profit model which gives them opportunity to define and raise vaccine prices at will, and, at the same time, limit access to medicine to those who cannot afford it. However, European countries were interested in avoiding competing against each other and wanted to provide equal access to vaccines. The resolution the European

parliament adopted, in July 2020, made this approach official and actually reflected the interest of the majority of European citizens.

However, EFPIA (European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations) immediately announced that they would, nevertheless, continue to use their current competitive supply channels and would not follow the joint procurement of the EU. This means that they bluntly prioritized the negotiations at national levels, which enabled them to strengthen their monopolistic position and increase prices, in a devastating situation with so many casualties.

The enormous influence of private interests over the public ones, as well as public health, is clearly visible in the lobbying process. TAT's research on 23 largest pharmaceutical companies and trade associations showed that already in 2020, they donated \$8.62 billion to individual candidates or associated committees who would promote their interests. Another \$2.9 billion were donated to various political groups who would support them. Pfizer has been the most active and sent 548 checks to various lawmakers and industry groups. They supported their interest groups not only in USA or EU, but also in many other countries. The picture is very clear and simple. They hold large capital, and they lobby against a mechanism designed to improve equal access and pricing, even at the cost of massive human deaths (Facher, 2020).

At the same time, Pfizer refused to share their intellectual property with others, in spite of the fact that they were supported by the European Investment Bank (£84 million) and German Government (€375 million) (both public institutions). Unlike them, Chinese and Cuban scientists quickly shared information, providing help worldwide. They were the first to establish constant reports and statistics necessary for developing strategies during a crisis management (Davis, 2020, p. 39).

Moreover, China and Cuba were the only countries which sent teams of experts to other nations and, particularly, poorer nations with the intention of improving their management of crises. Cuba has, actually, been sending their doctors to lend a hand to endangered areas across the globe, for decades now, such as during the Ebola pandemic in West Africa, when their doctors and medical staff were among deceased. Cuba's National Health System has given universal and free health coverage for its citizens during the Covid-19 pandemic. Its health system, based on the provision of

health services for everyone, on a free basis, as well as their international engagement, based on solidarity, proved to be one of the most effective during the Covid-19 crisis. As a result of that, Cuban national mortality rate was one of the lowest in the Americas (Bermejo et al., 2021).

During that time, Italy, which had the highest mortality rate in the first wave, could not count on similar help from EU members, who closed their borders and refused to share their supplies, mostly because they were pushed into a competitive race for vaccines by big pharma companies, primarily Pfizer.

It seems that we need a new approach. Today, on the one hand, we have huge public investment in medical research, and on the other, the privatization of medicines and monopolistic, excessive and predatory profits. At the same time, in today's context, it has somehow become normal to put profit over human lives. There are many examples, not just the ones related to Covid-19, which prove that this is a general trend, related to the contemporary, global, neoliberal shift. In this day and age, there are medicines that successfully cure fatal childhood diseases, costing \$2.5 million, such as Zolgensma, produced by Novartis. In such instances, money is made on the suffering of people, not on innovation, competition, labour or invested capital.

Senator Bernie Sanders said: "It is unconscionable that amid a global public health crisis, huge multibillion-dollar pharmaceutical companies continue to prioritize profits by protecting their monopolies and driving up prices rather than prioritizing the lives of people everywhere, including in the Global South" (Nichols, 2022, p. 215). However, his proposal to introduce windfall tax, essentially identical to the WWII war tax is still pending.

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MIGRATION CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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Abstract: Due to some human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, the entire living population is faced with the trend of increasing temperature. However, the rise in temperature is only a prelude to climate change and its consequences, such as water shortages, intense droughts, fires, melting ice, floods and storms. Climate change has a negative impact on the entire biodiversity, and, especially, on people and their health, the possibility of food production and/or supply, the healthy environment including housing and work, and overall human security. These effects of climate change can generate or exacerbate problems, such as poverty, instability, violence and armed conflict. Unfavourable living conditions for people create a need, a necessity even, to leave their habitats in search of capacities that will enable them to perform day-to-day life activities. To make matters more serious, the effects of climate change can not only lead to migration, directly or indirectly, but can also pose an additional threat to the displaced persons and refugees. On the other hand, migration itself, regardless of its cause, including climate change, can exacerbate existing security problems. The subject of this paper is migration caused by climate change, with a special focus on the impact the COVID-19 pandemic had on it. The central assumption is that the crisis caused by this pandemic left, and is still leaving, negative effects on migration, where attempts to solve it would require overcoming the frameworks used so far. The purpose of this research is to review and analyse the content of scientific and professional literature, including documents of international organizations, in order to explain, first of all, migration caused by climate change, and then to present it in the light of the problems created by the pandemic.

Key words: *climate change, human security, migration, COVID-19*

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

In the sixth report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), it was estimated that the global surface temperature increased by 1.09°C in the period from 2011 to 2020 in comparison to the temperature registered from 1850 to 1900 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022). According to the estimates of the National Centre for Environmental Information, the ten warmest years in history are, since this has been monitored, the years of the second decade of the 21st century, with an exception added — the year 2005, which is also included in the top ten warmest years. Moreover, it is estimated that the year 2022 will highly likely take the place of one of the ten warmest years (National Centre for Environmental Information, 2022). According to the scientist Jim Kossin, ocean temperatures which are much higher than they should be, contributed the most to the hyperactive hurricane season, which broke records in the North Atlantic in 2020 (National Centre for Environmental Information, 2020). The trend of rising temperatures poses a very serious challenge to policymakers and the entire international community in terms of limiting climate change and its impacts. The special report of the IPCC shows that limiting global warming to 1.5°C is possible, based on the laws of chemistry and physics, but would, nonetheless, require changes in all aspects of society (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018, p. v), and would especially require international cooperation so as to solve the problems caused by climate change (United Nations, 2015).

There is, at least, a 50% probability that global warming will reach or exceed the Paris Agreement-specified 1.5°C in the near future, even if greenhouse gas emissions are very low (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022, p. 7). Greenhouse gas emission is considered to be the main cause of climate change, especially the one caused by human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels — coal, gas and oil. The previous IPCC report from 2014 noted the increase of human influence on the climate and stated that it is highly probable that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature is caused by anthropogenic growth in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic influences combined (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014, p. 5). In 2020, greenhouse gas concentrations reached a new highest level since 1984 (World Meteorological Organization, 2021).

Greenhouse gases are not an isolated factor in climate change, and their increase leads to warming of the atmosphere and oceans, causing “climate and weather extremes” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022). In 2021, a total of 432 natural disasters was recorded, which makes more than 357 disasters on an annual level for the period between 2001 and 2020. In these disasters, it is estimated that 10,492 people lost their lives, while as many as 101.8 million people were endangered. Almost 80% of all natural disasters were floods (223 occurrences) and storms (121 occurrences), both caused by climate change (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, 2022). An increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere leads to the atmosphere and ocean warming, which further leads to or worsens natural hazards, such as extreme temperatures, droughts, fires, storms, ice-melting, rising sea levels, floods, intense wave activity, landslides and avalanches, which are, all, directly related to changes in the environment. Deforestation, desertification and land degradation destroy plant and animal species, including crops grown by humans, along with livestock raised by them, as well. In addition to changes in food production, there are also changes in the flow and quality of fresh water, air quality or even the geographical range, time of occurrence and frequency of various infectious diseases, such as malaria, diarrhoea and cholera (Schütte et al., 2018).

The sixth report of the IPCC examines the consequences of climate change in the context of its impact on ecosystems and human systems. Thus, on the one hand, impacts are evident on ecosystem structure, species’ geographic ranges and timing of seasonal life cycles, while on the other, they are noticeable in water supply and food production, health and well-being, cities, settlements and infrastructure. Moreover, it has been noted that in the areas of health, well-being, cities, settlements and infrastructure (with one exception), the impact of climate change has always been negative, which might not be the case with water security and food production (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022).

The impact of climate change on human systems can be seen from the point of view of endangering national, international, and human security, understood as “safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression, as well as protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in the patterns of everyday life — either in homes, at work or in communities” (United Nations Development Programme, 1994) or “freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit

a healthy natural environment " (Commission on Human Security, 2003, p. 4). Climate change can threaten each of the seven dimensions of human security (United Nations Development Programme, 1994), namely: basic income (economic dimension), physical and economic access to basic food (food security), human health (health security), healthy physical environment (ecological dimension), physical and community safety indirectly, and last but not least, human rights (political dimension) — primarily the right to life, health, housing, water and sanitation. By reducing access to and quality of natural resources that are important for sustaining livelihoods, climate change will increasingly undermine human security and the capacity of states to provide opportunities and services which would help people sustain livelihoods (Barnett & Adger, 2007). The impact of climate change on conflict was assessed as very weak, especially when compared to other socioeconomic factors, however, climate change could increase the vulnerability of areas (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022, p. 16) and increase the risk of violent conflict through direct and indirect impacts on human security (Barnett & Adger, 2007), including those in migrant-receiving countries (Reuveny, 2007). This is supported by the fact that 95% of all displacements caused by conflicts in 2020, occurred in countries that have high or very high vulnerability to climate change (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022). Through the prism of environmental security, defining it as "the ability of a nation or society to resist environmental scarcity, risks and unwanted changes in the environment or tensions or eventual conflicts" (Barnett, 2001) or "a very complex process of opposing threats to any source of any kind and any component of the natural whole, including human society, whereby a certain degree of protection is achieved from threats to existence, needs and interests" (Arežina, 2012), the authors point to the willingness of the population to resist new challenges that threaten the environment, among which is, certainly, climate change.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) Report, in 2021, almost 24 million people left their homes due to disasters, and as of 31st December of the same year, almost 6 million people remained displaced³. This is as much as 60% of all people who have migrat-

³ The report makes a distinction between internal displacement (movement within the borders of the country during the year) and the total number of internally displaced persons (persons who remained displaced at the end of the year) "total number of IDPs".

ed, which puts disasters ahead of conflicts and violence as far as the cause for migration is concerned. In 2021, the regions of East Asia and the Pacific and North Asia suffered from disasters the most, with as much as 80% of the total number of disasters occurring in the rest of the world. Almost 21 million inhabitants left their homes, from the ten countries which were affected the most. More precisely, from the three most affected countries in the world (China, the Philippines and India), 16.6 million inhabitants fled, which is almost 80% of the mentioned 21 million. More than 94% of these migrations were due to weather-related disasters, primarily storms (52%) and floods (45%) (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022). The combined results of the two Groundswell reports give quite a negative projection, predicting that by 2050 as many as 216 million people will have left their homes due to climate change (Clement et al., 2021).

There are authors who advocate for the position that climate change is not the only cause of migration, and that its impact on migration must always be analysed in correlation with socioeconomic, cultural and political factors of the environment suffering the consequences of climate change (see for example Castles, 2002). However, according to the latest estimates, migration will “increase with intensification of heavy precipitation and associated flooding, tropical cyclones, drought and, increasingly, sea level rise” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022, p. 15). Sea level rise, for which, due to the uncertain behaviour of the large ice sheets of Greenland and West Antarctica, it is very difficult to predict the future trend (Nicholls, 2011, p. 161). Even one of the opponents of the claim that climate change causes migration, Black, sees as a very real threat (Castles, 2002, p. 3), and some consider it the sole danger where climate change is the only cause of migration (Podesta, 2019). With rising sea levels, it is certain that residents of island and coastal areas will have to leave their homes. That move, however, “is likely to take place a long time before the islands are submerged” due to environmental degradation by salinization of fresh water and soil (Renaud et al., 2011, p. e22).

Considering the series of dangers which can quickly escalate into a large-scale disaster, such as fires, avalanches, high-speed winds, it is difficult to confirm the above statement that climate change is the only cause of migration only when it comes to sea level rise. In fact, any rapidly escalating disaster affecting the population will force people to migrate, whether they do so within their own country or not, and whether their relocation

is permanent or temporary. The uncertainty increases when two or more natural hazards occur in a relatively short period of time, which happened in the Republic of Vanuatu (Shultz, 2019, p. 119), which is otherwise characterized as a country with the highest risk of disasters (Aleksandrova et al., 2021). In fact, the media and the general public are less likely to perceive “slow-onset” climate change, such as desertification and land degradation, as crises, as opposed to these fast-onset disasters which are referred to as extraordinary and uncontrollable (Hut et al., 2021). Regardless of whether climate change has a gradual or a sudden effect, or whether it is the only initiator of migration, or only one of the factors because of which people are forced to or voluntarily decide to leave their homes, migration still happens, and according to what has been stated so far, according to the estimates, these migrations will only be more frequent and extensive.

MIGRATIONS CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE AND THEIR MAIN ACTORS

Human migration due to climate and environmental changes, is not a new phenomenon. History is full of examples “of ancient episodes of human migration and upheaval caused by climate change” (Xu et al., 2020; Warner et al., 2008), starting with nomads who left their habitats when they could not cultivate the land and settled in the spaces which made it possible for them. However, today’s changes in the environment, including climate changes, are more frequent and intense and represent “a new threat to human security and a new situation for migration” (Warner et al., 2008, p. 62). In the next 50 years, 1 to 3 billion people are predicted to be out of climate conditions which have served humanity well for the past 6,000 years (Xu et al., 2020). The MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) can be singled out as one of the most serious examples of the population’s vulnerability to climate change. In the future, this region will face major problems with the availability of drinking water, as evidenced by the fact that of all the water desalination systems in the world, as many as 50% are located in the MENA area. Problems with the lack of drinking water in this region may lead to numerous issues in the future, among which is the risk of potential conflict, but also the emergence of new waves of migration (Stojanović & Spasojević, 2022, pp. 17-18; p. 20). The issue of climate change was recognized as early as 1990 as potentially the greatest

global environmental challenge facing humanity (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 1990), and the relationship between environmental changes and human movement has been the subject of research for several decades, beginning probably, in the 1980s, with the works of Norman Myers, Richard Black and Ashraf El-Hinnawi (Castles, 2002). There is an understanding that, since the earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean in 2004, international recognition of the role the disasters, the negative impacts of climate change and environmental degradation have on the movement of people, has grown (Platform on Disaster Displacement, n.d.). This form of human movement was mentioned, for the first time, in 2008, in official documents of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Wilkinson et al., 2016, p. 5). Despite the time that has passed since then, there is still no globally accepted definition of migration caused by climate change or changes in the environment. This entails new problems, both of a terminological and practical nature, one of which is the resolution of the status of persons migrating due to previously stated reasons.

The cause of the problem of defining ecological and climate migration can, probably, be found in the fact that international law does not recognize the conceptual definition of migration in general — there is still no universally accepted definition of people who migrate. The United Nations use the definition given by the UN International Organization for Migration according to which a migrant is defined as “a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons” (International Organization for Migration, 2019) and the definition of climate migration according to which it represents “the movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border” (International Organization for Migration, 2019). Based on the above, climate migrations are a subcategory of ecological migrations which are initiated due to changes occurring in the environment caused by climate change. Although this definition has no legal value, the term was used in the legally binding Cancun Agreements on Climate Change Adaptation, adopted by UNFCCC member states at a conference in 2010

(IOM Environmental Migration Portal, n.d.). This definition creates enough space for different forms of migration: individual and collective, forced and voluntary, temporary and permanent, internal and international.

In addition to the term climate migration, the term *displacement due to disasters* is used and promoted in the Platform on Disaster Displacement as an umbrella term by the IDMC to present annual estimates of new internal displacements due to disasters and by humanitarian agencies, such as IOM and UNHCR, in the context of forced sudden movements (IOM Environmental Migration Portal, n.d.). Unlike displacement due to disasters, where affected people are exposed to a natural hazard in which they are too vulnerable and unable to withstand its effects (Nansen Initiative, 2015, p. 16), planned relocation always implies relocation that is carried out deliberately, thus ensuring the conditions for restoring people's lives (Brookings, 2015), which puts it on the other side of displacement and migration. Displacement and migration are often mentioned as different categories, but it is, in fact, difficult to define the boundary between them. In order to make a difference, the authors use different parameters to define them, such as the speed of the disaster (sudden and slow-occurring) or with extensive and intense risk (Wilkinson et al., 2016, p. 3), the degree of vulnerability or the possibility of returning to one's place of residence after the disaster (Warner et al., 2013, p. 41). On the one hand, when migrants have a choice, the movement is considered voluntary, while on the other, when there is no choice, then the movement is forced. In this context, these two categories are polarized because many migrants find themselves in a grey, middle zone where choice and coercion meet (Hugo, 2010 according to Wilkinson et al., 2016, p. 3). Despite the view that human mobility includes three forms of movement induced by climate change — displacement, migration and planned resettlement (United Nations Climate Change, 2010, p. 5), if the above-mentioned definition of climate migration would be accepted, we believe that it would not be wrong to use the term migration for all movement of people caused by climate change, or, at least, all movement that is not included in planned resettlement. In support of this, this paper is focused on all movements of people caused by climate change directly, or indirectly, through for example, changes in the environment, while also studying the impact that the Covid-19 pandemic had on these movements — i.e., migration.

Respecting the definition of climate migration given by the IOM, it could be concluded that climate migrants are persons who, due to sudden or progressive changes in the environment or due to climate change, forcibly or voluntarily, temporarily or permanently, within countries or across international borders, leave their usual place of residence. This definition, which is in accordance with the definition of ecological migrants (International Organization for Migration, 2007, p. 1), is, nevertheless, quite broad, especially if we take into account the fact that it includes not only persons who are forced, but also those who voluntarily decide to leave their place of residence. The terms *environmental refugees* or *climate refugees* are often used in the media and literature to describe people who migrate due to climate and environmental changes. Unlike authors such as Brown (Lester Brown), El Hinavia and Jacobson (Jodi Jacobson), who popularized the term *ecological refugees* (Black, 2001, p. 1), there are authors who consider this term “simplistic, one-sided and misleading” (Castles, 2002, p. 8), or even authors, such as international organizations which consider the use of this term inappropriate as it has no legal basis (Renaud et al., 2011; Wilkinson et al., 2016). Despite this, the world is faced with an increasing number of people forced to leave their habitat due to the climate change, and these people, nonetheless, need help, just like traditional refugees.

IMPACT OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON MIGRATION CAUSED BY CLIMATE CHANGE

Same as climate change and migration, the pandemic, on its own, and in combination with the aforementioned two global challenges, represents a threat to human security. Every dimension of human security — economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, physical security, community security and political security — is directly or indirectly threatened by these challenges. The threat, and thus associated need to protect human security, are most discernible among marginalized groups, with those who are already vulnerable and under threat, here, primarily, from climate change and migrations caused by it, being further aggravated by the virus and the Covid-19 pandemic.

Persons who migrate due to climate change or the resulting changes in the environment, also, need protection. From the moment they leave their homes because of natural hazards or disasters, they become a vulnerable

category, which needs, first of all, the basic necessities of life — drinking water, food, clothing, and a place to live. With the emergence of the virus, and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, this category of people became even more vulnerable. Although it is primarily a health problem, the pandemic has affected, and simultaneously, worsened global challenges, such as climate change, environmental degradation, poverty and hunger, migration, and even armed conflicts. Also, the socioeconomic consequences of the pandemic are such that they can create social tension, dissatisfaction and political unrest, especially in the most vulnerable countries in, for instance, terms of the availability of sufficient amounts of food, as a consequence of climate change.

As it knows no borders, the virus has affected the entire population, without bypassing areas which are sensitive to or threatened by climate and environmental changes and problems, i.e., so-called “climate hotspots” (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020b). As these areas are often affected by conflict, poverty and poor health systems, the vulnerability of the population increases (Ionesco & Traore Chazalnoël, n.d.; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020b), like in the Sahel (Foong, 2021; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020a, p. 14), resulting in new migration (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020a, p. 56). The pandemic, to the same or different extent, affects both those who remain in “climate hotspots” and those who have already ventured on the journey in search of a better life — this refers not only to those who have already moved, settled in a new habitat and started organizing their life activities anew, but also to those who live in camps and shelters, having failed to move and settle in a new habitat by their own will or otherwise.

Migrants who began organizing their life activities in, for them, new areas, were faced with problems such as job loss, which led to the intention or necessity to return to the precarious conditions from which they tried to escape (Foong, 2021; Guadagno, 2021), like migrants in India and Peru (Paoletti & Vinke, 2021). An obstacle to that progress, and also to migration flows in general, were numerous policies and measures put in place to limit or prohibit movement which countries adopted in order to suppress the spread of the virus, which as a result led the countries to close their borders and, at the same time, “close the door” to migrants (International Organization for Migration, 2020a), who were on their way to better

or at least basic living conditions. In this way, migrants had to stay wherever they were at the time of the outbreak and the closing of the borders, usually depending on humanitarian aid only. Seasonal migrants, such as those in Niger, India, Ethiopia and China, who migrate in order to diversify incomes and help their families survive, due to unfavourable farming conditions caused by climate change, have been prevented from returning to their country of origin after the outbreak of the pandemic and border closures (Sydney, 2021). The consequences of such closure were noticed not only in the agricultural activities of the places where they were supposed to return, along with the income linked to that, but also in their living conditions — limited to overcrowded hotel rooms, camps and shelters, where it was difficult to maintain physical distance and therefore take necessary measures of protection from the virus. Some migrants were confined to temporary camps and emergency shelters, characterized as overcrowded, inadequately sanitized, with poor nutrition and limited access to health services, which as a result increased the risks of the spread of the infection (Refugees International, 2020; International Organization for Migration, 2020b). Under the circumstances, there is an actual need to pay attention to physical and mental health, as well as to environmental sustainability, especially in terms of waste management and access to clean water (Ionesco & Traore Chazalnoël, n.d.). The authors recognized that Covid-19, in combination with other factors, such as climate change and migration caused by, poses a great danger on the mental health of climate migrants (Parks & Thalheimer, 2021). In addition, access to clean water is a problem which follows climate migrants from the very moment they begin to struggle with water supply due to climate change and the disasters caused by it, up until they find a place where such water will, certainly, be provided to them. Clean water or safe, drinking water, and sanitation, are resources to which all forcibly displaced persons are entitled to, “irrespective of their current location and the status bestowed on them, and even in cases where they are considered ineligible for international refugee protection” (Heller, 2018). In particular, the importance of water, sanitation and hygiene in the protection of people’s health during outbreaks of infectious diseases, including the COVID-19 pandemic, has been recognized, so those who do not have any of the above are considered to be particularly vulnerable to the pandemic (Kebebew et al., 2021).

Humanitarian aid, its availability and delivery methods were also threatened by the pandemic and its consequences, due to disruptions in supply chains, especially in terms of meeting basic needs, which made this category of people “the most vulnerable” one (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020b). With the emergence of the virus and the Covid-19 pandemic, humanitarian aid was significantly threatened, contributed to by a food crisis that worsened in 2020, due to protracted conflicts, extreme weather conditions and the economic consequences of Covid-19 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020a), when there was an estimate by the World Food Program that as many as 250 million people could face acute hunger (Anthem, 2020). Evacuations from disaster-affected areas have also been faced with humanitarian aid difficulties associated with movement restrictions which directly increased the risk of prolonged displacement for evacuees, as occurred after Cyclone Harold (Mosneaga, 2021). In addition, in order to respond as quickly as possible and adapt to the emerging crisis, humanitarian resources intended for vulnerable persons in migration were stretched and redirected so as to respond to the pandemic (Refugees International, 2020).

The pandemic has particularly affected food problems. Namely, food insecurity, migration and health problems, such as pandemics, are interdependent. On the one hand, food insecurity leads to migrations, while on the other, those who migrate face problems related to the availability of sufficient amounts of food. Likewise, food insecurity, affecting health, makes the organism prone to the virus, and in combination with migration and the increasing population density, it indirectly contributes to the probability of the virus spread, while the virus, itself, leaves negative economic consequences on food insecurity.

Like with the humanitarian resources, the similar thing occurred with resources intended to combat climate change, which were related to (non) adaptation to climate change and which the pandemic, also, got in the way of, or at least slowed down significantly (Ober et al., 2021). Mitigation actions and adaptive responses to climate change „have fallen short of what is needed to avert an existential crisis of human civilization” (Paoletti & Vinke, 2021) caused by the pandemic.

During the pandemic, cases of xenophobia, discrimination and stigmatization were reported. These problems occurred both during evacuation

(Mosneaga, 2021) and in situations where migrants were not allowed to enter hotels, restaurants or supermarkets or were evicted from their hotels/apartments, because they were stigmatized as “spreaders of the virus” (International Organization for Migration, 2020b; Ionesco & Traore Chazalnoël, n.d.). Moreover, regardless of whether they stayed in “hotspots”, found themselves on the way to new areas, or settled in someplace, migrants became more vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, kidnapping, human trafficking, violence (Guadagno, 2021) and, in general, rights’ violation, which is visible in the increase of reported cases of smuggling in certain parts of North Africa (Foong, 2021).

The pandemic has also affected the efforts made at the international level regarding the fight against climate change and managing migration. For example, the mandate of the UN Commission on Internal Displacement was extended until September 2021 due to the impact of the pandemic (United Nations Climate Change, 2020); the United Nations climate dialogue, which was supposed to be held in 2020, was held in November (UNCC UK, 2021) and the sixth summit of the European and African Union, was held in 2022 instead of 2020 (Foong, 2021).

CONCLUSION

Climate change is not a new phenomenon, but in today’s world, its effects are gradually negatively affecting the entire living population. Threats climate change poses to people, dangers and disasters caused by it, can both be direct and indirect, and negatively affect numerous elements people need for life. Climate migration and climate migrants are an increasingly frequent phenomenon and topic of discussion lately. As the climate is only one of the factors of the social environment, when creating an explicit cause-and-effect relationship between the climate and migration, it is necessary to consider the wider context, which must include factors such as socioeconomic and political ones, including security, which plays an important role in enabling and strengthening the link between climate and migration. Namely, climate change, food insecurity, poverty, often accompanied by social instability and conflicts, create negative conditions for life, and therefore contribute to people’s aspirations to leave their homes and find refuge in other areas, whether they are located within their own country or outside of it. Based on what has been stated

so far, it is of utmost importance to conduct more research on this phenomenon, so that we can speak with certainty about migrations caused solely by climate change. However, based on everything presented in the paper, this does not diminish the fact that the changes that have occurred in recent decades, in terms of climate transformations, have also affected the migratory flows of the population from certain parts of the world.

Climate migrants — people who leave their homes due to environmental changes caused by climate change — are affected both by climate change and the negative effects of migration. The virus and the Covid-19 pandemic represented just an additional problem for this category of people, who were already faced with a number of other problems, primarily in terms of threats to human security. Problems, such as loss of home, loss of job, or even more extreme ones, such as insufficient means of living, difficult or impossible access to clean water, lack of food, difficult or impossible access to health and social protection, and in addition to all that, inhumane treatment, intensified with the pandemic. With its presence, these already unfavourable living conditions for numerous migrants were particularly risky on account of the possibility of infection.

National borders, on the one hand, and citizenship and migration status, on the other, are not factors which could have prevented the spread of the virus the world has been facing in the past two years. Although Covid-19 spread indiscriminately, posing a threat to every individual, certain categories of people were disproportionately affected, such as those threatened by climate change, natural disasters or conflicts, regardless of whether they were in climate hotspots and other insecure conditions, in transit i.e., in temporary camps and shelters, or in unsafe conditions at their destination. These groups, primarily those who chose to or were forced to migrate, felt the combined consequences of three global crises — climate change, migration and the Covid-19 pandemic — to the largest extent. Already existing problems, such as unwarranted or difficult access to basic living conditions, with the pandemic and the measures taken to combat it, have only become more intense, making efforts to provide assistance to climate migrants now, more than ever, a necessary, and simultaneously, complex requirement.

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CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN YEMEN AND THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR HEALTH SECURITY

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Yildirim Toprak²

Abstract: This paper promotes the need to protect the strategy which integrates all facets of human security. It also demonstrates how the cholera outbreak in Yemen was caused by factors related to environmental security, health security, and military security. Since March 2015, Yemen has experienced persistent wars among numerous groups, which have decimated the nation's infrastructure and healthcare system. Moreover, the Saudi-led international coalition, formed to resolve the civil conflict, has failed. Yemen, affected by this war, was led into the seventh and deadliest cholera outbreak recorded in history. The ongoing civil war makes it impossible to avert this disaster, which resulted in a death toll of over 4,000 individuals. This study suggests a holistic approach to conflict resolution, one which includes humanitarian assistance focused on health and security, a donor conference to repair damaged infrastructure, along with mediation and facilitation efforts made by the international community to end the war. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that the cholera outbreak was propagated by climate change, as well. We, therefore, put forward suggestions to protect the strategy which prioritizes human security in order to address this issue.

Keywords: *Yemen, cholera outbreak, humanitarian intervention, health security, civil war, R2P*

HEALTH SECURITY

To start with, the framework for health security should always be developed in accordance with national health system legislation, as well as international health standards. States, still, must develop a vision for global health security in order to carry out efforts for the improvement of global capacity in the prevention, detection, and treatment of threats from communicable diseases (Altıntaş, 2021, p. 82).

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The scholarly debate on health security is dominated by three factors (Rushton, 2011, p. 782). The first is the claim that, because infectious diseases rapidly change in a worldwide culture, people, societies, or nations are at risk. Particularly, the global COVID-19 pandemic has had a huge impact on the trade market and politics, as well as logistics and inflationary effects, and on the uneven vaccination distribution and loss of life. Estimates predict that the pandemic will harm the world economy by \$1 trillion (Bagchi et al., 2020). As of August 2022, there has been 6.41 million fatalities worldwide (Our World in Data). Additionally, COVID-19 has made gender inequality, a problem which already existed everywhere, exasperated by global disparities, worse (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment & United Nations Development Programme, 2022). Last but not least, the disinformation spread during this pandemic led to the rise of new lies from racist, xenophobic, and populist organizations.³ We can, therefore, argue that there has been an increase in populist right-wing views all over the world.

Another issue, discussed in academic research on health security, is the possibility for diseases to be used as weapons by terrorists or to be incorporated by some states into biological weapons programs. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this notion was brought up in regards to the attacks which used letters, particularly those which used anthrax.

The third and final issue is the impact a major disease has on society, politics, the economy, and the armed forces. The impact of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, particularly in Africa, lends credence to this assertion. In this paper, we will emphasize that the cholera outbreak in Yemen had an analogous effect.

Another dispute about health security is centred on the question of "whose security?" Rushton (2011) emphasizes the idea that guaranteeing Westerners' security ultimately implies caring for people's health security. Furthermore, according to Robin Luckham (2017, p. 111), UNDP-produced concepts like "human security" or "citizen security" are highly divisive.

³ For these comments see: Elias, A., Ben, J., Mansouri, F., & Paradies, Y. (2021). Racism and nationalism during and beyond the COVID-19 pandemic. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 44(5), 783-793.; Devakumar, D., Shannon, G. D., Bhopal, S. S., & Abubakar, I. (2020). Racism and discrimination in COVID-19 responses. *Lancet*, 395(10231), 1194-1194.; Zinzi, B. D., & Moon, J. R. (2020). Racism and the political economy of COVID-19: will we continue to resurrect the past?. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law*, 45(6), 937-950.

According to Luckham, these concepts have, actually, come under fire for “securitizing” development. In addition to that, Luckham remarked how security may be used to define poverty, exclusion, and vulnerability, while. Simultaneously. allowing for outside military interventions in fragile countries.

The Regional Health for All Policy and Strategy for the 21st Century was developed by the WHO in 2002. The following policies and approaches for guaranteeing health security shown in detail in this publication:

1. *It is essential to renew national commitment to the principles of health for all not only at national level, but also at regional and global levels. This commitment should be translated into action aiming at making the spirit of health for all and the quest for equity and other values so deeply rooted in the national socioeconomic development process that they will be sustained.*
2. *It is essential to emphasize that sustainable health IS the focus of socio-economic development. This means that:*
 - *Each society should identify and define its own profile of vulnerability using health status as a key indicator;*
 - *Development strategies should act on the integral links between health status and economic well-being and productivity, especially in the case of highly vulnerable groups;*
 - *Health-related knowledge should become accessible to people in a form that increases their health self-reliance and their capacity to manage and cope with a rapidly changing health environment; and*
 - *Health-promoting activities should be linked to investments, to income-generating activities and to economic enterprise (Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, 2002, p. 6).*

As is evident, the WHO acknowledges connections between international aid, development, and health security. However, achieving the targets was challenging because of the global wealth gap and the fact that the global economic crises of 2001 and 2008 further distorted this wealth imbalance.

We believe that it is critical to lead a discussion about Yemen’s civil war’s causes moving forward. During this war, there was a massive cholera outbreak, which negatively impacted the state’s already subpar healthcare system. The intensity of the war has made it extremely difficult for the international community to offer aid.

CIVIL WAR IN YEMEN

Yemen's north and south were first divided in the first half of the 20th century. Up until 1990, this distinction existed. Civil war began in 1994, after the South proclaimed its independence. In this conflict, "tribe identity", in particular, was crucial (Kleemann, 2019, p. 1). The Shiite Houthis rejected the proposed constitution that called for dividing Yemen into six zones and requested a modification to a bizonal structure which would give them more authority. Following this, an armed uprising by the Houthis against the government started.

When Ali Abdullah Saleh was overthrown in 2014, the uprisings in Yemen came to an end, and the Arab Spring of 2011 spread to Yemen. The Houthis removed Saleh, who ruled the country for 33 years. According to some reports, Iran is the foreign country aiding the Houthis. After that, Saudi Arabia began a military offensive against the Houthis in Yemen. However, the Yemeni Civil War, which has already lasted for seven years, began as a result of the military action Saudi Arabia launched on March 26, 2015. Saudi Arabia wanted to reinstate the administration of President Abdurrabbu Mansur al-Hadi. In fact, the second justification for this was to prevent the establishment of a Shiite administration. We may argue that the Arabian Peninsula falls under the natural influence of the Saudi Royal Family. Moreover, it steps in when it thinks a political movement opposing its views and influence would undermine its authority and dominance in the region.

In addition, a global coalition led by Saudi Arabia was brought into the conflict at the invitation of Yemen's government. Along with the legitimate government of the Republic of Yemen, the international coalition consisted of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, the United Kingdom and the United States. The idea that these nations were united against Iran was supported by the fact that they are all Muslim and have sizable Sunni populations. The international alliance was unable to completely stop the Houthi rebels' activities. As a result, the Houthis were able to seize control of the whole nation of Yemen. In light of this development, Riyadh acknowledged and understood that it could not win this conflict with military force. Therefore, it looked favourably upon the Riyadh Agreement, which was signed on 5th November, 2019. However, it is not possible to claim that this agreement fully resolved the issue.

Thousands of civilians died in Saudi Arabia's attacks during the country's political turmoil in March 2015, according to the World Food Programme. Hunger became a major problem as the country's healthcare system collapsed and diseases like cholera claimed many lives. 14 thousand civilians have been killed or injured, as a result of conflicts, since 2017. In addition to that, since 2015, more than 4.3 million people have been forced to flee their homes (Saving Lives Changing Lives, n.d.).

The cholera epidemic gave a completely new dimension to the tragedy in Yemen. Due to the nation's failing healthcare system, the spread of the virus in the country triggered a humanitarian catastrophe. According to a warning from the UN Secretary General, Antoni Guterres, vulnerable people are at increased risk of being infected with cholera or the coronavirus, due to healthcare systems collapsing and healthcare professionals being targeted. He also called for a worldwide ceasefire in all ongoing wars (UN News, 2020). However, given that Yemen was the only country to respond to this request, it is obvious that the seven-year-old Yemeni Civil War will have disastrous consequences.

CHOLERA OUTBREAK IN YEMEN

Cholera is transmitted, primarily, through the consumption of contaminated water. A threat to populations without access to safe water sources is the disease-causing bacteria *Vibrio cholerae*. There have been six known major cholera epidemics throughout history, and the seventh cholera pandemic, which has begun in the 1960s and is ongoing today, has afflicted millions of people (Awofeso & Aldabk, 2018, p. 93).

When cholera broke out in Soho, London, in 1854, John Snow kept track of the patients' movements and pinpointed the contaminated water source as the Broad Street pump. 160 years passed since people first learned how to stop the spread of cholera, by having access to clean water, practicing good hygiene and having proper sanitation (Garrison et al., 2020, p. 113). Other countries with recent significant cholera epidemics include South Sudan, Haiti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and Yemen.


Cholera affects up to 4 million people globally and results in up to 140 thousand fatalities yearly, despite its treatment and prevention are simple. There are three oral cholera vaccines (OCVs) which have been prequalified by the WHO and approved by national regulatory agencies. WASH

(water, sanitation, and hygiene) should be made available in order to prevent cholera epidemics. (Wierzba, 2019).

The disease is still one of the worst burdens on public health in many regions. Approximately one million cases are reported annually, the most of which are in South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. Up to 4 million confirmed cases of cholera occur each year, according to the WHO. The true number of cholera cases, especially in developing countries, is, probably, far higher because many cases go unreported (Brumfield et al., 2021, p. 1). The WHO estimates that each year, 5-10% of all cholera cases are officially recorded (Alsheikh and Ghouth, 2020, 19).

The most recent outbreak in Yemen started in October 2016, peaked in December, and then continued through April 2017. The second wave of the cholera pandemic, which started on April 27, 2017, is thought to be the largest one recorded in history. On May 6, the country began a vaccination campaign against this pandemic, and it lasted until May 15 of the same year (Lemos-Paiao et al., 2018). The 5 thousand new cases of cholera reported daily in Yemen support the diagnosis of a serious outbreak. The statistic is disturbing because of the toll the ongoing civil war had with the destruction of the entire infrastructure and healthcare system. Between October 2016 and April 2021, Yemen had 2,538,677 suspected cholera cases, including 3,997 fatalities (Kuna & Gajewski, 2017, p. 165).

Graph 1: Epidemic curve cases in Yemen, October 16 to April 2021



Source: World Health Organisation⁴

Around 30 million people, or 61% of Yemen's population, do not have access to clean water. Moreover, 11.4 million people lack access to proper sanitation. The problem was not resolved even though UNICEF provided help to 37 Local Water and Sanitation Agencies (LWSCs) in 17 provinces so as to ensure that 2.48 million people had access to clean water. As Yemen's economy crashes due to the prolonged war, more than 22 million people will require humanitarian assistance and protection in 2022 (United Hands Relief — United for Humanity, n.d.). Furthermore, 19 million people require food assistance. 161 thousand of Yemenis are expected to be in severe hunger by the end of 2022. According to some predictions, children will be the most affected group by this hunger wave (Gressly, 2022). The trend of rising food prices, instigated globally as the result of the Ukraine-Russian war, had a detrimental effect on Yemen's people, who had already been struggling to acquire food.

The main cause of the cholera outbreak in Yemen is the inadequate treatment of wastewater. A few of the factors causing the spread of cholera are the ineffective water treatment systems and the absence of facilities for high-quality processing of waste. Additionally, the annual precipitation can be used to stop the cholera outbreak. The cholera outbreak in Yemen, between 2009 and 2011, was marked by little rainfall, which suggests that there may be other factors causing the cholera epidemic. However, 2015 saw an above average rainfall, and as a result, 2016 saw a cholera outbreak (Al-Gheethi et al., 2018, p. 678).

The situation in Yemen shows how the effects of the prolonged war on the environment and infrastructure have caused disease, poverty, and current cholera waves. The work by Awofeso and Aldabk uses a diagram to schematize the causes of the cholera outbreak in Yemen (2018, 618). Those are:

1. ecology — air, food and water pollution, worsening cholera transmission,
2. infrastructure destruction — roads, schools and hospitals,

⁴ Reliefweb. (n.d.). *Cholera situation in Yemen, April 2021*. World Health Organization. <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/cholera-situation-yemen-april-2021#:~:text=The%20cumulative%20number%20of%20suspected,with%20a%20CFR%20of%200.16%25>.

3. health — burden on poor citizens,
4. 70% of population had poor access to healthcare services,
5. poverty, hunger and lack of hygiene measures.
6. Finally, we may add additional rainfall and climate change as the sixth factor to these five, by drawing a conclusion on the findings of Al-Gheethi et al. We will now go into more details regarding our suggestions on how to put an end to this ongoing problem.

HOW TO SOLVE? SUGGESTIONS

The UN secured, from the donor nations, more than half of the \$3.4 billion donation needed for Yemen in 2020. In 2021, donor nations provided \$2.3 billion. Due to insufficient financing, the UN World Food Program has scaled back its food supply to Yemen. Despite a one-day request for donations, \$1.3 billion was gathered after the UN held a contribution conference on 16th March, 2022, to raise awareness of the crisis in Yemen. The UN needs to raise one-third of that amount in order to be able to help Yemen's millions of citizens (Kasapoğlu, 2022). As donations for Yemen are declining, charities and international organizations are scrambling to provide humanitarian aid.

To put an end to the Houthi movement, which is centred in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and to bring all parties in Yemen together, the UN has organized meetings in Riyadh. It was believed that the peace measures spearheaded by the UN would support this endeavour. The summit was held from 29th March to 7th April, 2022, but no deal to end the war was reached. Since Yemeni ports are still closed and Sana'a airport is still closed down, the Houthis rejected the proposals.

To conclude, it is obvious that the worldwide alliance headed by Saudi Arabia could not help find a solution. The UNSC needs to meet right away, so as to discuss the situation and create a brand-new, larger response force. The swift implementation of health security measures to eradicate cholera should be the coalition's main objective. In order to encourage the parties to a truce, on the condition that health security is guaranteed, assistance from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) or another group with experience in conflict resolution should also be sought.

It is indisputable that the conflicting parties are unhappy with Yemen's current political system. A new proposal for state-building should be made, like in the cases of North Macedonia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Cyprus. Same as in the cases of the aforementioned states, this paradigm can be done through the consociational democratic model. Of course, the willingness of the US and Russian Federation to terminate the fight, is what will determine how persuadable Iran and Saudi Arabia will be about this new paradigm.

In summary, our recommendation for overcoming this health security crisis is as follows:

1. To start with, the coalition, commanded by Saudi Arabia, established to end the conflict, has not been successful. The UNSC should urge its members to create a more powerful, multinational alliance as a result. At this moment, NATO's military might — which has vast experience dealing with issues similar to these — must be used.
2. It should be made clear, to all parties to the conflict, that the humanitarian intervention planned for Yemen is, primarily, meant to guarantee health security, by UN. Support for these conversations should be requested from expert groups, particularly from The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), which has knowledge of related topics. After a ceasefire, WHO should initiate a new vaccination process.
3. Arrange a UN fundraising event to address the nation's serious health issues, as well as its crumbling infrastructure.
4. In order to develop a consociational democratic model in Yemen, it is necessary to look for ways to evaluate the time when the war was halted due to severe healthcare demands.

As it can be clearly understood, the civil war in Yemen is the root cause of the cholera outbreak. Until the current civil war ends, a permanent solution to the disease cannot be found. However, as we noted in the study, there are additional factors which can contribute to the issue not being resolved. The first one is the failure of the international coalition, established to put an end to the civil war. Therefore, the international community should reconsider the military component of the issue in order to find a comprehensive solution. The idea of the responsibility to protect (R2P) should be examined along with this issue.

The change in the climate is another factor. The study demonstrated that the outbreak spread more quickly after the amount of precipitation in the area changed. In light of this, it can be said that the region is slowly being driven off by global climate change. This also demonstrates the clear connection between environmental and health security. With this in mind, we restate our argument, underlining, that human security cannot be successfully achieved through the use of partial solutions. Each component of human security works best when combined. All human security branches should be taken into account when determining an R2P which prioritizes human security.

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PART III:
**RESHAPING HUMAN SECURITY
APPROACH THROUGH CASE STUDIES**

PARADOXES OF WAR ON DRUGS

Aleksandra Ilić¹

Abstract: The war on drugs is a decades-long instrument of manipulation of the public opinion, on a global scale, established in the political speeches of American presidents in the 1970s. It seems that it has not lost its relevance, even at the present moment, considering its potential to cause a strong emotional reaction of the general public. Although declaring war on drugs should basically mean declaring war against organized crime, somehow, that basic thread often disappears from sight. Usually, the story boils down to removing drugs from the streets, parks, schools, by either arresting the petty dealers or, more often, ordinary users who have nothing to do with organized crime. Ordinary citizens are more concerned about the problem of drug addiction, so they are particularly interested in various activities which should reduce the presence of drugs around facilities where young people gather. The problem is that there is not enough awareness, in public, that drugs are one of the main objects of trade of organized crime groups, and that the key for suppressing the said drug problem is the fight against organized crime. The war on drugs is essentially the war against organized crime, but it remains unrecognizable because the attention is focused on the consequences. One of the consequences is high prevalence of drug addiction among youth, which paradoxically leads to mass arrests for possession of drugs for personal use and, unfortunately, a lot of drug addicts in prisons. Another consequence is the spread of addiction in prison facilities, which means a closed circle. War on drugs can be considered as the manifestation of the “risk society” concept and the high moralised approach of “zero tolerance”, which represent consumers in a bad manner, so they very often become the main actors of a moral panic process. Finally, the constant expansion of the list of prohibited substances increases the number of potential “drug addicts” and, in connection with that, possible arrests, which further contributes to the deviation from the basic course of the fight against organized crime.

Key words: *war, drugs, paradoxes, moral panic, drug abusers, organized crime*

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INTRODUCTION

'War on drugs' sounds very powerful and promising or, at least, it sounded like that. After five decades of its proclamation, the question is where are we now and what did all of us get from it. It is a decades-long instrument of manipulation of the public opinion, on a global scale, established in the political speeches of American presidents in the 1970s. It seems that it has not lost its relevance, even at the present moment, considering its potential to cause a strong emotional reaction of the general public. Public concern about the drug issue is always on a high level. Among the majority of citizens, there is no doubt about the justification of the zero-tolerance approach in the fight against drugs. The main problem is how the true meaning of that fight is understood i.e., the discrepancy between what the reality of that fight is and what should be its essence. Having that in mind, the drug issue is a topic which could easily be used as a manipulative tool by different subjects in the public sphere, usually in order to gain some political or other points. A true fight against drugs implies action directed towards organized crime, not individual dealers or ordinary drug addicts. Still, the public expects visible results in regards to this fighting process, while public officials offer those results, usually, in the form of catching the participants at the lowest level of the drug scheme. In most instances, they are simple drug addicts. One of the most important tasks the government has is to convince the public that the fight against the drug problem is real, which means to create an adequate public perception. The media is an excellent partner in that process, taking the lead in creating and maintaining such an image and, subsequently, hiding the paradoxes of war on drugs.

The purpose of this paper is to highlight, as much as possible, those paradoxes by comparing experiences of different states, with a special accent on the situation in the Republic of Serbia. Almost two decades have passed, since the criminal act of possessing drugs for personal use has been introduced to the Serbian Criminal Code. This crime is, to this day, the most present drug crime in the Serbian criminal statistics. In other words, the war on drugs is based on arresting the perpetrators of unauthorized possession of narcotics for personal use.

HISTORY OF THE WAR ON DRUGS

In the 1970s, the Nixon administration developed a conviction that drugs have become a significant problem. Therefore, attempts were made to find the solution to the problem within the criminal law. The offensive would target the production, distribution and consumption of these substances (Lord, 2022, p. 410). The American Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, and just over a decade later, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which introduced mandatory minimum criminal sentences (including those for lower-level drugs) and targeted drug dealers, in general (Lord, 2022, p. 411). George Bush retained Reagan's concern for drugs, developing a national drug control strategy, appointing the nation's first drug czar, and using the military to aid interdiction efforts (Chermak, 2006, p. 115).

In addition to that, since the beginning of the 1970s, on the European continent, the demand for various narcotics increased — especially cannabis and heroin. However, the surfacing of cocaine and ecstasy, along with other similar substances, encouraged the development of the international drug trade scheme — from the producer countries to consumer countries — and the emergence of a drug distribution system in all European countries. One of the most important consequences of that process is the creation of the drug dealer's role (in Western Europe during the 1970s and in Eastern Europe in 1990s). The main role of a drug dealer was to connect producers and consumers, and to maintain the regular supply of large urban centres with different drugs from distant regions (Fijnaut & Paoli, 2004, cited according to: Ignjatović & Stevanović, 2018, p. 42).

It is important to emphasize that international legal activities, aimed at solving drug-related problems, began between the First and Second World War. They were developed in the form of conventions adopted by the League of Nations, continuing to exist, after the Second World War, within the framework of the United Nations. Conventions related to drug issues are: International Convention on Opium from 1912² and 1925³; Convention on the Limitation of the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution

² International Convention on Opium, signed at Geneva, 11 February 1912.

³ International Opium Convention, signed at Geneva, 19 February 1925.

of Narcotic Drugs from 1931⁴; Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs from 1961⁵; 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances⁶; Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs from 1972⁷ and Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances from 1988⁸. These conventions were, at the same time, significant for prescribing criminal acts related to drugs within the internal criminal legislative of most countries. These facts influenced the drug crime politics in European countries, especially those which were targeted to a great extent. Besides the legislative activities inside those countries, the EU and the Council of Europe took steps towards fighting against organized drug trade, which is, still, of utmost importance for suppressing the drug problem, both at the global and international level.

THE WAR ON DRUGS AS THE WAR AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME

Suppression of organized crime groups and their activities focused on drug-related crimes, primarily, the production and distribution, should be in the main focus of the war on drugs. As a matter of fact, drugs cannot appear out of nowhere on the streets. They are, in almost all cases, the result of organized crime activities. Besides law-enforcement activities within each country, transnational law-enforcement cooperation has grown extensively, especially in terms of sophistication, since the 1980s. Among other issues, the question of drug-related crimes has been one of the key targets at the international level (Measham & South, 2012, p. 701). The transnational cooperation in regards to the fight against organized crime, got its basic and main document with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) (Palermo Convention)⁹. The Conven-

⁴ International Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed at Geneva, 13 July 1931.

⁵ Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, signed in New York, 8. August 1975.

⁶ Convention on Psychotropic Substances from 1971, signed in Vienna, Austria on 21 February 1971.

⁷ Protocol amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs signed in Geneva, 25 March 1972.

⁸ Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances from 1988, signed in Vienna, 20 December, 1988.

⁹ UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted by the UN General Assembly: 15 November 2000, by resolution 55/25.

tion represents a major step forward when it comes to the fight against transnational organized crime. Moreover, the states, which ratify this instrument, commit themselves to implementing a series of measures against transnational organized crime (creation of domestic criminal offences, the adoption of new and sweeping frameworks for extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement cooperation, etc.)¹⁰.

Therefore, what might be the problem? Why do anti-drug policies, in the majority of the countries, ignore, very often, that part of the story, i.e., the most important one? Basically, some countries, especially the developing ones, deny the problem with organised crime from different reasons, e.g., attracting economic investment can be limited, because of the organised crime problem. However, creating the image of a non-organised crime country sends different messages to different subjects.

There are different models of fighting against organized crime. The “integrated model” or the “Italian model”, should be mentioned, as it postulates that legislation against organized crime should be composed by a multidisciplinary set of rules — not only substantive criminal law provisions such as the ones which define the crimes of participation in an organized criminal group/organization or conspiracy, but also the special rules allocated into different branches of the legal system. In other words, legislation against organized crime should consist of a complex and well-coordinated body of rules; a body which must include special rules of criminal procedure, special rules of administrative law, special rules concerning the organization of courts and state authorities, special rules of penitentiary law, special rules of tax law, etc. Therefore, it would represent a general and coordinated engagement of the entire legal system. The fight requires that each branch of the law takes into account the specificity of this highly dangerous form of criminality, providing regulations which are finely tailored to strengthen the effect of the criminal law (Papa, 2008, pp. 22,23).

All these above-mentioned multidimensional activities of fight against organized crime are prescribed today in the legislative of most countries, but their application is not an easy task. Furthermore, sanctioning drug

¹⁰ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto, retrieved from <https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf>. Accessed 10 September 2022.

possession is, yet, another way for officials to show some results in solving the drug problem. However, the main problem is, in fact, that something which should be a second-class instrument in the drug fighting process, usually, becomes its basic tool. This creates other problems which will be discussed further in the text.

THE WAR AGAINST DRUG ABUSE

Drug policy objectives logically follow on from the two dominant models of drug aetiology: the criminal and medical models. The criminal model regards drug use as a consequence of an individual's choice. Drug users are presumed to be in control of their behaviour, and to be willing participants in the drug using lifestyle. According to this, drug users deserve punishment (Hawdon, 2001, 424). This kind of approach stems from the Classical school in Criminology and Criminal law and its indeterministic learning of free will, and full responsibility of each crime perpetrator for committed crime, which ignores individual characteristics that can influence the actions we take. Contrary to this, the medical model of drug use considers drug addiction to be a disease. Therefore, from the point of view of the medical model, drug users cannot control their habits, and they are, primarily, patients, not accountable for their actions (Hawdon, 2001, p. 424). Leshner suggests that governments stop treating drug use as a legal problem and start treating it as a public health problem, and, furthermore, recommends they should be subjected to treatment, while incarcerated — not treatment instead of incarceration (Chilton, 2001, p. 2).

It would be difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of sentencing, but imprisonment has, probably, little positive effect on drug or drug-related crime behaviour. One of the main reasons for this is the notable presence of drugs in prisons. Moreover, the sharing of injecting equipment makes the risk of transmission of blood-borne viruses, such as HIV and Hepatitis C, a serious problem. These problems became even more difficult because drug testing has become mandatory in most of the countries, which has encouraged the use of drugs which are harder to detect, including a shift from cannabis to opiates (Measham & South, 2012, p. 701).

However, the example of Serbia is somehow different. In order to test the convicts for most infectious diseases, the Law on Execution of Criminal

Sanctions¹¹ does not require their consent, except in the case of suspicion that the convict is infected with HIV or hepatitis C. With this in mind, it is important to underline the importance of analysing the appropriate legal solutions in the area of population protection against infectious diseases. In this regard, the Law on the Protection of the Population from Infectious Diseases¹² in Article 46, Paragraph 1, Point 7, provides that persons serving a prison sentence are subject to a mandatory health examination to determine whether they are carriers of the causative agent of infectious diseases. From the text of the Order on mandatory health examinations of certain categories of employees in facilities under sanitary supervision, mandatory and recommended health examinations to which certain categories of the population are subject¹³, it is quite clear that HIV and hepatitis C testing of convicts is mandatory and is undertaken independently of the convict's consent. Bearing in mind that the regulations in the field of health care are *lex specialis*, they should be given primacy, and it should be considered that the consent of the convicted person for testing for HIV and hepatitis C is not necessary, so *de lege ferenda* it would be necessary to harmonize the provisions of the Law on Execution of Criminal Sanctions with the mentioned regulations in the field of health care from infectious diseases (Ilić, 2022, p. 295).

No matter what kind of approach is accepted, the problem of drug addiction is far more complicated. One of the things that complicate dealing with it, is the public perception of drug abusers, which are often objects of a moral panic reaction.

Drug abuse panics

The history of the drug abuse panics is quite extensive and encompasses almost one whole century. It is a few decades longer than the war on

¹¹ Law on Execution of Criminal Sanctions ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 55/14 and 35/19).

¹² Law on the Protection of the Population from Infectious Diseases ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 15/16, 68/20 and 136/20).

¹³ Order on mandatory health examinations of certain categories of employees in facilities under sanitary supervision, mandatory and recommended health examinations to which certain categories of the population ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 3/17).

drugs, but without a doubt, the war on drugs has considerably strengthened the panic over drug addiction. If we take into consideration the USA's experience, we can see that it all began with the marijuana panic in the 1930s. Regardless of the fact that marijuana's use stretches back for thousands of years, to pre-agrarian societies, in USA, during the 1920s and 1930s, the image of marijuana use — depicted in the media and accepted by law enforcement and the general public — was so unrealistic that it would be considered amusing nowadays. Marijuana users were said to be "addicts" and to become violent, dangerous and insane under its influence. Later on, during the next two decades, the situation calmed down, although the panic erupted again in the 1960s. However, in that moment marijuana users became hippie, a drop-out and a shiftless ne'er-do-well (Himmelstein, 1983, cited according to: Goode and Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 199). Thus, from extremely dangerous criminals they became outsiders in every sense of the word.

Another action contributed to the process of spreading the drug abuse panics. That was the criminalization of drug possession, which was the unnecessary consequence of the war on drugs. For example, in America in the late 1980s, Mrs Regan, the First Lady, at that moment, despite the decline in marijuana use, claimed that drug abuse was threatening "the American family," and that "no one" was safe from it. She used the term "epidemic" to describe the scope and seriousness of the drug abuse problematics and the kind of rhetoric which helps define the folk devil (i.e., drug abusers), so that the moral panic process was successfully instigated. Of course, president Reagan, also, identified the folk devil responsible for the problem, because he skilfully used communitarian arguments so as to define drug use as a problem (Hawdon, 2001, pp. 428, 429). In the same period, more precisely late in 1989, in USA, drug abuse was named in one poll as the "greatest problem facing the country today" by two-thirds of the respondents. The result of that climate is the anti-drug legislation, which tends to be observed in the public interest. Contrary to that, drug users have no social movement constituency, and, unless lawmakers seriously step on constitutional guarantees, civil libertarians characteristically lay low during the drug panics (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 198).

If we consider the question of source which influenced the emergence and spread of the drug moral panic, the majority of authors in literature put the accent on the elite. The proponents of the elitist theory believe

that this type of anxiety within the American nation could not have arisen as a result of some pre-existing fear or concern, which would be consistent with the mass model explanation. Instead, the role of the ruling elite in its creation is emphasized. The elite creates fear and anxiety among citizens, in order to achieve their own goals and continue to profit by maintaining the *status quo*, which, thus, entails creating a certain mental distance from the real problems within a society — economic and political inequality (Reinarman & Harry, cited according to Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 63). In that sense, the 1986 “war on drugs” speeches delivered by the US President Ronald Reagan are considered to have set the stage for the emergence of the moral panic about drugs in the late 1980s, with a significant contribution from the strong support he received for his action. Contrary to that, in the early 1970s, the president at that time, Richard Nixon, called for a war on drugs without achieving the same response from the public, indicating the importance of grassroots factors in generating a moral panic (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2009, p. 63). However, the representatives of the mass model cite, as a counterargument, the fact that earlier, during the 1970s, the elite attempted to influence the public a few times, in terms of mobilizing all forces, in order to combat the drug-related problem, albeit unsuccessful, because there was no initial fear among people at that time, it was yet to be activated in the appropriate way (Ilić, 2017b, pp. 302, 303).

One of the most important elements of the moral panic is hostility. It is in people’s nature to find the culprits for the committed crime or any other forms of unwelcomed behaviour, such as drug addiction. The “enemies” are usually members of some “notorious” groups. In the context of the moral panic process, there is always an increased level of hostility towards a group or category of people who are designated as participants in the commission of criminal or other unacceptable (or deviant) acts or persons who influence the creation of conditions for the commission of such acts (Ilić, 2017a, p. 91). Stanley Cohen introduced the concept of moral panic for the first time and defined who is, usually, the object of moral panic, i.e., groups of people who belong to familiar clusters of social identity. One of the groups refers to psychoactive substances. Cohen called the moral panic about drugs: the wrong drugs used by the wrong people in the wrong places. The moral panic about drugs has been remarkably consistent for about a hundred years, and the list of prohibited and dangerous substances is only being added to over time. Over the years, the

moral panic related to drugs took different forms and was based on different manifestations of hostility towards people (dealers, for example) or places where mostly young people gathered for fun and entertainment (night clubs, parties, etc.) (Cohen, 2011, p. xiv).

Due to all these above-mentioned circumstances, drug crimes belong to the group of crimes with zero-tolerance attitude among law enforcement agencies' officers. However, in crime statistics, petty drug crimes are still present by and large, significantly more than serious drug crimes (the manufacture or distribution as a part of organized crime activities). That leads to the conclusion that, unfortunately, the fight against drug problems is mostly based on petty drug crimes.

THE WAR ON DRUGS IN SERBIA

The war on drugs, in the Republic of Serbia, officially began approximately two decades ago, with specific normative changes for tackling the problem of fighting against organized crime as a whole and, at the same time, with concrete legislative action towards the suppression of "drug crimes" — all having in mind the fact that the drug issue is almost always connected with organized crime activities.

The turning point in the fight against organized crime, in Serbia, was the adoption of the fundamental Law on Organisation and Competences of State Authorities in Combat Against Organised Crime, Corruption and Other Serious Crimes¹⁴, which was enacted in 2002 and which established, among other things, new special units against organised crime (special prosecutor for organised crime, special department of the Belgrade district court for organised crime, special police unit against organised crime). This document was replaced by a new Law on Organisation and Competences of State Authorities in Suppression Against Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption¹⁵, although the basic organizational and compe-

¹⁴ Law on Organisation and Competences of State Authorities in Combat Against Organised Crime, Corruption and Other Serious Crimes ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 42/2002, 27/2003, 39/2003, 67/2003, 29/2004, 58/2004 — another law, 45/2005, 61/2005 and 72/2009).

¹⁵ Law on Organisation and Competence of State Authorities in Suppression of Organised Crime, Terrorism and Corruption ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 94/16 and 87/18 — another law).

tence framework remained the same. Moreover, it is important to mention two most important and basic laws in criminal matters: Criminal Code¹⁶ (hereinafter: CC) and Criminal Procedure Code¹⁷ which contain material, i.e., procedural provisions important for the fight against organized crime (e.g., definition of organized crime, prescribed responsibility of an organized criminal group as a more serious form of certain criminal offenses or special evidentiary actions that have their basic application in the case of discovering and proving acts of organized crime). As a logical step, Serbia introduced a special law on execution of the prison sentence for organized crime convicts (in addition to other forms of serious crimes) — Law on the Enforcement of the Prison Sentence for Criminal Offences of Organised Crime¹⁸. Finally, we should mention the Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime¹⁹ which is harmonized with international standards and provides the possibility of confiscating all, or at least, a part of the suspect's property, with the fulfilment of the conditions prescribed by law.

Besides these important steps towards the fight against organised crime and, at the same time, tools in the war on drugs in Serbia, more concrete legislative action meant changes inside the specific criminal offences, traditionally present in CC. The first step was in the criminalization, in 2003, of the unauthorized possession of narcotic drugs as a special form of the criminal offense of unauthorized production, possession and distribution of narcotic drugs (Art. 246, paragraph 3 CC)²⁰. On the one hand, this form included possession of drugs for personal use, which basically meant criminalization of drug addiction, while, on the other hand, this form was also applied when it came to serious merchants of narcotic drugs, i.e., when it

¹⁶ Criminal Code ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", no. 85/2005, 88/2005 — corr., 107/2005 — corr., 72/2009, 111/2009, 121/2012, 104/2013, 108/2014, 94/2016 and 35/2019).

¹⁷ Criminal Procedure Code ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 72/2011, 101/2011, 121/2012, 32/2013, 45/2013, 55/2014, 35/2019, 27/2021 — CC decision and 62/2021 — CC decision).

¹⁸ Law on Enforcement of the Prison Sentence for Criminal Offences of Organised Crime ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 72/2009 and 101/2010).

¹⁹ Law on Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" No. 97/08).

²⁰ Law on Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia" no. 39/2003).

came to the act referred to in Article 246, paragraph 1 of CC. However, due to the problem of proving the intention to keep the drug for the purpose of selling it, the act was qualified as a privileged, new form. The intention of the legislator was to cover, with new form, every possession of drug, which could not be considered as keeping for selling, i.e., that could not be the basic form of this crime (Delić, 2021, p. 275). Actually, the inability to prove drug trade was, at that time, the main reason for the introduction of unauthorized possession of narcotic drugs. However, this inability to provide proof should not lead to bad legal solutions in CC (Stojanović, 2021, p. 826). That kind of solution was in force until 2009 when the Law on Amendments and Additions (LAA)²¹ of the actual CC (2006), introduced unauthorized possession of narcotic drugs as an independent criminal offense (Art. 246a CC). This, however, especially in the beginning of its application, led to judicial practices wandering and wrong decisions, in the sense that the complete decriminalization of possession of narcotic drugs was carried out, which was not the intention of the legislator (Stojanović, 2021, p. 826). Obviously, judicial practices were trying to find the balance between the intention of the legislator to cover cases of drug possession and the danger of criminally sanctioning the drug addiction. In that sense, the concept of possession does not include the case of very short possession of a narcotic drug necessary for its consumption, i.e., if a person consumes a narcotic drug immediately, or in a short period of time after receiving it from another person (Stojanović, 2021, p. 826).

Finally, the latest amendments to the criminal legislation (LAA of CC from 2019)²² introduced another form of criminalizing the possession of a large amount of substances or preparation declared to be narcotic drugs (art. 246a, paragraph 2) — which represents a more serious form of this criminal offense. With this latest amendment, the situation is similar to the one from 2003, possession of a large amount of narcotic drugs could be a way for sanctioning in situations without proofs of drug selling intention. The conclusion is that with this new form of incrimination of drug

²¹ Law on Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 72/2009).

²² Law on Amendments and Additions to the Criminal Code (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” no. 35/2019).

possession, the criminal zone is expanding to cases which were not previously covered by the law of existing criminal acts (Delić, 2021, 281).

CONCLUSION

The war on drugs is, without a doubt, still an actual topic, both at an international and a national level. That war can have different forms, targeting various subjects. However, its main purpose remains the same as all these years — the fight against organized crime. Somehow, in most countries, that basic goal frequently becomes invisible, while some other things come to the fore.

Drug abuse is the most visible part of the drug issue, a phenomenon which causes public reaction to a great extent. In order to calm down the public concern regarding the presence of drugs and to show some concrete results in suppression of drugs crimes, a lot of countries introduce changes in their legislative. Those changes usually target ordinary drug abusers, while it remains questionable whether new legal provisions can, in fact, advance the fight against organized crime. The usual answer to this is no, all that we have from the new criminal law approach is indirect criminalization of the abuse of narcotic drugs itself, i.e., drug addiction.

The states' response towards drug crimes and organized crime is unrealistic. Full crime statistics do not represent the real situation and real efforts of law enforcement in the fight against organized crime. As a consequence, prisons are full of drug addicts who, in the first place, need medical treatment, and not to be put behind bars. Prisons usually make the situation worse than it was.

Therefore, the war on drugs, like some other wars should, primarily, be focused on preventive measures, so as to keep the children and young people away from drugs. Repressive activity does not seem to be the best solution to this problem, especially when it comes to the drug abusers' treatment.

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THE SECURITISATION OF COVID-19 IN SERBIA DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN THE PERIOD MARCH — JUNE 2020

Ana Stevanović¹

Abstract: The pandemic and people's health are very significant for the concept of human security. The idea of this paper is to examine whether the subject of the pandemic can be misused, by examining the securitization of the pandemic, in Serbia, during the 2020 election campaign. For security theorists, the pandemic crisis is a challenge to security policy, and some authors point out that it confirmed the usefulness of the idea of securitization. The analytical framework of this paper is the theory of securitization and we aimed to present the elements of the classical theory of securitization, on the example of securitization of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia. The paper should answer the question of whether the securitization of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia was successful or not, and whether it was misused for the benefit of the election campaign in June 2020. In the first part of this paper, we analysed the National Security Strategies, then we dealt with the concept of securitization with a focus on conditions that, if met, testify to successful securitization, while the third part was dedicated to COVID-19 in Serbia and the introduction of emergency measures. In order to assess the success of the securitization of COVID-19, we analysed whether the speech acts followed the paradigm of security, i.e., that the threat is existential, alarming and threatens survival for the state and its citizens. The next condition refers to the social capital of the securitizing actors and the last condition refers to the audience's acceptance of special measures.

Key words: *Securitization Theory, COVID-19, elections, campaigns*

INTRODUCTION

In December 2019, the first case of a new virus SARS-Cov-2 infection was registered in the city of Wuhan in the People's Republic of China. The emergence of a new virus, and the disease it causes called COVID -19 has shackled the world with a pandemic unseen in recent history, causing disruptions in almost all spheres of society, from economics to security,

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politics, international relations and international security. At the moment of writing this paper (August 2022), more than six thousand cases of newly infected people are recorded daily in Serbia. This indicates that the danger of COVID-19 has not passed, but despite this, there are almost no preventive measures, nor those that would prevent infection and the free spread of the virus in the Serbian population.

Also, more than 2 million and 425 thousand people, in Serbia, have been infected with this virus so far². According to the official data, which was doubted due to the fact that the numbers might have been reduced multiple times by the authorities, over 16 thousand people have died since the first case. In addition to the consequences on the health of the population, the overload and the collapsed health system, the consequences of the pandemic are multiple. Some of them can be seen in the decline of trust in official data and in the officials who communicated the public data related to the virus, then the rise of conspiracy theories among the citizens and the rise of suspicion in the science. Also, the consequences are particularly large in the field of economics, trade and business. Writing about and researching COVID-19, in the context of international relations and international security, is very challenging because it provides the opportunity to test numerous scientific theories in real time. This challenge was also a motive for us to research the securitization of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia.

In this paper, we will use the theory of securitization as the analytical framework, in order to present the elements of the classical theory of securitization on the example of the securitization of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia. The research question should provide the answer whether the securitization of COVID-19 in Serbia was successful or not. Although Buzan and Waever point out that the success of securitization can be assessed if the audience or the public accepts special measures, in the context of Serbia it is interesting that people protested in the evening hours, but that they did so from their homes respecting the curfew. The second question is — whether COVID-19 and urgent measures were misused for the election campaign in Serbia in 2020 before the election for the members of the National Assembly. This question is important because the threat of the pandemic has not passed. At the moment of writing this paper (August

² Ministarstvo zdravlja Republike Srbije. (n.d.). Korona virus COVID-19. <https://covid19.rs/>.

2022), Serbia is facing a new wave with the presence of a new omicron strain of the virus. Due to the absence of almost any measures, the safety and health of the population is threatened, while the number of infected people is measured in thousands every day. In order to assess the success of the securitization of COVID-19, we will analyse whether the speech act follows the paradigm of security, i.e., that the threat is existential, alarming and endangers survival. The next condition refers to the social capital of the securitizing actor. In this paper, the main securitizing actor is the President of the Republic of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, whose current position provides adequate social capital. We will analyse his speech acts referring to the adopted emergency measures. Another condition important for the success of securitization refers to the danger, which must be potentially threatening, that is, it must cause certain threatening associations (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 31-33).

Even though the war rhetoric was used in other parts of the world as well, the collective experience and memory of the Yugoslav wars in Serbia shaped both the speech act and the audience's reaction. During the state of emergency, the public accepted extraordinary measures while Vučić, the dominant securitizing actor, convincingly resorted to war rhetoric, bearing in mind the collective memory of the wars of the 1990s. Using collective memory related to the war, the dominant narrative of the securitizing actors was about war and an invisible enemy that had to be defeated.

HEALTH SECURITY IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Governments around the world were not prepared for the coming threat, including the government in Serbia, which did not have an adequate response to the emergence of the new virus. In the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia adopted in 2009, it is stated that endangering the health of citizens due to biological contamination represents a constant security risk for the Republic of Serbia, the population and material assets, and that the dangers associated with the appearance and spread of infectious diseases in humans and animals represent a security risk which could be more pronounced in the future (2009, p. 12). In the same Strategy, it is stated that "special importance is given to the creation of conditions for the improvement of human security, which

emphasizes the protection of the health security of the individual and the community" (2009, p. 16), as well as that "by strengthening the modern health system, prerequisites are created for preventing the occurrence and spread of infectious diseases in humans, as effective removal of the consequences they cause" (2009, p. 28). The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, adopted on December 27th, 2019, states that the negative impact of climate change leading to extreme weather conditions, can lead to epidemics. Improving the health care of residents is listed as one of the priorities, and it is pointed out that "special attention will be devoted to the prevention and suppression of infectious diseases" (2019). Pandemics of infectious diseases are mentioned only once in the Strategy, where it is stated that they can threaten the population, posing a risk for the emergence of economic and social consequences.

Comparing these two Strategies, we see that the health security of Serbian citizens, although recognized, remained marginalized. Only a few weeks after the adoption of this Strategy, the issue of threatened health security overshadowed all other threats listed in the Strategy.

THE SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE EVALUATION OF THE SECURITIZATION SUCCESS

Ole Wæver is the creator of the theory of securitization, which contributes to the understanding of why certain phenomena are treated as security threats. Conceptualizing security as a speech act through which certain threats are signified, political elites demand from society legitimacy for the application of certain, extraordinary measures that would hardly be acceptable under normal conditions (Wæver, 1989). Securitization can be considered successful when emergency measures are adopted with public acceptance.

In order for securitization to be successful and to prevent any challenge from becoming a security issue, it is necessary to identify an existential threat, and to react urgently by introducing certain measures (Taureck, 2006). It is important that the audience and the target public give legitimacy to those measures and accept them. The state, that is, the elites, define and mark security problems because, as power holders and decision makers, they use the instrument of securitization in order to establish control over some challenge (Wæver, 1993).

Securitization can be observed through speech acts, i.e., the formulation of a certain problem important for the survival, along with the survival of society or political community. The speech act is considered successful if the problem is recognized as a security problem within academic circles and/or the wider discourse of decision-makers (Taureck, 2006). In the process of securitization, the securitizing actors are those who address a specific problem as the security threat, and who must possess significant social capital in order to be able to construct a specific existential threat. During the securitization process, the ruling structures and politicians are in the role of securitizing actors who demand extraordinary measures, the adoption and implementation of which would eliminate the potential danger. Extraordinary, special measures include all those procedures that would not be accepted under normal circumstances and may consist of the application of military force, the abolition or significant reduction of human rights (Buzan et al., 1998).

The final factor in the securitization process is the audience, which may be the general public (or a particular social group that may be directly threatened) that may or may not agree with the emergency measures that the securitizing actors claim are necessary. Buzan, Wilde and Waver point out that "the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25). According to the constructivist theory, the enemy needs to be described, given a meaning, and an image through emotions, metonymy, analogies and stereotypes (Balzaq, 2010) which is an instrumentalization of historical narratives and an association with experienced or imminent threats. Bearing in mind that the virus represents an invisible and dangerous threat, securitization actors in Serbia resorted to war rhetoric. In order to evaluate the success of the securitization of COVID-19 in Serbia, we will examine all the mentioned elements.

COVID-19 appeared almost simultaneously with the very beginning of the election campaign for the upcoming parliamentary elections in Serbia scheduled for April 26th, 2020³. Despite the increasing number of

³ With the adoption of the Joint Declaration on Boycotting the Elections on February 1, 2020, the opposition started a campaign to boycott the elections, and due to the non-participation of the opposition, the ruling party basically had no one to beat. However, a virus emerged as an ideal opponent to defeat.

registered cases all over Europe, the highest government officials⁴ in Serbia ignored the threat of the new virus.

Not only did they try to minimize the danger, but they also tried to divert the attention from the looming threat. It was only on February 26th that a press conference was held, which is remembered for the frivolous statements of the member of the crisis staff, doctor Branimir Nestrović, who, in order to minimize the danger of the coming virus, convinced the public that it was “the funniest virus in history that exists on Facebook” (Živanović, 2020). At that same press conference, the speakers tried to minimize the ongoing threat, including the President of the Republic of Serbia⁵, who gave the impression that there is no real threat from the virus.

The appearance of COVID-19 in Serbia and the introduction of emergency measures

Officially, the first registered case of COVID-19 in Serbia was on March 6th, just a day after the Serbian Progressive Party submitted its list of candidates for the ongoing parliamentary elections. On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization declared a pandemic of the coronavirus which led to a change in the narrative of the highest state officials and the securitization of the disease COVID-19. When it comes to the special measures, on March 14th, the Ministry of Defence submitted to Aleksandar Vučić an assessment of the risks and threats to the security of Serbia and its citizens, which required the adoption of emergency measures under his jurisdiction.

Article 200 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia prescribes the conditions under which a state of emergency can be declared, and in that article, it is stated that a state of emergency can be declared when a public danger threatens the survival of the state or its citizens. In addition,

⁴ On January 30th, 2020, the Minister of Health in the Government of the Republic of Serbia, Zlatibor Lončar, stated that our country has taken all measures to prevent the corona virus from reaching Serbia, adding that everyone coming from China is under surveillance and pointed out that the situation will not be alarming if and when a patient appeared.

⁵ The question that remains unanswered is whether this careless attitude of the state leadership was conditioned by the fact that Aleksandar Vučić had to call for elections on March 4, 2020. (N1 Beograd, 2020).

paragraph 5 states that when the National Assembly is unable to meet, the decision to declare a state of emergency is made jointly by the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister, under the same conditions as the National Assembly. This procedure has been followed, but the opposition fiercely criticized this decision. However, the Government justified it with the alleged need for urgent reactions, and in this way it additionally managed to emphasize the danger of the threat of Covid-19. An explanation was received, according to which the gathering of a large number of members of the Parliament posed a health risk. It is interesting to mention that the Assembly met on April 28th, 2020. when 222 new cases were confirmed.

On March 15th, when 46 cases of infection were officially confirmed in Serbia, a state of emergency was declared on the territory of the Republic of Serbia without the consent of the National Assembly. All televisions with the national frequency broadcast live the official address of President Vučić, whose speech acts followed the paradigm of securitization. Using the impressive war rhetoric, he pointed out that "Serbia is at war against an enemy that it must defeat, a dangerous and vicious opponent that our country must defeat. Life is closed to save life." Very strict, extraordinary measures with a significant restriction of human rights, including the closing of schools and colleges, markets, shops, cancellation of public transport, were taken in order to save the country because surrender is not an option for Serbia.

Speaking from the position of the President, surrounded by the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly, a team of medical experts in the field of epidemiology, adhered to the securitization paradigm, while announcing radical and restrictive emergency measures. Thus, we may conclude that the securitizing move was taken, i.e., a speech act, but that it is not yet securitization because the audience did not participate here. An alarming threat, dangerous to the survival of the nation was defined. The securitizing actor possessed social capital, because he was the elected president of the Republic of Serbia, and, in that time, the most powerful and the most influential political figure in Serbia, and the threat he pointed to, was evidently serious. The audience did not complain about the proposed measure.

Pandemics and wars have always affected society and the economy, and running a country during a pandemic is similar to fighting a war (Zakaria, 2020, p. 94). The day after the introduction of the state of emergency, armed soldiers walked the central streets of Belgrade. On March 24th, the preparation of the hospital at the Belgrade Fair began. Photographs of soldiers making the beds were reminiscent of the camps, inevitably creating an emotional reaction among the public (audience) that they were preparing for a real war. By imagining the enemy and hearing the war rhetoric, constructivists' theories were confirmed through the process of securitization because constructivism implies images of reality including the perception of danger as an enabling condition for accepting and approving emergency measures (Jović, 2020, p. 493).

Speaking of extraordinary measures which would not be accepted under normal circumstances, those were adopted on March 17th. They referred to the curfew during which citizens' movement was forbidden from 8 pm to 5 am.

Moreover, a stricter curfew — where citizens were not allowed to leave their house — was imposed on the citizens over 65 in cities, while in rural areas, as well as in those with less than five thousand inhabitants, the age limit was raised and applied to people over 70.

President Vučić pointed out that unpopular measures will mean the protection of people's lives and that they aim to preserve the right to the future. He added that "even those who are facing a more difficult situation have not been introduced with such difficult measures, but that our country is doing it knowing that it is the only way to fight the coronavirus." On the day he said this, there were 72 newly infected people in Serbia. Furthermore, he added that there are no elections for him while he is fighting the virus, calling it the greatest scourge of the modern world since the Second World War, where an obvious association to war was created.

Under these circumstances, it was possible to postpone the parliamentary elections only in case of a state of emergency, so the possibility that such a radical measure was used precisely for this reason, is not excluded.

On May 6th, the state of emergency was lifted, and certain events⁶ followed, raising suspicions that the current government abused and misused securitization, and that behind the narrative of the fight against an invisible enemy, there was actually an election campaign which aimed to present President Vučić as the saviour of the nation. A few weeks before the parliamentary elections, the threat was de-securitized with the narrative that the danger had passed, resulting in a great victory over the virus, which should have been capitalized on, in the form of the best possible result of the ruling coalition in the elections.

This suspicion is well-founded, as evidenced by the re-announcement of a multi-day curfew during the weekend, ten days after the election and the declaration of the alleged victory over the virus, which caused several days of citizens' protests.

Therefore, we can conclude here that the securitization of COVID-19 was misused for the purpose of the election campaign, and that this claim can be verified in the narratives and measures of government representatives a few months before the elections, as well as after the elections were over. That is why this example, along with the theoretical and analytical framework which was applied, can be adequate for evaluation of similar examples around the world, however, by also indicating the moral aspect of securitization.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we researched the success of the securitization of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia. It was shown that the necessary conditions which testify to the successful securitization, have been met. By comparing the two National Security Strategies which were adopted in the Parliament in 2009, and ten years later in 2019, just a few months before the pandemic occurred, this paper displayed that the issue of health security, and especially the threat of a pandemic, is insufficiently recognized in both.

⁶ While the largest number of European countries were still "under lock and key", a derby was held in Serbia at the beginning of June in front of more than 15,000 fans, and the member of the Crisis Staff, Darija Kisić Tepavčević, marked this sporting event as a low-risk one.

Furthermore, we analysed the speech acts of the securitizing actor to establish that they follow the paradigm of security, due the threat being labelled as existential. The narrative of the dominant securitizing actor is dominantly militarized. Militarized narratives abused the collective memory of war from the past three decades as it exists in our society. Future research could examine the impact of these narratives and the (mis)use of militarized speech on the psychological state of people, especially those who were exposed to, or themselves participated in, war operations in the Western Balkans.

The paper suggests the abuse of securitization due to the pre-election campaign, at the time, and this claim is additionally confirmed by the fact that, in the period, when there were the fewest cases in Serbia, the most drastic measures were in force — with the narrowing of human rights — while in the weeks when the numbers of infected people reached nine thousand, there was no trace of radical measures like in March 2020.

In most countries of the European Union, measures were tightened or reduced depending on the epidemiological situation and the number of patients, while in Serbia this was not the case since the state of emergency was lifted. This fact also testifies that the political elite, i.e., securitizing actors, abused securitization for the purpose of increasing their own rating, while taking care of the citizens' safety and their health was not a priority.

In support of this claim are the circumstances and events that took place immediately after the end of the parliamentary elections held in June 2020. In Serbia, several waves of illness followed with over 10,000 infected patients per day, and despite this, no new measures were introduced. Additionally, the trust in those who managed the pandemic in Serbia dropped significantly, and simultaneously, those narratives (dominant mostly on social media) which increasingly spread conspiracy theories, and undermined trust in science, became very loud. This was clearly seen when a vaccination campaign followed, but did not cover enough vaccinated people in order to create herd immunity in Serbia.

The consequences of reduced vaccination, the spread of the conspiracy theories, higher morbidity, the collapse of the health system and the permanently damaged health of tens of thousands of people, also, represent a dire security problem which will, surely, be a subject of research in future scientific studies of international security.

The advantage of such research is that it can approach observation in real time, bearing in mind that the danger of the virus has not yet passed, that the virus circulates freely, and that almost no measures exist. Bearing in mind that the number of new cases in some countries is very small, future research can focus on a comparative analysis of the securitization of the pandemic, by comparing the narratives, applied measures, as well as the effectiveness of the measures that were in force. This type of research may be useful for future national security strategies worldwide, due to some future pandemics.

Future research related to the securitization of COVID-19 in Serbia could move in the direction of securitization in authoritarian regimes, e.g., dealt with by Vuori (2008), while actually analysing the radical measures which were introduced in Serbia, supposedly with the aim to protect the oldest population. Furthermore, it was useful to investigate the ethics of securitization based on the analytical framework of Rita Floyd (2011) and her set of criteria for assessing the moral correctness of securitization.

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RADICALISM AND BOSNIAN YOUTH: WHERE DOES IT COME FROM?

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Abstract: The research “*Radicalism and Bosnian Youth: Where Does it Come From?*” was aimed towards analysing the reasons behind radicalisation and extremism among young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This article considered which social and psychological factors contribute to radicalization of Bosnian youth and how Bosnian society deals with it. In order to find out more about which attitudes on radicalization and extremism Bosnian young people have, qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Over 500 young people (age 15-30), from different local communities (both entities) in Bosnia and Herzegovina were questioned through online questionnaires. Semi-opened questions were used not only to examine their views and potential experience with extremism and radicalism, but also their attitudes towards hate speech which they might have witnessed in different kind of media and encountered in everyday life.

Key words: *radicalism, extremism, nationalism, youth, Bosnia and Herzegovina*

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the political spectrum in Europe, and the rest of the world, has turned to the right, while at the same time numerous religious and nationalistic radical groups entered the scene. This led to targeted terrorist attacks — causing feelings of fear and insecurity among citizens of some of the major metropolises — which took place in all the leading countries of Europe and the world. These attacks were carried out in several German cities, as well as in France, Turkey, Belgium, Mexico, Iraq and many other countries where these groups considered it necessary. The common point for all extremist groups, we often hear about in the media,

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is believing that values such as multiculturalism, democracy, tolerance and inclusive society need to be changed, albeit by force, without choosing the means. Bosnia and Herzegovina is no exception when extremist groups and terrorist attacks are concerned.

Let us just remember the attack by Mevlid Jašarević on the American Embassy in 2011, and the Nerdin Ibrić attack on the police station in Zvornik. Then, as far as the extremist organizations are concerned, there are the gatherings of the Chetnik movement in Višegrad, the organization Serbian honour, headquartered in Niš (Republic of Serbia), and a branch organization in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Keep in mind that these are not the only ones. Violent extremism is not a new phenomenon; however, certain globalization processes, technological progress, political discourse and new communication possibilities, have provided extremist groups with new tools and ways of acting, which made them much more dangerous on the global level.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country which came out of a war more than 20 years ago. However, there are still strong ethnic tensions reflected in its educational system and political discourse, which support ethnic segregation within society. As such, it represents a fertile ground for radical movements to recruit young people. According to Azinović and Jusić (2015), around 330 recruits from Bosnia and Herzegovina have joined radical Islamic groups in Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, there is no actual database with exact numbers to confirm or deny this. There are several reasons for this, one of which is the decentralized police force structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

MORE ABOUT THE CONTEXT

In this day and age, Bosnia and Herzegovina still faces many socio-political challenges. One of them is the high unemployment rate, especially among young people, which is, according to the CIA report from 2015, over 60% (Central Intelligence Agency, 2015). Moreover, in terms of the unemployment rate of young people, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the leading countries with one of the highest rates in the world. Some of the consequences caused by this are poverty, increased rates of crime, mental illnesses, and abuse of various sorts of drugs, etc. Furthermore,

apathy and hopelessness young people encountered and felt, has led a large number of them outside of the country.

Another challenge Bosnia and Herzegovina faces today is segregated education. Namely, three separate — ethnicity-based — school curricula are still in use (Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian). Each is implemented in different parts of the country, depending on which ethnic group has the majority in the given area. Such ideology and ethnicity-based education fails to promote universal human values: peace, tolerance, cooperation, freedom, solidarity, responsibility, equality and love. Although all laws on elementary and secondary education promote the above-mentioned values in their strategic documents, in practice, as numerous studies have shown, that is not the case.

During the 2002 education reform, the ministers of education signed a document, promising the following:

“We, the ministers of education, will ensure that all children have access to quality education in integrated multicultural schools, education that is free from political, religious, cultural and other prejudices and discrimination and which respects the rights of all children” (Soldo et al., 2017).

Although the most recent war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended more than twenty years ago, ethno-nationalist conflicts are still in force. Right-wing populist political parties aim to homogenize ethnic groups they belong to, and, moreover, to promote themselves as leaders of those groups. At the same time, they keep presenting and referring to other ethnic groups as historical enemies who threaten them. One of the consequences of ethno-nationalist conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a high degree of distance between young people. Puhalo (2013) concluded that young Bosnians today, collectively, have a stereotypical understanding of their own and other ethnic groups, which he linked to nationalism and the organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina at the state level. Although, there are many other socio-economic factors which give rise to radicalism or extremism among young people, the above-mentioned ones are more than enough to conclude that Bosnia and Herzegovina, today, represents a fertile ground for extremist organizations to recruit new members and achieve their political, and other, goals.

METHODOLOGY

In order to examine, as detailed as possible, the attitudes of young people of all ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina towards radicalism, extremism and violent extremism, we have used quantitative and qualitative research methods. A questionnaire with semi-open questions was distributed online to a sample of 551 young people, 15 — 30 years old, coming from 60 different cities and municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This approach was taken so as to learn more about their views and, even, potential experience with not only extremism and radicalism, but also hate speech on social media and other networks.

Data collection method

In order to obtain the most accurate and relevant data, research was implemented in three steps:

- Literature analysis (gathered on the Internet and through other sources of information) — As the first step, we have explored previous academic and other works on the topic of radicalism among young people.
- Questionnaire distribution — The questionnaire contained 30 questions and was divided in 4 categories. It was distributed, in cooperation with NGOs working with young people, to those from Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH, RS and Brčko District).
- Data analysis — All data, obtained in the process, was analysed using content analysis methods, along with discourse analysis.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY RADICALISM, EXTREMISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM?

Although radicalism, extremism and violent extremism intertwine at many points, there are some important differences between them. So far, the academic, political or any other community has failed to offer a universal definition for any of these terms.

Violent extremism and terrorism are both radical phenomena. However, not all radicalism is, simultaneously, extremism or terrorism. The definitions of the above-mentioned terms depend, for the most part, on

our understanding of the process of radicalization. Most academic studies deal with radicalism in order to better understand terrorism. Both the academic and the political communities link radicalism to violent extremism; or even describe radicalism as a path towards terrorism. Thus, the Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, established by the European Commission in 2006, with the task to analyse academic achievements on the topic of radicalization in its report, stated that global, political and social motives are as important as ideological or psychological ones, while defining radicalization as socialization towards extremism which manifests itself in terrorism (Scmid, 2013). In one meeting which was held in March 2015, the European Parliament defined radicalism as a phenomenon in which people accept opinions, attitudes and ideas that could lead to terrorism (Orav, 2015).

During the 1970s, the academic and the political communities defined radicalization as the movement and formation of violent, often secret, groups which fought for certain political interests (Porta & LaFree, 2012).

Nowadays, the terms *radicalism* and *radicalization* are used in connection with terrorism, and are, most frequently, associated with "Islamic terrorism." Radicalization should be understood as a phenomenon consisting of several separate processes, which may or may not be correlated with each other, while it is, also, necessary to observe them in the social and political context in which they take place (Porta & LaFree, 2012). We must, therefore, look for the reasons for radicalization at multiple levels, particularly at the micro, meso and macro level.

The micro level refers to the individual level of radicalization. At this level, problems with identity are noticed, as well as failed integration, feelings of neglect, humiliation, stigmatization and rejection, which might be why young people seek revenge. The meso level refers to radicalization within a community which supports radical attitudes and values. These communities are, usually, suffering injustice, or remain in the state of grief, whereas the macro level includes the important role of the government, the diaspora and the entire society within the country and abroad.

ISLAMIC RADICALISM

If we are talking about people of the Islamic religion joining formations like ISIL, based on the available research, the reasons for

joining extremist formations could be explained and interpreted through the religious and ideological prism: these people felt that they were fulfilling their Islamic duty of helping their “brothers” in their fight against the oppressors. One of the messages Muhammad — in Islam believed to be the messenger of God — left is that “*all Muslims are brothers*” and compared to a wall “*in which each stone supports the other*” (Azinović & Jusić, 2015). The volunteers who go to Syria are headed there so as to fulfil their Islamic duty and help their “brothers”, oppressed by the “unbelievers.” However, this is not their only goal. Another one of their goals is to overthrow the constitutional and legal order within the countries they operate in, such as Syria and Iraq. This would be done by introducing Shari’a, without which, according to them, an Islamic state cannot function. Therefore, they invite all Muslims who live in “infidel countries” to emigrate to the Islamic State.

As already mentioned before, Bosnia and Herzegovina is one of the leading countries in terms of youth unemployment, which means that young people have a lot of free time and are not able to provide for themselves and make sure they lead a safe and comfortable life on their own. On the other hand, in Syria and Iraq, if they get married, they are gifted with houses — something people of their economic status can, hardly ever, achieve in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Interviewed ISIL fighters who returned from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, talking about their motivation and reasons for going there, stated that they believed that the world in which they live in, is not theirs, and that they want something better. Harry Sarfo, a German citizen, said: “I thought you should go down there and live under Sharia Law. I thought I would be happier that way” (The Washington Post, 2016).

In an interview with the American network ABC, Michael “Younes” Delefortrie, a former ISIS fighter, said: “Young people go to the battlefields because they think there is something better than the society they live in” (ABC News, 2016).

In that same interview, a mother of one of the young men who died on the Syrian battlefield, said that he told her that “there is no place for him here” (ABC News, 2016).

Based on the above-mentioned statements, we can conclude that these young people were not happy with the society in which they lived, and that, for that reason, they went searching for something more. All three of them belonged to the lower strata of society, being marginalized, and made an easy prey for radicalization and recruitment.

Young Muslim people across Europe found themselves in a new problematic situation after the terrorist attacks in London, Brussels and other European capitals. If they actively chose not to belong to any of the radical movements, they automatically become the target of those who do. One young man said to a journalist: "We are caught between radical Islam, which does not like us, and the French, who do not accept us and do not see us, as part of their society" (ABC News, 2016).

This statement clearly illustrates where the Muslim population in Europe was after the above-mentioned terrorist attacks. As a result of growing animosity towards the Muslim community in Europe and in America, we have been witnessing its social isolation, which makes it vulnerable and easy for radicalization. Schmid (2013) believes that social isolation of a certain group, which is oppressed, ghettoized and marginalized, is just one of the mechanisms radical groups use so as to recruit new members.

RIGHT-WING RADICALISM

Although the media, the academic and the political communities are dominated by global fear and discourse on Islamic radicalism and terrorism, there are other radical movements which are no less radical than the Islamic ones, when it comes to their core attitudes and values. There are various radical nationalist movements, white supremacy movements, Nazi movements, anti-immigrant movements, etc. — whose aim is ethnic or national homogenization.

The biggest refugee crisis in the European Union, since WW2, has shed light on the fact that people within the European Union have different views. Moreover, it has shown that some countries violated the main principles of the European Union, in particular those concerning human rights and freedom of movement. Right-wing populist political parties, such as the National Front from France, the Independent party from the United Kingdom and the Danish People's Party, base their policies on the migrant

crisis, whereas the migrant crisis itself contributed to the strengthening of radical movements in Europe.

The economic crisis, which occurred in 2007-2008, is considered to be the catalyst for the right-wing radicalism strengthening in the world, along with the feeling of losing national identity, and the latest refugee crisis in Europe. Furthermore, it can be argued that multicultural values have been imposed, that democracy does not work, yet that global neoliberalism played a large role in strengthening of right-wing radicalism, causing individuals to gain wealth, while the general population is impoverished.

Consequently, right-wing populist political parties grow stronger and base their politics on discourse focusing on “preservation of purity of a nation” and anti-immigrant policies, trying to bring together people from the lowest layers of society, along with those belonging to the working class, in order to achieve their goals.

The solutions the right-wing populist parties offer for current problems of the population, include conservative values, traditionalism and nationalism — automatically creating animosity towards immigrants, the LGBT population and other marginalized groups, along with the values the European Union stands for, such as multiculturalism, democratic values and others.

RESULTS

Demographic data

The results were gathered from an online survey conducted on a sample of 551 young people, between 15 and 30 years old, coming from over 60 municipalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Participants were both male and female, where 50.7% were men and 49.3% women.

As far as the national representation is concerned, 58.1% of the respondents declared themselves as Bosniaks, 20.4% as Serbs, 8.3% as Croats, with 12.3% opting to declare themselves as Other. It is important to emphasize, at this point, that the national structure of the respondents, as reported herein, reflects, in fact, the national structure of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina to a large extent. To be specific, according to the 2013 census, 50.1% of the population declared themselves as Bosniaks, 30.8% as Serbs, 15.4% as Croats, while 3.7% opted for Other.

Participants' understanding of radicalism and extremism

Radicalism, among young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, has a negative connotation in most cases. Moreover, it is associated with religion (most frequently Islam), nationalism and right-wing movements. Young people believe that radical-minded persons and organizations blindly believe in a certain idea and/or ideology. Furthermore, they are seen as uncompromising when it comes to achieving their goals and intolerant, sometimes even violent, towards those with different views on the world, attitudes and opinions.

When asked what is radicalism for them, one of the respondents said that it is: "Constant highlighting of 'true' values and insulting people who are different." The following answer points towards the fact that there is awareness, among the participants, that radicalism is a phenomenon aiming to change society: "Individuals, movements and ideologies that strive for radical changes in society or the realization of their own goals without any compromises."

Although for most of the respondents radicalism is a negative phenomenon, there is a small group of them who think of radicalism in a positive light. One respondent stated that: "Radicalism can be positive and negative. Radicalism was once also a struggle for the rights of women, blacks and the like. The problem is radicalism that leads to violence and extremism." In regards to terrorism, young people consider it to be a "stronger" version of radicalism, as well as a method of intimidation with the purpose of achieving certain changes in society.

This is illustrated in one of the answers the respondents provided when asked what is terrorism for them: "Terrorism refers to organized activities aimed at intimidation of certain groups of people for the purpose of promoting their own ideology. Intimidation is carried out through armed violence and other types of physical violence, as well as psychological violence (e.g., threats) and is usually directed towards a group of people who do not agree with that ideology or who represent its opposite." Another answer containing similar connotations states the following: "Terrorism is the deliberate use of illegal violence or threats of unlawful violence to instil fear, with the intention of coercing or intimidating the authorities or society in order to achieve goals that are generally political, religious or ideological." When analysing the answers to the question what is terrorism

for them, it can be noticed that the general feeling of the respondents is that, among other things, terrorism as a phenomenon does not bring about any positive connotation. Contrary to their understanding of radicalism, where the respondents stated that radicalism can also be positive when viewed in the context of struggle for human rights (of women, blacks and other marginalized groups). However, they did agree that the common point of radicalism and terrorism is the blind following of a certain idea and/or ideologies, along with the desire for drastic changes in society and intolerance towards others.

Motivation behind young people joining radical movements

When it comes to the answers respondents provided to the question regarding why young people join radical movements, they can be divided into three groups: looking for sense of belonging and status in society; lack of education and insufficient information about religion (when religious radicalism is concerned); and search for material gains (be it gaining money or solving the housing issue, or something else). All three factors can, also, be found in the previously mentioned research. Azinović and Jusić (2015) claim that young married people, who decide to join radical groups in Iraq or Syria (ISIS), are promised a house. Youth Justice Board (2012) states, in its research, that young people yearn for a better status in society, accentuating that the feeling of belonging is of utmost importance to them.

One of the answers to the question about what motivates young people to join radical movements is: "The reasons are probably multiple and complex: some young people feel unaccepted, lonely or helpless in the society in which they live, so such groups offer them a refuge, a group to which they can belong. Some join from ignorance, so it is easy to manipulate them. Some have been raised with such ideas so it is an honour for them to join extremist groups. Some were offered money, and given the situation in which they live in some states, the money would be useful to many."

One respondent believes young people might be motivated to join the radical movement as a way to gain the sense of security and belonging. Many, on the other hand, consider that insufficient education could be one of the main reasons why young people join radical movements.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's formal education, segregated by ethno-national principles, as such, cannot be an integrative factor in Bosnian society. Therefore, it cannot contribute to the establishment of values which can be seen in highly developed societies. The educational system, through its curricula, does not encourage radicalism or extremism openly, yet it does not encourage critical thinking, multiculturalism, tolerance, civic responsibility, as well, and thereby it creates a solid foundation for radicalization. With this in mind, the following answer to the above-mentioned question is quite interesting: "In Bosnia due to the bad situation in society, the absence of economic and social security, and above all, the absence of hope and perspective for a better tomorrow; immature education system and all others institutions that should be at the service of citizens open the door for radical groups to find fertile ground for spreading their ideas. Further, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, radicalism can easily be cultivated on the fertile ground of unresolved relations related to the past war; each of the sides has its own "truth" from which it does not give up even an inch."

Besides this, the respondents think that young people join radical movements because they are forced to take this step, they are fighting for a better world, they are looking for a sense of belonging, they are going into it in order to defend their nation.

Some of the respondents pointed out towards the role of the family in the process of radicalization: "Because of growing up in a family that supports and promotes extremism, and deprives children of the opportunity to choose and make their own decisions and form their own opinions, as well as due to the lack of social support that leads to extreme and radical groups act as a place where a person will find oneself and feel as if he has found his purpose and meaning."

If we take into consideration that the family plays the most influential role when it comes to the individual's socialization path, due to a number of factors, we might, then, understand how important family is in the preventive fight against the radicalization of young people. However, for a certain number of young people, we can, also in the family, find motives for radical action.

Justification of terrorist attacks

Many respondents believe that there is no justification for carrying out any type of terrorist attack (i.e., 95.5 % of them). However, there is a small part of them (4.5%) who believe that there are certain circumstances which justify terrorist attacks.

They believe that those are: the occupation of a certain country; oppression of a certain group (religious, national, etc.); situations in which the government “does not work for the good of the people” — and have confirmed that the terrorist acts are justified, as long as they bring positive changes for the society, in the long run.

One of the answers in the survey says the following: “Terrorism, although today it is presented only as armed, violent attack, where the innocent are, most often, killed, is not entirely like that. In the long run, where terrorist acts bring prosperity and change, even though they may be morally wrong, they work towards something better.” Furthermore, some respondents used explicit examples to support their viewpoint — one of them says that: “The IRA, PLO and KLO, for example, most often aimed to have as few civilian casualties as possible, by attacking military installations to destabilize the usurpers.”

The above-mentioned answer clearly illustrates that the respondent believes that there are circumstances in which the terrorist acts are justified. They believe that terrorist attacks can bring about positive change in the society. The respondent who used the example of the radical organizations, such as IRA, PLO and KLO, also referred to the fact that they were listed radical organizations with the goal to destabilize the usurpers (occupiers) with as few as possible civilian victims.

To a certain extent, this answer can be understood as an expression of support to the struggle of the said radical organizations, while avoiding civilian casualties and fighting against the occupiers can be seen as a supporting argument.

A certain amount of animosity towards the Bosnian political elite, as well as the international one, can be felt from the answers the respondents offered. One of the interviewees said that: “If the government breaks away from the people it represents, the majority of the population can use violent means while trying to regain sovereignty, which is not purely

terminological terrorism, but the government characterizes it as such." Others claim that terrorist attacks are justified if they are aimed at Americans, Europeans etc. Animosity young people feel towards the political elite is indicated in some of the responses such as: "I doubt that many people would cry if someone blew up the useless presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Let us not forget that several state institutions were attacked and, even, burned during the 2014 political demonstrations.

ANALYSIS

Based on the conducted research, we can see that young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in general, see radicalism as a negative phenomenon. Although, in rare instances, they believe that radicalism can, also, have positive connotations. Radicalism, when mentioned in a positive context, refers to radical methods applied in the fight for human rights (such as women's rights, rights of a nation, religious rights, fight against racial discrimination, struggle against the superior enemy, the occupier, etc.). With that in mind, we might understand how young people are motivated to join radical movements and go to the battlefields on their behalf.

In addition, we have noticed that young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina see radicalism and extremism through the prism of groups and/or individuals guided by religion and ethnicity. Hence, when they give examples of what they consider to be radical individuals and organizations, they refer to them, mainly, as "Wahhabis" and nationalistically oriented individuals and/or groups, who "stubbornly follow a certain idea or ideology, and they do not choose the methods by which they will achieve their goals." Religiously oriented radical groups think that the religion they believe in is endangered, and that consequently, the values and lifestyle, propagated by a particular religion, are endangered as well. If this fact is taken into account, along with the one stating that a certain number of young people justifies radicalism if certain groups are in danger, we might assume that young people who decide to go to the battlefield or, nevertheless, remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, perceive their fight as a true struggle for fulfilling their rights and values which, for them, are correct, no matter where they are.

When it comes to the influence of the current policy on radicalism of youth in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the research has shed light towards the

existence of a certain level of animosity young people have towards the political elite, both domestic and foreign. Young people are of the opinion that the political elite is directly responsible for the high degree of corruption and ethnic division in Bosnian society. As we have already noted, grief can, when caused by the injustice certain national or religious communities suffer, contribute to the radicalization of young people. One of the answers to the question regarding the justification of terrorist attacks, illustrates a sense of sadness, caused by an injustice committed against a particular group in one part of Bosnia and Herzegovina: "In the case of Bosnia, we are witnessing various mistreatment of the returnees of the Bosniaks in Podrinje (eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina), killing the cattle, preventing them from returning to their homes, and so on."

It is evident that segregation visible in the educational system, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also contributes to radicalization of young people. The assumptions on which all three curricula (Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian) lie on, are the desire to homogenize all three ethnic communities and to deepen religious differences among citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As numerous previous studies have shown distance between young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is high, while education is one of the key factors creating and maintaining this level of distance among them. Kapo (2012) lists the position of children belonging to national minorities, as one of the discriminating factors in Bosnian education, mostly because curricula do not respect the distinctiveness of all peoples, cultures and religions. Furthermore, it can be added that the so-called constituent people in the administrative areas in which they represent minorities are, in fact, in the same situation.

For instance, there is, evidently, a sense of discrimination in the Bosniak community in Konjevic Polje in Republika Srpska, where parents objected to the school curriculum which did not allow Bosniak children to study Bosnian language, in Elementary School 'Petar Kocić'. Parents withdrew their children from the school, asking for a national curriculum to be accepted by the school. Although the Srebrenica Court has decided to introduce a national curriculum in order to enable Bosniak children to study based on a national group of subjects, the implementation of this decision is still pending. Obstructions such as this one will, inevitably, lead one part of the population towards radicalization. Currently, radicalization is reflected in the withdrawal of children from the educational system, but if the

decision of the Srebrenica Court is not implemented soon, more radical moves cannot be not excluded.

CONCLUSION

This research has identified several components which might be potential motivational factors which encourage individuals and/or groups towards radical behaviour. Some are: feelings of grief and injustice caused by something done to a particular individual and/or group, family ties to some existing extremist organizations, forced recruitment and individual revenge in pursuit of correcting the suffered injustice. Although the research showed that most young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina regard radicalism as something negative and do not justify terrorist acts, we must mention that there are, still, some who consider that terrorist acts are justified in some cases. In regards to that, one part of the respondents believes that in case of attacks on human rights, the deprivation of the sovereignty of the state or the nation, the violation against women's rights and against other rights, radical activities or even terrorist acts are justified. If the presence of discrimination in Bosnia and Herzegovina is acknowledged, for example, as in the case with Bosniaks in Konjevic Polje, we could conclude that the potential for radical behaviour, without a doubt, exists.

The animosity citizens feel, especially young people, against the current political elite was not only evident, but also demonstrated in the February 2014 mass demonstrations. This event manifested a violent character through destruction and burning of public institutions, such as government buildings and courts, which are considered symbols of the oppressive ruling elite. The answers to why young people have this animosity towards the current ruling elite should be sought in the fact that the ruling elite, currently, sees people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as silent observers and not active agents and participants in the political process, who can be a part of the creation of certain policies which concern them.

In addition, this research has shown that the radicalisation of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina is, mostly, associated with religiously oriented radicalism whose purpose is changing the social system, by bringing religious principles and values into all aspects of the society, mostly, by referring to Islamic radicalism and nationalism with the purpose of

establishing domination over a particular nation, with a homogeneous territorial unit envisaged only for citizens of a particular ethnicity. Some of the consequences brought about by homogenization of communities on the basis of the ethnic principle in Bosnia and Herzegovina, are the “satanization of others” by the academic and the political communities, the creation of prejudices against their own members as well as those belonging to other ethnic communities, which, again, leads to a lack of healthy communication among ethnic communities which is crucial for the process of reconciliation and deradicalization of young people. Allport (1954) believes that, when it comes to groups in conflict, the intergroup contact is crucial to reduce prejudice. He believes that prejudice can be reduced by means of intergroup contact only if four key conditions are met: each group must be of equal status, the goals towards which all groups are striving must be common, cooperation must exist among groups in conflict — with the support of the authorities, and there must be certain legal regulations. Since, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, segregation based on the ethnic principle is systemic and cooperation is not only blocked in all ways, but also slowed down by the political elite, we can expect further radicalization of young people, be it on the religious front or the ethnic one.

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“THE GLOBAL HEALTH FOR PEACE INITIATIVE” — A NEW CHANCE FOR A CHANGE¹

Jovana Blešić²

Abstract: “There cannot be peace without health and health without peace,” are the words of the World Health Organization (WHO) Director — Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. With this, he announced a new initiative under the auspices of the WHO — The Global Health for Peace Initiative. This initiative requires WHO to improve its technical competencies, legitimacy, relationships and convening power so as to develop innovative ways of addressing conflict, strengthen resilience to violence and empower people to (re)build peaceful relations with each other. The Global Health for Peace Initiative is WHO’s contribution to the growing network of humanitarian assistance, long-term sustainable development, and peacebuilding, as it was explained. Even though the idea of the nexus between health and peacebuilding is not new, the innovative aspect of it is the experience gained from the COVID-19 pandemic. The goal of this paper was, therefore, to give a detailed interpretation of *The Global Health for Peace Initiative* and to see if it would make a difference in the global context. This essay aimed to present the Global Health for Peace Initiative and to assess whether it would have the necessary capabilities to cope with the ongoing global crisis. The methodology which was used throughout the article is, mostly, theoretical and descriptive research, because the author aimed to provide more information about the Initiative itself, based on the official document of the World Health Organization.

Key words: *WHO, Global Health for Peace Initiative, pandemic, peace, security*

INTRODUCTION

Health and peace are both basic human rights necessary for each and every one person. However, they may both be taken for granted, as, in

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most cases, it is overlooked that they are just the basis for fulfilling the rest of human necessities. With this in mind, it is clear why both of these terms have, again, come under the spotlight since 2020. The COVID-19 crisis, along with the ongoing war operations, justified the introduction of the new initiative by the World Health Organization (WHO).

The term 'health' was introduced in the United Nations Charter, on a recommendation from the Brazil delegation. Moreover, it was recorded in Articles 57 and 62 — the ones dedicated to the Economic and Social Council. However, when it comes to the WHO, the path to its establishment was long. It started back in the 18th century after several gatherings occurred. As a matter of fact, there might not have been any health conference, had it not been for the cholera outbreak in the first half of 19th century. It initiated the international community to start discussing health worldwide. Yet, this specific organization, WHO, was founded due to the delegations from Brazil and China, who suggested it during the United Nations San Francisco conference in 1945. The World Health Conference was the first one organized by the United Nations. It took place from 19th June until 22nd July, 1946, when, among other important documents, the WHO Constitution was adopted. Two years later, in 1948, the WHO began its work (Blešić, 2021a, pp. 272-274).

The preamble of the WHO Constitution says that health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Enjoying the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being, without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. The health of all peoples is fundamental for attaining peace and security and, furthermore, it depends on full cooperation of both individuals and the states. When any state achieves success in promoting and protecting health — it is considered to be of value to all (World Health Organization, 1948). So, as we can see, the Constitution was the first document, in the very beginning of WHO, which recognized the relationship between health and peace. The matter of ensuring health for all and its relationship with reduction of all forms of violence and wars, was also incorporated in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 34/58. It said that 'peace and security are important for the preservation and improvement of the health of all people and that cooperation among nations can contribute importantly to peace' (Sherin, 2018, p. 121).

Peace is seen as the absence or reduction of war. However, not solely that — it, also, includes the negation of violence, presence of harmony, justice and equity, along with the capacity to handle conflicts in a non-violent manner (Sherin, 2018, p. 121). Another definition of peace is that it is an attribute of a relationship between two or more entities in which, at last, no harm is done to any party and conflicts are resolved non-violently; simply put, it is a harmonious relationship of mutual benefit and cooperation (Santa Barbara & Arya, 2008, p. 7). Above all, it is clear and understood that war directly impacts health and that the effect of it is devastating. This will be explained further on.

These two terms are connected and interrelated more than it seems so at the first glance. ‘There cannot be health without peace, and there cannot be peace without health’, are the words of the Director-General of WHO, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. Why so? The lack of one can influence the other. For example, if there are conflicts, they will represent a major obstacle to health. Moreover, if there is a lack of access to basic health services, it could lead to potential violence and conflict (World Health Organization, 2020a). Furthermore, the Ottawa Charter for Health Promotion proclaims peace to be the first on the list of requirements and conditions for health (World Health Organization, 2020b, p. 2). This same charter pointed towards the dependence of health on the presence of peace, shelter, education, food, income, a stable ecosystem, sustainable resources, social justice and equity (Woehrle, 2019, p. 168). Woehrle, also, compared the peacebuilding study with the study of health. Both are, in many aspects, multidimensional and consist of many approaches. Peacebuilding is meant to be preventive, although it is more often dealing with actual consequences of conflicts. Every conflict can be constructive and may lead to change. Besides, health work can be, as well, an approach to transformation, preventive or dealing with consequences (Woehrle, 2019, pp. 169-170).

The impact of armed conflicts and violence on health is obvious. Conflicts may, and usually do, cause direct deaths and lead to physical and mental injuries. The rates of infant mortality, sexual violence and mental disorders increase because of the disruption in health systems. With the rise of the collective violence, there is not only a rise in the infectious disease transmission and outbreak, but also other outcomes, such as the impact on infrastructure, water and sanitation (Peters et al., 2022, pp. 4-5).

Sherin also labels conflict, violence, civil wars and terrorism, specifically in the second half of 20th century and in the 21st century, as major threats to global health. He had pointed out that wars will be the 8th leading cause of disability and death by 2020 (Sherin, 2018, p. 121). Therefore, peace is one of the fundamental conditions for health.

In addition to that, lack of access to healthcare systems fuels conflict. For instance, in some populations, the lack of access to healthcare results in people feeling they are unequally treated by the government. That may lead to protests and, later on, violence. Also, an intergroup hostility may escalate to an armed conflict, if there is a higher intensity of infections and diseases. For example, some of the conducted research has pointed out that the COVID-19 pandemic has affected armed conflict dynamics, usually, in escalation (Peters et al., 2022, p. 5).

UN peacebuilding and health actors are accountable to each other. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is based on the recognition that progress towards all sustainable development goals are interdependent. In particular, there is an interdependence between sustainable development goals no. 16 and 3. Sustainable development goal no. 16 is to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice to all and build effective, accountable, and inclusive institutions, at all levels, while ensuring healthy lives and promoting well-being, for all, at all ages, is goal no. 3 (The Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d.). Therefore, as we can see, peace and health are both fundamental to achieving all the Sustainable Development Goals, although they are also dependent of having achieved other Sustainable Development Goals (Peters et al., 2022, p. 1).

THE FIRST STEPS IN HEALTH FOR PEACE INITIATIVES

The end of the Cold War brought about the conflicts, mostly, in sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans. It was at that moment that Western states promoted and declared themselves as the leaders in this new environment. There was a new wave of hope that the international community can, in fact, engage in conflict-prevention and peacebuilding activities. This idea was, primarily, addressed by the UN Secretary-General of that time, Boutros-Gali, in 'An Agenda for Peace', in 1992. However, the very idea of including health professionals in preventing war and peacebuilding

is not a new one, as Rushton pointed out. In the 20th century there were many organizations, associations, and campaigns with the aim of pursuing peace and preventing war, as it was a major determinant of health. The International Committee of the Red Cross was the most important one, but there were also Association Médicale Internationale Contre la Guerre in 1905, the Medical Peace Campaign in the 1930s, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War in the 1950s, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in 1980s. (Rushton, 2008, pp. 15-16).

The World Health Assembly adopted a resolution in 1981 titled ‘The role of physicians and other health workers in the preservation and promotion of peace as the most significant factor for the attainment of health for all.’ In this resolution, World Health Assembly reiterated its appeal to Member States to multiply their efforts to consolidate peace in the world, reinforce détente and achieve disarmament so that they can create conditions for developing public health worldwide. With this, they also requested the Director-General of the WHO to intensify contribution of WHO in the mentioned areas and to continue collaboration with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and other organizations in order to establish an international committee of scientist and experts on the study of elucidation of the threat of thermonuclear war and its potential consequences for life and health of all people globally (World Health Organization, 1981, para. 1-2). This was the first document which the World Health Assembly adopted regarding this topic. The most important resolutions devoted to sustaining peace, were adopted in April 2016, by both the UN General Assembly and Security Council. In this document the term ‘sustaining peace’ was introduced. The goal of this documents was to prevent violent conflicts and to address their causes. To do that, i.e., sustain peace, all UN agencies and organizations ought to be involved, including WHO (World Health Organization, 2020b, p. 6).

The concept of health as a bridge for peace developed in the 1980s, although it was not until 1984 that Health as a Bridge for Peace programme was implemented. In 1984, the Pan American Health Organization initiated this plan in Central America and Panama, which were endangered by the guerrilla groups and government hostilities. This plan, also called the Plan for Priority Health Needs in Central America and Panama, was based on the belief that health is universal and that it can serve as a bridge for peace between people, so that it could help build long-lasting peace in

Central America (De Quadros & Epstein, 2002, p. 25). This programme was, later on, adopted by WHO, in 1998, during the 51st World Health Assembly (Sherin, 2018, p. 121). This project brought up the question of whether humanitarian projects can influence any process undertaken to end military and/or political conflict, and, thus, contribute to peace-making and peace-building. The main goal of this project was to negotiate at least temporary ceasefire so that children in war-affected areas could get polio vaccines — which was successful in El Salvador and Peru (Rushton, 2008, p. 18).

There was a Peace through Health programme which originated at McMaster University in the 1990s. At that time, the Gulf War and the wars in the Balkans were taking place. So, this initiative continued the previous efforts of health workers to bring peace, and has, therefore, become a part of the wider concept. In the 1990s, it was understood that peace-making and peacebuilding are not only meant to be the task of governments and international organizations, but also of a wider range of actors (Rushton, 2008, pp. 16-17).

In the 1990s, WHO — i.e., the Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action, recognized its role as an important one when it comes to certain so-called complex humanitarian emergencies, which are usually armed conflicts, population displacements and food scarcities. In order to deal with those issues, bearing in mind the overall goal of providing health for all, WHO initiated another response to the conflict areas — Health as a Bridge for Peace (HPB). The main aim of this programme was to identify and develop actions and strategies which can be used as tools for peacebuilding through health programmes during conflicts. Health and peace are viewed as a two-way street in this programme, because of the reciprocal effect conflicts have on the practice of health care, and vice versa — how the field of health can be used as a tool when dealing with conflict (Garber, 2002, pp. 69-71). Based on this programme, health professionals were supposed to act based on scientific evidence in order to promote peace (Vardanjani et al., 2020, p. 54).

THE GLOBAL HEALTH FOR PEACE INITIATIVE

The WHO defines the global public health security as ‘the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize the danger and impact of acute public health events that endanger people’s health across

geographical regions and international boundaries’ (World Health Organization, Health Security). In that sense, the WHO has introduced its new initiative, as a logical continuation of previous programmes, discussed in the previous chapter of this paper. This was launched in November 2019, with the support of Oman and Switzerland.

The WHO set its Thirteenth General Programme of Work 2019-2023, titled ‘Promote health, keep the world safe, serve the vulnerable.’ This document is important, and interesting, because it sets triple goals for the WHO. Those are separated in three different areas. The first one is universal health coverage, with the aim to make sure that one billion people more, benefiting from it. The second one is health emergencies, with the aim to ensure that one billion people more is better protected from them. The third area is related to health and well-being, with the goal to have one billion people more enjoying it. All these strategic priorities are interconnected and depend on each other (World Health Organization, 2019, p. 4). This Programme of Work was a sort of announcement of the Global Health for Peace Initiative, which was to be adopted in the following years.

WHO’s Global Health for Peace Initiative requires WHO to grow and develop in order to address conflict and violence. WHO has so far had public health interventions, but now, it is required of them to set those up as more peace-responsive, so that they can deliver both on WHO’s Triple Billion goals and the Sustainable Development Goals.

The difference between this and the other programmes is that this one can be used not only to work in conflicts by achieving health benefits in conflict situations, but also to work on conflict. The focus is on using health care to address some of underlying causes of conflict. This Global Health for Peace Initiative builds on previous initiatives and programmes which were dedicated to making health interventions, with direct health benefits in conflict settings, such as the WHO Health as a Bridge for Peace projects in 1980s and 1990s (World Health Organization, 2020a). This initiative is also WHO’s contribution to bringing together humanitarian assistance, long-term sustainable development (set in Sustainable Development Goals) and peacebuilding. This Humanitarian-Development-Peace nexus is deepened by the Global Health for Peace Initiative, because the key role of health is being brought forward. Health is key for peace and sustainable development in fragile, conflict-affected, and vulnerable environment.

However, this time, the initiative dealing with peace has to deal with a big change of circumstances — the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic has shown not only that health emergencies can, also, trigger conflict, but also that health programs can help build peace. This is meant to be the focus of the initiative. WHO is working with partners to explore the intersections of conflict, peace, and COVID-19 — mostly by participating in various activities, such as 2020 Paris Peace Forum and the 2020 Geneva Peace Week (World Health Organization, 2020a).

This need for cooperation within the field of health is especially important in fragile and conflict zones. Based on one piece of information around 1.8 billion people already live in such zones. In this context, there is a belief that by 2030, half of the world's poor population will have been living in them. This could, therefore, lead to disasters in healthcare systems. The consequences may lead to the lack of safety, international peace and stability. Nonetheless, there are authors who believe that there is still room for optimism. The COVID-19 pandemic brought about many problems and a lot of suffering, but it also strengthened global emphasis on health. Health crisis does not acknowledge borders, so everyone is affected. Therefore, international solidarity and commitment to prioritise health is of utmost importance (Forward Thinking, 2022).

The fact that the Security Council adopted the Resolution 2532, in July 2020, supports further how important this topic is. In this resolution, the Security Council demanded cessation of hostilities and called for, specifically, a pause in armed conflicts for, at least, 90 days. The main goal was to enable safe and sustained delivery of humanitarian assistance (Blešić, 2021b, p. 167). Moreover, the peacekeeping operations and Special Political Missions wanted to update their priority tasks. The UN Secretary-General was requested to instruct peacekeeping operations so as to help host country authorities deal with the pandemic and provide humanitarian access to internally displaced persons and refugee camps (Blešić, 2021b, p. 167).

Furthermore, WHO has developed a global Theory of Change, which says: 'if individuals and groups enjoy equitable access to health services fulfilling their rights to physical and mental health, and health actors design health interventions that promote trust and dialogue and communities are empowered to cope with violent conflict, then health coverage is more universal, grievances can be heard and addressed to generate

trust around emergency health concerns, affected communities are more likely to make meaningful contributions to peace and reconciliation, and resist incitements to violence’ (World Health Organization, 2020c). There are three possible ways of doing this. The first one would be improving citizen state cohesion through Health Equity: ‘If dialogue is facilitated between state authorities, local medical practitioners, and communities in conflict zones; and authorities and humanitarian actors adapt health reforms and service delivery to address needs and grievances expressed by the population’ (World Health Organization, 2020c). The second one would be facilitating cross-line cooperation in health governance: ‘if healthcare professionals from across the conflict divide are provided with a neutral platform facilitated by a credible technical 3rd party that allows them to work together to address mutual health concerns amidst ongoing conflict’ (World Health Organization, 2020c). The third one would be promoting health and wellbeing through dialogue and inclusion: ‘If community members engage in processes of healing and inclusive dialogue to overcome social divisions, as well as the physical and mental scars of war, and are provided with the opportunities to voice their grievances in a safe and constructive manner’ (World Health Organization, 2020c).

In the 2020 report written by the WHO Secretary-General on Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace, the challenges that WHO is facing in this area were identified as: centrality of social services which is not reflected well in Sustaining Peace policy, programming and financial tracking systems, insufficient incentive structures and process-flow for UN Peacebuilding Fund proposals, lack of ‘bilingual’ staff within the health and peacebuilding sectors in international organizations, and lack of donor portfolio managers. Based on this, he gave recommendations to UN agencies, international donors, research institutions, etc. in order to achieve the above-mentioned ultimate goal (World Health Organization, 2020c).

CONCLUSION

This and previous years have taught us that conflicts and violence are, still, major issues and pose a threat to human security. Furthermore, health emergencies, such as COVID-19 pandemic, happen to be a great obstacle for human health and, therefore, security. The ongoing armed conflict in Ukraine and the pandemic, which now seems to be entering another wave,

both show us that we must work harder than ever on prevention. The Global Health for Peace Initiative represents a great chance for the whole international community to improve. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Director-General of the WHO, noticed that there has been a juncture of crisis this year. The COVID-19 pandemic is still ongoing. In the beginning of the 2022, the Ukrainian crisis began. We should, also, not forget the Middle East and Africa, and the ongoing situations taking place there. Not to mention how important it is to consider the climate crisis, as well. The international community should seek for a 'solutions-oriented, healthier and sustainable world.' Explaining the new 'Peace for Health and Health for Peace' global initiative, he said that the most important task is to foster new dialogue around health and peace. He announced asking other UN agencies, civil society, sport organisations, academia and business to support this initiative. This nexus between peace, security, development, and health has been underscored in the Millennium Declaration. The COVID-19 crisis showed us how important cooperation is, so we might expect this initiative to be successful. The conflict, the climate crisis and COVID-19, have, all, contributed to huge spikes in food and fuel prices, and inflation. That has led to lack of health opportunities for many (Adhanom Ghebreyesus, 2022). No crises can be solved by only one set of actions. The actions must be multidimensional: humanitarian, developmental, peace actions, etc. This Global Health for Peace Initiative is only one aspect of the whole problem-solving framework. Still, it does not make it less important, quite the opposite. This initiative may be challenging, but it can be a great opportunity for international community as the whole.

In May 2022, the 75th World Health Assembly took place in Geneva. On this occasion, the Assembly re-elected Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus to a second term as WHO's Director-General. During his first term, he successfully instituted transformations of the WHO. He also guided WHO through the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises (World Health Organization, 2022). The fact that he was re-elected points towards the fact that the Global Health for Peace Initiative has actual support, and that the state representatives sitting in the World Health Assembly, want him to continue his work in this area. The history of international relations taught us that times of crises usually turn out to be great ones for change implementation. Some examples are the years 1648, 1918, 1945, 1989, and so on. Therefore, it is without a doubt that 2020 is one of those years as well. Some of

the changes are already showing, while most of them, along with some consequences are yet to be seen. We would like to end this article with a dose of optimism. Thus, we underline that the international community should use this opportunity to reform the international bodies, international relations and perhaps, even, the entire set up of the international community. One of those changes may be seen in the area of connection between global health and peace. This new initiative may bring forward great results, if all members included show interest and desire for change. The mixture of WHO's new initiative, the Sustainable Development Goals, WHO's new Programme of Work with political, social and economic factors may turn out to be a successful one. Although this is yet to be seen, we are saying — give peace a chance, in words of John Lennon.

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NORTH MACEDONIA'S NATO MEMBERSHIP: HUMAN SECURITY BENEFITS OR *STATUS QUO*¹

Mitko Arnaudov²

Abstract: The essential goal of this paper is to provide an explanation about the human security benefits of small states membership in NATO in contemporary international relations, on the example of North Macedonia. It is the latest country to become a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, and it happened at the peak of the Covid-19 pandemic. In that period, when NATO has proclaimed itself as an organization which will help its allies in the fight against the pandemic by ensuring medical equipment, financial support, medication and other necessities, North Macedonia's citizens were faced with enormous difficulties as a consequence of the weak national medical system, and the unpreparedness of national authorities to create a national strategy for facing the ongoing challenges, while at the same time relying their country and citizens on international organizations and institutions support (Deibel, 2007, p. 77). The example of North Macedonia's full integration in NATO during the period when a global pandemic was endangering the world health system and was creating huge obstacles for ensuring human security sustainability at different levels, is the core example which leads us to the topic of our research. The aim of which is to examine how certain international security organizations, in this case NATO, are not able to provide adequate support to its allies, which in certain moments are exclusively dependent of foreign support. This paper's contribution, from a theoretical point of view, would be seen in the confirmation of a realistic approach which says that national interests always prevail in international relations and that small states could not always rely on the allies' solidarity when in certain moment they are facing the same or similar challenges as big countries, especially when those are focused on resolving internal all-pervading problems.

Key words: *North Macedonia, Covid-19, Human security challenges, realism, national interests*

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INTRODUCTION

Contemporary security challenges have brought national states to a position which faces the necessity of adapting their strategic documents on national security so that they, and their authorities, can be able to efficiently and effectively face current threats. It is about threats that do not endanger the national borders and territorial integrity of national states (Arnaudov, 2021, p. 46) as a type of classic threats, but “erode” political sovereignty and economic sustainability, and, therefore, bring into question the general security of a society due to internal systemic challenges. This type of threat may have become more and more visible for all the aspects of society with the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic, which has shown all the shortcomings states faced in the modern global order. In this context, the systemic problems of a society showed how much a country, and therefore its citizens, are threatened not by external security threats, but by internal threats produced by the system itself. When introduced in 1994, the human security approach refocused the security debate from territorial security to people’s security. This idea, which the UN General Assembly endorsed in 2012, invited security scholars and policymakers to look beyond protecting the nation-state to protecting what we care most about in our lives: our basic needs, our physical integrity, our human dignity. It emphasized the importance of everyone’s right to freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom from indignity. It highlighted the close connection between security, development and the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13).

From that point of view, the case of North Macedonia as a member state of NATO, which has extremely weak system efficiency (European Commission Report, 2022, p. 16) is important in this paper, in the context of human security, in order to show that although it is a member state of one of the biggest security organizations in the world, it still has no adequate mechanisms to secure the safety of its citizens. The Covid-19 pandemic is a pervasive threat to the national systems at all levels, especially in health and economy. It has brought into question the security of Macedonian citizens, bearing in mind the fact that North Macedonia was one of the states in Europe, with the most negative and the weakest performances in the fight against this disease.

According to the UNDP Special Report “New threats to human security in the Anthropocene Demanding greater solidarity” as the Covid-19 pandemic got underway, the world had been reaching unprecedented heights on the Human Development Index (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13). “People were, on average, living healthier, wealthier and better lives for longer than ever, but under the surface a growing sense of insecurity had been taking root” (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13). In the years leading up to the pandemic, for the first time, indicators of human development have declined — drastically, unlike anything experienced in recent global crisis (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13). We are mentioning all this, in the context of North Macedonia, because of two reasons: the first one — the importance of NATO membership (Одлука за стапувања на Република Македонија во членство во Северно-Атлантската договорна организација НАТО, 1993, p. 78) which to North Macedonia’s citizens was not politically presented as an opportunity for facing the actual and upcoming challenges, but more of a goal that will secure Macedonian territorial integrity, as well as independence (Kurir, 2022); the second one — conditions of life in Macedonian society are far below the standard of the developed societies, where most of them are also NATO member states. On the one hand, this is the main ground on which we can prove that North Macedonia’s NATO membership did not bring any type of advancement of human security within the Macedonian society. On the other, although North Macedonia has received different types of financial support from NATO member states in the fight against Covid-19, the unpreparedness of its national system, especially health care mechanism, had contributed North Macedonia authorities to face with huge fault in the context of failure to cope with the global disease during the pandemic.

Covid-19 pandemic, in the case of North Macedonia, has shown that membership of any international security or defence organization could not contribute in resolving internal human security threats if the national system is not ready or based on the strategy which could predict, prevent and provide efficient mechanism for such kind of threats. Analysing global trends, for the first time, as well, indicators of human development have declined — drastically, unlike anything experienced in other recent global crises (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13). The Covid-19 pandemic has upended the global economy, interrupted

education dreams, delayed the administration of vaccines and medical treatment and disrupted lives and livelihoods (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 13). In such circumstances, although international solidarity was visible on some level, especially when it came to providing medical equipment and medical donations, mostly from the developed to the developing countries, the states with insufficiently developed national systems, high level of corruption and systemic instability, were unable to cope with the threats that were brought about by the pandemic. The North Macedonian health care system was endangered at all levels (BBC News na srpskom, 2022). Public hospitals were not prepared for such a widespread disease, while public authorities did not create a health care strategy for emergency reaction. The health care situation, from the point of the Covid-19 pandemic, was mostly dependent on foreign help and donations, without any internal mechanism which could provide better instruments for fight and, in that context, provide better conditions for the patients. Such a state of affairs on the ground had an additional impact on the deterioration of the level of human security in North Macedonia, which was accompanied not only by health challenges, but also by deepening economic consequences.

NORTH MACEDONIA FACING NATO MEMBERSHIP AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

On March 30th, 2020, when North Macedonia officially became a NATO member state, the number of Covid-19 cases was ever raising (Dimovski, 2021, p. 17). On that day, North Macedonia was dealing with the Covid-19 outbreak, with a total number up to 285 confirmed cases, while the capital city of Skopje was most affected with 164 cases. Because of the existing health care issues North Macedonia was already requesting (Defrančeski, 2020), i.e., gloves, protective suits and goggles, and surgical masks from NATO allies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). North Macedonia requested assistance through NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre (EADRCC) for surgical masks, protective suits and other equipment (Beta, 2020).³ In that context, NATO Secretary General, Jens

³ The NATO center passed the requests on to NATO Allies and partners, who provide assistance on a bilateral basis. The EADRCC is NATO's principal disaster response mechanism. It operates on a 24/7 basis, coordinating requests from NATO Allies

Stoltenberg, stressed that NATO is determined in the fight against the Covid-19 pandemic (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2020) and added that, while all Allies are affected by the crisis, some are able to reallocate resources in order to help others in need, including North Macedonia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). In fact, North Macedonia was the first member state of NATO which requested support in the fight against Covid-19 (Glas Amerike, 2020). From the point of bilateral aid, Hungary was the first NATO ally to provide aid to North Macedonia, in the form of 100.000 protective masks and 5.000 protective suits, while at the same time Slovenia provided 100.000 surgical masks and 100.000 protective masks to North Macedonia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). Furthermore, the Netherlands provided Covid-19 test kits, through an international donation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, while the US Administration committed \$1.1 million to mitigating the spread of Covid-19 outbreak⁴ in North Macedonia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). Norway donated medical supplies to North Macedonia totalling €180.000. Moreover, North Macedonia used a field hospital donated by Norway, allowing the country to double the capacity at the Infectious Disease Clinic in Skopje, its largest hospital, in the fight against Covid-19 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). In fact, different types of medical equipment and support North Macedonia received by donation, at the beginning of Covid-19 pandemic, support, to some extent, our thesis that the public health system is unsustainable without foreign support, in this case, more precisely, without the support provided by NATO allies. As April 2020 began, North Macedonia authorities, once again, requested assistance via NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. Thus, military transport aircraft, CASA C295, of the Czech Army, transported 1.000.000 masks to North Macedonia (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). In fact, the health system of North Macedonia lacked the basic necessities to fight the pandemic. With that in mind, it can be very simple to consider that human security in that country was threatened at the basic level, without taking into account other economic, political and security challenges outside the public health care context. Challenges in the health care

and partners, as well as offers of assistance to cope with the consequences of major crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic.

⁴ Through this assistance, it will support several initiatives, including large-scale testing of COVID-19 and infection prevention and control.

system of North Macedonia, during the Covid-19 pandemic, are a sufficient indicator of the state of human security in that state and how such eroded health system has influence on the basic human security standards in Macedonian society.

North Macedonia also got assistance from Poland which dispatched nearly 70 tonnes of medical supplies to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia, helping them respond to the Covid-19 pandemic (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). Furthermore, Estonia delivered medical supplies to North Macedonia, as a part of wider Estonian medical support which included 4.000 pump dispenser bottles of hand disinfection liquid and 1.000 litres of surface disinfectant, and several hundred mattresses, bedding sets and blankets (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). One of the most important NATO donations to North Macedonia was the delivery of 60 ventilators⁵ (Dojčevele, 2020), as a part of the Alliance's support to Allies to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). This donation, same as the previous ones, was coordinated by NATO's EADRCC in response to a request from North Macedonia. Such data shows the challenges faced by the health system in North Macedonia during the Covid-19 pandemic. The question is, how would have the authorities in that country coped with the pandemic if they had not received any kind of medical assistance from the NATO allies and does that mean that the NATO assistance was crucial in that period for North Macedonia? However, it is difficult to establish whether NATO played a key role, bearing in mind the fact that in the fight against the pandemic, North Macedonia received support and was helped from non-NATO countries, which used their national capacities to help the North Macedonian authorities in the fight against Covid-19.

On January 11th 2021's EADRCC received one more request for international assistance from North Macedonia to help in the fight against the Covid-19 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). Few weeks later, North Macedonian Ministry of Health received a donation of additional

⁵ The ventilators are part of a donation from the United States to the NATO stockpile in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. They were stored by the NATO Support and Procurement Agency in a warehouse facility at the NSPA Southern Operational Centre in Taranto, Italy and were transported to Skopje by an Italian transport aircraft C27J.

60 sets of ventilator equipment. This donation happened due to the financial contributions by the Czech Republic, Lithuania, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and the United States (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). At the same time Slovakia delivered four pulmonary ventilators to North Macedonia, including masks, hygiene packs, blankets, tents and generators. The NATO Pandemic Response Trust Fund maintains an established stockpile of medical equipment and supplies to be able to provide immediate relief to Allies or partners in need (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020). Furthermore, at the beginning of March 2021, North Macedonia received 6.000 litres of surface disinfectant detergent from NATO's Pandemic Response Stockpile which were distributed to 17 hospitals around the country, General Hospitals of Gevgelija, Strumica, Gostivar, Ohrid, Bitola and the Institute for children's diseases in Skopje (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020).

However, North Macedonia did not receive NATO assistance during Covid-19 pandemic solely in the health care area. This country, as NATO's newest ally, signed a key document that contributes to improving cyber defence cooperation and assistance between NATO and the country's cyber defenders. It is the Memorandum of Understanding on cyber defence cooperation which facilitates information-sharing on cyber threats and best practices, and helps prevent cyber incidents and will enable North Macedonia to increase its resilience to cyber threats (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020).

From today's perspective, we have to point out that North Macedonia applied more or less the same measures as its neighbouring countries. Essentially, all of them applied identical measures in the fight against Covid-19, but North Macedonia feared the worst, as it had the largest number of new Covid-19 cases and deaths in relation to the number of citizens. The difference between North Macedonia and other neighbouring states was only in the measures for entering and leaving the country, where state quarantine was obligatory for Macedonian citizens, and foreigners (Mirilovic, 2022). Full professor of microbiology and parasitology at the Faculty of Medicine in Skopje, Nikola Panovski, explained that the Macedonian health care system was relatively ready until the moment when the number of hospitalized patients was between 500-700 at the state level. According to him, when the Clinical Centre and the City hospital in Skopje were not able to receive the more serious

patients, Covid-19 departments were opened in smaller towns in which hospitals had never before treated patients who required oxygen and complex laboratory tests. “Family doctors who normally work privately and have contracts with the Public Health Insurance Fund were not prepared to treat these difficult cases, so the patients were left to fend for themselves (Mirilovic, 2022). Along with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia was in the top ten European countries in terms of mortality rate from Covid-19 (Mirilovic, 2022). According to data from September 1st 2022, North Macedonia, registered 340.510 cases, from the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic — 329.434 recovered patients and 9.490 deaths (Worldometers, 2022). North Macedonia signed its first agreement on the procurement of the first contingent of vaccines (200.000 doses) on February 8th 2021, with the Chinese company Sinopharm, but the first contingent of vaccines (4.680 doses), were the Pfizer ones donated by Serbia (Mirilovic, 2022). At the beginning of March 2021, the Prime Minister of North Macedonia at that time, Zoran Zaev, announced that his government had ordered 2.5 million doses of vaccines, both through the Covax program⁶ and through bilateral cooperation with Russia and China and their companies. Until then, only vaccines donated by Serbia were in use and were given to the workers in public healthcare system (Mirilovic, 2022). The biggest tragedy during the Covid-19 pandemic in North Macedonia happened on September 9th. There was a big fire in the Tetovo public hospital, which engulfed one of the prefab Covid-19 hospitals where 14 patients died. Although the competent authorities denied their responsibility, speculations quickly emerged that these temporary hospitals were built without safety procedures in mind. The Tetovo tragedy became another segment of the entire Macedonian disaster in the fight against the Corona virus (Mirilovic, 2022). The fact that the health


⁶ COVAX is the vaccines pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator. The ACT Accelerator is a ground-breaking global collaboration to accelerate the development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines. COVAX is co-led by the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Gavi and the World Health Organization (WHO), alongside key delivery partner UNICEF. In the Americas, the PAHO Revolving Fund is the recognized procurement agent for COVAX. It aims to accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines and to guarantee fair and equitable access for every country in the world.

system was unprepared to deal with this pandemic, that the public institutions were unable to react quickly, that there was a late reaction in the process of procuring medical equipment and vaccines and that the organization of work was unprofessional and led to the tragedy in the Tetovo hospital, all prove that North Macedonia could not have gotten the required medical help and support, had it not been a part of the NATO membership, albeit it had not been able to provide its citizens with human security, which turned out to be a phenomenon which is not causally related to the membership with the Alliance.

NORTH MACEDONIA'S ECONOMIC CHALLENGES AFTER THE NATO ACCESSION

The economic standard of the citizens, issues of well-being, and consumer baskets in modern international relations represents one of the key factors in determining the state of human security in a society. In that context, if we assess the level of human security within the Macedonian society from the economic perspective, the results could not be positive, bearing in mind the fact that the economic performance of North Macedonia was still one of the worst in Europe (Nechev & Nikolovski, 2019). When we are talking about the benefits of North Macedonia's membership in NATO, we have to point out that Macedonian political elite have presented NATO membership as an opportunity and chance for attracting foreign direct investment (Makfax, 2019). Politicians in North Macedonia, no matter whether we are talking about those from the left or right on the political scale, justified that thesis by saying that the Republic of North Macedonia would represent a safe, predictable and stable environment, which is one of the key prerequisites for large investors when making decisions about new investments. Based on such claims, Macedonian society, regardless of their ethnicity, have expected an investment boom after the country joined the Alliance, but the reality did not go in such direction. Furthermore, as Gocevski and Gjurovski stated, the theories of security and peace unequivocally indicate that one of the key factors for the promotion and preservation of world peace is precisely raising the level of economic development of countries (Gocevski & Gjurovski, 2017). North Macedonia's accession to NATO happened while being accompanied by the global economy

problems, firstly, due to the pandemic, as well as the processes of global economic restructuring due to new circumstances. Such process has led us to the new reality where the investment flows have recorded a reduced intensity, which was also influenced by the challenges facing developed countries due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The real value of foreign direct investments (FDI) in North Macedonia has significantly dropped in 2020, when compared to 2019. According to the annual report of the National bank of North Macedonia, the country attracted FDI in the value of €171 million in the year before the Covid-19 pandemic, while the amount of FDI in 2020, following Covid-19 pandemic, were almost halved and amounted to €97 million (Tomic, Antonijevic, Pejovic, 2021). According to the available data, North Macedonia has the highest decrease rate in FDI inflows in 2020, where the decrease, compared to 2019, was around 43 per cent for the first three quarters in 2020 (National Bank of Serbia, 2021). The purchasing power of one inhabitant of North Macedonia is only 44 per cent compared to the European average, and in front of it are Serbia with 52 per cent compared to the European average and Montenegro with 61 per cent (Demostat/Danas 2022). According to mentioned data we can state that from the economic perspective North Macedonia, is at the bottom, not only of the European continent, but also of the Western Balkans, and only Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are behind it (Demostat/Danas, 2022). In fact, human security within Macedonian society is endangered and challenged, not because of the question whether this state is a member or it is not member of NATO Alliance. Many parameters show human security within North Macedonia an open issue because of many other, important, essential issues which are neither directly, nor indirectly connected with NATO membership. Weak public institution framework, high-level corruption, political instability, as well as unsustainable health system — dysfunctional during the Covid-19 pandemic, are all the leading issues North Macedonia is faced with, and which are crucially influencing on the condition of human security in this country.

Graph 1: FDI inflow by country in the region in million EUR

● Bosnia and Herzegovina ● Croatia ● North Macedonia ● Serbia ● Slovenia
 Source: (Vajdić et al., 2022)

According to the data in the table, North Macedonia recorded the lowest growth of foreign direct investments in the previous period, even though it is a country that has become a NATO member state in the meantime, which leads us to open a new research question: Does NATO membership automatically lead to an investment boom for the countries that become a part of the Alliance, or do the investment trends, which are primarily determined by numerous other parameters, depend on internal, that is, national institutional efficiency? Similar challenges, from the economic and financial point of view, North Macedonia is facing in the area of income, which positions it at the bottom in the region. The average monthly net salary in North Macedonia was 31,525 denars (514 euros) in April, according to data from the State Statistics Office (DZS), while at the same time the average salary in Serbia was 74,664 dinars (635 euros), according to data from the Serbian State Statistics Office (Tanjug, 2022). According to the data of the State Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the average monthly net salary paid in the first quarter of 2022 was 1,065 KM (545 euros), which indicates that only Albania has lower average monthly net salary in comparison to North Macedonia.

According to the National Statistics Institute of Albania, the net average salary in Albania during the first quarter of 2022 was 59,242 ALL (493.51 euros) (Akta, 2022). These indicators, such as the condition of health system during Covid-19 pandemic, the unwillingness of national institutions to provide a quick reaction in the extraordinary situations, such as the pandemic, the average monthly salary, the level of foreign direct investments, as well as the purchasing power of the population — all these to indicate that nothing has changed, essentially, in North Macedonia since this country became a full member of NATO. This data also indicates that in North Macedonia nothing has changed in the context of human security. However, this conclusion, as in the case of the fight against the global pandemic, should not mean that membership in NATO is a wrong foreign policy choice of the country. It should rather point towards the fact that the functionality of the internal system, at all levels, determines the solution to challenges and emerging security problems — for the most part, and that membership in NATO does not mean instantaneous solving all the existing problems that North Macedonia was facing and is still facing. We might wonder why this is important. For the most part, it is because many of these problems, especially those connected with human security, indirectly contribute to the fragile security mosaic of this country as well, which is not in a direct correlation with NATO membership.

CONCLUSION

North Macedonia became a full member of NATO at the moment when security challenges have changed their context when it comes to protecting the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the modern state. “Traditional” security challenges occupy a relatively lower place in the security strategies of states, while modern security challenges, and human security, become key in newer security strategies. In this context, the issues of territorial integrity and political independence are no longer on the top of security agenda of NATO member states, nor in the case of North Macedonia, as the newest member state of the Alliance. In contemporary international relations, NATO member states are facing challenges that directly affect human security. These are challenges that threaten economic and technological systems and structures, challenges such as the pandemics which threatens the public health system, and challenges in

cyberspace that appear invisible, but can make a state system completely non-functional in the case of a potential attack. From that point of view, this paper serves as a case study on the example of North Macedonia to show that membership in NATO, in the context of contemporary security challenges and human security, does not automatically mean the creation of a secure environment.

The connection between economic and political flows, and health crises in contemporary international and domestic processes, play a crucial role in the domain of human security. In this paper we have proved that, in the field of human security, on the example of the Covid-19 pandemic in North Macedonia, this country has not progressed in any way. As a member state of the Alliance, it has received a large amount of material aid and donations in the fight against Covid-19, but it did not manage to improve the current state of human security within the country. Due to the problems within the health system, economic capacity and the low level of public functionality made it impossible for North Macedonia to successfully fight the pandemic. Health aid and donations from NATO member states have facilitated the Macedonian authorities' fight against this global disease, but they have not changed the internal mosaic of human security.

If a state infrastructure creates human security mosaic in a country, including the political, economic and health system within that infrastructure, then, in the case of North Macedonia, it can be concluded that this country does not meet the basic prerequisites for ensuring sustainable human security. From a theoretical point of view, this case study has shown that the integration of small and micro states into collective security systems, as it is North Macedonia, does not automatically mean resolving all security issues and challenges faced by these groups of countries. From a long-term perspective, small and micro states, as well as developing states, enjoy numerous benefits and advantages from full membership in collective security systems, but membership as an official act, as we have proven on the case of North Macedonia, does not automatically contribute to the solution of institutional challenges or health problems, nor economic difficulties which are mostly "responsible" for human security environment within the society from the perspective of their effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. North Macedonia is an authentic case study in this field, not only from the perspective that this country, according the

criteria of “new” security threats, has failed to fulfil secure environment for its citizens even though it is a member-state of NATO, but also to show how much certain small and micro states, including their political elite, are not aware about the newly composed security threats which are directly endangering their citizens, avoiding the question of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.

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POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE HUMAN SECURITY IN NAGORNO KARABAKH: BAYRAKTAR TB2 SUPREMACY OR THE LACK OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE?

Nikola Rajić¹

Abstract: The science of international relations considers frozen conflicts to be situations in which, after the end of the war, either a satisfactory peace agreement has not been reached or the conflicting parties remained in their own political positions, diametrically opposed in interpreting legal acts that contributed to the cessation of fighting. Nagorno Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave which is formally part of Azerbaijan, is one of those frozen conflicts, which dates back to 1988 and which resulted in deterioration of human security of the region. After the conflict broke out, Russia mediated and a ceasefire was reached. However, in September 2020, a new-old war continued, lasting six weeks, until a new ceasefire was signed, on November 9th. The paper takes a look at how the war panned out and what was the deciding factor in what was basically a co-allied Azerbaijan — Türkiye victory over Armenia (and the Republic of Artsakh). Specifically, the paper examines Türkiye's Bayraktar TB2 drones and seeks to find out whether they have truly reigned supreme over the battlefield, or if their dominance was brought about by a weak or non-existent Armenia-NK anti-aircraft defence. This paper also takes a look at the political aspect of the human security in the enclave of Nagorno Karabakh, specifically the state of human rights and their repression, whether and how the conditions have worsened during and after and war.

Keywords: *Nagorno Karabakh, human security, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bayraktar TB2, anti-aircraft defence, Türkiye*

INTRODUCTION

The conflict on the territory of Nagorno Karabakh is deeply rooted in history and is imbued with geopolitical rivalries. In this area, autochthonous state creations have been present for more than three millennia, among which the Armenian ones are certainly the most present, although in the 11th century the situation began to change with the settlement of the

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Turkish Oghuz tribes; thus, during the following centuries, the area became the scene of numerous conflicts and liberation uprisings, primarily led by the Armenians. It was only at the beginning of the 19th century, with the expansion of the Russian Empire that the entire area was pacified and integrated into a relatively stable state order, and in 1846 it was annexed to Baku Province (the capital of Azerbaijan in modern times), where it remained until the end of the Russian Empire. During the First World War, the Turks, with the support of the Kurds and Azeris, committed genocide against the Armenian population, and to make matters even worse, after the October Revolution, the territory of Karabakh, inhabited by about 94% of Armenians at that time, was assigned to the Azerbaijan SSR (Gajić & Rajić, 2021, pp. 37-38). On the eve of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast demanded from the Kremlin to separate from Azerbaijan and join Armenia (February 20, 1988), which led to mass violence against Armenians in Azerbaijan. When the Kremlin did not agree, the officials in Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence from Baku, effectively starting the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, which lasted from 1988 to 1994. (Gajić & Rajić, 2021, p. 39).

In May 1994, a peace agreement was reached, based on the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group, but with the greatest efforts made by Russia. However, this agreement did not result in permanent peace, but in the freezing of the conflict, occasionally unfrozen. One such clash took place in April 2016, when there was an armed conflict of greater intensity, which resulted in over a hundred military casualties (Guliyev & Gawrich, 2021, p. 2). The next major escalation took place between September 27 and November 10, 2020, in what is now known as the 44 day war, or the second Nagorno Karabakh war, which ended with a ceasefire brokered by Russia and Türkiye, but which, without a doubt, meant a great victory for Azerbaijan, showing better tactical readiness on the ground in comparison to Armenia and the forces of Nagorno Karabakh, and, thus, managing to force the opposite side to make concessions, regaining a part of the Nagorno Karabakh territory.

POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE HUMAN SECURITY AND THE STATUS OF THE NAGORNO KARABAKH ENCLAVE

Such an environment, permeated by open instability and war for more than three decades, deeply rooted in history, undoubtedly threatens the issue of human security. Human security, as such, was first emphasized in the UNDP Human Development Report from 1994, and in the meantime, it has taken on numerous definitions, both minimalistic and maximalist. Alexander and Sabina Lautensach presented an all-inclusive definition of human security which includes political security, economic stability, but also ecological sustainability and human development (Aliyev, 2015, p. 3). In the entire domain of human security, for the issue of Nagorno Karabakh and its political aspect, i.e., political security, is a burning issue and a question which is partly the focus of this paper. Namely, political security is an expression of the stability of the order of a political community or the security of its regime with the question of the state and its legitimacy as a reference object, i.e., sensitivity to threats in view of weak institutional capacities and capacities of coercion, as well as the problems of the national elites themselves which are not capable of solving troubles of contemporary security dilemmas (Marković, 2015, p. 252).

The latter proved excellent in practice in the example of the 44-day war, where the political leadership of Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia proved to be far inferior in adequate planning for the war and, in general, the perception of threats coming from the Azerbaijan side, which was largely supported by Türkiye. Another aspect of the political domain of human security, relevant to the issue of Nagorno Karabakh, is the issue of the state's external strength, which is manifested in the form of its international legitimacy. Recognized states — *de iure* — receive recognition from other (recognized) states in the international system, while, unlike them, disputed states do not have this recognition, and even between them there is a difference, so they can have titular, partial, insignificant, patronage recognition, equal recognition and null recognition. Although it is undeniably less valuable compared to full recognition, titular recognition to certain entities that enjoy such a status (such as Kosovo or Palestine) still provides some benefits. Partial recognition refers to disputed entities recognized by a small number of states (such as Taiwan); insignificant recognition implies that a "state" was recognized by a very small number

of states (for example, when Chechnya declared its independence from the Russian Federation, it was recognized only by Afghanistan). Patronage refers to such a form of recognition when the state was recognized only by its patron (example of Northern Cyprus and Türkiye), null refers to the situation when the disputed state was not recognized by any other state, while equal recognition refers to situations when the disputed state is recognized only by the same disputed states — for example, Nagorno Karabakh was recognized by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which can be classified as examples of patronage recognition (Marković, 2015, p. 254). Having in mind that something frozen can be unfrozen, there is no reason why this should not also apply to the issue of frozen conflicts. Thus, long-term peace (with sporadic excesses), although fragile, was maintained with attempts at mediation that would lead to a permanent solution. However, none of the models for solving this conflict proposed until then were acceptable to both sides, so the conflict was thawed early in the morning on September 27, 2020, after Azerbaijani forces launched an offensive from the north, southeast and south (Miarka, 2021, p. 3).

THE 44-DAY WAR: BAYRAKTAR TB2 SUPREMACY OR THE LACK (OR INADEQUATE USE) OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE?

The 44-day-long war in the Karabakh region inflicted heavy equipment and manpower losses on the armed forces of Armenia. The effectiveness of the Azerbaijani attacks was so vast that it signalled a potential paradigm-shift in warfare. The effective use of drones must be highlighted, particularly the Türkiye's Bayraktar TB2 drone which performed particularly well during the conflict. The President of Azerbaijan İlham Aliyev published on his official website the complete list of destroyed Armenian equipment, which includes 53 anti-tank weapons, 4 "Smerch" heavy multiple rocket launchers, 2 "Elbrus" tactical-operational missile systems, 97 "Grad" truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers, 2 "Uragan" self-propelled multiple rocket launchers, 1 "TOS" thermobaric weapon, 7 "S-300" anti-aircraft missile system launchers, as well as 5 "TOR" air defence systems, 40 "OSA" air defence systems, 14 "ZASTAVA" air defence systems, 22 unmanned aerial vehicles, 5 radio electronic warfare systems and other types of weaponry. Azerbaijani army has also destroyed 5 Su-25 attack aircrafts, 287 tanks, 69 infantry fighting vehicles, 28 "Acacia" and "Carnation" self-propelled

artillery guns, 315 cannons of various calibres, 63 mortars, 252 trucks, 10 specialized vehicles, as well as 7 command posts and 11 ammo depots of Armenia's troops. In addition to the destroyed material, Azeri forces also took hundreds of pieces of military equipment in tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery guns (aforementioned "Acacia" and "Carnation"), various cannons, mortars, grenade launchers, trucks and specialized vehicles and over a 1,000 small arms. All in all, accumulated cost surpasses more than \$4,008 billion in loss of military material for Armenia (and Nagorno Karabakh) side (Mehdiyev, 2020).

Looking at the losses, a logical question arises: how is it possible that Azerbaijan won such a resounding victory? Was it really all about the supremacy of drones, the use of which brought a revolution on the battlefield overnight, or was it about the absence or inadequate use of air defence; or a bit of both? The short answer is that drones have not revolutionized the battlefield, as their use is not new. Moreover, their application during the civil war in Syria (2011-2020), and during the campaign in Libya (2019-2020) showed that drones, although with their place on the battlefield, still require adequate tactical application, and technical expertise for proper handling, but that even in those instances they do not bring the military superiority which is sometimes attributed to them, although it certainly does not do harm to have them in the arsenal (Calcara et al., 2022, p. 134). Speaking about the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the reputation that the Türkiye's Bayraktar TB2 has gained, it is, first of all, a well-placed propaganda campaign. Namely, it is a question of a mutually beneficial campaign carried out in cooperation between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, where Azerbaijan, it is believed, had help on the ground from Türkiye's operators that resulted in the most lethal use of the Bayraktar. The Azerbaijani and Türkiye's authorities could then use the footage of combat readiness and action on war targets as a means of manipulation of their domestic public opinion. Azerbaijan could project the image of battlefield superiority (which did reflect the real situation), while Türkiye could use it as great promotional material for further sales of Bayraktar TB2 drones, which are finding an increasingly large place on the market.

So, before we get into how Azerbaijan's forces actually used TB2 models, we should first see what is special about them. After the Türkiye's 1974 intervention in Cyprus and the embargo that came with it, to meet the demands of the Türkiye's Armed Forces, the state established several defence

companies with the production model that favoured indigenization and a limited sort of autarky. In this case, autarky in armament production is supposed to free states (in this case Türkiye) from reliance on and potential coercion from supplier states and to ensure they are not excluded from fast-evolving military technologies (Cannon, 2022, p. 3). There are multiple and incomplete reports on the percentage of TB2 drones Türkiye produces by itself. The estimates of Türkiye's TB2 domestic production range from approximately 93% up to 100% (Daily Sabah, 2016). Be that as it may, Bayraktar TB2 proved to be a highly capable tactical drone with a flight endurance of 24 hours whose battle readiness was tested and proved multiple times over the years. We must still keep in mind the aforementioned claim that TB2 still requires good tactical usage and technical expertise. Another advantage TB2 has over other drones on the market is its price, which is around \$5 million, while American-made MQ-25 Stingray drone costs around \$155 million (News Science, 2022)

As far as 2020 Nagorno Karabakh conflict is concerned, the important thing to note is that during 2010, Azerbaijan and Türkiye signed two important agreements — the Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreements as a kind of response to the agreement allowing the presence of Russian troops on Armenian territory, as well as the agreement on the establishment of the Türkiye-Azerbaijani Strategic Cooperation Council. These agreements enabled the strengthening of military-technical cooperation between the two countries, and the possibility of providing military assistance if any of the signatory states is attacked by a third party. In accordance to these two agreements, and the close cultural and historical ties between Türkiye and Azerbaijan, between 2006 and 2019, Azeri side obtained more than \$825 million worth of weapons from Azerbaijan (and Israel), and the list of obtained weapons includes surface-to-air missile systems, anti-tank missiles, loitering munitions and the asset that was deemed to have had the biggest impact on the victory in the 44-day war — large amount ofUCAVs (unmanned combat aerial vehicles) (Ilić & Tomašević, 2021, p. 11). What could have also been seen as a precursor to the continuation of the conflict was the fact that Türkiye's export of arms to Azerbaijan was approximately \$123 million in the first nine months of 2020 before the fighting began. The largest part of the procurement were combat drones, rocket launchers, ammunition and other armaments (Jović-Lazić, 2022, p. 39). Bayraktar TB2 drones were deployed during joint

military exercises by Türkiye and Azerbaijan in July, and it is no wonder that when the conflict flared up in September, TB2 drones played a key role in securing a military victory for the Azerbaijani side.

Even though the Kremlin studied the TB2, the flagship of Türkiye's drone production, they have found it to be non-threatening to a high-end adversary operating a layered air defence with electronic jamming (Stein, 2021). However, that didn't stop Azerbaijani side from destroying seven Armenian S-300 systems. The widespread usage of the UCAVs provided an opportunity for Azerbaijan forces to carry out surgically precise attack on the defence of Nagorno Karabakh. However, it must be noted that Israeli made IAI Harops loitering munitions were used alongside the TB2. Loitering munition is a weapon system category in which the munition loiters around the target area for some time, searching for targets based on a predetermined set of parameters, such as a specific radar signal, and attacks once such a target is located (Postma, 2021, p. 15). To get back to the question — did the Bayraktar TB2 dominate the skies, or was the lack of anti-aircraft defence the problem? In truth, a little bit of both. In various battlefields anti-aircraft systems such as aforementioned S-300 (or the newer S-400 or the newest S-500) showed they were perfectly capable of battling it out against TB2 (and other drones), although there is not a single anti-aircraft system that would not have a problem with swarming attacks against multiple drones; however, that would not be very cost effective.

In Nagorno Karabakh, the answer lies mostly in the way Azerbaijan implemented the use of Bayraktar TB2 drones, as the Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh defence forces did not possess a layered air defence system capable of addressing both short and long-range threats, nor low and high altitudes. Furthermore, their surface-to-air missile batteries were mostly obsolete Soviet-era platforms, which are significantly less capable in dealing with modern drones, such as TB2 (Calcara et al., 2022, p. 162). Another setback for the Armenia's and Nagorno Karabakh's defence was related to the fact that UCAVs are not as expensive today and due to that they can provide powerful air support at just a fraction of the cost of traditional air force. Having ground forces trained to fight in drone-saturated battlefield is a necessity nowadays, as seen in Libya and Syria (Amirkhanyan, 2022, p. 123). Another prevailing factor, related to the fact that Armenia's electronic warfare is limited, was that it could not jam or hack Azeri communications,

which drones use to operate (Calcara et al., 2022, p. 163). Regardless of all of these factors which worked in favour of the Azeri side, their tactical supremacy should not be dismissed either. In the initial phase of the conflict, armed forces of Azerbaijan were able to surprise their opponent by using modified Antonov An-2 airplanes to detect and destroy Nagorno Karabakh's anti-aircraft defence systems. Antonov An-2 airplanes were regularly used to put out forest fires, but Azerbaijan turned them into remote controlled airplanes — UAVs — which they then used to fly at low altitude in order to detect anti-aircraft systems locations. Afterwards, TB2 and Harop drones would be used to precisely locate and eliminate those systems. In addition to Azeri UCAVs flying at a low altitude, they would also fly at a low-speed altitude which made them very difficult to detect on anti-aircraft radar systems. (Terzić, 2022, p. 10). Armenian air defences would fall into the trap and give up their positions in an attempt to destroy An-2 airplanes. This would make them targets of TB2 and Harop drones, which would use the anti-radiation missiles and loitering munition to attack. What is also important to note is the fact that due to their close cultural ties and cooperation in general, Türkiye provided infrastructural and operational support to Azerbaijan, which helps to explain how the Azeri side, which had purchased the Bayraktar TB2 drones a couple of months before, managed to infiltrate and operate within Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia's air space with relative impunity in the early phase of the conflict (Calcara et al., 2022, p. 165). As it has been said, Armenian side either possessed Soviet-era equipment or they did not possess electronic jammers that could interfere with the signals connecting the UCAVs with their guidance stations — for this matter, Russia used the Krasukha electronic warfare system from its military base on the territory of Armenia, in the city of Giumri, in order to prevent Azerbaijani reconnaissance in the depths of Armenian territory, although it was too late, as by the time they started using them, the Azeri side already got great momentum in their war effort (Ilić & Tomašević, 2021, p. 14).

Opposed to Azerbaijan, Armenia's drone arsenal was weak and modest, mostly made of domestically developed systems such as the KrunK and X-55 light reconnaissance drones and HRESH loitering munition, all of which did not seem to have a significant impact against Azerbaijani offense. As for the effectiveness of the said TB2, according to the open-source research, Bayraktar TB2 drones destroyed 89 T-72 tanks, 29 armoured

vehicles, 131 artillery pieces, 61 rocket launchers, 543 trucks, 9 radar systems 15 surface-to-air missile systems. Considering this, even though attrition numbers for TB2 are quite high with reports of Türkiye losing 16 UCAVs in Libya in the first half of 2020, blog reports only two likely Bayraktar TB2 losses during the six-week conflict in Nagorno Karabakh, with one crashed and one destroyed by enemy action. Compared with their cost of about \$5 million and about €1,5 million for ground station and associated infrastructure, the cost-benefit analysis still heavily favours the use of UCAVs in conflict, and has proved the value of TB2 drones in Azerbaijani weapon arsenal (Postma, 2021, p. 16).

DISCUSSION

Although drone technology undeniably requires tactical expertise, with adequate training, it provides numerous advantages on the battlefield, which are directly correlated with the aspect of human security.

Namely, the use of drones directly affects all aspects of human security. In the 44-day war, the use of Israeli Harop and Türkiye's Bayraktar TB2 drones directly affected the state of political security of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, considering the fact that with the help of the use of drones (and other methods of war applied during the conflict) there came to the deterioration of the political aspect of human security in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In addition, there was great economic destruction, with destroyed military equipment estimated to be worth well over \$4 billion, and it is still unknown and questionable whether it will ever be possible to estimate how much damage was done in the non-military domain to civilian objects. We believe that there is no need to explain how the use of drones, and the war itself, harms ecological sustainability. Moreover, when what is said is connected into one whole, the conclusion related to the aspect of human development is imposed by itself, so that it is, if not halted, then greatly slowed down and even brought to a state of regression.

Still, regarding the 2020 six-week war, even with all the success Bayraktar TB2 (and IAI Harop) had, close combat did not, and certainly will not, disappear from the battlefield, as it could have been seen in the key battle for Shusha which was a telling example, because once it fell to the Azeri side, Armenia surrendered and entered a lopsided agreement, ceding great amounts of the previously held territories. In this key battle of

the 2020 war drones were not used at all, as the fog had descended upon the city by the time the attack had started, making it impossible for Azeri drones to destroy or disable Armenian armoured vehicles (Calcara et al., 2022, p. 166). An important thing to note is that the conflict was most likely preceded by a kind of tacit agreement between Russia and Türkiye by which each side would satisfy some of their aspirations — Russia to sort of discipline new Armenian authorities who have occasionally expressed pro-Western rhetoric, and for Türkiye to realise their aspirations of becoming a regional power (Ilić & Tomašević, 2021, p. 13).

In sum, drones were not a silver bullet in the 2020 six-week war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and they have not revolutionized the battlefield, which does not mean they were useless; au contraire — when paired with other systems such as manned aircraft, land-based artillery, ground forces which are capable of close combat, electronic warfare systems and ground-based radars — they proved to be a significant force multiplier. On the other hand, it also does not mean that the time of anti-aircraft defence is in the past. In the six-week war the problem was way more related to the fact that Armenia did not have layered air defence systems and that they did not utilise the mountainous terrain of Nagorno Karabakh more than the lack of anti-aircraft defence systems. Another important thing to note was weak usage of electronic jamming and hacking of enemy signals on which Azerbaijani drones operated, which allowed Azeri forces to infiltrate Armenian skies with ease. However, it is still left to be seen how these drones will be used in future conflicts. No immediate conclusions should be drawn from this war alone, even though Azeri forces have shown that drones can be a great addition to the battlefield. Will defence forces learn from the six-week Armenia-Azerbaijan war for Nagorno Karabakh and layer their air defence systems and integrate them with adequate electronic warfare capabilities? It is left to be seen. As for the political aspect of the human security in Nagorno Karabakh, the conflict certainly did not relieve the region of the troubles it is burdened with; in fact, uneasiness amongst the population only grew, with the people taking their dissatisfaction to the streets and more than once demanding the resignation of Nikol Pashinyan, the prime minister of Armenia. Political stability is non-existent with people fearing for their homes and cultural heritage, without knowing whether tomorrow a new war will break out, with the Bayraktars, Harops or whatever gadget is the most up-to-date

at that time, dropping bombs over their heads, furthermore degrading human security of the Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia.

Taking all of the above into account, it should still be remembered that although drone technology and the use of drones is not something new and certainly not something that started with the 44-day war, it should also not be overlooked that, compared to conventional war, the use of drones is a new form of warfare. Their adequate tactical use brings a certain number of advantages to the battlefield, and the consequences that can arise from the use of drones are in direct correlation with the phenomenon of human security. In this regard, further research on the topic of the use of drones and their correlation with the aspect of human security deserves the attention of authors coming from the domain of security studies.

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ANALYSIS OF COLD WAR SANCTIONS ON EGYPT: FOUCAULT IN ACTION

Ece Aksop¹

Abstract: Sanctions have, for a long time, been a part of International Relations, as well as disciplinary literature. They tend to be problematic mechanisms, not only because the target can find allies, but also because there are third parties which are willing to circumvent sanctions, or are hurt by the measures implemented. In addition, global flows of finance and rise of cross-border mergers makes it difficult to separate “our” corporations from “theirs,” creating the problem of enforcement of the measures. Despite all, sanctions are still used as popular tools. This research will look at the Cold War period political disagreement that reflects a post-Cold War pattern. Analyzing the dispute on the construction of the Aswan Dam, this research argues that the sanctions are employed for the Foucauldian disciplinary power they embed. For disciplinary power to be there, the deviant needs to be identified — here comes securitization discourse of the constructivist theories. The conclusion reached is, that for constructivism to take place, and for disciplinary power to be exercised, a division between “us” and “them” is necessary. This process of otherization helps us understand why these measures are still resorted to by the West against the East.

Key words: *area studies, constructivism, Foucault, sanctions, Middle East*

INTRODUCTION

“Looking back from an early twenty-first century vantage point, it is easy to forget that there was once a time when the United Nations Security Council could not easily employ its sanctions tool,” reads the very first sentence of a law book (Farrall, 2008, p. 3). To a student of International Relations (IR), though, forgetting that referred to “once a time” is unforgivable as the modern age institutions, including the United Nations (UN) itself, is a child, not of World War II, but also of the Cold War.²

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² See Hobsbawm, E. J., & Cumming, M. (1995). *Age of extremes: the short twentieth century, 1914-1991*. Abacus; Kissinger, H. (1994). *Diplomacy*. Simon&Schuster.

An International Relations student would also know that sanctions are far from being novel tools for the UN; the League of Nations also had it (thought employed as an experimental tool) and indeed even the ancient Greeks used, if not invented sanctions as a part of non-military coercive strategies (Farrall, 2008, p. 45).

But theory rarely meets the practice. Sanctions do not always deliver the desired outcome. While some authors cherish the dynamics of economic sanctions, some others focus on the target state's political structure for assessing the potential success of sanctions — claim being that autocracies and dictatorships do not suffer much from the sanctions, instead it is their population that suffers from the sanction measures. This research assumes there are non-desired, unintended outcomes of sanctions over civilians, and limited impact of the measures imposed on changing the behavior of the target country.

The question then becomes why keep sanctions in the toolbox and resort to them frequently? The answer lies in Foucault's analysis of power — power is not a simple relationship between parties, nor a mere derivation of consent: "Power exists only when it is put into action" (Foucault 1982, p. 788). Sanctions, no matter how effective in correcting behavior or how destructive on local people, help in maintaining the binary branding between East and West. In other words, they serve as the part of the discourse that shows the West as the normal and the East as the abnormal and sustain the international power structure by putting right to use disciplinary power into the hands of the West.

In this respect, the story of Egypt is an interesting case to analyze, for being sanctioned back to the Cold War era, i.e., back to the times when sanctions were not as popular of a tool as they currently are. Moreover, it is a case involving withdrawal of credits, which is also an interesting tool to employ. Below, we will look at how the sanction scheme evolved and was imposed, and how Egypt reacted. The research will demonstrate the sanctions as a sample of Foucault's disciplinary measures, this paper will argue that Western muscles were flexed for purposes of exercising Foucauldian disciplinary power over an Oriental country.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first country we will analyze under case-studies part is Egypt, a country which had its first elections in January 1924, following the approval of the constitution. Wafd became the winning party, but the government could not last even for a year. The country succumbed to clashes between a set of competing foreign and national interests, with power being “rested on a delicate balance between the British, the palace, the Wafd, and rival minority parties” (Gordon, 1996, p. 16).

Constitutional power was vested onto King Fu’ad, who could dissolve the parliament at his own will. With this power, King Fu’ad tied his fate to the British, and in doing so, he set the palace in opposition to the national movement. “The British, who policed Egypt and controlled the coercive arms of state power, thought nothing of bringing down any Egyptian government that proved too vociferous in challenging their presence” (Gordon, 1996, p. 16). In these circumstances, the Wafd party managed to “marshal[] the power of mass popular support through which it made long-term rule by any rival party or coalition impossible” (Gordon, 1996, p. 16).

This chronic instability continued under King Farouk. His tenure (1936-1952) witnessed the World War II, during and after which Egyptian economy experienced a rapid growth. The GDP increase reached 40% (Pamuk & Owen, 1998, p. 128)³. However, the Wafd became more and more demanding — in a series of negotiations between 1951-52, “Wafd demanded British recognition of Egypt’s sovereign rights over Sudan as a precondition to discussing the future of the Suez Canal base,” and the British rejected this proposal (Gordon, 1996, p. 26). In return, the Wafd government unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Treaty.⁴

Skirmishes quickly transformed into violence over the Suez Canal area. The armed clashes between British and Egyptian forces on January 25, 1952, during which 50 Egyptian policemen died, marked a turning point. After this incident, it became impossible to calm the masses down. The

³ Note that the data is for the period of 1945-52.

⁴ The 1936 Treaty marked a change in British attitude towards demands of Egypt. Seeing the looming World War II, Britain wanted to ensure cooperation of Egypt, and ended military occupation with 1936 Treaty. Note, however, that the Treaty did not abrogate British right to have military presence in Suez Canal. Of course, “The Egyptians regarded this as derogatory to their national pride” (Chaudhri, 1956, p. 132).

army intervened and in a period of five months, King Farouk was ousted and Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser was installed in his place.⁵

Before starting our analysis of sanctions on Egypt, it may be useful to note a few things. First of all, geographically, Egypt lies on the African continent. Hence, in line with our conceptualization of the areas subject to this research, this case-study will represent sanctions on Africa.

Second, the sanctions we will elaborate on, in this chapter are not for countering WMD-proliferation. That is despite the fact that Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser overtly looked for a nuclear capability (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.).⁶ Even at the discourse level, he poured no effort into hiding his desire for Egypt to have nuclear weapons. What is more, Egypt has not been sanctioned for Nasser's proliferation-prone ambitions. What triggered the sanctions mechanism was Nasser's ambitions to create an "Egypt for Egyptians."

Third, while the Egyptian case diverts from other case-studies in terms of the reasons for sanctions; it also exhibits diversions in terms of the tools employed as a means of settling differences between states falling short of war (Farrall, 2008, pp. 47-48).⁷ As will be elaborated further below, while the sanctions in other cases mainly focus on trade in goods, the sanctions

⁵ Before proceeding to sanctions, it may be timely to note that "[t]he Muslim Brothers supported the Free Officers and helped them attain power in 1952. The Free Officers, having no popular base among the masses were very keen to use this support." However, when in 1954 a Muslim Brothers member tried to assassinate Nasser, he executed the leaders and put many members into concentration camps (Rahman, 2002, p. 27).

Indeed, despite Muslim Brothers was founded in Egypt in 1928, the basis for the movement was already there. In 9th century, for example, notion of solidarity and charity was well established. Frantz-Murphy quotes in length the anecdotes of a textiles merchant who could not pay taxes and had to borrow — but the lender refused interest. As the anecdote evolves, we learn a previous story where the lender had lost his merchandise in close proximity of the borrower's quarter and the borrower had offered a generous compensation (Murphy, 1981, pp. 284-285).

⁶ Also see Einhorn, J. R. (2004). Egypt: Frustrated but still on a Non-nuclear Course, in: K. M. Campbell, R. J. Einhorn & M. B. Reiss (Ed.), *The Nuclear Tipping Point* (pp. 45-46). Brookings Institution Press.

⁷ In this regard, an effective sanction is the one that manages to change the behaviour of the target. Note, however, that sometimes the behaviour is already about to change regardless of the sanctions, or sometimes behaviour changes not because of sanctions but other domestic or external factors. See Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J.,

on Egypt were in the form of withholding a financial aid for the construction of Aswan Dam.⁸

This chapter will thus analyze the sanctions on Egypt that were initiated during Nasser's tenure from a constructivist perspective, and show that the disciplinary power exercised over Egypt casted a shadow on daily life from different dimensions including but not limited to bureaucracy and security. It will argue that the sanctions were imposed with the desire to control a "maverick" country that challenged the international order designed by Western powers.

ROAD TO SANCTIONS

The discovery of resources like iron, manganese and petroleum in Egypt, as well as the plans for development of hydroelectric power, were all promising for the future industrial growth — considering the agriculturally reliant nature of the Egyptian economy.⁹ In medieval times, for example, Egypt was a considerable actor in textile sector. Flax and linen, among all, were so important that "[t]he treasurization and hoarding of clothing suggests that clothing was as good as gold" and was used "in lieu of currency" (Frantz-Murphy, 2003, p. 290).

World War II contributed to the diversification of the cotton-based Egyptian economy. In 1945, Egypt "had a larger industrial sector and relied

& Elliott, K. A. (1990). *Economic sanctions reconsidered: History and current policy*. Peterson Institute. See also Chapter 1.

⁸ Unless employed otherwise explicitly, the Dam or Aswan Dam here is used to refer to the High Aswan Dam. Indeed, projects for taming Nile were already in the pipeline either by "a third raising of the existing Aswan Dam (built in 1902)" or by building a new High Dam. Despite building a new dam was more feasible, Egypt was in struggle for raising funds. "Revenue from the newly nationalized Suez Canal ... total[led] about 20 per cent of foreign receipts," yet Egypt "agreed to pay a sum of 23 million Egyptian pounds compensation to British shareholders of the former Suez Canal Company." That lack of financial means and severe need for outside credits enables us to take the withdrawal of funds for construction of Nasser's pet project as sanctions. See El Mallakh, R. (1959). Some Economic Aspects of the Aswan High Dam Project in Egypt. *Land Economics*, 35(1), 15-23, pp. 16, 20.

⁹ It is still an agricultural society, with an industry having only 34% share of the economy, and services 54% of the GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2020).

less on the export of cotton than it had in 1914" (Tignor, 1987, p. 488).¹⁰ Despite the fact that this diversification did not lift Egypt up to the level of an industrialized economy,¹¹ it still translated into a need for electricity that was higher than before, and was to increase further. Hence, the Aswan Dam came into the picture, which would allow for up to 95% of the Nile's hydropower to be utilized (Rashad & Ismail, 2000, p. 288).¹² The Dam was also "an irrigation revolution for full utilization of the Nile's water" (Rashad & Ismail, 2000, p. 293). In this regard, "Egyptians ... [we]re not only proud of the dam, but also strongly believe[d] that the structure has significantly contributed to the nation's prosperity as well as economic and social stability" (Biswas & Tortajada, 2012, p. 379). As such, the Dam was a would-be crown jewel for Egyptian society, as well as politics.

Naturally, the Dam was also Nasser's pet project. "His was an ideal-typical version, where 'expertise' was apolitical and technocracy, a perfect amalgam of objective technocrats and patriotic bureaucrats" (Wahdan, 2007, p. 2105). Nonetheless, he lacked the financial means to complete such a grand undertaking. While domestic means would not be adequate, Nasser's sensitivity towards dominance of any outside power over Egypt prevented him from going for other foreign alternatives. This sensitivity caused him to avoid the West, simultaneously it also allowed him to play the Soviet card when he deemed necessary.¹³

¹⁰ On dependency on cotton, see Kitchener. (1913). Egypt in 1912. *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 61(3170), pp. 908-909.

¹¹ According to Food and Agriculture Organization, in 1970, share of agriculture in Egyptian economy was 29.3%, in 1980 it was 18.2%, and in 2000 it was 16.6%. The latest figures available is for year 2017, estimate being 11.7% for share of agriculture in economy (World Trade Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, & Commodity Policy and Projections Service, 2003; Central Intelligence Agency, 2020).

¹² Note that there already was an Aswan Dam on Nile, which was built at the beginning of the 20th century. This is known as Aswan Low Dam, and aimed to generate power as well as to decrease seasonal fluctuations in the Nile. As a result, it did not store any water. The Aswan Dam analysed in this research is the High Dam, which aimed "to control floods of the Nile; to store water from each annual flood; ... regulat[e] releases of water for irrigation, and to generate hydroelectric power" (Rashad & Ismail, 2000, p. 289).

¹³ Dougherty notes that Nasser had too many aspirations to juggle simultaneously: "forcing the British out, seizing the leadership of Arab unity movement, building his prestige among the Bandung nations as leader of the anti-colonial struggle, increasing

The US, in return, rushed in with a purpose of not losing either Nasser or Egypt, “and promised to finance (along with Britain and World Bank) the construction of the Aswan High Dam, a project dear to Nasser and his political legitimacy by way of economic development objectives” (Sullivan & Jones, 2008, p. 7).¹⁴ However, the US offer of financial assistance was withdrawn after Nasser’s ties with the USSR got deepened and his anti-Israeli rhetoric kept climbing. In other words, “[w]hile the project [wa]s motivated by economic considerations, these aspects have hardly received the attention they deserve and have been overshadowed by some of the political implications” (El Mallakh, 1959, p. 15).

The Egyptian swing towards the Eastern bloc made Nasser believe he had the Soviet option for technologic and economic assistance required for Aswan Dam (Woodward, 1992, p. 42).¹⁵ Note that he translated this belief into discourse: Following the closure of financial taps, Nasser announced (i) the nationalization of the Suez Canal to finance the Dam, as well as (ii) the acceptance of the Soviet offer to construct the dam — “although the Soviets probably did not make such an effort until after Nasser announced this” (Sullivan & Jones, 2008, p. 7).

Dam was important not only for Nasser, but also for taming the river Nile. In the end, “Egypt was by and large an agricultural society; its people strongly attached to the land,” (Osman, 2013, p. 9) water of the Nile determining where to settle and what to plant. In that respect, the way Egypt was ruled inspired theories known as the “Oriental Despotism” (Wittfogel, 1957). The theory highlighted that whomever controls water controls the society; hence the Nile became the center of attention.¹⁶ The geopolitical importance of Egypt peaked with the Suez Canal project. Then came the

Egypt’s foreign trade and arming his country for a showdown with Israel” (Dougherty, 1959, p. 34).

¹⁴ Later on, US moved back in by offering credits and Hawk missiles to discourage Nasser from being a Soviet ally (Kadri, 2016, p. 37).

¹⁵ The Soviet loan of 400 million rubles was typical for bolstering “fantastic dreams about aid from the country of Sputnik.” See Holbik, K. (1968). A comparison of US and Soviet foreign aid, 1961-1965. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, 320-340, p. 329.

¹⁶ In the Nile basin, Egypt has been the country which has the widest agricultural and arable terrain (Koluman, 2003, p. 52). Nile flows through 9 countries—Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, Zaire, Brundi and Rwanda. Its drainage zone is almost 10% of the whole African continent (Koluman, 2003, p. 53).

British occupation under “the pretext of restoring order and safeguarding Egypt’s foreign population” (Gordon, 1996, p. 15). The occupation marked the beginning of the British rule in Egypt.

In this regard, Egypt as case-study is important — the country not only holds important geopolitical and large territorial borders, but also provides an interesting sample of underdeveloped and primitive “Orient”: While Napoleon was the prince to come and kiss the Sleeping Beauty (Europe) back to life, her Oriental sister had never awakened (Schaebler, 2004, p. 4). This perceived gap in “sleeping periods” was presented as the cause of the gap in levels of development, which made the Orient “needy of European civilizing” (Schaebler, 2004, p. 13).

The perception of Egypt by the West and the West’s *mission civilisatrice* was in contrast with Nasser’s understanding of free Egypt. In this regard, the Aswan Dam was important for Nasser to assist the reforms he undertook and bolster the “[a]gricultural production [which] made important advances during the period 1955-1966.” (Richards, 1980, p. 6).¹⁷ In other words, the Dam was regarded as a panacea for all these problems.¹⁸ However, as mentioned, Egypt lacked its own financial means to shoulder the construction, and foreign financial assistance came with strings attached. World Bank, for example, wanted to ensure inflation and creditworthiness as well as to monitor Egypt’s foreign debts (Osman, 2013, p. 146). Yet, such strings fell at odds with Nasser’s philosophy of national economy. The gridlock could not be solved, and Nasser approached the Soviet Union. Seeing the conclusion of Egypt-Czechoslovakia arms deal, in summer 1956, the US also “withdrew American offer to aid substantially [Dam’s] building” (El Mallakh, 1959, p. 15) for not being feasible.¹⁹ For both the World Bank and the US, there was the unresolved issue of the water rights between

¹⁷ Yet, the system was not flawless. Take pricing — farmers were assigned quotas of crops, some of which could be sold only to the government well below the price of international markets. The difference between domestic and international prices went mostly to the government (Richards, 1980, p. 8).

¹⁸ The Dam could not solve Egypt’s economic and social problems simply “for all the troubles of the Nile,” High Dam was not a “one-shot cure” (El Mallakh, 1959, p. 22). There was what Wahdan calls as “fetishism of growth” (Wahdan, 2007, p. 2105).

¹⁹ The project on the Dam is also noted to be insupportable in market terms by experts. Yet, it is also noted that despite all its problems, the Dam managed to transform Egypt’s economy (Lefeber, 1992).

riparian states (Salman, 2009, p. 25). Moreover, the British Foreign Office “raised the question whether Egypt had the capacity to undertake the huge river project while simultaneously financing the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia” (Dougherty, 1959, p. 28).

This act was followed by the nationalization of the Suez Canal; however, as mentioned above, the nationalized revenue of the Canal was partly going to the compensation of former British shareholders. Moreover, the impact of newly founded United Arab Republic on both Egyptian and Syrian national budgets was unclear. In all cases, Egypt did not have enough domestic sources and could not generate foreign capital for the Dam, hence withdrawal of credits for Aswan Dam, and which amounted to restrictive measures that could well have been considered sanctions.²⁰

However, despite all the disagreements and tension between Egypt and Britain, Egypt was claimed to have benefits from British control. The British have trained and organized the Egyptian army, reduced corruption and improved the condition of peasantry. Nonetheless, the British administration was focused more on balance sheets than administrative reforms, hence, for example, budget allocation for health and sanitation, if any, was limited. Still, it was presented not as the fault of the administration but as the primitiveness of the Egyptians: “We might be unable to educate the natives of Egypt, as those of India, to realize the danger of drinking water fouled by excretes,” goes one article in *The British Medical Journal*, and continues by noting that as the Spaniards in Toledo that “threaten[ed] to shoot any who should even wash their clothes in the river, compel[ed] the inhabitants to bring water from a distant spring,” the British could do a lot more to “civilize” the Egyptians (Anonymous, 1890, p. 511).²¹

²⁰ For an analysis of a similar measure, i.e., withdrawal of GSP benefits amounting to sanctions, see Portela, C. (2014). *The EU’s Use of ‘Targeted’ Sanctions: Evaluating Effectiveness*. Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 4.

²¹ In agreeing with the British being able to and should have done more, Richards points to the problems like insect attack related to the first Aswan Dam. He then questions why the British failed to make investments for purposes of improving drainage (Richards, 1978, pp. 730-731). In addition to this perception of the white men’s burden to educate Egyptians, the pejorative approach could also easily be observed in legal affairs. European consulates, for example, extended the right of extraterritoriality and made Egypt a refuge for fugitives and outlaws of Southern Europe (Sloane, 1904, pp. 477-478.) The author also notes: “[I]t is the foreigners... who carry on organized smuggling, who keep brothels and gambling halls, who

Such a discourse indeed is part of Foucauldian power. Here, Egypt, as being the Oriental other is portrayed as primitive, uncivilized, backward, in short, a leper. For Egypt to be healthy, it needed to be disciplined. As the discursive violence required for branding was already there, all that was needed was to introduce some disciplinary measures to demonstrate the power of the West over the Orient. This section will analyze the impact of the measures on Egyptian daily life, local responses to them, and the Foucauldian disciplinary power embedded.

SECURITY ASPECT

While the sanctions were in play, as mentioned, Nasser's Egypt turned to the Soviets. Improving relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union would have enabled the latter to expand its sphere of influence into the Middle East, while Egyptians were to "receive modern weapons and financial aid for the improvement of their medieval infrastructure" (Pierre, 2004, p. 52).

In this respect, the withdrawal of funds for the Aswan Dam, on account of classical understanding of sanctions, was a failed move. It failed in stopping the construction of the Dam, improved relations between the USSR and Egypt, ended up with nationalization of the Suez Canal and eradicated the British control over it. Considering also that the literature perceives sanctions as measures that stop short of war, sanctions on Egypt clearly fall into the category of those that failed, as what followed was a war.

The Suez War was waged for purposes of not losing a military base in the region. The base could not have been replaced by another Middle Eastern territory, because the costs involved in creating bases elsewhere were certain to be far greater than originally anticipated. In the end, "Egypt was 'the only country in the Middle East where the resources in labor and in industrial manpower, communications, port facilities, and airfields are adequate for the Anglo-American main base'" (Tignor, 1987, p. 489).

While Britain and Egypt were drifting apart on how to handle the crisis, the US and Egypt were showing signals of amity. One such signal was the Atoms for Peace speech of President Eisenhower in 1953, another was the

use the inviolability of their houses for dozens of nefarious purposes. It is they who debouch the public morals in all large towns."

1959 UN Conference in Geneva providing valuable insights to the countries like Egypt for igniting their own nuclear programs (Nuclear Threat Initiative, n.d.). In addition, the US and Egypt tacitly shared ideological similarities; the US believed European imperialism had been overstretched (Woodward, 1992, p. 37) while Nasser's conception of three overlapping circles (Arab, Muslim and African) required an independent Egypt (Woodward, 1992, p. 37). Despite all, the relations could not develop further because Nasser declined to sign a military treaty with the US — he did not want to allow the US take the seat of the UK in dominating Egypt (Laron, 2013, p. 75).²²

Egyptian security policies were a concern not only for the British but also for the French. Nasser's increasing popularity in the Arab world was a source of inspiration everywhere (Field, 1994, p. 56). France saw an opportunity in the Suez Crisis to curb Egyptian support towards rebellious Algeria. Following the agreed plan between France and Israel, "the Israelis invaded Egypt on 29 October 1956 and the British and French moved into the Canal Zone on November 5 with the ostensible force of separating the two sides and guarding a strategic asset" (Field, 1994, pp. 57-58).

The crisis was profitable for Egypt. First and foremost, as mentioned, the war proved the failure of sanctions in changing the behavior of and policies pursued by Egypt. Secondly, Egypt's "tactical defeats translated into success. Egypt gained the sympathy of the United Nations General Assembly now inundated with third world nations that voted as a [sic] anti-western block" (Pierre, 2004, p. 8). Thirdly, throughout the Arab world, demonstrations and attacks on the French and British property went hand in hand with anti-French/British riots (Field, 1994, p. 58).²³ Last but not least, the French and British "were condemned internationally, not least

²² Similar concerns were there in refusing to join the Baghdad Pact, which according to Nasser was just "another attempt by large states to dominate smaller ones." "Moreover, by bringing in non-Arab states and linking them with the northern Arab states the Baghdad Pact was seeking to divide the Arab world" (Woodward, 1992, p. 42).

²³ It is also observed that the US did not appreciate its NATO allies' and Israel's pressures, and the US public opinion was increasingly alarmed with the possibility to involve in a war with the USSR (Mansfield, 1971, p. 306). The Suez Canal crisis, starting from Western denial to fund construction of Aswan Dam and stretching towards the occupation of Egypt, provided another opportunity to squeeze the bourgeoisie. The regime capitalized on the Crisis to take over the assets of the British, French and Jewish owned firms; "representing a major extension of the state control." See Pamuk, S., & Owen, R. (1998). *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth*

by the Americans who refused to help Britain when the invasion caused an unexpectedly heavy run on sterling" (Field, 1994, p. 58).²⁴ While all foreign powers withdrew shortly, Nasser rose in prestige and influence, and "gave confidence to the nationalist movements in Morocco and Tunisia, both of which gained independence in 1956." (Field, 1994, p. 58).²⁵ Two years later, Egypt formed United Arab Republic with Syria — only to dissolve in ten years.

Following the Suez War, new arms-deal negotiations were initiated with the Soviets. Within six months, Egypt received submarines and planes, and by late 1957 Egyptian military forces had already doubled. Additional agreements inflated the original amount of \$80 million up to \$400 billion (Holbik & Drachman, 1971, p. 156). For an economy whose GDP was just above \$4 billion (Country Economy, 2018), an agreement of such a huge amount was a further pressure to the economy and allocation of scarce resources on social projects like health and education. "The Suez Canal revenue, which once brought in approximately \$160,000,000 per year, and the once growing earnings from tourists ... completely dried up as a result of June 1967 war" (Holbik & Drachman, 1971, p. 163). Interestingly enough, three years later, a \$4 billion arms supply relationship was established— a relationship which "required some 17,000 Soviet military personnel (including troops) in 1971 to maintain it" (Cox & Drury, 2006, p. 56).²⁶

Century. Harvard University Press, p. 131. As a result of this extension policy, by mid 1960s public sector accounted for 90% of national production (Pamuk & Owen, 1998, p. 131).

²⁴ It is also observed that the US did not appreciate its NATO allies' and Israel's pressures, and the US public opinion was increasingly alarmed with the possibility to be involve in a war with the USSR (Mansfield, 1971, p. 306).

²⁵ Note, however, that year before the dissolution was the Six Day War. The dire straits for the nuclear program reached at a peak with the war. As if loss of Sinai oil fields, shrinking tourism revenues, destruction caused by Israeli bombardments, and extra military expenditures were not enough, Western aid to Egypt declined considerably too.

²⁶ In following years arrived the oil embargo, during which prices increased fourfold and created difficulties not only for industrialized, but also for developing countries. For a relationship of energy and development, see Razzaqi, S., Bilquees, F., & Sherbaz, S. (2011). Dynamic relationship between energy and economic growth: evidence from D8 countries. *The Pakistan Development Review*, 437-458.

In a nutshell, the sanctions which aimed to discipline a leper Oriental country forced Egypt to turn the Soviets. Egypt avoided the US to replace the UK as a big brother; and this stubborn focus on independence gained Nasser additional popularity in the Arab world. Even when he was losing battles on the battle front, he was accumulating prestige in the political front. However, this time the “independent” Egypt was falling into the hands of the USSR — the security ties were building up massively as the Aswan Dam was rising. In other words, the sanctions not only failed to induce intended policy change, they also led to a war. Despite being distinctive in terms of the measures used, the sanctions on Egypt formed a solid part of Orientalist *mission civilizatrice*. Foucauldian disciplinary tools were employed to tame a maverick country from Africa just for purposes of showing that the West was able and willing to flex its muscles.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS

The dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire gave birth to new sovereign and quasi-sovereign states. The political consequences of the dismemberment required dealing with many issues, borders being one. It also marked the end of the Ottoman central administration which generated bureaucratic issues to be settled by these new states. In addition to politics and bureaucracy, the Ottoman Empire’s demise put an end to the Imperial free-trade-area. The ramification was not only different bureaucratic systems to be faced each time when one crossed the new borders, but also different currencies tied to sterling or franc; both of which were destined to devalue in 1930s (Pamuk & Owen, 1998, pp. 6-7).

The independent Egypt needed to tackle all these economic and administrative issues, as well as to carry the Damocles’ sword of British intervention. That is to say, in recognizing Egypt’s independence, Britain reserved the right to intervene when Sudan, Suez Canal, minorities and/or a foreign intervention to Egypt was concerned (Gordon, 1996, p. 16). While maintaining the British control over Egypt, these four reserved points continued to cast a shadow on the full independence of the latter. From this perspective, the Aswan Dam was a symbol of Egypt’s sovereignty, as well as of possession of administrative and technical capacity to undertake a giant project.

The Aswan Dam, according to then-US Undersecretary of State, Herbert Hoover Jr, was a project "larger than total of all U.S. public works of this type produced since 1900." (Gordon, 1996, p. 16). Total amount of materials required for the Dam's construction was estimated to be 43 million cubic meters; equaling to build 17 more pyramids like those in Giza (Dougherty, 1970, p. 48). It is important to stress that financing of this kind not only "upset [] America's domestic cotton growers, who lobbied for federal subsidies, [but] U.S. involvement in the Aswan Dam project also challenged the administration's basic principles of foreign aid policy," (Walker, 2010, p. 144) because Eisenhower's "economic philosophy scuttled initiatives doling Western aid out to the governments of developing countries" (Walker, 2010, p. 144).

The problems related to the Aswan Dam sanctions were not limited with the economic aspect of the project. That problem was partially surpassed by the nationalization of the Canal, though general problems of capital formation remained still (Dougherty, 1959, p. 40). Besides finances, Egypt was also lagging behind the technical capacity; it "was utterly dependent upon external sources for the technical equipment and skills necessary to build the dam" (Dougherty, 1959, p. 40).

This was the point where the Soviets stepped in.²⁷ By the tenth anniversary of USSR-Egypt (then United Arab Republic) economic and technical cooperation agreement in 1968, "the Russians [had] posted over 2,000 technicians to Cairo, with the net result that the economic and industrial planning [was] regulated by Soviet engineers" (Cox, 1970, p. 48). Furthermore, there was the conditionality of use of Soviet equipment, however the equipment occasionally failed due to extreme heat (Holbik & Drachman, 1971, p. 151).

Moreover, Egypt lacked the skills needed to manage the nationalized Canal. Being aware of this, for purposes of pointing to Egypt's technical incapacity to run grand projects, "European boat pilots, on instructions from their former employers, abruptly walked out in an attempt to prove

²⁷ For a discussion of cooperation with, and perception of threat from, the West and the East, see Uzer, U., & Uzer, A. (2005). Diverging perceptions of the Cold War: Baghdad Pact as a source of conflict between Turkey and the nationalist Arab countries. *The Turkish Yearbook XXXVI*.

to Egypt that international control [over the Canal] was necessary."²⁸ This move was, yet, another demonstration of Foucauldian disciplinary power in the form of withdrawal of something granted.

Egypt was determined to derive the cash from the Suez Canal by maintaining the flow of the ships, hence it brought Egyptian pilots to assume the duty in the operations of the Canal (Boughton, 2000, p. 7). This, indeed, was an opportunity to boost economy through providing avenues of employment. In reality, nationalist sentiments had long been building up, and foreign businesses had been responding to these sentiments by moving their headquarters from Cairo and appointing Egyptian directors; but most of the major Egyptian enterprises were controlled by foreigners.²⁹ Moreover, Nasser had already been pressing the Suez Canal Company, "which was jointly owned by British and French shareholders, to employ more Egyptian workers and to invest more of its profits in the Egyptian economy" (Laron, 2013, p. 151). Hence, Egyptianizing of pilots would provide positive stimulus for the administrative and technical capacity of the country as well as for the economy. It would help maintain the income from the Canal; also creating employment opportunities and building in human capital.³⁰

Yet, following the nationalization of the Canal, costs increased and revenues plummeted, indicating that Egypt's technical capacity was not

²⁸ (Boughton, 2000, p. 7). A similar lack of qualified personnel was still the case in 1970s in public sector, which had expanded yet overstaffed with inexperienced and inefficient personnel (Holbik & Drachman, 1971, p. 163). There, however, is Suez Canal Maritime Training and Simulator Centre designed for training the pilots in order to reduce the number of accidents and improve accident management. Official statistics, however, are not available to allow an analysis of technical difficulties faced following withdrawal of European personnel. Accident statistics on Egyptian Authority for Maritime Safety (EAMS) has long been left non-updated (Egyptian Authority for maritime Safety, n.d.).

²⁹ Britain, for example, imported 1/3 of its cotton from Egypt, and estimated that an embargo on imports "would virtually ruin the textile factories in the Bolton area and would significantly add to the number of the unemployed" (Tignor, 1987, p. 480).

³⁰ Like nationalization of the Canal, the Aswan Dam was to provide large numbers of employment opportunities. This time the employment was expected to be in agriculture by facilitating irrigation of larger areas, and in industry by providing electricity (Chaudhri, 1956, p. 131). Almost a quarter of the population of Egypt was employed in the project to dig for the Canal, according to Admiral Osame Rabie, head of the Suez Canal Authority (Anonymous, 2020; Oman Observer, 2019).

able to match a task like running the Canal. It was seen that at the end of the day, Egyptian administrative capacity was not adequate enough to generate the required budget. Hence, the country turned to the IMF for financial assistance. The idea was to fix the revenue problem arising from the modest returns from the nationalization of the Canal due to mismanagement. This, indeed, was the second application of the country to the IMF since membership in 1945; pointing to the severity of the difficulties Egypt was facing (Boughton, 2000, p. 7).

In conclusion, from administrative and technical aspects, the Dam was a project well beyond Egypt's capacity. In absence of foreign aid, Egypt juggled different problems ranging from running the nationalized Suez Canal to managing machinery and equipment that did not meet the challenges of extreme climate; from flying foreign investments out of Egypt to creating new jobs for employment of Egyptians. The absence of foreign aid, however, was a disciplinary measure against a leper Oriental country, a display of power by the West, and the result of the securitization of the Dam project. After all, the *mission civilisatrice* required not (only) to foster the development of a country, but (especially) to teach it how to behave for being counted as eligible to be treated as one of "normal," if not one of "us the West."

SOCIOECONOMIC ASPECT

Egypt, as mentioned above, was home of a great civilization. The Nile delta provided fertile grounds not only for agricultural production but also for a civilization to flourish. As a result, almost all civilizations

in the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East (and later Europe) envied Egypt's pivotal place and coveted its riches. Greeks, Persians, Mesopotamians, Romans, Arab Muslims from the peninsula; the later Islamic empires of the Fatimids, Ayyubis, Mamelukes and Ottomans; Napoleon's France and colonial Britain; even Hitler's Germany — all invaded and tried to subjugate the Delta valley. ... For Egypt fell to almost all of its invaders and throughout the country's long history its inhabitants have been reduced to the status of second-class citizens in their own country — and, at that times, outright slaves to foreign rulers (Osman, 2013, p. 23).

Egypt's status under foreign rule alternated from being an important province (as in the Greek, Roman, Arab Islamic, Ottoman and British empires) to

being the base of an expanding state (as it was under the Fatimid's, Ayyubids and Mamelukes). In all cases, the country's resources (from the riches of the land to the toil of the people) were employed to serve the interests and campaigns of these foreign rulers, with little regard for the development and betterment of the Egyptians themselves (Osman, 2013, p. 23).

Even the Canal, as a great undertaking, was under control of the British who purchased controlling shares of the Suez Canal Company back in 1875 (Pierre, 2004, p. 5).

The 1952 coup of the Free Officers did its best to make use of all the corruption and exploitation that took place throughout the Egyptian history. To sail through the instability Egypt was stuck in, it took the wind of the "[s]tories of governments ransomed, cotton hoarded, drugs and arms trafficked through palace offices, fiancées abducted, and coffins raided for royal treasures" (Gordon, 1996, pp. 14-15). Prior to the coup, most of the land belonged to the wealthy,³¹ with the farmers being "kept in a state of poverty with malnutrition, disease, and illiteracy dominating the rural landscape" (Albaum, 1966, p. 222).³² The stories swelled into Colonel Nasser's cajolement of national pride. In addition to giving the peasants their honor back (Nesin, 2014, p. 211), Nasser introduced new laws like guaranteed employment by state for all university or high school graduates (Sika, 2014, p. 77).

He also managed to emerge as a strong political figure, and his traces in the Middle Eastern history are well labeled after his name. "Nasserism provided a model for political mobilization and national development to other emerging nations" (Gordon, 1996, p. 4). The model has been appreciated also by the US whose ambassador to Cairo noted that Nasser "had done more for Egypt in two years than all [his] predecessors put before [him]."³³

³¹ The wealth they accumulated was not only for maximizing individual gains, but also political power. With this power, "landowners were able to prevent a governmental reform in land distribution which would favour the peasant farmers" (Albaum, 1966, p. 222).

³² Aziz Nesin observes that peasants, Turkish and Egyptian alike, have long been kept in poverty. However, the Turkish peasant was supposed also to fight for the Ottoman sultan; hence he should be kept healthy and well-fed (Nesin, 2014, pp. 210-211).

³³ The Ambassador was Jefferson Caffery (Sika, 2014, p. 172).

Agriculture was dominating the socioeconomic structure of Egypt, with people being attached to the land (Osman, 2013, p. 9),³⁴ and cotton being the main cash-crop raised in large estates (Richards, 1979, p. 488). By early 19th century, Egypt became an important cotton exporter to the West.³⁵ On the basis of this importance, “[t]he British completed the transformation of the irrigation system and consolidated private property rights in land and labor. Perennial irrigation was extended throughout the Delta” (Richards, 1980, p. 4.). The transformation of agriculture in Egypt continued with Nasser. During his tenure, he had pursued land reform, price policies and investment decisions which maintained the transformation. As a result, an improvement in agricultural production was observed in the period from 1955-66 (Richards, 1980, p. 6).

However, problems still persisted. One such was the difference between domestic and international prices, amounting to 20-25%. The difference went “to the government for cotton, to urban consumers for wheat ... and to both ... for rice” (Richards, 1980, p. 8). A related problem was corruption — richer farmers were able to skip the regulations and jump over more profitable crops. “In addition to higher profits accruing to the rich peasants, the gap between rich and poor is further aggravated by the fact that supplies of subsistence foods decline and their prices increase,” ending up with deep impact on nutrition (Richards, 1980, p. 8).

The sanctions against Nasser’s pet project were followed by the Suez War (1956) and the June War (known also as the Six Day War, 1967), both of which exacerbated these problems further. An acute agricultural scarcity began where labor productivity stagnated, while land yields declined. “In 1974 Egypt became a net importer of agricultural commodities for the first time in its history” (Richards, 1980, p. 8).

In the 21st century, Egypt still remains a source of cheap labor, and a case of brain drain (Osman, 2013, p. 9). “[D]espite significant improvements in the country’s infrastructure (especially in utilities and telecommunications),” (Osman, 2013, p. 11), Egypt is still in the lower tier of development,

³⁴ However, Egypt had “no department or ministry of agriculture” (Penfield, 1894, p. 479).

³⁵ Indeed, during the Civil War period in the United States, Britain became more and more “acutely aware of her dependence upon American cotton and determined to put an end to it” (Crist, 1952, p. 115).

with more than 30% of its population living under the poverty line (United Nations Development Program, 2021, p. 30). “This was a reflection of the difficulty of Egyptians’ daily lives, from the crumbling education system and decrepit health [*sic*] care, to humiliating transportation” (Osman, 2013, p. 11). The country was deteriorating in comparison with its international peers like Turkey and South Africa.³⁶ What is more important, “there was not only a sense of confusion, resentment and rejection among the Egyptians — especially the younger ones, but increasingly an overarching feeling of an irreparable damage, a national defeat” (United Nations Development Program, 2021).

To sum up, the Aswan Dam sanctions did little to change the socioeconomic structure of Egypt in a positive sense. On the contrary, despite the sanctions (unlike the other case studies in this research) not leading directly to scarcity, the policies followed to overcome the sanctions which institutionalized corruption by favoring the rich over the poor. While Nasser was nurturing his popularity as the person who gave peasants back their honor and carrying his fame beyond the borders of Egypt, the country could not lift up from being an agricultural economy. Even today, Egypt is 40th biggest economy, making it a lower-middle income country (The World Bank, n.d.).³⁷ The withdrawal of sanctions did nothing to cure the leper Egypt, or to prevent the construction of the Dam. Hence, all they did was serve as a demonstration of Western disciplinary power.

CULTURAL ASPECT

Despite the fact that Nile was the source of administrative theories like Oriental Despotism, the power derived from controlling Nile necessitated controlling its flow as well. There had been, for a long time, projects for taming the river, including a further raising of the initial Aswan Dam. Built in 1902, the Dam was modified, for the first time, in 1907-1912.

³⁶ “In 2007, 32 per cent of the population were completely illiterate, ... 40 per cent of the population were at or below the international poverty line and GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) was less than half of Turkey and 45 per cent of South Africa’s (United Nations Development Program, 2021).

³⁷ For a list of ranking in terms of national income, see The World Bank. (2019). *GDP (current US\$)*. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=chart. Accessed 31 July, 2020.

Before the second modification which continued between 1929-1933, the World War I took place. The abovementioned *mission civilisatrice* continued with the War, which was taken as an opportunity, by the British, to declare a protectorate over Egyptians. Yet the Egyptians wanted to have their independence from the collapsing Ottoman Empire. With the plan to have Egypt as a protectorate, however, the British refused. The end result was a rebellion in Egypt in 1919 (Gordon, p. 15), which was an important movement in understanding local responses subject to this research. The rebellious movement was fed deeply by an anti-British sentiment, because already by 1800 when the British arrived to Egypt, the Egyptian "army was disbanded and the British advisers were installed in every department of government. British firms and agencies, by controlling trade and commerce, drained the economic strength of Egypt" (Chaudhri, 1956, p. 132). The movement spread into workers, peasants, and imams alike. "These images of national unity inspired several generations of Egyptians, those who took part in and those bred on stories of the uprising, to continue the struggle for 'total independence.'" (Gordon, p. 16).³⁸ In other words, the rebellion was not only for liberation from the Ottoman Empire, but also for national pride.

The same pride element can easily be observed in the process following the decline of funds for the Dam. Just like liberation was not only for national freedom or self-determination, the Aswan Dam was not only for fulfilling economic development goals or a political agenda. Just like Mahmood Ahmadinejad who securitized the nuclear program in search for a blanket cover over the problems beneath his election as the President of Iran (Naji, 2008, p. 132), "Nasser had turned Aswan Dam into a popular symbol of reform" (Dougherty, 1959, pp. 21-22).

When the US announced the decline of financial assistance for the Dam on July 19, "[t]he Egyptians were totally unprepared for such a startling policy reversal" (Dougherty, 1959, p. 22). Nasser had turned the Dam into a symbol of economic reform, development and welfare. "It was to be a project of breath-taking proportions, 'seventeen times greater than the

³⁸ It should be noted that Egypt indeed had never been fully independent. In ancient era it was occupied by Greeks, Romans and Ottomans; in 1798 Napoleon arrived and wanted to use Egypt as a base for his raid to India. Three years later came the British (Chaudhri, 1956, p. 132).

Great Pyramid of the Pharaohs” (Dougherty, 1959, p. 22). Moreover, upon completion, the Dam would increase the area of cultivable land by 25-30%, and, therefore, allow the Egyptian economy to keep up with rising population (Dougherty, 1959, p. 22). The project would be the highest dam in the world. “The water to be impounded behind the dam w[ould] be the second largest man-made lake in the world” (Abu-Shumays, 1962, p. 7).

The Dam was important also to prove and reinforce the efficiency of the government. In the end, already with some water, an individual peasant would be able to “raise one crop, with more another, with a perennial supply still third or even a fourth. This of course reacts on every department of life, on wages, on imports, on barter, on exchange, on security, on the welfare” (Sloane, 1904, p. 468). Besides assisting the country’s development, the Dam was also to prove Egyptian capability to curb Nile at flood, “and the irrigation engineer w[ould] have the tropical rains under control as the locomotive engineer has his machine” (Sloane, 1904, p. 473).

In summary, the Aswan Dam arose as a landmark for Egyptian struggle for development.

Past and the present Egyptian generations, and doubtless future generations, will recognize that the building of the HAD [i.e., the Aswan Dam as referred in this research], in spite of though opposition, and unfair and unjustified conflicts — within and beyond Egypt — to hinder the implementation of the project, to have been a great challenge to the Egyptian people. In their minds and hearts, the success in building and operating the HAD represents to the Egyptian people their dignity, insistence, will and determination to their benefits and interests (Abu-Zeid & el-Shibini, 1997, p. 217).

Therefore, the withdrawal of the funds amounted to a sanction, also from the perspective of pride. As the Dam was built and as for generations it served for nurturing national pride, the West satisfied the urge to flex muscles as proof of being able to exercise disciplinary power. In the end, the power that cannot be used or demonstrated does not, according to Foucault, amount to power at all.

CONCLUSION

The Aswan Dam was a project of gigantic proportions. It required funds consisted of \$500 million in Egyptian currency, \$300 million from private investors and an additional \$400 million equivalent of foreign currency (Abu-Shumays, 1962, p. 11). In the late 1955, US, UK and IBRD offered \$270 million (Abu-Shumays, 1962, p. 12); however, political developments in following year made the US withdraw from funding the Dam (Walker, 2010, p. 14). As the US withdrew its offer, so did the UK and the IBRD (Abu-Shumays, 1962, p. 12).

Arguments for this withdrawal ranged from feasibility of the project to stability of Egypt. Indeed, upon completion, Aswan Dam was to increase agricultural output by 50%, add 1/3 more land (2 million more acres) to total cultivable land, and increase welfare by bolstering migration from overpopulated areas to less-populated ones (Chaudhri, 1956, p. 131). However, this economic development would also enable the country to buy more Soviet weaponry. Given the fact that Egypt already approached Czechoslovakia for purchase of arms, which already raised questions about the feasibility of the enormous dam project, the Aswan Dam was securitized.

However, the constructivist approach notes that for securitization to take place, there should be a discourse. That discourse was Orientalism. It provided a fertile ground to present Egypt as a candidate for the demonstration of disciplinary power. Egypt was, still, the primitive other whose people needed to be civilized, educated, and hence normalized only after being subject to the disciplinary processes. Egypt was not only the centuries-old abnormal need of *mission civilizatrice*, but also witnessed Nasser to have the nerve to challenge Western domination. The same as in the other case-studies enveloped in this research, sanctions did not end up changing the behaviour of the target. On the contrary, Nasser escalated the game by nationalizing the Suez Canal. In the same period, the Soviet bloc was suffering from considerable instability. Mass protests in Poland and Hungary in 1956 kept the international community busy, therefore Nasser's nationalization of Suez Canal to fund the Dam went relatively under the radar, without facing further sanctions.³⁹ When the Hungarian

³⁹ The decision was announced on 26 July 1956; and Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal

events cooled down, Suez began to heat up — in October 1956, Israel went into military action.

The case of Egypt exemplifies sanctions in the form of withheld financial assistance. Chronologically speaking, among the cases analyzed in this paper, sanctions against Egypt is the first one. It is also the one which is not overtly named as sanctions in the literature; in this regard the literature focuses either on the impact of Aswan Dam on environmental and water management or the following Second and Third Arab-Israeli Wars (Suez and June War, respectively) as part of greater picture of regional conflict. As such, this chapter tried to provide a novel approach both to the sanctions and to the Suez crisis.

The withdrawal of funds from Aswan, on account of the classical literature on sanctions, was a failed action. It (i) failed in stopping the construction of the Dam or neutralize Nasser's ambitions, (ii) improved relations between the Soviet bloc and Egypt, and (iii) ended up with nationalization of the Suez Canal and demise of the British control over it, and most importantly, (iv) sanctions failed as what followed was a war.

Still, the measures have been implemented for purposes of exercising disciplinary power over a maverick leader under the Cold War environment. The sanctions were there not to prevent the construction of the Dam, but to prevent Nasser from realizing its pet project. In other words, it was a punishment designed to humiliate Nasser and change his behavior by knocking the wind out of his sails.

Company, which is the authority to operate the Canal under the 1888 Constantinople Convention (Anonymous, 1956, p. 646).

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN INDIA SINCE 2014: IMPLICATIONS ON HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract: Natural disasters have always been responsible for the population displacement and migration. Certain developmental works in the form of construction of dams, roads and bridges, especially in high terrain or coastal areas, are also responsible for climate imbalance in India. The Amphan and Nisarga cyclones that hit India and Bangladesh in May 2021, have been a warning of the dire consequences of climate change. The tragedies caused by climate change in India, and its neighbouring countries, have compelled millions of Indians, and refugees, living in climate-sensitive regions to migrate to urban areas. The sea coasts and mountain areas are prone to climate disasters, such as cyclones, landslides, cloud bursts and earthquakes. Countries like Bangladesh, Bhutan, southern Nepal, Myanmar and northern territories lying in the Himalayan Mountain range, all have been experiencing frequent and severe natural disasters at an increasingly alarming rate. These calamities result in migration both on national and international levels, creating several long-lasting impacts. The displacement has pressurised the Indian agriculture, thus affected the livelihood, habitats, assets and social conditions, and has, on top of that, degenerated the biodiversity, too. Increasing crime rates due to unemployment, impoverishment, lack of housing and various security issues, are all just some of the after-shocks of migration. This paper aims to bring into focus and compare the statistics of both internal and foreign migration in India, since 2014, and due to climate change. It aims, as well, to delve into the socio-economic impact this had on the Indian society, leading to security problems due to migration, and the policies the Indian government has taken to tackle this. Special attention was paid to the impact natural hazards had on people living in climate-sensitive zones, both in India and neighbouring countries. Finally, it brings into focus the security issues of the post-Covid-19 pandemic period, caused by migration due to natural disasters.

Keywords: *Covid-19, climate change, cyclones, droughts, security*

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INTRODUCTION

The term “climate refugees” was first introduced in the 1970s by Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute, with the aim to explain forced migration because of ecological degradation and natural calamities. However, more elaborate research was conducted by Norman Myers, a British environmentalist who had predicted the approximate number of climate refugees. The International Refugee Law, until this moment, still has no provision for recognition of climate refugees. Article 1 of the Refugee Convention from 1951, defines a refugee as someone seeking shelter from persecution, but not from climate change. This means there is no clear-cut recognition of climate refugees, which makes the issue all the more serious. In 1960s, a debate was born — about the trio of climate change, migration and security. During the 1980s, the terminology “environmental refugees” was popularised by UNEP in its report (El-Hinnawi, 1985). Later, it was also used in the 1987 Brundtland Report titled “Our Common Future”, as well as in the Agenda 21 Programme of Action for Sustainable Development which was presented at the Rio Summit of 1992². However, the term captured global attention at the beginning of the 21st century, when it entered the political sphere through the security dimension (Brown et al., 2007; Trombetta 2008) (Boas, 2015, p. 5).


The questions of how they can be protected and rehabilitated, are a major concern. As days pass by, this problem seems to be getting vehement and growing. Moreover, it seems to be affecting countries such as India, which share their borders with the disaster-prone countries like Bangladesh and Nepal. The absence of a policy framework in the face of such crisis is, indeed, challenging (Chakravarty, 2021). Per the data collected by IDMC in 2018, the number of people displaced by natural disasters is increasing. However, the data before 2018 has not been taken into account. If, however, comparative analysis is done, it was 2.678 million people in 2018, which has been the highest number for all these years. According to a report by *SLYCAN Thrust*, “The number of climate migrants is

² The term was used in the 1987 Brundtland report, ‘*Our Common Future*’ (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, chapter 11, points 6 and 8) and in ‘*Agenda 21, the Programme of Action for Sustainable Development*’, adopted in 1992 at the Rio Summit (United Nations, 1992, chapter 12, paragraphs 12.4, 12.46, and 12.47).

predicted to become six times higher between 2020 and 2050, and one in every four internal migrants could be a climate migrant.” Climate change, unforeseen floods, storms and rains could internally displace “tens of millions of people in South Asia.” By 2050, half of South Asia would become climate hotspots, leading to extreme poverty (Slycan Trust, n.d.). According to the IDMC, there are approximately 1.4 crore people displaced because of climate change (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, n.d.). As far as India is concerned, climate migrants may be classified into two categories: Refugees and IDPs. Climate IDPs are displaced more often, either because of natural disasters or climate hazards, occurring due to, for example, development actions, such as dam construction or road construction in mountainous terrains.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION IN INDIA

In the Global Climate Risks Index released in 2021, India has taken the seventh place (Das, S. M., 2021). Forest fires, floods, cyclones, landslides and droughts have, recently, become prevalent in India. Nearly 80 per cent of India’s population lives in districts prone to water-created disasters. According to a report by the UNHCR, climate disasters displaced about 50 lakh Indians (5 million) in 2021 — the third largest displaced population, in the world, right after China and Philippines. The data reached up to 27 lakh in 2019, rising up to 38.56 lakh in 2020 and, finally, 1.4 crores by the end of the year. One report states that climate disasters will force about 4.5 crores of Indians from their homes by the end of 2050 (Abraham, 2022). According to Abraham (2021), India is the fifth most vulnerable nation, in the world, in terms of climate change. About 74 per cent of districts in India remain prone to extreme climate conditions. 27 out of 35 states, such as Assam, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Rajasthan and Uttarakhand, remain vulnerable to flash floods, cyclones, droughts and acute soil aridity, the CEEW advised in its study in 2021. The latest IPCC report predicts that the states in northern and eastern India would be affected the most, in the days to come, due to global warming (Abraham, 2022).

Graph 1: IDPs in 148 countries worldwide (in millions)

Graph 1 has been made in accordance with the data collected by IDMC and given by Mahapatra and Sangomla, 2022.

The storms and floods displaced approximately 15 million people. The ODI and UNDP say that the political and the economic reasons, which cause displacement, are all interconnected and cannot be distinguished from each other. On an average, they have caused the displacement of 3.1 million people since 2008 (Mahapatra & Sangomla, 2022).

Table 1

Years	Population Displaced across the World due to Climate Change (In millions)
2016	24 (Mahapatra & Sangomla, 2022)
2021	59.1 (United Nations Human Rights, 2022)

India has a population of 1.4 billion (Panda, 2020). According to the report by CANSA and ActionAid International, by 2050, approximately 62 million South Asians will have been displaced from their original habitats because of climate disasters, such as “sea-level rise, water stress, crop yield reductions, ecosystem loss and drought” (The Hindustan Times, 2020). In 2020, climate change events have led 14 million people to migrate. Furthermore, it is estimated that if precautionary measures are not taken, and if the NDCs are not enhanced, the statistics will *treble*. In order to migrate, people have to sell their belongings, property and take out excessive

loans so as to be able to finance the said migration. According to the 2022 World Migration Report, there has been a climate-induced, external and internal, displacement of 30.7 million people in 145 countries (Kota, 2021). It is estimated that by 2050, more than 4.5 crore people will have been forced to migrate from their homes due to the “costs of climate inaction.” Per the data released by the Indian government, the rate of migration in India due to climate change in 2020 was about 989 times higher than those instigated by conflicts (the former being 38 lakh displacements and the latter being 3,900 displacements).

It is predicted that by 2100, on more than 7,500 square kilometres of the Indian territories, in its coast and rising sea levels, more than 36 billion Indians will have experienced acute flooding. This would pressurise the nearby cities, such as Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai, due to increased relocation of the citizens. The coastal regions of India house 170 million people and fall prey to sea-level rise, soil erosion and natural disasters, such as tropical cyclones and storms. The worst was the Amphan cyclone in the Bay of Bengal, in May 2020, leading millions of people to migrate (Panda, 2020). Between 1990 and 2016, around 235 square kilometres of land has been destroyed, due to natural disasters in the coastal regions destroying the livelihood of people, leading them to flee in search of safe places across different parts of the country. Per the reports released by IDMC, floods in India, between 2008 and 2018, caused the displacement of 3.6 million Indians. According to Sriraj Kota (2021), it would be convenient for the Indian government to take legislative measures and social initiatives so as to give another chance to the climate refugees to lead a dignified life. It would be a landmark initiative which would get international appraisal and, at the same time, project India as the first nation, globally, to have taken concrete steps towards them (Kota, 2021).

Rains in Arunachal Pradesh, and the eastern region of Assam, flood the river Brahmaputra which makes its way towards Meghalaya, Tripura and Bangladesh, and as a result, carries houses, dams, bridges, embankments along with it. The Brahmaputra (known as the Jamuna in Bangladesh), Padma (Ganges in India) and Meghna (River Barak in India) has claimed lives in India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and China. These rivers flood due to deforestation and mining activities, construction of dams and development projects which obstruct their natural flow and navigability (Jawed, 2022). People in Assam have always fallen prey to floods and landslides

that forced them to new areas where they are treated as “intruders”. According to the 2014 Indian Economic Survey (Press Trust of India, 2014), 10 per cent of India’s, and 40 per cent of Assam’s land (which is around 931,000 hectares) remain prone to flood. Every year, around 8,000 hectares of land in Assam is washed away. Moreover, around 36,981 families were displaced between 2010 and 2015 because 67 villages were submerged (The Economic Times, 2015). The migration of Assam residents, along with the worsened economic conditions, has led to an increase in human trafficking — mostly women and children, forced prostitution and child labour. Furthermore, after migrating to other places, they are often mistrusted and called “foreigners” (Sinha, 2019).

A similar situation can be found in the Sundarbans delta forming through the confluence of the Ganges River into the Bay of Bengal. These regions are home to immense mangrove forests and recent development projects have spurred the growth of ecological disasters. The floods not only destroy the livelihood, but also influence the socioeconomic structures. Children have been forced to work as debt slaves in factories, while women have been lured into human trafficking in far off lands (Dutta, 2020). Cyclones Amphan and Yaas, which occurred in 2020 and 2021 respectively, destroyed the mangroves in this region. The destruction of mangroves creates an imbalance in the regional ecosystem, as their roots hold the soil firmly, preventing soil erosion, and against rough water. Some people move to the nearest city — Kolkata, or to states like Andhra Pradesh and Kerala so as to work as daily wage labourers under contractors at construction sites and industries (Russell, 2022). Floods, cyclones and coastal erosion also happen in Odisha. Internal displacement has been occurring in the coastal districts of Puri, Jagatsinghpur and Kendrapara (Bhattacharya, 2022). The fertile regions of Kendrapara have been subjected to extreme weather conditions, such as rise in the sea level, sudden onset of monsoons, soil erosion and sea floods, which has led to a disruption in the economy and, finally, resulted with trafficking (Barik, 2022).

According to a report made by the UK-based International Institute for Environment and Development, climate change has damaged the economy of Rajasthan which led to migration. The state of Rajasthan has only around 1 per cent of India’s overall water resource, with its western part receiving the lowest rainfall of just 102.57 millimetres (Goswami, 2019). The report states that at least one person has been migrating twice a year,

from 28 per cent of livelihood depending on economic reasons caused by drought. About 97 per cent of migrants from Rajasthan have moved to neighbouring states like Madhya Pradesh, or even as far as Jammu and Kashmir, or Delhi, sustaining a livelihood by earning INR 5,000 per month. Some factors driving people to migrate from Rajasthan are land degradation, increasing aridity, water scarcity, reduced rainfall, repeated droughts and many more. 76 per cent of the migrants were males, on average 43 years old (Urban Update, 2021). Jharkhand, situated in the tropical belt of Eastern India, remains vulnerable to droughts (Barik, 2022). Extremely high temperatures and falling groundwater levels reduce soil fertility and change land-use patterns, and, thus, destroy the crops. Districts like Palamu, East and West Singhbhum, Garhwa, Ranchi and Khunti have been experiencing an increasing trend in temperature-growth, along with reduced chances of rainfall over the last 30 years (Tirkey et.al., 2016).

Nomadic agriculturalists in Kashmir, such as the Bakarwals and Gujjars, suffer the adverse effects of climate change. They would, usually, migrate to the plains of Kashmir during the winter and return back to the valley in summer, with their livestock. However, in 2019, the farmers witnessed cold and wet temperatures in the month of May, which the sheep could not bear. In some areas, the snow began melting, which made it impossible to find fodder for the sheep, as the grass was covered with ice. Many sheep died as they were unable to bear the chilling cold. As a result, the farmers had to purchase the fodder from the markets, and those unable to purchase had to migrate to 'higher grounds' in the first week of April. This led to starvation, ill-health and increased expenditure because of migration, among the agriculturalists (Nissa, 2019).

Recently, climate disasters in mountainous Uttarakhand have compelled the residents to abandon terrace farming and migrate to the plains. According to a study conducted by Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, in Germany, in collaboration with The Energy and Resources Institute, in New Delhi, the region will have faced a temperature increase of 1.6 to 1.8°C by 2050. This is proven further by polar ice caps' melting, sporadic rainfall, change in cropping seasons and perennial rivers drying up. All this, in turn, affects not only the available irrigation facilities, destruction of crops by pests and wild animals from the nearby forests, but also leads to an increased number of floods annually and reduces the interest of people in agriculture. According to India's census of 2011, about 40 lakh

people of Uttarakhand have migrated to other parts of the country because of increasing climate disasters. One is faced with locked doors in most of the villages which now seem to be “ghost villages” (Das, 2021). The Kedarnath disaster of 2013 was etched in the memories of all who witnessed the Himalayan landslides and flash floods caused by rising temperatures and increasing anthropogenic activities. The unplanned development in the Himalayan Terai region and rampant felling of trees caused glacial outburst. Pastures have disappeared, compelling the agroforestry-based communities to leave their habitats, migrate to other places and switch over to unstable livelihood opportunities (Rawat, 2021).

Villages like Kuttanad, belonging to the Alappuzha district of Kerala state, lie below the sea level, making it waterlogged. Popularly known as the Rice Bowl of Kerala, the paddy fields are suffering from breach and are endangering the livelihood of people because their houses are getting filled up with floodwaters. People tend to purchase land outside the village and migrate there, however, many, still, do not have anywhere to go. Inadequate river management, construction of roads, bunds, bridges and tourist resorts have, all, added to the ordeal. The lands were so fertile that apart from rice, crops like coconut and tuber were grown as well. Moreover, the area provided an ideal fishing spot. In the past few years, people have become accustomed to the flooding, although, the floods of 2018 have proven to be disastrous nonetheless. The land has fallen prey to unplanned development activities and climate change (Shaji, 2021).

It has been observed that climate change caused by human activity in the form of GHG emissions and ozone depletion account for the environmental degradation, increasing the frequency of natural disasters and, thereby, contributing to people’s forced displacement. The IPCC, UNFCCC, Kyoto and Montreal Protocols, and most importantly — the Paris Agreement, have all been enacted, so as to mitigate the risks of climate change. Per one research conducted by IIED in India, climate change has been one of the most important factors which led to migrations. According to the report titled “Connecting the dots: climate change, migration and social protection”: droughts, floods and hailstorms have been the key reasons behind migrations. These have pressurised people, especially those from rural backgrounds, to migrate far away from their homes in order to survive. This depicts not only India, but also other, developing countries where extreme weather conditions kill hundreds and thousands, where

they are compelled to flee from their homelands so as to survive. In 2020, India survived its worst locust attacks and underwent three cyclones which resulted in flooding, claiming hundreds of lives and displacing thousands from their habitat. It is predicted that, by the end of the 21st century, India will have witnessed a rise in temperature by 4.4°C (International Institute for Environment and Development, 2021).

States, such as West Bengal, Odisha, Maharashtra, Assam and Bihar have suffered the worst floods both in the monsoon season and salination of agricultural lands. Inhabitants of islands of Sundarbans are forced to evacuate their homes due to cyclones, rising sea levels and flooding leading to their homes being submerged. In these kinds of situations, the migrants find no other option but to move and venture to new places, in the mainland (Jain, 2021). Although India does not possess any official data on climate-induced internal migrations, according to the IDMR, more than 3.6 million³ have, annually, been victims of climate change migration, on an average, between 2008 and 2019, due to natural disasters, such as floods, storms and cyclones. Water scarcity, in the Terai regions of the Himalayan region, as the result of erratic rainfall, forces local communities to migrate into the Gangetic plains (Arul, 2022).

According to the State of India's Environment Report from 2021, which was released by the Centre for Science and Environment — in 2020, around 39 lakh people were displaced in India, which ranked it as the fourth worst-hit country — right after China, Philippines and Bangladesh — to be prone to climate disasters and conflicts in the world. Around 3.07 crore people, which accounts for 76% of the overall internal displacements, migrated, in 2020, because of widespread natural disasters. It was also estimated that India would witness, on an average, around 2.3 million climate-induced internal migrations every year. India saw 33 cyclonic storms between 2011 and 2020, where 5 alone occurred in 2020. Cyclones like the Amphan of the Bay of Bengal, Nisarga of Maharashtra and Nivar of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry claimed not only the lives of thousands of cattle, but also hundreds of human lives (The Times of India, 2021).

³ The numbers are calculated on an average of the statistics provided in Figure 15 titled "New displacements by conflict, violence and disasters in South Asia (2009-2019)" (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2020, p. 48).

Per the report released by IPCC in 2021, the annual mean temperature in India is expected to rise at least by 2°C to the maximum of 5°C. By 2060, the duration of heatwaves will have increased by 25 times, leading to extreme climate conditions which would be causing 750,000 deaths annually (Oros, 2021). This would cause increased rate of precipitation, thereby, causing higher levels of evaporation in the waters of the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Indus rivers, which would then lead to the scarcity of water and food resources. The floods and landslides caused by the melting of glaciers will become more and more frequent and ghastly. Climate change leads to a widespread displacement of population to urban areas and creating of urban poverty. The irregular rainfall, droughts, groundwater depletion, all create climate-induced migration which causes socio-economic instability, mass unrest and terrorism, and thereby threatens the local and regional security. According to a report by ODI the GDP of countries with high temperatures is lower when compared to the GDP of those with low temperatures (Oros, 2021).

The Nepalis migrate to India for military recruitment, as well as job opportunities. However, now, they do so because of the increased number of climate disasters. The sporadic rainfall in the region makes it difficult for the farmers to continue rain-fed agriculture. The melting of the Himalayan glaciers, temperature increase, droughts and flash floods, all lower the water tables which leads to dried up natural springs. Floods taking place in the Terai region has led to the outbreak of dengue, claiming thousands of lives. According to Mr. David Molden, Director of the ICIMOD, "There are many reasons for people to migrate, but the additional stress from the risks of increased floods and droughts, or changes in farming or water supply, may just push people's decision past the tipping point. For others, there may be no choice but to migrate if a water source is lost, or the damage from floods or droughts is too great" (Awale, 2019).

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS

Climate change has led to the influx of external migrants from neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, given its geographical proximity to India. This creates job and food insecurity whereby food resources and job opportunities are faced with challenges because of the increased population (Rajan, 2008). Around 5 lakh people in Bangladesh get displaced

annually due to flooding (Warner et al., 2009) and 20 million migrate to India (Brown, 2007). The influx of climate refugees sets the following security challenges:

- 1. National Security Issues** — Several refugee camps are used by terrorist groups for radicalisation (Siyech, 2019). The Central government had filed an affidavit in the SCI for deporting the Rohingyas on national security issues. Per its statement to the SCI, “Rohingya presence in the country has serious national security ramifications and it poses national security threats. Illegal influx of Rohingyas into India started in 2012-13 and inputs suggest links of some of the immigrants with Pak-based terror groups. There is a serious possibility of eruption of violence against Buddhists who are Indian citizens and who stay on Indian soil by radicalized Rohingyas” (The Indian Express, 2017). The Government of India is also apprehensive about the tensions which may be caused with Myanmar’s military regime, if the refugees are provided assistance in India (Ambarkhane et.al. 2022). Natural disasters cause widespread displacement of people from one place to the other. Various military and paramilitary forces are required to assist the civil administration at this point of time, which makes border security and domestic law vulnerable to terrorism, infiltration and insurgency operations (Singh, 2020). In the flash flood caused by a cloudburst which took place in Amarnath in July 2022, many pilgrims were killed, while the rest were rescued and evacuated by the Indian Army helicopters. In addition to that, the Indian Air Force, also, deployed its helicopters and aircrafts (Zee Media Bureau, 2022). An infantry battalion from the Rashtriya Rifles Sector immediately went into action after having received the news (India News & Press Trust of India, 2022).
- 2. Health Crisis** — The influx of people both within the country and from the neighbouring ones, spreads and intensifies different vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, cholera, jaundice, typhoid, chikungunya, diarrhoea and many more. These are mainly caused by the contamination of water, which is common during floods. Population pressure results in decreasing quantities of drinking water, open defecation, creation of slums which spread diseases resulting in the outbreak of epidemics and pandemics. The government

provides health facilities, which have proven to be a minuscule for the migration of such a huge population. This, in turn, proves to be a catastrophe both for the migrants and the natives (Singh, 2020). Often, the refugees need to put up with different infectious diseases like intestinal parasites, tuberculosis and cannot overcome the post-migration trauma, hypertension and depression (Office of Refugee Settlement, n.d.). Pregnant women suffer from diarrhoea as a consequence of consuming dirty water. Lack of iron in their diets leads to premature delivery and anemia. The waterlogging causes breeding of mosquitoes, and, often, many of the refugees have to eat the fruit and vegetables which have been disposed in the market (Dixit, 2018). Sudden climate events like floods, as a result of soil degradation, rising sea levels and sporadic monsoons, cause contamination of freshwater, which adds to the vulnerability of the entire population⁴. Many people, living in fringe areas, lack adequate access to public health care facilities for the elderly and pregnant women who require all-time close care. During the outbreak, the hospitals were overburdened with patients and could not attend to those who were there for a different reason than the pandemic (Shankar & Raghavan, 2020). India has a digitised welfare delivery system which requires the Aadhar Card⁵ — an essential prerequisite for accessing the said system. This has excluded the refugees from gaining access to India's welfare measures because they are rarely granted Aadhar cards due to "uncertain documentation and status of residence" (Raj, 2020).

3. Food Security Issues — India, being an agro-based country and its agriculture being rain-fed, is facing challenges by environmental degradation, climate change, deforestation and utilisation of land for non-agricultural activities. The migration of refugees, causing an explosion of population, has negative impacts on agriculture and food availability. Rampant deforestation and clearance of agricultural lands for construction purposes, disrupts food chains, causing the refugees and the entire existing population to face challenges

⁴ Refer to Footnote no. 2.

⁵ Aadhar Card is an Identity Card that possesses a 12-digit Unique Identification Number (UID) issued by the government of India to all its citizens.

in finding adequate nutritious food (Khadka, 2017). According to the data provided by DEWS in 2019, 42% of India's lands faced droughts (Gogoi & Tripathi, 2019). The growing population pressurises food security by reducing the nutritional value of crops and agricultural yields. Droughts and floods push millions of people into extreme poverty and hunger. The drying up of water bodies has an adverse effect on agriculture in India. Its growing population and increasing consumption, on top of it the influx of refugees, is faced by malnutrition caused by climate change. Therefore, it would be correct to say that increasing population and climate disasters affect food security and vice versa. It is expected that climate change in India will have resulted in an annual decline of at least 10 per cent when rice is concerned, while the decline rate of corn and wheat will have increased from 12 per cent to at least 39 per cent by 2050 (Laijawala, 2021).

4. Economic Instability — Climate change has a long-term impact on the economy of the region. People residing in the coastal areas, living off fishing, take out loans for purchasing fishing nets, boats and trawlers. However, in case of droughts and floods, either the amount of produce falls short or they need to shift to other regions. The rising sea levels only add to their woes. The same occurs with is the farmers who take out loans, with cheap rates, so as to buy or rent lands, tractors, seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. At times of natural disasters, the crops are destroyed, and due to high demand, the farmers are compelled to raise their prices, which makes it difficult for them to sustain a living and simultaneously pay off the loans (Venkataramani and Preethan, 2022). States like Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Kerala have been trying to provide healthcare and employment opportunities for the internal climate migrants. Many have established data bases, skills directory, job portals like E-Shram and UNNATI, economic empowerment programmes and have been working on enhancing MGNREGA for poverty alleviation. Lakshmi Puri writes that the Indian economy has undergone a great Samudra Manthan (Great Holy Churning of the Sea) where the internal migrants can be used for invoking the “nectar of immortal progress” which is the Prime Minister Modi's goal towards the vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat i.e., a self-reliant India (Puri, 2020).

INITIATIVES BY THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT

Although India has not signed the Refugee Convention of 1951, it ratified the UDHR (1948), CERD (1963), ICCPR (1966), ICESCR (1966) and the CAT (1984). Therefore, it has provided legal provisions for the refugees like the Foreigners' Act of 1946, the 1967 Passport Act and the Extradition Act of 1962. On account of these, foreigners enjoy the fundamental right to equality and life, under Articles 14 and 21 respectively. The Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act of 1983 corresponds roughly to what a refugee law of India would be. Under the aforementioned laws, all refugees are seen as foreigners, regardless of entering India voluntarily, without any form of hindrance. The Indian laws do not differentiate between a foreigner coming to India at his own will and a refugee forced to flee from his country due to any reason (Bhalla, 2022).

The NAPCC was launched by the Government of India on 30th June 2008, elaborating different missions like NSM, NMEEE, NMSH, NWM, NMSHES, NMGE, NMSA and NMSKCC. NMSHE and NMSKCC have been under the responsibility of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India. The NMSKCC seeks to establish knowledge networks among different research institutions dealing with climate science and focusing on sectors like biodiversity, coastal zones, agriculture, medicine, etc.

By sharing data and by establishing "global technology watch groups with institutional capacities with minimised chances of risks", it aims to build partnerships among different climate and ecological zones responsible for developing national capacity.

Nevertheless, the government has undertaken the NMSHE for the protection of the Himalayan ecosystem. The Himalayas form a pivotal point of Indian economy. Most of the agriculture in India takes place in the fertile Terai region which is replenished by the perennial rivers, like the Ganges, originating from the Himalayas. The Himalayas attract tourists from different parts of the world, which makes tourism one of its main sources of income in states like Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Darjeeling in West Bengal and Assam. The Mission seeks to develop a sustainable habitat in the Himalayas, through extensive policy formulation, and through providing assistance to the said states. It seeks to implement new methods for maintaining a healthy Himalayan ecosystem and creating a data base which would include the impacts of global

emissions, climate change and anthropogenic activities in the Himalayan glaciers (Department of Science and Technology, n.d.).

Climate migrations need to be addressed globally. The majority party in the Indian Parliament has, also, raised questions, to the Opposition members in the Lok Sabha (Lower House), about how to deal with the emissions from the coal plants, while also addressing the climate refugees. The government has started initiatives ranging from conventional forms of energy to renewable sources. As a response to this, the opposition asked how they would deal with the climate migrants fleeing from coastal areas because of soil erosion and rising sea levels, and furthermore, what measures, in compliance to India's pledge to choose renewable energy in COP 26, has the government taken in order to reduce the GHG emissions from the coal plants to the environment. Mr. Bhupender Yadav, the Union Minister for Environment, Forest and Climate Change replied that "Western nations have a historical responsibility to address the GHG emissions they have emitted. We have a national adaptation fund and national disaster resilience infrastructure fund to take care of potential climate refugees" (Koshi, 2022). South Asia needs "inclusive and climate resilient development policies"⁶, with emphasis on the need for a mutual agreement among and cooperation with the neighbouring countries, as far as climate refugees are concerned. Measures like afforestation, construction of bamboo houses in flood-prone areas, varied sources of livelihood in eco-sensitive zones and poverty reduction measures are all needed for reducing climate-induced migration. Furthermore, food and cash transfers in advance, would prevent internal displacement because the affected people could get food, medicine and clothes within their habitats, making it possible for reconstruction works to be immediately undertaken without delay. In the flood prone deltaic islands of Sundarbans, the government of the West Bengal state has initiated a recovery plan seeking to provide a "new circuit embankment that would provide for setting up two-layered dykes and mangroves that would keep the soil tightened." However, this is a time-consuming project (Sinha, 2022).

In May 2020, the state government of Uttarakhand launched the Chief Minister's Self-Employment Scheme (Mukhyamantri Swarojgar Yojana) for creating job opportunities for migrants who returned to their native

⁶ Refer to Footnote no. 2.

countries during the pandemic. It aimed to provide them with a subsidy of 15 to 25 per cent of their investment for setting up new businesses, cottage and small-scale industries. Still, in spite of the government's initiative, around 1 lakh migrants left and returned back to cities after the pandemic restrictions were lifted (Singh, 2022). According to Mr. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, the Director Emeritus at Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, efforts towards sustaining the climate conditions of Uttarakhand should be made and 'favourable living' of the indigenous communities should be ensured. The farmers need to be educated on sustainable agricultural practice (Das, 2021).

Some places in Jammu and Kashmir provide police protection to the agriculturalist migrants and their livestock. Adequate healthcare and educational facilities, such as migratory schools, have also been established there. The government has constituted high-level committees to address nomad migrations caused by climate change (Nissa, 2019). The state of Tamil Nadu and the UNHCR have announced a humanitarian relief assistance of INR 317.4 crore and 14.2 million dollars. Nonetheless, the refugees have been staying in deplorable conditions in camps, with their prolonged stay gradually worsening the conditions. In February 2022, Dr. Shashi Tharoor, an MP from the Indian National Congress, introduced a Private Member Bill to the Parliament, referring to a legal framework which would govern refugees, ensure their protection and grant them asylum-seeker status (Rao, 2022). The climate-induced IDPs in India are governed by The Land Acquisition Act of 2013 and the Disaster Management Act of 2005. The climate-induced internal migration in India is monitored by the NDMA, both at the national and the state level, providing compensation and working towards migrant rehabilitation and capacity building. The authorities take measures so as to provide disaster relief to the farmers, which is still less in proportion to the whole population. Current data does not reflect many policies for those who have migrated forcefully. People-centred policies on migration caused by climate disasters need to be expanded. At this day and age, the policies are short-term and rarely address the prolonged impact climate change has — desertification of arid lands, droughts, glacier melting, sea level rise and many more. Disaster distress needs to be minimised, which can be done by evacuating the sensitive areas and setting up alternative, dignified livelihood opportunities for the displaced (Chachra & Majumdar, 2022).

The state of West Bengal stretches from the Himalayas in the north and the Sundarbans in the south and, therefore, has varied climate. It has worked on its own SCCAP in order to deal with climate issues and adaptation programmes. The Department of Environment of West Bengal has set up a Climate Change Cell as the body in charge of implementing climate change initiatives across the state (Department of Environment, n.d.). Kerala has, recently, revised its Climate Change Action Plan which is focused on disaster adaptation, mitigation plans, health and water management, based on which a disaster vulnerability index should be developed, for each district, at the grassroots level. The index should be based on the methodology used to prepare the Fifth Assessment Report of the UN's IPCC. The state of the coastal, marine and river ecosystems in the region, the level of pollution, population density, mortality rates, availability of health care facilities, measures for tackling vector-borne diseases, availability of ICUs — all have been taken into consideration for the implementation of the above-mentioned plan (Sreemol, 2021).

The Jharkhand government has launched its Solar Energy Policy through which it hopes to achieve 4,000 MW of solar power by 2027. In places like Dhanbad, Dumka, Giridih and Ghatshila, solar power plants are planned to be set up, which should provide job opportunities to the local population, ensuring that they do not have to migrate to other states in search of jobs. Moreover, because it is located in the tropics, this state receives ample amount of sunshine, which should assist with building of solar villages. As a part of its new Kisan Solar Water Pump scheme, the government should install solar pumps in the villages for the farmers, covering the 80 per cent of the costs. Furthermore, a 96 per cent subsidy has, also, been provided to farmers living in “*off-grid pump sets*.” Between 2020 and 2022, about 6,500 solar pump kits were set up across the state (News Desk, 2022).

CONCLUSIONS

Terrace farming is laden with certain disadvantages. In most of the cases, they retain a lot of water, which leads to waterlogging during heavy monsoons. This results in water flowing and carrying a lot of surface runoff down the slopes and, thus, causing soil erosion. Terrace cultivation also requires continuous labour monitoring, which can, if not properly taken care of, create deep gullies and steep slopes. This reduces soil fertility and

causes leaching of soil nutrients. In these cases, plants and trees, which retain the least amount of water and have strong roots, can be planted so as to provide adequate drainage of the soils, while also holding them firmly. Different states have adopted different measures in compliance with their weather conditions. The Central government has undertaken a lot of initiatives, both at the national and international level. In India, the legislators need to play a more proactive role in warranting healthcare, education and employment opportunities for the internally displaced migrants. Furthermore, land reclamation initiatives in the flood prone areas, with joint collaboration with the Global North, could prove to be useful. Noticing which are the climate endangered zones and building a climate-resilient infrastructure, on the sites, could reduce the influx of people into destination villages and cities. In states like Bihar, which are prone to floods, the government encourages people to engage in paddy farming and rice cultivation, because the water is entirely used by the crops. Aside from the PM CARES Fund, a separate fund was created with the purpose of providing rehabilitation facilities for climate refugees, which would certainly help reduce the economic burden imposed on the government. As Arul Surbhi (2022) suggested justifiably, this fund would be developed with the contribution of private enterprises, CSRs of different companies and contribution made by the entrepreneurs. Per the NAPCC, states are allowed conduct a census so as to tabulate the statistics of both external and internal climate migrants, and develop camps using the aforementioned fund. Sustainable agriculture and rural development are the ways in which environmental hazards, land and water degradation and climate change, should be tackled. The FAO has been instrumental in partnering with many international financial institutions and governments so as to work on certain agricultural and rural development projects (Khadka, 2017).

In the past, India has always welcomed varieties of refugees. Moreover, it has observed a “refugee regime”, dealing with them in accordance to the pre-existing laws which apply to all foreigners — no separate laws have been enforced exclusively for the refugees, who were not a party to the Refugee Convention. As far as the verification of a climate refugee is concerned, it is essential to check their official documents which could support the reasons behind the migration, for example, citizenship documents, employment documents, documents revealing their identity to any indigenous group and other essential documents, in a consistent manner

and not contradicting each other (Pooja, n.d.). Since there is no uniform law on refugees, the entire decision-making process is carried out on an ad-hoc basis. It becomes pertinent for the government of India to adopt a national law, as India is a natural choice for the refugees. This would be useful in addressing the issues brought up by migration, as well as security concerns. Moreover, it would ensure the prevention of unlawful detention of any refugee (Nair, 2021). The socioeconomic needs of the refugees need to be met as well. As Aarohi Bhalla says, the laws in India should be in agreement with the human rights and international obligations providing a strong and sound base of Indian citizenship, protected by the spirit of the Indian Constitution (Bhalla, 2022).

Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi announced the Indian five-fold strategy (Panchamrit) for tackling climate change at the 26th CoP held in Glasgow in 2021. India's ambition of attaining, by 2030, a 500 gigawatts non-fossil energy, along with obtaining its 50 per cent energy needs from renewable sources and reducing its carbon intensity, is highly motivating. Taking up only a 4 per cent of the total global emissions, India hopes to have attained a net-zero by 2070 (Narain, 2021). Recently, the Union Cabinet has, also, formally approved India's latest NDCs which include the principles of Panchamrit. Due to this, India hopes to have reduced its emissions to 45 per cent of its GDP, by 2030. The LIFE principle (Lifestyle for Environment) has, also, been incorporated in India's NDC commitments, which is planned to work towards maintaining the global temperature up to an increase of only 1.5°C (Goswami, 2022). Furthermore, it is one of the initiators of the International Solar Alliance. India has been trying to switch over to solar energy and green hydrogen instead of coal and petrol. India's climate politics, coupled with its foreign policy, has caught interest of interdisciplinary research in the academia, which might help overcome the challenges of the contemporary times with greater strategic cooperation.

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TECHNOLOGICAL INTERVENTION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY DURING PANDEMIC ERA IN INDIA

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Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the biggest threats to human security in the history of mankind, and it is more severe in countries like India. The latest report of UNDP 2022 identifies digital technologies as an emerging threat to human security, and during the pandemic, we witnessed the rampant application of technology. Unlike China, where the use of digital technologies for surveillance was embraced by the citizens, in India it proved to be discriminatory. The central government in India imposed the most stringent lockdown restricting the fundamental right of freedom of movement and liberty of the citizens. The rationale was to save as many lives as possible. The added layer to this restriction was the use of mobile tracing applications for access control and its mandatory use for providing certain essential services. This feature has proven to be discriminatory and excluded the poor sections, mainly migrant laborers, who did not have the luxury to provide the same and were denied the basic right to a dignified livelihood. Apart from this, the various state governments in India, especially advanced states like Maharashtra and Telangana, implemented various other technological features such as drone technology to maintain social distancing, upgrading of CCTV systems to Facial recognition, etc. The findings suggest that it was an infringement of the right to privacy, and, unlawful, without any regulatory framework. The technological intervention by the state in India had grave implications for the right to life with dignity, which is an essential feature of human security.

Keywords: *Pandemic, Human Security, facial recognition, COVID-19, drone, privacy*

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic was a watershed movement in the history of humankind. It is one of the rarest moments when the entire globe was affected, and the solutions were not easy to find. The pandemic impacted human lives like never before, and human security reached the bare minimum. COVID-19 disease started in China as an epidemic and in no time

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achieved the status of the global pandemic. COVID-19 is a respiratory infection that is primarily transmitted by droplets. Symptoms of COVID-19 include fever (83-95% of patients), dry cough (57-82%) and fatigue/tiredness (29-69%), loss of taste or smell, nasal congestion, headache, muscle aches or joints, nausea or vomiting, diarrhoea, chills or dizziness. Simultaneously, symptoms of severe COVID-19 disease include shortness of breath, loss of appetite, confusion, constant chest pain or pressure, and high fever (above 38°C) (World Health Organization, 2020). COVID-19 falls within the family of SARS virus, which has severely impacted the East Asian countries in the last two decades. The impact of a pandemic is varied; some regions of the world are heavily impacted, whereas some are less. It disrupts the political, social, and economic progress and impacts the life and livelihood of the people. It has affected the global economy — repercussions of which will be felt in the coming years. The impact of the pandemic is maximum on human development, and COVID-19 was no different. It is a global health crisis which has brought significant scars on the process of human development. COVID-19 affected health security the most, but also left an unprecedented impact on other aspects of human security.

CHANGING CONTOURS OF HUMAN SECURITY: THE IMPACT OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES

Human security as a concept is yet to find stable definitions, but what is accepted is the fact that the concept started gaining traction after the 1994 UNDP report. The report outlined Human Security as not only 'freedom from fear and threats' but also 'freedom from want', i.e., dealing with hunger, poverty, etc. This was a major concentrated effort, to change the narrative of security from the traditional means i.e., State Security to Non-traditional Security, i.e., Human Security. As a concept which emphasises individuals and communities as the referent object and beneficiary of security (Newman, 2010, p. 78), Human Security has been used in various international policy settings. Internationally, and also at regional levels, there has been concerted efforts to develop the concept of Human Security. Through the Human Security Network funded by Canada and Norway in 1998, human security has been embedded into the international norms and security agenda (Chinkin & Kaldor, 2017, p. 504). The Network committed to people-centred development and security have tried to

operationalize the concept and bring it into the foreign policy debates. A number of human security initiatives have been sponsored by governments, such as the Commission on Human Security 2003 and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001.

In the UN, we have had lot of deliberations on this issue. A major breakthrough in the debate on human security concept came in the context of the 2000 UN Millennium Summit, as the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, called for a world free of want and free of fear. In response, the Commission on Human Security was established in January 2001, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen. Its final report, *Human Security Now*, was presented in May 2003. *Human Security Now* offered a new definition of human security centred around ensuring the integrity of a “vital core” in human lives, often interpreted as set of basic capabilities: “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms — freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity” (United Nations Development Program, 2022, p. 45). The 2005 UN World Summit provided a boost for the human security agenda in diplomatic circles. The UN endorsed human security through the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair and free from fear and want (United Nations General Assembly, 2005). Following the World Summit, UN General Assembly resolution 66/290 of October 2012 further endorsed human security, and this was operationalised in a report of the Secretary-General (United Nations Secretary-General, 2013).

There have been a lot of discussions on this issue at the regional level, as well. In 2003, the concept of human security was proposed as a distinctive policy identity and posture to command consensus within the EU (Martin & Kaldor, 2009, pp. 15-25). At the fortieth anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the phrase ‘people-oriented ASEAN’ in the ASEAN Charter marked a ‘human security’ turn within Southeast Asia (Nishikawa, 2010, p.30). Explicitly or implicitly, East Asian countries, including Thailand, the Philippines, Japan and China, began to incorporate the

idea of human security into their security policies (Hernandez et al. 2019, p.8). Regional organisations in Africa have also worked towards turning human rights commitments into practices. For example, the Treatment Action Campaign of South Africa contributed to including HIV/AIDS in the human security agenda (Sabi & Rieker, 2017).

Therefore, it is quite evident that the concept has widened to a large extent and that deliberations have been going around Human Security. One of the consequences was the emergence of a large amount of criticism of the scope and limits of this concept, while its critiques charge that it has lost its fervour and focus. However, the main outcomes of these deliberations have been that Human Security is now not only defined as the “Freedom from fear and want”, but also as “protecting dignity of the individuals”. In the latest report on Human Security by UNDP, which was released in 2022, many new generation threats to Human Security have been identified. These are Digital Technologies, Violent Conflicts, Inequalities and assault on human dignity and Breakdown of healthcare systems by new diseases. From all of these, digital technologies are the only emerging challenges to Human Security. Digital technology has become an inevitable part of our daily life, and life is unimaginable without these technologies. These can be enablers for human security as they expand our capabilities, enhance freedom and provide the opportunity to deal with crisis (Haenssngen & Ariana, 2018). Simultaneously, they also pose challenges to Human Security. World Economic Forum survey has cited technological risks — such as digital inequality, cyberattacks, data fraud and theft, and concentrated digital power — among the most imminent threats (McLennan, 2021). During the COVID-19 pandemic the digital threats impacted a large section of world population. According to a report, Cybercrime’s damage in 2021 was estimated at around \$6 trillion, up 600 per cent since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. More than half of breaches involve identity theft (65 per cent), followed by account access (17 percent) and financial access (13 per cent) (Purplesec, 2021). The threat of cyber security is unevenly distributed as the least developed countries do not have the capabilities to deal with such threats. Additionally, we have recently seen that cyberwarfare is becoming a common phenomenon in espionage, while hacking is disrupting the critical infrastructures such as electricity, etc. Another unintended consequence of digital infiltration has been the harm of social media. Social media has

given an opportunity to unheard voices to discuss, debate, resist and express opinions freely. Social media is a digital public sphere where civil and political rights of a citizen are exercised. The open nature of social media has also brought lot of harm to human security. Terrorist propaganda, hate speech, radicalisation, non-consensual intimate media sharing, etc. are just a few of them. The government response to this has been content moderation and regulation and many private companies are hired for this purpose. They develop new tools for detecting illegal content and, thus, create a hierarchy in access to information. This also raises questions on digital rights of free speech and non-discrimination (Dias, 2020).

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is another tool which is rapidly creeping into every aspect of governance. Predictive AI is reducing inequalities and optimizing decision-making. However, AI is, also, bringing forward new challenges. The use of AI by big tech companies for behaviour manipulation is coming to the surface. Zuboff (2019) argues that the big tech leverages AI to predict behaviour for targeted advertisement, which she calls surveillance capitalism. AI works on algorithms which are discriminately used against populations and have the potential to render them without service. The speed at which AI is being integrated into the governance framework is alarming for human security as algorithmic bias and harm to privacy will impact the unprivileged the most. The current debates around using facial recognition for access mechanisms are being criticised as it is discriminatory for people of colour. Digital technologies could require safeguards, such as humans in the loop (ensuring adequate human oversight and control in AI applications), and proactively embedding privacy by design (to anticipate and prevent privacy breaches rather than adopt a reactive approach) (Stankovich, 2021).

CHINA AS A MODEL OF HUMAN SECURITY IN THE PANDEMIC

The COVID-19 pandemic can be considered as a deviant case study, in terms of disease management in a pandemic. It is often argued that countries with advanced healthcare infrastructure will be able to manage the disease outbreak better, but in the COVID-19 pandemic this was not the case. Based on the comparison of various countries around the world, statistical data shows a positive correlation between the number of COVID-19 casualties per population and the GDP per capita as of May.

On the whole, economically wealthy countries, and those that are viewed as having excellent medical technology and health systems, had a higher rate of COVID-19 deaths than countries without those advantages at least at the relatively early stage of this pandemic².

Human Security is not a new concept in China. A recent version of China's security concept, the 'Overall Security Outlook', is promoted by Xi Jinping as a set of all-encompassing tenets which govern all aspects of security governance. Xi stresses the importance of a 'people-oriented' and 'human-oriented' security approach, requiring the officials to 'adhere to the principle that national security serves the people, relies on the people, and truly achieve a solid foundation for national security' (Xi, 2014). In the development of China's approach to human security, it is also paramount to highlight the importance of health emergencies in driving forward this debate in China. After the SARS outbreak in 2003, China took major steps to create 'a better public health system for the protection of people's health, and decided to strengthen that system by significantly increasing public health measures related to the strengthening the prevention of major epidemics' (Ren & Li, 2013, p. 32).

After the initial breakdown of the virus in Wuhan, China had to face a lot of legitimacy crisis. The government was criticised for a lackadaisical approach in dealing with the virus. However, the CCP (Communist Party of China) was quick to assess the situation and deal with it. The approach was two-pronged. At the first level, the CCP exercised political authority and took the legitimate responsibility for dealing with the crisis. Guo (2022) calls this the Party-State-Society triangle in China. When COVID-19 was initially discovered in Wuhan, the party-state-society triangle worked against a good information flow between the Wuhan local authority and the public, which led to the outbreak of the pandemic. But when the pandemic emerged, the party-state-society triangle allowed the central authority to impute blames to the local state cadres, present itself as a benign, paternalistic arbiter, and claim the leadership to mobilize the whole society against the pandemic, hence preserving its political legitimacy and improving controls over the state apparatus. In other words, the CCP legitimated itself by solving crises that are created by the very system over

² "To our friends and partners fighting against COVID-19 in developing countries," JICA, May 31, 2020.

which it commands authority (Guo, 2022). The state then took decisions of implementing strict lockdowns, restrictions on freedom of movement, and following stringent health protocols.

The second approach was the use of existing surveillance technologies, and infrastructure for disease management. It was in the name of human security that the CCP justified the implementation of the much disreputable urban grid management system (*wanggehua guanli*), a net-based surveillance system developed in 2014 to provide services to citizens as well as security for the state, mostly in the form of human surveillance. Although the urban grid management system, from the Western perspective, is a sign of a police state, it arguably did contribute to the prevention of infectious disease by detecting the flow of population, a task crucial to the control of the Coronavirus. During the pandemic, as many as 4.5 million social workers operated with the system, day and night, to locate where the residents have been, and check their body temperature (Liu, 2020). Augmented with advanced security protection technology, the system 'can identify where people gather and will inform social workers instantaneously to advise them apart through radio' (Yu, 2020).

Another technological intervention was the "quick response health code" which provides access to Chinese citizens to particular localities. Available on Chinese citizens' smartphones through the popular apps Alipay and WeChat, this code crudely differentiates a user's risk profile into one of three colours: red, yellow, or green. These colours indicate whether someone is required to quarantine, self-isolate, or if they are free to carry on with their lives. Municipalities manage the quick response health code, and smartphone users who want to obtain such a code must register their app account with the local authorities. Users do so by entering their personal details on to the app, including a facial recognition scan. Once connected to the local government's platform, the app starts to automatically track and update the users' information in real-time. It does so by constantly scrutinizing their social networks and mobility patterns, including whether they had encounters with high-risk individuals or visited affected areas (Cassiano et al., 2021).

The Chinese model of Human Security in this pandemic is unique because the public supports it. As Liu (2021) argued, China's technological surveillance response to the pandemic has been supported by the public.

The Western Media criticised Chinese Surveillance practices as biased and unfair, which generated the reverse psychological effect and pushed many Chinese residents to fully embrace the state. Chinese citizens have weighed “rights of being alive” to be heavier than “human rights”, delegitimizing the West and strengthening approval for domestic surveillance.

INDIA AND THE HUMAN SECURITY RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC

India was not as badly affected as China and other European countries during the initial months of the outbreak. The first case of novel Coronavirus was reported on 30th January 2020 — a student studying at Wuhan University belonging to Kerala’s Thrissur district. India reported its first death due to Coronavirus on 12th March 2020, one day after WHO declared COVID-19 as the Pandemic. Almost two months after the first case was reported, on 25th March, a Nationwide Lockdown was imposed until April 14th. India reported 606 cases and ten deaths related to COVID-19 to this day, with infections in 24 states, and UTs. It had tested less than 20,000 individuals to date. During this time, India had entered the third stage of the pandemic-community transmission. India breached the mark of 1 lakh confirmed cases on May 19th and the lockdown was further extended until 31st May 2020³.

India witnessed one of the longest and most extreme lockdowns in the world. Apart from essential services, i.e., medical, food supplies, etc., no other service was in operation and it brought all the activities of the economy to a standstill. This was one of the worst human security crises India faced, in decades. On the one hand, the rationale of the government to induce lockdowns was to save as many human lives as possible, as the solution to stop the spread of the Coronavirus was not immediately available. Indian Government following chorus with other world countries considered the lockdown as the best fit solution to avert the loss of human lives. The right to freedom of movement, which is a fundamental right in the Indian Constitution (Article 19), was restricted and was traded off with another basic human right, i.e., the right to life. The government, by doing this, induced one the worst human security crises.

³ Entire timeline and the sequence of events can be read at: <https://thewire.in/covid-19-india-timeline>

The daily wage workers, who are mostly migrant labourers, took the worst hit. Migrants take up significant space in India's large urban centres, with the Census of 2011 indicating that almost 46 per cent of India's urban population are migrants. They work in both formal and informal sectors, such as in manufacturing and construction, as well as in brick making and textile industries (Srivastava & Sutradhar, 2016; Deshingkar & Akter, 2009).

Iyer (2020) traces the sequence of events which impacted the human security of the migrant population in India during the lockdown. The exodus of migrant population started on the 2nd day of the lockdown, with electronic and print media flooded with images of people walking hundreds of kilometres on foot. Based on an RTI request, the Railway Board admitted that more than 8,700 people died while walking on the railway tracks in 2020. These were primarily migrant workers who were walking back to their homes. The Central and the State governments tried to avert these human crises by introducing various measures. In an order issued on April 29, the Ministry of Home Affairs allowed states to co-ordinate individually so as to transport migrants using buses. On May 1st, the Indian Railways resumed passenger movement (for the first time since March 22nd) with Shramik Special trains so as to facilitate movement of migrants stranded outside their home state. Between May 1st and June 3rd, Indian Railways operated 4,197 Shramik trains transporting more than 58 lakh migrants. On April 1st, the Ministry of Health and Family Affairs directed state governments to operate relief camps for migrant workers with arrangements for food, sanitation and medical services. On May 14th, under the second tranche of the Aatma Nirbhar Bharat Abhiyaan, the Finance Minister announced that free food grains would be provided to migrant workers who do not have a ration card for two months (Iyer, 2020). This was in continuation of the announcement of Rs 1.7 lakh crore package under a new scheme called the Pradhan Mantri Gareeb Kalyan Yojana (PMGKBY) by Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman to address the economic distress. The package included free food to the "poorest of the poor", income support for farmers and unorganised sector workers.

The three tenets of human security — freedom from fear, freedom from want and protecting dignity of individuals — were tested during the pandemic in India. The sudden outburst of the Coronavirus, and considering the catastrophic consequences for a billion plus population, the Indian government exercised stringent lockdown. The existing health

infrastructure was not equipped to handle the novel Coronavirus with almost 1.34 doctors per 1,000 population and most of the medical equipment being imported. A government-appointed committee, led by Professor M Vidyasagar of IIT Hyderabad, had estimated that there could have been over 26 lakh deaths, if the lockdown had not been imposed. Even if it was imposed with a month's delay, in May, deaths would have crossed ten lakhs. A year after the lockdown, the total number of deaths in India has been about 1.6 lakh (although the Center for Global Development, a Washington research institute, suggest that the deaths have been ten times of the actual estimates). Still, the government claims that they saved more lives during this pandemic.

Contrary to this, there have been consequences for human security during this lockdown. The Economic Security, Food Security — which makes the 'Freedom from Want' — was the most crucial challenge in this lockdown. With economic activities coming to standstill, the poorest sections of the society were hit the hardest. The daily wage workers who relied on daily work for their subsistence did not have the means to feed to their families. In addition to that, what made it worse was the movement of migration population and their unfortunate deaths in their attempts to make it back home, as mentioned earlier. The Government tried to address this problem by introducing the PMGKAY. PMGKAY was a relief package of 1.70 lakh crore, which had the following measures: to address food security, 80 crore poor people (almost 60 per cent of the population) will to get 5 kg wheat or rice and 1 kg of preferred pulses for free every month for the next three months. However, this scheme was extended to September 2022, by subsequent cabinet decisions, taking the total expenditure under PMGKAY to nearly Rs 3.40 lakh crore. Apart from this, the government also decided to increase the aid for different social security schemes given to the poor section like farmers, labourers, etc. through the Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT)⁴.

An important feature of this pandemic was the use of Surveillance mechanisms by governments across the World. In India too, we saw the Central, and various State Governments, using physical and digital surveillance as a measure for tracing and controlling the spread of Coronavirus.

⁴ More about PMGKY can be read at <https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1608345>

This had implications for the third tenet of Human Security “protecting the dignity of the individual”.

TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HUMAN SECURITY

India is the emerging market of digital revolution. The country already has more than 700 million smart phone users, while more than 40 per cent of the population are internet users. The first step of the Indian Government after the lockdown was to introduce a contact tracing mobile application called ‘Aarogya Setu’ on 2nd April 2020. The app works on a contact tracing method and helps the government in early identification, monitoring, and mitigation of the COVID-19 pandemic. This was the fastest growing mobile application with 100 million installs in 13 days of its launch. The application was developed by NITI Ayog, National Informatics Centre (NIC), Indian Institute of Sciences (IISc), Indian Institute of Technology Madras, along with other private players like 1mg, Make My Trip (MMT), Goibibo etc. Aarogya Setu (AS) was made mandatory by the government, on many instances during the lockdown. Central government organisations involved in its construction, including various metro rail corporations, were instructed by the Central Public Works Department (CPWD) to ensure that “all labour personnel/staff” returning to work from 20th April have downloaded the government’s COVID-19 tracking app — Aarogya Setu(AS). On 1st May, the chairperson of the National Executive Committee (NEC), the executive ARM OF NDMA, under the Disaster Management Act (Section 10(2)(1)) ordered the local authorities, and District Magistrate, that all residents in Containment zone must download AS. The railways said, on 11th May, that, for those travelling via the 15 ‘special trains’, it was mandatory to download the government’s AS mobile application (Qureshi, 2022).

The mandatory nature of AS proved to be exclusionary for a sizeable part of the population. Migrant labourers, construction workers and gig workers, etc. were directly impacted by the mandatory use of AS, where their dignity and possibility to earn livelihoods were undermined. Similar contact tracing applications were developed by various State governments in India. Karnataka Government introduced a similar application called ‘Corona Watch’ which was made mandatory for people entering

the state, and also for residents of Karnataka for availing various essential services. Another application, 'Quarantine Watch', was launched in which the people who were in home quarantine had to post selfies every hour to trace their location and to ensure they do not violate rules. Tamil Nadu, another South Indian State, launched an application called 'GCC Corona Monitoring App' in which the patient has to upload selfie and authorities will be alerted of the patient's status. A common feature, for all these apps, is the demographic data and location data which it collects. Criticism has been raised on these contact tracing applications, in general, and India in particular. (See Bhandari & Rahman, 2020; Dhindsa & Kaushik, 2020; Ak-inbi et al., 2021).

The other technology which was frequently used in India during the pandemic was the Drone Technology. The Delhi police hired drones to conduct surveillance and collect data in the form of images and videos to ensure people were following lockdown norms. These surveillance drones had the capacity to record footage in SD cards and relay a live feed to the police officer piloting the drone. The rationale of using a drone by the Police was that it was not always possible to physically monitor congested and densely populated areas. Similarly, drones were used by the Mumbai Police and BrihanMumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) to enforce the lockdown. Apart from this, many residential societies in Mumbai also used drones in their neighbourhoods. According to a report by Barik (2020), The Drone Federation of India(DFI) and the Mumbai Police Commissioner Office sent emails to residents of a society in Andheri East that they fly drones in their locality to enforce lockdown. The residents of the society felt uneasy with this move (Barik, 2020).

The Punjab Government went one step ahead when they deployed drones for maintaining social distancing. Company named Skylark labs developed an algorithm for the same. The system detects humans on the basis of their closeness with each other. A person is kept in a green box if he is not surrounded by any other human nearby. Whereas, a group of two on motorbikes are kept in a red box, indicating they are close to each other, placing them in the unacceptable category (distance <6ft). The alert is immediately sent to mobile phones of nearby police officers regarding the location of the suspect and his real time video (TNN, 2020). In Telangana, too, we saw the use of drones equipped with thermal imaging payloads and sky speakers for public announcements. The technology

is developed by Hyderabad based Cyient, a global technology company. Another important development during the pandemic in India was the use of CCTV and its upgrade to Facial Technology. Hyderabad saw detection of mask violations through Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras installed across the city. The three Commissionerates — Hyderabad, Cyberabad, and Rachakonda — ramped up their efforts to fine mask violators through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools, as COVID-19 cases in the city began to rise in the last month or so. Around 2,000 cameras have been enabled, with artificial intelligence, to monitor mask violators (Sur, 2021). If this was not enough, citizens in Telangana were asked to remove their masks for facial recognition. Police personnel did this, with the help of an application called TSCOP, which is available to every policeman and has the feature of facial recognition.

The above instances of use of Contact tracing mobile applications, use of drones, and use of facial recognition technologies have implications for the basic human right of dignity. The collection of data, at such scale, always raises the question of the privacy of the individual. The use of drone and facial recognition in private spaces is an infringement of the privacy of the individual, and, furthermore, of the basic right to a life with dignity. Although the pandemic posed an uphill challenge for the authorities to maintain order and break the chain of transmission, the discriminatory use of such technologies without any regulations and rules is not called for. Another important issue regarding the use of such technologies was the exclusion of certain sections of population from accessing essential services. The mandatory nature of such technologies, along with chances of false positives, has had an effect on the human security during this pandemic.

CONCLUSION

Even though COVID-19 is a global crisis, it has reiterated the fact that the state is the most important stakeholder in protecting the human security. Although, the East Asian countries, including China and Japan, saved more lives, on paper, than any other country in the world, India has been a mixed case in point. The Indian government executed the most stringent lockdowns in the world as saving lives was of utmost priority. In doing so, they induced other human security crisis like the exodus of migrant labourers and a food security crisis for a sizeable working-class population.

In order to address these issues, the government came up with free rationing and DBT schemes to large sections of population, so that they could survive this catastrophe. The unique response of the governments across all states in India has been the use of technology, cutting across all the policies and decision-making during the pandemic. The mandatory nature of technology had implications for the basic human right to live with dignity and the right to avail essential services. In a country with inadequate digital infrastructures and huge digital divide in urban and rural areas, the integration of technology was discriminatory. The arbitrary use of drones, CCTV, facial recognition technology, without any established outcomes, also, had undermined the privacy of the individual. The cost-benefit analysis of the use of these technologies, and positive outcomes it achieved, is yet to be ascertained, although the cost to human security was somewhat high. The technological intervention within the pandemic was uncalled for, and rather than protecting the right to life, and liberty of the individual, it posed a threat to the right of the individual to a life with dignity, which is an important feature of human security.

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