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ABE DOCTRINE AND JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

Dragana MITROVIĆ¹

Abstract: While apparently preserving general course and framework of Japan's post-war foreign and security order, Prime Minister Abe has actually initiated complex and controversial changes in their context that have caused simultaneous support, uneasiness and strong criticism at home and abroad. His concept of 'active contributor to peace' has added to growing dynamism of on going rebalancing of power in Asia-Pacific and on the other hand, emphasized regional and global role of Japan.

Key words: Abe Shinzo, Abe Doctrine, Japan, 'active contributor to peace'.

INTRODUCTION

While pursuing his second mandate as Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe for sure has been trying to fulfil any prime minister's job – to provide economic prosperity and security to his people. What have challenged his second attempt to perform successfully are severe international circumstances – economic, political and security ones, regionally and globally, as well as enlarged sensitivity at home for economic, political and ecological issues. What differs him from his predecessors at the post of Japanese Prime Minister is his expressive stile, as well as the practice and doctrine it is based on. His extensive diplomatic performance, on multilateral and especially bilateral level, equally caused domestic and foreign attention as well as pronouncement of the so called *Abe Doctrine* in several speeches and papers, and through the newly adopted security policy papers and government decision to

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reinterpret Constitution different that it has been done since 1972 and 1981 (Report of the Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security, p. 9).

It is possible to see Prime Minister Abe's aim to follow the steps of his predecessors in the shoes of PM of Japan in their attempt to provide the basic national goals – to provide economic prosperity and security to his nation. The former he has been trying to achieve by introducing package of economic measures, so called *Abenomics*, still not unwrapped in totality, with some questionable elements, and some appreciated ones, at least within big businesses community if not the majority of the population, that has been mostly hit by it so far (Finbarr, 2014). The second one – that is to provide security by extensive foreign policy first started with announcing its doctrine – Abe Doctrine – which for many is total abandoning of Yoshida Doctrine and, what is even more important, Fukuda Doctrine. Many neighbours of Japan and many inside Japan see *Abe Doctrine* as abandoning the path of those Japanese prime ministers who were highly appreciated and trusted by Japanese neighbours and Japanese nation. What is inseparably part of that doctrine, as much as *Abenomics*, has been the new security doctrine of Japan that has been developed in several documents and papers, speeches and acts delivered by Abe and fully explored in the Defence White Paper published in summer 2014.

ABE DOCTRINE – REASONING BEHIND

At the moment when Abe Shinzo was appointed as Prime Minister for the second time in his political career, for sure he got a strong ambition to perform much better than during the previous (and) abruptly ended time on the post, and left more beyond as personal political legacy, as well as to contribute more to his family's grand political legacy in post-war Japanese history. Abe's maternal grandfather, Kishi Nobusuke (born as Sato Nobusuke), former Japanese prime minister (1957-60), was one of the most prominent pre and post war Japanese politicians, conservative with vision and capability to realize much of it, has been his role model since childhood (Yoshida, 2012). Prime Minister Kishi was one of the conservatives who managed to revise Japanese post war 'peace Constitution' towards creating Self Defence Forces in 1960 and to keep firm on the close security coop with the USA as the guarantee for Japanese security and comfortable framework for Japanese economic performance. This enabled his government that in January 1960 signs a revised U.S.–Japan Security Treaty intended to put the relationship between the two nations on an equal basis and to restore independent diplomacy for Japan. At the same time, during previous years, he also had paid efforts to improve relations with the nations of Southeast and South Asia, visiting them in 1957 with proposals of reparations agreements and economic cooperation (Nobusuke. 2014). At the time of his grandfather's political reign, young Abe admired his hard work, dedication and vision of his country's restoration and

progress. At the same time, as a young man, he felt alienated from a majority of his generation and general public influenced by leftist mainstream intellectuals, who pointed at his grandfather as a representative of the militarist Japanese past and statehood, whose personal responsibility was even questioned by the Occupation authorities after the World War II. As explained in his book “Toward a Beautiful Country” Abe admired his grandfather and understood his visionary dedication to his country’s recovery and becoming truly independent state again.

On the other hand, his work as his father’s secretary when Abe Shintaro was Japanese foreign minister (1982-86) helped him to develop understanding of highly needed flexibility and personal connection impact on successful foreign policy performance (Yoshida, 2012). That “dual approach” could be seen in Prime Minister Abe’s pose, as parallel to his conservatism and determination in pursuing his agenda, elements of charm offensives and openness towards building personal relations with world leaders were also obvious.² Another important figure from Prime Minister Abe’s family from his mother’s side and another role model was Satō Eisaku, younger brother of Prime Minister Kishi, who was prime minister of Japan between 1964 and 1972, and played extremely important role in Japan’s post-World War II re-emergence as a major world power. In 1969 Satō reached an agreement with U.S. President Richard Nixon for future return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan that officially happened in 1972, the removal of all nuclear weapons from the area, and the continued maintenance of the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty. Even though, SatM came under heavy criticism for provisions in the agreement that allowed U.S. military forces to remain on Okinawa Island after its return to Japan, although secret amendments of the agreement that put financial burden on Japan were not known to the public. For his position on nuclear weapons that resulted in Japan’s signing the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1974.

Coming after long chain of very short holdings of the post by his predecessors,³ Abe Shinzo’s hold on time was uncertain, although after poor performance by the Democratic Party led government, more open towards relative longevity. Nevertheless, when LDP (with minor New Komeito backing) won victory in both houses in July 2013 elections (Sieg, 2014), a new perspective, both on time in the

² Typical case was his intention to establish and deepen personal relations with the president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin and his attempt to “charm” President of the Republic of Korea with greeting her in Korean, during the trilateral summit with her and USA president, Obama.

³ Junichiro Koizumi (LDP): 1980 days, Shinzo Abe (LDP): 366 days, Yasuo Fukuda (LDP): 365 days, Taro Aso (LDP): 358 days, Yukio Hatoyama (DPJ): 266 days, Naoto Kan (DPJ): 452 days, Yoshihiko Noda (DPJ): 482 days. Tsukimura, Taro, *Japan and the Collective Self-Defense*, presentation at the conference “Major international issues in the 21st Century – from perspective of Japan and Europe”, IPE, Belgrade, 15 September 2014

office and power of his government emerged, perspective that had opened the door wider to his ambitious agenda that was announced soon. This political space was confirmed with sudden December 2014 dissolution of Parliament and the following victory of LDP in both chambers of Diet.

Abe's foreign policy goals are focused on answering challenges born in the international environment – regional and global one – and at home. One of the most demanding tests of Japan's ability to cope with the ongoing international developments is posed by change in the balance of power among world nations, some of which caused by the rapidly gained economic and political power of the "emerging countries" that has strengthened their global influence. Among those, PR China's extended influence in the international political economy, accompanied with her expanding military capability and stronger political positioning has been the most alerting for Japan. Some aspects of the ongoing deepening of globalization increase risks coming from being more active globally - on the level of nations, corporations and individuals - that could be coming from international terrorist organizations or pirates or other criminal groups, now technically advanced and possibly even armed with weapons of mass destruction. On the other side of this balance is the declining influence and superiority of the United States that creates change in the balance of power on the global scene and asks for new structures and arrangements that require broad and very complex, yet fragile consensus. Additionally, Japan's dependency on fuels imports, dramatically increased after shutting down all eleven nuclear plants after The Great Eastern Earthquake in 2011, makes its economy particularly dependent on global energy market, global trade and transportation, while as all major global investors and exporters it has buffered with difficulties and economic and social costs all the negative trends coming from other major economies.

There have been some remarkable phenomena developing in East Asia, but not only of regional importance, but global ones too, for which naturally Japan has been vitally interested in and involved into. One of the most important ones was in 2009 announcement of USA Asia Pivot,⁴ that has not been never delivered or not delivered to the extent that was announced, expected and desired by the USA's regional allies, including Japan (Baumiller, 2011). Also, there has been so strong and unexpectedly boldly expressed rise of China in the region, not only economically (and culturally), but also by military means and in geopolitical sense. That caused an immediate response and urged for accommodation of all the regionally present states - from the global super-power, USA, traditional Chinese allies and friends in the region, those states which were accommodated by intense economic

⁴ The administration of President Barack Obama first announced this strategic re-shifting in July 2009 at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Singapore, in the speech of US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton.

cooperation with China during last two decades, and those whose relations with China has been mixture of cooperation and competition with ideological distance, including Japan.

The challenging phenomenon for the whole East Asian region and all the neighbours, with more, less and no understanding for its unique position, has been dynamics of political and military developments inside North Korea and their outward expressions. Not only that Democratic People's Republic of Korea has repeatedly tested nuclear bombs and claimed to be able to put it into missile, it also tested middle-range missile and proved it was able to reach fair parts of Japanese territory if still not to successfully launch long-range one. Japan was carefully following the consolidation of the regime around Kim Jong-Un and engaged in several initiatives aimed at relaxing if not solving the issue of the abduction of its citizens and their offspring living in PDR Korea today.

Many of the newly emerged economic rising powers are also situated in this part of the world that gives impetus to the regional economic development – said to be the world's most dynamic region - and adds an optimistic note to the global economic gloomy prospects, but also has required reshuffling and adjustment. Additionally, there has been rising tension coming from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) developing on a parallel tracks as rival trading blocs, one led by the USA and excluding China, and the other led by China, excluding the USA, as their parallelism has created complex economic, political and security issues. Japan, as other countries with dual membership is specially challenged by this role. Some analysts, though, see such countries as those positioned favourably to help facilitating the adoption of compatible rules.

Territorial and maritime disputes in East China Sea and in South China Sea added to complexity of the regional kaleidoscope and deepened security concerns inside and outside Japan and led to the first time in modern history biggest purchasing of weaponry by Asian nations than by Western industrialized countries (Thalif, 2012). In spite of decades old and some newer, but also successful regional mechanisms of cooperation and multi level diplomacy and intra-regional economic cooperation, there has not been one security mechanism for solving all the mounting uncertainties – old and new ones – neither there has been established a *code of conduct* for dealing with such security problems and challenges. There is a rising number of uncertainties and all these uncertainties affect Japan to a great deal. On the other hand, history has remained highly important in Asia. Memory of history remains strong, and accordingly, historical issues tend to be easy to emerge and cause huge political and emotional tensions able to affect relations between Asian states and within Japan that could affect the public support of the government. Due to its late XIX and XX century history with Asian neighbours, Japans attitude towards common history has been under particular attention and

highly sensitive measurement by the others. Accordingly, there has been another dimension of Prime Minister Abe Doctrine and its realization, as it has had double-track impact. It means it affects a lot domestic political and economic development in Japan, and at the same time it has simultaneous influence on intra-regional economic, security and political relations and inter-states relations in East Asia.

Japan finds risks coming out of broader use of global commons, especially seas, outer space and cyberspace ever more increasing. As an island state Japan is strategically vitally dependent on open and regulated fishing, transportation of trade and fuels exploration activities' regulation in the seas, sea lanes and seabed surrounding its territory. Japan proved to be particularly vulnerable by any action challenging the existing order in the seas and oceans surrounding it, including piracy in South-East Asia and Western African coast, environmental damages or intrusion of unidentified vessels. From this vulnerability comes Japan's insisting on 'the rule of law at sea' and promotion of it within its foreign policy apparatus and insisting on international unison activity. Regarding outer space, Japan finds that beyond its valuable utilization for civilian activities, more and more countries being able to use it for surveillance and information gathering make it more sensitive issue, especially after some of the 'newcomers' as China, developed and used satellite-destroying weapons. Even though, the first two are accessible to few relevant actors, while cyberspace with nearly universal accessibility, anonymity, asymmetric nature and no physical territory opens wide door to ongoing and possible cyber-attacks to military systems, strategic infrastructure, classified information of corporations and states and private information of individuals, when controlling it demands building a legal structure and international consensus on how to protect its freedom and upgrade its safety.⁵

Prime Minister Abe was particularly harsh when measuring threat coming from rising China, not without generous assistance coming from Beijing, as both parties used each other positioning, acting and 'intentions' to justify military upgrading budgets, bold statements and finger pointing. In Japan's Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Bluebook 2014 China's strong progress in military capabilities, continues growth of her military budget that was marked as 'without sufficient transparency', as well as her attempts to 'change the *status quo* by coercion' in East China Sea and South China Sea in the maritime and aerial domains were emphasised as incompatible with the existing order of international law and particularly dangerous for the region of East Asia's security environment. As particularly challenging for Japan China's increased activities in the seas and airspace around Japan were seen,

⁵ Publicized report of The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) of Japan claimed that there were 25.66 billion syberattacks on Japanese government and other bodies and corporations were logged during 2014, some 40% coming from China and significant percentage from South Korea, USA and Russia. *Kyodo News*, February 18, 2015

among which Chinese vessels' assertiveness around Senkaku/Diyao islands and unilateral establishment of her Air Defence Identification Zone in November 2013 were noticed as alarming and asking for respond.

ABE DOCTRINE – THEORETICAL LAYOUT AND ITS CONTROVERSIES

Many of Abe critics see his new security and foreign policy doctrine and its legislative backing-up as a demonstration of will of the rightist and ultra-conservative political figure for which Prime Minister Abe does not even have support within his own party and the ruling coalition. They argued that absence of it was why he did not dare to check the level of the support in the Parliament in spite of having dominant majority in both houses of the Diet. Also, while preaching about 'universal values' shared by the 'civilized world' and democracy as one of them in his public statements around the globe, Prime Minister Abe's government did not allow general public and national debate (except for a few expert opinions on the matter through almost private Advisory Panel on Reconstruction of the Legal Basis for Security) nor discussion or voting in the Diet on the re-interpretation of the Constitution, but only did it as an act of the Cabinet, although such a process in democratic political system is of a crucial importance and should be delivered under widest scrutiny. Such a manner neither made this change the result of the wide political representation nor as the expression of the political will of the nation – on the contrary, it created even deeper division within political and electoral body on the highly controversial and sensitive issue opening by this question of the legitimacy of the new re-interpretation. Furthermore, it not only caused strong uneasiness among the Japanese nation, but created division among the ruling coalition, as it is not easy for The New Komeito Party, due to its peace oriented religious affiliation to support such change of the 'Peace Constitution'. Of course, it caused rising brows among most of the Japanese neighbours, which is the factors that for sure will not contribute to the 'peaceful contribution to peace' nor will help Abe's mission to be successful and welcomed by them. It is not difficult to agree with the criticisms that mark such acts of Abe's government as challenges to the deepening of democracy in Japan and not contribution to it.

One of the first pieces on regional diplomacy and security written by Prime Minister Abe and posted on December 27, 2012 on the web site of Project Syndicate caused criticism among his critics at home and abroad, although published before his first wholesome foreign policy speech. It was titled 'Asia's Democratic Security Diamond' as it graphically explained his strategy that 'Australia, India, Japan and U.S. State of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific'. India was specifically called into deepened defence and economic cooperation with Japan, as

the two ‘must join together to shoulder more responsibility as guardians of navigational freedom across the Pacific and Indian oceans’. Critics saw it as confirmation of the widely spread perception of his conservatism and hawkishness, that argue for confrontation instead for conciliatory stances and policies and a radical departure from post-war decades of pacifism. It was also seen as mere strategy of containment against China (Hayashi, 2013).

In the paper Prime Minister Abe strongly criticised China for her military expansion and assertive behaviour in East China Sea and South China Sea, for turning the former into ‘Lake Beijing’ and polygon for her nuclear-powered attack submarines aimed in ‘scaring the neighbours’. Explaining why Japan has to respond to the similar behaviour of China in East China Sea Prime Minister Abe pointed that daily routine of coercion around Senkaku/Diyao islands by Chinese ships had an aim to make their presence appearing normal, and over becoming ordinary present there China wanted to empower her jurisdiction in the surrounding waters as a *fait accompli*.

In contrast, others see ambition of Prime Minister Abe to reform Japan’s security legislation and strategy and reinterpret the so called ‘peace constitution’ and its Article 9 as desirable and positive development. Abe’s main goals were noticed as attempts to improve Japan’s capability to respond to threats that could not be defined as ‘arm attacks’, to enable Japan to more efficiently take part in peacekeeping activities as permitting it to protect other mission members and to be able to redefine measures that it will be able to take for self-defence under the Article 9 of the Constitution. Like Prime Minister Abe, those positive reviewers of his policy stipulates that these measures will make Japan more capable to play its role in strategic security partnership within the US-Japan Security Treaty, that for them is the basis for stability and economic development in Asia-Pacific. Such neediness comes from the reality of East Asia, which did not see the post-war true reconciliation, or conflict resolution permanent and comprehensive mechanisms while threats are severe. According to such analyses, Japan’s security is particularly challenged by the economic, political and military rise of China and its assertiveness when comes to the territorial disputes and sea-lanes that are ‘vital to Japanese trade’ and by unpredictable, though military ambitious regime in PDRK, to whom it must respond by being prepared ‘against uncertainty’, while engaged in cooperation. The other strategic goal of Prime Minister Abe is recognized as an attempt to change the very nature of the Japan-USA alliance, by making it more symmetric. The proposed step, additional to the changes already proposed by Abe, was one that led more boldly towards the Japanese control over the US bases on its territory, one after another, including those in Okinawa, where basis would be run and controlled by Japanese forces and US forces would just rotated among them. While this projection calls for more equal partnership between the two allies and see Abe’s government’s new military doctrine as a positive step towards it, the former does not explore the financial aspect of such future

arrangements regarding the basis on the Japanese soil, while it gives impression of the “inevitability and lucidity” of the solution.

Abe's administration move towards reinterpretation of the Constitution regarding the reconstruction of the legal basis for national security was praised by scholars taking part in the Tokyo Foundation's Forum focused on the issue of 'Task and Prospects of Abe's Diplomacy', as one leading to more functional security policy and in particular defence capability, especially when it comes to the so called 'grey zone' circumstances and occasions that lay between organized armed attack and peace. As pointed, the previous legal basis interpretation was too rigid and thus inadequate, restricted by 'legal and political concerns'(Watanabe, 2014) even when it comes to self-defence needs of Japan. Having China in mind, author reflects to an expert panel, organized and hosted by Prime Minister Abe on February 4, 2014 that recommended to the government and the Diet to enable use of the SDF in the so called 'grey zone', as China has been 'persistently sending paramilitary vessels into Japan's territorial waters', which, in spite of the danger it brings, would not be considered armed attacks according to the existing legal interpretation. On the other hand, if not responding, Japan would, according to such understandings, send wrong signal and that could lead to heightening of tensions in East China Sea. Abe's administration approach has been marked much more by realism than nationalism and by envisaging the revision of the legislation regarding use of SDF it is making 'a rational and incremental development of democratic governance in Japan's post-war security and defence policy' far away from emotional nationalism.

Some analysts argue that Prime Minister Abe's attempt is graduate evolution from Yoshida and Fukuda doctrines, but in the positive direction, as current situations across East China Sea that is burdened with maritime disputes and frequent mini-crisis, which could easily trigger off the diplomatic row, but also military conflict that could have severe regional and even global consequences. By upgrading its capability as a loyal ally, Japan, according to such statements, could contribute the most to strengthening of its primal alliance with the USA by becoming more equal, more reliable and devoted partner, than it proved to be with just financial or logistics support as its sole engagement. Another issue, defended and criticised was idea to allow Japan's SDF to act and come to the aid of allies in UN peacekeeping missions or even of USA forces on the Japanese soil, even if Japanese territory was not attacked or Japan citizens were not targeted.

Understandingly, steady and harsh criticism has been coming from Beijing, as Abe's approach was convenient hot spot for cohesion building and nationalism inspiring sentiments and acts. Chinese media pointed that Abe's 'proactive pacifism' concept was merely catchy expression made to cover his real intentions to turn Self Defence Forces into regular army and Japan into military power in full capacity.

Additionally, as after four decades Japan abandoned the ban to export weapons and military equipment, and contributed to the dangerous development trend, that for the first time in 2012, Asian nations were bigger buyers of the weaponry than the leading industrialized nations. It is tragic tendency regarding so many issues that resources could not be found to be addressed – such as poverty, inequality, poor social and health security systems, even absence of such, poor education network and rate of illiteracy, short life-expectancy as result of those and similar problems that make and uphold poor life quality (Mitrović, 2009). Japan in a significant way contributed to it, not just with its plans and acts to export weaponry to neighbour states that helps economy but is controversial as contribution to strengthening or even maintaining the peace, but also by enlarging its military budget. Abe's cabinet plans to increase military budget by 5% in the mid-term⁶ regarding the efforts invested in strengthening its hard power. So far, Japan for years has been one of the biggest purchaser of the American military equipment and weapons, but the policy change offered some other options. The decision creates a potential for enormous changes in the way Japanese defence suppliers do business, allowing them to concentrate on developing and making weapons' parts in which they have special advantages in building high-end components, particularly electronics, and to become part of the supply chain of the biggest US weaponry producers. That for sure would have a strong impact on *Abenomics* and future GDP growth. Some analysts point that other pacifist or neutral countries are at the same time major weapon exporters, such as Sweden.

Abe's policy change is also part of a larger strategic shift that realizes the weakening of the position of USA, and the newly emerged task for Japan to fill the gap coming from this process, as an active participant in the region's effort to buffer China's expansion. It considers the Southeast Asian states as potential partners in this stand-off with China as protectors of free navigation along their coast, so it wanted to be able to sell arms to those countries, too.

By doing all these, Japan under Prime Minister Abe made huge shift from 'One country pacifism' to 'Collective pacifism' and that was what most critics saw as abandoning the path of his predecessors (de Miguel, 2013). Those who support him, claim that, by doing so he contributed to Japanese security, regarding that is very difficult to predict how long and how strongly Japan could in the future and even now rely on the USA and its announced, but never delivered 'Asia Pivot' due to the budget restraints and obvious signs of the decline of its powers amidst the numerous problems rising from the hot-spots it has had created around the world – especially North Africa, Middle East, Afghanistan, etc., the USA's potential Machiavellism that would lead it to choose China instead of Japan, China rise, rise

⁶ Abe's cabinet announced that ¥24.7 trillion will be spent between 2014 and 2019, including on drones, subs, fighter jets and amphibious vehicles production and purchasing.

of other traditional and non-traditional security treats – from climate change, terrorism, pollution, pandemics of contagious diseases, etc. Analysts and political supporters of those bold steps emphasize that besides giving impetus to improving and expanding Japan's production of 'defence equipment and technology' and by that - export and economy as a whole - Abe's government invigorated security cooperation with them significantly. In March 2014 Abe's government approved new three principles on transferring defence equipment that would 'contribute to world peace and international cooperation only after a strict screening process'.⁷ Also, in an interim report on the revision of the Guidelines for Japan-USA Defence Cooperation it is stipulated that Japan and the United States will promote security cooperation with allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region.

In his address during the General Debate of the UN General Assembly In September 26 2013, Prime Minister Abe emphasised Japan's global role as a 'Proactive Contributor to Peace' through which Japan will contribute to securing 'peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, while achieving its own security and peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region', based on the 'principle of international cooperation' with the United States of America and other partners. In December 2013 Japan adopted its first National Security Strategy that further explored Japan's basic policies concerning 'strategic diplomacy' and defence strategy that constitute the policy of 'Proactive Contributor to Peace'. Since taking office for the second time, Prime Minister Abe announced the establishment of the National Security Council and initiated consultations focused on it. After several consultations and papers based on them, the Cabinet decided on 'the Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security Council (NSC Establishment Act)' on June 7, 2013 (Defence of Japan, p. 106).

ABE'S EXTENSIVE FOREIGN POLICY, RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS

Since taking the office Prime Minister Abe has introduced into reality the premise of 'Taking a Panoramic Respective of the World Map', e.g., strategic foreign policy in which he mixed global geographic scope with preaching 'unilateral values', such as 'freedom, democracy, respect of fundamental human rights, and the rule of law' and pursuing economic policy designated to turn Japan's economy towards

⁷ The so-called three principles on arms exports were adopted in 1967, when Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared Japan would prohibit weapons exports to communist countries, countries subject to arms embargoes under U.N. resolutions and countries involved in or feared to be involved in international conflicts. The ban started to fray in 1983, however, when the government allowed Japanese companies to provide weapons technology to the United States as an exception. Since then, 21 "exceptions" have been made by chief Cabinet secretaries issuing a statement, one of which in 2013 allowed Japanese companies to take part in developing the F-35 fighter.

growth and renewed competitiveness. Based on these fundamental policies, Japan's diplomacy has been focused on the four crucial policy areas: strengthening the Japan - United States Alliance as first pillar of its diplomacy, deepening cooperation with neighbouring countries, building stronger economic diplomacy and stronger contribution to global issue solving. The first one, Japan-U.S. Alliance, described as 'becoming more important than ever' has been carefully nurtured by frequent exchanges of high official, started with Prime Minister Abe's visit to Washington in February 2013, frequent meetings of foreign ministers and Japan - U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (so called two plus two') in Tokyo, in October 2013. In spite of the complexity of the issue of the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, further steps were made towards its realization. Also, Japan tried to support and meet needs of its rebalancing toward Asia Pacific.

When it comes to the second pillar – cooperation with neighbouring countries – could be also seen as reinforcement of the US rebalancing, as those countries are seen as 'partners'. The first foreign visit and high in Japan's diplomatic agenda is cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which in 2013 experienced the 40th year of cooperation that was celebrated in December 2013 in Tokyo at special, the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit. Both, Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida met with all ten ASEAN countries' relevant partners since taking the offices in an attempt to 'further strengthen cooperative relationship' with each of them individually. High on this agenda come relations with India and Australia with which Japan shares 'universal values and strategic interests' that enables deepening cooperation in various fields, especially in economy and security. After them, relations with Russian Federation, People's Republic of China and Republic of Korea were listed as 'very important'. Bilateral relations with China were modestly described as 'one of most important' (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2014), and both countries responsible for peace and stability in the region and globally. Japan's intentions to pursue improvement on the basic principle of 'mutually beneficial relationship, based on common strategic interests' were reasoned as for the benefits of both countries and the region.

The document further explores Japan's intention to strengthen economic diplomacy as a tool to support *Abenomics* thru different economic frameworks and partnerships – from TPP, RCEP, FTA with China and ROK, Japan-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and promotion of 'infrastructure system exports true "top-level sales" initiatives', with the help of newly established Headquarters for the Promotion of Japanese Business Support within Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2013, the strategic utilization of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and similar measures supported by the state. Additionally, Japan plans to use the existing frameworks of G8, G20, APEC, WTO, OECD, Paris Club, etc. to strengthen its presence and provide assistance to its economy's recovery. Japan also pledged to continue its engagement towards achieving the goal of a world free of nuclear

weapons, starting from supporting the frameworks of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted by UN General Assembly in June 2013, on the initiative of Japan.

Practical aspect of Abe's foreign policy is firstly marked by its very extensive substance, as so far, for the first twenty five months in the office he visited fifty two countries, which is unprecedented for any of his predecessors. His intensive style may be marked with the highlights when Japan being given the hosting of the Olympics and Paralympics Games in 2020 in September 2013 and the darkest moments during the and after fatal outcome of the Islamic State militants' execution of the two Japanese hostages (Kurtenbach, Yamaguchi, 2015). While on the one side, intense diplomatic activity of the Prime Minister was seen very positively, although criticized, it was even mocked by some observers inside and outside of Japan (Ono and Honda, 2014), who primarily noticed intensity of his foreign activity and its tracks that very often followed path of the visits done by Chinese president and prime minister (Ford, 2014).

On the other hand, it was also highly praised behaviour, for many reasons, starting with the fact that many visits, including his visits to all ASEAN member states during the first year in office were seen as strategic focusing into close neighbourhood. Also, his foreign minister, Kishida Fumio visited all ten ASEAN member states. Abe's visits were seen as positive and welcomed move by those states and ASEAN, as this region – paradoxically - was neglected by previous Japanese prime ministers and during that decade of negligence China stepped in boldly as an investor and trading partner and by other numerous ways of cooperation through the framework 'ASEAN plus One'. Although Japan appointed an ambassador to ASEAN, resident in Jakarta in 2010, and took part in dialogues and various activities in 'ASEAN plus Three' framework, Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asian Summit (EAS), Mekong-Japan Summit, etc, it was not competitive enough to preserve the leadership in the region that it built after the Vietnam War. At the time applied the Fukuda Doctrine focused Japanese strategy to the South East Asia region and through its rich set of measures created strong link between Japanese strategic foreign policy aims and economic development. Japanese aid to the region focused on the key ASEAN countries and contributed to growth of Japanese investments and trade with the region and generally, while during the last decade Japan was more inward oriented and constrained by its internal problems, as its foreign regional engagement was more oriented towards China and DPR of Korea issues. When calling for the 'renaissance' of the Fukuda Doctrine, analysts suggest that current available ODA resources are much more limited than at the time, which require sharing the burden of aid to the region with the USA and other willing donors.

It was apparent that Japan needed to fulfil gaps emerged behind, give incentives to the trade with the block and bilaterally, increase investment and ODA programs that benefited both sides as it particularly included small and medium Japanese firms, that were in position to boost their businesses that will help Japanese economy recovery and *Abenomics*, and at the same time to give impetus to local development in the relevant ASEAN countries by spreading technological advantages there. On the other hand, ODA funds were used, for the first time for ‘strategic reasons’, to provide some military equipment or equipment that could and is planned to be used in such purpose, to the countries that lie along important sea lanes and (happen to) have been in escalating territorial misunderstanding with China (Shinizo, 2014).

First foreign trip of Prime Minister Abe happened to be to three ASEAN countries, instead one to Washington, which was his prime wanted designation and which he realized in February.⁸ He also visited Russia, Mongolia, United Kingdom, NATO Head Quarters, France, Poland, took part of the ‘Vishegrad Group’ summit and other destinations by which he attracted a lot of attention with the intensity of his performance in the scope Japan’s diplomacy. In 2013, his first year in the office, Abe visited the following countries for bilateral visits or took part in the international mechanisms’ events there:

January - Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, February – USA, March – Mongolia, April - Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Turkey, May – the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, June - G8 Summit (Great Britain), Poland, Ireland, Great Britain, July - Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, August - Bahrain, Kuwait, Djibouti, Qatar, September - Canada, UN General Assembly, G20 Summit (Saint Petersburg), IOC General Committee (Russia and Argentine), October - Turkey, APEC Summit (Bali, Indonesia), ASEAN Summit (Brunei), November – the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. During 2014, Prime Minister Abe performed the next foreign visits: January – Republic of India, Davos Conference (the Swiss Confederation), the Sultanate of Oman, Cote d’Ivoire, the Republic of Mozambique, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, February - Sochi Olympic Opening (Russian Federation), March - Nuclear Security Summit (the Kingdom of Netherlands), April-May – the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, May – the Republic of Singapore, June - the Kingdom of Belgium, the Italian Republic, July - Mexico, the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Chile, the Federative Republic of Brazil, New Zealand, the Commonwealth of Australia, Papua New Guinea, September - UN General Assembly, the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Democratic Socialist Republic

⁸Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga informed the press that PM Abe had hoped to first visit Washington in order to strengthen Japan’s alliance with the United States, but the visit was postponed due to President Barack Obama’s tight schedule and the first visit turned out to be this way.

of Sri Lanka, October - ASEM Summit (Milan, Italy), November - APEC Summit (Beijing, PR China), ASEAN Summit (the Republic of the Union of Myanmar), G20 Summit (Brisbane, Australia). In January 2015, he visited Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian territories.

When visiting Latin America, Prime Minister Abe was also looking for support for Japanese bid for the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council that was going to be decided upon autumn 2015. He was particularly targeted CARICOM as a powerful voting block in international organizations and within OUN family and its member states, six of which do not recognize PRC, but Taiwan, where he sought for understanding and support for the bid. That support he also asked from his hosts during visits to South Asian countries, even competing candidates, such as Bangladesh and from Sri Lanka and during visit of the Indian PM in August 2014. Although very close to Japan and positioned near sea lanes through which more than 80% of imported LNG and oil is transferred to Japan, these states were not visited by Japanese prime ministers for twenty four years – Sri Lanka – and after almost a decade to Bangladesh. All the visits were consisted of several elements – intensifying or rebuilding political bilateral relations, including security dimension where in many of them he introduced or tried to introduce ‘two-plus-two’ model at the top level (Richards, 2014) (prime ministers plus ministers of Defence), practiced for years in Japanese-USA bilateral summits and is primarily concentrated on security issues, as well as including elements *Abenomics* with attempts to intensify trade, Japanese investments and generally to open field for Japanese corporations, and because of that on those trips Abe was accompanied with over seventy of the business representatives.

His critiques pointed that wherever he went it was in a way too late in the sense that relations were neglected as there were no high-level visits during long periods, and where meanwhile China, as power-house, strongly stepped in as an economic partner and source of generous loans and donations thus winning hearts of the local governments and partly people and at the late our Japans tries to do the same. Numbers and figures showing this reality are genuine, but Abe did something to change it towards Japanese interests. Obvious new reality is, on the other hand, that GDP of PRC is worth nine trillion US\$, and one of Japan is five trillion and it is not possible nor wise for Japan to compete with China on the terms of which each RMB Yuan should be followed by eighteen Yen of investments or assistance. Japan should follow its own path and strategic goals when approaching them. In that sense, both – extensiveness and contents of Abe's visits have had positive results, even though he was ‘trailing the steps’ of the Chinese leaders.

The other argument of those who criticized him, and where we could agree with them, points that in spite of all that extensive diplomatic activity stuffed with economic diplomacy there have been no highest level meetings with the most important Asian neighbours and economic partners in the region – People's

Republic of China and Republic of Korea (Ono and Honda, 2014). PM Abe in fact met with South Korean president Park in the Hague in March 2014, in the trilateral framework that was organized and insisted upon by USA president Barak Obama, on the sidelines of the Nuclear Summit, but the event did not bring any progress in melting the antagonism carefully nurtured by Korean side (Ennis, 2014), for the reasons of internal politics – pre election one and personal legacy of the first lady president in Korea (McCurry, 2012), one of the Asian “princelets”. Looking from a distance and angle of political realism it is not easy to explain why territorial and historical discords grew to the level of becoming such a serious obstacle to the improvement of the relations between two crucial USA allies in this part of the world. All Japanese attempts towards improvements met cold response. Although Japan is the second biggest Korean trade partner, while ROK is the fourth biggest for Japan, it did not affect the ongoing political frictions that Seoul has been insisted on. China is Japan’s leading trading partner, with bilateral trade between the two valued over 332US\$ billion in 2012, according to *the World Trade Organization’s Trade Profiles 2013 report*. Japan-South Korea trade was worth over 103US\$ billion in the same period, making South Korea Japan’s fourth largest trading partner, after USA and the EU. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea are China’s third and fourth largest trading partners, with total trade in 2012 valued at 332US\$ billion and 257US\$ billion respectively. Finally, for South Korea, China is the biggest trade partner and Japan is the second. Beyond the issue of the so called ‘sex slavery’, there has been territorial issues regarding the island of Takeshima/Dokdo island and name of Sea of Japan, that ROK insists on renaming to ‘East Sea’.

The positive elements amid the wave of negative developments between the three East Asian economic giants, which combined economies make 20% of the global GDP and trade share make 17.5% of the global trade, survives all the expressions of animosities are free trade talks on the ministerial level, that are planned to be finalized sooner than Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RECP).

Relations with other Korean state were one of the mentioned biggest challenges that according to Abe Doctrine – its security part – asked for Japan’s adjustment, as latest expressions of PDR of Korea’s nuclear and military abilities pose the security threat to East Asia. Abe’s cabinet tried to soften the North Korean leadership by several semi-secretive missions sent to Pyongyang and Mongolia for talks that were primarily dealt with the case of abductees, and which primary aim was to make the regime in North Korea more dependent on the Japanese aid.

One of the goals of PM Abe’s visit to Russia in April 2012 - that was the first such visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to this country in ten years - was to establish personal relations with Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, as he announced. During the next six months they had another four meeting on different occasions. In November 2013, the first Japan-Russia Joint Foreign and Defence

Ministerial Consultations were held in the 'two plus two' framework. But, Japan ended being among few nations that imposed economic sanctions on Russia on the pretext of the events in Ukraine. Prime Minister Abe in that sense demonstrated sort of self-denying manner of fulfilling his announced goals, which is especially harmful to Japanese interest when it comes to Russia and importance of Russia for Japan. It is very hard to see this as an attempt to revitalize the relations that are highly promising in the sense of economy within the context of the North-East Asia and so important for Japan in strategic sense regarding solving the issue of the North Territories/South Kurils Islands and concluding a peace treaty. Regarding the importance of Russia globally and as an regional factor in energy field, the border issues, Six Party Talks, APEK, East Asia Summit and other bilateral and multilateral highly important mechanisms, processes and issues, following the path marked by the USA proved here to be harmful to Japan, but the question was if Japanese government was capable or allowed to create a space for Japan to occasionally make some distance from that path. In this case, it is not unreasonable to expect the respond from the Russian side towards the negative impact that was done by such behaviour of PM Abe's government. On the other hand, president Putin's political realism creates some area of optimism and even opened slightly a door for improvement of the personal relations⁹ and bilateral relations.

The problem with bilateral relations of Japan with China is huge one – it damaged significantly economies of both countries.¹⁰ It already made many representatives of Japanese businesses to move their premises from China towards countries of ASEAN and even to other continents. The prolonged tensions have very bad political impact and contribute to the worsening of the security in East Asia making it very dangerous. Abe has additionally angered Beijing with his revisionist views on Japan's wartime conduct in China and specifically regarding women used as sex slaves, robust claims that he expressed to the Senkaku/Diyao islands issue, as well as a visit in December 2013 to Yasukuni shrine, regarded by China and South Korea as a symbol of Japanese militarism. His continuous criticisms on numerous public occasions of China's conduct - from human rights,

⁹ Thanks to mediation of the former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori and his personal ties with V. V. Putin, Russian president and Japanese PM, in spite of the current developments, exchanged birthday congratulation phone conversations on the relevant dates (September 21 – PM Abe's birthday and October 7th – President Putin's). This was revealed to the public in Mr. Mori's speech at the Yomiuri Shimbun International Economic Society, held in October 2014, in Tokyo.

¹⁰ According to the Japan External Trade Organization, in 2013 investments by Japanese companies in China shrunk by a third. The Chinese Commerce Ministry said that Japans DI in China fell even more in 2014 with a 38% decline from the year before to 4.33US\$ billion. During the same period, Japanese FDI in the rest of Asia climbed for 21%, and particularly so in the Philippines – for 70%. Diplomatic tensions with Republic of Korea had similar impact on FDI data – in 2013 Japanese FDI fell 18%, but recovered in the first quarter of 2014 with rebound of 43% to the value of 1.1 billion US\$.

respect of law, behaviour in South China Sea, etc. - coined strong animosity on the other side of the East China Sea. It only fortified their view of him as a conservative and militaristically oriented. The territorial dispute Senkaku/Diyao Islands is so high on the Chinese leadership agenda that this importance made them almost totally inflexible towards Abe's attempts to soften it for creating some room for the summit between the two leaders – president Xi Jinping and himself during the APEC summit. Until the last moment, all three semi-secretive missions did not prove to make any progress as Chinese position remained strong and filled with accusations towards Abe personally. His decision to appoint Sadakazu Tanigaki as LDP's secretary general, and veteran MP Toshihiro Nikai as his deputy, drew a moderately optimistic response from Beijing and raised hopes that the two neighbours could improve ties. Chinese president Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Abe eventually hold formal talks on November 10, 2013 during the APEC summit in Beijing, for the first time since the two leaders took office, as a very modest, but positive small step.

Some diplomatic sources in Beijing claim that Chinese aim is to press Tokyo continuously and harshly until it will be ready to admit that there is Senkaku/Diyao issue (and, presumably accept the dual control over the islands). Japanese position is that there is no issue, that the islands are under Japanese control and accordingly Japanese territory, while China strongly claims the ownership of it, and such an opposite stands make the outcome and solution to this very serious cause of conflict highly uncertain. Further more, current situation gives room for the future development of the dangerous incidents that could lead to more serious events, even clashes or other more serious combat activities that would endanger peace in East Asia and would have made negative impact on the Asia-Pacific and even global peace and security. One of the most dangerous situation happened during Chinese-Russian maritime drills in the East China Sea when Japanese surveillance plane and electronic intelligence aircraft were scrambled by Chinese fighters within the Chinese declared air defence zone over the disputed islands in May 2014. Similar situations happened 415 times in 2013, up 36% from the previous year, while both countries patrols ships and different vessels were playing dangerous games in the waters around the islands, raising regional fear that one of the incidents could lead to an accidental clash that could spark even more dangerous developments.

After having approved the export of parts for a surface-to-air missile system to the United States and joint Japanese-British research on missile technology for fighter jets, in October 2014 Japan positively responded to Australian request to start the talks on joint cooperation in submarine development. If positively decided, that would not only mean transfer of highly sensitive 'top secret' technology of Soryu-class submarines to Australia in 2030, but also upgrading security cooperation with the nation that 'maintains closest and highest levels of security cooperation with Japan, except for the United States' to another level, above the usual and regular

common drills, and very likely also to transform it into trilateral USA-Japan-Australian project. This could be realized as Australia would like to equip the submarines with US's cruise missiles and other communication equipment and trilateral talks were held during the G 20 summit in November 16 2014, in Brisbane. Although the three sides keep each other for the closest allies against the China's continuing advance into the Pacific and Indian oceans it was their first trilateral summit in seven years.

In the early 1990s Japan established the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process aimed at assisting African economies and support cooperation with them. In June 2013, the Fifth TICAD was organized in Yokohama, while Abe visited several African countries in January 2014 with the intention to make known assistance package that should give humanitarian aid and support business capacity building. Abe has been visiting Middle Eastern countries, which are sources of over 80% of Japan's crude oil import and about 29% of its natural gas import couple of times, offering sales of nuclear technology and energy industries, offering humanitarian and other forms of assistance, and promising to stand with countries that fight against terrorism. The region will remain of the highest strategic importance to Japan, as Abe promised to continue the situation were together with North Africa it remains a destination of much overseas development assistance, worth 1.5US\$ billion in 2012.

When it comes to Central Asia, Japan initiated the Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue of foreign ministers in 2004. The administration of Abe is aiming to increase Japan's presence there, where China's economic, political and cultural influence has been growing. Even though, Japan's presence remained only within the framework that put five Central Asian countries together. The latest, fifth, meeting of the 'five plus Japan' framework was held in Bishkek, under the widest framework of 'proactive pacifism' and Tokyo's plan of promoting peace and stability in the region. Japan initiated cooperation in agriculture true offering advanced farming techniques to Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as well as some road infrastructure projects in Kyrgyzstan and border control between three of the countries and Afghanistan to prevent drug smuggling and terrorist over-spills.

In Japan's 'Panoramic foreign policy' so far there has been no specific place for the countries in the South-Eastern Europe, including Serbia, where increase of the Chinese economic presence has been very obvious recently and where Japan has traditionally good reputation, but too modest economic and political presence.

On the other hand, soft power as element also explored in the numerous published papers with the Doctrine, was much less visible so far in Abe's acts and words, although it was the second leg and of the Japanese post-war global acceptance and respected and widely recognized element of its identity. Japan has won its place

as significant global nation with already established impressive soft power, with huge influence on a cultural level, one of the biggest world donor nations, it is so important beyond its economic significance of the second or lately third biggest world economy, technological power-house, investor and financial big power, development model for all successful Asian tigers and little dragons, and rising economic powers in Asia and globally. Nevertheless, the investment in hard power is what worries many in the region and sown the seed of scepticism among those who might accept the rest of it. Soft power is within the Abe Doctrine, but ‘Cool Japan’ has not been seen a lot in practice, while strengthening of hard power through different elements that rose concern inside and outside Japan was very obvious.

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Dragana MITROVIĆ

ABEOVA DOKTRINA I JAPANSKA SPOLJNA POLITIKA

Apstrakt: Pokušavajući da sačuva opšti okvir japanske posleratne spoljne i bezbednosne politike, premijer Abe je započeo njihove složene i kontroverzne promene koje su istovremeno izazvale podršku, ali i oštre kritike u zemlji i inostranstvu. Njegov kontekst “aktivnog doprinosa miru” s jedne strane uneo je dinamiku u rebalans moći u azijsko-pacifičkom regionu, a s druge strane naglasio regionalnu i globalnu ulogu Japana.

Ključne reči: Abe Šinzo, Abeova doktrina, „aktivni doprinos miru“.

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ENERGY SECURITY AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN BULGARIA

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Abstract: The paper defines the concept of energy security and outlines the role of energy security for national economies. The energy sector in Bulgaria has been analyzed as well as the energy dependence from foreign energy supplies that secure/ensure internal energy consumption.

The paper gives information for the dynamics and trends of development of energy consumption in Bulgaria for the period 1990–2013. The prognoses for the future energy consumption trends are presented. The method of trend extrapolation of energy consumption development is used.

The energy balance of Bulgaria is analyzed regarding the usage of local and imported primary energy sources (coal, petrol, natural gas, nuclear energy, renewable energy sources) for ensuring final domestic energy consumption (for all industrial sectors and households).

A detailed analysis of each of the primary energy sources used for electricity production is elaborated; the advantages and disadvantages of each of them have been explained.

Special attention has been paid to the engagement of Bulgaria concerning the implementation of Europe 2020 strategy and the future energy policy of the country that includes not only enhancing energy security but also increasing the share of renewable energy sources in final energy consumption, building of a new energy infrastructure, development of a highly competitive energy market, finding the right balance between the interests of energy consumers and energy producers and suppliers.

The article also points out the dependence of major energy projects upon the changes in political situation.

Key words: Energy security, energy consumption, energy sources, energy statistics

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INTRODUCTION

The Bulgarian energy agenda is determined by deepening of the link between the Bulgarian and the European Union energy policy.

Energy security (Commission on Sustainable Development (2007)) of Bulgaria is a multi-facet problem that includes the country's provision of traditional and renewable energy sources as well as measures for enhancing energy efficiency in all industrial sectors. National energy security should be analyzed in parallel with the EU energy security policy. Energy markets liberalization, transparency and efficiency are important prerequisites for the achievement of national energy security. Diversification of energy sources (traditional and renewable) and diversification of the routes via which energy sources (mainly natural gas and petrol) are delivered are also important elements of national energy security.

The energy security policy of Bulgaria is integrated (Energy Efficiency Agency (2010)) in the “Climate change – Energy” pack policy measures.³ The Bulgarian energy policy is currently under restructuring that is inspired by the clear strive to energy independence, efficiency and transparency. The development of contemporary national energy policy of Bulgaria will have a major impact on tomorrow's national and regional (SEE) energy security and energy markets.

Energy system is a “cardiovascular” system of any economy: being well-provided-for electricity, petrol and natural gas economy it has one of the major prerequisites of sustainable economic growth. Economic and social welfare of any state depends on many factors, among which is safe and reliable energy supply. That is why energy security is an issue in both economic and national security.

The Bulgarian energy sector is a key factor for the economic development of the country. On the average, for the last ten years exports of electricity and imports of energy sources account annually for 12% and 21%, respectively, of the total trade turnover of Bulgaria. For the last ten years, every 4th public procurement deal has been concluded in the energy sector as well. In one particular year – 2008, Bulgaria started energy projects with a monetary value equal to the European funding budgeted for Bulgaria for the whole EU programming period 2007–2013.

Different external factors exert an impact on energy security of Bulgaria as well, and among them are global climate change and the EU binding objectives for CO₂

³ The concept “energy policy” is often used in theory as well as in the acts of EU institutions. In Part I of the Treaty for Establishing of the European Community energy is set as one of the major Community activities. This is important because two of the Communities – The European Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM are entirely devoted to energy aspects. Proceeding from the ideas and principles of the EU legislation, it can be assumed that the EU energy policy represents a complex of policy measures that have been undertaken at the EU level, which are aimed at implementing actions that will result in certain long term effects for the energy sector at the EU level and at the national level for the EU member states.

emissions reduction, global trends of reduction of energy intensity of the economy and enhancing of energy efficiency, global trends of increasing the usage of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) in the total energy mix, the economic crisis impact on the energy sector, political risks resulting from internal and external geopolitical interests.

The objective of the article is to make an analysis of energy security and energy consumption of Bulgaria.

ENERGY SECURITY OF BULGARIA – STATE OF THE ART AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Energy security is important for contemporary economy because the uneven geographic distribution of energy sources in different parts of the world makes certain countries vulnerable to energy supply security risks. Energy security enhancement is the only decision for these countries, though the basic elements that should be focused vary from country to country; nevertheless, energy security involves diversification of energy sources and the routes via which they are imported in any energy dependent state enhancing energy efficiency of the local economy, effective usage of the available local energy sources, flexibility of the energy system, balancing the different interests existing on any energy market, diversification of the total energy mix (via stimulation of both renewable and traditional energy sources usage in the final gross energy production and consumption).

Having in mind the key role of energy security for national security of Bulgaria, our country has to solve several basic problems that have roots in the energy field and hinder the overall economic development of Bulgaria. Seven years after its accession to the EU Bulgaria cannot decrease the high level of energy dependence from Russia and cannot increase the overall energy efficiency of the economy to reach an acceptable EU level. Local energy sources are not sufficient to satisfy internal energy consumption.

National energy balances depict most clearly the situation in the energy field of any country. Bulgaria is strongly dependent on imports of crude oil, natural gas and high quality coal, while the only significant local energy sources are low calorie lignite and brown coal and hydro energy. In 2012, the primary energy production in Bulgaria satisfied approximately half of the total internal energy consumption this mostly resulting from the contribution of solid fuels and nuclear energy. A clear trend could be followed in the last twenty years: nearly 2/3 of the energy sources that have been further transformed have been used for electricity production and heating. Approximately 30% of the total energy sources that have been transformed are directed to oil refineries and the rest of it is transformed by briquettes compressing factories, blast and coking companies. Final energy, produced as a

result of primary energy sources transformation, amounts to approximately 60% of the primary energy input.

In 2012, the predominant part of the energy available for final consumption was used by transport (31.7%) being followed by industry (28.5%) and households (26.5%). The structure of the final energy consumption of energy sources by type of source outlines oil products as the leading energy source followed by electricity and natural gas. Slowly, but certainly, consumption of energy generated by renewable energy sources has increased over the last years and decades. In 1990, renewable energy had accounted for only 1% of the final energy consumption in Bulgaria; in 2012 it contributed with 12% of the final energy consumption. Solid fuels have the smallest percentage in the final energy consumption – 4.8% of the final energy consumption is formed by solid fuels consumption in 2012.

Coal is one of few energy sources which is naturally available in Bulgaria. Large deposits of low calorie lignite coal have some undisputable advantages as low costs of extraction, low transportation costs (for the territorial proximity of the coal deposits to their basic consumers – the thermo electric power plants “Maritza Iztok 2”, “ContourGlobal Maritza Iztok 3” and “AIS Galabovo”). The advantages of this type of energy source make it reliable and independent from external geopolitical factors. The total production of coal in Bulgaria in 2012 was 33.4 million tons, where lignite and brown coal prevailed. “Maritza – Iztok Coal Mines” Single-member PLC is the basic producer contributing with 96.2% of the total coal production in Bulgaria. Internal consumption of black and anthracitic coal is totally satisfied by imports that come mainly from Ukraine and Russia. Black and anthracitic coal imports are processed mainly by the thermo electric power plant “Varna” that is the second largest thermo electric power plant on the Balkan Peninsula. This plan is expected to bring closer full modernization in the recent years that will result in black coal reduction. In Bulgaria 97.4% of coals (no matter of their type) is used for production of electricity and thermal energy, 1.4% of coal is used for production of briquettes, 0.7% is used by the thermo electric power stations for their own energy needs and 0.5% is used by households for homes heating.

Consumption of petroleum is satisfied by petroleum imports because local Bulgarian petrol deposits are rather humble and local petroleum extraction is low (only 23.5 thousand tons in 2012). Petroleum imports come predominantly from Russia (which is the main exporter), but in the last five years there are some separate import deals for petroleum imports from Ukraine, Georgia and Kazakhstan. Notwithstanding these import deals, they refer to rather low import quantities that do not affect the fact of practically full energy dependence on the petroleum imports from Russia. In 2012, petroleum imports in Bulgaria were 5.7 million tons. “Lukoil Neftochim Bourgas” JSK is the main Bulgarian refinery as well as the biggest one on the Balkan Peninsula. Taking into account the fact that the Russian company “Lukoil Group” is the owner of the refinery and since its establishment

the company has been adjusted to process the Russian petroleum of the “Ural” type, reduction of the Russian petroleum imports dependence is hardly likely to occur for Bulgaria.

Bulgaria is one of the biggest petrol exporters in South East Europe. In 2012, Bulgarian production of petrol products is 6.0 million tons, diesel fuel holds the largest portion of petrol products production, which is followed by gasoline and steam generators fuel. The consumption of these petrol products is distributed almost equally between the internal and the exports markets. A positive trend of rising exports of these commodities could be followed and they represent a constantly growing share in the total exports of Bulgaria. Basic export markets for Bulgarian petrol products are Central European countries, the Balkan Peninsula countries, the USA and Singapore. Despite Bulgaria is one of the major petroleum processing countries in the region, nearly 50% of its local consumption is satisfied by imports (mainly of diesel and gasoline) and distribution which is done by large foreign companies distribution networks in Bulgaria.

Bulgaria is heavily dependent on natural gas imports. Natural gas imports satisfy almost all internal demand of natural gas. Russia is the only importer of this energy source, and the gas itself is imported via the only existing import route passing through Ukraine, Moldova and Romania. In 2012, natural gas consumption in Bulgaria was 2.7 bln. cubic meters, natural gas imports were 2.5 bln. cubic meters and local extraction was 389 mln. cubic meters.

Problems of natural gas market in Bulgaria are connected both with consumption and supplies. Gas consumption follows a steady downsizing trend in the last years. Industry and energy plants are the main consumers of natural gas in Bulgaria, but their activities are shrinking in the last years, while household gasification has rather low levels in Bulgaria (1.5% of homes in Bulgaria has gas supply) compared to the EU average (55%) (“Energy strategy of Republic of Bulgaria till 2020” (2011)). Moreover, the share of Bulgarian households that use natural gas is growing rather slowly that is an additional constraint to the market of this energy source.

Another important problem of Bulgarian gas sector is the high dependence of Bulgarian economy on Russian gas supplies. The combination of lack of alternative sources and routes for gas delivery and the limited quantities of gas consumption in Bulgaria results in higher gas prices for final consumers in Bulgaria. This fact reduces the export competitiveness of local industrial companies. The strong vulnerability of Bulgaria to the security of gas supplies became evident during the gas crisis from the beginning of 2009 and was the main reason for the actions that have been taken later for building of inter-system connections between the Bulgarian natural gas transportation system and the gas systems of the neighboring EU countries (Greece and Romania) as well as for the participation of Bulgaria in

building of the South gas corridor that is supposed to supply natural gas for the region that comes from the Caspian region and Near East. Even though, these actions are not enough to avert future crisis situations concerning the security of gas supplies to Bulgaria.

Gross consumption of electricity in Bulgaria was 47.3 terawatt-hours in 2012. Thermoelectric power stations have a predominant share of 43.4% (20.5 terawatt-hours) in the total electricity production. The nuclear power station “Kozlodui” contributes with 33.4% (15.8 terawatt-hours) of the total electricity production in Bulgaria and its share in the total national electricity production has remained approximately unchanged before and after stopping of its four old reactors (reactors 1-4). Renewable energy sources generate nearly 11% (5.2 terawatt-hours) of the total electricity production of Bulgaria and nearly 2/3 of renewable energy comes from hydroelectric power stations. Bulgaria exports electricity to neighboring Balkan countries: in 2012, the exports of electricity amounted to 8.3 terawatt-hours (17.6% of the total energy production) to Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey, while prospective export markets for Bulgarian electricity are Kosovo and Italy.

Production of renewable energy is a basic energy priority of Bulgaria in the recent years. According to the “Europe 2020” strategy Bulgaria has the commitment to achieve an important national target: renewable energy should secure 16% of gross final energy consumption in Bulgaria till 2020. Hydroelectric power stations have a leading role in renewable energy production in Bulgaria and new priorities of national energy policy result in a considerable and steady growth of the share of renewable energy produced in wind and photo-voltaic power stations.

Electricity generated by wind power stations amounted to 1.2 terawatt-hours in 2012 what was 23.4% of gross renewable electricity production. Photovoltaic power stations generated 0.8 terawatt-hours, what was equal to 15.4% of gross renewable electricity production in Bulgaria for 2012. In order to achieve the objective of “Europe 2020” Strategy Bulgaria applies the national energy policy that stimulates the installation of renewable energy power capacities by guaranteeing buying up of renewable energy from producers at high preferential prices for a period of 20 years as well as priority accession of renewable energy of all types that has been produced all over the country to the national system for energy distribution. The result of these policy measures has been a strong development of the renewable energy sector in Bulgaria and the investment interest that had even created an investment balloon on the renewable energy market. Bulgaria overfulfilled the 2020 target for eight years before the set deadline – the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption reached 16.3% in 2012. The country, however, was in a difficulty to provide sufficient financial resources for buying up renewable energy, what resulted in higher electricity prices for final consumers that paid the bill. To solve this problem a number of legislative changes have been introduced that decreased investors interest to the renewable energy

sector in Bulgaria. The legislative changes include reduction of preferential tariffs for buying up renewable energy and reduction of the period of their validity, setting of these tariffs and validity periods after the completion of power stations construction works, the right of the regulating government institution to change the tariffs once per year and the introduction of a special fee for connection to the national system for energy distribution.

With a view to the key role of the energy sector for the Bulgarian economy, the energy policy aims of enhancing national energy security, raising the share of renewable energy in the final energy consumption, development of a competitive national energy market, satisfying energy needs at national level while balancing between energy producers and consumers interests. An adequate energy infrastructure is a key factor for the achievement of these goals for it is the “cardiovascular system” of the economy. Proper maintenance and development of national energy infrastructure is an important factor for sustainable development of national economy and economic and social welfare of the nation. The forecasts for increase in energy consumption in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years make the need for improving the existing national energy infrastructure as well as extending and enlarging it, what is a real issue and a step for improving national energy security.

As a whole, carrying out of energy sector projects depends on both their expedience and the concrete political situation and geopolitical conventionalities hiding considerable risks for their implementation. For example, carrying out of most of the biggest national energy projects has been postponed or prolonged for decades and in the meanwhile some of them have dropped out of the national priorities projects lists. For example, the construction of a second nuclear power station (“Belene” nuclear power station) in Bulgaria is an issue that had suffered many twists in the past decades and finally after many funds had been invested, in February 2013 the government in Bulgaria officially froze the construction works on the project and stopped working on it.

As a participating country in the project for building of the so-called South gas corridor that represents a priority project for the EU, Bulgaria participates actively in almost all projects for supply of the Caspian and Near East gas to Europe. Concerning this corridor, the key geographic location of the country makes it a leading transit route for natural gas to the other EU countries. Carrying out of these projects, however, met serious problems arising from market conditions, different political interests of the participating countries and inconsecutiveness in the participating governments’ actions (mostly the Bulgarian government) concerning the energy projects. The basic transit routes for gas supply in which Bulgaria has participated are the projects “South Stream”, Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the construction of inter-connecting pipelines between the gas pipeline systems of Bulgaria and its neighboring countries (Greece, Turkey, Romania and Serbia). The Project “South Stream” was stopped on 1 December 2014 when the Russian

President Vladimir Putin announced during his visit to Ankara, Turkey, that Russia would invest in a new gas pipeline through Turkey and Greece that would replace the “South Stream” which would be stopped. The construction of these pipelines will result in diversification of the routes for gas supplies that will reduce the dependence of Bulgaria on Russian imports. At this stage, only the inter-connecting pipeline with Romania is under construction and will soon be finished, but this pipeline offers limited possibilities for real diversification and alternative route for gas supply. The construction of inter-connecting pipeline between Bulgaria and Serbia is postponed for the ambiguity on how the project will be financed, because the interconnecting pipeline between Bulgaria and Turkey is still under negotiations and for the Bulgaria–Greece interconnecting pipeline it is quite clear that financing is totally missing.

The Irish company “Petroceltic” that has bought “Merlous Resources Sarl” in the fall of 2012 has undertaken an investigation on the possibilities for extraction of natural gas in the Black Sea Bulgarian territorial waters. Currently, it exploits the “Kavarna” and “Kaliakra” gas deposits and extracts 729.9 thousand cubic meters of natural gas daily. It is expected that till 2015 another gas deposit (“Kavarna-east”) will start operation, thus extending the production of this company up to 850 thousand cubic meters of natural gas daily. This will be enough to satisfy just about 10% of domestic demand for natural gas in Bulgaria.

Another perspective for enhancing national energy independence is the project for construction of the 7th reactor (and potentially of one more 8th reactor) of the “Kozlodui” nuclear power station. The basic advantage of this project is the existing supporting infrastructure. Thus, it is obvious that the costs for construction of an entirely new nuclear power station will be higher than the enlargement of the existing one. Notwithstanding, at this stage the future of this project is unclear as well.

STUDY OF THE TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION IN BULGARIA

Trends of development are considered to be basic components of development when studying the dynamics of economic phenomena and processes. The trend of development is a result of the action of considerable, important and permanent factors and reasons that determine the direction of development of a certain economic phenomenon. Studies of trends of development contribute to the analysis in the following aspects:

- From a descriptive analysis viewpoint such studies clearly show the regularities of the development of the phenomenon;
- From a prognostic analysis viewpoint it helps to prognosticate the future levels of energy consumption in the country.

Internal gross energy consumption

Internal gross energy consumption includes the entire energy consumption of a certain country, regardless of the type of energy sources that have been consumed (Eurostat 2013). It is measured in thousand tons of oil equivalent and its diagram of development has been presented on Fig.1.

From the diagram of development it could be noticed that the development of internal gross energy consumption in the last 23 years follows a clear downsizing trend. A number of factors determine this development such as the reduction of the population of Bulgaria in the last 23 years, increasing of the energy efficient technologies application both in industry and in the living houses, the closedown or restructuring of many energy consuming companies, etc. Moreover, quite logically it is evident that in periods of economic crises total energy consumption decreases and in periods of economic growth it grows up.

Fig. 1. Dynamics of the internal gross energy consumption for the period 1990–2012 measured in thousand tons of oil equivalent



Except for the simple visual tracing of the trends of development, statistical methods such as hypothesis testing can be applied in the energy field. Different tests are known in theory that help finding out whether a trend of development⁴ is available for a given dynamic row. Autocorrelation coefficients of first order⁵ (Dimitrov, 2005; Mishev and Goev 2010) are among the most commonly used tests. It is considered that when dynamic rows contain a trend of development they are

⁴A dynamic row of data is “a row of primary or secondary data, ordered chronologically in time, that reflect the changes in a certain phenomenon in time”.

⁵“Autocorrelation is the correlation between the consecutive meanings of a certain statistical data row”. “Autocorrelation coefficient of first order can successfully be used as a criteria for testing the presence of a trend”.

autocorrelated, e.g. each member of the row is correlated and depending on the previous member/s of the same dynamic row.

Velichkova (Velichkova, 1981, p.7) describes how to find autocorrelation coefficient of first order, using the formula:

$$r_1 = \frac{\sum_{i=2}^N Y_i Y_{i-1} - \frac{1}{N-1} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} Y_i \sum_{i=2}^N Y_i}{\sqrt{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} Y_i^2 - \frac{1}{N-1} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{N-1} Y_i \right)^2 \right] \left[\sum_{i=2}^N Y_i^2 - \frac{1}{N-1} \left(\sum_{i=2}^N Y_i \right)^2 \right]}}$$

where: r_1 is autocorrelation coefficient of first order,

Y_i are the values of the dynamic row,

Y_{i-1} are the lagging values of the dynamic row,

and N is the length of the dynamic row.

To perform the test, two hypotheses should be defined: a zero hypothesis (H_0) and an alternative hypothesis (H_1). According to the zero hypothesis there is no autocorrelation in the dynamic row that we examine, e.g. the autocorrelation coefficient is not statistically significant and there is no development trend. According to the alternative hypothesis, the autocorrelation coefficient is statistically significant and there is a development trend. The risk of mistake is 5% ($\alpha 0,05$).

Table 1 presents the results of the calculation of the autocorrelation coefficients and their levels of significance. In this case, the autocorrelation coefficient of first order is equal to $r_1 = 0.471$ and its level of significance is less than 0.05. According to the methodologies defined by Velichkova (Velichkova, 1981, pp. 71–74) and Mishev and Goev (Mishev and Goev, 2010, p. 45), this means that we can assume the hypothesis for presence of trend of development. In the particular case that we study, with a probability of 0.95% we can assume that the gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria for the last two decades follows a trend of development.

Table 1. Autocorrelation coefficients of gross domestic energy consumption (Mishev and Goev (2010))

Lag	Autocorrelation coefficients	Standard errors	Test of Ljung – Box		
			Empirical characteristics	Degrees of freedom	Level of significance
1	0.471	0.196	5.789	1	0.016
2	0.286	0.191	8.034	2	0.018
3	0.251	0.187	9.849	3	0.020
4	0.097	0.182	10.135	4	0.038
5	0.215	0.177	11.607	5	0.041
6	0.157	0.172	12.440	6	0.053

Modeling of the trend

Modeling of trends of development results in specifying the analytical type of the function, where the phenomenon has been studied depending on time, where “Y” is the energy consumption in Bulgaria, “t” is artificial variable for time, and ε_t is accidental component in the model.

To determine the trend of development 11 different econometric models are used (linear and non-linear), where the trend of development is described through the model that has greater explanatory power.⁶ The results have been presented in Table 2.⁷

Table 2. Results from the 11 econometric models constructed to describe the trend of development of gross internal energy consumption in the country

Models	Characteristics of the models				
	Coefficient of determination	F em	Degree of freedom 1	Degree of freedom 2	Level of significance
$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \varepsilon_t$	0.524	23.080	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln t + \varepsilon_t$	0.694	47.693	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 + \frac{\beta_1}{t} + \varepsilon_t$	0.714	52.339	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 t^2 + \varepsilon_t$	0.630	17.022	2	20	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 t + \beta_2 t^2 + \beta_3 t^3 + \varepsilon_t$	0.679	13.424	3	19	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 \beta_1^t + \varepsilon_t$	0.547	25.349	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_1 t^{\beta_2} + \varepsilon_t$	0.690	46.731	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = e^{\beta_0 + \beta_1 t} + \varepsilon_t$	0.664	41.453	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = e^{\beta_0 \cdot \beta_1^t} + \varepsilon_t$	0.547	25.349	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = \beta_0 e^{\beta_1 t} + \varepsilon_t$	0.547	25.349	1	21	0.000
$Y_t = 1 / (1 / u + \beta_0 \beta_1^t) + \varepsilon_t$	0.547	25.349	1	21	0.000


The results of the competitive models that have been used show that the hyperbola model (j) could be assumed as the best model that has the following shape after it has been evaluated with the parameters:

⁶ From statistical point of view, the most appropriate model is the model that has the highest coefficient of determination (R Square).

⁷ For studying of the trends of development it is possible to use different econometric models, among which the most appropriate will be the model that will have the highest coefficient of determination. 11 models are used for the current research that is suitable for this type of researches.

Graphically the trend of development can be presented as a hyperbola (Figure 2.)

Fig. 2. Dynamics and trend of development of gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria, 1990–2012.



As Figure 2 depicts, the trend of development (the dense incessant line) for the last two decades is downsizing. In this case, it is specific that gross internal energy consumption has been gradually reducing, while at the same time the speed of this reduction is gradually slowing down, so that mathematically the trend of development is slowly coming near to its asymptote which is about 18-19 kilotons of oil equivalent.

The econometric model that has been chosen could be assumed as good, because it explains 71% of the changes in the gross internal energy consumption in the country.

In order to properly analyze the dynamics of gross internal energy consumption in the country it is necessary to trace out the dynamics of energy consumption of the different types of energy that have been consumed in the country for the respective period. These types of energy sources are coal, petroleum products, natural gas, nuclear energy, renewable energy sources (Boneva and Atanasov, 2013) (Table 3).

Table 3. Data (used in the analysis) for energy consumption in Bulgaria by type of energy source, thousands of oil equivalent

Year	Gross energy consumption	Coal	Petroleum	Natural gas	Nuclear energy	Renewable energy sources
1990	27,649.7	8,716.6	9,094.7	5,395.7	3,782.9	333.9
1991	22,255.5	7,697.5	6,006.7	4,617.0	3,400.9	350.8
1992	20,651.8	7,556.2	5,476.6	4,066.6	2,979.9	340.0
1993	21,955.0	8,137.3	6,085.1	3,802.3	3,604.4	316.5
1994	21,161.5	7,572.5	5,521.8	3,820.2	3,959.6	293.7
1995	22,689.4	7,621.3	5,628.0	4,584.4	4,458.5	411.0
1996	23,000.4	7,731.2	5,470.3	4,676.2	4,670.4	491.0
1997	20,781.6	7,835.9	4,468.5	3,699.7	4,585.6	476.5
1998	20,213.1	7,499.6	4,850.3	3,129.1	4,365.9	678.2
1999	18,287.4	6,488.7	4,527.4	2,686.2	4,086.4	658.1
2000	18,522.6	6,432.9	4,068.2	2,931.4	4,699.4	776.4
2001	19,295.7	7,244.2	4,157.6	2,738.1	5,058.0	692.3
2002	18,694.6	6,650.5	4,114.8	2,402.3	5,232.7	828.0
2003	19,296.2	7,326.7	4,498.5	2,499.6	4,473.7	942.1
2004	18,940.5	7,220.5	4,370.4	2,492.7	4,351.5	980.0
2005	19,754.1	6,895.0	4,724.4	2,804.1	4,826.0	1,098.2
2006	20,398.8	6,965.7	4,956.3	2,900.6	5,042.3	1,140.5
2007	20,036.9	7,863.9	4,720.6	3,010.4	3,797.6	961.6
2008	19,926.5	7,551.1	4,767.2	2,914.2	4,088.3	1,062.2
2009	17,504.1	6,400.6	4,303.4	2,160.7	3,958.4	1,111.3
2010	17,769.8	6,886.8	3,887.8	2,300.4	3,956.1	1,456.6
2011	19,089.9	8,105.9	3,669.2	2,630.3	4,230.3	1,362.6
2012	18,233.3	6,931.4	3,837.0	2,451.2	4,094.2	1,627.2

Prognosis for energy consumption in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years until 2020

As it has been already mentioned modeling of trends of development could be used both to describe the objective laws governing the developments in energy consumption in Bulgaria in the years that have already passed as well as to make prognosis for the forthcoming years (Fig. 3, Table 4).

Figure 3. Prognostic values of gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria until 2020




Table 4. Prognostic values of gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria until 2020, kilotons of oil equivalent

Years	Expected gross internal energy consumption	Lower limit	Upper limit
2013	19,200	16,595	21,805
2014	19,185	16,580	21,791
2015	19,172	16,565	21,778
2016	19,159	16,552	21,766
2017	19,148	16,540	21,755
2018	19,137	16,529	21,744
2019	19,126	16,519	21,734
2020	19,117	16,509	21,725

The presumption that has been assumed here is that energy consumption in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years until 2020 will follow the same patterns of development as in the period that has been analyzed (1990–2012). The econometric models that have been used as well as all definitions of the concepts used in the statistical analysis are explained in detail by Velichkova, 1981 and Mishev and Goev, 2010.

To receive a realistic and reliable statistical prognosis, the following key issues should be taken into account:

- The choice of appropriate functions for modeling of trends of development. The functions have been chosen in the previous stage of the research, where 11 mutually competitive econometric models have been used;

- The received parameters can be accepted as stable ones, because we do not observe different trends of development in dynamic rows that have been examined for the different time periods;
- It can be assumed that in the forthcoming years the trends in energy consumption in the country will be relatively unchanged since no major technology or economic changes are expected as a whole;
- The modeled trends will be extrapolated until 2020 and will provide a prognosis for the average expected values of energy consumption in the country;
- Confidence intervals have been calculated for the prognosis, which show the limits within which the values of energy consumption can fluctuate in the forthcoming years, with a probability of 0.95.

On the basis of the prognosis that has been developed, if we presume that the trend of development of gross internal energy consumption in the country will not change in the forthcoming years, it is highly probable that in 2020 it will be no less than 16, 509 and no more than 21, 725 thousand oil equivalent.

Table 5. Prognostic values of expected consumption of energy in Bulgaria until 2020 by type of primary energy source, in thousands of oil equivalent.

Year	Coal	Petroleum	Natural gas	Nuclear energy	Renewable energy sources
2013	7,359	4,326	2,644	3,725	1,588
2014	7,399	4,318	2,715	3,576	1,673
2015	7,435	4,310	2,800	3,419	1,761
2016	7,468	4,303	2,900	3,257	1,850
2017	7,494	4,297	3,015	3,090	1,942
2018	7,515	4,291	3,144	2,919	2,037
2019	7,527	4,285	3,288	2,745	2,134
2020	7,529	4,280	3,446	2,568	2,233

In spite of the fact that energy consumption in Bulgaria depends on different factors, an attempt to make a prognosis for the energy consumption in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years has been done with the use of econometric models. On the basis of the research it can be assumed that if energy consumption trends that have been observed in the last two decades in Bulgaria remain unchanged for the years to come, the expected total energy consumption in 2020 will be 19, 117 thousand tons of oil equivalent. As far as energy consumption by type of energy is concerned, a considerable rise in the energy consumption of renewable energy could be expected, while other types of energy sources consumption will slightly decrease or will remain relatively unchanged.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The study and prognosis of gross internal energy consumption in the country is a complex process that is, however, crucial for the proper management of national energy policy and the smooth functioning of all economic processes in the country as a whole. The study has traced out the main trends of development of total energy consumption and prognosticated the expected energy consumption in the country until 2020. The total energy consumption in Bulgaria shows a steady downsizing trend for the last two decades and it is quite logical that this trend will be kept unchanged. It is important to mention that the pace of this reduction is slowing down and it is quite probable that in the future, energy consumption will retain at a relatively steady level.

In support of the downsizing trend of gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria in the forthcoming years we can point out the following facts:

1. Population is one of the major groups of energy consumers in Bulgaria. According to the demographic prognosis of the National Statistical Institute, the number of population will decline in the following years, so the expected energy consumption of the population will decline as well.
2. Companies represent the second major group of energy consumers in Bulgaria. They have constantly increased their energy efficiency in Bulgaria in the last years and this tendency is expected to continue, so the expected energy consumption of companies is expected to decline.
3. Finally, the high explanatory power of the econometric models that have been presented (the high coefficients of determination) make the prognoses that have proved to be highly reliable.

CONCLUSION

The policy of Bulgaria in the field of energy is directed mainly towards increasing of energy security increasing the share of renewable energy in the final energy consumption, the development of a competitive energy market, satisfaction of the population and industry needs of energy and finding the proper balance between the interests of consumers and producers. The achievement of these objectives could be made through building of a new energy infrastructure that will contribute to energy security of the country. Carrying out of new strategic energy projects for Bulgaria (in the field of nuclear energy and South Stream) will bring to a reduction energy dependence of the country.

The analysis and the prognosis of the gross internal energy consumption in Bulgaria are crucial for the management and implementation of the nation's energy policy.

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Antoaneta VASSILEVA

Svetla BONEVA

ENERGETSKA BEZBEDNOST I POTROŠNJA U BUGARSKOJ

Apstrakt. Rad definiše koncept energetske bezbednosti i naglašava njen značaj za nacionalne ekonomije. Analizira se energetske sektor Bugarske kao i energetska zavisnost od stranih energetske zaliha koje obezbeđuju/osiguravaju unutrašnju potrošnju energije.

Rad daje informacije o dinamici energetske potrošnje Bugarske u period od 1999 do 2013. Takođe su predstavljene i prognoze za buduću energetske potrošnju, uz primenu odgovarajuće metodologije.

Energetska ravnoteža Bugarske je analizirana u pogledu upotrebe domaćih i uvoznih primarnih energetske izvora (ugalj, benzin, prirodni gas, nuklearnu energiju, obnovljive energetske izvore) za obezbeđenje celokupne domaće energetske potrošnje (za sve industrijske sektore i domaćinstva).

Analiziraju se primarni energetske izvori koji se koriste za proizvodnju električne energije, kao i njihove prednosti i nedostaci.

Posebna pažnja je posvećena angažovanju Bugarske u pogledu sprovođenja strategije Evropa 2020 kao i njena buduća energetske politika koja uključuje ne samo poboljšanje energetske bezbednosti nego i povećanje udela obnovljivih energetske izvora u ukupnoj energetske potrošnji, izgradnja nove energetske infrastructure, razvoj visoko konkurentnog energetske tržišta, pronalaženje adekvatne ravnoteže između interesa potrošača i proizvođača energetske proizvoda.

Rad ističe i zavisnost velikih energetske projekata od promena političke situacije.

Ključne reči: energetske bezbednost, potrošnja energije, energetske izvori, energetske statistika.

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AN OVERVIEW OF SPORT WITHIN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IR)

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ABSTRACT

Abstract: Countries/governments tend to use sport to promote their political, social and economic agendas. Decision-makers looked for ways to shift legitimacy from the sport ground because sport results could be easily measured and transmitted to the general population, especially considering that sport is positioned between politics and international relations on the one hand and politics and culture on the other. For domestic policy strategy analysts, the work should serve as a supplement to the future policy documents with attempt to trigger for adequate positioning of the sport in the prism of overall country's development. It is an attempt to realistically as possible discloses position of sport within IR with an example from the socialist Yugoslavia.

Key words: IR, sports, politics, ideology, globalization.

INTRODUCTION

It is not uncommon that the strategy of the sport system of each state is a reflection of the general situation within the same one shaped by global arena of IR. Many pages have been written in the world in order to understand the role of sport in both internal development and as a tool in international relations. Sport (elite one) is co-opted by politics (Jackson and Haig, 2008). Various governments (leaders) have endorsed international sporting competition as a testing ground for the nation or for a political system. German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Soviet and Cuban Communists, Chinese Maoists, western capitalist democrats, Latin American junars-all have played the game and believed in it (Allison, 2003). On the other hand, sports, sporting associations, and sport individuals, gaining a greater worldwide influence and have become visible non-governmental actors in the arena of IR. Also, the

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influence of the media cannot be overlooked and sport has become an indispensable segment of global society.

INSTITUTIONAL POSITIONING OF SPORT WITHIN IR

Nowadays sport is the active agent of international development and popularly used term “Sport for Development and Peace” (here after SDP). In his speech, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan spoke of the importance of sport as a potential facilitator of global social progress, overcoming social and cultural differences based on human rights (United Nations, 2004). In the name of the SDP movement a number of international NPOs (Olympic Solidarity, Right to Play, Playing for Peace, Kicking AIDS out) are engaged in underdeveloped countries through programs such as sports development, post-conflict reconciliation, humanitarian assistance, education and prevention.

Historically speaking, sport played an important role across the globe but it was formally recognized after WWII. Institutional positioning of sport occurred through human rights, development and peace process. In the 1952, UNESCO recognized sport as a tool for education (ICSSPE Science Service Advocacy, 2014). Seven year later, by UN Declaration on children rights was acknowledged importance for kids to participate in sport activities as well as an obligation for public authorities to enable conditions for that (United Nations, 20 November 1959). In the 1978, UNESCO place sport and physical education as a fundamental right for all introducing an International Charter of Physical Education and Sport (UNESCO, 21 November 1978).

In the 1991, members of the Commonwealth countries have recognized the unique role of sport in eliminating poverty, promoting individual development as well as funds for the social development (Commonwealth of Nations, 20 October 1991). UN adopted numerous resolutions on respecting Olympic ideals and to end all conflicts (United Nations. GA Resolutions (n.d.)). End of the millennium has brought adoption of the MINEPS III Punta Del Este Declaration, with specific aim on sport for all (UNESCO, 1999). Bearing in mind growing importance of sport, UN General Secretary appointed Special Advisor for SDP (United Nations, (n.d.)). Not long after, followed by 1st International Conference on Sport and Development, UN adopted Resolution on SDP (United Nations, 17 November 2003). In the 2005, UN proclaimed International Year of Sport and Physical Education, emphasizing the importance of sport for reaching MDGs (United Nations, 2005).

Institutionally, European Sport for All Charter is document within the Council of Europe, noting that sport shall be encouraged as an important factor in human development and appropriate support shall be made available out of public funds

(Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, 24 September 1976). Bearing in mind principles from the European Sport for All Charter, European Sport Charter was adopted in 1992 (revised in 2001) in order to set up a joint principles for all at the Pan-EU level representing policy foundation in the field of sport within Coe (Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, 24 September 1992). As complementary document to the European Sport Charter, acknowledging ethical values that sport stand for, Code of Sports Ethics was adopted (Council of Europe, 16 May 2001).

The Amsterdam Treaty (Declaration on Sport, 10 November 1997) and three years later Nice Declaration on Sport (March, 2001) clearly emphasize the social importance of sport. Those documents served as a foundation for the first strategic initiative in sport, the European Commission White Paper on Sport (2007). Document is primarily focused on three segments: societal role, economic importance and organization of sport. In section four, concerning organization, of sport, is stated that there is no unique approach for sport regulation and attempt of Commission will be to encourage sharing of best practice governing models. In the light of numerous disputes, difference in the sport systems, sport is broadly included in the Lisbon Treaty, Article 165 (2008):

“The Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on voluntary activity and its social and educational function.” (Para. 1)

“Developing the European dimension in sport, by promoting fairness and openness in sporting competitions and cooperation between bodies responsible for sports, and by protecting the physical and moral integrity of sportsmen and sportswomen, especially the youngest sportsmen and sportswomen.” (Para. 2)

“The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the field of education and sport, in particular the Council of Europe” (Para. 3)²

For sport related issues it is important to consider following provisions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU):

Public Health, Title XIV:

“Union action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such action shall cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health.” (Para. 2)³

² Ibid., 47.

³ Ibid., 122.

Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital, Title IV:

“Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Union.” (Para. 1)

“Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment.” (Para. 2)⁴

The tendency of this chronological display clearly shows the intention to incorporate sport into a number of strategic documents and the activities, thus ensuring the basic conditions for the development of individual societies (countries) on one side and harmonizing within the global community on the other.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SPORT AS TOOL WITHIN IR

Political and cultural dimension of sport has been identified as a significant contributor to the IR as well as a way to accomplish political goal (Beacom, 2000). Because sporting results could be easily measured, international sport organization was established and gaining great deal of significance during the Cold War era. When West and East competed, the world watched and measured their success. There is intertwining of sports and politics through the role of sport in diplomacy, ideology, nation-building, the international arena and the economy (Houlihan, 1994). On the other hand, the commercialization of sport, which somehow transcends state organs and ultimately contributes to the appearance of corruption in sport and exclusion of people from the participation in sports. It is not uncommon to international sports organizations influence the decisions of state institutions to their financial capabilities and extensive network of lobbyists.

As globalization progressed, number of participants in the arena of international relations increased. In recent years the status of the basic subjects in international relations has undermined the emergence of new entities (Simić, 2002), i.e. International and non-profit organizations, such as the FIFA or IOC, that have huge impact on the international community. Free diplomatic space “grabbed” the leading international sports organizations. In the 1992, after the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Resolution 757 of the UN Security Council which was first introduced sport as a component of the sanctions (United Nations, 18 December 1992). IOC suggested a plan for individual athletes from Yugoslavia to participate under the IOC flag (The Olympic Museum, n.d.). The same principle was also used in the 1994, in collaboration with WHO, UNICEF and the Red Cross to provide participants attendance and participation at the Winter Olympics in Lillehammer (Jarvie, 2008).

Sports movement, created the necessary conditions making it an indispensable segment in designing strategies and implementing the same activities. Sports

⁴ Ibid., p. 65.

organizations are full partners and consultants in various political and sensitive issues, such as violence, racism, drug abuse, corruption and manipulations, promoting education, health, tolerance.

Similarities between sport and IR could be described by Orwell's (1986, p. 60) skepticism:

“I am always amazed when I hear people saying that sport creates goodwill between the nations, and that if only the common people of the world could meet one another at football or cricket, they would have no inclination to meet on the battlefield. Even if one didn't know from concrete examples (the 1936 Olympic Games, for instance), that international sporting contests lead to *orgies of hatred*, one could deduce it from general principles.”

Aron (2001) is probably more precise, stating that a football match is not simply an event pitting team against team; it is confrontation of nations through sports match (country).

Sport is perceived as an action-reaction relation according to following statement (Strenk, 1979, p. 445):

Founder of the International Olympic Committee Baron Coubertin lived idealizing sport that could serve as a platform for international cooperation and to bring long lasting peace by influencing global politics. The footprint of this relationship reflected in the resilience of the politics that will in the end overcome and shape use of sport in order to promote their strategic interests.

The strength of the connection between sports and politics can be seen in the arena of the IR certainly are the Olympic Games and boycotts. Aggression on Afghanistan marked as cause for boycotting the Moscow Olympics (1984) by WEST which led four years later boycotting (in smaller scale) LA Games (1988) by EAST.⁵ On the other hand going a little bit in the past and “peek” in the US-China relations, there is a chance to spite the western misunderstanding of Chinese tradition, threatening “far east” with the same approach (containment) (Vukadinović, 2008) as used with USSR, diplomatic relations were opened through sport by invitation to the U.S. table tennis team to visit China (Harding, 1999).

SPORT AND IR IN THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

Former Yugoslavia has positioned in the very small frame between clashing ideologies (capitalism and communism) with attempt to find a “third” way by

⁵ A lot has been written about this topic. Jay, K. (2004). *More Than Just a Game*, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 181; Gwertzman, B. (1979). Carter Calls Soviet Actions a ‘Threat’, *New York Times*, December 29, 1979; Burns, J. F. (1984). “Protests are Issue“, *New York Times*, sec. A; Shaikin, B. (1988). *Sport and Politics: The Olympics and the Los Angeles Games*. Preager Publisher, p. 50.

creating the Non-Aligned Movement (Lothi, 2014). It was stated about Yugoslav way “was supposed to mean ‘neither the East nor the West’ but in reality it was a compound: both the East and the West” (Lazic, 2003). Yugoslavia developed a peaceful coexistence doctrine strongly supported by the NAM. This has root from IR constellation in the 1954-55, which was explained as an ‘equidistant constellation with blocs’ (Bogetic, 2000).

During the Cold War era, Yugoslavia remained not aligned to either the US or USSR, which allowed it to experiment with the best of both worlds in terms of sports development- the worker-athletes model (USSR) and the student-athlete model (USA) (Bertling, 2007). The institutional support was granted to both models on all levels, including the educational system, the military, and public service. Back then, gender, racial, ethnicity, and religion was taken into account and inclusivity was sometimes excessive.⁶ At the institutional level, the situation was slightly different as political background (commitments to the party) was a determining factor to be involved as a stakeholder in sports organization (Stevic and Rabrenovic, 1999).

Regardless of the high level of political involvement, sport system in Yugoslavia reaped the benefits of that development. A philosophical approach existed in former Yugoslavia at that time; participation in sports (physical education, professional and recreational) was well structured (organized from national to community level) and open to everyone with focus on educational, health and community development aspects which could be described by the philosopher Isocrates (1929), who stated in the *Antidosis* (vol. II, pp. 289, 291), about importance of training the minds as well (not only the body) of athletes in order to be prepared for completions (life?):

“Are twin arts; parallel and complementary- by which their master prepare the mind to become more intelligent and the body become more serviceable, not separating sharply to kinds of education, but using similar methods of instruction, exercise, and other form of discipline. Watching over them and training them in this manner, both the teachers of gymnastic and the teachers of discourse are able to advance their pupils to a point where they are better men and where they are stronger in their thinking or in use of their bodies.”

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The work showed position of sport as a tool within IR, but also noted that role is not a crucial one. A more common example is that of sports events becomes a reflection of relations in the global arena of IR (ping-pong diplomacy or boycotts).

⁶ Socialist principles introduced pragmatic plans to ensure equal representation of Yugoslav citizens no matter of religion, ethnical, class or any other differences.

Blocs through sport elite tried to demonstrate superiority and to indicate advantages in comparison to the rival side. Global politics shape use of sports.

Socialist Yugoslavia through the welfare system inherited sport as a part of the culture of citizens, spreading the values of work, responsibility, readiness and team spirit. Amateur and school sport, were used for the development of the sport for all. State leadership at the time were operating between blocs, strongly relied on both East and West organizational specificity creating an original system of sport as a reflection of the Yugoslav position within global arena of IR.

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Marko BEGOVIĆ

REALISTIČKI PREGLED SPORTA U MEĐUNARODNIM ODNOSIMA

Apstrakt: Države imaju običaj da koriste sport za promociju svojih političkih, socijalnih i ekonomskih ciljeva. Oni koji donose odluke traže način da pomere legitimitet sa sportskih terena, zato što sport daje rezultate koje je lako izmeriti i saopštiti javnosti, posebno imajući u vidu da je sport pozicioniran između politike i međunarodnih odnosa, sa jedne strane i politike i kulture, sa druge strane. Za domaće strategije i političke analitičare, rad treba da posluži kao dopuna budućim strateškim dokumentima sa pokušajem da se aktivira adekvatno pozicioniranje

sporta u prizmi sveukupnog razvoja zemlje. U pokušaju da se što realnije moguće prikaže položaj sporta u međunarodnim odnosima sa primerom iz socijalističke Jugoslavije.

Ključne reči: Međunarodni odnosi, sport, politika, ideologija, globalizacija.

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THE CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, AND SOLVING THE CRISIS IN LIBYA

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Abstract: This article addresses the issue of maintaining international order, peace and security in the changed international security environment, particularly since 2001, when a new concept called the responsibility to protect has taken shape in the international community. The concept of the responsibility to protect stems from criticism of humanitarian intervention that, especially in the 1990s, represented the international community's mechanism for intervening in grave internal conflicts of states with the aim of protecting civilian populations. In the new security environment, the international community is seeking to achieve the same aim through the concept of the responsibility to protect, which is on its way to become a new norm of international common customary law. The central research question to which this article has answered is: is the military intervention in Libya in 2011 under the responsibility to protect (R2P) an example of good practice the international community will also be able to use in the future when reacting to the most serious crimes? The analysis has shown that since the R2P concept was used in Libya, the international community has been facing a new challenge, namely to ensure a moral and political support for the adoption of a more integrated definition of the R2P concept that can provide the international community's timely and efficient response including the responsibility to protect, react and rebuild.

Key words: international peace and security, international community, system of collective security, humanitarian intervention, concept of the responsibility to protect.

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INTRODUCTION

“We the peoples of the United Nations (UN) determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war...” (The Charter of the United Nations) are repeatedly confronted with the question of how to put this statement into practice. In 1945 these introductory words were written by the states in the UN Charter (UNC), representing the legal cornerstone of the modern system of collective security which is based on the following assumptions: today’s threats know no national borders; they are connected with each other; and should be addressed at the global, regional and national levels (Secretary-General’s High Level Panel, 2004, p. 1). The fundamental question of how to protect future generations from the horrors of war or efficiently provide international peace and security continues to be topical in today’s globalised and changed security environment.

The purpose of this discussion is to provide an answer to the central research question: Was the international community’s military intervention in Libya in 2011 under the R2P concept (as defined by the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty – ICISS) an example of good practice that is also worth using in the future as part of the international community’s response to the gravest crimes?

PROVIDING SECURITY IN THE CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Emerging since the end of the bi-polar strategic polarisation, the changed international security environment requires states and the entire international community to provide fresh answers to the challenges of complex threats. Besides the conventional threats (hard security threats such as war, the arms race, the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction), modern threats to security include non-conventional threats (soft security threats) (Grizold, 2005, p. 24) whose intensity and global dissemination are bringing them ever closer to the level of conventional threats (e.g. global population growth, mass violations of basic human rights and liberties, global trends in the fields of environmental pollution, famines, human trafficking and trafficking in drugs, sudden and mass migrations, international terrorism, international organised crime and others). Today, the horizontal and vertical connections between conventional and non-conventional threats related to the so-called unfinished states² represent the main bases of the

² Unfinished states or weak states are marked by unconsolidated or non-existent democracies, they face serious problems of legitimacy, unfinished states invariably lack cohesive national identities, they are defined by varying levels of institutional incapacity and a frequent inability by governments to implement their policies and are characterized by an external vulnerability to international actors and forces (Jackson, 2002, p. 38-39).

complex threats in today's world which pose the greatest threat to the civilian population both within and outside individual states and in the wider international community.

The threats to international peace and security have changed, although responding to them is still based on the system of collective security which is institutionalised in the UN. While the international security environment has experienced dramatic changes, this cannot be said of the existing international legal system. According to Slaughter and Burke-White (2002), today “/to/ respond adequately and effectively to the threats and challenges that are emerging in this new paradigm, we need new rules”. The international community is adapting to such changes by adopting a wide range of documents (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) and concepts intended to better protect individuals against potential threats from their state (humanitarian intervention – HI, the concept of human security, R2P).

CRITICISM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION PROVIDING GROUNDS FOR THE NEW CONCEPT OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

After 1989 when the Cold War era had come to an end and the desire for independence, the autonomy of individual nations and democracy increased threats to states with internal conflicts, humanitarian interventions became a frequent way of resolving conflicts (Weiss, 2007, p. 136). Following 1990, the mechanisms of collective security and coercive actions were revived by the UN due to serious inter-ethnic conflicts in the territory of former Yugoslavia, the genocide in Rwanda, the persecution of and violence against the Kurds in Iraq and the civil war and humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia. This triggered many debates on humanitarian interventions (Grizold, 2005, p. 31). The human suffering and great losses among the civilian population required intra-state conflicts to be addressed as threats to international peace and security.

Up until the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's appeal,³ the UN HI was the only and an unsuccessful form of the international community's response to serious crimes occurring within states. The reason for the failure of HI is not only to be sought in the fact it was widely criticised or in the unclear definitions included in the UNC's normative provisions and other documents, but also in the lack of political will (Reisman, 1993). While during the 1990s HI became “lost” in

³ “... if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that affect every percept of our common humanity?” (ICISS, 2001, p. vii).

criticism, following its aim to protect individuals and their rights it nevertheless remained the only means which, in the face of the unclear definitions, led to the development of new concepts.

Examples of the use of HI as the international community's means of intervention in instances of grave and massive violation of human rights show the uncertainty of the UN Security Council's decision-making procedure as such with regard to HI (let alone the latter's efficient implementation). "First, grave violations of human rights or crime occur in a state. Then non-governmental organisations and civil society call attention to these grave violations and potential losses of human lives among the civilian population. /.../ Due to the influence of the media on one hand and moral responsibility on the other, the superpowers have to respond. Their reaction, however, depends on their interest. The superpowers' interest affects the adoption or non-adoption of a UNSC resolution laying down the modes of taking action and possibly giving the mandate to use all available means under the Chapter VII of the UNC. Only after that HI follows" (Prašnikar, 2014, p. 41-42). This is when the HI "period" "comes to an end", with – according to its critics – the reason for its failure lying in it being defined as a right rather than a responsibility, i.e. being a unilateral act aimed at pursuing the national interests of the intervening state (Thakur, 2006, p. 268; Wheeler, 2000; Reisman, 1993). The critiques of HI also partly explain the non-adoption of HI as a norm that would make it a legitimate and legal means within the international community.⁴ Also drawing attention to the problem of the legitimacy of using HI as the international community's means of intervening, Grizold (2005, p. 32) argues that: (1) such an intervention does not respect the right to political autonomy; (2) it destabilises international stability; and (3) it is only rarely successful. However, no author rejects HI as being completely erroneous and unacceptable. While the legitimacy of HI can be justified through its aim, its legality requires the elaboration of a new norm of international law or, as Grizold (2005, p. 37) puts it, a new joint international security strategy which would provide answers to the complex threats in the globalising international environment.

A new joint international strategy has indeed started to take shape on new grounds completely overturning the existing system of collective security by defining the sovereignty of states not only as their right, but also as their responsibility. This new strategy has revived the aims of HI not as an opposition to or rejection of its traditional principles emphasised by the UNC, but as a new explanation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the UNC (Knudsen, 1999, p. 313-316).

Following the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's appeal (cf. above) one of the responses came from the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd

⁴ According to Bartlett, (2008, p. 5-6) the main reasons for this include: 1. the states having differing conceptions of the rules that were established by the international society to provide for order among states; 2. undefined justification criteria for HI; 3. the prevailing view of the states that there is no need to risk the lives of their soldiers to save the lives of others.

Axworthy who established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty – ICISS. The Commission proposed that the aims of the responsibility to protect concept should consist of three things: first, to change the conceptual terminology of HI towards the language of the R2P; second, to put responsibility on state authorities at the national level and on the UN Security Council at the international level; and third, to ensure that when conducted interventions were implemented in an appropriate manner (ICISS, 2001, p. 3–5).

THE CONCEPT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

In the modern international community, coercive military intervention based on humanitarian intentions (to protect the civilian population) is regaining the nature of “just war” which includes an ethical dimension (Luard et al. 2001, p. 47). Justifying war with the aim of protecting civilians and their rights has a long history, having been called HI in the Cold War era and R2P since 2005.

R2P represents the combination of two opposing concepts – state sovereignty on one hand and intervention to protect the civilian population on the other. The ICISS, which first presented the R2P definition in 2001, grounds this concept in state sovereignty as a responsibility and not only as a right. Four years later, this extraordinary and revolutionary definition of sovereignty as a responsibility was unanimously, albeit in a curtailed form⁵, confirmed at the UN General Assembly World Summit.

FROM THE ADOPTED DEFINITION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT TO ITS USE IN THE CASE OF LIBYA

The emergence of new wars, the main participants of which are political, ethnic and otherwise organised groups in unfinished states fighting for their interests and

⁵The curtailed form of the definition refers to the changed and consensually accepted definition of R2P adopted by the UN General Assembly. The main reason for this lies in the fact that the sovereign UN GA member states are still unwilling to adopt a legally operational humanitarian intervention. (Hamilton, 2006, p. 295–297). The definition given by ICISS accentuates three elements (pillars) of the international community’s responsibility: “... not just the responsibility to react to an actual or apprehended human catastrophe, but the responsibility to prevent it and the responsibility to rebuild after the event.” (ICISS, 2001, p. 17). Conversely, rather than underlining these three responsibilities the World Summit definition only exposes the first two (the responsibility to prevent and react): “*Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. [...] The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity*” (UN GA, 2005).

the seizure of power require states and the entire international community to look for adequate solutions. Through the globalisation process, tendencies towards the democratisation of life within states have also grown stronger at the regional level. Recently, the wish for freedom and democracy was clearly demonstrated at the end of 2010 and at the beginning of 2011 during the occurrence of the so-called Arab Spring. In the period since the UNSC Outcome Document (2005) was passed, the UNSC and the UN Secretary-General have adopted several resolutions based on the R2P concept which, however, prior to 2011 had no essential impact on shaping this concept as a norm. The case of Libya and the adopted UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 showed the extent to which the military intervention affected the R2P concept. The remainder of this article will analyse the main reasons for the crisis in Libya and the international community's response to it. It will also examine how the R2P concept is implemented in practice through its three core pillars defined by the ICISS.

Directly after it came to an end in 2011, the international community's military intervention in Libya under the R2P represented "a pivotal step for the further affirmation of this principle" (Hilpold, 2012, p. 78) and UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon declared that now it is "clear to all" that R2P "has arrived" (Ki-moon, 2011).⁶

REASONS FOR THE CONFLICT IN LIBYA AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S TIMELY RESPONSE UNDER THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The revolution and civil war in Libya were part of a wider regional process called the Arab Spring which in the MENA (Middle East and North African) countries was represented by a wave of demonstrations in which citizens of those countries demanded democracy: "We have known for years that there is an urgent need for modernization and democratization in the Arab world (...) The Arab Spring represents freedom and it is in the interests of democracies that the Arab populations get the chance to choose their own leaders by means of genuine and fair elections" (Hjarvard and Kristensen, 2014, p. 61).

The second part of this article comprises an analysis of the crisis in Libya and the international community's response to and solving of the crisis, first through

⁶ The initial enthusiasm and joy over the outcome of the intervention proved to be premature. While based on this definition the international community successfully prevented the threats of the Libyan dictator, who had intended to brutally crush his opponents, it left the Libyan state in ruins. In the case of Libya, the responsibility to protect as written and adopted in the UNSC Outcome Document was implemented in two segments. Through its UNSC Resolution 1970 the international community warned Libya of its responsibility to protect and failing to achieve any success, adopted tougher measures and used military force based on the UNSC Resolution 1973. At this point the responsibility to protect as defined by the UNSC Outcome Document terminates.

an analysis of the reasons for the conflict, followed by an analysis of all three pillars of the R2P concept as defined in the ICISS and namely they are as follows: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild.

The analysis of the causes of the Libyan conflict is based on defining the criteria which show the possible threat of grave and systematic crimes that could happen and should draw the attention of the international community. According to Evans (2008, p. 74-76), these factors include experiences and a history of mass crimes which the state is unable to resolve; the state's ability to confront these tensions; answers to the question of to what extent a given state or society is perceptive of external influences; and the question of good governance and leadership of the state. In addition, other factors such as the possession of weapons of mass destruction need to be analysed along with two factors that strongly influenced the Libyan crisis, namely the Arab Spring and the financial crisis.

First, Libya's own actions aiming to reduce or eliminate these causes need to be presented. With the exception of allowing for some benefits (free health care and education), by ruling Libya as a dictator and following his own ideology Muammar Gaddafi brought the Libyan people to the verge of poverty. The Libyan state leadership did nothing to prevent these causes from escalating into civil war. This is where regional and international communities stepped in, what, however, had left the Libyan population in the hands of the dictator(ship) until their direct military intervention. With Gaddafi having given up Libya's emerging nuclear programme in 2003 and 2004, i.e. the weapons which could have posed a great threat to the international community, the international community's military reaction to Libya was also influenced by the absence of such a threat.⁷ No government which possesses weapons of mass destruction has ever been attacked and toppled by a foreign military force (Zenko, 2011).

The first analyses of the causes of a crisis are followed by early warnings and an adequate political reaction of the international community (Evans, 2008, p. 85).

USE OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S CONCEPT OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS IN LIBYA

Direct Prevention Measures of the First Pillar of the Responsibility to Protect

The first part of the answer to the question of whether the first pillar of the responsibility to protect was implemented involves analysing the causes of the conflict and their prevention and elimination.

⁷ As stated by Gaddafi's daughter, Aisha, the lesson that can be learned from the case of Libya by: "...every country that has weapons of mass destruction to keep them or make more so they will not meet the same fate as Libya." (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

In Libya, like in other countries of the MENA region, it was just a matter of time before the people would become strong enough to succeed in toppling their dictator. The development of the Arab Spring can best be understood from the aspect of the unfinished process of state-building. States in this region had repressive political power but lacked tools of state power, namely embedded political authority and most importantly, popular legitimacy (Bin Talal and Schwarz, 2013). Gaddafi's politics divided the nation, one tribal community against the other and created the lines of conflict during the Arab Spring starting at the end of 2010 and which are still going on. Despite good economic indexes and a high income from oil extraction under the Gaddafi's regime, Libya was a failed state. It participated in no system of political alliances, economic associations or national organisations of any kind. In aiming to make his regime untouchable Gaddafi abolished all state institutions and disabled all elements that could bring an end to his hegemony. In the absence of any public-sector bureaucracy, including a reliable police force, family ties and kin networks of his supporters provided illusory security to the citizens (Anderson, 2011, p. 5).

The international community had long co-operated with Gaddafi, while non-governmental organisations with their limited role had unsuccessfully tried to call attention to the increasingly frequent and ever graver violations of human rights and direct threats to people's security. It became necessary to react to the crisis which had already claimed lives.

The Responsibility to React

On 22 February 2011, Francis Deng and Edward Luck, the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect, respectively, released a statement reminding the national authorities of their responsibility to protect. The Office of Special Advisers continues to closely monitor both the situation in Libya and the response of the international community in their implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 (United Nations, 2011).

UNSC Resolution 1970⁸ represents the international community's first test case on use of the R2P concept. During this time, Libya was not a signatory to the Rome Statute, which is why the investigation and arrest of Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam

⁸ The UNSC Resolution 1970 which was adopted unanimously on 26 February 2011 is based on Article 41 of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In it the UNSC demands to put an end to violence, imposes an arms embargo, a travel ban and assets freeze. Moreover, it refers the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Resolution condemns the violence and use of force against civilians, warns against the existing crimes amounting to crimes against humanity and expresses concern at the plight of refugees. The Resolution recalls the Libyan authorities' responsibility to protect its population and establishes the Security Council Committee to monitor sanctions (UN Security Council, 2011a). The UNSC members write down that the

Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, charged with the crimes against humanity of murder and political persecution committed in the territory of Libya, had to be authorised by the Security Council (Bin Talal and Schwarz, 2013). Soon after the intervention in Libya ended, the question arose of whether the International Criminal Court's (ICC) decision to issue arrest warrants during the conflicts was right or wrong. Critics wrote that there was no evidence to clearly demonstrate that the ICC and the procedures it had started against Gaddafi would in any way deter the Libyan leader from continuing with his criminal politics. However, it is a fact that the warrants the ICC issued made it harder or even prevented the Gaddafi from finding an exit strategy that would let them avoid criminal persecution and trial (Bolton, 2011, p. 22).

The first pillar – the responsibility to prevent – failed to be successfully implemented. In the case of Libya, the use of non-military means available to the international community proved ineffective. The most obvious peaceful means were the so-called smart sanctions⁹. According to the definition and procedure of the use of the R2P concept, peaceful means were used, but not exhausted. Further reaction from the international community was necessary.

On 17 March 2011, the UNSC's second document, Resolution 1973, was adopted which expanded the authorisation of the Member States to the entire Chapter VII of the UNC (UN Security Council, 2011b)¹⁰. The Security Council expressed its deploration at the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with Resolution 1970 and its concern at the escalating violence and number of civil casualties. After Resolution 1973 was adopted, Muammar Gaddafi declared a ceasefire, although the shelling of the cities of Misurata and Ajdabiya continued and some government units moved close to the rebel-held city of Benghazi.

The Response of Actors of International Relations to the Crisis in Libya

In international relations, reacting or non-reacting to the internal affairs of a sovereign state is considered a delicate issue. The reason lies in the right of sovereign

Resolution is a strong step in affirming the responsibility of states to protect their people. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the united will of the community of nations which unanimously adopted the Resolution, while also expressing the possibility that more forceful measures might need to be used.

⁹ Smart sanctions are targeted and selective. Their goal is to reduce to the greatest possible extent the undesired consequences of imposing sanctions avoiding a negative humanitarian impact. Smart sanctions apply pressure and enforce coercive measures against the actors responsible for a norm violation (Cortright and Lopez 2001). In the case of Libya, the sanctions included a no-fly zone, travels restrictions on visible regime members and specifically the Gaddafi family and Gaddafi himself as well as an arms embargo.

¹⁰ UNSC Resolution 1973 was adopted with 10 votes in favour and 5 abstained (Russia, China, Germany, Brazil and India).

states to organise or lead their countries without foreign interference. Among the actors of international relations this issue re-emerged through the concept of R2P, particularly with its second pillar (the responsibility to react) reintroducing the challenge: military intervention in the internal affairs of a state on the grounds of protecting human lives – yes or no?

At the beginning of March 2011, the UN General Assembly unanimously decided to suspend Libya from the UN Human Rights Council (Powell, 2012, p. 311). This was a result of the consensus of members of the General Assembly who had debated “on the role of regional and sub-regional arrangements in implementing the responsibility to protect” (Luck, 2011, p. 389). The seriousness of the debate was confirmed by the General Assembly’s acceptance of a call from the Arab League to establish a no-fly zone over Libya: from this point on, however, the discussion about solving the crisis in Libya was mainly left in the hands of the Security Council and NATO.

The intervention in Libya started as an *ad hoc* coalition of the willing run by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the American reluctance to take the lead in the operation offered an opportunity for alternative solutions such as a British and French-led operations. Running the operation through the mechanism of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) elicited very little support. NATO was the only actor that provided the capacity, the existing military command structure and the transatlantic element needed for the intervention. Although not all NATO countries participated in the Libyan operation, there was a political consensus on the mission’s validity (Michaels 2011). On 23 March 2011 the NATO Alliance took complete control over the arms embargo and called the operation Unified Protector. One day later, it took over unified command of the Libyan airspace. A unified military command over the exercise of all military operations was only established on 31 March 2011; prior to that, the units had been under the command of their respective national authorities. Following the first air strikes under the NATO command that prevented a “massacre” in Benghazi, later NATO chose to conduct much more than a watching-brief and selective-strike operation making the judgment that only by supporting the rebels to achieve regime change could all of Libya’s civilians really be protected. This step, however, “tainted” the R2P concept and numerous critiques referred to this part of the operation which stretched the Security Council’s very clearly specified mandate to its limits (Evans, 2011).¹¹ The estimations of the NATO’s military intervention in Libya define NATO as the only available tool and one that

¹¹ The NATO’s operation comprised three elements: (1) the enforcement of a no-fly zone over Libya; (2) the enforcement of a maritime arms embargo in the Mediterranean Sea; and (3) military measures (air and naval strikes) against the regime military forces involved in attacks also posing a threat to the civilian population (Bin Talal and Schwarz 2013, p. 8).

worked reasonably well (Brown, 2012, p. 85), while the operation Unified Protector “showed the commitment of the international community to the protection of civilians” (Ulfstein and Christiansen, 2011, p. 169).

In the case of Libya, all key actors seemingly adopted a unified stance and voted in the affirmative or abstained from voting on UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, thus establishing yet another precedent in the Security Council’s decision-making. However, a single example is insufficient for the R2P to move up to the level of a norm.

In the case of solving the Libyan crisis, actors of international relations responded in two ways: (1) with clear support for all available means of solving the conflict; and (2) with support only for a peaceful way of solving the conflict with non-opposition to a military intervention and later a critical attitude to the NATO’s military intervention.

Once again, the intervention in Libya confirmed that the five permanent members of the Security Council played the decisive role in solving international crises. Libya represents a clear exception in which all permanent members moved beyond their national interests and actually brought a halt to Muammar Gaddafi’s threats to use brute force against the civilians and the rebels and to expand the conflict to the wider region. In the case of Libya, France and Great Britain (GB) continued with their “defence alliance” policies helping the rebels at the outset of the crisis, each conducting its own military operation and together with the USA they elaborated the text of UN Resolution 1973. Apart from France, GB and the USA, strong support for the Resolution and thereby the military intervention was also expressed by the Arab League which called on the international community to establish a no-fly zone over Libya. With this move, the international community obtained regional support for the implementation of further measures under R2P. There is no clear answer to the question of why the Arab League had taken this step and, thereby changed the position of Russia, as well as those of the USA and China.¹²

The second group of states which had called for a solution to the crisis with peaceful means includes Germany, Russia, China, Brazil, India, the African Union (AU) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference. Russia, China and Brazil which had abstained from voting on UN SC Resolution 1973 supported the dialogue and a complete ceasefire. India and Germany also abstained and called for political measures instead of the use of force. Germany clearly expressed its concerns, namely “... we see great risks” the military intervention could hold for Libya and

¹² Without the support of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arabian Gulf countries, Russia and China would have certainly vetoed UNSC Resolution 1973 (Bellamy, 2011, p. 4). Russia, China and Brazil were among the countries that after the end of the military intervention in Libya issued well-argued criticism of the use of the R2P concept in the case of Libya by forwarding concrete proposals and solutions regarding an upgrade of the concept which they named responsibility while protecting and responsible protection.

a possible expansion of the crisis to the wider region (Miskimmon, 2012, p. 393). Similarly, Italy was also not in favour of the intervention due to its dependence on its oil agreements with Gaddafi, but later agreed to the military intervention provided it was headed by NATO (Brown, 2012, p. 81). African countries that were non-permanent members of the Security Council, namely South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon, voted in favour of UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973; yet it should be pointed out that AU did not wish to leave resolution of the crisis solely to external actors in continental affairs, so on 10 March 2011 it adopted a statement by which it established an AU ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya whose task was to find a diplomatic solution (Peace and Security Council, 2011). Finally, the EU needs to be mentioned as the worst actor in solving the Libyan crisis. In the context of solving that crisis, many commentators (Wouters and De Man, 2013, p. 388; Edwards, 2013; Menon, 2011) also criticised the European neighbourhood policy saying that the EU put before other interests its ambitions for the Libyan oil, the national interests of its individual countries, with the only common point connecting the EU members being the agreement on financial sanctions against Libya.

Based on the definition of the R2P concept adopted at the World Summit the end of the military intervention in Libya also means the end of the international community's responsibility for resolving a conflict – in this case, the Libyan crisis. However, our discussion stems from the definition of R2P as given by the ICISS which also envisages the third pillar of the international community's responsibility, namely its responsibility to rebuild.

CONCLUSION

The intervention in Libya triggers questions about why a similar intervention was not carried out in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, or Israel. Selective arguments (of why R2P was not used elsewhere) show that the intervention in Libya was not morally controversial, while non-reacting in similar circumstances is morally wrong. (Pattison 2011, p. 6).

Therefore, states are looking for and giving their proposals and answers to the changed security environment which requires new international-legal mechanisms for resolving contemporary conflicts. On 11 November 2011, right after the end of the intervention in Libya, Brazil had presented its upgrade of the R2P concept called responsibility while protecting (RWP). RWP was not presented as a new concept totally separate from the R2P concept, but one that elaborated and explained it. Again this concept brings to the fore the need to apply the prevention measures, exhaust all diplomatic means and to authorise the use of military force only as the last resort with the entire operation being constrained by the aims of the UNSC (UN General Assembly, 2011). Less than a year later, China also presented its critical response to R2P. On 15 June 2012, in an article entitled:

Responsible Protection: Building a Safer World, Zongze (2012) presents Responsible Protection (RP) explaining China's abstention from voting with regard to UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and claiming that the R2P concept has been controversial since the very beginning and is prone to easy abuse. In his well-substantiated criticisms, he gives a list of RP measures he claims represent a clearer and more precise definition of R2P: the object of RP must be made clear (i.e. the people of the target country, peace and stability of the region), the legitimacy of protection must be established, the means of protection must be limited (the exhaustion of all diplomatic means), the purpose of protection must be defined, the intervening forces should be responsible for the post-intervention strategy (reconstruction) and the UN should establish mechanisms of supervision, ensure an outcome evaluation and post-factum accountability. In addition to Brazil and China, Russia presented its critique of R2P on 30 October 2013 at a conference entitled "State Sovereignty and the Concept of Responsibility to Protect /.../" pointing to the contents and significance of the RWP and RP concepts and, thereby continued the discussion on the formulation of a new definition of R2P.

These three countries following and critically upgrading the R2P concept were highlighted here for the purpose of showing that the R2P definition as presented by the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is an integrated one. Namely, all of these states point to the significance of preventing the causes of crisis and a timely reaction (the responsibility to prevent – the 1st pillar); the need to exhaust all peaceful means of conflict solving, particularly diplomatic ones and the fulfilment of the criteria for the use of military force (the responsibility to react – the 2nd pillar); and finally, the need for a post-intervention strategy to prevent the intervening forces from simply marching away after the military intervention instead of remaining accountable by continuing their responsibility to rebuild (the 3rd pillar).

Being based on the R2P definition as given by the ICISS, this article should provide an answer to the question of whether in the case of Libya the third pillar – the responsibility to rebuild – was implemented, with this answer also being critical for obtaining a clear answer to our research question. On 16 September 2011 the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established by UNSC Resolution 2009 with the aim of helping Libya's authorities define and implement the national needs and priorities in Libya (UN Security Council, 2011c). The Mission's task is to help with the strategic and technical assistance in rebuilding the country. Today, three years after the military intervention in Libya came to an end, the country is considered by some to be on its way to becoming yet another failed state (Al Jazeera Centre for Studies 2013; Arafauoui, 2014; OECD 2013). The government does not have complete control over the entire state territory, has no monopoly over the means of coercion and has not established any legal bodies. Today, "Libya is a disaster we helped create" (Jones, 2014). This claim provides a

negative answer to the question of whether the international community's military intervention in Libya in 2011 under the R2P concept (based on the ICISS definition) was an example of good practice. The case of Libya is not an example of good practice since, regardless of RWP and RP, the R2P concept needs to be complemented with the third pillar. While the third pillar is already specified in the ICISS definition, any amendments and supplements of the R2P definition depend on the political will of the main actors of international relations.

With regard to the question of the protection of human rights and the consolidation of R2P as a norm in today's international community, the case of Libya represents a turning point and one from which the debate has been continuing on how to elaborate a better definition of the R2P concept.

The present discussion may be concluded with the following answer to the research question about whether the use of the concept of the responsibility to protect in solving the crisis in Libya represents an example of good practice which can also be used in the future by the international community in solving international crises:

1. The use of the concept of the responsibility to protect enabled the international community to make a timely reaction to the crisis in Libya under the auspices of the UN and, thereby prevented both further bloodshed and crimes of the Gaddafi regime against the civilians and the rebels as well as most probably the conflict expanding to the wider region. This possible expansion of the crisis posed the greatest concern for the international community which is why a quick reaction to Muammar Gaddafi's threats was appropriate.
2. In solving the crisis in Libya the international community and in particular, the UNSC's Permanent Members and some other important actors showed the political will to activate the mechanism of the responsibility to protect and thereby proved the international community's aptitude to respond to complex threats in today's world by asserting the value of protecting the people regardless of their citizenship through the UN collective security system, with state sovereignty no longer being understood as simply a right but also a responsibility.
3. However, three years after the end of the conflict the general situation in Libya shows that the biggest problem is implementing the third pillar of the responsibility to protect, i.e. the rebuilding, stabilisation and construction of infrastructure along with the establishment of the state and its democratic institutions. Evidently, Libya has a long road ahead to become a functioning democratic country; as for the international community, after its use of the responsibility to protect it faces a new challenge of providing moral and political support within the UN General Assembly to more quickly elaborate and adopt a more integrated definition of the responsibility to protect mechanism that has already been provided by the International Commission for Interventions and State Sovereignty.

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KONCEPT ODGOVORNOSTI ZA ZAŠTITU I REŠAVANJE KRIZE U LIBIJI

Apstrakt: Ovaj članak se bavi pitanjem uspostavljanja međunarodnog poretka, mira i stabilnosti u izmenjenom međunarodno–bezbednosnom okruženju, naročito nakon 2001. godine, kada je novi koncept, nazvan *odgovornost za zaštitu*, uobličen unutar međunarodne zajednice. Ovaj koncept proizilazi iz kritike humanitarne intervencije, naročito tokom 90-tih godina 20. veka, koji je predstavljao mehanizam za intervenciju međunarodne zajednice u pogubnim unutrašnjim sukobima država sa ciljem zaštite civilnog stanovništva. U novom bezbednosnom okruženju, međunarodna zajednica teži ostvarenju istog cilja kroz koncept odgovornosti za zaštitu, koji se nalazi na putu da postane nova norma međunarodnog običajnog prava. Središnje istraživačko pitanje na koje članak daje odgovor jeste: da li je vojna intervencija u Libiji 2011. godine na osnovu koncepta odgovornosti za zaštitu primer ispravnog postupka međunarodne zajednice, i da li ona ima volju i sposobnost da ga upotrebi i u budućnosti, u situacijama kada se suočava sa ozbiljnim zločinima? Analiza je pokazala da od kada je ovaj koncept upotrebljen u Libiji, međunarodna zajednica se suočava sa novim izazovom, prevashodno u pogledu obezbeđivanja moralne i političke podrške za usvajanje integrativnije definicije ovog koncepta, koji će joj obezbediti pravovremen i efikasan odgovor, uključujući odgovornost za zaštitu, reagovanje i obnovu.

Ključne reči: međunarodni mir i bezbednost, međunarodna zajednica, sistem kolektivne bezbednosti, humanitarna intervencija, koncept odgovornosti za zaštitu.

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THE ROLE OF THE SERBIAN ARMED FORCES IN HUMANITARIAN HEALTH ACTION AND FIGHT AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS

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Abstract: Due to the specific resources, available to all armies of the world within their stipulated missions, such armies play an important role in the fight against biological threats, especially the potentially most dangerous, bioterrorism. The real threat of misuse of biological agents and the possible consequences of asymmetric threats to public health, society, agriculture, economy and political stability has clearly been recognized in recent years. The Republic of Serbia is committed to giving its contribution to the global fight against this danger, given the experience it has in the care and treatment of infectious diseases, primarily of a zoonotic character that are present in our geographic area, as well as the response to crisis situations which create favorable conditions for the spread of infectious diseases. The Serbian Armed Forces and its capacities in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear services, and its medical and veterinary services which have a long tradition and experience is ready to actively participate in the implementation of the measures of prevention and response in the case of biological threats contributing to the civilian community, medical services, and society as a whole in order to protect the life and health of the population.

Key words: CBRN, biological agents, bioterrorism, Serbian Armed Forces.

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INTRODUCTION

As was stated in the Oslo Declaration of 2007 “threats to health may compromise a country’s stability and security” and Labonté and L Gagnon (2010, p. 14) argue that the securitization of health is claimed to be “a permanent feature of public health governance in the 21st century.” According to the WTO, military health services have unique capabilities that can contribute to global public health under the International Health Regulations (IHR) framework (WHO, 2005), particularly in surveillance and laboratory support (WHO, 2013). For illustration, in Peru and Thailand, military health organizations in partnership with the military of the United States use their laboratory, epidemiological, communications and logistical resources to support civilian ministry of health efforts (Chretien et al., 2007, p. 174–180). Over the last decade, military have been increasingly involved in relief activities, including sometimes providing direct assistance to crisis-affected populations (WHO, 2011). In fact, the three major health related functional areas where the military is directly involved in global health activities include: 1) medical force protection, 2) humanitarian assistance/disaster response, and 3) medical stability operations (Licina, 2011).

By participating in peacekeeping operations with medical teams the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) contributes to global health, and through civil-military cooperation and interaction with the civilian population at the local level as well. Since 2007, the members of SAF have been engaged in multiple efforts to mitigate the damage from natural disasters (floods, earthquakes, wildfires, etc.), providing aid to vulnerable populations, road and bridge repairs, humanitarian blood donation campaigns, and providing medical assistance to the residents of rural areas (the “Military Physicians in the Countryside” campaign). During the floods which affected Serbia in May 2014, the SAF mobilized a large number of human and material resources. Between May 14 and 24 a total of 10,949 members of the Ministry of Defense and the Serbian Armed Forces were deployed on a daily basis, 802 of whom were cadets of the Military Academy. In other words, the daily average number of SAF members deployed was 912, making this the largest SAF deployment since the emergence of the SAF (in 2006). The most of the rescue operation and the affected areas recovery (primarily decontamination) was carried out by the SAF. At the request of the Republic Staff for Emergencies members of the SAF conducted a biological decontamination of over 38,500 m² terrain and warehouse space (Government of Serbia, 2014).

However, in the times we live in, humanity is threatened by great danger in the form of biological agents. Climate changes and ecological balance disorders also bring about an increased incidence of zoonotic diseases primarily of the features that can pose a great danger and thus they have a great importance from a military point of view. A large number of zoonotic agents are on the lists of

potential biological agents. Medical and Veterinary Service of the SAF has a long tradition of multidisciplinary and teamwork in the field of study of microbiological, antigenic and epidemiological-zoonotic characteristics of zoonotic agents that are widespread in our geographical area. If the biological agents were used deliberately in a potential biowarfare, primarily in bioterrorist acts, it would have incalculable consequences for the health of humans, animals, plants, the environment, as well as national and international security, and it would certainly entail economic consequences in terms of high expenditure for preparation and providing resources for detection and identification of agents, hospitalization of the diseased, injured and vulnerable, as well as for prevention measures and prophylaxis of healthy / exposed individuals.

In general, in all the wars waged so far, 12 times as many people died of infectious diseases than from weapons, so that the biological agents are a real enemy of our civilization, as evidenced by the current epidemiological situation in the world related to the occurrence of Ebola virus as well as HIV and their consequences. Lessons learned from the recent civil war in the former Yugoslavia point to the incidences of diseases whose causes are on the lists of potential biological agents such as tularemia, brucellosis, hemorrhagic fevers with a renal syndrome in the war-affected areas. These are zoonotic agents, which, as previously stated, have complex ecological cycles. The former Yugoslavia is an endemic area for most of the diseases mentioned, and the Army entering into natural foci, poor hygiene and sanitation in times of war and a great expansion of the rodent population all has contributed to the occurrence of such diseases. However, there were also concerns that it was a case of the use of biological agents, also made more real by the objective fact that because of such an undercover operation it cannot be easy to prove and make sure a biological attack is in progress. In this connection is precious and unique experience related to the occurrence of smallpox in the former Yugoslavia in 1972. Efforts against such threats or risks are described in Oslo Declaration as ‘national health security, “a variation of a government’s overall obligation to defend ‘the state from external attack’ (Oslo Ministerial Declaration, 2007).

USE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS AS A POTENTIAL TERRORIST TOOL

Bioterrorism involves the intentional use of biological agents-organisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa) and their products-toxins from the political, economic, ideological, religious and other reasons (Ristanović, 2013). It is a threat as old as human society and civilization as a whole. According to available data the first use of biological agents as weapons has been reported as early as the sixth century B.C. when contamination of water supply with the fungus *Claviceps*

purpurea (rye ergot) by the Assyrians had been reported. In contemporary world the most significant biological attack was the intentional contamination of restaurant salad bars with *Salmonella* by a religious cult in Oregon in the United States in 1984. More recently, in September 2001, the American public was exposed to anthrax spores as a bio-weapon delivered through the US postal system. The centre for disease control and prevention (CDC) identified 22 confirmed or suspected cases of anthrax during this attack. These included 11 patients with anthrax through inhalation, of whom five died (Das & Kataria, 2010, p. 255).

Today, thanks to the development of molecular biology, genetic engineering and biotechnology, bioterrorism can get scary dimensions. It is possible to modify the existing microorganisms in order to prevent their detection and identification, to increase their resistance to drugs (bacterial strains resistant to several dozen types of antibiotics), vaccines, antidotes and environmental factors (heat, UV radiation), cross the existing (eg.ebolapox virus) and produce completely new biological agents that could selectively and in a controlled way impact a particular nation, population or a target group. Incidentally, such experiments have already been performed in the laboratories of the most powerful countries in the world during the Cold war, which at one point threatened to turn into the race to develop biological weapons, and the very awareness of biological hazards led to the signing of the biological Convention, which entered into force in 1975. Despite the Convention, work on improving biological weapons continued in the so-called defensive and defending purposes.

In today's world of global contradictions, there is a growing concern worldwide that terrorist organizations and individuals, or even some states could use micro-organisms or their products-toxins, as their weapons.

CDC Classification of Bioterrorism Agents
(Das & Kataria, 2010, p. 257).

Category A agents	Category B agents	Category C agents
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Bacillus anthracis</i> (anthrax) • <i>Clostridium botulinum</i> toxin (botulism) • <i>Francisella tularensis</i> (tularemia) • <i>Variola major</i> (smallpox) • <i>Yersinia pestis</i> (plague) • Filo viruses • Ebola virus (Ebola hemorrhagic fever) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alpha viruses • Eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis viruses (EEE, WEE) • Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis viruses (VEE) • <i>Brucella</i> species (brucellosis) • <i>Burkholderia mallei</i> (glanders) • <i>Coxiella burnetii</i> (Q fever) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Hanta viruses • Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis • Nipah virus • Tickborne encephalitis viruses • Tickborne haemorrhagic Yellow fever

Category A agents	Category B agents	Category C agents
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marburg virus (Marburg hemorrhagic fever) • Arena viruses • Junin Viruses (Argentinian hemorrhagic fever) and related viruses • Lassa viruses (Lassa fever) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Epsilon toxin from <i>Clostridium perfringens</i> • Ricin toxin from <i>Ricinus communis</i> • Staphylococcal enterotoxin B <p>A subset of Category B agents includes pathogens that are food and waterborne. These pathogens include but not limited to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Cryptosporidium parvum</i> • <i>Escherichia coli</i> O157:H7 • <i>Salmonella dysenteria</i> • <i>Vibrio cholerae</i> 	

Table 1 shows the classification of potential biological agents, according to the CDC, Atlanta. If the biological agents are used in unmodified form, they are very cheap, readily available (laboratories, hospitals, biological material of human and animal origin) and portable, so they can be used with the aim of causing illness and death of human beings, animals or plants. Biological agents can be easily and effectively combined with other agents (chemical, nuclear, explosives). Also, we should not neglect the so-called agro-terrorism and consequences of the use of biological agents against plants and animals that can also cause immense environmental, health and economic consequences (foot-and-mouth disease epidemics in the UK, 2001). Agriculture is a “soft target”, easily vulnerable and hard to defend, and the effects of the use of such agents would be immeasurable. It is therefore not surprising that in developed countries, special attention is paid to the defence from agro-terrorism. And given the fact that genetic engineering and biotechnology are undergoing their expansion, numerous issues have also been posed related to the so-called genetically modified foods. If we also add to this cyberterrorism, as well as all the possibilities that today’s information technology provides and the possible information dissemination abuse, it is clear that in an eventual bioterrorist act the psychological aspects and impacts on mental health would be also significant, as well as the scope of manipulation. In order to prevent the above-mentioned it is necessary to react as efficiently as possible in terms of prevention and response to an eventual terrorist act so that the consequences should be as little as possible.

In the event of a possible attack, it is necessary to more efficiently perform the detection and identification of an agent used, and the treatment of patients and exposed should be implemented in accordance with the defined guidelines. All relevant institutions at a local and national level (health, police, civil defense units, with the obligation of public-private partnerships), and if necessary, at the international level, should be involved in the processes of preparation, treatment and recovery, that is, taking care of the consequences of an attack. To address this threat, it is necessary to make great efforts at the national and international level, which includes raising the awareness of the public and decision-makers about the threat from today's bioterrorism, respect all international obligations stemming primarily from the Convention on the Prohibition of the use of biological agents and toxins, conform to and implement appropriate legislation, promote international cooperation in this field, boost intelligence and security measures and transfer control of potential biological agents and hazardous substances, strengthen epidemiological-epizootologic surveillance, improve standards of biosecurity and biosafety and provide resources to enable the detection and identification of possible biological agents and dangerous pathogens, primarily define a strategy how to act in the crisis caused by the use of potential biological agents and also the strategy concerning tasks and obligations of all entities (intelligence and security, NBC, medical, veterinary, agricultural, academic, media sector). It is also necessary to strengthen the capacity of crisis management and crisis communications.

AVAILABLE RESOURCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN RESPONSE TO THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS – THE ROLE OF THE SAF

Public health institutions that make up the (health centers, hospitals, institutes, clinical hospital centers, pharmacies) in the Republic of Serbia performing health activities in primary, secondary and tertiary levels have a legally established network throughout the territory of the country (Official Gazette of RS, 107/05) . Although in their daily work and responsibilities, they deal with controlling the activities of biological agents with medical-epidemiological aspects, objectively largest operational resources for prevention and response to the use of biological agents are within the Army. The capacities that each country's army has for Nuclear Biological and Chemical Defence are developed predominantly for their own needs, but through civil-military cooperation they are also taken into consideration in emergency conditions, which would certainly be the use of biological agents or appearance of a larger outbreak of infectious disease.

Catastrophic floods in the whole region and in particular the Republic of Serbia⁴ in May 2014 featured in the recovery stage the consequences of a lack of awareness of the need for monitoring the occurrence of microorganisms in floodplains and the threat of a possible outbreak of epidemics, especially zoonoses, vector and natural focal infections. Also as unlikely, but possible worst case scenario relates to microorganisms used by terrorists in such circumstances, since a crisis situation such as the above-mentioned provides excellent conditions for such activities. Analysis of possible scenarios raised the issue of the existing organization set-up and the capability to respond to that kind of risk.

The Republic of Serbia wishes to improve and promote its national capabilities for protection against radiological, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (CBRN) threats including B agents. CBRN Defense of the SAF is designed as a general purpose service for all arms and branches. Functioning of SAF CBRN Defense Service includes CBRN measures on the level of all tactical units (so called “general CBRN measures”), and on the level of CBRN units (so called “specialized CBRN measures”). SAF CBRN Defense System consists of CBRN Training Center (TC) within Training Command, and 246.batalion CBRN within Land forces. There are also CBRN officers as CBRN advisers, in the SAF operational brigades. On the experts field of functioning CBRN TC and 246.bCBRN use capacities of the Military Technical Institute, Technical Research Institute and National Poisoning Control Centre of the Military Medical Academy which are under Serbian MOD, and with other civilian governmental institutions (Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Defence, 2015).

According to Partnership for Peace, Presentation document of Republic of Serbia the existence and development of a national but also the regional Center for training of CBRN staff created the conditions for training, joint international engagement of teams, the study of national mobile training teams and instructors, as well as support to civil authorities in the country and the countries of the region and Europe. The significance of the Center shows the number of students of various courses in the period from 2009 to 2014. European countries - 243 participants; African countries - 33 participants.

Engagement SAF and 246.batalion CBRN in case of bioterrorist attack is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (Article 139, 140 and 141), the Law on Defence (Article 41), the Law on the SAF (Article 2), the Law on

⁴ In the period from May 14 to May 23 ,2014, as a result of unprecedented flooding, a state of emergency was declared throughout the territory of the Republic of Serbia. A total of 16 districts were affected, about a third of the territory of Serbia, more than 31 000 people were evacuated, several thousand houses were destroyed or damaged as well as 350 public office buildings, 280 bridges, hundreds of roads, the flood washed away part of the railway in the length of 10km. The flood wave diminished the reliability of the system for the generation and transmission of electric power and jeopardized the stability of the power system of Serbia.

emergency situations (Article 12) and Functional doctrines SAF. Considering the importance of participation SAF in emergency situations, the legislator has predicted that in cases where it is necessary to rescue people and property, as a result of natural disasters, technical and technological accidents and other hazards, the order may be issued by the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of operational level and commanders of brigades.

A special and specific resource represent also the capacities of the Military Medical Academy (MMA), which in the context of an integrated facility occupies an area of 180,000 square meters, where the annual medical check undergo 600,000 people, 30,000 of them are hospitalized, about 20,000 surgical interventions as well as approximately 3,000,000 million of laboratory and diagnostic procedures are performed and accommodation capacity amounts to 1200 beds. The Military Medical Academy has 27 clinics and 17 institutes with powerful diagnostic centers and polyclinics (Jeftić, Ristanović et al. 2011, p. 50-51). It is particularly significant that within the MMA operates the Poison Control Center which is the national referral and an important pillar of the state in all accident situations. With regard to the detection and identification of microorganisms are significant human and technological capacities of the Department of Preventive Medicine of the Military Medical Academy, primarily the Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology Institute, as well as accommodation capacities of the Infectious Diseases Clinic and other organizational units of the MMA.

However, given the specificity of biological agents, their contagiousness and the possibility of aerosol application for the detection and identification of biological agents Class 1 and 2, according to the CDC classification, and treatment of the infected and sick from these agents it is necessary to improve the mobile capacities and strengthen the standards of biological safety in laboratories and hospitals, as well as to define and provide adequate isolation facilities.

In addition to the above-mentioned, the military health care system within its jurisdiction has four institutions of secondary level and a large number of health facilities of the primary level of protection, which, together with the resources available in terms of the troop military ambulance makes an indispensable resource for a response to any health problem, including a terrorist attack.

The synergy that exists in the Republic of Serbia has primarily been reflected through the capacities available to the Ministry of Defense, and also through the possibility of an adequate training within the Army and medical care and hospitalization offered by the military health system, providing an opportunity for not only the national but also the regional response to potential misuse of biological agents.

Given that this is a very important resource, but the systemic response to the risk would require inter-sector cooperation and coordination. In order to achieve a

satisfactory level of preparedness it is necessary to establish inter-agency cooperation and networking of both military and civilian capacities aimed at developing the capacity of the public health system and other relevant institutions for the prevention and reduction of the potential consequences of a biological terrorist attack.

Therefore, there is a clear desire and need of the Republic of Serbia to improve and promote its national capacity for the protection of biological agents in order to affirm the clear commitment of our country to make its full contribution to the fight against terrorism and strengthening primarily regional cooperation, as well as resources for participation in International Peacekeeping Missions.

CONCLUSION

In the theory of warfare the biological weapon has long been regarded as an asymmetric threat and the atomic bomb of the poor, because of the simple and inexpensive production and the possibility of a hidden, but effective and specific use. Although a biological warfare has not been publicly waged so far, bioterrorism as a permanent phenomenon and a social phenomenon has been constantly changing its form and adapting to the technological and scientific aspects of time in which it appeared. Nowadays it is a specific threat, risk and challenge from the security, public health, economic and political standpoint. Preventing and responding to potential bioterrorism act implies raising awareness, continuous improvement of legislation, improving intelligence and security measures, transfer control of potential biological agents and dual-use goods at all levels, strengthening the resources and capacity to detect and identify potential biological agents and treatment in the event of their occurrence. Multidisciplinary and team approach is necessary to achieve these objectives with clearly defined duties and responsibilities of all concerned. The Army of Serbia, with its capacity (CBRN service, medical and veterinary services and other resources) within its defined missions and tasks is ready to give its full contribution and actively participate in protecting the population from the consequences of a possible bioterrorist act, and by active engagement in regional and international framework it is also capable of contributing to the fight against this global scourge.

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ULOGA ORUŽANIH SNAGA SRBIJE U HUMANITARNOJ AKCIJI ZAŠTITE ZDRAVLJA I BORBI PROTIV BIOLOŠKIH PRETNJI

Apstrakt: Usled posebnih izvora dostupnih svim armijama sveta u okviru ostvarenja svojih strateških zadataka, one igraju značajnu ulogu u borbi protiv bioloških pretnji, naročito onih potencijalno najopasnijih—*bioterrorizma*. Danas postoji stvarna pretnja zloupotrebe bioloških agenasa čije bi posledice predstavljale asimetričnu pretnju javnom zdravlju, društvu, poljoprivredi, ekonomiji i političkoj stabilnosti, i ona je jasno prepoznata tokom nekoliko prethodnih godina. Republika Srbija je opredeljena da da svoj doprinos globalnoj borbi protiv ove opasnosti polazeći od iskustva koje ima u prevenciji i tretmanu zaraznih bolesti, prvenstveno onih sa životinjskim poreklom prisutnih u našoj geografskoj oblasti. Ona ima spreman odgovor i u kriznim situacijama koje stvaraju pogodne uslove za širenje zaraznih bolesti. Oružane snage Srbije sa svojim kapacitetima u hemijskoj, biološkoj, radiološkoj i nuklearnoj oblasti, kao i dugogodišnjom tradicijom i iskustvom u pružanju medicinskih i veterinarskih usluga, spremne su aktivno da doprinesu primeni mera prevencije i odgovora u slučaju bioloških pretnji, pomažući civilnoj zajednici, medicinskim službama i društvu u celini, sa ciljem zaštite života i zdravlja stanovništva.

Ključne reči: CBRN, biološki agensi, bioterrorizam, Oružane snage Srbije.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S ROLE AS AN INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTER

Camelia RATIU¹

Abstract: This paper aims at outlining the principles, mechanisms, strategies and instruments that form the core of Brussels' democratisation policy, as well as its potential and limits. In a first step, the paper briefly discusses the main theoretical approaches to external democracy promotion as well as its characteristics as a policy area. It further outlines the EU's legal basis and institutional foundations for its democracy promotion policy, as well as its implementation in practice, and finally sums up the main findings.

Key words: Brussels' democratisation policy, theoretical approaches, democracy promotion policy, implementation.

INTRODUCTION

After being neglected and even ignored for decades, in recent years the role of external actors in democratisation processes has become increasingly interesting and relevant to both scholars and policy-makers. External democratisation influence in the international system is everything but a new phenomenon. It emerged as a political reality shortly after 1945 with the Allies' successful top-down democratisation of Germany and Japan (Kneuer, 2008, p. 9). However, a glance at the existing literature reveals that the role of external actors in the democratisation of states has been largely disregarded until the end of the Cold War. It was not until the complex political and socio-economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe during the 1990ies, under the obvious influence of numerous European

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and international actors that academic attention shifted towards this issue. Thus, the importance of external actors for democratisation processes is now indeed undisputed, yet, even today, still “more often assumed than incorporated adequately into theoretical work” (Pridham, 1991, p. 5). While the international dimension has been recognized as a parameter, there is a need for deeper theoretical systematisation to determine its concrete character, instruments and potential. To date, Political Science lacks a “theory of external democracy promotion” that would explain the impact of external actors in democratising countries. At the same time, the question of appropriate strategies and instruments for external democracy promotion is highly topical with a view to troubled regions like the Middle East, the Southern Mediterranean and, more recently, Ukraine.

The European Union plays a leading role among the actors interested in the global export of democracy and stability. It sees itself as a community of values and has set the promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law as main goals of its foreign policy. Nevertheless, the EU’s role as a democracy promoter remained unexplored for quite some time. Given the Union’s unique characteristics as an international actor and the attraction it exerts on third countries, it appears particularly interesting to submit its democracy promotion policies to a closer analysis. There is a solid consensus among academia and policy-makers regarding the EU’s potential to impact positively on transition states and foster democratic reforms. The democratisation of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 represents an impressive proof of the EU’s transformative power and so far the most successful example of democracy export and stabilisation. At the same time, the EU is facing new security challenges in its neighbourhood that are increasingly questioning its abilities as a democracy promoter.

DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS A RESEARCH AREA

The role external factors can play in the democratisation of a political system was for a long time overlooked or downplayed by democratisation scholars. As a result, this field of research developed relatively late and brought forward few attempts to theoretically explain the influence of external actors. The American political scientist James Rosenau can be considered a pioneer in the area, as he was the first to address the issue of external influences by analysing the interaction between national political systems and the international environment. In 1969 he developed the so-called linkage theory that defines linkages as “any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another” (Rosenau, 1969, p. 45). Rosenau points to the existence of an input-output pattern in the international system that results in various forms of interaction (“linkages”) between states. He identifies three different types of linkage-processes: the penetrative, the reactive and the emulative type.

A penetrative process occurs when members of one polity directly participate in the political process and allocation of values of another polity e.g. as an occupying force in post-conflict states or, to a lesser extent, as an aid donor. Secondly, the reactive process is the most common model of interaction and refers to traditional diplomacy, in which the actions of one state generate a response in another state. Finally, an emulative process is a type of reactive process and involves demonstration effects that lead to imitation of a state's actions by another state. Rosenau's theoretical contribution consists thus in the differentiation between various types of external influences as well as in the acknowledgment of the international environment as a variable instead of a constant factor, as it had been the case until then.

Some twenty years later, post-communist transformation in Central and Eastern Europe pushed the role of external actors into the focus of researchers. Few of them, however, chose to undertake a theoretical in-depth analysis of the topic. Laurence Whitehead, Geoffrey Pridham and Philippe Schmitter must be mentioned in this context.

Comparing the methods, tools and motives of American and European democracy promotion, Whitehead develops three partly overlapping models of external democratisation: *contagion*, *control* and *consent* (2001: 5ff). *Contagion* is defined as the spread of democracy from one country to another through geographical proximity e.g. in Latin America in the 1960ies and in Central and Eastern Europe after 1990. *Control* refers to the case of democracy being "imposed" by a hegemonic power e.g. by the US in Central America. Finally, *consent* describes the bottom-up development of democratic values in a country as a result of complex and multiple types of interaction between international factors and domestic political actors. Although these theoretical categories furnish little insight into the concrete motives of actors and their channels of influence, they have established themselves as reference models in the democratisation literature. Schmitter extends Whitehead's contagion-consent-control-model by a fourth category: conditionality. It is applied by international institutions and nation states and links the granting of advantages, direct financial aid and other forms of cooperation to the prior fulfilment of a number of conditions by the country in question (Schmitter, 1995, p. 503).

The Eastern enlargement of the EU triggered a huge number of studies related to the impact of the EU on the accession countries, including through its democracy promotion policies (see for example Frantz 2000; Grabbe, 2002 and 2006; Kubicek, 2003; Vaduchova, 2005). In this context, Pridham (Pridham and Agh, 2001) emphasizes the importance of convergence and conditionality as main tools of the external actor EU in exerting its influence. He defines convergence as "the gradual movement in system conformity with a grouping of established democratic states with the power and institutional mechanisms to attract transiting countries and to help secure their democratic outcomes", and conditionality as "deliberate efforts to determine from outside the course and outcome of regime change" (Pridham, 2001,

p. 57). On a more general level, he concludes that external influences are structural phenomena inherent to the international system rather than ad-hoc occurrences and interact in a complex and multifaceted manner with domestic developments in a given state. Their impact, however, depends on the degree of linkage i.e. the type of relation between the external actor and the country in question.

This assumption, undoubtedly inspired by Rosenau's linkage theory, is also being picked up by Levitsky and Way when examining Western democracy promotion in authoritarian regimes. The two authors argue that linkage must be coupled with leverage in order to be effective. They define a country's degree of linkage as the "density of its ties to the United States, the EU and Western dominated multilateral institutions", while these ties can be of social, economic, geopolitical and communicational nature (Levitsky and Way, 2005, p. 21). Leverage refers in this context to 'vulnerability to external democratising pressure' and can take the form of diplomatic pressure, political conditionality, sanctions or military intervention. The degree of leverage depends on a number of factors, such as the size of the country, its economic and military capacities, but also of its ranking on the democracy promoter's agenda.

Returning to the enlargement literature, it is essential to mention the German authors Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier who have made a significant contribution to the research area by introducing the concept of Europeanization (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). It describes the process of norm diffusion, in the course of which EU candidate countries take over EU rules. Initially designed to explain the mechanism of member states adapting to EU rules, the concept proved to be easily transferrable to candidate countries. Thus, the authors develop two interrelated models that explain norm diffusion: the external incentives model and the social learning model. The former is designed as a rationalist bargaining model, according to which the EU is granting rewards (political cooperation, financial support and, finally, membership) in exchange for the adoption of EU norms by the country in question (Schimmelfennig, 2005, p. 10). The social learning model is based on the assumption that governments adopt EU norms if, on the one hand, they are persuaded of their appropriateness and secondly, if the benefits of compliance with a certain norm exceed the costs (Schimmelfennig, 2003, p. 410). This cost-benefit analysis is conditioned by several factors, for example the credibility of incentives and sanctions, the quality of rewards, the role of veto powers and the costs of adaptation. While the Europeanization theory focuses primarily on compliance with the EU *acquis*, its insights may also be relevant for democracy promotion policies.

EXTERNAL DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS A POLICY AREA

After having outlined the main theoretical approaches to external democracy promotion, let us take a closer look at its operationalisation in practice. How did

democracy promotion as a policy field come about? What are the motives and interests of actors for engaging in democracy promotion? Under what circumstances are they inclined to support democratisation processes? Which instruments do they operate with and what can they achieve?

Since 1989, the number of actors participating in international democracy promotion has constantly increased. According to Sandschneider (2003: 33), they can be broadly divided into:

- International organisations with an economic (OECD, IMF, World Bank), political (OSCE, Council of Europe) or mixed profile (EU, UN);
- Nation states;
- Non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

International organisations focus on granting political and/or economic support to democratisation processes by generally applying a more or less strict conditionality. Democratic nation states have a fundamental interest in disseminating their ruling model and their system of values – this category of actors includes the states commonly referred to as “Western countries”, mainly the democratic and economically developed EU and NATO member states. Sandschneider points out that democracy promotion by nation states is *per se* self-serving and benefit-oriented, both with respect to the selection of receiving countries and to the means used (id.: 24). In addition, democracy promotion as a foreign policy objective is interest-driven and therefore liable to fluctuations in the individual foreign policy agendas of states. As a third category, international NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in democracy promotion by providing assistance in various sectors.

The United States have been featuring prominently among the actors pursuing democracy promotion for decades. Since the First World War, spreading democratic values around the world has been not only a key component of American foreign policy rhetoric, but a part of the United States’ political self-conception. In 1916 President Woodrow Wilson justified US entry into the First World War with the intention “to make the world safe for Democracy” (Carothers, 1999, p. 3). This foreign policy objective was at least declaratively reaffirmed throughout the Second World War and the Cold War. In reality, however, American idealism was often eclipsed by pragmatic economic and security interests (see also Brown, 2005). For decades, the US maintained friendly relations with authoritarian regimes when these proved to be useful partners in the confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The collapse of the Soviet block in 1989 led to a shift in the foreign policy of Western democracies and freed democracy promotion from anti-communist strategic objectives, allowing it to establish itself as a policy in its own right. The US, which had been the main aid donor for decades, found themselves suddenly rivalled by an EU that quickly became the world’s main democracy promoter. Democratisation aid became increasingly important and has been since then

accepted as a standard component of European foreign policy. On the one hand, this development was based on the conviction that the West had a moral obligation to support young democracies in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world as the best possible governance model that had defeated socialism. On the other hand, democracy promotion continued to reflect the economic and security interests of its promoters. A second shift was brought about by the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and led to the reinforced prioritisation of security interests. The controversial and so far rather unsuccessful interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan have largely discredited the idea of democracy promotion and reduced it to nothing more than a buzzword (Carothers, 2008, p. 132). In addition, the legitimacy of the democratic model is increasingly challenged by apparently successful alternatives such as the “authoritarian capitalism” practised by Russia and China.

Looking at the motives and interests of democracy promoters, two types of intentions can be identified. They aim at creating an environment of peace and security by cooperating with actors who have similar governance models. According to Sandschneider, the drive to disseminate its own values is inherent in every political system, be it democratic or authoritarian. Thus, democracies seek to secure and diffuse their own vision of a pluralistic system governed by the rule of law and the protection of human rights (Sandschneider, 2003, p. 7). Democracies provide an institutional framework for peaceful conflict resolution through cooperation, therefore it is assumed that democratic states will translate this behaviour into their foreign policy. This assumption is supported by the empirical evidence that democracies do not wage wars against each other. Secondly, on a more pragmatic level, democracy promoters also expect to obtain material benefits. like economic gains as a result of trade relations with the emerging market economies that are established along with democratic structures, as well as the containment of soft security risks (illegal migration, organised crime, environmental challenges etc.) through cooperation.

Democracy promotion finds itself faced with criticism from both academia and policy stakeholders. Critics’ main arguments range from the promotion of neo-liberalism under the umbrella of democracy promotion initiatives as a means for certain actors to secure their economic dominance to the unilateral transfer of norms regardless of the historical and cultural context in the target country. Some critics question, on the one hand, the legitimacy of external democracy promotion measures, as they interfere in the institutional set-up and the policy-making process of a sovereign state, and on the other hand their overall effectiveness. Carothers for example comes to the conclusion that democratisation assistance can influence political and socio-economic developments in a country only to a small extent and therefore ‘no dramatic results should be expected from democracy promotion efforts’ (2008, p. 351). So far, only the prospect of EU membership has proven to have effectively contributed to democratisation (Grävingsholt/Leininger/ Schlumberger, 2009, p. 1).

The validity of such arguments must always be examined on a case-by-case basis. However, as regards legitimacy, democracy promotion can undoubtedly be regarded as legitimate in countries where the population and/or the political elite explicitly expresses its wish for democratisation (e.g. through a broad resistance movement, by overthrowing an authoritarian regime or in free elections). The existence of a population and an elite willing to democratise are *sine qua non* prerequisites for a successful democratisation process. Without them, external support is doomed to fail.

As regards effectiveness, while the democratic orientation of elites is a basic requirement, it is by far not the only factor influencing the outcome of a democratisation process. Schmidt (2008, p. 108) identifies eight aspects that determine the prospects for democratisation: economic and demographic indicators, with a diversified modern economy, a strong middle class and low income inequality being most favourable conditions for democratisation; the state of the rule of law and corruption; ethnic and religious differences within the country's population; the level of secularisation; previous democratic experiences; political culture; geographic proximity to potentially significant (democratic or authoritarian) actors; consequences of armed conflicts. In addition, an in-depth knowledge of the context of intervention on the part of the democracy promoter is essential, as the selection, timing and sequencing of instruments needs to be adapted accordingly (Grävingholt/Leininger/Schlumberger, 2009, p. 3). Democracy promoters dispose of a wide range of instruments and measures. Without attempting to be exhaustive, the most important ones include:

- political support: election assistance, institution building through political and technical assistance (e.g. constitution drafting, judicial reform etc.), support to political parties and civil society, international socialisation (e.g. granting membership in international organisations);
- economic support: assistance in establishing a market economy, support for reforms, financial aid in the form of loans, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction aid, asymmetric trade liberalisation, debt relief;
- security building measures in post-conflict societies: peace building, mediation, conflict prevention measures, military and civilian missions, refugee return, support for regional cooperation.

THE EU AS A DEMOCRACY PROMOTER: INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL BASIS

The EU is today the world's major donor of development and democratisation assistance, providing, together with its member states, about 55% of international development aid. EU democracy promotion policy entails the specificity of being a cross-cutting issue, located at the interface of several policy areas – Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), trade, development and enlargement policy – and

at the crossroads between intergovernmental and supranational policy-making with the EU and the member states sharing competencies in this area. These circumstances widely determine the EU's capacity to act as a democracy promoter.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the pillar structure stipulated in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty has been formally abolished. Nevertheless, the EU's foreign policy, and implicitly its democracy promotion policy, continues to be marked by the supranational-intergovernmental dichotomy intrinsic to the European integration process that has affected the EU's capacity and credibility as an international player for decades. Thus, trade, development and enlargement policy lie within the competence of the European Commission, while the European External Action Service (EEAS) is responsible for formulating and implementing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). (For the history of the CFSP and CSDP see for example Regelsberger, 1997; Dembisnki, 2010; Beck, 2012). The EEAS is headed by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who at the same time holds the post of Vice-President of the Commission.

Democracy promotion, like many other EU policy fields, started out informally before being codified in official documents and established as an official policy goal. Its origins lie in the 1970ies, when it emerged in the form of rather sporadic support for human rights and by far not as a coordinated promotion of democratic structures. At that time, the view that economic development was enough to create favourable conditions for the respect of human rights prevailed within the EC (Knodt and Urdze, 2008, p. 27).

After setting up the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the early 1970ies, the EC member states sought to establish a common basis for their collaboration in this area. The "Document on the European identity" agreed by EC foreign ministers in 1973 set out for the first time the common policy objectives of the EC and its commitment to "defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice — which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights" (Document on the European Identity, 1973). This commitment was repeatedly confirmed by the multitude of reports and declarations adopted by member states in the following years. But it was only in 1986 that the member states decided to take democracy promotion a step further by codifying the principles of respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the Single European Act (Single European Act, 1986). In the same year, EC foreign ministers also adopted the "Declaration on human rights" that defined human rights as a pillar of European foreign policy cooperation, and established a working group that had the task to formulate a human rights policy in the context of the EPC. Three types of foreign policy instruments were used at that time as a form of protest against human rights violations: public statements, public demarches and confidential demarches, in fact the weakest instruments of external action (King, 1999, p. 317).

Thus, despite the EC's rhetorical commitment to human rights issues, the scope and effectiveness of European human rights promotion remained extremely limited during the 1970ies and 1980ies. This was partly due to the different prioritisation of human rights by EC member states in their bilateral relations with third countries, and partly a consequence of the missing common foreign policy instruments. Subsequently, between 1970 and 1992 EC member states succeeded only in very few cases to find a common position *vis-à-vis* human rights violations and to proactively promote human rights or apply sanctions to enforce them. The EC's role in the Helsinki process and its persistent demand *vis-à-vis* the Soviet block to implement the Helsinki Final Act can be named as a positive example. On the other hand, sanctions were only used in cases when human rights violations took place in a European country and directly affected EC interests (e.g. Poland after 1980), when the country was an international pariah (e.g. South Africa), or when the violations attracted so much public attention that the failure to act on the EC's side would have resulted in heavy criticism (e.g. in the case of the Tiananmen massacre in 1989) (id: 323). In most cases however, the EC's reaction was confined to diplomatic criticism.

The complex systemic changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and the EC's new role in a radically modified international environment revealed that the EC was lacking a comprehensive approach to democracy promotion. As a response, in 1991 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution that became a fundamental document for European democracy promotion, summing up the existing tools and practices in this field and setting concrete policy objectives. Thus, the EC's 'active support' should aim at holding elections, establishing democratic institutions, strengthening the rule of law and the judiciary as well as supporting the role of civil society (Council of the European Union, 1991). In addition, the document introduced the concept of "good governance", as well as the possibility of suspending cooperation agreements in case of serious and persistent human rights violations or a serious disruption of the democratic process.

The international euphoria at the beginning of the 1990ies provided a strong impetus for further developing the EU's democracy promotion policy. In a next step, democracy promotion was anchored as a policy goal in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. For the first time, democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights were defined as fundamental principles of the EU and, at the same time, as a condition for EU membership and as a foreign policy objective (Treaty on European Union, 1992, Article y-1). Furthermore, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms was defined as a goal of the EU's development cooperation with third countries (Treaty on European Union 1992: Article 130-2). Democratic principles also ranged high on the agenda in the EU's relations with the Central and Eastern European countries aspiring for membership. The Copenhagen criteria set up by the Council in 1993 put democratic standards at the centre of EU accession conditionality.

As of 1990, a reference to the respect for democratic principles and human rights was gradually included in all new cooperation agreements concluded by the EC with third countries as a basis for bilateral relations. The cooperation agreement with Argentina, the first one to entail such a provision, stated: “Cooperation ties between the Community and Argentina and this Agreement in its entirety are based on the respect for the democratic principles and human rights” (Council of the European Union, 1990). The European Commission then proposed in a 1995 communication to include standard democracy and human rights clauses in all future trade and cooperation agreements concluded by the EC with third countries (European Commission, 1995).

Subsequently, such clauses have been inserted in all newly concluded agreements, a trend referred to by Knodt and Urdze as “democracy mainstreaming” (2008: 21). The intention of this undertaking was to “standardise” democracy promotion and avoid the allegation of applying double standards in the future. Developing countries would no longer be able to elude democratic standards under the pretext that the EU imposed a stricter conditionality on them than on other countries (Youngs, 2001a, p. 36). It soon became clear, however, that democracy mainstreaming failed to achieve its purpose. Older agreements such as the trade agreement with China concluded in 1985 contain no democratic conditionality and have not been renegotiated since (Knodt and Urdze, 2008, p. 28). On the other hand, it is up to EU member states to decide whether and to what extent they apply negative measures if a third country breaches the democracy clause. There is neither an automatic response mechanism in place, nor do the agreements specify sanctions to be applied. To date, democracy promotion policy is being handled on an arbitrary case-by-case basis.

The EU’s Security Strategy from 2003 added a security dimension to democracy promotion stating that:

“The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” (European Council, 2003, p. 10)

In recent years, the Council of the EU has adopted a comprehensive set of human rights guidelines meant to be applied in the EU’s external policy. They are not legally binding but represent a political signal. Their effects remain to be assessed.

EU DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN PRACTICE: MAIN FEATURES, STRATEGIES, INSTRUMENTS

In a next step we will explore the practical implementation of the EU’s democracy promotion policy, the principles it is built upon as well as the instruments

it disposes of. EU democracy promotion is shaped by the EU's character as a transnational "civilian power" (Schubert/Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2000, p. 10) as a result of the strong economy-centred dimension of European integration and the late development of foreign policy and military capabilities. Jünemann and Schörnig (2002, p. 5) identify the following attributes of civilian powers:

- a preference for economic and diplomatic instruments toF the detriment of classical power politics (military use of force);
- an active promotion of international regimes and institutions as well as of political and economic cooperation;
- promoting democracy and human rights as an international security strategy.

Schörnig and Jünemann also point out that the concept of a civilian power is nevertheless compatible with the development of military capabilities. The quality of civilian power is not determined by the possession (or non-possession) of military capabilities, but by the reluctant use of these capabilities as a last resort.

The concept of civilian power is closely linked to the one of "soft power" introduced by Nye (2004), who differentiates between two types of power in the international system: *hard power* as the traditional form of military force and economic power, as opposed to *soft power* defined as an actor's attractiveness in relation to others. More concretely, according to Nye, soft power means

"..the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced." (Nye, 2004b, p. 256)

Soft power thus lies in the capacity of an international actor to function as a "role model" and to persuade others of its rightfulness without using coercive measures. Its key sources lie in the credibility and legitimacy of the pursued goals and the employed means that can set a standard for other countries:

"Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. (...) [It] co-opts people rather than coerces them. (...) And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioural terms, soft power is attractive power."

"Soft power uses a different type of currency – not force, not money – to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values." (Nye, 2004c)

The author illustrates this thesis with the main paradox of US foreign policy: While the US's military dominance is internationally recognized, the US's popularity and credibility have dramatically decreased in many parts of the world. He argues that soft power has proven to be a more effective means than hard power, conducive to more sustainable achievements at lower costs. While Nye's analysis of soft power was originally related to US foreign policy, the concept was quickly picked up by a large number of scholars and EU representatives to describe the EU's role as an external actor. Today, soft power is not only an integral part of the EU's self-conception. It largely defines the way the EU is perceived on the international stage, often in contrast to the hard power US, as a result of a foreign policy approach based on political dialogue, multilateralism and conflict prevention. Europe's attractiveness lies in the values it stands for – democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, solidarity (Kneuer, 2008, p. 104). This reality is illustrated best in the context of the enlargement process. The EU's enormous attractiveness in relation to the candidate countries translates into a unique transformative power that has made enlargement its most successful external policy.

The scope of EU soft power varies, however, regionally. While the EU generally enjoys a good reputation in its neighbourhood, its influence and leverage have proven to be less effective beyond its neighbouring regions. Ultimately, EU soft power works best in countries that widely share the EU's values and seek closer relations. In distant conflict areas such as the Middle East, EU leverage is limited and reveals the other side of the coin: Due to the almost exclusive use of soft power, the EU has developed good capacities in crisis prevention and peace-building, but remains weak in the area of conflict resolution and peace enforcement, which ultimately undermines its role. Effective soft power requires not only a declared commitment to certain values, but the readiness to defend these values by hard power if needed.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the characteristics of the European integration process and the EU's attributes as a political construction *sui generis* have conferred to the EU the quality of a civilian power whose both strength and weakness lie in the predominant application of soft power, which in turn has an impact on its democracy promotion policy. But it is not only the EU's institutional architecture that becomes relevant in this context. Democracy promotion policy is widely determined by the EU member states' history and often diverging geopolitical preferences and animosities. Whitehead for example notes the 'far more tentative and introspective' (1986, p. 11) character of European democracy promotion in contrast to the aggressive-missionary attitude of the US. Europe's totalitarian experience with both rightist and leftist regimes and the devastation produced by the two world wars, both originating on the old continent, led to a more "humble" approach of the Europeans in this area. In addition, as opposed to the US, the EU with its inherent diversity of political systems does not seek to

disseminate a unilateral democracy model, but focuses rather on the fulfilment of certain standards. Also, while the US tend to almost exclusively focus on the electoral aspect of democracy promotion, the EU is pursuing a more substantial and comprehensive definition of democracy that emphasises, apart from elections and institution building, the strengthening of the rule of law, judicial and public administration reform, the fight against corruption, the protection of minorities as well as the promotion of local self-government and of civil society structures (Kneuer, 2007, p. 97). The purpose does not lie in transferring one-to-one a certain institutional model but in ‘constructing a political will for democratic policy-making’ (Youngs, 2001b, p. 363).

Another factor impacting on European democracy promotion is the colonial history of individual EU member states and their historical, geopolitical and cultural preferences (Emerson and Aydin, 2005, p. 6). For example, the Mediterranean region has traditionally been a priority for French and Spanish foreign policy; Germany tends to take a reserved stance when it comes to Israel, while the Central and Eastern European countries advocate a more critical position in relation to the Russian Federation and Austria favours a stronger engagement of the EU on the Balkans. All these different (and sometimes diverging) foreign policy preferences of member states may impact on EU democracy promotion in an inhibiting (blockage or subversion) or supportive way (synergy effects).

Having noted these structural determinants of EU democracy promotion, we shall take a closer look at its implementation. A global assessment of the EU’s democracy promotion is a complex analytical and methodological challenge. On the one hand, a comprehensive evaluation of the EU’s democracy promotion measures in all (or most) targeted countries and regions would go beyond the scope of this paper. On the other hand, the existing literature mostly concentrates on case studies that lack the “bigger picture”, while few authors address the role of the EU as a democracy promoter from a theoretical perspective (e.g. Jünemann and Knodt, 2007).

Youngs is one of the few authors who have conceptualised the EU’s strategy in this field. In a 2001 study Fhe analyses the EU’s democracy support in the Mediterranean and Eastern Asia and notes the generally positive character of the EU’s approach to democracy promotion (Youngs, 2001a, p. 191), a view also shared by other researchers (e.g. Santiso, 2003, p. 7). According to Youngs, the EU’s democracy promotion strategy is designed with the primary goal to create a framework for policy dialogue and institutionalised cooperation in the target countries that would ultimately be conducive to consensus on democratic standards among political elites. The strategy aims at a latent diffusion of democratic values and the socialisation of political elites in a democratic context without directly confronting non-democratic regimes (Youngs, 2001a, p. 193). In fact, coercive measures are not a major component of the EU’s strategy. In practice this means that the EU tends not to respond to the violation of democratic principles by applying negative

measures, and even if such measures are imposed, this mostly happens in an ad-hoc manner and is not consistently implemented (id: 192). Also, trade relations and financial aid are not significantly linked to compliance with democratic criteria. Studies on the EU's development policy in relation to the ACP States reveal that a country's performance in fulfilling democratic standards is not a determining factor when granting development aid (Wolf and Spoden, 2000). Especially in regions where the fight against poverty and humanitarian disasters is more pressing than enforcing democratic standards, authoritarian governments often succeed to circumvent sanctions and obtain additional assistance, as was the case in Kenya, Egypt, Venezuela and Cuba in the past (Youngs, 2001b, p. 357). Nevertheless, the EU considers an engagement based on positive measures like incentives and financial assistance as being the most promising approach. Youngs argues that over the years, the EU has developed a specific democracy promotion concept essentially based on two elements: elite socialisation to encourage consensus on democratic principles and values, and a prioritisation of socio-economic development.

Elite socialisation reflects the assumption that fostering dialogue and cooperation between different stakeholders (government and civil society) will put in motion a dynamic conducive to a long-term consensus on the need for democratic reforms, the establishment of democratic practices and, eventually, a democratic identity (id: 359). The primary goal of the EU's strategy is promoting political dialogue among elites and establishing networks of institutionalised cooperation. The purpose of this is 'to get the vocabulary of democracy introduced into relations with non- or weakly-democratic third countries' (ibid). Critics may qualify this approach as weak, but its political relevance is given precisely by undemocratic states' resistance against it (Youngs, 2001b, p. 361). For example, countries such as Mexico and Cuba were reluctant to accept the democracy clause as part of their cooperation agreements with the EU, since it implied accepting democratic standards as a basis for their relations with the EU. Similarly, the ACP states initially rejected the inclusion of the "good governance" concept in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.² This proves that the EU's democratic requirements are not being perceived merely as lip service, but as a political commitment that potentially grants a certain degree of leverage to the contractual partner or to internal political actors.

One of the main innovations of the EU's democracy promotion strategy is represented by the mainstreaming of the good governance concept at international level. Good governance was first mentioned in a 1989 World Bank Report on Africa and has since become a concept of reference in the development policy field. Essentially, governance refers to the way in which the economic and social resources of a country are managed and is established on the basis of six indicators: voice

² As a compromise, the agreement mentions good governance as a policy goal, without the possibility of suspending the agreement in case of non-compliance with it (except in serious cases of corruption).

and accountability, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2008). The EU has extended and further politicised the term by adding democracy, the respect for human rights and a market economy as conditions for good governance. Fostering decentralisation, administrative efficiency and transparency are presumed to bring about “democratic side effects”, without setting democratisation as an explicit policy goal. Indeed, empiric evidence shows that external actors can get easier access to non-democratic systems under the good-governance-label, but whether this actually contributes to improving democratic standards remains an open question. In fact, measures supporting good governance can become highly problematic if they lead e.g. to strengthening the administrative capacity of an undemocratic regime.

Apart from the concept of elite socialisation, EU democracy promotion is borne by the idealistic conviction that socio-economic development will eventually lead to democratic reforms. This is why economic and trade policies take up a central role (Youngs, 2001c, p. 35). Carrots (e.g. trade liberalisation) and sticks (e.g. to achieve compliance with WTO conditions) are mainly applied in the economic area, with the effects being often undermined by the highly criticised protectionist measures and asymmetric trade liberalisation favouring the EU (Youngs, 2001c, p. 39).

Furthermore, EU democracy promotion policy is characterised by a bottom-up approach in the sense of support being granted predominantly to civil society structures, in particular to NGOs with a human rights and development profile (Santiso, 2003, p. 9). Especially in the 1990ies, the bulk of EU funds for civil society was directed towards branches of Western NGOs, whereas local NGOs and other local organisations (e.g. trade unions) were only being considered to a small extent. Youngs criticises the almost exclusive focus on civil society structures to the detriment of policy structures (political parties, parliaments, governments) that play an at least equally important role for the development of a democratic system (2001b, p. 346). The strong preference for a bottom-up approach is based on the belief of EU stakeholders that support to state institutions does not represent genuine democracy support. Youngs therefore concludes that the EU strategy is ‘too political to be genuinely socio-economic, too socio-economic to be comprehensively political’ (id: 373).

One can state with certainty that the political relevance of EU democracy assistance has been steadily increasing since the 1990ies. Between 1990 and 2000, the EU tripled its development aid to 800 million Euros, overtook the US as the main global donor (Youngs, 2001a, p. 31) and managed to uphold this position to date, providing more than half of development aid worldwide. While “democracy and human rights” are defined as a cross-cutting objective of development policy, it is however difficult to determine the exact amount allocated to democracy promotion within the total figure, as it is rarely specified as such but rather implicit

to a number of different funding objectives. The main democracy promotion tool is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) launched in 2006, under which the European Commission allocates about 1.1 billion Euros. Beyond financial aid, there has been a trend in recent years going towards raising visibility (and hopefully the effectiveness) of democracy promotion. The adoption of the EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan setting the principles and priorities for human rights and democracy promotion in EU external relations as well as the nomination of an EU Special Representative for Human Rights in 2012 are milestones on this path.

A closer look at democracy promotion instruments reveals that the variety of EU foreign policy tools has been continuously widened over the years. The broad range of political, diplomatic and economic measures the EU applies in its foreign policy can be classified into positive and negative instruments, depending on their intended impact. Positive democracy promotion measures include political cooperation, strengthening trade relations, granting financial and technical support for reforms etc. Negative instruments range from cutting back on political and economic cooperation and suspending cooperation agreements to diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions and embargos.

The guiding principle of the EU's democracy promotion policy is the concept of conditionality, meaning that granting aid and other advantages is linked to compliance with a number of principles (democratic standards, the rule of law and respect for human rights). The principle of conditionality functions according to the "carrot and stick" approach: Positive measures are used as incentives to persuade the recipient country to implement democratic reforms. The "stick" is brought to bear in the shape of negative measures if the country violates democratic principles resp. breaches the existing agreements. Conditionality is effective when the granted reward or benefits are deemed by the country to outweigh reform costs (Schimmelfenning, 2003, p. 411).

However, traditional conditionality with incentives and sanctions has proven to be less effective than initially expected by international donors (Santiso, 2001, p. 160; see also Collier, 1997). It can only be successful in countries where a basic consensus on democratisation already exists. Conditionality can support democratic transition and consolidation but not decisively influence, much less induce it, and turns out to be thus most effective where it's least needed (Burnell, 2000, p. 28). "[Conditionality] cannot bypass the complicated yet indispensable process of consensus building within a democratising country" (Brown, 2005, p. 184). Its effectiveness is ultimately determined by ownership and commitment to reforms of the democratising country. By contrast, both positive and negative measures have proven ineffective when applied to authoritarian regimes or dysfunctional democracies. Coercive measures have even turned out to be counterproductive, as they rather affect the population than the autocratic elites (Hansen and

Borchgrevink 2006, p. 624). On the other hand, the EU often failed to implement sanctions in a coherent manner. Youngs argues that sanctions can only be successful in three cases and under specific circumstances (2001a, p. 23): when international pressure is requested by elites advocating democratisation; if the country is undergoing an acute economic crisis and a policy of strict sanctions would bring the already weak authoritarian regime to a fall; following an authoritarian coup. Effective sanctions must always be internationally coordinated and applied with a clearly defined purpose.

By introducing the democracy clause in its trade agreements, the EU has embraced conditionality as an integral part of its democracy promotion policy. However, in practice, this principle is being inconsistently implemented. Youngs notes that the EU rarely applies negative measures against undemocratic states and when it does, this happens in an inconsistent manner (Youngs, 2001c, p. 18). Sanctions and diplomatic isolation are only applied when regional security and stability are at risk e.g. in the case of Libya, Iraq, North Korea and, more recently, Russia. The EU suspended trade agreements and financial aid as a response to undemocratic coups or serious violations of human rights e.g. against Sudan and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. But the mere fact of a state being governed undemocratically does not represent a sufficient reason for the EU to employ negative measures.

By contrast, the emphasis lies on positive measures, for example through the “more for more” approach introduced in 2010-2011, according to which countries that make more progress towards democratic reforms can expect more EU support. Overall, there does not seem to be a convincing correlation between the allocation of EU aid and the democratic performance of recipient countries, partly due to some member states’ lobbying for their “clients” in former colonies, partly as a result of cumbersome reallocation procedures within the EU Development Fund.

In addition, the scope and impact of EU conditionality vary significantly from region to region. Overall, it can be argued that conditionality has the potential of being most effective in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. Its influence then decreases proportionally with the increasing geographical distance from the recipient country. Given its limited resources, the EU is bound to prioritise according to (security) interests (Warkotsch, 2008, p. 230). Democracy promotion is in essence a form of security policy – it represents the EU’s response to security threats (civil wars, territorial disputes, weak states, organised crime etc.) Therefore, democratic conditionality is applied more thoroughly in the EU’s neighbourhood than in other regions of the world (Jünemann and Knodt, 2006, p. 116). On the other hand, here EU conditionality enjoys a unique leverage, particularly in countries with a membership perspective. This argument is illustrated best by the EU’s enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe, which has proven to be the success *par excellence* of EU democracy promotion.

Jünemann and Knodt explain the EU's choice of instruments in relation to third countries by identifying three variables that determine the formulation and effectiveness of democracy promotion policy (2007, p. 19):

- 1) The EU's capabilities as a foreign policy actor given its structural specificities as a multi-level-system. Democracy promotion is subject to individual member states' interests and affinities. The closer the bilateral relations between the third country and at least one EU member state, the lower the EU's capacity to act coherently, as member states might undermine or even neutralise its role as a democracy promoter.
- 2) The resource relationship between the EU and the third country: The leverage of EU conditionality depends on whether political and economic relations are symmetrical or asymmetrical, and whether the asymmetry favours the third country or the EU. Symmetric interdependence leaves the EU with a minimum level of leverage (e.g. as in the case of China).
- 3) The structure of resonance in the third country i.e. the existence of partners sharing the same values and goals and who are committed to dialogue.

A fourth, additional factor is represented by the international security environment. In the aftermath of 9/11, the security imperative ranks at the top of the EU's foreign policy agenda, overshadowing democracy promotion, especially when this conflicts with security aims. The result is what Jünemann and Knodt call the "stabilisation-democratisation-dilemma": Faced with the threat of terrorism, the EU is willing to cooperate with authoritarian regimes for security purposes and more reluctant to promote democratic reforms that typically tend to destabilise a country by producing uncertainty, at least in the initial phases of the transition process (Jünemann and Knodt, 2006, p. 118). The price paid is the increasingly damaged credibility of an EU democracy promotion policy.

CONCLUSION

Summarising, we can conclude that EU democracy promotion is an evolving policy field that has considerably developed, both formally and content-wise, in the context of the EU's more active role on the international stage after 1990. Today, the EU disposes of a variety of instruments in this field. It has developed its own democracy promotion approach and has invested a considerable amount of resources in this purpose. The EU is taking a holistic approach to democracy promotion, bringing together economic reform, social change, strategic diplomacy and democratisation measures, according to the belief that these areas are closely intertwined, influencing and determining each other (Youngs, 2001b, p. 368). EU democracy promotion thus combines strategic, idealistic, economic and development objectives and approaches that are 'neither entirely mutually reinforcing, nor

completely contradictory' in relation to each other (Youngs, 2001a, p. 199). Also, it is rarely being handled as a separate policy, but rather addressed indirectly as a desirable side-effect of supporting reforms in other areas. Not least, EU democracy promotion entails a mixture of self-interest and ethics that are weighted and implemented differently depending on the region and the actors involved. As a cross-cutting area of the EU's external relations, democracy promotion is shaped by the multidimensional policy-making process characteristic to EU foreign policy and its inherent weaknesses. Moreover, the EU's role as democracy promoter has the potential to collide with its security aims, as well as with individual member states' interests (Grimm, 2005). Therefore, despite ranking high on the agenda in countless speeches and documents, democracy promotion occupies a rather modest place in terms of implementation. Due to external and internal constraints the EU is incapable of putting its entire political and economic weight in the service of democracy promotion, hereby keeping a low profile in this policy field.

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Camelia RATIU

ULOGA EVROPSKE UNIJE KAO MEĐUNARODNOG PROMOTERA DEMOKRATIJE

Apstrakt: U radu se iznose principi, mehanizmi, strategije i instrumenti koji čine suštinu Briselske politike demokratizacije, kao i njene mogućnosti i ograničenja. U prvom delu rada kratko se obrađuju osnovni teorijski pristupi u vezi sa spoljnom promocijom demokratije, kao i osobine ove oblasti politike. Nadalje se ukazuje na pravne i institucionalne osnove EU za njenu politiku promocije demokratije, njenu primenu u praksi, i konačno, sumiraju osnovni ishodi.

Ključne reči: Briselska politika demokratizacije, teorijski pristupi, politika promocije demokratije, primena.

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THE STATE AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

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Abstract: The world is characterised by dynamic changes which intensify interdependence of states, what is especially reflected in the field of economy. In spite of numerous crises and bigger risks in international relations it is clear that the world convergence of systems and institutions is carrying on, what points to the fact that globalisation keeps on going its way. Taking into consideration the current position of the Republic of Serbia on the international scene as well as its economic position it is obvious that big challenges and hard work is before us in order to keep up with developed countries and to take a position after EU accession and in the global order which is being established. In order to achieve such significant economic progress competitiveness of our economy should be constantly strengthened, what is the only efficient way towards achieving increase in exports. The experiences of developed countries show that their highly professional and first-rate economic diplomacy is to a great extent responsible for the success of their export potentials. Therefore, by doing an analysis the paper has attempted to point not to the need, because in an indirect way it can be consider a rhetorical question, but to the possibilities for the promotion of the Serbian economic diplomacy in practice.

Key words: economic diplomacy, economic development, globalisation, competitiveness.

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary world is characterised by strong globalisation which is at the same time shaping the business environment. According to the opinion of the

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author of the article, globalisation is by itself an irreversible process of dynamic integrations and continuous intensification of interdependence of states and people at the world level. Under such conditions the quality of relationships between the state and business is a key element for the success and achieving of a comparative advantage in the global market arena.

In the opinion of Prof. Vukotić, one of the leading economists from this region: “The intensity and nature of economic activities depend on many factors such as climate, size of the territory or population, customs, degree of development, capital and technological level, but it depends most on the rules of the game” (Vukotić, 2005, p. 184). In that sense, the comprehension of the relationship between globalisation, the state and business is of vital importance for finding solutions to achieve economic success.

Be that as it may, the driving forces of globalisation which characterise the post-Cold War surroundings do not substantially decrease the value of the existing international system. They rather encourage as necessary the establishment of the reform process and adjustment to new conditions and systems by which the world works. In that sense, the future of diplomacy will depend on its ability to duly recognise the newly created changes and encourage its governments to undertake transformations that will enable their efficacy and efficiency which are in the interest of the people, states and the whole plant as well.

Therefore, in the present kind of “economic global village”, when capital ignores that there exist all kinds of differences between peoples and states diplomacies of countries of primarily small and medium sized territories and financial power among which the Republic of Serbia is, inevitably moves the focus of its activity from political to economic aspects of international relations.

Bearing in mind what has been said above, considering all available information we have endeavoured to perceive the state of economic diplomacy in Serbia (both in theory and in practice) and to point to the possible directions of its promotion. The article does not intend to give answers to all unknown matters concerning the Serbian economic diplomacy. On the contrary, it should be understood only as a part of efforts that are taken with the aim of improving our economic reality.

THEORETICAL DETERMINATION OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY

Although economic diplomacy has a clear historical development dimension, the term itself was created comparatively not long ago. It originates from French - *la diplomatie economique*. Very soon it was adopted by the Russian diplomacy under the term *экономическая дипломатия*. On the other hand, we have Anglo-Saxon variations using the terms such as trade diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, although in recent

times it can be noticed that the term economic diplomacy has been being increasingly adopted (Ruth, 2006). Trade diplomacy puts emphasis on trade promotion, while economic diplomacy is a broader term involving all economic aspects.

In that sense, trade diplomacy implies the activities of the state in international promoting and protecting of the interests of companies, negotiations with the governments and companies in whose countries home offices do business, preventives measures of possible economic conflicts at home or abroad, collecting of information as well as global promotion of domestic export interests through the diplomatic apparatus, what should all be done in co-ordination with domestic companies (Bryde, 1993).

Concerning economic diplomacy it can be perceived from two aspects. One is economic diplomacy in a broader sense and it is more comprehensive regarding all subjects of a society which participate in strengthening of economic competitiveness of a country by applying diplomatic methods. The other is the definition of economic diplomacy in a narrower sense regarding the exclusive activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which protects economic interests of its country. In a broader sense, economic diplomacy implies applying of state diplomatic measures as well as economic measures and instruments bilaterally and multilaterally in order to ensure the development of the national economy and protection of foreign economic interests of a country (Орбатски, 1985, p. 3).

In our country economic diplomacy is theoretically defined by several researchers. For the purpose of this paper we shall mention only two authors and these are Prof. M. Raičević and Prof. V. Prvulović. In his book “Međunarodna ekonomija” (International economy) which was published in 1999 Raičević explains that economic diplomacy “...includes applying of diplomatic mechanisms and methods in co-ordination with the strategic, foreign economic goals and instruments for their operationalisation on the part of the state in bilateral and multilateral flows of international economic co-operation as well as in the domestic economic space. The goal is to actively support the national economy and ensure the achievement of foreign economic interests, positioning and providing of direct support to home offices in international business (what includes reaching of political and some other goals within the foreign policy strategy of the specific state in some geographic and political areas or generally in the world)” (Raičević, 1999, p. 137).

Taking into consideration the “awkwardness” of the definition Raičević had provided Prof. Prvulović decided to apply the procedure of shorter and “gradual defining of economic diplomacy” (Prvulović, 2001, p. 24). According to him, economic diplomacy is a “... specific and sophisticated union of diplomacy in the classic sense and economic sciences, management sciences, negotiation methods and techniques with foreign partners, public relations and collecting of information which are of interest for the economy of one’s own country or one’s company with the aim of making a breakthrough to the world market” (Prvulović, 2001, p. 24).

On the other hand, in our paper, economic diplomacy in a narrower sense will be defined as efforts of the official diplomacy of a country to support pursuing its economic policy.

It is important to have in mind that ministries of foreign affairs generally do not carry out foreign economic relations (with the exception of Australia, Canada and several other countries which combine their activities with the activities of some other ministries). But, following bilateral economic relations, which are in most ministries interwoven with political activities, through the system of territorial organisational units is something that is implied itself and to which special attention is given. This is a sort of confirmation that the economy is vital being often a dominant element of bilateral relations. The other related element is that most diplomatic services combine economic activities with other assignments. However, there is a lot of those that have also specialised trade departments (as is the case with the USA)² or they pursue trade diplomacy by combining persons in big embassies who are especially trained and delegated by the Ministry of Trade with regular officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who also deal with these matters.

There are several models by which states support their economic interests abroad. It is interesting to perceive them through trade and investment aspects which are treated in different ways by Ministries of Foreign Affairs. These are as follows: (a) unified model, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays the most important role fully unifying foreign affairs and foreign trade of the country, (b) partially unified model, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade jointly establish a separate body which deals with trade and investments in diplomatic missions, c) agency model, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not deal with trade issues at all, but this is done by special government bodies under the supervision of the Ministry of Trade, d) competition model, where activities and powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries overlap, and e) model of rejection, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs completely leaves foreign trade and investment issues to other ministries, i.e. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not play any role in the economic policy of the country (Rana, 2000).

THE STATE OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

It is an indisputable fact that the best results in any activity are achieved by creating a symbiosis of theory and practice. In that sense, when economic

² In 2010, the State Department was reorganised and on that occasion the Office for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment was established. It is also responsible for conducting the US economic diplomacy. See the organisational chart of the State Department at <http://www.state.gov>.

diplomacy is concerned, we shall only partly consider the state of theory of this narrow scientific discipline in our country.

Economic diplomacy in the scientific theory of the Republic of Serbia

The research shows that after the break-up of the SFRY the “father” of economic diplomacy in our country has been Prof. Vladimir Prvulović. In 2001, he wrote the book “*Ekonomska diplomatija*” (Economic diplomacy) of which 5 Serbian editions with all changes and additions have been published so far, while the English edition is also to be brought out (Prvulović, 2001).

Apart from Prof. Prvulović, only few researchers in Serbia have explored or have been still exploring economic diplomacy. Among them, we should, certainly, mention Prof. David Dašić (Dašić, 2013) and Prof. Miroslav Raičević (Raičević, 2006).

To be fair we should also mention several titles which have directly or indirectly dealt with economic diplomacy such as the following: Mitić Miodrag, *Diplomatija kao sredstvo za promociju, ostvarivanje i zaštitu poslovnih interesa* (Diplomacy as a means for promotion, achievement and protection of business interests), Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna sredstva, Beograd, 2003; dr Dobrosav Radovanović, *Geoeconomija, poslovna diplomatija i globalni menadžment* (Goeconomics, business diplomacy and global management), Liber, Beograd, 2008; Petković Todor, *Poslovna špijunaža i ekonomsko ratovanje - Globalna ekonomija i poslovna diplomatija* (Business espionage and economic warfare – Global economy and business diplomacy), Public Triton, Beograd, 2006. i Golubović Zoran, *Komuniciranje u ekonomskoj diplomatiji* (Communicating in economic diplomacy), Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012.

The proceedings entitled *Nova ekonomska diplomatija mogućnosti i izazovi* (New economic diplomacy: possibilities and challenges) (Asocijacija nevladinih organizacija jugoistočne Evrope, Beograd, 2012) is especially valuable for the Serbian economic diplomacy because our 15 economic diplomats currently doing this job wrote articles for the book.

In the early 21st century several universities in the Republic of Serbia included the subject “Economic Diplomacy” in their curriculums. After the Megatrend University, i.e. its Faculty of Geoeconomics (today it is the Faculty of International Economics) the subject entitled “Economic Diplomacy” is also studied at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of the Alfa University, Faculty of Economics and Engineering Management of the Business Academy as well as at some, mostly private universities and faculties.

It is interesting to mention that at the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade, which could be metaphorically called the “core” of our future diplomats, economic

diplomacy is not studied as a separate subject but only as a thematic entity within the “Contemporary Diplomacy”.

In late 2003, Institute of Economic Diplomacy had been founded in Zemun. For ten years of its work it did not meet the expectations of our scientific and professional public. Apart from group forms of work (seminars, round tables...), which were organised by the Institute “Leksikon ekonomske diplomatije i međunarodnog poslovanja” (Lexicon of economic diplomacy and international business) could be considered its greatest achievement.

Economic diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia in practice

In late 2009, followed by the pomp of media 29 economic diplomats (Minister-Counsellors) were sent to 27 foreign countries. Unfortunately, by the general impression of the public, they have not done their job properly. Therefore, their mission was and has remained unsuccessful. Apart from them, about dozen of representatives from the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia work as representatives in foreign countries as well as a number of persons who are engaged in trade parts of our diplomatic missions.³

After the analysis had been done on their performance and the budget funds intended for this purpose were cut, in early 2013, economic diplomats were withdrawn from Skopje, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Podgorica, Ljubljana, Kiev and Budapest.

In perceiving the performance of our economic diplomats the expenses they incurred and which our country had to pay should not be ignored. According to the official date, in late 2013, Serbia had 21 economic diplomats (Minister-Counsellors) in 18 states.⁴ The expenses the state covered annually totalled 1,377,470 Euros, i.e. 65,594 Euros by an individual. Monthly expenses of the state totalled 114,790 Euros, i.e. 5,468 by a diplomat. What is the structure of expenses of the Republic of Serbia for its economic diplomats? The greatest part, even 60 per cent, was intended for salaries (69,030 Euros), funds for taxes and fees amounted to 11 per cent (12,974 Euros), accommodation expenses amounted to 26 per cent (29,586 Euros), and finally, all other expenses totalled 3 per cent (3,200 Euros).⁵

It is an indisputable fact that economic diplomacy incurs expenses to the state and this should be as such. This is an assertion which no one should deny. However, one can justifiably put a question whether the data showing the promotion of

³ In early 2014 the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia had its missions in Russia, Belgium, Austria, Germany and Italy. Available at: <http://www.pks.rs/ONama.aspx?id=119&p=1&>

⁴ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Canada, China, Germany, Romania, Russia, USA, Slovakia, Turkey and Great Britain.

⁵ M.Č. *Za ekonomske savetnike u inostranstvu 1,3 miliona evra* (Minister-Counsellors for Economic Affairs cost us 1.3 million Euros), „Politika“, Beograd, 25. decembar 2013, str. 6.

foreign trade of our country in the last five years have resulted only from the performance of Serbian economic diplomats. The official data for 2009 when Serbia established the current model of economic diplomacy show that exports had amounted to 5,961 million Euros, while imports amounted to 11,505 million Euros (Annual Statistical Bulletin of the Republic of Serbia, 2011, p. 281). Five years later, in 2014, Serbian exports amounted to 11,157 million Euros, while imports totalled 15,526.3 million Euros.⁶

Six years after sending economic diplomats abroad the economic situation in Serbia has almost not improved at all. None of our economic diplomats can say that he has made some great or at least a modest result. Practically, out of 29 none of them has managed to bring to Serbia a tangible investment. One could ask a question: who have we sent abroad to represent us? Are they experts, analysts, experienced business persons or sons, daughters, sisters, friends and “good people”?

The biggest mistake was made in choosing economic diplomats which we sent abroad and it was done too hastily. There were chosen young people with no diplomatic experience who were mostly recruited from government administration services. The criteria were badly established, while their implementation was even worse along with the fact that those economic ambassadors were not thoroughly prepared, so it was hard that they could give any better result. Besides, they were surrounded by envious career diplomats and other servants in the Serbian embassies where they were regarded as undesirable “tenants”. There was no satisfactory co-operation and synergy with them which was necessary, their connections were weak or were even made difficult with the two ministries in the country and they could possibly co-operate only with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce if there were any in the missions in the countries to which they were accredited. Their inexperience, bad preparations for specific jobs and the bad choice of diplomats are sufficient reasons for the prevalent failure of our first economic diplomats. It should be mentioned that the Foreign Office of the United Kingdom train its future diplomats 18 months before they are sent to mission in the receiving country, while from four to six months before the mission begins they get acquainted with the specific assignments which will be set before them. In the SFRY similar practice was also applied.

It should be necessary to additionally stress that our economic diplomats are not adequately educated. For more than ten years France has the Economic Warfare School of Paris. Our country does not consider it appropriate to establish an academy or any sort of school for civil servants that would support the efforts for developing serious personnel that would be capable of responding to the needs for a more intensive foreign economic activity of the Republic of Serbia.

⁶ Available at: <http://www.makroekonomija.org/robna-razmena/robna-razmena-u-2014-godini>.

Concerning the domestic economic faculties, the Faculty of Political Science or the Faculty (former Academy) for Diplomacy and Security and their curriculums we can conclude that they are lagging far behind the contemporary world. Therefore, in our country there is no such thing as is the education in the field of economic diplomacy which requires specialised and specific knowledge.

For this reason, we should additionally stress that a Serbian economic diplomat should be adequately educated, well informed of the country where he would serve, he should study the language of the people that live there and work hard for the purpose of achieving the state's interests. Any other way would make an economic diplomat inefficient. If otherwise, a diplomat would spend some time in a foreign country where he would be paid much better than in Serbia not bringing any benefit to the state, what has been the case so far.

POSSIBILITIES FOR PROMOTION OF ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

The unfavourable economic situation in our country imposes the need to speed up the integration processes under the conditions where interdependence with highly developed countries prevails. This should be done in order to accelerate its development above all, in the economic sphere. In that sense, Serbia's integration to the EU is for our economy one of the most hopeful opportunities. So far, this process has mostly proceeded in the political sphere, so that one could get an impression that it has been the most important. However, the experiences of the European transition countries show that it is equally important or even the most important to achieve significant economic progress without which such an integration could not be possible.

Undoubtedly, for the achievement of great economic progress the competitiveness of our economy should be continuously strengthened, what is the only efficient way for exports increase. The experiences of developed countries show that partly thanks to their highly professional and first-rate economic diplomacy the achievement of success of their export potentials has been partly made.

There is no dilemma whether the state should help its companies in their access to the European and world markets. The only genuine dilemma is how to ensure necessary funds for the support and what moves should be made in the multi-stage process of promotion of our economy at the increasingly demanding world market.

If there is any dilemma over some political issues concerning the future development of Serbia, there should be no dilemma over the economic development, because economic success is *sine qua non* for the survival of our people. In that sense, whatever efforts are made and means are invested in the economic development, they would never be useless.

Economic diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia by applying the Austrian model

Since we have established the fact above in the text that most of developed countries do not leave the co-ordination of their economic diplomacy to Ministries of Foreign Affairs there is a question what model could produce the best results in our case. Taking into account the existing infrastructure and political reality the most appropriate seems to be the so-called Austrian model. That is the model where economic diplomacy issues are treated, i.e. co-ordinated by the Chamber of Commerce of the country concerned. The “Austrian model” of economic diplomacy is in our public discussed more generally than its details are presented. The essence of this model is the fact that economic diplomacy is “handled” by the Chamber of Commerce (Economic Chamber) of Austria (Foreign Trade Sector) with a network of over 110 branch offices in more than 70 countries all over the world.⁷

In some countries such as Serbia branch offices are attached to the Trade Department within the Embassy of the Republic of Austria. In some other countries branch offices of the Austrian Chamber of Commerce act autonomously from the Embassy.

At this moment, 750 people from the Austrian Chamber of Commerce are engaged in economic diplomacy activities offering support to Austrian companies in finding business partners all over the world, this also including foreign companies attempting to find partners in Austria. Apart from this, every year it organises more than 1,000 events with the aim of establishing business contacts, dissemination of information of Austria and the like.

The positive thing with the “Austrian model” is that business people deal with economy and the negative one is that the state can to a small extent influence the regulation, i.e. direction of economic relations.

The institution which most greatly supports the application of the “Austrian model” in the Serbian economic diplomacy is the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia. As said by Željko Sertić, President of the Chamber, this institution is “...willing to participate and make available its experiences in these activities for the purpose of setting up and building of personnel of the future institution or organisation”.⁸

Concerning this model the professional public and government bodies agree that it is necessary to take two steps in the preparation and building of a new model of economic diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia.

The first is to thoroughly consider and find the destinations on the economic chart of the world for our trade offices and the second, which is equally important - is to get the personnel that would work there well prepared, trained and who will

⁷ See more at: <http://www.advantageaustria.org/>

⁸ Available at: <http://www.dnevnik.rs/ekonomija/mora-da-se-menja-i-ekonomska-diplomatija>.

acquire the knowledge and skills necessary for the employees that will represent Serbia's economy in the world.

Finally, the Chamber of Commerce have initiated the discussions on its proposal with the ministries which are responsible for this area expecting that the new model will be "applied" during 2015.

Economic diplomacy for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible

The alternative to the previously mentioned model is that economic diplomacy is co-ordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The implementation of such a model of work can be found in several developed countries. In March 2013, the Sector for Economic Diplomacy was founded within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. Italy constantly puts emphasis on economic diplomacy as a key priority of foreign affairs of its country. During 2010, Hillary Clinton, former US State Secretary, reorganised the State Department establishing the Office for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment, what has already been mentioned above.

The same trend has become evident in the countries in the region. In this way, Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia have defined economic diplomacy as a priority of their foreign policies. At the "International Conference on Economic Diplomacy and Internationalisation" representatives of governments, ministries of foreign affairs, chambers of commerce and business emphasised the significance of economic diplomacy through the models applied by France, Denmark, Slovenia, Turkey, Russia, India, Germany and Austria. Although some differences in opinions were expressed the participants in the conference found that the "Scandinavian" model was optimal. By applying it a co-ordination mechanism is being established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The starting point for the establishment of an efficient model of economic diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia could also be the application of the "Scandinavian" model or more precisely the model applied by Denmark. It has also been applied by Montenegro and Slovenia. The Danish model implies the establishment of *integrated economic diplomacy* within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Within the Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is the Directorate for Economic Diplomacy for which the Minister is directly responsible. Within it there is the Department for Public Diplomacy and Bilateral Economic Co-operation.⁹ Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Montenegro there is the Directorate General for Economic Diplomacy and Cultural Cooperation for which the Minister is directly responsible.¹⁰

⁹ Available at: www.mzz.gov.si

¹⁰ Available at: www.mvpei.gov.me

Such an idea was presented by Ivan Mrkšić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, who stated that by the end of 2014 there would be established a separate organisational entity in the MFA, which would be responsible for economic diplomacy of our country,¹¹ what had not been done until this paper was written.

Combined model

Having in mind what has been said above, we have concluded that in our case the best results would be achieved by applying the “Combined Model of Economic Diplomacy”. It implies an integrative approach in order to ensure better co-ordination and creation of conditions for the achievement of a possible synergy effect of institutions which are responsible for foreign economic relations and promotion of our economy. In that regard, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should establish a new organisational unit, and if not a sector (what would probably be too ambitious), then at least a Directorate (Directorate General?!) for Economic Diplomacy. It is just necessary to establish a new organisational entity because the existing organisation does not recognise economic diplomacy as one of its functions. By all this, economic diplomats – first-class experts in this field would be engaged in carefully chosen diplomatic and consular missions of the Republic of Serbia in foreign countries.

Regardless of the establishment of a new organisational entity and in accordance with the strategic significance which the economic success has for Serbia the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the State Secretary should be directly responsible for its work.

By the model of private-public partnership with all institutions and organisations of the Republic of Serbia the Directorate for Economic Diplomacy would co-ordinate economic diplomacy, i.e. the activities in supporting and promoting exports and foreign direct investments as well as in providing information to all interested parties.

The activities of economic diplomacy should serve the priorities of the Government of Serbia which are directed towards achieving economic growth and creating of new jobs through inducing our companies to access the markets of foreign countries and increase exports as well in attracting foreign direct investments to Serbia.

Integrated economic diplomacy of the Republic should imply the following:¹²

¹¹ The statement by Minister Ivan Mrkić made in the „Oklo magazin” programme, RTS, 16 January 2014.

¹² Presented by using the text of “Ekonomaska diplomatija” (Economic diplomacy) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Montenegro (<http://www.mvpei.gov.me/rubrike/ED.10.02.2015>).

1. Establishment of the Directorate for Economic Diplomacy as an integrated and co-ordination mechanism for all institutions and organisations which are involved in the process (corresponding ministries, business associations, Serbian diplomatic and consular missions, foreign diplomatic and consular missions in Serbia, universities, local self-governments, Serbian companies, the Chamber of Commerce of Serbia, foreign investors....);
2. Establishment of an efficient mechanism of support to Serbian branch offices abroad and foreign investors in our country;
3. Establishment of an efficient mechanism of support to our diplomatic missions for carrying out the planned activities, what includes providing instructions and information duly;
4. Openness of the Ministry and diplomatic missions to companies;
5. Establishment of a strategic body that would be a co-ordinator at the intersectoral level of the Government of Serbia, which would involve strategic directions and regulatory promotion for business dealings;
6. Serbia's embassies will provide information on economic frameworks of the receiving country as well as on potential possibilities for imports and attracting of investments, this including submitting of an annual work plan and a report.
7. Providing of information of Serbia as an investment destination, of specific projects as well as giving regular instructions on the current issues in order to present a single position;
8. Organisation of meetings with business associations or potential investors during official visits of states delegations;
9. Official delegations should also include representatives of the business community both from our country as from foreign countries during visits of states delegations;
10. Establishment of a mechanism of scholarships for the fields of international economic co-operation, promotion and other necessary knowledge and skills which are indispensable for strengthening the capacities which economic diplomacy performs, etc.

In applying the integrated model of economic diplomacy the role and tasks of our economic counsellors (diplomats) would be as follows:

- offering assistance in establishing contacts with ministries, other state institutions, chambers of commerce, business associations, media at the national and regional level as well making connections with the same or similar institutions in Serbia;
- offering assistance in finding solutions to the questions put by ministries, other institutions and the society;
- providing services relating to the exports promotion;

- providing information on business opportunities, international tenders, industries and fairs relevant for Serbian institutions and companies;
- holding and participating in business meetings (business delegations), fairs, and other presentations, seminars, conferences and other promotional events;
- collecting, processing and disseminating of business information and business opportunities;
- providing advisory support for the access to the markets of receiving countries;
- providing assistance to Serbian companies in establishing contacts with potential business partners;
- consulting and providing IT support to potential foreign investors;
- performing activities, what would motivate foreign investors to invest in Serbia, etc.

Finally, a resolute and successful economic policy in the county and effective economy diplomacy are closely connected to each other. Development makes an impact on the capacity of companies to appear abroad, while an increase of attractiveness of the country creates a favourable environment for successful marketing of the country and investments. A combined acting of the foreign policy with foreign trade creates a foundation for achieving a synergy effect. The Republic of Serbia should substantially improve economic knowledge and skills in the diplomatic network and fully open itself to economic partners.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Economic diplomacy is not a new term for a new phenomenon in the development of diplomacy. Since the Renaissance up to the present times economic issues have been one of the most important tasks of diplomacy in parallel with political and security aspects ensuring balance of power through them.

In the international system economic diplomacy is becoming more significant with the acceleration of globalisation when there is deficiency of appropriate rules and institutions which set the framework for acting of companies in the planetary market arena. Under such conditions companies refer to the institutions of their states in order to strengthen their access to the world market. Governments are to support the activities of companies from their territories because otherwise, companies from other states will benefit from their passivity. All this is nothing else but an open fight for growth and development of economic power of some companies whose success is in the long run the success of the economic policies pursued by national governments.

Economic diplomacy is a specific activity since its goals are precisely defined and basically, it has been an integral part of diplomacy since its beginnings. Now

we are witnessing the economisation trend of the whole diplomacy. By the end of the political processes such as the Cold War and opening of the process of globalisation primarily as an economic phenomenon economic objectives are becoming of primary significance. By the definition, economic diplomacy is nothing else but using diplomacy for achieving economic goals.

Economic diplomacy is the future of diplomacy, because with globalisation of the world economy and politics which is under way it has become the main means for the breakthrough to the world market. The main function of economic diplomacy is the protection of one's national interests in international economic relations.

Economic diplomacy of the Republic of Serbia has not appropriately responded to contemporary globalisation. Serbian universities have no study programmes in the field of economic diplomacy, while the number and level of quality of scientific papers in this field is not appropriate. Apart from this, economic diplomats who the Republic of Serbia has sent to foreign countries have not satisfactorily done the job with which they have been entrusted. This is proved by the foreign trade balance of the country and for the last several years the Republic of Serbia has constantly recorded foreign trade deficits amounting to more than 4 billion Euros.

Such a state of economic diplomacy of our country when globalisation is going on demands a complete improvement of this activity, both in theory and in practice. There are numerous possibilities to achieve this. In theory, they are reflected in the introduction of study programmes of "Economic Diplomacy" at relevant universities and in the increase in the number and quality of papers in that field. In practice, its promotion would be achieved by the implementation of integrated economic diplomacy for which the Chamber of Commerce or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be responsible.

If we let the global processes create the social environment instead that we do it, we will again remain on the margins of development. Globalisation is a cruel reality. We can fight against the global processes, but we should not let them create our fate instead of us. This is the process which brings numerous advantages and opportunities with it, this also including risks. It depends on us ourselves whether we shall accept more advantages and opportunities than risks. We must accept the fact that the most lethal weapon today is knowledge. Therefore, our future social, economic, social and political development should be based on knowledge. Only in this way we shall have the opportunity to make the global processes which permeate us bring with them more advantages and opportunities than risks to this area.

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Branislav ĐORĐEVIĆ

POLOŽAJ I MOGUĆNOSTI UNAPREĐENJA EKONOMSKE DIPLOMATIJE REPUBLIKE SRBIJE

Apstrakt: Odlika savremenog sveta su dinamične promene koje pojačavaju međuzavisnost država, što se posebno ogleda u oblasti ekonomije. Uprkos brojnim krizama i velikim rizicima koji se javljaju u međunarodnim odnosima, u svetu je u toku proces približavanja sistema i institucija, što ukazuje na činjenicu da globalizacija nastavlja svoj pohod. Uzimajući u obzir trenutnu poziciju Republike Srbije na međunarodnoj sceni, kao i stanje njene privrede, jasno je da se pred našom zemljom nalaze veliki izazovi i naporan rad kako bi održali korak sa razvijenim zemljama i kako bi smo zauzeli bolju poziciju u Evropskoj uniji po pristupanju i novom svetskom poretku. Da bi se postigao tako značajan ekonomski napredak, potrebno je stalno jačati konkurentnost naše privrede, što je i jedini efikasan put ka povećanju izvoza. Iskustva razvijenih zemalja pokazuju da je njihova visoko profesionalna i prvoklasna ekonomska diplomatija u velikoj meri zaslužna za povećanje izvoznih mogućnosti. Prema tome, u ovom radu autor je svojom analizom pokušao da ukaže ne na potrebu, zato što se to na indirektan način može smatrati retoričkim pitanjem, već na mogućnosti za unapređenje ekonomske diplomatije Republike Srbije.

Ključne reči: ekonomska diplomatija, ekonomski razvoj, globalizacija, konkurentnost.

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EXPECTATION AND SATISFACTION OF FOREIGN TOURISTS IN RURAL TOURISM: A CASE STUDY OF SERBIA

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Abstract: Tourism plays a significant role in the economic growth of any country. Its contribution is primarily reflected in the increase of foreign exchange inflow, employment opportunities, return on investment and conservation of resources. Serbia has a huge potential for development of rural tourism, due to its natural characteristics, abundant historical-cultural and ethnographic heritage, local values, entertainment opportunities etc. The purpose of this paper is to identify the key factors and values affecting tourist satisfaction in rural areas of Serbia, in order to develop the strategy for attracting international (foreign) and domestic tourists. Research results show that international tourists were most satisfied with cordiality and hospitality, gastronomy and quality of services, and least satisfied with organized activities, local events and diversity of attractions. The overall impression of respondents regarding their stay at the rural destinations in Serbia was quite positive, which will undoubtedly encourage them to revisit those destinations as well as to recommend them to their friends.

Key words: foreign tourists, rural tourism, tourist expectations, tourist satisfaction, Serbia.

INTRODUCTION

There has been a growing need for the development of rural tourism in recent decades due to a new lifestyle. A more prominent trend among tourists will be to seek authentic experiences and explore cultural and natural resources within the destination. This will also affect the functional trends: people will travel more

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throughout the year and there will be increased sensitivity to the loan to value ratio. An annual average growth rate of demand for rural tourism products in Europe is about 6% (UNWTO, 2007). The future lies in the destinations that can offer something unexpected, exceptional, unusual, possibly a different experience, content and food. Consumer motivation to travel will probably be related to places that offer short but intense excitement with entertainment activities; vacation with friends; destinations that can be booked via the Internet (Yeoman, 2008, p. 269). Tourism supply shall be adjusted to meet the needs of the future target groups and shall comply with the principles such as: sustainability, quality, variety, typical regional ambience and image, which shall highlight and develop services related to culture and the nature. Modification of the old and creation of new demands of tourists for still “unseen“ destinations supports the thesis that the tourism field is undergoing globalisation. A journey from one part of the world to another one is no longer a tourism issue. Having in mind the current trends related to tourist behaviour in the market, as well as the fact that tourism demand is directed towards new destinations, it can be claimed that Serbia can use such trends for positioning itself at both national and international markets.

Rural areas are the key parts of Serbia. Despite the fact that they boast numerous natural and cultural resources, these areas are faced with numerous issues- low employment rate, depopulation, human resource endangerment etc. Research shows that around 85% of the total territory of the Republic of Serbia is rural; these areas generate about 41% of the total gross domestic product (GDP), with agriculture being the key activity involving 75% of the population in rural areas. Major efforts have been made in recent years to improve agricultural market position and rural economic infrastructure in order to support rural destinations development. Moreover, in order to revitalize rural destinations, rural tourism product is highlighted as an activity that can trigger rural economic growth in all parts of the country (Sustainable Tourism for Rural Development joint UN programme, 2010).

Rural tourism is an important segment of the overall international tourism (UNWTO, 2007). The first forms of rural tourism emerged in the 19th century as a result of a more pronounced level of urbanisation and industrialisation. Modern rural tourism differs significantly from its initial form – it does not only expand in the areas designated as those of the outstanding natural beauty, but it also starts to affect all types of an ambient environment. Statistical determinants show a growing number of tourists involved in such travel (Wilkerson, 1996, p. 79). Even though it represents a market niche, rural tourism accounts for 10 to 20% of total tourist activities in Europe, while it accounts for 27% of the total number of overnight stays in the Republic of Serbia (Mintel Group Ltd, 2003). Rural tourism development can often be hampered due to the characteristics of

rural destinations, as well as the characteristics of tourism supply (Polo and Frías, 2010, p. 25-45).

Rural tourism destination management is a very complex process that involves cooperation of various enterprises in the provision of services, as well as in sustainable management of resources and attractions across both domestic and international tourism markets (Cawley and Desmond, 2008; Wang and Krakover, 2008). Serbia boasts numerous potentials for tourism development, and along with the increase in the level of competitiveness and attractiveness of tourism products, it can successfully position itself in the tourism market. According to Petrić (2006), numerous European countries perceive rural tourism as one of the strategies for sustainable development of local communities. It can develop in two ways: as a result of entrepreneurial activities aimed at attracting tourists, or with an increase in the number of visitors in rural areas generating demand for tourist services, which further results in the enhanced entrepreneurial activities at a local level (Petric, 2006, p. 138-170). The development of rural tourism in Serbia would facilitate the process of destination image formation, enhance competitive position, and increase the length of stay and tourist consumption. It would also affect the overall impression about the destination that has an impact on the decision to revisit the destination, and attract new market segments.

THE CONCEPT OF RURAL TOURISM

It is not an easy task to provide an adequate definition of rural tourism as there are various interpretations and criteria used for that purpose in the literature. Bramwell (1994) emphasizes that tourism activities are heterogeneous, which is why various concepts are used to define it (farm tourism, green tourism, agritourism, ecotourism etc.). However, it is necessary to differentiate between the essence of rural tourism and activities in rural destinations. What they have in common is that the activities in rural tourism occur in rural areas. Jafari (2000) defines it as a tourism that happens in rural areas, outside the city, and is also associated with the vacation at rural destinations, where tourists spend most of their time doing recreational activities in a rural setting on a farm, ranch, country house etc. (Hall et al., 2005, p. 180).

Rural tourism mostly valorises villages, thermal springs, rivers, lakes, and together with traditional hospitality and life values of the local population, it offers a unique experience to tourists seeking rest and relaxation in a quiet and tranquil environment. On the other hand, it represents a backbone of economic growth and development in the area, i.e., the foundation for upgrading the life standard of the local population, and thus ensures additional sources of income to the population in rural areas (Živković, 2013, p. 80).

According to strategic documentation, such as the Tourism Development Strategy of the Republic of Serbia (2005) and Master plan for sustainable rural tourism development in Serbia (2011), rural tourism implies and includes a range of activities, services and additional activities organized by the rural population of family households in order to attract tourists and gain additional income.

Based on the given definitions of rural tourism, together with the component of sustainable development, various forms of tourism activities can be observed in rural areas: observation or participation in traditional agricultural activities, with no adverse effects on ecosystem or rural household productivity, activities in the nature (walking, hiking), experiences combined with the cultural, archaeological contents in rural areas, experiences of special interest, touring in local areas, various events, festivals, recreational activities in the nature, purchase of local souvenirs and agricultural products etc. According to Ćurčić (2010), rural tourism supply highlights authenticity, uniqueness and the role of the local factor. Which factor will be of vital importance when choosing the destination, shall depend on their availability and motives of tourists. Of course, it is needless to say that tourists need to be offered an interesting combination of "things to see and things to do".

EXPECTATION AND SATISFACTION OF TOURISTS IN RURAL TOURISM

Modern tourism has transformed from "holiday industry" to "experience industry", which is reflected in a constant increase in the number of tourists seeking a dynamic holiday, with more adventure and sports activities instead of monotonous and passive relaxation.

The choice of rural tourism destination primarily depends on tourists' motivation, their desires, delivered value and satisfaction of needs (Park and Yoon, 2009, p. 99-108). As regards their motivation to travel, certain links are established between their needs and tourism destination. Some tourists dream of being offered numerous services and activities while others seek less adventure, closer destinations, modest volume of activities. All that depends on their age, income, profession, free time and psychological factors (personality, prestige, fashion etc.), as well as on the type of tourism destination that could meet such needs (Živković, 2013, p. 140-141).

The complexity of motivation and assumptions arising from it for the purpose of creating tourism supply, indicate that tourists seek contracts, i.e., something that quite differs from their daily lives and there is a range of alternatives that can serve a purpose.

Creating value according to the individual demands of modern tourists is a significant challenge in the marketing field. Creation and delivery of tourism

products adjusted to the expectations and preferences of tourists affects their satisfaction (Maricic and Djordjevic, 2012, p. 20). Satisfaction can be defined as a result of what tourists expect from tourism products and what they have experienced at the tourism destination (Pizam et.al, 1978, p. 314-322). Also, it can be perceived as an evaluation of service providers, services and experiences. Customer satisfaction with services shall depend solely on his/her expectations and the level of criteria fulfillment (Correia et. al, 2008, p. 164-176).

Understanding and management of tourist satisfaction stems from the fact that tourists' behaviour varies depending on the level of their satisfaction (Correia et. al, 2008, p. 164-176). The level of total satisfaction has the greatest impact on the repeated visits and purchase of tourism products. Namely, tourists whose expectations are exceeded show greater tendency to revisit those destinations. Hence, the number of repeated purchases and the level of verbal propaganda increase together with the increase in the level of satisfaction (Kozak and Rimmington, 2000, p. 260-269). However, Yuksel (2001) states that satisfaction of tourists who visit some destination for the first time and those with repeated visits develops in different ways and is based on different segments. Even though, the tourists assess the quality of accommodation, food, service process and overall security, various additional services will affect their satisfaction and willingness to repeat their visit. It can be observed that tourists who visited some destination for the first time and are satisfied with services provided most often revisit the destination in the following few years, while those who already repeated their visit will do the same next year. Tourists, who experienced dissatisfaction, will definitely not return and will not give a positive recommendation to others. (Yuksel, 2001, p. 153-168).

In order to motivate tourists to revisit the tourism destination, as well as to reward loyal customers and improve sales, the holders of tourism supply develop special programs that are primarily based on understanding the needs and motives of customers and their evaluation of the quality of tourism products and services (Yuksel, 2001, p. 153-168). The use of tourism products and services in rural tourism not only has the dimension of functional satisfaction of needs, but it also affects the segment of satisfaction called consumer hedonism (Maricic and Djordjevic, 2012, p. 21). Hedonism does not refer to tactile sensations affecting the level of satisfaction, but it is directed towards achieving the feeling of personal pleasure and happiness. Hedonistic dimension of value does not exclude the traditional concept of product functionality, but it represents the form of additional value affecting differentiation of supply and the growth of a total value. The traditional consumer hedonism comprises enrichment of contents and product design available in one place: 1) a wide range of rural experiences as a basic part of the product (becoming conversant with the atmosphere of rural areas, scenography and architecture, possibilities of taking part in rural household

chores, becoming familiar with ethno-heritage etc.) and 2) a wide range of additional content-bike riding, hunting, fishing, walking, horse-riding, paragliding, hang gliding, cooking lessons, arts, old crafts, folklore, gastronomy, wine festivals etc.) (Djordjevic, 2011, p. 165).

An important criterion for tourists when choosing the specific rural destination is the existence of tourism infrastructure adjusted to the needs of users. Besides infrastructure, numerous other factors affect the decision-making process: *hospitality* (efficiency and interaction in provision of services, cordiality, language knowledge, precision in providing information, interpretations on attractions, assistance in using additional services etc.); *accommodation* (types of services offered by accommodation facilities, equipment, comfort, location and connection with the immediate surrounding, atmosphere etc.); *food and beverages* (assortment, correctness, serving method etc.), *security* (fire alarm, availability, modern trails for additional activities, environmental protection etc.); *price* (adequate price of accommodation and additional services, value for the given money) (Djordjevic, 2011, p. 171).

Rural tourism product incorporates various basic and additional values and thus, it can be concluded that products are interrelated and that the main elements of value of one product are additional value elements of the other one. As tourist expectations are changing rapidly, successful integration of different values within a single portfolio has become a key factor in tourism development (Buhalis, 2000, p. 97-116).

The creation of a basic and additional value for consumers is based on good understanding of consumers. The analysis of consumers and their behaviour enables us to better perceive and analyse their purchasing decisions and the process of consumption, and thus become aware of the quality of tourism products. Namely, the analysis of tourists' behaviour offers three types of information. Firstly, research results enable the holders of tourism and business policy to focus on real issues and achieve efficiency in the domain of marketing. Secondly, research provides numerous facts on the size and structure of market segments, demographic characteristics, lifestyle, satisfaction with the content, consumption, motivation to travel etc. Thirdly, numerous theories that have become essential for formulating marketing strategies and actions are based on the research results.

In numerous parts of Europe, rural tourism is viewed as a key activity that can contribute to the overall development of the country. Vázquez et al. (2005) emphasise that foreign tourists represent a key segment for provision of information on building the appropriate image, regardless of the type of tourism.

In August 2009 and January 2010, the authors Marangon et al. (2013) conducted a longitudinal research in four destinations at Natisone Valley, Italy.

The main goal was to determine the factors relevant to tourists when choosing the rural tourism destination. After examining the four attributes (food, information, transport and price), it has been determined that tourists who intend to visit rural destinations take all these factors into consideration when making a decision to purchase some tourism product. Detailed analysis has shown that tourists want a unique experience and that food is not the crucial factor, but the information on the destination and transportation means. (Marangon et al., 2013, p. 77-90).

Vázquez de la Torre et al. (2011) conducted research comprising a sample of 542 tourists in the natural park Sierra de Hornachuelos in Cordoba, Spain. They came to the conclusion that the respondents were most satisfied with the environment, peaceful surrounding typical for this park, natural treasures and sports activities. They were dissatisfied with the accommodation facilities and price -they believe that accommodation was not adequate and equally available throughout the year. Also, they consider it necessary to diversify and specialize tourism products in order to entirely meet their needs and expectations (Vázquez de la Torre et al., 2011, p. 1-19).

In order to understand how foreign tourists perceive Bulgaria as a rural tourism destination, research was conducted in Spain comprising a sample of 500 respondents. The results show that foreign tourists are indifferent to Bulgaria as a destination, except when it comes to gastronomy, original local cuisine and natural environment they perceive as soothing, relaxing and comfortable. They were dissatisfied with the infrastructure, restricted choice of accommodation and a limited number of activities available to tourists. (Vázquez et al., 2005, p. 37-40).

By examining satisfaction of tourists with the destination, it is possible to determine which values prevail as the sources of motivation to initiate travel. Marketing experts believe that the impact of consumers on the quality of products and services will get stronger along with the development of the society. In the future, every business shall undoubtedly rely on the analysis and forecasting of consumer behaviour. Thus, enterprises will have to do more to enhance consumer satisfaction, i.e., they will have to constantly impress them.) (Solomon et al., 2006, p. 26).

THE SURVEY OF FOREIGN TOURISTS SATISFACTION IN SERBIA

In the tourism market, which is characterised by a high level of competitiveness, business success in the value chain is highly dependent on the tourist satisfaction. Customer satisfaction is one of the most important marketing goals in the modern business management, but also the tool for achieving other

business goals (profit, market share, loyalty level). Tourist satisfaction in Serbia is not explored enough and examined. Most of the statements regarding the attitudes and motives to travel are not empirically tested, which is why unproven arguments or subjective thinking often affect the tourism supply.

Below we shall present the key results of the empirical research conducted for the purpose of creating Master plan for sustainable rural tourism development in Serbia (Sustainable Tourism for Rural Development joint UN programme, 2011).

In order to determine the expectations and satisfaction of tourists who visited rural destinations in Serbia, research was conducted relying on the face-to-face technique comprising a sample of 162 foreign tourists in four regions that are crucial for the development of rural tourism in Serbia-SouthBanat, Lower Danube, Eastern Serbia and Central Serbia. For the purpose of collecting relevant data, a structured questionnaire for measuring the rating attributes of tourism products and services was used.

Sample description is given in Table 1. Over half of the respondents are aged 36+, predominantly male, with higher or high educational background and a middle socio-economic status.

Table 1. Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

Gender	Female	41%
	Male	59%
Age	18-25	12%
	26-35	24%
	36-49	35%
	50-65	23%
	66+	4%
	No answer	2%
Education	Primary school	3%
	High school	34%
	High/ higher education	50%
	Magistrate/master/PhD	5%
	No answer	8%
Socio-economic status	middle-lower	14%
	Middle	58%
	middle-higher	20%
	Higher	8%
	No answer	2%

Tourists experience and perceive each travel as a unique value. Namely, 62% of the respondents listed natural and cultural resources as the main reason for visiting rural areas of Serbia, followed by opportunities for relaxation (16%) and gastronomic offer (12%).

Developed tourism destinations examine thoroughly the purchasing process in order to identify what, where, how, how much, when and why tourists purchase. Tourists' needs can be stimulated by internal and external motivators and they encourage an individual to start collecting information. Sources of information can be divided into personal, commercial, public and experiential. The relative impact of the information depends on the type of the product and the customer. Generally speaking, the consumer receives the largest amount of information from commercial marketing sources. However, the most effective information comes from personal sources, as supported by this research. A total of 55% respondents came to Serbia at the recommendation of their friends or family, while 24% of them mentioned the Internet as the main source. The services of tourist agencies and tour operators were used by only 10% of the respondents. This is supported by the information that over 70% of foreign tourists organized their travel on their own, by purchasing separate tourist services, while only 4% of them opted for travel arrangements. The main motive of their visit to Serbia was vacation and relaxation (81%), followed by visits to friends and family. Over 40% of the respondents had already visited Serbia, while 34% of them were in Serbia for the first time. Foreign tourists who stayed at rural destinations in Serbia most often came by their own car (39%), by bus (26%) or by plane (17%). Their stay was between six to eight days long (23%); during that time they resided mostly at one destination (72%) and spent less than 1000 RSD (30%) or from 1000 to 2000 RSD on a daily basis (30%). The respondents most frequently travelled with a partner (32%) or in a group, or with friends (22%). The most popular accommodation facilities were rural households and apartments (66%) while hotels were the least popular. During their stay, foreign tourists preferred walking (51%), as it enabled them to see and visit all attractions available at the certain destination. Also, they were particularly interested in the activities such as rural household chores, cooking, sports etc. (19%). During their stay, the respondents visited Topola (17%), Zlatibor (15%) and Arandjelovac (11%), and they listed farms in Vojvodina (18%), Mokra Gora (13%) and Tara (12%) as the most attractive destinations they would like to visit.

In order to determine the level of satisfaction of the respondents with rural tourism destinations in Serbia, we asked them to list their positive and negative impressions. According to the survey, the three words that could best describe the vacation in rural areas of Serbia are the nature (31%), relaxing atmosphere (25%) and hospitality (21%). The main obstacles they encountered during their stay were inadequate traffic infrastructure (45%), distance (12%) and the climate (11%).

The respondents were most satisfied with hospitality and cordiality (44%), gastronomy (32%) and the quality of services (24%), and least satisfied with the organized activities (37%), local events (32%) and diversity of attractions (31%). The overall impression regarding their stay was quite positive (95%), which will definitely encourage them to repeat their visit (96%) and recommend rural destinations in Serbia to their friends.

Based on the research conducted in Serbia, and compared to the similar one in Europe, it can be concluded that Serbian rural tourism has a really good chance to position itself high in the international market. Despite certain limitations that hinder tourism development of Serbian rural destinations, Serbia is a relatively new, unexplored destination that can be very attractive, especially if we take into account the fact that modern tourists prefer new and unexplored destinations. Solutions that could be implemented in order to meet the expectations and increase the level of tourist satisfaction should be found in the use of the appropriate strategic approach to rural tourism planning. The capacity to understand the importance of certain elements of value (the quality of products and services, the quality of content and attractions, food and beverages, traffic and tourism infrastructure development, image branding, information on the destination, opportunities for relaxation, professionalism, guiding services, tourist agency services and tour operators services etc.), ways of their design and their impact on the total value, represents the basis for formulating and implementing the strategy for value creation in Serbian rural tourism, as well as for the adjustment to individual demands of various segments of tourists.

CONCLUSION

In order to enable Serbia to position itself successfully in the international tourism market, it is necessary to make use of its potentials in a sustainable way and develop tourism products that could contribute significantly to raising the visibility and competitiveness. Rural tourism is of vital importance for the economic growth and the overall development of rural destinations and local communities. However, tourists play a crucial role in the development of any type of tourism. The analysis of tourist satisfaction enables service providers to gain better understanding of their consumers, develop successful strategies for attracting new tourists and retaining the existing ones. This research indicates a significant correlation between motivation, expectations and satisfaction in Serbian rural tourism. Foreign tourists who stayed at rural destinations in Serbia were satisfied with the services provided and are willing to return to those destinations and recommend them to others. However, it is worth noting that there are certain disadvantages that need to be eliminated in order to foster rural tourism development. Continuous research should be conducted in the field,

through monitoring changes related to the needs and demands of the dynamic tourism market, with the aim to meet tourist expectations and satisfy the needs of tourists in rural tourism.

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Radmila ŽIVKOVIĆ

Ivana BRDAR

OČEKIVANJA I ZADOVOLJENJE POTREBA STRANIH TURISTA U RURALNOM TURIZMU: SLUČAJ SRBIJE

Apstrakt: Turizam ima značajnu ulogu u rastu ekonomije svake zemlje. Njegovi doprinosi se prvenstveno ogledaju u povećanju deviznog priliva, mogućnosti za zapošljavanje, povraćaj investicija i očuvanjem resursa. Srbija ima veliki potencijal za razvoj ruralnog turizma, zahvaljujući prirodnim karakteristikama, istorijsko-kulturnom i etnografskom nasleđu, lokalnim vrednostima, mogućnostima za zabavu i slično. Cilj rada je da identifikuje ključne faktore i vrednosti koji utiču na zadovoljstvo turista u ruralnim oblastima Srbije, kako bi se razvila strategija z aprivlačenje domaćih i stranih turista. Rezultati analize su pokazali da su strani turisti iskazali najveće zadovoljstvo kada su u pitanju ljubaznost i gostoljubivost, gastronomija i kvalitet usluga a najnezadovoljniji su po pitanju organizovanih aktivnosti, lokalnih manifestacija i raznovrsnosti atrakcija. Generalni utisak ispitanih stranih turista je da su zadovoljni ukupnim boravkom što će definitivno uticati da ponove posetu i preporuče ruralna područja u Srbiji svojim prijateljima.

Ključne reči: strani turisti, ruralni turizam, očekivanja turista, satisfakcija turista, Srbija.

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IPE'S AMBASSADORS FORUM

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN THE XXI CENTURY: A BRAZILIAN PERSPECTIVE

OPENING REMARKS: THE PROTECTION OF THE BRAZILIAN ENVIRONMENT

The environment is a major concern in our days. In Brazil it could not be different. Brazil is known for its continental proportions, a big variety of climates, a gigantic environmental heritage and the greatest biological diversity in the world with most of the Amazon rainforest.

Brazil was the first country to introduce the use of alcohol to replace oil fuel for motor vehicles in the beginning of the 1970's. In 1992, Rio de Janeiro hosted the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 20 years after Stockholm. The focus of this very important conference was, for the first time, to state the global environment and the relationship between economics, science and the environment in a political context.

20 years later, Brazil hosted the Rio+20, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development, one of the largest UN conferences ever and a major step forward in achieving a sustainable future. Debates were centered on two main themes: a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, and the institutional framework for sustainable development. The full package of agreements, actions, commitments, challenges, initiatives and announcements made at Rio+20, addresses a range of global issues that includes access to clean energy, food security, water and sustainable transportation.

RANGE OF ACTIONS

- The document calls for a wide range of actions, among many other points, including:
- launching a process to establish sustainable development goals;
 - detailing how the green economy can be used as a tool to achieve sustainable development;

- strengthening the UN Environment Program and establishing a new forum for sustainable development;
- promoting corporate sustainability reporting measures;
- taking steps to go beyond GDP to assess the wellbeing of a country;
- developing a strategy for sustainable development financing;
- adopting a framework for tackling sustainable consumption and production;
- focusing on improving gender equality;
- stressing the need to engage civil society and incorporate science into policy; and
- recognizing the importance of voluntary commitments on sustainable development.

Brazilian President Dilma Rouseff, concluding the Conference, told participants that the final document is a great step forward: “I am convinced that this Conference will have the effect of bringing about sweeping change.”

During the BRICS meeting in the city of Fortaleza, held last July, Brazil reiterated its commitment to the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity and its Protocols, with special attention to the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020 and the Aichi Targets. BRICS member countries recognized the challenges posed by the agreed targets on conservation of biodiversity and reaffirmed the need to implement the decisions on resource mobilization agreed to by all parties in Hyderabad in 2012, and set resource mobilization targets that are ambitious in order to allow for their fulfillment.

INSTITUTIONAL CARE

The beginning of the new millennium came with new challenges for the management of environmental heritage and sustainable use of natural resources, in particular the search for alternative ways to make compatible the ideal of economic development with the conservation of these resources for future generations. The challenge in the search for suitable instruments to enable a sustainable development project made the Brazilian Government reform not only its Ministry for Environment but to include also in other institutions in the care for the preservation of our most important wealth, creating secretaries in charge of environmental preservation as well as developing the Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources - IBAMA.

The main objectives of those Governmental institutions are:

- Maintenance of ecological balance, considering the environment as a public asset to be definitely secured and protected;
- Rational use of land, subsoil, water and air;
- Planning and monitoring the use of environmental resources;
- Protection of ecosystems, with the preservation of areas considered especially representative;
- Control and zoning of polluting and potentially polluting activities;

- Incentives for study and research of technologies for the rational use and protection of environmental resources;
- Monitoring the state of environmental quality;
- Recovery of degraded areas;
- Protection of the threatened areas of degradation;
- Environmental education at all levels, prompting the community to actively participate in environmental protection.

CLIMATE CHANGE AND STRUGGLE FOR FOOD

It is important to note that Brazil is a major food producer and refutes the supposed contradiction between agricultural production and environmental protection. Through agro ecological practices, research and innovation, abundant investment and intensive support from the Brazilian Federal Government, it has been proved that it is possible to grow, preserving and protecting the environment.

While bearing in mind that fossil fuel remains one of the major sources of energy, the Brazilian Government reiterates its belief that renewable and clean energy, research and development of new technologies and energy efficiency can constitute an important drive to promote sustainable development, create new economic growth, reduce energy costs and increase the efficiency in the use of natural resources. Brazil believes that the strengthening of international cooperation in view to promote renewable and clean energy and to universalize energy access is of great importance for improving the standard of living of our peoples. There are no doubt that international efforts aimed at promoting the deployment of renewable and clean energy and energy efficiency technologies, taking into account national policies, priorities and resources are of the most importance.

Climate change associated natural disasters have claimed lives and affected economic activities throughout the world. In a context of environmental injustice, the poor are the most vulnerable, especially in our cities. In Brazil, we have also implemented the National Policy for the Prevention and the Monitoring of Natural Disasters, with the objective of keeping these disasters from hurting people, property and the environment. The costs of tackling climate change are high, but the benefits outweigh them. We must overcome the logic that preventing climate change negatively impacts the economy. Actions to reduce emissions and to foster adaptation must be considered a source of wealth, as they attract investment and warrant new initiatives of sustainable development.

Since 2009, when Brazil announced a voluntary commitment to reduce between 36 to 39% of our projected emissions until 2020, we have put in place decisive actions with great results. In the last 10 years, deforestation in Brazil has decreased by 79%. Between 2010 and 2013, we have avoided releasing into the atmosphere, each year, on average, 650 million tons of carbon dioxide. In that same period Brazil achieved the four lowest levels of deforestation in our modern history. And our resolve in tackling climate change is not limited to the Brazilian Amazon. We cooperate with countries from the Amazon Basin in activities related to monitoring and combating deforestation. We will also lend

our support to countries from the Congo Basin in their efforts to do the same. Domestically, we have adopted sectorial plans for reducing deforestation in the Brazilian “cerrado” region; scaling up use of renewable energies; and promoting Low-Carbon Agriculture

Brazil calls on all countries to build upon the decisions adopted in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with a view to reaching a successful conclusion, by 2015, of negotiations on the development of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, in accordance with the principles and provisions of UNFCCC, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Historically, developed countries ensured the welfare of their societies through a development model based on high rates of harmful gas emissions from a climate change point of view, felling forests and using practices harmful to the environment. We do not want to emulate this model but we will not relinquish the need to reduce inequalities and raise the living standards of our people. We, developing countries, have the same right to welfare. And we are proving that a model based on social justice and environmental sustainability can be achieved. Brazil is an example of just that. In this regard, Brazil gives support to the Presidency of the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties and the 10th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, to be held in Lima, Peru, in December 2014.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Last September, the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, in her statement at the Climate Summit at the UN, confirmed this understanding, demanding concrete progress in the ongoing negotiations under the UNFCCC. In this regard, she pointed out that we have actively participated in these negotiations supporting the collective adoption of fair, ambitious, balanced and effective measures to face this challenge.

Brazil believes that the new climate agreement must be universal, ambitious and legally binding, while respecting the principles and provisions of the Framework Convention, in particular the principles of equity and of common but differentiated responsibilities. In Brazil, we are already basing the growth of our economy to be compatible with reductions in emissions. At the same time that we reduce poverty and bring down social inequality, we protect the environment and in the past 12 years extraordinary results have been achieved.

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FEDERALISM IN THE USA AND EU AND THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES

- THE CASE OF KOSOVO'S INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION -

1. Although the first form of federalism existed in old Greece (and the very notion is of Greek origin – *foedus*), federalism is the phenomenon of the modern history and contemporary society. The first historically most relevant example was US federalism. It is useful to remind us that when 13 North American colonies had declared their independence from Great Britain on July the 4, 1776, they just recognized the need to coordinate their efforts in the war and to cooperate with each other generally. To these ends, they adopted the Articles of Confederation, a Constitution which created a league of sovereign states which committed them to cooperate with each other mainly in military affairs, foreign policy and other important areas. The Articles had been barely sufficient to hold the states together through the war against England and at its successful conclusion they completely fell apart as the states pursued their own interests rather than the national interests of the new United States.

However, in further building of the new State (USA) ten years later, the Constitution from 1787 was adopted. It vests the power to make foreign policy in the federal government. The Constitution precludes the states from entering into “any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation”. The President and the Senate share authority over the making of treaties and the extension of diplomatic recognition to other nations. And that basic rule has remained unchanged since then for more of two centuries. In this context, we should have a look at the process of the appointment of ambassadors. In the procedure of the appointment, the Senate should confirm the nominees of the President. Particularly, the Senate has to consider whether the ambassador has been nominated to serve in a foreign nation (state) that deserves to be recognized by the United States. In that sense, all states must meet minimum standards if they are to qualify as sovereign. They must provide for the security of their people, have a fair and honest system of justice, and maintain a currency and a diplomatic service. It is noticed that the President and the Senate have paid too little attention to this responsibility in recent years. The recognition of Kosovo as the independent state is particularly paradigmatic in that sense.

2. The USA was one of the first countries which recognized Kosovo's independence and has urged other countries to extend diplomatic recognition of Kosovo with mixed success. It had been done the first day after the adoption of the Declaration on Independence on February, 18, 2008 and only four months later the first US ambassador to Kosovo was sworn in. Kosovo considers the United States its greatest partner in gaining recognition from the rest of the world and such a view is also expressed from the US officials. So, Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State stressed (during her visit to Kosovo in November 2012) that US regarded Kosovo's sovereignty and territorial integrity as completely non-negotiable. Although most EU countries would agree with that statement, nobody could make such a comment on behalf of the European Union, as the EU is divided over the issue of Kosovo's independence.

3. The European Union does not possess legal capacity to diplomatically recognize any state; member states do so individually. The majority of member states have recognized Kosovo. However, to articulate the common EU policy of either support or opposition to Kosovo's independence would require unanimity on the subject from all 28 member states, which does not presently exist.

In the Treaty on the European Union there is a legal base for common foreign policy, which is much more developed than it is in the US Constitution. Within the Preamble of the Treaty it is already emphasized that member states are "resolved to implement common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, which might lead to a common defense... reinforcing European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world". That general stance is more developed in the Treaty (consolidated version) under Title V – General provisions on the Union's external action and specific provisions on the common foreign and security policy. In the context of this consideration, especially relevant are the provisions present in Articles 21, 30, 31. So, in Article 21, paragraph 2, among main goals of the Union foreign policy it is written that the Union shall act to "preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders". Article 30 provides that "any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council and may submit to it, respectively, initiatives or proposals". And Article 31 says that the decisions "shall be taken by the Council and the Council acting unanimously."

Having in mind these basic provisions concerning the Union foreign policy, there is no doubt that Kosovo's issue and its international recognition should be part of the Union's common foreign policy. It should deal with territorial integrity and borders of one European state – Serbia with a long tradition of its own statehood guaranteed by the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act and confirmed by the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council. The issue is more than relevant for the stability in South-Eastern Europe, for preservation of the peace, the prevention of conflicts and strengthening of international security. But, as it is well-known, there is no unanimity on this issue. Most EU member states have opted to recognize the Serbian province of Kosovo as the sovereign state. That decision has been usually explained by the wish “to end the years-long lack of security and instability”. However, five member states – Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain and Cyprus have seen the problem quite differently. They have refused to recognize Kosovo as the sovereign state and have well founded reasons for that stance to make impossible for the Union to have a common attitude on this important question.

The supporters of Kosovo's independence notice that its opponents have nothing to do with Kosovo itself, but with the state's own domestic problems and politics. It can be basically correct. All five member states rejecting the recognition of Kosovo's independence have strong minorities within their own borders fearing that they, too, might seek independence. But that fact does not in any way call into question the principled position of these member states. Moreover, their insistence on that position is extraordinary positive and significant from the point of view of the preservation of international order and legality. And such their stance, already qualified as the recalcitrance (non-compliance) that would make the EU's efforts less effective, is much closer to the main goals of the Union common foreign policy and perfectly in accordance with the provisions quoted from Article 30 of the Treaty on EU. In that sense, Cypriot former Foreign Minister Marcos Kyprianou declared at one time – “We believe everything to do with the territorial integrity of a country should be reached through discussion, and not through a unilateral declaration of independence.”

I would particularly like to underline on this occasion that Cyprus's position on that issue has been remained very clear – Cyprus will never recognize a unilateral declaration of independence outside the United Nations framework. And it is not – as former President Demetris Christifias especially emphasized - because the Serbian case is similar to ours, but it is a matter of principles.

4. This split in the EU's approach to the question of Kosovo's independence, contrary to some opinions, does not weaken the EU international policy, but makes it more realistic. It means that the official EU position on that question is neutral concerning the status of the Serbian province under the international UN mandate. It reflects much better the situation in the whole international

community where a number of states – despite all diplomatic actions, including pressures from the USA and the Western powers for the international recognition of Kosovo as a state – did not recognize its independence. With good reasons, of course.

And what is the situation on the ground, in Kosovo today, six years after the self-proclaimed independence? Kosovo is still unstable, above all regarding the respect of minority fundamental human rights, return of refugees, the rule of law and relations with the Serbs in the north of the province and in Serbia itself. According to the opinions of many experts, any withdrawal of the international presence in Kosovo can only mean more danger for the Serbs there. This is still a dangerous region, where the international presence will be needed for many years. That is exactly – they emphasize – how the EU and NATO see things. And the NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR as well as the EU policing and justice mission – EULEX will remain in Kosovo for now.

5. It has become clear that the insistence of the USA for the international recognition of Kosovo and the stand that its sovereignty and territorial integrity is “completely non-negotiable” does not improve the situation there. On the contrary, taking into account all relevant circumstances, the realistic and responsible attitude should be that Kosovo issue must be negotiable and that the lasting solution can be found only through negotiations.

BOOKS REVIEW

THE GLOBAL MONETARY CRISIS AND THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS IN THE WORLD

Dragan Petrović, Slobodan Komazec, *Globalna monetarna kriza i novi geopolitički i finansijski odnosi u svetu* [The global monetary crisis and the new geopolitical and financial relations in the world] Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2014, p. 249.

Institute of International Politics and Economics has published a scientific monograph with its central subject: the explanation of the world economic crisis and the consequences that effect modern economic relations between countries within the global order. This scientific work consists of two extensive chapters, in which the first one is dedicated to emerge of the economic crisis, and its impact and link with the geopolitical relations in the world. The second one describes position of Serbia and the subject of the Serbian factor in general, but is closely linked to the monetary crisis and geopolitical change that occurred within that framework and it also reflects to the Serbian position in the Balkans.

The global economic crisis which had emerged and developed in 2008 had its nucleus and structural causes mostly in the USA and some other Western countries. At the same time, they are mostly struck concerning both soft and hard power. Due to the great importance that these countries have in the global financial order and global economy, the crisis soon spilt over other countries and regions in the world, especially considering the globalised nature of the contemporary world economy and mutual connections within. Authors are explaining the facts on which they drew the conclusion that this economic condition hasn't yet been overcome, but as far as the economic system of the United States is concerned, certain elements of the recovery can be seen (to give an example, the USA had an economic growth of GDP in 2013, which implements the recovery of economy).

On the other hand, not all countries in the world are equally struck by the crisis. Some sort of paradox represents the fact that the leading countries of the EU, Germany and France, in every way are less affected by the center of the crisis than the USA and Great Britain. At this point it must be mentioned that EU as a whole, is suffering an economic stagnation during the recent years, and hasn't achieved any economic growth.

The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), thanks to their enormous indicators of hard power and certain distance towards the neoliberal economy which has resulted from their independence in pursuing their own economies, are hit to a

lesser extent by the economic crisis than the Western countries, especially considering the USA. In that sense, when the consequences that the crisis cause are analyzed, it could be concluded that the economic system of the USA is especially jeopardized in a double way - it reduces the soft power as Neoliberalism was primarily closely linked to USA, and in the same time it also reduces the hard power due to the fact that the bigger economic lost reduces the impact and the power of the states in the sense of global domination.

The authors are emphasizing the phenomena that the global system independence from current crisis is heading towards the multipolar world, considering the fact of gradually transferring the world economy centre from the region of the North Atlantic to the region of the North Pacific, stressing the Far East especially China, and also having in mind the global increase of the BRIC influence.

In the geopolitical sense, the Western countries lost a lot of their international power which they enjoyed before the crisis. Such an economic situation could just partly be seen in the decrease of the share these countries had in the world's GDP. On the other side, economic parameters are showing that BRIC countries enjoy a bigger share of the world's GDP. Additionally, in the last fifteen years Russia is showing an economic progress, as well as wider social progress. This country, even in the period of strong crisis, has maintained to keep two parameters that represent the world power, namely the nuclear armament and the power in the energetic field where Russia is one of the world leading distributor and producer. China and India are also showing important signs of gross economic power, but according to economic parameters per capita, these countries are still falling far behind standards of the Western countries.

When it comes to Serbia, during the 1990s the economy was blocked on multiple levels: by the sanctions put upon the outside world, the war in the near neighborhood and finally, by NATO aggression in 1999. After 2000, Serbia uncritically implemented the neoliberal economic model, which resulted in very poor, even disastrous economic situations.

Privatization was badly carried out by the government, selling assets off often in a suspicious way, there was a lack of serious investments, the government spent the money collected from the privatization, but it also took loans and used money orders from people working abroad for the budget and some fishy expenditures involved the country easy into debts. All these measures contributed to the bad economic position, whereas the world economic crisis had just intensified the negative economic situation in the country.

In the macroeconomic sense recent neoliberal and neomonetaristic model with the accent on maintaining the stability of exchange rates and prices (stability of domestic currency) should be, according to the authors reoriented towards the direction of the development and full employment. In those two fields we can find

the necessary basic for possible development strategy, where the main point would be to attempt an increase of agriculture manufacture with the export direction focused on Russia by using the benefits based on the special trade agreement between Serbia and Russia.

The scientific importance of this book is significant on many levels. Besides the actuality that this topic has, which is important by itself, in one place there could be found simple and concisely explanations of the basis determinants and the parameters of the phenomena that has been shaping global economic field for more than six years. Besides the description level, the book provides us with scientific development prospects as the highest level of scientific knowledge, as far as the process of overcoming the structural economic problems (of the countries where the crisis has emerged) is concerned. In this global system Serbia is no exception, therefore this book could be a useful basis for analysis of the further movement of our country in the direction of economic stabilization and recovery.

Nevena MANEVSKI, M.A.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Milan Lipovac, Dragan Živojinović. (eds.). *Međunarodna bezbednost: teorijski pristupi* [*International Security: Theoretical Approaches*]. Faculty of Security Innovation Center, Belgrade, Akademska knjiga, Novi Sad, 2014. p. 366.

The idea behind this thematic collection of papers is to offer insight into main contemporary theoretical approaches in international security research. The collection is therefore primarily addressed to students of international relations and security who are introduced to theoretical approaches for the first time. In addition to basic information on theories, many of the papers contain material for advanced discussion. This way they are useful for international security researchers who already possess elementary knowledge of theoretical approaches.

The collection is clearly structured as a textbook: it has an introduction about security studies in general and role of theory in security research, as well as a conclusion which deals with subdivisions in security studies. Authors of papers in these two parts of the book present wide knowledge of the field. Especially interesting moments are: Vujinović and Glušac's comprehensive review of post-Cold War approaches; Lipovac's table with many different authors' questions for security concept analysis; Kučeković's explanation of theoretical paradigm.

Central part of the collection is divided into three chapters, following the most often division of international relations theory textbooks: about realist, liberal, and alternative approaches. Each contains several papers, which cover almost all leading theories. Srđan Slović distinguishes Morgenthau and Aron as main representatives of classical realism. Žaklina Novičić deals with Kenneth Waltz's structural realism (neorealism). Dragan Živojinović covers an interesting topic of offensive and defensive realism distinction. From the broad sub-approach of neoclassical realism, Vladimir Trapara takes out and analyzes Randall Schweller's balance of interests theory. Liberalism is divided into three categories. Jelena Milićević-Proroković writes about liberal institutionalism, Žaklina Novičić about commercial liberalism, and Dragana Đurašinović-Radojević covers democratic peace theory. Three papers deal with alternative theories: Ana Zlatanović and Milan Lipovac present social constructivism; Nikola Lakić writes about critical theory; feminism also has its place, in Vesna Jarić's paper.

Especially interesting is the chapter before the conclusion, in which two papers deal with disciplines akin to security studies. Nebojša Vuković and Željko Budimir write about several classical geopolitical concepts, which are divided into three groups – those about the importance of sea, land and air power. Nemanja Džuverović, Mladen Stojadinović and Goran Tepšić offer a comprehensive review of peace studies.

This collection should encourage students and researchers in Serbia to think theoretically, because scientific dealing with security problems is impossible without using theory. This is especially important today, when threat of a new global war is more present than ever in the last half a century. Common sense approach, used by many international relations and security „thinkers“ often leads to dangerous conclusions, which later become foundations of wrong foreign policy choices. Only a good theory can show the way to Serbia’s foreign policy decision makers how to do the best for their country in these times of troubles.

Vladimir TRAPARA

DOCUMENTS

Indian Diplomacy at Work – Nuclear Security in India


Nuclear security is the prevention and detection of, and response to unauthorised removal, sabotage, unauthorised access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear or radiological material or their associated facilities. Nuclear security thus differs from nuclear safety, which involves prevention of and protection against accidents involving such material or related facilities that could give rise to radiation risks. In common parlance nuclear security gets equated with nuclear terrorism using stolen or improvised nuclear devices and/or Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs). However, as the above definition used by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows, nuclear security deals with a broader set of threats, including sabotage, conventional attacks on nuclear or radiation facilities and breaches of regulations governing transfers of technology and nuclear or radiological materials including during transport.

The scale and scope of India's civil nuclear programme is unique for a developing country. India has twenty operating nuclear power plants, a range of fuel cycle facilities from mining of uranium and thorium to reprocessing plants and fast reactors, and a large, expert human resource in nuclear science and technology spread over a variety of research labs and institutions. Nuclear energy is slated to play an increasingly important role in India's energy security and sustainable development plans. The country is looking at a target of 60,000 MW of electricity production by 2030 from a range of reactors – indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), now standardized at 700 MW per reactor Light Water Reactors (LWRs), set up in technical collaboration with foreign vendors such as the one that achieved criticality in 2013 at Kudankulam in the south of the country recently, as well as the indigenous Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) that can generate more fuel for the future and create the base for the utilization of the country's abundant thorium resource. This strategy calls for a significant set of measures, such as civil nuclear cooperation agreements with international partners, uranium supply arrangements, fabrication of a variety of fuels, construction of new facilities and human resource development, which are moving apace.

India is no stranger to nuclear security. At the dawn of India's nuclear power programme, Prime Minister Nehru minuted that source material for nuclear energy was not an ordinary commodity and needed to be handled with care. India participated actively in international discussions on safeguards for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and became a founder member of the IAEA in 1957, a year after its first reactor went critical. India has been implementing IAEA safeguards on its civilian nuclear facilities

for more than four decades. Conscious of the need to protect the Indian public against exposure to harmful radiation and as party to IAEA Conventions on Nuclear Safety and Security, in particular the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment in 2005, Code of Conduct in Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, 2006 it has also been following the highest international standards on nuclear and radiological safety and security.

India's approach to nuclear security



Five elements of India's approach to Nuclear Security.

Governance framework

Laws such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1962 and the Rules and Notifications issued under them such as Rules on Safe Disposal of Radioactive Waste (1987) and Radiation Protection (2004) form the backbone of India's framework for governance of nuclear activities. The Foreign Trade Development & Regulation Act (FTDR) of 1992 and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act of 2005 provide additional legal authority for controlling nuclear trade and transfers. The FTDR has been amended in 2010, inter alia, to strengthen safeguards against leakage of technology and Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers have been issued in July 2010 under the Atomic Energy Act to regulate trade by authorized entities, including foreign partners. While this is not *strict sensu* a nuclear security issue, AERB guidelines for use of radioisotope-based scientific devices have been strengthened following a safety incident involving a disused device in the Mayapuri area of New Delhi in 2010.

Institutions

Set up under the Atomic Energy Act, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) has been functioning independently of the nuclear power operator in India since 1983. AERB's focus has been on both nuclear safety and security of civilian facilities. Separate institutions and operating procedures exist for nuclear security at India's strategic facilities. A Nuclear Controls & Planning Wing (NC&PW) has been created in the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) as of 2013 to integrate DAE's safeguards, export controls and nuclear security related activities. The NC&PW takes the lead on international cooperation on nuclear security in collaboration with the Ministry of External Affairs. Extensive use of information technology in various systems and growing concerns of potential attacks on these systems are addressed by the Computer Information and Security Advisory Group (CISAG) which audits the information systems periodically. It has also put in place plans and guidelines to counter cyber attacks and mitigate its adverse effects. Specific guidelines are under preparation to deal with network related risks to control and instrumentation systems used in various installations.

Nuclear Security – Practice & Culture

Nuclear security within the boundary of a nuclear facility in India has to be integrated with the technology design of the facility and is reviewed by the AERB. India has a national Design Basis Threat (DBT) document and each facility has to devise their own DBT document based on national DBT for designing physical protection system at its facility. The Indian DBT takes into account the existing threat from saboteurs, thieves, terrorists and possibly other malicious actors, their characteristic capabilities and tactics as well as possibility of collusion with insiders. A specially trained paramilitary force - the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which works under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is deployed at nuclear facilities and functions under a senior Indian Police Service (IPS) officer who can coordinate for additional forces as required. CISF personnel deployed at nuclear facilities are rotated regularly and undergo specific training programmes.

In addition to CISF, other national level organizations are also involved in DBT assessment and nuclear security audits. A variety of surveillance, detection, delay, response and access control measures are in place at Indian nuclear facilities in a graded manner over four layers surrounding the most sensitive parts of the facility. Physical protection system is also being regularly audited by a team of independent regulatory body (AERB). India's national system of Nuclear Material Accounting & Control (NUMAC) and personnel reliability measures play important roles in the daily practice of nuclear security.

India can justifiably take pride in its nuclear security culture, fostered by institutions such as the BARC Training School. Not a single serious security incident has taken place in more than five decades of the Indian nuclear programme and the credit in large measure goes to human element.

Technology

There are two aspects to the technological dimension nuclear security in India. The first is the design and deployment of portals, radiation detectors, secure communication networks, Radio Frequency ID cards, real time tracking systems for secure vehicular transport, infra-red cameras with video analytics, sensors, barriers and similar technologies. Most of these technologies have been developed in-house. The second dimension is proliferation resistant technology and procedures for nuclear fuel cycle technologies which reduce the risk of a nuclear security or safety breach. India is pursuing a closed fuel cycle with ‘reprocess to reuse’ of plutonium that avoids both the buildup of stockpiles as well as the need to store large amounts of spent fuel in underground repositories that could turn into easy to access plutonium mines for malefactors in the future. Indian scientists are also working on the design and deployment of proliferation resistant reactor designs such as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) using thorium and U233, which is associated with high energy gamma-emitter U-232, that makes access and use by unauthorized non-state actors difficult. India has also developed technologies for vitrification of waste that have the additional benefit of making access to high level waste by terrorists wanting to fabricate a radiological device, difficult.

International Cooperation

- *India is party to all the 13 universal instruments accepted as benchmarks for a State’s commitment to combat international terrorism. This includes the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).*
- *India is party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and is amongst the countries which have also ratified the 2005 amendment to the Convention.*
- *India supports the fifth revision of the recommendations contained in IAEA’s INFCIRC/225.*
- *India supports the 2003 IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and has voluntarily adopted its provisions.*
- *India adheres to the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s guidelines on supply of nuclear items, including for physical protection of nuclear material and facilities.*

Tackling nuclear security threats, including nuclear terrorism, requires international cooperation today. India is a party to all the thirteen anti-terrorism conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT). It is party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment that among other things brought domestic transportation of nuclear material under the ambit of the Convention. India applies IAEA’s guidance on physical protection of nuclear material as contained in the document INFCIRC/225/Rev 5 and adheres to the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Guidelines on nuclear transfers and related conditions. India has been an active participant in IAEA’s safeguards system and has voluntarily placed civilian facilities under safeguards in accordance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. While

the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) has conducted peer reviews of Indian power plants earlier, post-Fukushima, India has invited IAEA's OSART for safety review of two units at Rajasthan; a regulatory peer review of AERB has also been requested of the IAEA. India has recently contributed USD 1 million to the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund (NSF).

At the UN, India has sponsored a resolution since 2002 on WMD terrorism and has supported the implementation of the 2004 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on prohibiting WMD related transfers to non-state actors. India has submitted a national report on the 1540 as well as updates to that report. An international workshop on UNSCR 1540 and new dimensions in nuclear security was hosted by India in November-December 2012.

India participates in the IAEA's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB), which was established in 1995 and disseminates information on confirmed reports about illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear radioactive materials to the States. Since 2007, India is a party to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and has participated in its working groups on nuclear detection, nuclear forensics and response and mitigation. India also cooperates with the Interpol's Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism Prevention Unit and the World Customs Organization on nuclear trafficking issues.

Nuclear Security Summit communiqués have underlined the need to reduce reliance on Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) for research reactors. India has taken the lead by taking out the enriched uranium based fuel in its oldest research reactor, APSARA, and moving it to a safeguarded facility in December 2010. APSARA will use indigenous fuel which is not high enriched uranium.

A significant current aspect of India's international cooperation is its participation in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). The Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh participated at the 2010 Washington and 2012 Seoul Summits and India hosted a meeting of the NSS Sherpas in New Delhi in January 2012. At the 2010 Summit, PM announced the setting up of a Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP), as a centre of excellence on nuclear security.

The foundation stone was laid on January 3, 2014 at Kheri Jassaur in Haryana state after completing the acquisition of 234 acres of land for the campus for GCNEP. Off-campus courses have begun as of end-2011. They include courses on topics such as vulnerability assessment and physical protection. MoUs on cooperation on GCNEP have been signed with the IAEA, France, Russia and the U.S. and a draft MoU is under finalization with the UK. The Centre is expected to begin on-campus operations by end-2015.

GCNEP Schools

1. School of Advanced Nuclear Energy System Studies (SANESS)
2. School of Nuclear Security Studies (SNSS)

3. School on Radiological Safety Studies (SRSS)
4. School of Nuclear Material Characterization Studies (SNMCS)
5. School for Studies on Applications of Radioisotopes and Radiation Technologies (SARRT)

Courses conducted so far

Three international training courses on *Nuclear Security*, 11 national training courses on Food Irradiation, Prevention and Response to radiological threats, nuclear security , nuclear material accounting and control , radiochemistry and application of Radioisotope and two public outreach programme conducted so far.

Conclusion

It is natural for India to be an active participant in current efforts to strengthen nuclear security given its nuclear programme and expertise, its interest in expansion of civil nuclear energy in safe and secure conditions and its experience with state-sponsored terrorism. At the same time, India's efforts to secure its nuclear materials, facilities and activities did not begin with the recent rise in international awareness about the dangers of nuclear terrorism. Instead they have a long history and India's record on nuclear security and safety over 350 reactor years speaks for itself.

India's nuclear security record

India has an impeccable record on nuclear nonproliferation and Indian nuclear technologies and materials have not leaked anywhere in contrast with some cases of rampant proliferation in Asia involving governments and state actors. Despite a complex closed fuelcycle with a variety of facilities and nuclear materials, nuclear material accounting and control as well as IAEA safeguards have been implemented for close to five decades without anomalies.

There has been no breach of nuclear technology security of the kind that allowed A Q Khan to access and proliferate sensitive nuclear technology and material. Indian nuclear scientists and technologists have maintained high levels of personal and professional integrity. At the same time, as the slew of recent measures shows India is not complacent about nuclear security and has taken steps to strengthen nuclear security even further. India's commitment to international cooperation to bolster nuclear security is underlined by its being a party to all the major nuclear security related conventions and its active participation on these issues at the UN, the IAEA, the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). The planned Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership (GCNEP) would provide the ideal platform to strengthen the various dimensions of nuclear security in India with international cooperation.

Indian Diplomacy at Work – SAARC

Deeper integration for peace & prosperity

As per SAARC Charter (1985), the fundamental objective of SAARC is “to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life”.

The SAARC Charter stipulates that decisions at all SAARC fora are taken on the basis of unanimity; bilateral and contentious issues are explicitly excluded from its deliberations and cooperation is based on sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence and non-interference in internal affairs.

SAARC aims to channelize the aspirations of the people of South Asia through its multi-faceted institutions, projects and processes in various areas such as trade, finance, economic integration, security, environment, education, culture, agriculture, connectivity, science & technology and social development.

Over the past few years, new regional institutions have been created under SAARC, such as the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) in Thimphu, South Asian University (SAU) in New Delhi, and SAARC Arbitration Council (SARCO) in Islamabad, SAARC Regional Standards Organisation (SARSO) in Dhaka.

South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) Agreement signed in 2004, envisages eventual zero customs duty on virtually all products traded within South Asian region. Phased reduction of customs duties has been negotiated over time. In Phase I, each member country effected the 20% mandatory reduction in the number of items on its Sensitive List. Phase-II reduction has been almost completed.

The cumulative figure of intra-SAARC trade flows under SAFTA has crossed US\$ 2.9 billion during 2013-2014. Currently, trade under SAFTA accounts for only around 10% of the total regional trade because bilateral FTAs offer greater concessions amongst SAARC countries. India's trade with South Asia accounts for 5 % of its global trade.

SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS) came into force in December 2012. The Agreement provides for expanding intra-regional investments, trade liberalization in the services sector, etc. The 5 Least Developed Countries in the region namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives and Nepal, are accorded special and differential treatment, commensurate with their developmental needs. Trade in Services is to commence after Schedules of Specific Commitments are finalised. So far, only Bangladesh, Bhutan and India have prepared their final schedules of commitments; other countries are working out their schedules and necessary clearances.

India's proactive, asymmetrical and non-reciprocal approach to stimulate and sustain cooperative projects of SAARC has been a transformative factor in enhancing the effectiveness of SAARC.

South Asian University (SAU) offered by India is fully functional from its temporary campus at Akbar Bhawan in New Delhi. SAU has 437 students in 7 Masters and Doctoral courses and 56 faculty members on its rolls.

India, in addition to its assessed annual contribution, made a voluntary contribution of US \$ 100 million, to the SAARC Development Fund (SDF), for projects under the social window. Currently, 9 social development projects of SDF are at various stages of implementation. SDF is taking initiatives to operationalize its Economic and Infrastructure Development windows.

SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement and the SAARC Railways Agreement were endorsed by the Inter- Governmental Group on Transport (IGGT) meeting held in New Delhi on 30 September 2014. India has proposed negotiating a Regional Air Services Agreement.

The 18th SAARC Summit took place from 26th to 27th November 2014 at Kathmandu, Nepal. The theme of the summit was deeper integration for peace and prosperity. The 18th SAARC Summit took place three years after the 17th Summit at Addu in the Maldives in November, 2011. Maldives handed over the chair of SAARC to Nepal.

The Summit was an opportunity for the leaders of all SAARC countries to meet together and review progress as well as discuss future orientation.

In the six months since the new government took office in India, there has been a constant emphasis on the importance of the South Asian region and India's abiding desire to deepen and strengthening interactions with all neighbouring countries. The invitation by Prime Minister Modi to all seven SAARC leaders, which they were gracious enough to accept at short notice, was a very early sign of the importance attached to the region and to SAARC.

Trade, connectivity and economic cooperation with fellow SAARC countries has grown considerably. For instance with Bangladesh. India and Nepal have started a new era of cooperation in energy through the signing of three agreements in recent months which, when implemented, would generate a great deal of energy for trade between India and Nepal. Similarly with Bhutan, cooperation in hydroelectric power projects is already strong and growing increasingly. There is a Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka and a close economic and commercial relationship with the Maldives which India supplies with over 97% of its day-to-day requirements of essential commodities.

During his visit to the Summit, Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi again emphasised that interaction with South Asian neighbours was a diplomatic priority for him.

“The future I dream for India is the future I wish for our entire region”

“A prosperous SAARC needs the strong foundation of a secure South Asia .If we are sensitive to each other`s security, and the lives of our people, we will deepen friendships, spur cooperation and advance stability in our region.”

“There is a new awakening in South Asia; a new recognition of inter-linked destinies; and, a new belief in shared opportunities.

The bonds will grow. Through SAARC or outside it. Among us all or some of us. We can all choose our paths to our destinations. But, when we join our hands and walk in step, the path becomes easier, the journey quicker and the destination closer.”

Elements of SAARC engagements

On 26 November, while noting that the theme of 18th SAARC Summit was “Deeper Regional Integration for Peace and Prosperity”, PM said “For India, our vision for the region rests on five pillars – trade, investment, assistance, cooperation in every area, contacts between our people – and, all through seamless connectivity. This is the call of our times”. During the course of his speech, PM made the following announcements:

Infrastructure

To set up a Special Purpose Facility in India to finance infrastructure projects in our region that enhances regional connectivity and trade.

Business and Economy

India to give business visa for 3-5 years for citizens of SAARC nations.

For ‘ease of doing business’, PM also proposed the idea of a ‘SAARC Business Traveler Card’.

Trade

India to work towards a ‘sustainable’ trade balance with SAARC member states.

India has given five South Asian partners duty free access to 99.7% of their goods and is “prepared to do more with others”.

Economic Assistance

Over the past decade; India has provided economic assistance of nearly US\$ 8 billion to its South Asian neighbours.

Energy

The entire region should consciously encourage the use of solar energy and micro grids to quickly provide clean power to villages across the region.

Health

India will meet the shortfall in funds to establish the SAARC Regional Supra Reference Laboratory for TB and HIV.

To offer the five-in-one vaccine for the children of South Asia.

To support monitoring and surveillance of polio-free countries, and provide vaccines where it might reappear.

For those coming to India for medical treatment, India will provide immediate medical visa for the patient and an attendant.

Education

SAARC University being set-up in Delhi will also have partnerships with at least one university from each SAARC country.

India to connect all South Asian students through online course and E-libraries. India's National Knowledge Network, once operational, will be extended to the entire SAARC region.

Space technology

India plans to launch its SAARC satellite by the time of SAARC Day in 2016. This satellite will provide services for the entire SAARC region in areas like education, telemedicine, disaster response, resource management, weather forecasting and communication.

India will also host a conference in India for all South Asian partners next year, to strengthen our collective ability to apply space technology in economic development and governance.

Kathmandu Declaration – After interactions between the leaders at the SAARC retreat, 27th November -the concluding day of the SAARC Summit, saw the release of the 'Kathmandu Declaration'. The significant elements of the declaration were:

Agreement on power co-operation in the electricity sector was a major take-away from the Summit.

The Transport Ministers of the member states will meet within three months to take forward the discussions on the two pending agreements on waterways and railways.

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(Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia)

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Cite references in the text by name and year in parentheses. **Some examples:** The problems related to the borders with some neighbouring countries ... (Dimitrijević, 2003, p. 33); These effects have been widely studied (Gupta et al. 2010; Petrović and Vesić, 2009); The results were later contradicted by Thompson and Golubović (1999).

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2-6 authors:

Prost, M., & Clark, P. K. (2006). Unity, diversity and the fragmentation of international law: How much does the multiplication of international organizations really matter? *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 5, 341–370.

Fatić, M., Đukanović, D., & Gajić, D. (2012). Security of Balkans and Serbia in the Context. *Review of International Affairs*, 44(3), 70–83.

More than 6 authors:

Biermann, F., Betsill, M., Gupta, J., Kanie, N., Lebel, L., Liverman, D., et al. (2010). Earth system governance: a research framework, *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law & Economics*. 4, 277–298. DOI: 10.1007/s10784-010-9137-3.

Book:

Calfee, R. C., & Valencia, R. R. (1993). *APA guide to preparing manuscripts for journal publication*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

Nikolić, M. (2011). *Ekumenski odnosi Srpske pravoslavne i Rimokatoličke crkve 1962-2000* [Ecumenical Relations of Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church 1962-2000]. Beograd: Službeni glasnik.

Book chapter:

Jonsson, C., & Tallberg, J. (2008). Institutional Theory in International Relations'. In J. Pierre, B. G. Peters & G. Stoker (Eds.). *Debating institutionalism* (pp. 48–65). Manchester University Press, Manchester, NY.

Petrović, P., Mirković, A. (2011). General characteristics of foreign direct investment in Serbia, in Antevski, M. (Ed.). *Development Potentials of Foreign Direct Investment:*

International Experiences (pp. 229–247). Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics.

Conference papers:

Petrović, D. (2010). Interes Srbije u odnosu na carinski savez i druge integracione procese i međunarodne organizacije na postsovjetskom prostoru [The interest of Serbia in relation to customs union and other integration processes and international organizations in the post-Soviet space]. U Đukanović, D., Lađevac, I. (pr.). Zbornik radova sa međunarodne naučne konferencije *Uloga i mesto Srbije u međunarodnim organizacijama*. Beograd, 12-13. Oktobar 2010. (str. 524–540). Beograd: Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu.

Institutions as authors and legal documents:

World Bank. (2010). *World development report—Development and climate change*. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., USA.

United Nations. (2006, November 9). *Delivering as one*. Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance and the Environment, New York.

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Zakon o spoljnim poslovima, *Službeni glasnik RS*. Br. 116 (2007).

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Todić, D., & Dimitrijević, D. (2013). Priority goals in international co-operation of the Republic of Serbia in the field of environment and sustainable development. *International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economy*, DOI: 10.1007/s10784-013-9207-4.

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Commission on Sustainable Development. (2002). Commission on Sustainable Development Acting as Preparatory Committee for the World Summit for Sustainable Development. Fourth session. Chairman's text for negotiation. Accessed November 29, 2011, from http://www.bdix.net/sdnbd_org/wssd/preparatory-process/globallevel/prepIV.htm.

Evropski pokret u Srbiji. (2011). *Nacrt spoljnopoličke strategije Republike Srbije [Strategy on foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia, draft]*. Beograd. [Online] <http://www.emins.org/sr/aktivnosti/projekti/strategija-sp-pol/Strategija-C.pdf>. Accessed 25 June 2012.

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