

Founded in June 1950

RIA

UDK 327

ISSN 0486-6096

THE REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

BELGRADE, VOL. LXIII, No. 1146, APRIL–JUNE 2012

Aleksandar Fatić

A SYMPATHY-DRIVEN DIPLOMATIC ETHICS

Dragan Simeunović

POLITICAL DIMENSION OF MOBING
IN POST-SOCIALIST SOCIETY

Željko Bjelajac,
Miloš Marković,
Zoran Pavlović

PARTICULARS OF MODERN SLAVERY
AS A DEVIANT SOCIAL PHENOMENON

Marko Nikolić,
Ana Jović-Lazić

INSTITUTIONAL FORMS OF
CONTEMPORARY ECUMENICAL DIALOGUE

Mina Zirojević Fatić,
Dragan Đukanović,
Dejan Gajić

SECURITY OF BALKANS AND SERBIA
IN THE CONTEXT OF EURASIAN
SECURITY INTEGRATIONS

Gordana Bekčić Pješčić

UNITED STATES IDEOLOGICAL
LEGACY IN THE FLAT WORLD

Stevan Rapačić

DEMOCRATISATION AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Nevenka Jeftić

NEW PROJECTIONS OF THE TURKISH
POLITICS IN XXI CENTURY

Milovan Radaković

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND SERBIA



THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS



Institute of International Politics and Economics

Belgrade, Makedonska 25, Phone: 3373 824,

Internet site: www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

e-mail: iipe@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS is a research institution established in 1947. The Institute's mission is to undertake systematic research into fundamental processes in the international community and political, economic, military, technological, cultural and social features of the contemporary world. Providing a scientific basis for defining strategic principles and proposing foreign policy priorities, the Institute works most closely with officials who conduct foreign policy (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia). Its special task is to educate and inform the general public about basic trends in international relations, issuing numerous publications, holding conferences, and organising lectures and debates featuring prominent political figures, experts and diplomats. Since its foundation, the Institute has also produced a significant number of diplomats and other officials active in both domestic and international affairs. The Institute consists of a research department with 30 research fellows and one of the best-equipped specialist libraries in Southeastern Europe, including an exclusive depository for publications and documents from the UN, the European Union, and NATO. Apart from *The Review of International Affairs* (in English), the Institute also publishes *Međunarodni problemi/International Problems* (in Serbian and English), *Evropsko zakonodavstvo* (in Serbian), and *Međunarodna politika* (in Serbian).

The Review of International Affairs

ISSN 0486-6096

UDK 327

VOL. LXIII, No. 1146, APRIL–JUNE 2012

Editorial Council

Jouni JÄRVINEN, Ph.D., Director of the ECEBB Studies
Aleksanteri Institute Finnish Centre for Russian and Eastern European Studies;

Professor Klaus BACHMAN, Ph.D., Professor of International relations,
Warsaw school for social psychology, University of Warsaw;

Vesselin POPOVSKI, Ph.D., Director of Studies, International Order and Justice Peace
and Governance Programme UN University;

Dimitar BECHEV, Ph.D., Southeast European Studies Programme St. Antony's
College, University of Oxford;

Professor Raju THOMAS, Ph.D., Marquette University SAD;

Dejan JOVIĆ, Ph.D., University of Stirling, Scotland, UK;

Emilian KAVALSKI, Ph.D., University of Western Sydney, Australia;

Professor Dragan SIMEUNOVIĆ, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Belgrade, Serbia;

Branislav RADELJIĆ, Ph.D., School of Law and Social Sciences,
University of East London, UK;

Professor Aleksandra JOVANOVIĆ, Ph.D., Faculty of Law,
University of Belgrade, Serbia;

Professor Predrag SIMIĆ, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Sciences,
University of Belgrade, Serbia

Editorial Board

Professor Vladimir GREČIĆ, Ph.D., Faculty of Economics; Belgrade;

Professor Slobodan PAJEVIĆ, Ph.D., Megatrend,
University of Applied Sciences, Belgrade;

Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade;

Nevenka JEFTIĆ ŠARČEVIĆ, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade;

Marko NIKOLIĆ, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade;

Sanja JELISAVAC TROŠIĆ, M.A., Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade;

Dejan GAJIĆ, M.A., Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade

The Review of International Affairs

Editorial correspondence:

Mina Zirojević Fatić, Editor-in-Chief, Tel: 3373 824

E-mail: mina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Makedonska 25, 11000 Belgrade, P.O. Box 413

Internet: www.diplomacy.bg.ac.rs/ria.htm

Published quarterly

Publisher

Institute of International Politics and Economics,

Belgrade, Makedonska 25,

E-mail: mina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

For the Publisher

Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D.

Director

Language editor

Aleksandra Janošević

Editor-in-Chief

Mina Zirojević Fatić, Ph.D.

Layout

Sanja Pavlović,

Snežana Vojković

For information on annual subscription please contact:

BiFS doo, Books and Periodicals, Supilova 10

11000 Belgrade, Serbia

Tel/fax: +381 11 20 84 229

E-mail: bfsbooks@sezampro.rs

Circulation

300

Printed by

“Želnid”, Belgrade, Nemanjina 6

Publishing of *The Review of International Affairs* is funded by
the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia

The Review of International Affairs

Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, April–June 2012

UDK 327 ISSN 0486-6096

Contents

<i>Aleksandar Fatić</i> A Sympathy-Driven Diplomatic Ethics	5
<i>Dragan Simeunović</i> Political Dimension of Mobbing in Post-Socialist Society	23
<i>Željko Bjelajac, Miloš Marković, Zoran Pavlović</i> Particulars of Modern Slavery as a Deviant Social Phenomenon	33
<i>Marko Nikolić, Ana Jović-Lazić</i> Institutional Forms of Contemporary Ecumenical Dialogue	50
<i>Mina Zirojević Fatić, Dragan Đukanović, Dejan Gajić</i> Security of Balkans and Serbia in the Context of Eurasian Security Integrations	70
<i>Stevan Rapačić</i> Democratisation and Cultural Differences in the Former Soviet Union	83
<i>Nevenka Jeftić, Dragan Tančić</i> New Projections of the Turkish Politics in XXI century (Turkey and the European Union)	106
<i>Milovan Radaković</i> Russian Foreign Policy and Serbia	119

Book reviews

Terrorist Financing through Money Laundering128

Components of National and European Identity 133

Documents

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee
— The Role of Civil Society in EU-Kosovo Relations135

UDK: 17+341.7
Bibliid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 5–22
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Aleksandar Fatić*¹

A Sympathy-Driven Diplomatic Ethics

ABSTRACT

The paper deals with the development of an applied ethics for the diplomatic service — a section of applied ethics that is clearly called for in order to non-repressively regulate this part of the public administration, yet one that so far has hardly been addressed in depth. The paper explores some of the specificities of diplomacy as a cooperative game-based profession and builds on the legacy of Max Scheler’s philosophical views on the role of sympathy in human relations to lay groundwork for a diplomatic ethics based on sympathy. In doing so, the author revises some of Scheler’s starting positions — for Scheler believed that sympathy cannot be a basis for ethics — through first exploring the reasons for Scheler’s pessimism about an ethics of sympathy, and then by developing empirically informed groundwork for precisely such an ethics in the diplomatic field. The paper’s argument rests on the assumption that, if there is to be an effective ethics for diplomacy as a discipline, it must be simple and based on a dynamic principle that will motivate all participants to cooperate, regardless of their cultural or geo-strategic differences and interests. In other words, such ethics must be capable of taking account of the differing interests, while at the same time providing sufficient common ground in values to ensure cooperation. The author argues that an applied ethics that is grounded in the functional mechanism of “sympathy” of “fellow-feeling”, allows for a regulatory system of behaviour that would satisfy both mentioned conditions: simplicity and sufficient motivational potential to generate cooperative initiatives.

Key words: sympathy, ethics, diplomacy, Max Scheler, commonalities.

¹ Aleksandar Fatić is Research Professor at the Institute of International Politics and Economics and Director of the Centre for Security Studies in Belgrade. He is a Fellow of the American Association of Philosophical Practitioners.

Sympathy as a founding value for ethics

While sympathy is almost universally recognized as a desirable character trait or social habit, because it expedites and makes more satisfying all the social relationships and “transactions”, its ability to serve as a founding value for specific ethics is not clear. The functional value of sympathy is primarily cognitive; especially the context of others’ feelings, perceptions or impressions can hardly be cognitively accessible to us except through the exercise of sympathy. Max Scheler depicted sympathy as a primal mechanism that species use to relate to each other: he quotes the example of a wasp that lays its eggs inside a caterpillar by stinging the caterpillar in a specific nerve so that the insect is paralysed while the eggs are laid. The wasp has no previous “information” on the caterpillar’s anatomy; its ability to deliver poison to the exact right spot is a native capacity, information inherited from past generations. The wasp has not learned where to sting; it just does so.²

While bizarre, the “knowledge” the wasp exhibits in stinging the caterpillar is a type of inter-species “sympathy” as a carrier of cognitive potential: the wasp “feels” or, in the extended sense, “knows”, how it is for the caterpillar to be stung in a particular way to a particular part of its anatomy; it has a primal relationship with the caterpillar in a way much more innate and profound than the lion has with its prey: the lion learns from its parents that to kill a zebra a particular strategy is required, culminating in an attack on the throat or the spine, while the wasp does not undergo any such learning. The wasp simply “senses” everything it needs to do in order to fertilise the caterpillar: all that it does is led by a biologically conceived inter-species instinct or “sympathy”. Sympathy, in this context, is nothing like “empathy”: it is possible to exercise sympathy with a living organism that is entirely instrumental to exploiting or even destroying that organism. Thus, on a base level, sympathy as a primal conduit of cognitive content is morally and emotionally neutral. This context of “sympathy” provides for the broadest application of theory across a range of evolutionary and biologicistic arguments aimed to explain both animal and human relations.

Similar though less distasteful examples exist throughout human interactions. It appears that people from very different cultures can sense what pleases and what displeases, even terrorizes, others, and can perform both acts of great humanism and those of great malice, based on pure intuition of the effects certain actions will have on others. Sympathy as an ability to put oneself

² Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath, edited by W. Stark, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1979, p. 29. All references to *The Nature of Sympathy* in this paper are to this edition.

in another's position, to anticipate the reactions to our actions by another, or to share in the common experience of pleasure or pain appears to be rooted in our collective psyche. According to Scheller, sympathy manifests itself, among other ways, as empathy, which is also often devoid of any prior information that could explain its cognitive potential: babies will often cry if other babies cry, even though they are neither hungry nor afraid. The moment other babies stop crying, they also will stop crying. Empathy is a part of our collective identity as human beings, and arguably the same applies to mammals more generally. This intuitionist account of sympathy, and of empathy as one of its manifestations, while widely debated, is not our primary concern. What matters to us is whether sympathy in the narrower sense of sharing positive emotional dispositions to one another can found an ethics, and in particular an applied, professional ethics for diplomacy.

In order to discuss the normative potential of sympathy for diplomatic ethics, certain pre-requisite steps will be taken first. Initially, this includes a brief discussion of the conceptual aspects of "intentionality" for ethics, only to open the argumentative space that allows us to see sympathy as a particular quality of mental states that is directly related to the ways in which *intentionality* is exhibited in human interactions. Thirdly, the argument will move to the reasons for sympathy to play the role of a lead "functional" value in a diplomatic ethics. Finally, some consequences of such an ethics in the concrete sense will be discussed.

Understanding intentionality as a pre-requisite for appreciating the normative potential of sympathy

Cultures permeated with sympathy tend to be more pleasant to live in, but the same holds for any other cultures where positive mutual dispositions of people are more strongly pronounced than elsewhere. Sympathy is a mental and emotional disposition with strong cohesive potential for communities, but the controversy over its capacity to found an ethics rests on the question of whether sympathy can provide an adequate criterion for deciding what is right and what is wrong. In the strictly deductive, logical sense, sympathy can't discriminate between the morally right and the morally wrong, simply because it is a relational concept: one can sympathise with just about anything, both right and wrong. In other words, the fact that one sympathises with something does not make that thing right or wrong, and, while sympathy is "nice" and contributes to the quality of life of all members of communities that tend to be permeated with relations of sympathy, it seems incapable of founding an ethics of its own.

However, while sympathy cannot substitute a general sense of the right and wrong, and in this sense cannot guide what could be called a "foundational

ethics” (an ethics laying out the rights and the wrongs of a particular system of moral beliefs), it can play a key regulatory role within an applied ethics for the professions (at least for some professions), within a pre-existing foundational ethics that is presumably shared by most in a political community. In other words, while sympathy may not be able to generate the sense of right and wrong in a community, once this sense exists (and, presumably, it usually exists in most communities), sympathy can indeed play a key functional role as a value in producing professional ethics whose aim is to adapt the norms to the circumstances of specific professions and maintain the dynamic (motivational) potential in the members of those professions to uphold the right and the wrong. To better understand the way in which sympathy can achieve this applied task it is helpful to briefly relate the idea of “intentionality” to the present discussion of sympathy.

Intentionality and sympathy

In the simplest sense, intentionality is the quality of mental content, speech and action in the broad sense whereby they are “about something”. People relate to each other, they speak about something, and their overall behaviour tends to have a referential point that, in most general terms, anchors the purposiveness of human life. If human action is not “about” something, it tends to appear as meaningless, misguided, or psychotic. The way intentionality functions colours everyday interactions; the quality of the intentionality spells the quality of life in most social situations. While the analytic discussion of intentionality is not our primary aim here, suffice it to say that intentionality has been discussed at length by Scheler in *The Nature of Sympathy*, with the seminal work in the 20th century by John Searle.³ For our purposes the simple delineation of the concept of intentionality in the broad sense that is given above is sufficient. Scheler was of a firm belief that intentionality is exclusive to human beings, which we may not agree with: if intentionality is merely the quality of mental states that they tend to be “about something”, then there appears to be no reason to deny intentionality to the snake that hungrily hypnotises the rabbit into submission. However, this again is not essential for our argument, for even if, contrary to Scheler’s belief, intentionality is not exclusive to humans, only in humans it becomes subject to *moral judgements*, because of the freedom by humans to considerably (if not completely) control their intentional impulses, the intentional content of their mental states, and the behaviour that results from such states. The snake’s intentionality in projecting appetitive force to the rabbit or the squirrel does not fall under a moral meter,

³ John Searle, *Intentionality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

for it does not really have a choice: it is inconceivable that it should be able to “restrain itself” on account of the rabbit’s rights or for the rabbit’s benefit. On the other hand, a man’s unrestrained appetitive desire for career advancement or political power very much falls under a moral meter, because the man has the ability to act otherwise; he has the freedom to choose various values, strategies and life-plans. Assuming that the pre-requisites of freedom are fulfilled (e.g. the individual is sane and not under external coercion), human intersubjectivity is fully subject to moral judgement.

It should be seen as uncontroversial that intentional content, coupled with human freedom, is subject to moral judgements, and that the way this judgement will unfold will depend on the sort of values selected for a particular type of morality. Sympathy may be a powerful emotional foundation for social interactions. At the same time, Scheler has shown quite convincingly that the various forms of “sympathy” serve key cognitive purposes, some of which, in the various species, are not conscious. This can be illustrated by numerous examples, but what is really interesting here is to examine sympathy’s *normative* potential in the ethical field. Are there reasons to *morally* prefer certain types of normative languages (including that of sympathy) to others in regulating behaviour within certain professions? I shall first focus here on a linguistic and psychological analysis of what normative languages, or normative grammars (the two terms used interchangeably here) imply for a social and political system, and then develop implications for diplomacy as a politically informed profession.⁴

If it is true to say that various propositions or beliefs, which, according to Searle, have a word-to-world direction of fit (essentially conforming to the so-called “correspondence theory of truth”, which implies that a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds with the real state of affairs in the world “out there”), are validated by certain truth-conditions, what, then, of intentional content, such as desires or orders? They do not express propositional content, and thus cannot have truth-conditions attached to them. My desire to own a Volvo truck is neither true, nor false — it is either realized in the world, or not. Intentional content thus has conditions of satisfaction, rather than truth-

⁴ “Social system” includes a set of norms, institutions and habits that constitute a particular culture in the development of mutual relations in a society. “Political system” is a set of institutions and customs that govern the distribution and exercise of political power. While in some cases it is justified to speak of, for instance, “democratic social and political system”, the two are not necessarily consistent, as there are institutional democracies with extremely exclusionary or authoritarian social systems and cultures, and there are quite cooperative and open social systems framed by particularly brutal and authoritarian political systems of the time. Social systems tend to be more longitudinally stable in their normative content than political systems.

conditions, and they depend on a number of circumstances some of which at least are beyond the control of the person whose intentional content it is.

When social relations are at stake, intentional content precedes them all. In the historically broad sense, the hopes, plans, intentions and dreams of those who have helped shape revolutions, modernizations or plunges into dictatorship over time have played a unique role in the actual unfolding of such developments. The directions of intentionality, or prevailing intentionality, of a particular time in a particular society are thus crucial for the nature of events in that society, and the sort of culture fostered by popular education and by the unique role played by political and social elites in framing mindsets in the society is based on the conditioning and building of particular types of intentional content.

Assuming that intentional content (such as intentions or hopes) consists of various representations that are not necessarily realized, it is decidedly a psychological phenomenon. Intentions and hopes depend on representations, beliefs, knowledge and impressions to generate networks of mental states. Such networks allow mental states to become causally operative, or to manifest themselves through cogent and/or organised external action.

In order to decide or intend to drive a Volvo truck, I must first *know* that there are such things as trucks, that Volvo is a factory that makes particular trucks, and some at least very general facts about trucks, in order to like them and to desire to own or drive one. If I was a medieval knight, I would hardly be able to desire to drive a Volvo truck, because the rest of my mental representational network would not give rise to such intentional content. In other worlds, my beliefs and representations would not allow for the creation of a network of mental states that would be able to result in my desire to drive a Volvo truck (or, for that matter, any truck). In addition, I must have certain capacities, such as the ability to sit, move my feet and hands, see signals and obstacles, and perform a myriad of other small things involved in acts such as purchasing, registering, driving and maintaining a truck. Only against the background of such abilities, which I must be conscious of, alongside with the whole context of intentional content, can I form the desire to drive a truck, and more specifically, to drive a Volvo truck.⁵

On a social level, if my intentional mental content includes benevolence and sympathy towards the other members of my political community, this too depends on a complex set of representations, beliefs, and abilities, most of which are socially acquired or learned. This is where we arrive at the critical

⁵ Searle simply refers to the contextual representations and intentional content described here as “The Network”, and to the background abilities as “The Background” — Searle, pp. 20–5.

terrain that must be crossed to arrive at social solidarity. The idea that one learns to desire certain things, especially in the moral realm, was after Plato and Aristotle first articulated in modern philosophy by the Scottish Enlightenment, by Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Silver and others. Adam Seligman has recently recounted this in the following way:

“We know from Alan Silver that (...) (the) private realm of friendship was posited as an ideal. We also know (...) that society was held together by ‘natural sympathy’, ‘moral affections’, innate sociability, and so on. (...) In fact, moral sentiment by which ‘men are united by instinct, that they act in society from affections of kindness and friendship’ was, for the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, an axiomatic property of human mind (...).”⁶

The desire to drive a truck or ride a horse can only be formed if one is familiar with some of the features of either that one could like. One also needs to be aware that one would actually be able to perform the action one desires, should one be given an opportunity to do so. This is clear enough. However, it is far less clear that for a political subject to desire to sympathise with other members of one’s community, certain preconditions need to be fulfilled that are not unlike those for the desire to ride a horse. One needs at least to be familiar with what it would be like to sympathise with others, and one must be aware that one is actually able to do so. In addition, one would need to be aware of certain good effects of sympathy that could translate into a desire to sympathise with others. In order for these preconditions to be fulfilled, an appropriate culture needs to pre-exist in the society. Solidarity, and, by extension, sympathy, are cultural traits in a society.

The pedagogical role of the system can be compared to the role of language and to the learning of languages. If a language one speaks is very easy and sufficiently pervasive to get by without having to learn other languages, then an individual is likely to have low motivation to learn other languages. To have an attitude towards other languages, one must be able to appreciate their qualities. For an English speaker to like French, one needs to have heard French often enough to appreciate, for example, its melodic character, to grow to like its pronunciation, and to wonder as to whether there are situations and contexts of meaning where French is able to structurally “catch” the meanings in more elegant or more precise ways than English. This is still not enough for someone to form a desire to learn French. To do so, one would need to both like the language, have a personal motive to invest time and energy in learning it, and believe that one is able to accomplish the task. If I have spoken Serbian all my

⁶ Adam B. Seligman, *The Problem of Trust*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997, pp. 60–61.

life, it is by no means clear to me that I can, for example, learn Polish. For me to form a desire to learn Polish or French, I need to be fairly confident that, should I decide to do so, and should there be an adequate opportunity (school, time to be spent in one or both of the respective countries), I would have sufficient capacities to accomplish the task.

What are the social pre-requisites for these cognitive and volitional conditions to be met for me to learn a foreign language? First, learning foreign languages should be a desirable endeavour in the community, unlike learning the skill of picking locks, for example. Secondly, some people in the community should be able to speak other languages in a way that enthralls others to learn to do the same, similarly to athletes' performing to the peak being able to motivate thousands of others to try to pursue sports to the limit of their abilities.

The role of learning volition (learning to wish things) is well known in communities with prodigious corporate cultures: the military, sports clubs and the professions where solidarity is a key functional ingredient for collective success. For a team to work harmoniously all of its members must have learned not just to run, row or shoot at the right time, but also to share certain basic common values so that their own training and work do not "fall out of sync" with the others. The same is true for political communities, and for certain professions; thus for an applied ethics to work as a non-repressive regulatory mechanism in any community conditions of solidarity must be met at a high level and the substantive grounds of solidarity must be in harmony with the general foundation ethics of the community. As long as a group functions on the same foundational ethical principles as the rest of the community, solidarity and sympathy are powerful dynamic regulatory values that allow the group to both maximise its potential, and to preserve its internal relations. While solidarity in crime, though possible, militates against the foundation ethics in a community, solidarity in excellence promotes foundational values and strengthens the profession. Thus an ethics of sympathy, though not a foundational ethics, appears *prima facie* desirable for most professions.

Sympathy and trust

Similarly to discussing sympathy, when one discusses trust one easily falls into the trap of focusing only on its functional value: trusting relations in a society, the same as sympathetic ones, substantially reduce the everyday transaction costs. Doing business without written contracts, lawyers and courts is generally desirable, because it promotes a more optimistic atmosphere, reduces financial costs and loss of time, and maximises the efficiency of transactions. However, this is not all that is needed. Eric Uslaner makes a useful

distinction between at least two fundamental types of trust that are relevant for our discussion in the present context. He distinguishes between the so-called “strategic trust”, which is trust in an instrumental and strictly rational sense: I strategically trust someone when I know enough about that person to believe that she can be trusted. I may trust my dentist to put fillings in my teeth, because I have known him for a long time and know that he knows his job, but I may not strategically trust him to fix my roof, because I know nothing about his ability as a builder.

The second type of trust that Uslaner writes about is “moralistic trust”. Moral trust is a generalised trust of all other members of the community: people who are trusting in the moral sense tend to adopt a more optimistic worldview, and their positive expectations of others are not easily shaken by individual disappointments. A person who is trusting of others in the moral sense may be cheated just like anybody else, but her moral trust, which is a matter of deeply entrenched values, is unlikely to change because her trust in others has been betrayed on particular occasions.⁷

Just like a sympathetic one, a society where people are more morally trusting is a pleasant one to live in. Uslaner writes about fruit sellers on the border between Maryland and Colorado who leave their fruit stalls unmanned, filled with fruit for the drivers to purchase, and a box to put the money in. Apparently theft is a rare occurrence. Uslaner himself does not go as far as requiring any type of substantive moral test for values in a trusting community: he concludes that trusting communities tend to be morally sound simply by pointing out the empirical fact that trusting relations and the stability of institutions that depend on public trust are possible only where most people are “morally upright”. This principle is particularly clearly visible in the conditions for stability of legal systems: a democratic and equitable legal system, which is based on public trust as much as on the state’s ability to exert repression, is sustainable only in a society where “most people are law-abiding citizens, and not rascals”.⁸ Where most people are “rascals” the courts are bound to collapse very quickly, because no morally upright community will support them in dealing with rascals, and the rascals will win. As positive moral values tend to be closely related to legitimate and equitably satisfied human needs, trust, which is also dependent on a predictable satisfaction of needs, naturally arises only where the majority harbours morally sound values, namely where the majority is both law-abiding and subscribes to at least basic moral standards.

⁷ Eric M. Uslaner, *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 14–50.

⁸ Uslaner, p. 46.

It is theoretically possible that a morally delinquent community is permeated with trust, but this can hardly be a moralistic trust, because of the universal character of moralistic trust. A criminal, disloyal or cruel community may, by a stretch of imagination, be trusting within the core of its members, but it cannot be trusting of everyone, because its values diverge from those of the wider world (that, after all, is why it is delinquent). This mere logical possibility can be disregarded in a practical ethics.

It is also possible for otherwise morally upright communities to develop essentially destructive public moralities while maintaining a high level of mutual trust, in situations where they react to a period of collective trauma. For example, some post-communist societies of central Europe in the 1990s, after the fall of Communism in Europe, developed a strong anti-communism as an essentially destructive ideology (or anti-ideology), which mobilised a broad consensus. This “anti-ideology” resulted from the trauma of a period of Soviet-imposed communist rule, and its negative disposition exacerbated some of the delinquent tendencies, including, for example, an anti-Romany (anti-Gipsy) sentiment, and a degree of xenophobia.⁹ Fundamentally, however, the phenomenon does not satisfy the criterion of moralistic trust: those central Europeans who do not like or trust “Russians”, “Soviets”, “Gypsies”, of “communists” *by definition* do not exercise moralistic trust, because such trust is both universal and *a priori*. Their mutual trust is strictly strategic: it spans only members of their community and those whom they believe share their views.. Thus it does indeed seem safe to assume that a morally trusting community tends to be substantively “morally upright”.

Assuming that moralistically trusting communities are morally sound, sympathy can then play the main dynamic role in a social ethics. In other words, sympathy can be a driving force of ethics, but only against the background of an already morally healthy community: it cannot generate an ethics that is capable of rectifying a basically unjust community, or, in other words, an ethics that would be able to address unjust foundation values of the community.

Sympathy in diplomacy

Diplomacy can be described as a quasi-cooperative game-based profession, because its aim is to use models of cooperation to address political interactions that may or may not be cooperative. In other words, diplomacy pursues both cooperative and antagonistic strategies through means designed for cooperative

⁹ Zoltan Dujisin, “Towards a collective memory of socialism?”, *South-East Europe Review*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2010, pp. 475–488.

outcomes; that is why the manner of diplomacy is cooperative even in negotiations during wartime. As a quasi-cooperative game profession, it instils a particular professional ethos that requires special skills and training, yet that depends more on a corporate “spirit” and culture than on concrete and formalised qualifications of its actors.

Core values shared by the diplomatic service are thus likely to be similar across different countries and political systems: they will draw on the cooperative culture of the game diplomacy is a part of, thus ideological differences are undesirable as causally operative factors in a diplomatic ethics. In fact, there are methodological grounds to argue that party membership should be forbidden in the diplomatic service as it is in the judiciary. In order to act fully as diplomats, public servants need to recognise others primarily through the prism of their mutual profession, and ideological or policy affiliations are likely to obstruct this collegiate view and compromise the quasi-cooperative game that is the heart of diplomacy.

Respect for persons

One specifically philosophical argument in support of this view rests on the popular notion of “respect for persons”, which appears to be shared as a principle across a range of different moralities, yet it lacks a sufficiently strong substantive grounding. Namely, if we assume that we must “respect other persons”, we assume that there is substantive moral ground for such respect: either persons themselves constitute the moral basis for respect (they are moral values in themselves), or they exemplify a moral law or a moral principle that conveys moral value on them. The former view is characteristic of the Christian concept of morality, where persons as such as the “likes” of God and therefore carry an intrinsic moral value, thus justifying a demand for respect for persons *regardless* of who these persons are. In the context of professional ethics, this view has limited value because it is insufficiently operational: within a profession, respect, while being a priori, is confirmed and amplified on the basis of the actions one performs. In other words, while members of a certain profession are expected to a priori respect each other, this is in fact a matter of courtesy and, in a sense, a “formal” respect; the “real” respect is earned by the actions the others perform. A diplomat who is openly incompetent or disloyal to the service will not command collegiate respect once her actions are evaluated, regardless of the initial, formal respect that is *prima facie* due to her as a member of the profession. Thus diplomats, or any professionals, are not sources of value for themselves in the sense of Christian ethics; while the Christian ethics of intrinsic values of persons has foundational value as a

generic ethics, it is not appropriate, in this specific aspect, to the regulation of professions as an applied ethics.

The above discussion leaves us with the latter option for explaining the need for respect for persons, namely the assumption that they exemplify a moral law. Kant formulated the principle in the following way: “All reverence for a person is properly only reverence for the law (or honesty, etc.) of which the person provides an example”.¹⁰ The problem with this assumption is that it does not guarantee the universality of respect for persons in any context, and thus also in the context of professional ethics. Or, as Leslie Green points it out, “(p)eople differ greatly in the extent to which they exemplify, or are capable of exemplifying, the moral law, so it is going to be tricky to show how we end up with an invariant duty to respect all of them”.¹¹

There are a number of attempts in contemporary philosophy to found a universal respect for persons, including that by Joseph Raz, who argues that respect is connected with an obligation to respect values: the “personhood” of others is a value in itself, or is intimately connected with the various values that these persons pursue, and thus the general obligation to respect values extends to an a priori duty to respect persons, to the extent that their expectations of respect are reasonable.¹² This and similar accounts are what I shall label “structural”: they attempt to link respect for persons to a static value or set of values that command respect, and thus separate the concrete motivation to respect a particular person from a universal duty to respect them all. Our aim here is not to discuss duty. We may agree that there is a general duty to reasonably respect every person due to the value of their “personhood” as such; this, after all, is the essence of Christian ethics. However, once we venture in the area of applied ethics, where the grounds for respect need to be couched in group-membership or the special actions, or values, that apply to a particular group, or profession, the static view of universal duty ceases to be as helpful.

The question for professional ethics is what makes members of a certain profession respect and form an attachment to one another, where the relevant type of respect or attachment are different from that respect that they a priori owe everyone else. Clearly the bonds within a profession are stronger and structurally different from the universal bonds that apply, or ought to apply, to “all people”: many things that ought to apply to all people in fact apply to none, including respect, especially in societies or circumstances that are culturally,

¹⁰ Immanuel Kant, *The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by H.J. Paton, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1967, sec. 492n.

¹¹ Leslie Green, “Two Worries about Respect for Persons”, *Ethics*, vol. 120, January 2010, p. 213.

¹² Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.

politically or historically challenging or degrading. Still, members of a profession share an additional layer of common identity, in addition to being members of the same society, and this reinforced common identity gives rise to stronger attachments between them. Their desire, or motivation, to respect one another is less universal and less structurally determined; it is more specific in scope and more dynamic in character: professions share corporate interests, destinies and a selection of values that are particularly cherished by the guild. In addition, when professions such as diplomacy, which are based on quasi-cooperative games, are concerned, then respect between members of the profession is not just a consequence of the shared value substance; it is also a methodological precept for success. Quasi-cooperative games can only succeed in a context where there is mutual respect between all players, and where trust is much higher than in the antagonistic contexts, including, often, the “real world” situations of the countries that the diplomatic services represent in their quasi-cooperative games. This is the functional meaning of the often quoted “personal chemistry” between negotiators, or “long-standing friendships” between diplomats representing opposed political and strategic interests and positions. The crux is not in the “friendship” or “chemistry”, but in the special culture of dynamic mutual respect as members of the profession. This respect requires a dynamic foundation of sympathy, rather than resting on the static ground of “universal moral duty”.

Collective egoism

“Pleasantries in the face of controversies”, which so often characterise diplomatic practice on the level of appearances, have a deeper grounding in the nature of the quasi-cooperative game, and yet a deeper one in the dynamic features of professional relationships in diplomacy.¹³ The stern Kantian ethics of universal duty is not appropriate to the applied ethics of the professions, because professions require a degree of “collective egoism” that is not generally opposed to ethical requirements. While philosophers have debated egoism’s potential compatibility with ethics, where ethics is initially seen as a form of “internal” regulation of behavior arising from unrestrained egoism, most of the discussion centred on individual egoism, and on the idea that one might appear to act morally, but may in fact act egotistically, because one does what one does for the wrong motives: I may accept social norms and fulfil social expectations, thus acting “ethically” on the surface of things, not because I accept the norms that I obey, but because acting so will provide me with

¹³ Aleksandar Fatić, “Modern diplomacy in the Balkans”, *Montenegro Journal of Foreign Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1–2, 1998, pp. 61–74.

beneficial social interactions that I otherwise need. In other words, if I act as a rascal, even though I may wish to do so, or believe to be entitled to do so, I will not be able to enter into partnerships and arrangements that I need to prospect in the society; thus I may appear to act morally, while in fact acting entirely egotistically, focusing only on the furthering of my own interests. This is a well known argument put forward by David Gauthier, who concludes:

“We must distinguish clearly between persons who act only on self-anchored reasons, and so adhere to social requirements only when it is beneficial for themselves to do so, and those who, for self-anchored reasons, dispose themselves to adhere to social requirements whether or not it is actually beneficial for them to do so”.¹⁴

Assuming that the moral choices made are “self-anchored”, or authentic for the person, egoism that is sincere appears to qualify as a life-strategy that does not militate against ethics. One popular criterion for the theoretical sustainability of moral precepts is the so-called “test of universalisation”, again deriving from Kantian ethics: if a moral principle is to be considered viable, it must be universalisable, or, to paraphrase one of the formulations of Kant’s categorical imperative: “one must be able to wish the maxim of one’s action to become a universal principle”. The common objection to egoism is that egotistic people cannot desire everybody else to be egotistic, because that would endanger their own vital interests; they “free-ride” in the social space created by the assumption that everybody else (or at least most other people) will act morally and *not* egotistically, by acting egotistically amid the moral norms and thus deriving benefit that others do not gain. There are, however, views that “the theory of universal prescriptivism (...) does not rule out any ultimate principle as possibly being a moral principle, so long as it passes the test of prescriptive universalizability. On prescriptivist grounds, no absurdity is attached to the possibility of ethical egoism, in itself, being a moral principle”.¹⁵

While it remains unclear how a systematic egoism could be justified (for in the most radical form it would militate against any type of respect for general interest, and thus, ultimately, against the sustainability of rules and a social order as we know it), there are grounds to argue that egoism can be sustained as a life strategy in a limited form, *against a set of pre-determining circumstances*.¹⁶ In a society that is unjust, ruled in an authoritarian way, or undergoing a major and radical crisis of values and morality, egoism may be a

¹⁴ David Gauthier, “Reason to be moral?”, *Synthese*, vol 72, 1987, pp. 19–20.

¹⁵ Chong Kim Chong, “Ethical egoism and the moral point of view”, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 26, 1992, p. 25.

¹⁶ See Wim J. van der Steen, “Egoism and altruism in ethics: Dispensing with spurious generality”, *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 29, 1995, p. 34–5.

morally justified strategy, for any other choice would in fact not be strategically feasible. In natural disasters and wars, there are situations where “everyone to his own devices” is in fact the only available strategy of survival.

The question of whether “collective egoism” is egoism in the first place will not be addressed here, as it is a matter of definitions and there is insufficient space at present to delve into reasons to include collectives into the concept of subjects of egoism. There are authoritative philosophical views on egoism and the Ego that present it not in opposition to, but as a manifestation, even embodiment of, aprioristic morality. Scheler himself points this out poignantly:

“(…) the problem of individual and society, and of self and other as conscious subjects, is also, in its most fundamental sense, a problem of *value*, an ethical as well as a juristic problem. Indeed there is a whole group of philosophers who have sought to establish the existence of other persons in general primarily from this point of view—and who would consider any other grounds for their existence to be merely derivative from that which is designated by the idea of a ‘responsible being’ in general. Fichte is the clearest, acutest and most radical exponent of the problem from this point of view. He argued more or less as follows: the central core of the Pure Ego consists in a *primordial consciousness of duty*, or pure consciousness of obligation; or pure consciousness of obligation; (in virtue of his interpretation of the ‘primacy of practical over theoretical reason’ this constitutes, for him, as it does for Kant, not only the prior condition of all apprehension of value and practical decision, but also of all theoretical assertion and denial of matter of fact) (...).¹⁷

To avoid complex matters of definition, the discussion will henceforth rest on a *prima facie* view that collectives can be egotistic in structurally the same way as individuals can, and that egoism is in fact the value-particularism that the modern discourse conventionally takes it to be.

Both arguments discussed above (Gauthier’s and Chong’s), which attempt to position egoism on the map of morally acceptable strategies, deal with *individual* egoism alone. I shall attempt to establish here that *collective egoism* fares much better in these arguments.

Professions as collectives are structured broadly within the context of protecting general interest: they are intended to serve general interest, yet in this process they develop their own particular interests. Thus furthering the particular interests of a profession, especially one within the public service, may or may not factually hinder the general interest, but is not in principle opposed to the general interest. In other words, from the point of view of public morality, the

¹⁷ Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, p. 227.

fact that certain professions have their particular collectively egotistic views and strategies, which may, in concrete cases, militate against the general interest, is not in itself considered immoral. The constellation of collective interests within the public sphere includes morally legitimate corporate interests of the professions, and thus a morally acceptable projection of reasonable “collective egoism” by members of that profession. On one level, the ethics of the public service couches interests and regulates optimum behavior by public servants generally; a special diplomatic ethics articulates another level of “collective egoism” by the specific profession and provides formulae or prescriptions for optimum outcomes in individual deliberations by members of that profession, dwelling on the relative weight that needs to be attached to professional interest and the general duty of the profession. In the context of diplomacy, the interest and the duty are very close on the level of the appearances, as the duty is to pursue the quasi-cooperative game with a view of maximizing the results *in the long run*, and the interest is to maintain a high degree of mutual respect, cooperation and general well-being within the profession.

While the interests of any public service profession are very similar, regardless of the nature of the tasks entrusted to that profession (they include a general well-being and prosperity for the profession and its members), the tasks themselves are wildly different and some structurally challenge the profession’s interests. In antagonistic professions, such as that of a police officer or a soldier, the nature of the tasks is a risk to the professions’ interests, and the fewer the tasks, the better-off the profession is. The less war and crime, the better-off the army and the police will be, because fewer of their members will be killed or hurt, and more stability and less stress will exist in their ranks. However, with cooperative- and quasi-cooperative games-based professions, including diplomacy, the opposite is true: the more cooperative tasks the profession gets, the better-off it is, because it is more able to cultivate its social capital, resource its personnel, and lift the public profile of the profession.

An ethics of diplomacy, in a fundamental sense, is in the normative sense conducive to, rather than being restrictive on, its own pursuit of its well-being: a diplomacy that feels good in its role is an asset to the public administration even in trying economic and political times. In important ways, diplomacy is not supposed to share the fate of the rest of society, as it must be the representative edge of that society within the quasi-cooperative environment where rules of the game call for opulence and pleasantry. In this context, an ethics for diplomacy is less challenging and less stern than that for the other sectors of the public administration; it allows the protagonists of the profession to pursue mutual identification and corporate identity-building that rest on the dynamic role of mutual sympathy *as diplomats*. It is in this, largely insulated capacity, where they cultivate mutual sympathy as an operational method and

a corporate culture, that they are most able to achieve substantive results — ones that are often attributed to “personal chemistry” and “charisma”.

The work of sympathy as a mechanism for establishing cooperative relations is smooth within the context of a profession whose collective egoism is part of a legitimate moral rationale for its mission: while the society is at war, in poverty, or isolation, it is the task of diplomacy not to be at war, poor or isolated: it must transcend the circumstances of its society and find a way to both fare well and feel good about itself, in order to be optimally effective in advancing its tasks. While a society loses soldiers to the enemy, it is the task of the diplomat to be friends with another state’s diplomat; while most people in a society may be hungry, the diplomat’s role is to go to opulent dinners and work her way through the often long-winded avenues of pleasure and sociability that ultimately lead to substantive diplomatic discussions. In a sense, sympathy is the essence of diplomatic practice, and thus sympathy as a key dynamic principle in a professional ethics for diplomacy plays a pronounced role.

Clearly even in diplomacy there is unavoidable room for antagonistic strategies, including the various disciplining and controlling procedures; however such procedures can be reconciled with a general ethics of sympathy because the cases where they apply by definition radically deviate from the prevailing professional ethics. If the key value for the profession’s ethics is sympathy, then clearly cases where antagonistic measures will have to be applied will be only those that do not respond to “soft” regulation by ethics; the fact that antagonism exists does not conceptually or principally militate against sympathy.

Conclusion

Selective philosophical considerations of certain testing topics for applied ethics, such as those of respect for persons or collective egoism, show that diplomacy as a cooperative game profession is privileged on various theoretical levels. First, it is a profession whose mission is not always to share the fate of its society; rather a certain level of indulgence and well-being is a pre-requisite for diplomacy’s ability to effectively represent the state in international relations. Secondly, diplomacy’s mission implies a degree of horizontal interconnectedness on the level of values between diplomats of the various countries that largely insulates diplomacy from the general circumstances pertaining to any particular country, while at the same time allowing diplomatic effectiveness to be attributed to “personal charisma” or “chemistry” between the diplomats of various countries. Finally, and fundamentally, diplomacy’s special mission within the society has theoretical consequences for an ethics of diplomacy, which provides ample room for sympathy as the key functional value, and which tolerates considerable collective egoism, rendering it ethically acceptable.

For all of the above reasons, an ethics of sympathy, based on Scheler's perception of the primarily cognitive roles accorded to sympathy (unlike love, which Scheler considers on a different level from sympathy), does indeed seem appropriate for diplomacy. While such professional ethics will always need to remain within the bounds of the foundation ethics for the relevant society — where the foundation ethics will rest on normatively stronger values than that of sympathy, namely ones that are capable of clearly discriminating between the right and the wrong — as an applied, professional ethics, it will stand out as perhaps the easiest professional ethics for the public sector to reconcile sympathy, corporate interests of the profession, a considerable degree of self-indulgence and accumulation of privilege on the one hand, with the duty to serve the society, on the other.

List of literature:

1. Chong, Chong Kim, "Ethical egoism and the moral point of view", *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 26, 1992, pp. 23–36.
2. Dujisin, Zoltan, "Towards a collective memory of socialism?", *South-East Europe Review*, vol. 13, no. 4, 2010, pp. 475–488.
3. Fatić, Aleksandar, "Modern diplomacy in the Balkans", *Montenegro Journal of Foreign Policy*, vol. 3, no. 1–2, 1998, pp. 61–74.
4. Gauthier, David, "Reason to be moral?", *Synthese*, vol 72, 1987, pp. 5–27.
5. Green, Leslie, "Two Worries about Respect for Persons", *Ethics*, vol. 120, January 2010, pp. 212–231.
6. Kant, Immanuel, *The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by H.J. Paton, Barnes & Noble, New York, 1967.
7. Raz, Joseph, *The Morality of Freedom*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.
8. Scheler, Max, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath, edited by W. Stark, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London and Henley, 1979.
9. Searle, John, *Intentionality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.
10. Seligman, Adam B., *The Problem of Trust*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997, pp. 60–61.
11. Uslaner, Eric M., *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp. 14–50.
12. van der Steen, Wim J., "Egoism and altruism in ethics: Dispensing with spurious generality", *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, vol. 29, 1995, pp. 31–44.

UDK: 343.62:329.14
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 23–32
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Dragan Simeunović*¹

Political Dimension of Mobbing in Post-Socialist Society

ABSTRACT

Socialist societies, as very closed, were ideal environment for political mobbing. Mobbers made their victims additionally, and mostly, guilty, by making up political quilt, marking them as political enemies for life, and sometimes even their families for generations. Formally reshaped political practice of post socialist societies shows political consciousness and habits change hard, and that tradition, even when it is pathological, survives for long, especially in politics. Since political mobbing and democracy, at least formally, do not mix, mobbing in post socialist societies becomes formally less political, but even more perfid. There are more than enough indications that this kind of perfid repression sustained in post socialist societies that are not truly, but only formally democratized. In those states mobbing frequently exceeds companies and starts to spread across other spheres of the society, becoming much more a brake than a flywheel of democratization.

Key words: Mobbing, Post-socialist Society, Democracy, Beaters, Rule of Law, Serbia.

Introductory notes

Dehumanized socialist societies, as very closed, were ideal environment for political mobbing. Like giant mousetraps, they were not easy to get out of, and inside them, and political sins could result in inability to find employment, and in more severe cases, even jail time or loss of life. Instance of political suitability was hanging over everyone's head like sword of Damocles, and its implementation was in hands of those who held political power. Indeed, everyone who was recognized as politically suitable belonged to large

¹ Professor Dragan Simeunović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, email: dragan.simeun@gmail.com.

ideological brotherhood of “pure and honest”, and all those who were not confirmed as “honest” were suspicious.

Political mobbing should be distinguished from mobbing in the name of politics that was enforced in working and other collectives of socialist societies. Mobbers made their victims additionally, and mostly, guilty, by making up political quilt, marking them as political enemies for life, and sometimes even their families for generations.

The powerful, counting on their close affiliation to politics, gave themselves right to politically judge those who they disliked for personal reasons. That way, an ordinary reason was wrapped in a political jacket, and victims suffered even more from that politicized mobbing than from regular one.

Omnipresent fear of being marked as politically unsuitable made management of any collective in socialist society easier. Those who did not have political power strived, at least, not be politically unsuitable, if they couldn't confirm themselves as suitable.

These are the circumstances in which a special kind of people stands out: beaters. Hysteries by birth, strengthened by political power they passionately attached themselves to, they were that kind of revolution's watchdogs who preemptively barked at everyone as a suspect. They could be found in every collective, and they were most feared by ordinary members of the community. Finger they pointed at someone changed not only destinies of these individuals, but also their families.

Most fearsome of all was the fact that they took their “soul food” not only regularly, but also insatiably. Their method was simple — several unverifiable heavy accusations and the victim would be “in the spotlight”. Perfidy of mobbing in the name of politics was in this: victims were found guilty and inadequate for non-political errors, in order to prove that those who oppose ruling ideology and politics are, in fact, qualified neither as humans, nor as workers.

Formally reshaped political practice of post socialist societies shows political consciousness and habits change hard, and that tradition, even when it is pathological, survives for long, especially in politics. Capable for “feeling the atmosphere” better than ordinary, non-politicized individuals, the beaters had, in large numbers, became useful members of new ruling political forces, even after the political changes that directed ex-socialist countries towards neoliberal democratization. Dressed in new ideological attires, accommodating and loud, they proved as useful in the only way they knew — damaging those nearby. Seemingly transformed, these, essentially, pathological characters continued their dark business of suspecting, labeling and persecution of mostly innocent, in order to keep majority in fear for themselves and their position within community.

Switching ideologies and parties does not make them guilty by itself, since rights to evolution and change are sacred human rights. Of course, if they are not enforced too frequently and at the expense of the innocent. Their quilt is in the fact that they did not actually change, but ideologically disguised in order to keep their dark business of mobbing, relying on politics. For that purpose they approach every new government, in effort to keep the dominant enough position, from which they can keep persecuting those of their choosing. So we have a paradox that former mobbers persist as such, and that their victims are permanently victims. This shows that those societies have not changed enough to be called truly democratic.

Every democracy in which those who mobbed in the name of communist ideology keep doing the same in the name of democracy stultifies itself. However, former mobbers have perfected the skill of attaching to power so much that those in power not only feel uncomfortable about rejecting them, but starts to feel them as “their own” and useful, despite the fact that the only use they seek is for themselves. Instead of being punished they are first in lines of those finding culprits. New culprits being usually the old ones reveal perfidy of new-old mobbers. Former victims must be silenced, in order to avoid being accused for misdeeds, and the easiest way is the one already proven: labeling them as politically unsuitable. Only, new conditions no longer allow public brutality of mobbing in the name of politics so political labels are given unofficially, and mobbing is conducted for alleged mistakes at work and in the conduct around politically powerful, who still may not be criticized. Just this time it is in the name of democracy, very much like before, when every critique of a communist was taken by the beaters to be critique of communism itself and cause for conflict. Critique could come only from politically powerful, could be tolerated only among politically equal and united, and that is, probably, the reason why it was called “comrade criticism”. All others were disempowered mass, with only one right: to imitate actions of the powerful.

It was noted that right after “5th October changes” at one of Belgrade faculties a group of former communist officials was self-organized as “crisis staff”, allegedly formed by new, incoming political garniture. This fake “crisis staff” then called the meeting of the collective, claiming, no less, that Zoran Đinđić himself appointed them, and took over faculty management. Although they were exposed at the very same meeting and admitted that they were not appointed by Đinđić, the collective did not resist them, and had accepted them as leadership — just in case. Paradoxically, some of the members of this professed “crisis staff” were, in previous term, appointed as dean and other leading positions by Mira Marković and her political suite. And what has happened. New government accepted the will of the collective as democratic choice, and new-old management at the beginning passionately proved itself as

ideologically suitable by persecution of real political opponents. But, the moment it gained the trust of the government and established itself, they started persecution of personal enemies of members of management, by the group who took over the collective, and in the name of politics. So filthy practice of mobbing in the name of politics was not shut down, but only transformed into mobbing in the name of democracy.

Since political mobbing and democracy, at least formally, do not mix, mobbing in post socialist societies becomes formally less political, but even more perfid. Political labeling and fabricating of political quilt continued, but now it is done unofficially and thorough rumors; prominent individuals are restrained in their creativity and the incompetent are, through mobbing, keeping the leading positions and maintaining the image of their seeming greatness.

This is one of serious causes of slow pace of transformation of former socialist societies into democratic societies — since such practices stultify the very idea of democracy. Every mobbing, and especially that in the name of politics, is extremely harmful to the society, if for nothing else because it prevents many competent and capable individuals from advancement, but also to contribute to working process or improvement of the environment as much as they could if they were not targeted by the mobbers.

There are probably thousands of such examples in post-socialist societies, and that is the cancer of new democracies. Punks and bullies from the old times, disguised as democrats, neither can achieve nor want real democracy. Instead they are seeking personal gain, reproducing immoral practices of old times and laying grounds for continuance of old violence in the new form.

Political dimension of mobbing in Serbia

Standardization of political thought, and political theory within, in conditions and times of globalization, is frequently followed by mechanical projections of political paradigms of more developed democratic societies into non-democratic ones. Also there is transfer of theoretical patterns in a way that is deprived of boldness to upgrade proposed political and theoretical assumptions to conform conditions of democratically underdeveloped environment. Fear of originality and expression of creativity is actually fear of political error, fear of deviating from generally accepted theoretical premises offered by carriers of globalization. This deviation could be, especially in the domain of political thought, be understood as kind of revision of these premises, and therefore as a sort of political sin. This course of thought implies that such societies are just formally democratized, and that political state is still in place there, as well as repressive political culture which reflects this sort of anachronistic consciousness — sign of

its own antidemocratic stance and retrogression, as opposed to sincere acceptance of ideas and practice of modern democracy.

One of the examples is theoretical approach that distinguishes rule of law from party (that is political) state. For example, at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s in SFR Yugoslavia, and later SR Yugoslavia, then Serbia and Montenegro, authors started writing about rule of law, at first cautiously and relatively rarely. Afterwards, when it became normative standard for recognizing orientation towards democratic changes it became more and more frequent, ending with massive theoretical acceptance and promotion of rule of law, even by those who were not only theoretical but also practical proponents of party state. All that was not followed by much of theoretical originality, except in some cases.² Moreover, in this domain, as well as in other fields of reception of neoliberal premises, disposition towards observation of specific characteristics of these phenomena in SFRY as, undoubtedly, political state, and then in its' successors which were also political states, and not truly under rule of law, was visibly lacking.

Definitions of rule of law which can be found in political science and other sources of social thought of this time can generally be seen as, more or less, mere transmission of those assumptions about these phenomena which were dominant in the Western political thought at the time.

There are, however, certain variations that can be found in works of our authors that are worth mentioning.

Selimir Govedarica, for example, brought some theoretical freshness and undoubtedly some originality in thought about rule of law and party, that is political, state, with his thesis about three kinds of capital that reflect not only in the field of building of rule of law, but also differentiation between the rule of law and party and political state.

Rule of law, as counterpoint to party state, the only form of all socialist states including Yugoslavia and its successors, was theoretically, and then also practically, primarily politically defined, and without much theoretical originality compared to models offered by developed democratic world and treasury of its political thought.

Afterwards these assumptions were established in wider society, and transformed into certain normative, of course also legislative, solution, and discussion about rule of law was dismissed as finished.

This created a problem in Serbian political science, that manifested through some sort of transitional formalism which can be, at the time, recognized more

² Original Serbian thought about rule of law from early pre-transitional period includes works of Kosta Čavoški and Danilo Basta.

as strife for “theoretical modernity” and then incoming political suitability through acceptance of new neoliberal theoretical premises, proving at first distancing from Marxist theoretical matrix, as only valid by then, and its total rejection. This problem is more or less reflected in the field of reception and explanation of other important political phenomena as well, not only rule of law, although rich and somewhat specific political practice of former Yugoslav and later Serbian society offered abundance of possibilities for distinctive approach to explanation not only of rule of law and political state, but also of their residuals.

Apart from mentioned Govedarica’s text³ and texts of several other authors (Čavoški, Basta), all other writings on rule of law in Serbia from that period suffer from this same flaw. For example, in writings about criteria of presence or absence of rule of law in some environment, there is almost no observed specific characteristic of this society, which, it can be freely said, could lack everything but specificities in last decades of twentieth century.

It would be interesting to explore situation in this field in other post socialist societies at the time, see to what extent theoretical formalism manifested there, and establish reasons for differences in degree of such formalism in some of them.

Practice of formalistic reception of theoretical pattern in political science is still present. This is visible also in not recognizing mobbing as social phenomenon that is not only widely spread, but also important political specificum of socialist and post socialist states.

At the beginning of 21st century, research and writing about mobbing became more intensive and unavoidable for every more developed democratic environment. In our country at first comments started to appear, followed by few articles, which aimed more to formally legitimize one’s own correct attitude towards the phenomenon than observation of it as specific for post socialist society.

Therefore mobbing is here recognized just up to the point that exists in legal domain of more developed states, and afterwards it was rather obscurely defined in legislative solutions, where it is treated only as an occurrence in working environment.

Social and political reality of, firstly preceding social state creations, and afterwards post socialist society, is actually very different from arid identification of mobbing, which obviously followed as one more proof of acceptance of political and theoretical globalization standards.

³ See: Govedarica, Selimir, „Pravna država i politička država“, in: Simeunović Dragan, *Teorija politike*, Nauka i društvo, Beograd, 2002, pp. 106–108.

Namely, important difference between developed democracies and socialist societies was also that mobbing in the former existed mostly in non-political sphere, primarily in the workplace and in school, while in the latter, distinctively non-rule of law states, it was more widely spread phenomenon with pronounced political dimension and was an important instrument of policy enforcement.

Lack of observations of this specificity certainly impoverishes explanation of mobbing as a phenomenon in post socialist societies. Consequently, this is reflected in invalidity of legal definitions of this phenomenon and decreased possibilities for it's' removal from social relations.

That very presence or absence of mobbing in political and non-political sphere can be seen as a specific additional criterion for distinguishing rule of law from political state.

Rich history of repression in socialist societies includes distinctive presence of mobbing in function of politics. Maltreatment of individuals and their families, as well as close environment is not unknown, but was never widely spread in modern developed democratic societies enough to be significant. Therefore this dimension was never included in definition of mobbing. Rule of law can actually be recognized by the fact that mobbing is not possible in political sphere, at least not in sense of extending that sphere to workplace or school.

On the contrary, party, that is political, state, cherishes mobbing as a political phenomenon, even treats it as an important invisible instrument of maintaining the criterion of political suitability.

Politically unsuitable individuals and members of their families, but also other persons close to them who could support them in any way, were in party, that is political, states, mobbed in most brutal way. There are more than enough indications that this kind of perfid repression sustained in post socialist societies that are not truly, but only formally democratized.

Apart from punishing true political opponents, these societies cultivate another specific form of political violence which can also be qualified as mobbing. It is formally unfounded political mobbing, when abusers maltreat the victim as if it was politically unsuited, even when it isn't. When someone is to be mobbed in such a way that will not result in public condemnation of mobbers, they resort to politization of mobbing. Namely, whether the victim is politically guilty or not is completely irrelevant. Mobbers, rightfully, work under assumption that, in a country not yet under the rule of law, fear of political sin prevents others from protecting the victim. They are afraid that they could also be labeled as politically unsuitable, therefore exposed to mobbing and abuse. The mobbing group then resorts to proven Stalinist methods of, at first, unofficial, but often also official satanization of the victim regardless of its

“political innocence”, and than to methods of mobbing in order to punish the victim for its political crimes (political unsuitability). It is, mostly, distinct case of mimicry and use of political judgment as mighty instrument for displacement of the victim from network of normal social relations for abusive purposes. Political connotation of mobbing, very present in post socialist societies, is something that is not often outspoken, but is used as powerful, although mostly unofficial justification of mobbing. Mobbers are, at the same time, frequently ideologically disguised bullies who were mobbers during previous regimes and maltreated their victims referring to other ideologies, or its belonging or victim’s not belonging to some other, then relevant, regimes.

Actually mere not belonging to some current political mainstream can be sufficient trigger for mobbers, as well as sufficient legitimization of their violence over politically uncommitted victim (not committed enough to pro-regime thinking and acting). Fact that these societies very loudly advertise themselves as democratic does not diminish Alen Badiu⁴ account about repression towards those who do not share current reigning political attitudes as proof of incomplete democracy, therefore also rule of law. When one thinks that not being a democrat is punishable, and that it is, per se, sufficient reason for mobbing, he is not truly a democrat, but a Stalinist disguised as democrat, sustaining its practice of mobbing political abstinent and opponents.

Mobbers seize the role of guardians of political purity of the state and the society, while they are actually the beaters of the politically unsuitable, which, in a political and unlawful society, secures them the right to mob. Such thing is neither conceded nor recognized by the rule of law, and it is an exclusive feature of party and political states. Vigilant position of mobbers in post socialist societies reflects that these societies were not transformed into democratic milieu, and that is why it is important indicator of whether a state is a rule of law or party, that is political, state.

Mobbers take someone’s virtual political sinfulness as reason for bullying the victim, delay in promotions, or rough, even brutal behavior towards the victim. This is not confined to workplace, but spills into educational system of party state. In line with principle of collective quilt, extremely non-democratic and unlawful, children of politically unsuited are often bullied by teachers and other students. This, on one hand, proves that teachers and parents of underage mobbers belong to “correct”, current political course, and on the other it semi legalizes mobbing, giving it, at least, a flavor of legitimacy.

⁴ Alen Badiju, *Pregled metafizike*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 2008.

One more extensive research of this sort of mobbing as a form of political violence, specific for its occurrence in party and political, as well as insufficiently democratically transformed post socialist societies, would certainly show distinct dispersion of this phenomenon, bearing in mind its foundation in tradition of political mobbing that existed and was very widespread in former socialist states. Necessity of one's self-presentation as decidedly democratic and politically suitable influenced the change in forms of political mobbing in post socialist societies. Former intensive repression towards true and assumed political sinners, which existed, say, during Informbiro affair, is no longer possible, but has sustained in its more subtle forms that are allowed by the times of transition.

Practice of political mobbing is one factor that negates the claims of the states formed from the shatters of socialist systems that they have left the transition incubator and became democratic states with rule of law.

Rational and necessary replacement of carriers of political function inline with electoral victory on new political option is understandable, just as losing political and other arrogated privileges for political losers. However, mobbing in the name of politics is something entirely different and consists of unjustifiable violence in the name of the course of current politics, and it usually adds political properties to victim's attitudes and actions. This is done in order to justify mobbing and leave mobbers unpunished as defenders of the regime, and also to paralyze the environment and prevent it, by spreading fear of extending alleged political quilt on them also if they identify with victim of mobbing, from any action.

Conclusion

Conclusion could be drawn that mobbing within the rule of law is mainly non-political phenomenon distinctive for companies, while in party state mobbing frequently has pronounced political dimension. Therefore, in party state, mobbing could be treated as political phenomenon.

In post socialist societies posing as stated ruled by law, although they are in fact not, changes of parties in power bring numerous examples of political mobbing even when parties that alternate in power belong to the same, pro-democratic and, at least formally, liberal political option. Within the rule of law when it comes to professional function such as ambassadors, it is irrelevant which party is in power, or, at least, just some of professionals are appointed politically. In party state, on the contrary, not only all leading positions but also all professional functions are swept from personnel that are not "ours" and frequently replaced with utterly incompetent individuals that qualify only by party membership.

Mobbing in the name of politics exposes post socialist newly composed and formally democratic states as non-democratic, even still totalitarian. In those states mobbing frequently exceeds companies and starts to spread across other spheres of the society, becoming much more a brake than a flywheel of democratization. If democratic system assumes full and omnipresent tolerance as one of the chief principles of new society and politics, than in states which truly want to instate rule of law and stop being party-states, no kind of mobbing, least of all that in the name of politics, should be present.

Bibliography

1. Badiju, Alen, *Pregled metafizike*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 2008.

UDK: 343.431
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 33–49
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Željko Bjelajac*¹
Miloš Marković
Zoran Pavlović

Particulars of Modern Slavery as a Deviant Social Phenomenon

ABSTRACT

Trafficking in human beings is a global phenomenon that adversely affects the countries in the political and economic transition or in the post-conflict stress. This phenomenon is also present in the economically developed countries. It is not an individual phenomenon that poses a threat to a limited number of persons. It rather has deep social and economic implications, because it thrives on globalisation and introduction of high-end technologies. Human trafficking affects almost all: women, men, girls and boys. It affects every continent and all regions of the world where it is becoming a growing trend. The forms of exploitation that generates huge profit differ, yet all of them imply forced exploitation, abuse of human beings, and violation of human rights. In view of the fact that the data relating to this phenomenon are alarming, combating trafficking, along with combating terrorism and drug trafficking, has become a priority of governments and international officials worldwide.

Key words: human trafficking, prostitution, human rights, sexual exploitation, education.

Introduction

Human trafficking is a very complex phenomenon resulting from numerous causes which give us real apprehension of the scope and complexity of this problem deeply rooted in almost all spheres of life and work of modern man.

¹ Željko Bjelajac, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law for Business and Judiciary, University Business Academy, Novi Sad, Serbia; e-mail: zdjbjelajac@gmail.com.

Miloš Marković, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law for Business and Judiciary, University Business Academy, Novi Sad, Serbia; e-mail: markovic@pravni-fakultet.info.

Zoran Pavlović, Assistant professor, Faculty of Law for Business and Judiciary, University Business Academy, Novi Sad, Serbia; e-mail: zoran.pav@hotmail.com.

The causes of human trafficking are as follows: poverty, unemployment, migration factors, level of human development, governance and rule of law, gender inequality, discrimination in the labour markets, militarization of the regions, organised crime, domestic violence, poor education, lack of access to information, family background, endogenous factors, etc.

While the results of the studies and evaluations disagree due to the flawed statistics, and since trafficking is specific in its nature, meaning that it is mobile and inventive, it is estimated that over five million people are being ‘trafficked’ annually around the world. The assessment of the UN’s Centre for International Crime Prevention is that the global annual revenue generated from this form of criminal activity is almost competitive with the one obtained from drug trafficking.

For many years an implicit equation has been put between human trafficking and criminal acts of prostitution and people smuggling, which only reflects the severity and brutality of human trafficking as a phenomenon. This only led the efforts to suppress it in the wrong direction, due to the difficult identifying and sanctioning this criminal offence. In addition, such exploitation may appear in a whole range of forms, from sexual exploitation, to forced labour, domestic servitude, forcing the victims into criminal activity, ‘donating’ organs, forced military service, to forced marriage and the like.

The principles and guidelines recommended by the UN with regard to human rights and human trafficking begin with “The Primacy of Human Rights”. Human trafficking represents a serious violation of human rights and should, therefore, be recognised as the most extreme form of human rights violation. The victims of trafficking are deprived of the right to live, work, access education, to have dignity, security, equality, freedom of movement, right to health, etc. During their sexual exploitation, female victims of trafficking are not in a position to implement personal health protection practices, resulting in the highest HIV/AIDS prevalence rate. This represents a direct breaching of the right to live and the right to health, as well as of the concept of human dignity, which is in contrast with international norms and set out civilisation standards.

On the strategic level, once organised human trafficking that has found a stronghold within a country or a region will thrive there to represent a strategic risk for the stability and the future of the affected country and generate certain situations and their implications.

People trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation exist on several different levels, from spontaneous non-organised contacts on a very low level, to very complex and sophisticated internationally organised criminal networks on a very high level.

When analysing the characteristics of the human trafficking victims, it may be observed that there is not a consistent profile of a victim. There are, however, certain characteristics that they often share which tend to become constant.

Human trafficking comprises and involves three inter-connected elements: the recruitment, migration and exploitation. There are four fundamental ways of recruiting women and girls in sex trafficking, as follows: through the use of force, coercion and abduction; through false pretences of legitimate employment; deception through half-truths; the victims voluntarily accept to work in prostitution. Also, the victims are being controlled and exploited through the following mechanisms: bonded labour (debt bondage); isolation – confiscation of identification documentation; use of physical force and intimidation; threats of using physical force against family members of the victim; mental slavery and torture.

Despite the assessments by the U.S. State Department and other relevant international institutions and organisations that for many years Serbia had not been providing sufficiently persuasive evidence of combating human trafficking, and has been accordingly ranked Tier 2 Watch List, it is evident that certain progress has been made, in particular recently, in terms of both acknowledging and sanctioning human trafficking, and raising the collective consciousness about the consequences of ‘modern slavery’.

Carrying out measures to suppress human trafficking is a priority for all member states of the OUN. It is, therefore, necessary that these countries put in place adequate legal framework and harmonise it with the EU legislation and international standards. In addition to much-needed establishment of international co-operation, it is also necessary to provide support and protection to the victims of human trafficking, rehabilitation and reintegration into society, because their mental and physical health has been deteriorated to a level that it is very hard for them to regain previous balance and reach an optimum state. Also, education of the secondary and high school students should become a central point of focus and an imperative in preventing and combating this above all anti-civilization phenomenon.

The importance of making distinction between trafficking, prostitution and smuggling

Earlier definitions of human trafficking were aimed at stressing the difference between ‘innocent’ women, who had been pushed into the sex industry through deception, and the traditional prostitutes, whose own behaviour had led them in the position of vulnerability and, hence, they do not deserve any protection. The Convention Against Transitional Organised Crime, also known

as the 'Palermo Protocols', has definitely set up absolute international standards for defining human trafficking: "Human trafficking shall be the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs..."²

Today there is still no agreed approach to the issue of trafficking in women and prostitution. Some individuals regard these two phenomena as almost inseparable, maintaining that prostitution may never be voluntary in its essence and therefore it implies women trafficking. In this sense, it thrives in societies where women are in the marginalised and disempowered position which makes them sell their body against their own will.

Women who enter the world of prostitution are conditioned primarily by their unfavourable social and economic position, unemployment, low social status and the absence of any alternative for better and safer life conditions. Social and economic factors, as a driving force, lead them, or better to say force them to regard the prostitution as a light at the end of the tunnel. Therefore, generally speaking, when women turn to prostitution, there are always certain elements of force in it. In other words, this act is forced.³

Despite these and similar opinions, however, there are opposed opinions according to which a woman may dispose of her own body of their own accord. Based on that fact, prostitution clearly differs from trafficking in women. When a woman is a victim of sex trafficking, she is deprived of her freedom of choice and has no control whatsoever over what is happening to her, that is, she cannot choose whether or not she wants to do it, in what way, how much and with whom, and all that without an adequate pay. Also, her fundamental human rights are violated.

It is very important and effective to make distinction between human trafficking and people smuggling, because in certain situations the two terms

² UN Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 2000. New York, United Nations. Available from: http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf/24/10/2011.

³ Željko Bjelajac, Prostitution as a Controversial Social Phenomenon from History to Modern Age, *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. LXII, No. 1142, April-June 2011., Belgrade, pp. 48-69.

are confused. People smuggling implies illegal transportation of people from the country of their origin to the destination or importing country. In case of human trafficking, migrants are recruited through force, coercion and threat in order to meet the demand in the destination country. The relationship between the trafficker and the trafficking victim is continual, it extends beyond the border (border crossing) and the migrant is forced into exploitative forms of sexual and labour servitude; the migrant is deprived of dignity and freedom. The observed feature that differentiates people smuggling from human trafficking is, in fact, this continual relation 'after' the illegal border crossing, resulting from the specific relationship between the trafficker and his victim established based on the elements of force, which strongly differentiates these two seemingly similar phenomena.⁴

Causes of human trafficking

Human trafficking is a dynamic and concrete phenomenon whose roots date back to ancient times, and over the centuries it has changed to become even more ruthless and unscrupulous in its character. It is impossible to view the issue of human trafficking isolated from the causes that triggered the phenomenon. They are closely connected to the macro-social and economic factors. Also, micro-social factors that imply personal susceptibility and tendency should not be ignored either. Therefore, it is advisable to mention the whole range of the causes of human trafficking, as follows:

- Poverty, like wealth, has its intangible side, of course. Having or not having consumables is not a decisive factor in measuring the poverty or the wealth of people. Equally important is the issue of their general status in a society, their political position and influence, their cultural background, and the like. So, poverty does not simply imply the lack of food, but also the lack of basic sanitation and access to health care, employment, education, etc. "The world's failure to reduce poverty levels is now contributing to global instability in terms of terrorism, war, and contagious disease. An unstable world not only perpetuates poverty, but will ultimately threaten the prosperity that the rich minority has come to enjoy."⁵ The level of poverty

⁴ Željko Bjelajac, Fenomen trgovine ljudskim bićima, *Pravo, teorija i praksa*, Godina XXV, novembar-decembar 2008, Novi Sad, broj 11-12, str. 3-21

⁵ Michael Renner, "Vital Signs 2003" Project Director, points out the needs of the poorest population group in the world in his report produced by the research non-for-profit non-governmental organisation Worldwatch Institute, <http://www.skynemesis.org.ekol/1005.htm/20/10/2011>.

need not be exclusively viewed in an absolute sense, but rather in a relative sense.

- The unemployment rate in the world has reached an alarming point with the tendency of further growth. Analysis of the employment trends in the world regularly carried out by the International Labour Organisation in Geneva describe the reports on the situation in the labour markets as alarming, and warn of their further deterioration and destabilisation. Such circumstances, when people are unable to satisfy their basic needs and a minimum living standard, make them susceptible to different imprudent actions and easy prey to human traffickers.
- Economic and social differences between the countries, and within them, reflect probably one of the most important individual causes of human trafficking. On one hand, there are countries whose economic, social, cultural, and even political reality makes the life of their people unbearable; on the other hand, there are countries with richer economies, the so called “promised lands” in growing need for cheap labour force, commercial sexual exploitation included. So, such an economic disparity between the countries or even between the regions within the same country induces migratory movements from the weaker into the stronger economy. “The inferior status of women before the law and in society often leads to women, as a group, being more affected by general poverty and unemployment. This leads to the feminization of labour migration and consequently to the circumstances under which trafficking disproportionately affects women and girls.”⁶
- When the level of human development, governance and rule of law in certain countries is not adapted and reformed in compliance with the democratic trends, including transparency and strong democratic control of power, political functions and positions, the key institutions of the state related, for example, to the sphere of security and the judiciary will not be able to respond to the existing challenges and tasks and will eventually lose trust of their people.
- Today’s European society is characterised by the discrepancy between men’s and women’s strength and opportunities. Such an inequality (gender inequality) is obviously the main cause of all forms of gender-related violence (in particular human trafficking and domestic violence). However, violence as a phenomenon is tackled in the manner of wide passivity and inertness by the states to undertake more concrete measures against all forms of discrimination, gender-based violence in particular.

⁶ Angelika Kartusch, Reference Guide for Anti-Trafficking Legislative Review with Particular Emphasis on South Eastern Europe, Warsaw, 2001, p. 23.

- It is evident that economic insecurity and discrimination in the labour market are the main causes of trafficking in women and girls, which is confirmed by the established ‘trade’ chain on a geopolitical level. Significant unemployment rates are present in the countries undergoing transitional processes, where the existing scope of employment opportunities accessible to women is limited. In such circumstances women are the first to be fired from work and last hired, whereas during employment they are exposed to discriminatory practices by their employers who ask them to meet “specific requests”. Such an attitude, topped with insufficient pay or no pay at all, makes this specific population group susceptible and very exposed to human trafficking.
- Defined as a concept of “an armed truce”, militarization requires a deployment of greater numbers of troops in certain post-conflict environments, where there is usually no stable government control, that is, where governmental institutions (if established at all) are incapable of preventing or have not yet established mechanisms to prevent not only this but rather other forms of criminal activity. Due to the increased demand, a new sex-industry market will emerge.⁷
- Human trafficking is inseparably connected to corruption, for which it is said to be the mother of all serious crimes. Corruption is a widespread, painful, invisible, and hardly ‘cured’ phenomenon that accompanies the process of transition and introduction of reforms in certain countries. It impedes and blocks the functioning of the judicial, political and economic system by discriminating and ignoring the rights of certain groups and individuals, thus making space for the spread of other negative accompanying phenomena.
- Organised crime today does not recognise any state borders or political regimes. Networks of well-organised, highly sophisticated criminal groups of all nations and skin colours, for the purpose of gaining large profits, are engaged in different “lucrative businesses”, in particular in those relating to drug trafficking, arm trafficking, white slavery, etc. The criminals browse the electronic networks; using high-end technologies they launder huge amounts of money, and as some invisible, giant force pull the wheel of civilisation backward, degrading greatest inventions that have been invented so far.⁸

⁷ Đorđević Jelena, Dekić Slobodanka, *Trgovina ženama – Priručnik za novinare, Astra*, Beograd, 2003, str. 21.

⁸ Željko Bjelajac, *Organizovani kriminal vs Srbija*, Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe u Novom Sadu, Beograd, 2008, str. 9.

- Despite various international documents and constitutional charters that guarantee human rights and freedoms, both for women and men, violence over women is a general phenomenon reflected on the domestic, economic, educational and public level, creating thus a vicious circle that scarcely any woman can get out of without the adequate support by individuals and society. Under such circumstances, desperately trying to escape violence and abuse, women fall prey to human traffickers who lure them into a false sense of security.
- Due to the low level of education and inability to adapt themselves, the victims get a limited and distorted image of social integration; they make decisions based on their distorted perception or on adapting to the norms of subculture groups.⁹
- Specific features of the family background of both a victim and a human trafficker dictate and determine their work and life orientation. The families in which alcoholism, crime, conflict, abuse, incest, abandonment and parental deprivation dominate will generate deviant, destructive, and traumatised persons suitable for any kind of manipulation and abuse. Finally, individual susceptibility and tendency may prevail in some persons pushing them toward prostitution, human trafficking and some other incriminating activity.

The above stated causes obviously present fertile ground for the existence and expansion of human trafficking. “The fact is, however, that this is a phenomenon about which there is little reliable information, as is the case with the form and the extent of organised crime that by its nature does not allow collecting information using common methods. With an issue of trafficking, illegal and hidden, finding accurate estimates of the true extent can be compared to looking for needles in haystacks.”¹⁰ It should be noted, however, that this phenomenon represents immeasurable threat to mankind, and putting the focus solely on its consequences, without eliminating its causes that initiated it in the first place, is an undertaking doomed to failure, with the high humanitarian price paid by the overall human society.

Human and strategic risks

Human trafficking, sexual exploitation in particular, is a very lucrative, low-risk activity that devastates the quality of life of its victims. This criminal act

⁹ Krijumčarenje ljudi, Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija, Centar za pravna pitanja, Beograd, 2001, str. 60.

¹⁰ Liz Kelly, Linda Regan (2000), *Stopping Traffic: Exploring the extent of and responses to trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK* London; *Home Office, Police Research Series*, Paper 125, pp. 6.

implies holding vulnerable women and girls in permanent modern-day servitude. Traffickers control and exploit women in prostitution. Prostitution is to them a form of economic exploitation, because they gain profit by selling women's bodies. These women most often experience violence that is carried out by the men who buy them and the pimps who control them.

Human trafficking is a phenomenon that had grave consequences on the security, welfare and human rights of its victims, who are in all phases and processes of this criminal activity exposed to physical and sexual abuse, and forced to live in physical and psychological captivity. In the majority of cases the degree of such physical and psychological damage inflicted upon the victims is so deep and long-lasting that is hard for them to regain previous balance and achieve the satisfying quality of their physical and psychological health.¹¹

On the strategic level, once organised human trafficking that has found a stronghold within a country or a region will thrive there to represent a strategic risk for the stability and the future of the affected country:¹²

- Destabilisation of the existing sex-industry markets and labour markets;
- Growth and diversification of organised crime;
- Economic destabilisation through the expansion of money laundering;
- Demographic destabilisation;
- Increased public-sector corruption;
- Political corruption and purchase of influence;
- Destabilisation of economic inward investment;
- Implications of certain developments within a country.

Indisputably, the circumstances related to the certain developments in the country on the political, economic, social, legislative or other level, together with the described strategic risks, will additionally, in their specific way, destabilise the efforts to establish a harmonious society.

Characteristics of human traffickers and their victims

People trafficking in human beings for sexual exploitation exist on several different levels, from spontaneous non-organised contacts on a very low level

¹¹ Božidar Banović, Željko Bjelajac, "Traumatic experiences, psychophysical consequences and needs of human trafficking victims", *Vojnosanitetski pregled*, 2012; January Vol. 69 (No. 1): p. 1-134, str. 94-98.

¹² Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Razvoj modula tečaja u suzbijanju trgovine ljudima za suce i državne odvjetnike, 2002, str. 15-16.

to very complex and sophisticated internationally organised criminal networks on a very high level. The said levels may be categorised within the following three groups: informal network; extensive organised criminal network; and criminal distribution network.

Human traffickers see and comprehend their job in a highly professional way and very seriously, not hesitating to use the extreme forms of violence in order to maintain discipline and order on a required level. Human trafficking functions as a business operation divided into several segments, such as “a recruitment office”, “identification papers purchase office”, “transport office”, “prostitution office”.

Traffickers regard “purchased” women as trading goods and treat them as commercial goods or items even more than in the traditional slave trade.¹³ Illegal trafficking in human beings usually involves more than one perpetrator and may, therefore, also include the criminals that “trade” in human beings as if they were goods, which is a necessary element of illegal human trafficking.¹⁴

It may be observed that apart from significant migratory movements, political and economic instability in the East in the near past and fast expansion of the sex-industry in the West, criminal networks were also established due to lucrative profits gained in human trafficking for the purpose of sex exploitation.

When analysing the characteristics of the human trafficking victims, it is significant to note that there is no consistent profile of a victim. There are, however, certain characteristics that they often share and they tend to become constant.

Some of these characteristics are, as follows:¹⁵

- The victims are mainly women and girls, although it is estimated 2% of trafficking victims are men and boys;
- The victims mainly fall into the 18-25 age group, although the number of younger women being trafficked is larger;
- The victims are recruited from small rural regions, medium-sized towns and towns in impoverished regions;
- The victims are often unemployed and poor;
- The victims may have little education and are discriminated in their personal and professional life;
- The victims often come from dysfunctional families;

¹³ Željko Bjelajac, *Trgovina ljudima, uzroci i posledice*, Beograd, 2005, str. 135.

¹⁴ Coomaraswamy, Radhika (2000): Integration of the human rights of women and the gender perspective, Violence against women, E/CN. 4/2000/68, odlomak 17, 29. februar 2000.

¹⁵ Izvodi sa naslovne internet stranice La Strada, podružna kancelarija Poljska: <http://free.ngo.pl/lastrada/20/10/2011>

- The victims seldom speak foreign languages.

In addition to the above, there is an impressive and undoubtedly most pronounced characteristic of potential victims that makes them especially vulnerable and susceptible to trafficking. It is their strong wish to improve and enhance their living conditions by accepting jobs in a foreign “promised” land.

Elements and phases of human trafficking

In its essence human trafficking comprises three inter-connected elements:

- To begin with, illegal human trafficking requires recruitment of raw human material to be exploited in order to generate profit;
- Secondly, the recruitment is followed by migration based on one’s free will and own judgement, when the person gives consent to be transported;
- Thirdly, upon the arrival to the destination, a trafficking victim is subject to the exploitation regime.

The methods of recruitment of women and girls by traffickers are varied and depend on the modus operandi and the level of organisation of traffickers. In essence, the majority of common methods include the following:¹⁶

- Individual “lurers” who look for interested girls in bars, cafes, night clubs and discos;
- Recruitment via informal networks of family and of friends;
- Advertisements offering work or stud abroad;
- Agencies offering work, study, marriage or travel abroad;
- False marriages.

Statistic data and research indicate that more than a quarter of “recruited” women and girls knew in advance that they were going to work in the sex industry abroad. What these girls did not know was the conditions under which they would be forced to work. They usually imagine themselves as a stripper in a peep show or mere as an ordinary prostitute who offers and has “classical sex”.

There are four basic ways in which women are recruited into trafficking:¹⁷

- Complete coercion through abduction or kidnapping. There is increasing evidence of this in Albania, Kosovo, and in parts of Asia;

¹⁶ Željko Bjelajac, *Trgovina ljudima , uzroci i posledice*, str. 139.

¹⁷ Regional Standard for Anti-Trafficking Police Training in SEE, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Viena, september 2003, pp. 19.

- Deception by promises of legitimate employment. Women believe that they will be working in offices, restaurants, bars, households, or are entering the country for marriage;
- Deception through half-truths. Women believe that they will be working in entertainment, dancing or striptease, without additional requests;
- Some women are fully aware that they are migrating for the purpose of prostitution. They are quite unaware, however, of the extent to which they will be indebted, exploited, controlled and intimidated.

The recruitment phase is followed by the transportation and transit phase which can also imply the harbouring and receipt of the victim, including receipt and transfer within her own country. During the journey across the borders but also within her own country she may suffer grave human rights, physical abuse and psychological torture. Related to this, there are three basic methods of entry into the country of final destination:

- Covert (smuggled);
- Overt (by presenting forged or stolen documents);
- Overt (by presenting bona fide documents).

In the process of exploiting their victims, human traffickers need to ensure continuous control over the victim and permanent supervision. To do so they use many mechanisms either in isolation from the others or they implement them together so as to create a condition of actual or psychological imprisonment of the victim. The mechanisms most commonly used include the following:¹⁸

- Debt bondage (debt repayment). The victim is required to repay the exaggerated costs allegedly incurred for bringing her into the destination country. Costs of board and lodging and cumulative interest rates are usually attached to the above costs. This results in an ever-mounting debt bond that becomes impossible to pay off, and the victim is bonded with that debt during the whole exploitation process;
- Isolation (confiscation of identification and travel documents). It is a common practice that human traffickers confiscate the identification and travel documents from their victims immediately upon their arrival to the destination country. This robs the victims of their official identity, confirms their illegal entry status, and reduces the possibility to seek help from anybody;
- Use of violence and fear. Traffickers permanently use violence and the threat of violence. Victims are often beaten, raped, confined or kept in isolation, deprived of food and water, drugged and the like, all for the purpose of obtaining complete obedience;

¹⁸ Željko Bjelajac, *Moderno ropstvo*, DTA, Beograd 2008, str. 58-61.

- The use and threat of reprisals against the victim's family. The threat of violent reprisals against the family, that is, against the loved ones of the victim is one of the most effective methods. To do so, traffickers use the established channels to collect needed information, including details such as address or company where a family member of a victim works;
- Psychological imprisonment and torture. To summarize, when all the above control mechanisms are used, the victim finds herself in a regime of actual and psychological imprisonment and torture (she is alone, isolated, denied contact with the outer world, disoriented, denied possession of her identification documents, subject to permanent physical and sexual abuse, on a daily basis is required to engage in physically dangerous and unprotected sexual practices, and exists under a regime of threats of reprisals against herself and her family...).

A brief overview of the phenomenon of human trafficking in Serbia

It is a known fact that unlike any other country in the region Serbia has been devastated by the wave of social, economic, and political crisis, to a large extent caused by wars and imposed sanctions. This wave created an army of unemployed persons, refugees and people with no future. Logically, such circumstances initiated the growth and differentiation of socio-pathological and criminal phenomena, which also include human trafficking organised mainly for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

Human trafficking is a criminal activity present in Serbia due to the following three causes:¹⁹

- The first and the most common cause is that Serbia is a transit country;
- The second cause is the fact that Serbia is also the destination country, the country of final destination for the victims of human trafficking;
- The third cause is the fact that the territory of Serbia is a starting point, mainly for our female citizens, who are destined for the countries in Western Europe to work as prostitutes, either at their own will due to economic reasons, or are forced to do so.

Serbia is in the similar position as the remaining countries of the South-Eastern and Eastern Europe that were undergoing or still undergo the transitional processes. Feminisation of poverty and traditionally degraded position of women is present in the Serbian society. Common forms of

¹⁹ Ibid, str. 63.

prostitution, mendacity and homelessness, illegal employment, forced labour of children, organised begging of deaf and mentally ill children, violence and sexual harassment, and other phenomena are tightly connected to human trafficking. A particular event that alarmed the whole public in Serbia in 2000 was the scandal of babies missing from the maternity hospital, who may have become victims of baby trafficking for false adoption purposes.

In 2010, the government's Agency for Co-ordination and Protection of Victims of Trafficking identified 89 victims, which is a decrease when compared to 127 in 2009. "Since the beginning of its work in March 2002 until 31st December 2011, ASTRA SOS Hotline received a total of 14821 calls from 2706 clients. Of this figure, 391 persons were registered as the victims of human trafficking. In 2011, ASTRA received 2782 calls from a total of 457 clients, 343 of whom were first time callers".²⁰

The Serbian government took significant steps in 2010 to improve and institutionalize its response to trafficking, and Serbia has become a leader in the Balkans in the number of victims it identified, which is a prerogative for their protection, as is stated in the report by the State Department.

In their regular annual report, that covers 180 countries worldwide, their recommendation to Serbia is to increase the resources and job positions in governmental agencies for protecting the victims of sex trafficking and to implement further training of social workers, police and all those being on the front line in the fight against human trafficking. "The Government of Serbia does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so", concludes the report in which Serbia was placed in Tier 2 when human trafficking is in question. Countries whose governments fully comply with the TVPA's minimum standards are placed in Tier 1; countries which do not fully comply, but are making significant efforts in that direction are placed in Tier 2; countries whose governments are not making significant efforts to do so are placed in Tier 3. The USA reserves the right to implement sanctions against the countries from the third group.²¹

Review of measures to suppress human trafficking

Human trafficking is a complex social phenomenon deeply rooted in ancient history. In fact, this phenomenon cannot be stopped, since it has been

²⁰ ASTRA-anti trafficking action, Beograd, Republika Srbija, www.astra.rs/20/03/2012.

²¹ Videti više: U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, www.state.gov/j/tip/20/03/2012.

present from the beginning of civilisation. Therefore it is more realistic to talk not about stopping but about suppressing this phenomenon and reducing it to the minimal measure tolerable for any society.

First it is necessary to put in place an adequate legal framework that will serve as a starting point for detecting, processing, and adequate sanctioning of this form of criminal activity. Also, it is important to harmonise the current legislation with the established international standards, with the focus on the EU legislation.

It is also necessary to provide support and shelter to the victims of human trafficking. It is vital to identify a person as a victim of trafficking in order to provide her adequate support and protection, to inform the victim about her rights and how to exercise them, to set up expert teams, and to provide shelter, legal assistance, psycho-social support and protection, health protection, etc. It is also important to provide programmes so as to enable the victims of trafficking to get skills and entrepreneurship training, to help them in finding a job in order to become economically independent, and to provide alternative accommodation for them.

In terms of prevention, the social and economic causes of trafficking should be carefully studied, identified and eliminated, and the wide public should be duly informed about it. It is vital to provide information about where and how to seek and get help and protection. To do so, it is necessary to print and make public fliers, brochures, video spots, posters, advertisements, and to make use of SOS hotline, web pages and the like.

In principle, every country should have its own prevention strategy that would target each possible cause of human trafficking. Likewise, the countries should further strengthen their institutions and create adequate regulations, because it is the only way to successfully respond to the activities of human traffickers and suppress more efficiently making profits through exploiting other human beings.²²

Education is a significant segment of prevention through raising the level of self-protection, and suppression of human trafficking through providing specific knowledge to the following professionals: policemen, customs officers, medical workers, social workers, teachers, judicial workers, consular and diplomatic staff, military attachés, NGOs, journalists and media people, experts that take care of trafficking victims, etc. In doing so it is important to focus on the education of children, youth and women.

²² Jelena Matijašević, Zoran Pavlović, *Trgovina ljudima, uticaj i posledice po ljudska prava, Pravo, teorija i praksa*, Godina XXVI, broj 7-8, Novi Sad, jul-avgust 2009, str. 21-33.

Finally, it is necessary to establish international co-operation and intensify it, in particular with the countries in the region, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and others who make the frontline in the suppression and prevention of human trafficking, that is, modern-day slavery, as it is also referred to.

Conclusion

Human trafficking is a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon. Confused, non-systematised and sensationalistic approach to the problem only make it worse and blur the essence and content of this phenomenon. Consequently, a starting point to better understand it is to recognise the fact that it is a social phenomenon in the widest sense of the word that should be explained from various aspects based on cause and consequence factors, who range from macro-social to endogenous ones, which imply individual susceptibility and tendency. In relation to that, when selecting the most suitable starting point in order to fully understand the nature of this phenomenon, one should avoid giving priority to any specific analytical approach. Namely, if priority is given to only one segment of approaching this phenomenon, this may result in confused information that will only blur the very essence of the phenomenon. Such unilateral and partial approaches in theory and practice lessen the possibility to perceive the problems inherent in this phenomenon.

It is observed that for a long time no due attention has been paid to the issue of human trafficking, both in our country and elsewhere. It was rather focused on only one form, segment or a specific case in closer or wider environment, without any idea that the level of collective consciousness and understanding should be raised about what it in fact is – modern slavery. It is a phenomenon that should not be evaluated from the narrow perspective, but rather as a complex of causes, consequences, deprivation of fundamental human rights and freedoms, and discrimination. Analysing this problem as an isolated phenomenon contributes to blurring its essence and reality itself.

Therefore, when evaluating any counter-measure, it is important to fully perceive this activity and clearly define all its elements in order to differentiate it from similar criminal activities such as prostitution and people smuggling. Then, it is vital to define the causes and the consequences, human and strategic risks, personal characteristics of the victims and the “traders”, elements and phases of the trafficking process, and, finally, to develop measures for suppressing this “evil” of modern mankind, that only reflects the severity and brutality of the phenomenon incomprehensible to modern man engaged in civilization development.

References

1. ASTRA-anti trafficking action, Beograd, Republika Srbija, www.astra.rs /20/03/2012.
2. Banović Božidar, Bjelajac Željko, Traumatic experiences, psychophysical consequences and needs of human trafficking victims, *Vojnosanitetski pregled* 2012; January, Vol. 69 (No. 1): p. 1-134, str. 94-98.
3. Bjelajac Željko, Fenomen trgovine ljudskim bićima, *Pravo, teorija i praksa*, Godina XXV, novembar-decembar 2008, Novi Sad, broj 11-12, str. 3-21.
4. Bjelajac Željko, *Moderno ropstvo*, DTA, Beograd, 2008.
5. Bjelajac Željko, *Organizovani kriminal vs Srbija*, Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe u Novom Sadu, Beograd 2008.
6. Bjelajac Željko, Prostitution as a Controversial Social Phenomenon from History to Modern Age, *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. LXII, No. 1142, April-June 2011, Belgrade, pp. 48-69.
7. Bjelajac Željko, *Trgovina ljudima, uzroci i posledice*, Beograd, 2005.
8. Coomaraswamy Radhika (2000): Integration of the human right of women and the gender perspective, *Violence Against Women*, E/CN. 4/2000/68, excerpt 17, 29, February 2000.
9. Đorđević Jelena, Dekić Slobodanka, *Trgovina ženama – Priručnik za novinare*, Astra, Beograd, 2003, str. 21.
10. Internet pages, La Strada, Regional Office Poland: <http://free.ngo.pl/lastrada/> 20/10/2011.
11. Kartusch Angelika, Reference Guide for Anti-Trafficking Legislative Review with Particular Emphasis on South Eastern Europe, Warsaw, 2001, p. 23.
12. Kelly Liz, Regan Linda (2000), *Stopping Traffic: Exploring the extent of and responses to trafficking in women for sexual exploitation in the UK* London; Home Office, Police Research Series, Paper 125, p. 6.
13. Krijumčarenje ljudi, Centar za unapređivanje pravnih studija, Centar za pravna pitanja, Beograd 2001.
14. Matijašević Jelena, Pavlović Zoran, *Trgovina ljudima, uticaj i posledice po ljudska prava*, *Pravo, teorija i praksa*, Godina XXVI, broj 7-8, Novi Sad, jul-avgust 2009, pp. 21-33.
15. Regional Standard for Anti-Trafficking Police Training in SEE, International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, September 2003.
16. Renner Michael, "Vital Signs 2003" Project Director, points out the needs of the poorest population group in the world in his report produced by the research non-for-profit NGO, Worldwatch Institute, <http://www.skynemesis.org.ekol/1005htm/20/10/2011>.
17. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, *Razvoj modula tečaja u suzbijanju trgovine ljudima za suce i državne odvjetnike*, 2002.
18. UN Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations convention against transnational organized crime, 2000, New York, United Nations. Available from: http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf.
19. U.S. Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, www.state.gov/j/tip/ 20/03/2012.

UDK: 27-657
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 50–69
Original Scientific Paper
2012

Marko Nikolić¹
Ana Jović Lazić

Institutional Forms of Contemporary Ecumenical Dialogue

ABSTRACT

The article deals with the issue of ecumenism and the most important examples of its “institutionalisation”. It is stated that ecumenism considers doctrine, universal inter-church movement and proclaimed mission statement related to achieve Christian unity. It possesses at least theological, sociological and political determines. The World Council of Churches represents universal inter-church forum for dialogue and cooperation that lacks clear ecclesiological identity, but getting characteristics of typical international-political movement. The Conference of European Churches represents similar European organization. The Parliament of World Religions pretends to found and promote “global ethics” in order to accomplish pacifistic goals in the world.

Key words: Ecumenism, Ecumenical Movement, World Council of Churches (WCC), Conference of European Churches (CEC), Parliament of World Religions.

1. Introduction

Nowadays, “integration” also characterizes inter-Christian (inter-church) relations. Economic, socio-political, scientific and technological development, the growing “competitive” relationship with other religions and secularist (atheist and agnostic) view of the world, are the factors that influence attempts of “Church Unification” of Christians. In the “inner” sense, this refers to the

¹ Marko Nikolić, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Ana Jović-Lazić, MA, Research Associate, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. This paper was created within the project “Serbia in contemporary international relations: Strategic directions of development and firming the position of Serbia in international integrative processes – foreign affairs, international economic, legal and security aspects”, Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia, number 179029, for the period 2011–2014. Address: markon@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

obvious crisis of identity and impact of Christian values in the world, which can be rehabilitated only if historical antagonisms and divisions of the Christian churches are overcome. Only then the unification and reconsiliation character of original Christian values and principles, with positive consequences in the wider socio-political context, would come to the fore.

2. Ecumenism

The term “ecumenism” has the ancient Greek root (*oikoumene*), and the original geographical and civilizational-cultural determinant. It was pointing to a difference between known and inhabited world and “barbarians” from the surrounding regions, including territory, population and political and legal structure of the Roman (“universal”) Empire. Christianity gave him the theological (missionary and liturgical) meaning, using the attribute “ecumenical” to designate honorary titles of Bishops of the two major imperial cities (Rome and Constantinople), and joint councils of unified church of the first millennium.² In terms of essential (theological) and formal (political) disputes and opened church conflicts in the second millennium, the concept of ecumenism has lost its footing and practical impact. It was reaffirmed by the Protestant theology in the XIX century, starting from the need of overcoming their own divisions and denominationalism, by projecting the idea of the church “unification” and inter-Christian relations.³ The Protestants had started from the premise that, *the ideal and goal of unity of the Christian Church* would eventually be achieved through the joint missionary activities of its “devided parts”, especially in social and political domains. This would also set the stage for subsequent theological dialogue in the function of overcoming obstacles and doctrinal issues.⁴ Strategic initiative of Protestants, related to the Pan-Christian dialogue, was supported by the Orthodox Church in the early XX century, thus becoming “organic” part of the Ecumenical Movement.⁵ The Roman Catholic Church has also very actively, but informally in terms of

² Dragoljub R. Živojinović, „Ekumenizam: pokret za ujedinjenje crkava u Evropi dvadesetog veka”, *Bratstvo*, Vol. V, društvo „Sveti Sava”, Belgrade, 2001., p. 64; Radomir Rakić, „Ekumenizam”, in: *Enciklopedija političke kulture*, Savremena administracija, Belgrade, 1993., p. 283; and „Ekumenizam”, in: *Enciklopedija Pravoslavlja*, knjiga A–Z, Savremena administracija, Belgrade, 2001., p. 242.

³ Jean Boisset, *Protestantizam—kratka povijest*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1985., p. 141.

⁴ Ibidem, str. 143.

⁵ Georgije Florovski, „O granicama Crkve”, in: Aleksandar Đakovac (ur.), *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005., p. 89.

membership, joined the global process of “integration of church” after its Second Vatican Council (1962-65).⁶

Ecumenism today includes *proclaimed goal, doctrine, strategic and interdisciplinary methodological approach and universalist church movement for dialogue and cooperation*. It is characterized by declaratory denial of aspirations for unification of the identity of member churches and the affirmation of the importance of their coexistence, mutual interaction and enrichment. Therefore, ecumenism is an influential and “powerful factor of its time.”⁷ It must be distinguished from the content of related terms such as „ecumenical contacts“, „participation in ecumenical contacts“, „ecumenist societies“ and „inter-religious dialogue“ (practical ecumenism), and “inter-confessionalism”, “inter-religious pluralism” and “tolerance” (ideological and theoretical concepts and assumptions).⁸ In this sense, *inter-confessionalism*, as opposed to ecumenism, involves the sacrifice of exclusive church principle criteria of pluralism of the church. This makes it, in theological sense, qualitatively different from the concept of “universality” (the essential theological identity). Since that it often suggests “leveling the minimum” or the relativization of religious “Truth”, inter-confessionalism is important, but insufficient determinant of ecumenism.⁹ On the other hand, the global integrative processes are conditioning its expressed “horizontalization”, in terms of a tendency to include the *inter-religious dialogue* in its content.¹⁰ Ecumenism is often associated, mixed or identified with the concept of *tolerance*, which has broader, more horizontal dimension from inter-religious dialogue. Tolerance, in fact, implies the coexistence of different religions and church communities which accept and respect each other, but in practical terms often have a passive or indifferent relationship, based on the indifference to the truth.”¹¹ In this context, it is important to know that the relation between the

⁶ „Dekret Unitatis Redintegratio” (UR), in: *Dokumenti Drugog vatikanskog koncila*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1970, pp. 207–228.

⁷ Nadbiskup Jorka u Engleskoj Viljem Templ, in: Dragoljub R. Živojinović, „Ekumenizam: pokret za ujedinjenje crkava u Evropi dvadesetog veka”, op.cit., p. 63.

⁸ „Osnovni principi odnosa Ruske pravoslavne crkve prema inosavlju–prilog”, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op.cit., 150.

⁹ Nikolaj Berđajev, „Vaseljenskost i konfesionalizam”, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 110.

¹⁰ Jakob Pfeifer, „Ekumenizam–međucrkeno–međureligijsko razumjevanje i(ili) svjetska globalizacija”, in: *Religije Balkana: susreti i prožimanja*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (urs.), BOŠ, Belgrade, 2001., p. 54–55.

¹¹ Nikolaj Berđajev, „O fanatizmu, ortodoksiji i istini”, Internet: [http:// www.verujem.org/filosofija/savremena/berdjajev_fanatizam.htm](http://www.verujem.org/filosofija/savremena/berdjajev_fanatizam.htm), 23/11/2006.

Christian churches, bearing in mind that all of them are based on the Christological doctrine (teachings of Jesus Christ), does not, or should not be neutral in terms of value or be of passive nature. Inter-religious dialogue, however, implies dialogue of different religions, while ecumenism generally represents inter-church dialog.

In a thematic sense, ecumenism has at least theological, social, political and anthropological implications. It points to “bringing together of people and God” and improvement of “horizontal” relationships among the people, but also “approach to the state of peace” and prevention (rehabilitation) of political conflicts through recognition of ethical Christian principles. Ecumenism points to the possibility of overcoming of individual “limitations” through dialogue and acceptance of the value of “others”.¹² In practice, however, it is facing a number of obstacles and problems, out of which the most important are the patterns of thinking, belief and behavior, which are approached uncritically.¹³

It is important to know that the three churches (Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox) today, share different ideas and approaches about achieving generally accepted goal (Christian Unity). They are the consequence of their different church principles.¹⁴ They are specifically reflected in the proportion of different theological, socio-economic and political factors in “ecumenical” efforts and attempts of recognition of different forms of organizational structure of the “United Church” in the re-emerging. Therefore ecumenism implies, in practice, the church “rivalry”, or an attempt of promoting and establishing of their church principles, but certainly in terms of respect for the principles of pluralism of the church. In this context, the Orthodox (Eastern) Church insists on the “annexation” or “reunification” (reconciliation) on the basis of original theological criteria, while the Western Christians (Protestants and Roman Catholics) evidently advocate the “integration” (“union”) of theological, sociological and political factors.¹⁵

Ecumenism could be defined as *a set of interdisciplinary movements and activities* aimed at realization of “full unity” between the Christian churches

¹² Đuro Šušnjić, „Značenje i značaj dijaloga”, in: *2000 godina Hrišćanstva–istorija, kultrura, duhovnost*, Despotovac, 2001., p. 251; Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo–izazovi religijskog pluralizma*, Čigoja, Beograd, 2001., p. 9; and Ratko R. Božović, „Uspostavljanje dijaloga na razlikama”, in: *Interreligijski dijalog kao vid pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi*, op. cit. pp. 128–133.

¹³ Đuro Šušnjić, „Prepreke na putu razumevanja, poverenja i pomirenja”, in: *Vera–znanje –mir*, Centar za istraživanje religije BOŠ–a, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 103–111.

¹⁴ Nikolaj Berđajev, „Vaseljenskost i konfesionalizam”, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op.cit., pp. 107–109; and Jacques Mercier, *Povijest Vatikana*, Barbat, Zagreb, 2001., pp. 129-135.

¹⁵ Anton Kartašev, „Ujedinjenje crkava u svetlu istorije”, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 43.

through dialogue and cooperation in the social (social), theological and politicological area. Its central thematical and methodological point is *inter-church (theological) dialogue*, despite emerging trends of “expansion of competencies” on the global ethical and political issues. The common denominator of the original, as well as the latter meaning of the concept of Ecumenism, are their “cosmopolitan” and unification determinants.

3. Ecumenical movement

“Ecclesiasticism” as a philosophy of life was brought into question especially during the XIX century. Intellectual circles and scientific achievements have redirected views of people who have come to believe that the accumulated problems of capitalist society can be solved by scientific and materialist approach. This period is characterized by a wave of pronounced social and societal differentiation, in which much of the rural population moved to cities, creating the working class. In the socio-anthropological sense, polarization and alienation of certain groups and individuals happened then, while in the field of political events, this period was characterized by gaining national independence. The aforementioned factors have contributed to the relativization of Christian and religious values and marginalization of social influence of the Church, because of the supremacy of “rationalist and subjectivist spirit.”¹⁶ The processes of decentralization and “fragmentation” of all forms of life were intensified.

This was reflected in the life of the Protestant churches, which were faced with the need to bridge the gap in the attitudes of their own “orthodox and liberal currents.”¹⁷ Among their representatives, the awareness that the survival of Protestant churches in these conditions depends on the regulation and improvement of their inner relations, began to mature. The first steps in this direction were undertaken by Lutherans and Calvinists, by their administrative attempt of unification in Lambeth in 1867. Protestant churches have, in particular since then, attempted to parallelly project the logic of unification to Pan-Christian level, even though during the XVII century they succeeded in establishment of dialogue with the Constantinople and Alexandrian Patriarchate at the highest level. Concrete results were achieved in the second half of the XIX and early XX century, by establishing numerous associations of inter-confesional character: “The Gospel Alliance”, “Anglican Orthodox Joint Commission”, “Universal Federation of Christian Student Associations”, “the World Alliance for Improvement of International Friendship through the

¹⁶ Hristo Janaras, „Problem jedinstva danas“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 268.

¹⁷ Jean Boisset, *Protestantizam—kratka povijest*, op. cit., p. 141.

Churches,” etc.¹⁸ After the creation of a loose form of “church federation” in 1922, local churches in Germany achieved unity within German Evangelical Church in 1933. The same was with the Reformed Church in France in 1938.¹⁹ In the focus of these events was the idea of the unification of Christians under the “equal” terms, in order for the Christian Church to preserve “the leading and creative role in society.”²⁰ In order to accomplish this goal, it was necessary to contribute to the promotion of international cooperation in the broadest sense.²¹

As a milestone of shaping and establishment of the ecumenical movement in the ideological and conceptual sense, today we often consider the Conference of Anglican Bishops at Lambeth in 1897. At this Conference, as a fundamental principle of movement was proclaimed “dogmatic minimalism”, that is, common theological denominator of all Christian churches, which, as a cornerstone, would be the foundation for developing the future relations. It was considered that all the other differences could eventually be overcome, if they start from the aforementioned “minimum”. At this conference, the Bible, Nikean-Constantinopolitan Creed and “secrets” of the Baptism and the Eucharistia,²² were established as the foundations of Ecumenical Movement. The approach was actually based on today’s understanding of the concept of pluralism of the church, with the required tolerance and acceptance of the doctrinal differences for the sake of the “compromise of love”. This concept is known as the Protestant Branch Theory, in which the Christian Church is identified with a “branching tree” whose “branches” are the local churches as a partial manifestation of the whole. In this context the “fullness of Truth” can be achieved only through direct dialogue of its “parts”.²³

Today, as the first “institutional” example of the modern ecumenical movement is considered the meeting of *the International Mission Conference in Edinburgh in 1910*, followed by establishment of the World Conference for Faith and Order and The International Missionary Council. Afterwards, in 1914, the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches was established, and in 1920 the World Movement on Life and Work.²⁴ Since it has primarily religious character, the special role in the work

¹⁸ Aleksandar Đakovac, „Kratki pregled istorije razvoja Ekumenskog pokreta“, Internet: http://www.verujem.org/teologija/djakovac_istorija.htm, 10/08/2006.

¹⁹ Hristo Janaras, „Problem jedinstva danas“, op. cit., pp. 268–269.

²⁰ Petar Čebić, *Ekumenizam i vjerska tolerancija u Jugoslaviji*, NIRO Mladost, Belgrade, 1988, p. 77.

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Sava Janjić, *Ekumenizam i vreme apostasije*, Sveti knez Lazar, Prizren, 1995, p. 8.

²³ Ibidem.

²⁴ Hristo Janaras, „Problem jedinstva danas“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 269.

of Ecumenical Movement, from the beginning, has belonged to its submovement “Faith and Order”, which deals with determination and theological denominations and framework of cooperation between member churches. On these assumptions their convergence and possible future unification would be based. In this sense, a compromise was achieved that dogmatic compromise has logical source in *the common faith*. The conceptual and creative ascent the movement achieved at its conferences, in the Haj Liu in 1931 and Wiesbaden in 1932.²⁵

Mastermind of the second submovement *Life and Work* was the Archbishop of Uppsala, Nothan Söderblom. He advocated the realization of the unity between the Christian churches, through creative cooperation in “areas of practical life”.²⁶ The concept was guided by the premise that the convergence of churches in the dogmatic area will be a logical consequence of joint involvement in solving of existential problems. This movement held the first conference in Stockholm in 1925, and in 1929 it grew into the movement of “The Ecumenical Council for the Practical Christianity” with its headquarters in Geneva. Since then, it advocates intensification of inter-church cooperation for the sake of peace and service to humanity. At the Congress of the movement in Oxford in 1937, the idea of creation of the World Council of Churches was conceived.²⁷ For the third submovement, „the International Missionary Council“ was only the forum for the coordination of activities of previously established missionary societies, which together “merged” into the World Council of Churches.²⁸

Despite the proclaimed differences in theoretical foundations, objectives and approaches, all three submovements’ activities were, most often, intertwined and complementary. One gets the impression that from the very beginning of the Ecumenical Movement, they had the same goal, which was strategically achieved through a three-way action. Bearing in mind the proclaimed goal, it was logical that the Ecumenical Movement was characterized by a pragmatic nature. In the most general terms, we can separate at least three stages of its development. The first was characterized by pronounced socio-economic, the second by theological approach, while the third approach involved both of the aforementioned two.²⁹ The terms

²⁵ Nikolaj Arsenjev, „Pokret ka jedinstvu hrišćanskih crkava“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., pp. 80–81.

²⁶ Tomislav Šagi-Bunić, „Ekumenski pokret i tokovi u suvremenom svijetu“, *Pravoslavna misao*, godina XXII, sveska 26, 1967, p. 37.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ Aleksandar Đakovac, „Kratki pregled istorije razvoja Ekumenskog pokreta“, op. cit., p. 7.

²⁹ Jovan Majendorf, „Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 144.

Ecumenical Movement and the World Council of Churches (WCC) are often identified, but they have some important differences. From today's perspective, it can be said that the Ecumenical Movement implies the historical development of the "ecumenical and theoretical" concept and its institutional forms and assumptions (movement), while the WCC symbolizes their practical synergy and implementation. The World Council of Churches represents institutional form of recognition of Ecumenical Movement - both ecclesiastical and inter-religious dialogue.

4. The world council of churches

The central place in today's Ecumenical Movement belongs to the World Council of Churches (WCC), the organization of ecclesiastically universal character, which was founded after the Second World War by the Protestant and Orthodox members. The Council has established by decisions on the unification which the movements "The Life and Work" and "Faith and Order" had jointly adopted on their world conferences, in Oxford in 1937 and Utrecht in 1938.³⁰

"The Rules" or the WCC Statute was adopted at the founding conference in Amsterdam in August 1948. It represented the joint effort of representatives of those two movements.³¹ This Assembly was attended by representatives of the aforementioned "International Council Mission", which was also later integrated in the WCC. The Conference was attended by 351 representatives of 147 churches and confessions from 44 countries.³² Almost all Protestant churches became members of the organization then, as well as Anglican and Old Catholic Church, Greek, Cyprian, Constantinople and Alexandrian Orthodox Churches, as well as Romanian Missionary Episcopate from America.³³ On the meeting, *the Resolution* was adopted, by which the WCC was defined as a "a fellowship of Churches which accept Jesus Christ as God and Savior", with the main goal of achieving unity through "God's love through Jesus Christ".³⁴ These principles, *de facto*, implied full respect for the principles of ecclesiastical pluralism and

³⁰ In this sense, the Romanian theologian John Brije uses the term "fusion", and Serbian theologian Đakovac the term "unification"

³¹ Jovan Majendorf, „Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 146.

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ Jovan Brija, „Ekumenski pokret“, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 3. From 1952 to 1955, the same did the Antiochian and the American Orthodox Church.

³⁴ *The Toronto Statement (1950): The Church, the Churches, and the World Council of Churches*, Internet: http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/toronto_wcc.aspx, 12/12/2006.

“equal cohabitation” between members, leaving open the space for their changes amendments. The resolution made it clear that the WCC “is not and must never become supra-church” in terms of theological concept of “One Holy Church” (*Una Sancta Ecclesia*), where each, even potential member had the possibility to actively participate in the organization, regardless of whether it is recognized, or it recognizes “religious” identity and status of other members.³⁵ On the other hand, confirmed and affirmed was the universal theological principle of the existence of only “One Church”, whose “leader is Jesus Christ”.³⁶ WCC was not given any supervisory functions in relation to the right of interference in the internal life of its members.³⁷ Obviously, the WCC life concept is based on a very broad and liberal understanding of the principles of ecclesiastical pluralism, with the apparent program assumptions which will cause the internal polarization of the “top” and the “base”. The most important cohesive factor and driving force of the Organization is an attempt to spread the impact of Christian ideals in the world (*missionary activity*), where important strategic role is including of as many members as possible into the composition of the organization.³⁸ In their relationship, it is particularly insisted on mutual *solidarity*.³⁹ The ultimate goal and outcome of the WCC remains *the achievement of Christian unity*, through interdisciplinary activities. This universalistic goal and approach necessary requires willingness of minority members to sacrifice theological identity, and existence and cooperation. Speaking in economic terms, all members should have the status of “shareholders”, which will enable success of the corporation.⁴⁰

At the founding Assembly in Amsterdam, however, a number of differences in perceptions and approaches of members have already come to the fore, not only at theological but also at political, economic and social levels. First of all, the crucial issue of the WCC was and remained the question of *church identity and foundation*, which is extremely difficult (throughout all these years even impossible) to define, because the church doctrine of each member has exclusivist character. Therefore, it is more accurate and factually grounded to say that WCC has “church significance” rather than “church character”.⁴¹ This indeed is confirms by the program basis on which it was established. Also, the

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 3.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 4.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, pp. 5–6.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 7.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ Jovan Romanidis, „Bogoslov u službi Crkve u ekumenskom dijalogu”, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 165.

⁴¹ Jovan Zizjulas, „Samopojmanje pravoslavnih i njihovo učešće u Ekumenskom pokretu”, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 245.

majority of Protestant members, hasve from the very beginning, pointed to “substantial” importance of engaging of WCC in social field, which led to reservation of Orthodox members, which insisted primarily on theological criteria of dialogue and cooperation. Also, a special problem for minority of Orthodox members was the application of the principle of majority decision-making, and consequent marginalization of their influence.

Tendencies in the development of WCC

In terms of significance of its decisions, *the Third General Assembly of the WCC in New Delhi in 1961* stands out. The founding Resolution from Amsterdam was amended with appendix which stated that “fraternal Church ... are together trying to answer a common appeal to the glory of the Trinity of God.”⁴² By pointing out the specific responsibility of the WCC in further development of mankind, the theoretical basis and presumption of its thematic and spatial spread of “authority” was created. It is estimated that the WCC should actively participate in solving of all the problems that go beyond the “narrow” state and political interests. It was considered that such direction would contribute to the achievement of the main goal – *the Christian Unity*.⁴³ In the strategy of universal and interdisciplinary spreading of influence of WCC, there can be recognized many common points with globalist and universalistic ideology of today. Among other things, from that analytical perspective one should undoubtedly consider a phenomenon of today’s “red integration”, in terms of the apparent causal relation. Also, the Assembly in New Delhi was characterized by an unprecedented “wave” of reception of new members into the WCC, especially Orthodox Christian: Jerusalem, Russian, Romanian and Polish church. In the next few years, the same did the Georgian (1962), Serbian (1965), Czechoslovakian (1966) and the Japanese Orthodox Church (1973).⁴⁴

Apparent strategic redirection of activities of WCC was initiated by Protestant members at the Fourth Conference of *the Department for Faith and Order in Montreal in 1963*. They had managed to vote for a position on which the ecumenical activities of the organization should have a primarily anthropological focus, describing it by phrases “from the Church to humanity” and “from God to man.”⁴⁵ It was adopted by the *Fourth General Assembly of*

⁴² Hristo Janaras, „Problem jedinstva danas“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 270.

⁴³ „Generalna skupština hrišćana u Nju Delhiju“, *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije*, br. 2, Belgrade, 1961., pp. 87–88.

⁴⁴ Aleksandar Đakovac, „Kratki pregled istorije razvoja Ekumenskog pokreta“, op. cit., p. 9.

⁴⁵ Lukas Fisher, *Foi et Constitution*, par. 5,28, WCC, 1964; i u Jean Meyendorff, „Unite de l’Eglise–Unite de l’Humanite“, Louvain, 1971, *Truth*, 16/1971/3, p. 298.

*the WCC in Uppsala in 1968.*⁴⁶ If we bear in mind the original program policies and objectives of the WCC, this has greatly changed the unified “direction” of development of organization which caused intense internal differences, especially between the Protestant and Orthodox members. The tendency of their further polarization was especially present at *the Fifth Session of the General Assembly in Nairobi 1975* with the participation of over 2000 delegates. There were several reasons for this. First of all, the majority of Protestant members have for the first time openly expressed their intention to attribute to WCC in the future international political “responsibilities” and prerogatives, in terms of active participation in solving of global political issues. Thus, adopted and issued were numerous special announcements of a political nature, such as the assessment of the situation in the Middle East and East Timor, Angola and Jerusalem, on the issue of disarmament and the nuclear reactors in South Africa, the importance of the Helsinki Accords, Human Rights in Latin America, etc. In that context, Orthodox churches remained loyal to the attitude that the WCC, as a primarily *religious organization*, in its activities had to deal primarily with theological, and only in consequent sense, with wider socio-political agenda. Since then, within the WCC two thematically and methodologically profiled “wings” were actually created, with the international, political and theological aspirations.⁴⁷ Report of the Secretary General of the WCC Philippe Potter submitted to the Assembly in Nairobi, clearly pointed to the willingness of the organization to become an active subject in the process of solving of international political problems in the future.⁴⁸

On this occasion also the principle of majority decision-making was brought into focus. Its implementation has resulted in the complete marginalization of the influence of the Orthodox members. They did not stay overruled only in the event of any question of acquiring political prerogatives, but also in the appointing orthodox members in certain committees. For example, the Protestant delegates were then endorsed the appointment of an Archbishop of Constantinople Patriarchate, which was not the candidate of the mother church, which is why it said it would review its membership in the WCC.⁴⁹ This was repeated in the case of Russian and Greek Orthodox churches, whose proposals were rejected by the Protestant delegates.⁵⁰ These

⁴⁶ *Uppsala Speaks*, WCC, Geneve, 1968; i David Jenkins (ed.), *The Humanum Studies*, 1969–1976, WCC, 1975.

⁴⁷ Hristo Janaras, „Problem jedinstva danas“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 279.

⁴⁸ Radomir Rakić, „Peta skupština otvorena molitvom“, *Pravoslavlje*, br. 213, 1976., p. 25.

⁴⁹ Jovan Romanidis, „Bogoslov u službi Crkve u ekumenskom dijalogu“, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 167.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

events have only confirmed the hypothesis of a deep internal crisis in internal relations of the WCC and the supremacy of the “tyranny of the majority” in the relation to the original principle of respect for church pluralism, which could not come to the fore.

Starting from the Protestant principle and premisis that evangelism and socio-political engagement are “equal part of Christian duty”, it can be concluded that the WCC has increasingly acquired the characteristics of international political movement.⁵¹ Nevertheless, it remains a universal forum for inter-church dialogue and cooperation. If it survives all the more pronounced internal polarization, WCC could become a significant factor in international relations, especially in terms of impact on the socio-political life of hundreds of millions of Christian believers in the world. The importance of this assumption should be viewed primarily from the perspective of facts related to the global trend of relativisation of ethical values, which is conditioned by secularistic and materialistic consumer society. The affirmation of Christian values through the WCC in that context could represent a really creative and positive contribution.

The organizational structure and the functional principles of the WCC

The World Council of Churches is, in the real sense of the word, “politically” structured. Its *General Assembly* consists of official representatives appointed by the churches. From the ranks of the General Assembly, members of the *Central Committee* are elected that in the WCC have the role similar to the executive power. The Commette governs the life and work of the organization in the accordance with the mandate of the General Assembly. Operational function in the selection of its members is carried out by the Comeette for Appointing, without consent of mother churches. The Central Committee will then elect the members of the *Executive Committe*, with the supervisory function in implementing the policy of the WCC. Finally, the Executive Committee appoints one third of the members of all *Commissions of the WCC*, second third is elected by the *General Secretariat*, and third officers and the staff of the organization under the guidelines of mother churches, which are also not binding.⁵² By electing the Central Committe, direct control of life of the WCC by church members is terminated, whose function is then be reduced to the initiatives and proposals. The work of the Organization has since then been directly implement through the above committees, where they are monitored

⁵¹ Tomislav Šagi-Bunić, „Ekumenski pokret i tokovi u suvremenom svijetu“, op. cit., p. 117.

⁵² Jovan Romanidis, „Bogoslov u službi Crkve u ekumenskom dijalogu“, in: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, op. cit., p. 163.

and controlled by Executive and the Central Committee.⁵³ One can observe that the WCC, in a certain sense, is “supra-church “ universalist organization.

A special place and importance in its work today takes the *Commission (department) on Faith and Order*, the successor of the same named movement of the early XX century. It continued to study the most important theological questions, in the function of finding a commonly accepted formula as a basis for improvement of theological dialogue of members. The Commission manages and coordinates the activities of comparative analysis of different Christian dogmas, stating the specific theological proposals on further activities of members. In terms of methodology, it insists on emphasizing doctrinal denominators, trying to differentiate “essential “ from “irrelevant “ dogmatic differences. It brings into dialogue those denominations whose positions are not too far away. For example, in late 1960s, this has referred to the Lutheran and the Reformed, as well as Orthodox and Non-Chalcedonian churches.⁵⁴ Specifically, the Commission prepares a joint weekly prayers for Christian unity and proposes establishment of a common date of Easter celebrations. Over the decades, on several occasions it has initiated the question of convening the General (“Ecumenical”) Council of Christian Churches, modeled on the councils of the undivided Church of the first millennium.⁵⁵ It’s work has always involved the most eminent theologians of member churches. In this sense, the Orthodox Church was represented by George Florovsky, John Meyendorff, Count Boris Bobrinski, and the many others. The World Council of Churches conducts its activities at the regional and local levels “simultaneously” and implements them through National Committees, which have primarily operational character. Each National Committee is a separate member of the WCC, which often results the “duplication” of membership of individual churches in the organization.⁵⁶

When it comes to the internal balance of power, it is important to stress again that the Protestant majority dominates undisturbed in work of the WCC, whose legitimacy and legality was provided by minority members’ initial approval of the principle of majority decision-making. Since there was no indication that the situation will soon change, on *the Seventh Session of the General Assembly of the WCC in Canberra in 1991*, Orthodox members jointly asked for “radical

⁵³ „Ekumenski (svetski) savet crkava“, 19. novembar 1963. godine, *SIV, Dokumenti Savezne komisije za verska pitanja*, Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, fond 144, fascikla 67, pp. 1–4.

⁵⁴ Radomir Rakić, „Patrijarh srpski German posetio centar SSC u Ženevi“, *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije*, 1969., pp. 191–192.

⁵⁵ Ibidem.

⁵⁶ „Ekumenski (svetski) savet crkava“, *SIV, Domumenti Savezne komisije za verska pitanja*, op. cit., p. 4.

restructuring” of principles of functioning of the organization. As an alternative to finding new forms of relationships, they indicated to possibility of withdrawal from membership, but only on the basis of joint decision.⁵⁷ The Georgian Orthodox Church, however, has abandoned independently WCC in 1998, which caused disagreements within the Orthodox churches, but has not led to question of the common approach within the organization. The Executive Secretary for Faith and Order Peter Bouteneff said after the session of *the Eighth General Assembly in Harare in 1998* that the “partial boycott” of the Orthodox representatives would not significantly affect the work and decision making of the WCC.⁵⁸ This constatation implies that the Protestant majority has no intention to significantly change the course of their work.

Therefore, the World Council of Churches is facing today the gravest crisis of its own identity, as well as the challenge of survival. Although a sort of Protestant “Ecumenical nobility” kept his elitist position and influence, it is clear that the WCC in future will largely depend on its internal “democratization”, but also on a higher degree of harmonization of members in the theological field. The organization has so far undoubtedly achieved positive results, especially in the terms of convergence of the Western churches, and their familiarization with the position of the Orthodox Church. In this sense, the presence of Orthodox members is important for the WCC, because it affects the balancing of the relationship of theological and socio-political factors, consistent with the insistence that the WCC should remain a church organization with a specific social competencies. This position has a special significance in the global, increasingly secularistic (atheist, agnostic), and political and integrative conditions, which bring into question the church character of the WCC.

5. Conference of European churches

The Conference of European Churches is an association of 126 Orthodox, Protestant, Anglican and Old-Catholic churches, along with 43 associated organizations. It was established in 1959, on the foundations of principles of pluralism of the church and ecumenism, primarily in the function of ecclesiastical contribution in overcoming of common historical, cultural and

⁵⁷ „Odras sadašnjeg stanja ekumenizma–Naša delegacija na skupštini SSC u Kanberi“, *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije*, 1991., p. 79.

⁵⁸ “From a Report of the Harare Assembly by Peter Bouteneff, Executive Secretary of the Faith and Order Commission of the World Council of Churches”, in: *The Thessaloniki Summit, May 1998*, Internet, [http:// www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/thessaloniki_roc.aspx](http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/thessaloniki_roc.aspx), 20/05/2007.

economic obstacles to cooperation on the European continent. The main objective of the CEC is also to “promote the unity of the Church” through “joint Christian testimony to European nations and institutions”.⁵⁹

Fields of activities of organization in thematic terms are various. As an association of churches, it seeks primarily to improve inter-church dialogue, where the most important role has *The Commission “of the Church in dialogue.”* It largely represents “European form” of the Comision for Faith and Order of the WCC. Members of the CEC signed the famous “Ecumenical Charter “ (*Charta Oecumenica*) in Strasbourg at the end of April 2001, which defined the framework, common criteria and guidelines of its activities in the function of “ecumenical” cooperation of members in “all areas”.⁶⁰ During the period of start of political integration of the continent in the early 1990s this has, as one of its main goals, the CEC has stated contribution to the spreading of influence of Christian values (Christianization) in such a process.⁶¹

The Conference of European Churches, like the WCC, also aims at extending of membership and influence. It was united with the European Ecumenical Commission on Church and Society (*EECCS*) in 1999, after which their *Joint Commission* deals with social, economic and environmental issues on the European continent. Since then, CEC, has took the position that the organization and all its members should be actively involved in the process of European integration. Even the intention was expressed that the organization should perform “ethical” supervision and control of European political institutions in certain subject areas. Thus, for example, the CEC is actively engaged in discussing of issues of social and political status of women and migrants in Europe.⁶² On the other hand, together with the Roman Catholic Consilium Conferentiarum Episcoporum Europae (*CCEE*), the organization is seriously tackling the issue of more precise definition of the concept of European identity, especially in the context of the needs of the construction and improvement of relations with Islam, in order to achieve the coexistence of two religions and their believers in a common European home.⁶³

⁵⁹ *Conference of European Churches*, Internet: <http://www.ceckek.org/content/history.shtml>, 09/02/2009.

⁶⁰ *Charta Oecumenica, Guidelines for the Growing Cooperation among the Churches in Europe – “Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit“*, Internet: <http://www.ceckek.org/content/history.shtml>, 09/02/2009.

⁶¹ *Conference of European Churches, Current Concerns*, Internet: <http://www.ceckek.org/content/history.shtml>, 09/02/2009.

⁶² *Ibidem*.

⁶³ *Ibidem*.

In accordance with the Constitution of the Organization adopted in 1964, *the Assembly of CEC* is the most important subject in the process of making and implementing decisions.⁶⁴ Generally, it meets every six years, but in practice it happened more often. It consists of representatives appointed by the member churches, with members of *the Central Committee* with a mandate to manage the activities of the CEC in the period when the Assembly is in session.⁶⁵ Representatives of associated organizations sporadically attend meetings of the Assembly as *observers*. The first three Assembly of the CEC were held in Nyborg, Denmark in 1959, 1960 and 1962 and the last ones were held in Prague in 1992, Graz in 1997 and Trondheim in 2003.⁶⁶

Compared with the WCC, the CEC is based on almost identical ideological and theoretical assumptions and objectives, with a similar organizational structure. It seems that in relation to the WCC it has even more obvious political aspirations and goals, which can be explained by the nature of the moment in the process of European integration. The CEC also represents *forum for inter-church cooperation and dialogue*, but compared to the WCC, of the European and “regional” character.

6. Parliament of world religions

If under the ecumenism we also implicate inter-religious dialogue, for which there are more pronounced tendencies, its important institutional form represents *the Parliament of World Religions*. By its comprehensive aims, thematic aspirations and methods of their realization, it exceeds the WCC. Its two sessions, the Parliament held in Chicago in 1893 and in 1993. The last was attended by representatives of almost all world religions.

They agreed to an aspiration to “colorful fragments of religion as of the heavenly light” attempt to sum up in “heavenly white light of truth”.⁶⁷ The purpose of this “spiritual integralist” concept actually represented an attempt to synthesize the ethical aspects of world religions, in order to achieve the primarily pacifist globalist objectives.⁶⁸ For the sake of it, the importance of all known forms of religious and institutional forms is relativized to the extreme

⁶⁴ The Article 5.1 of the Constitution, in: *Conference of European Churches, Current Concerns*, op. cit.

⁶⁵ The Article 6.1., *ibidem*.

⁶⁶ *Conference of European Churches, List of Assemblies*, Internet: <http://www.cecekek.org/content/assemblies.shtml>, 09/02/2009.

⁶⁷ Sava Janjić, *Ekumenizam i vreme apostasije*, op. cit., p. 45.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 47.

limits. The essence represented an attitude according to which spirituality not only is not inseparably linked to the dogmas, but they are the very ones that “limits” it.⁶⁹ Such a degree and example of religious relativism and extreme theological liberalism (anarchism) was not known in a theological theory and practice. In all this, not even the term “God” was used, as the representatives of the various religions were not able to agree on the content of its term.

The Final Document of the Session affirmed the attempt to create a new “global ethics” and the establishment of universal moral criteria as a basis for overcoming the binding constraints and keeping the creative dialogue of world religions. As factors of “universal ethics”, the document has defined non-violence, social justice, ecumenism, pluralism, feminism, political and human rights, by insisting on the abolition of all social, economic and gender discrimination in the world. To achieve these goals, it is necessary to conduct the “transformation of consciousness” or “delete” historical examples of inter-religious conflict, fanaticism and hate from the minds of people. In this process of moral transformation of the world, the significant role was given to the “global Christianity”.⁷⁰ The whole concept, along with positive aspects, has a certain psychosomatic guidelines.

The Session was remembered by an attempt of affirmation and establishment of an entirely new model of inter-religious relations in the world, that would be based on complete religious (dogmatic and institutional) relativism, syncretism and unified reducing of religions to ethical. However, the big question was whether this kind of unification of religious “diversity” can have pacifist consequences. It is more likely to have just the opposite effect.

7. Conclusion

Ecumenism implies an idea, a doctrine and a movement aimed at achieving the proclaimed goal of unification of Christian churches. In today’s sense, it has primarily missionary, “Western”, character, and interdisciplinary, at least theological, sociological (social) and politicological determinant. Although the concept is getting “more horizontal” content, its central point represents theological dialogue. Ecumenism should be distinguished from similar concepts, such as tolerance, inter-confessionalism, religious pluralism and inter-religious dialogue. Since it promotes inter-church and, indirectly, inter-religious coexistence, dialogue and cooperation, it bears the “potential” of significant instrument in prevention of social and political conflicts, as well as for overcoming their consequences.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 48.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, p. 48.

The most important institutional forms of ecumenism today represent the World Council of Churches (WCC,) and the Conference of European Churches (CEC). In a broader sense, it refers to the Parliament of World Religions. The World Council of Churches is a universal forum for interchurch dialogue and cooperation, based on the principle of equal cohabitation of members. It does not possess a clear religious identity, and is characterized by interdisciplinary activity, expressed in internal polarization of Protestant and Orthodox members, and certain characteristics of the international political movement. Its deep crisis could only be overcome by finding new forms of internal relations, while the alternative would be withdrawal of Orthodox Christian from the membership. By their goals and methods, organization similar to it is the Conference of European Churches, an organization of European character. On the other hand, the Parliament of World Religions primarily seeks the establishment and global implementation of “universal” ethical principles, as result of synthesizing the ethical aspects of world religions, and in the function of achieving pacifist goals.

References

1. Georgije Florovski, „O granicama Crkve“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005, str. 89–103.
2. Nikolaj Berdajev, „Vaseljenskost i konfesionalizam“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005, str. 103–119.
3. Jacques Mercier, *Povijest Vatikana*, Barbat, Zagreb, 2001.
4. Nikodim Milaš, *Slavenski apostoli Kiril i Metodije i istina pravoslavlja*, Sinod SPC, Beograd, 1985.
5. Jean Boisset, *Protestantizam–kratka povijest*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1985.
6. *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, Vol. V, Gerhard Friedrich (edit.), WM. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1967.
7. Radomir Rakić, „Ekumenizam“, u: *Enciklopedija političke kulture*, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993., str. 67–91.
8. Sava Janjić, *Ekumenizam i vreme apostasije*, Sveti knez Lazar, Prizren, 1995.
9. Dragoljub R. Živojinović, „Ekumenizam: pokret za ujedinjenje crkava u Evropi dvadesetog veka“, *Bratstvo*, Vol. V, društvo „Sveti Sava“, Beograd, 2001, str. 81–103.
10. „Ekumenizam“, u: *Enciklopedija Pravoslavlja*, knjiga prva A–Z, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 2002, str. 171–195.
11. „Dekret Unitatis Redintegratio“, u: *Dokumenti Drugog vatikanskog koncila*, Kršćanska sadašnjost, Zagreb, 1970.
12. Jakob Pfeifer, „Ekumenizam–međucrveno–međureligijsko razumjevanje i(ili) svjetska globalizacija“, u: *Religije Balkana: susreti i prožimanja*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (prir.), BOŠ, Beograd, 2001, str. 54–60.
13. Petar Čebić, *Ekumenizam i vjerska tolerancija u Jugoslaviji*, NIRO Mladost, Beograd, 1988.

14. „Osnovni principi odnosa Ruske pravoslavne crkve prema inosavlju–Prilog–Istorija i karakteristika teoloških dijaloga sa inosavljem“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005, str. 9–45.
15. Jovan Majendorf, „Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005, str. 143–157.
16. Anton Kartašev, „Ujedinjenje crkava u svetlu istorije“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005, str. 43–79.
17. Nikolaj Berđajev, „O fanatizmu, ortodoksiji i istini“, Internet: http://www.verujem.org/filosofija/savremena/berdjajev_fanatizam.htm, 23/11/2006.
18. Đuro Šušnjić, „Značenje i značaj dijaloga“, u: *2000 godina Hrišćanstva–istorija, kultura, duhovnost*, Despotovac, 2001., str. 251–256
19. Georgije I. Mandzaridis, Мандзаридис, *Sociologija hrišćanstva*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2004.
20. Milan Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo–izazovi religijskog pluralizma*, Čigoja, Beograd, 2001.
21. Ratko R. Božović, „Uspostavljanje dijaloga na razlikama“, u: *Interreligijski dijalog kao vid pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (prir.), Beograd, BOŠ, 2001., str. 128–133.
22. Đuro Šušnjić, „Prepreke na putu razumevanja, poverenja i pomirenja“, u: *Vera–znanje–mir*, Centar za istraživanje religije BOŠ–a, Beograd, 2005, str. 103–111;
23. Jelena Đorđević, „Interreligijski dijalog i svakodnevni život“, u: *Interreligijski dijalog kao vid pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (prir.), BOŠ, Beograd, 2001., str. 199–204.
24. Milan Vukomanović, „Religion, Conflict, Reconciliation“, u: *Interreligijski dijalog kao vid pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (prir.), BOŠ, Beograd, 2001., str. 22–28.
25. Milica Bakić–Hayden, „O mogućnostima za dijalog različitih religija“, u: *Interreligijski dijalog kao vid pomirenja u Jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Milan Vukomanović, Marinko Vučinić (prir.), BOŠ, Beograd, 2001., str. 193–199.
26. Nikola Dugandžija, „Granice dijaloga“, u: *Vera–znanje–mir*, Centar za istraživanje religije BOŠ–a, Beograd, 2005., str. 18–27.
27. Đuro Šušnjić, „Verski dijalog i tolerancija–drama razumevanja“, u: *Religije Balkana–susreti i prožimanja*, Milan Vukomanović, Marko Vučinić (prir.), BOŠ, Beograd, 2001., str. 17–36.
28. Hristo Janaras, „Ka jednom novom ekumenizmu–Problem jedinstva danas“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005., str. 263–267.
29. Aleksandar Đakovac, Таковач, Александар, „Kratki pregled istorije razvoja Ekumenskog pokreta“, Internet: http://www.verujem.org/teologija/djakovac_istorija.htm, 10/08/2006.
30. Nikolaj Arsenjev, „Pokret ka jedinstvu hrišćanskih crkava“, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005., str. 79–89.
31. Tomislav Šagi–Bunić, „Ekumenski pokret i tokovi u suvremenom svijetu“, *Pravoslavna misao*, 1979., str. 29–43.
32. *The Toronto Statement (1950): The Church, the Churches, and the World Council of Churches*, Internet: http://www.orthodoxinfo.com/ecumenism/toronto_wcc.aspx, 12/12/2006.

33. Jovan Zizjulas, „Jedan jedinstveni izvor–Samopojmanje pravoslavnih i njihovo učešće u Ekumenskom pokretu”, u: *Pravoslavlje i ekumenizam*, Hrišćanski kulturni centar, Beograd, 2005., str. 227–247.
34. „Generalna skupština hrišćana u Nju Delhiju”, *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije*, br. 2, Beograd, str. 87–88.
35. Jean Meyendorff, “Unite de l’Eglise–Unite de l’Humanite”, *The Thruth*, Louvain, 16/1971/3, pp. 289–301.
36. *The Humanum Studies 1969–1976*, David Jenkins (ed.), WCC, Geneve, 1975.
37. Radomir Rakić, „Peta skupština otvorena molitvom“, *Pravoslavlje*, br. 213, 1976, str. 17–25.
38. „Ekumenski (svetski) savet Crkava“, 19. novembar 1963., SIV, Dokumenti Savezne komisije za verska pitanja, Arhiv Jugoslavije, fond 144, fascikla 67, str. 1–4.
39. Radomir Rakić, „Patrijarh srpski German posetio centar SSC u Ženevi”, *Glasnik Srpske Patrijaršije*, 1969., str. 191–192.
40. *Conference of European Churches*, Internet: [http:// www.ceckek.org/content/history.shtml](http://www.ceckek.org/content/history.shtml), 09/02/2009.
41. *Charta Oecumenica, Guidelines for the Growing Cooperation among the Churches in Europe–Glory be to the Father, and to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit*, Internet: <http://www.cec-kek.org/content/charta.shtml>, 09/02/2009.

UDK: 327.56(4+5)
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 70–82
Original Scientific Paper
2012

Mina Zirojević Fatić
Dragan Đukanović
Dejan Gajić¹

Security of Balkans and Serbia in the Context of Eurasian Security Integrations

ABSTRACT

Security in the Balkans and Serbia is largely determined by developments in the wider Eurasian region. In this sense, the authors point out the main challenges that manifest themselves primarily in the field of energy security as well as in the field of security integrations. The authors point to the past achievements of security integration at Eurasian space, which are primarily the product of indigenous initiatives in the countries of the region within which the particular joint military forces are planned or developed. In this regard, the most significant results were obtained in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) created under the initiative of Russia and former Soviet republics, as well as on initiative of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which is based on the Russian-Chinese initiative.

Keywords: Eurasia, security, Serbia, Balkan, CSTO, SCO.

Introduction

Eurasia is a single land mass occupied by the continents Europe and Asia. Although in physical-geographical terms Eurasia can be considered as one continent, the artificial division on Europe and Asia dates back to ancient times.² The line of demarcation between the two continents has been changing its

¹ Mina Zirojević Fatić, Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, E-mail: mina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; Dragan Đukanović, Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, E-mail: dragandj@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs; Dejan Gajić, Research Associate, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, E-mail: dgajic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

² Denis Sinor, "Introduction: the concept of Inner Asia", in: Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 2.

position during different historical periods, and despite numerous discussion, as current one is considered the line that moves along the Ural mountain range, the river Ural, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus mountain range and the Black Sea.

In geopolitical terms, the term Eurasia is usually used as a synonym for post-Soviet territory, or territory which includes countries arised from the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In this sense, this area includes the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; Caucasus states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; East European countries Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and Russia which due to its dominant role in the region is a separate entity.

When it comes to activities of organizations whose scope of work applies to security, especially those who plan and develop the joint forces in this field, the mentioned territory can be considered extremely dynamic. Namely, in Eurasian/post-Soviet space international organizations are functioning with the security attributes that are created based on autochthonous initiatives of countries in the region, primarily Russia and China — the Collective Security Treaty Organization — CSTO i Shanghai Cooperation Organization — SCO, as well as those which operate under the auspices of the West or NATO through its Partnership for Peace program, which is created precisely for the purpose of cooperation with the countries formed after the dissolution of the USSR.

Through this program, NATO has created a framework for cooperation that included all post-Soviet states, while with Russia, as the backbone of the former federation and one of the strongest forces, there are special mechanisms of cooperation. However, Russia seeks to protect its interests in the region as well as its safety, which does not imply NATO in the near surroundings or at its borders. In this context one should percieve the growing need of Russia to have in its surroundings states that are not under control or influence of the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition, Russia wants to protect its greatest export potential – energy, which is the perfect political tool due to the increasing demand. In addition, China as a regional and world power in rising, has interest to extend its influence over neighboring countries, but also has increasing need for energy.

Security and stability in the Balkans as neighboring region, to a large extent depend upon events in Eurasia. Energy products for Balkans are largely coming from area above mentioned, and it is expected that this quantity should be larger in the future. With the construction of the planned capacity for gas transport, safety in the Balkans will get its energy dimension. However, the Eurasian region “imports” in Balkan area other various forms of unconventional threats to security, especially narcotics, what is conected with terrorism and organized crime.

In Serbia there is a traditional economic reluctance when it comes to inclusion in the European integration process, while in the domestic public and

among the political elite, the dilemma is present, whether to seek the security of the country within initiatives, whose initiators are the western countries or in those that come from Russia. Therefore, issues related to Eurasian security organizations are particularly important.

The Eurasian security integrations based on Russian initiatives

Upon dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Atlantic Alliance has continued to operate in an environment without rivals, outside the originally defined framework related to collective defense in case of attack on any member, and has become a sort of force for intervention in the areas around the world where there is minimal indications that the safety or some of the vital interests of the Union are threatened.

However, even before the final collapse, the former republics of the USSR began a new wave of integration processes in the area of former common state, in order to minimize the consequences of decay and improve relationships.³ The Commonwealth of Independent States was created (CIS) with an essential intention to redefine relations in various areas of cooperation that newly formed states had to focus to after many years. CIS is the broadest framework for connecting of countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union, out of which only the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) made their way to the sought integration into NATO and the EU, while Turkmenistan in 2005 permanently left membership, but has associate member status. After the war in South Ossetia, Georgia left the CIS in August 2008.⁴

It soon became clear that among the CIS member states there is interest for expansion of cooperation in the security area – Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in May 1992 signed the Treaty on Collective Security.⁵ In 1993 Treaty was accessed by Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and came into force in April 1994. Treaty on Collective Security had a weak institutional base for further development of security cooperation, which became obvious 1999 when Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to sign treaty extension, after the first five-year validity period. Transformation

³ Dragan Petrović, *Integracioni procesi na postsovjetskom prostoru*, Pašić i sinovi, Beograd, 2010, pp. 22-3.

⁴ *Information on Georgia's withdrawal from CIS*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Press and Information Department, 18 August 2009, Internet, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=95&info_id=10783, 10/03/12.

⁵ *Договор о коллективной безопасности*, Содружество Независимых Государств, 15 мая 1992 г, Internet, http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_40703.html, 15/01/12.

into an international organization called the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) occurred in May 2002 after the decision is transformed into the founding act. With more ambitious goals than before and increased focus on collective defense instead on security cooperation, CSTO since 2004 has observer status at the UN General Assembly. Founding countries of the CSTO are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan while Uzbekistan has once again become a full member in 2006.⁶

Another important form of integration processes on the Eurasian territory in the field of security represents much broader framework of cooperation between countries considering that in the respect of the territory covered, significantly exceeds the post-Soviet borders. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established on the basis of the border agreement „Shanghai Five“ in 1996 between China and neighboring countries from the Central Asian region — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.⁷ This agreement enabled a significant relaxation of border tensions between China and its post-Soviet neighbors. Namely, there was a withdrawal of large quantities of weapons and military forces from the border regions, which certainly went in favor of Russia and central Asian countries, since in this way their ailing economies, diminished the burden of military expenditure, while China was able to move troops from the post-Soviet borders to coastal strip to Taiwan. In short, the states belonging to “Shanghai Five: no longer represented a threat to each other. Since the agreement has functioned very well, states have focused primarily on the cooperation in the economic field. However, the security aspect came into focus after concerns that Russia and China have expressed regarding the growing activities of radical Islamic movements in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the activities of the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁸ In this regard, the „Shanghai Five“ framework exceeded the border agreement and took the form of regional security structure that is fighting against the “three evils“ — separatism, fundamentalism and terrorism.⁹ These objectives in the transformation of “Shanghai Five“ in the the SCO, and its institutional strengthening and defining

⁶ Vladimir Socor, “Uzbekistan accedes to Collective Security Treaty Organization“, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 3, Issue: 124, June 27, 2006, Internet, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31820,10/03/12](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31820,10/03/12).

⁷ Pan Guang, “China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization“, in: Wang Gungwu, Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *China and the New International Order*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 237.

⁸ Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, Mikhail Troitskiy, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2007, p. 50.

⁹ Marc Lanteigne, “Security, strategy and the former USSR: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation“, in: Shaun Breslin (ed.), *Handbook of China's International Relations*, Routledge, London, 2010, p. 169.

in June 2001, were incorporated into content of the “new” founding act of the group as major common security goal.

Further development of the SCO, and its strengthening as a regional security structure took place simultaneously with the expansion of membership. In 2001 Uzbekistan joined the organization as the sixth member, Mongolia in 2004 obtained observer status, and in 2005 this status was acquired by India, Iran and Pakistan. Chinese President Hu Jintao stressed that the involvement in the full membership is the desire of all observer states, as well as of Afghanistan. In the year in which the SCO celebrates a decade of its existence, India, Iran and Pakistan applied for membership, in spite of the fact that the existing members are not in a hurry to expand the Organization. Thus, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari, while addressing the participants of the summit in Astana, capital of Kyrgyzstan, stressed that it is necessary to accelerate the process of accession of his country in the SCO, and expressed his satisfaction that the Afghan President Hamid Karzai also attended the summit and applied that Afghanistan should obtain observer status.¹⁰

Mentioned forms of association of the states on the territory of Eurasia, taking into account the expansion of the SCO, had created a suspicion that some kind of military alliance is in sight. Within both organizations, existence of any larger plan concerning collectivization of defense in the said territory was denied, despite the fact that the Article 3 of the CSTO Charter explicitly states that the purpose of the organization is to provide collective defense of the independence territorial integrity and sovereignty of states.¹¹ Also, both organizations, strongly deny the possibility of association against any country or group of states. Moreover, in founding act of the SCO it was pointed out that collective action is not directed against other States or international organizations.¹²

Institutional development of two organizations was accompanied by, to some extent, development of specific forms of military cooperation, both within the organizations themselves, but also in terms of mutual cooperation, which certainly represent a further indication that it may be the creation of military block. Despite the fact that none of the two organizations has built structures like those of NATO and that there is no obligation of states to direct a certain percentage of gross national income to the defense, as it is in NATO, military

¹⁰ *Pakistan Nudges Afghanistan Away From U.S. Towards Asian Bloc*, June 16, 2011, CNS News, Internet, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/pakistan-nudges-afghanistan-away-us-towa>, 17/03/12.

¹¹ *Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности*, Интернет, <http://www.odkb.gov.ru/b/azg.htm>, 17/03/12.

¹² Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, Mikhail Troitskiy, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, op. cit., p. 6.

cooperation in their frames has significantly advanced. Some kind of joint rapid reaction force counting 1,500 members with the joint command in Moscow has existed in the framework of the CSTO since 2002. Later, these forces reached a size of 4500 members, but because of the placement of their units in remote locations they were not in practical function and are rarely trained together.

The presidents of CSTO member countries, in February 2009 in Moscow signed the agreement on the establishment of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (*Коллективные силы оперативного реагирования Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, КСОР — KSOR*). The main tasks of these forces are participation in preventing and rejecting armed attacks, including aggression and armed conflict prevention, participation in activities in the fight against international terrorism, illegal trafficking in narcotics, psychotropic substances and precursors, weapons and ammunition, as well as of other forms of transnational organized crime; participation in the implementation of measures to protect the population from the dangers caused by military operations, emergency response and humanitarian assistance.¹³ The newly formed forces are ambitiously planned, they will be larger in numbers and more mobile, under unified command and stationed on Russian territory.

From the tasks assigned to these forces, it can be seen that the special attention is dedicated to fighting unconventional forms of security threats, especially those related to drugs trafficking. The data from the annual reports of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime speak about increasing production and increasing “export potential“ of neighboring Afghanistan in the period of intensive presence of international forces in this country. Part of the profits from these activities are allocated for financing of terrorist organizations, while as the leader in narcotics business, brother of the current president of Afghanistan, Karzai, is mentioned.¹⁴

The SCO has not developed particular joint military force similar to those in CSTO, although within the organization, since 2004, there has been a permanent body — The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent — responsible for coordination activities directed to achieving the set goals.¹⁵ Since 2002, annual regular joint military exercises has been organized

¹³ *Коллективные силы оперативного реагирования Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности*, ПРЕСС-РЕЛИЗ 2010, Internet, http://www.mamf.ru/odkb_mamf/ksor/ksor.pdf, 21/06/11, стр 4-5.

¹⁴ “Karzai’s brother shot dead in Kandahar“, *Aljazeera*, 12 Jul 2011, Internet, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2011/07/20117127299662659.html>, 15/03/12.

¹⁵ Thomas S. Wilkins, “Building Regional Security Architecture: The Shangai Cooperation Organisation from an Organisational Theoris Perspective“, in: M. Parvizi Aminah (ed.), *State, Society and International Relations in Asia: Reality and Challenges*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 171.

by the States Parties in the field of fighting terrorism. The first large-scale military exercise under the the SCO named „Coalition 2003“, was held in 2003, in the border regions of Kazakhstan and China, based on the presumption of anti-terrorist operations in a populated area and directly involved 100 „terrorists“ and 700 soldiers, and alltogether 1300 members of the armed forces of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were engaged, while Uzbekistan has refused to participate, given its, at that time, active cooperation with NATO and the United States.

After receiving positive evaluations regarding the aforementioned exercise, the first joint exercise called “Rubezh 2004” was carried out within the CSTO.¹⁶ It was held in Kyrgyzstan on the basis of a scenario involving the Antiterrorist operations, primarily in the dismantling of armed non-state actors with air strikes. Russia has provided aviation technology needed for the drill and a total of 1700 participants were engaged.

These exercises represent a turning point in the development of regional cooperation in the military sphere on Eurasian territory, but also indicate the possibility of more intense competition between China and Russia over influence in Central Asian region.

Expansion of russian influence on the Balkans and security of Serbia

During his visit to Belgrade in 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev expressed the idea of a new European security architecture, according to which Serbia would have a very important role, and soon after that Russian Emergency Situations Minister Sergei Shoigu has also stressed that Serbia as part of Europe shall be a part of a common conception of European security.¹⁷ After these statements by Russian officials, smaller parts of the plan became available to the general public, including the four major — the first part which highlights the basic principles of interstate relations, including those respecting the sovereignty and the reaffirmation of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, the second states that no country or organization may have the exclusive right to security policy, which calls into question the current role of the North Atlantic Alliance, the third part is focused on procedural issues related to negotiations on solving of regional crises, the fourth relates to

¹⁶ Bertil Nygren, *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*, Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 36.

¹⁷ Filip Ejdus, *Vojno neutralna Srbija i „nova“ evropska bezbednosna arhitektura*, Internet, http://www.filipejdus.net/2009_11_01_archive.html, 20/03/2012.

measures directed against all types of security threats, including construction of anti-nuclear missile shield in Southeastern Europe.¹⁸

The part about missile shield is particularly important, given that Russia urgently needs to make a countermeasure to the NATO missiles installation near Kaliningrad area, a Russian exclave, where the Russian Baltic fleet is stationed in. In this sense, it is possible to observe Serbia as the only realistic Russian option in the Balkans due to the fact that it is not deeply involved in the North Atlantic structures, as well as in connection to traditional ties with Russia. In this regard, at first glance it seems that these plans are discussed in small circles. However, the statement of Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Aleksandr Vasilevic Konuzin about the possibility for Russia to build nuclear power plant in Serbia, made at the end of November 2009, may create the impression that a similar option to build anti-nuclear missile shield is in serious consideration.

Russia in the Balkans has real interest which is in the function of energy use as a reliable and long-term strategic means for exercise of political pressure, which is simultaneously one of the main ways of Russian opposition to the expansion of NATO. This includes building a branch of the gas pipelines „South Stream“ through Serbia that should be put into operation in 2015. The planned annual capacity of above mentioned pipeline would amount up to 63 billion cubic meters of gas.¹⁹ The construction route of a future gas pipelines goes below Black Sea, through Bulgaria, where it splits in one branch that leads to Greece to Italy and another through the territory of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Hungary and leads to Austria.²⁰ In addition, a local branch of gas pipelines would be built from Serbia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Besides the stated gas pipelines, an oil pipeline Society Adria is planned for construction, on the route that goes from the Russian city of Samara across the territory of Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary and Croatia to the terminal in Adriatic island of Krk.²¹ We should not overlook the fact that Russia is rapidly buying the companies involved in the processing and distribution of energy throughout the Balkans, exceeding in this way the framework of supplier of raw material. Thus Russia establishes firm support for long-term presence in the Balkans,

¹⁸ Aleksandar Fatić, “A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast Europe”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (December 2010), p. 446.

¹⁹ U.S. Geological Survey, 2010, Area Reports — International — Europe and Central Eurasia: U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, 2008, v. III, p. 7.2.

²⁰ Jeffrey Mankoff, “Eurasian energy security“, *Council Special Report No. 43*, February 2009, p. 20.

²¹ Sergej Mahnovsky, “Natural Resources and Potential Conflict in the Caspian Sea Region“, in: Olga Oliker, Thomas Szayna, (eds.), *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003, p. 119.

providing itself with the role of main supplier of fuel in the region and also binds strategy of energy security to military strategy whose main aim is to oppose NATO expansion.

Issues related to energy and energy sources, Russia increasingly brings into broader context of strategic alliances with the the Balkan countries. Such intentions have been met with positive response only in Serbia, which resulted in an agreement between Russia and our country on the establishment of the center for humanitarian emergency response, which was publicly presented as a plan to establish a Russian military base.²² In October 2009, the plan was signed in Belgrade by Serbian Minister of Interior Ivica Dacic and Minister for Emergency Situations of Russia Sergei Shoigu. On this occasion, the two ministers stressed the importance of forming a joint humanitarian center in Nis, to react in case of emergencies such as fires, floods or earthquakes.²³ After signing of the dynamic plan about activities in this field the two ministers stressed that the humanitarian center should develop into a regional center in order to provide rapid and effective assistance to other countries in the region of Southeast Europe in emergency situations. The center, which should be formed in 2012 will represent a well-equipped logistics base, within which the joint anti-mine center shall also operate. Location was chosen because of the existence of airport and the good infrastructure, and one of the reasons probably applies to the proximity of the entry of the South Stream pipeline on Serbian territory.

Expectations, that is, doubts, that mentioned humanitarian center could be in a short time transformed into a Russian military base, the first one outside the post-Soviet area, after the dissolution of the USSR, have justification in the fact that the Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations has significant military forces — internal army consisted of about 50 000 members with assigned naval and aviation forces, as well as heavy weaponry. Main activity of the mentioned forces refers to participation in eliminating the consequences of natural and technical disasters, but the use of heavy weapons, as well as long-term engagement of Sergei Shoigu as Minister and the member of the National Security Council, that is, his significant role in Russia's security policy, may indicate the different character of the mission of the mentioned Ministry. However, any kind of intense inter-state cooperation in the economic field or in elimination of consequences of natural and technical disasters can at some point become a solid basis for military cooperation. Therefore, the construction of the

²² "Russia and Serbia. Base camps", *The Economist*, Feb 4th 2010, Internet, <http://www.economist.com/node/15464941>, 20/03/12.

²³ "Russia, Serbia ready emergency situations center", B92, October 21, 2009, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd=21&nav_id=62504, 20/03/12.

humanitarian center in Nis, does not necessarily represent an indicator of building of military base.²⁴

Opening of the first Russian (humanitarian) base outside the home territory can be viewed in the context of the changed priorities of the Russian military strategy, which was formalized in early 2010, in the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation, which includes conventional defense as the primary means for the protection of external security interests of Russia.²⁵ This strategy includes the construction of the platform outside its own territory, which in the context of further expansion of NATO in the Balkans would be impossible. Thus, Serbia emerged as the only country in the region that has shown a willingness to complement its strategic partnership with Russia with building of a base (of questionable purposes) on its territory. In this respect, Serbia's view differs from the view shared by most Balkan countries towards Euro-Atlantic integration and the full membership in the NATO, and in this sense it distanced itself from the North Atlantic Alliance.

While the remaining Balkan countries which have not already been integrated in the NATO see their future in the full integration in this alliance, Serbia is hesitant when it comes to the further advancement in the framework of Euro-Atlantic structures, and counts on the Russian strategic support. In particular, this refers to Russian support regarding the violent secession of the southern Serbian province, and recently more frequent are demands towards the authorities to send observers and join Eurasian security organizations founded on the basis of Russian initiatives.²⁶ However, some believe that Serbia should not join the CSTO for three reasons — the first relates to the fact that it is surrounded by NATO member states, so that the entry into another military-political alliance would create additional tensions in the region; the second reason is that the entry into NATO does not represent a prerequisite for EU accession, but the entry into another alliance represents barrier to European integration; the third reason relates to the insufficient articulation of Russia towards expansion of the CSTO outside the post-Soviet area.

²⁴ "South Serbia 'center not military base'", B92, October 20, 2011, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=20&nav_id=76950,20/03/12.

²⁵ *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, Internet, http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010,20/03/12.

²⁶ Sergei Blagov, „The CSTO Seeks Stronger Security Arrangements”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 8 Issue: 98, Internet, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=37951,20/03/12](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37951,20/03/12).

Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Alexander Konuzin, speaking about President Medvedev's proposal of Serbia joining the CSTO, to some extent has denied the claims about Russia's lack of interest in the expansion of the Organization outside the post-Soviet region, and made the assessment that it would certainly benefit Serbia. He also indicated that such an arrangement is not aimed against NATO, but towards common interests in terms of achieving the goal of public safety. Ambassador Konuzin emphasized that the Serbian Parliament debates on obtaining status of observer in the CSTO's Assembly, assessed that there was nothing controversial about it, and explained that membership in the Organization guarantees the safety of all members regardless of the obligations arising from membership in various associations.²⁷

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, in recent years, the Eurasian integration processes in the field of security and the establishment of closer military cooperation between the countries in the region, are flourishing. Achieved forms of joint action in the field of security certainly have enough potential for the future, while aspirations for membership in them suggest that perhaps only a small parts of the Eurasian region will remain unintegrated.

Further development of common security component of Eurasian countries will definitely depend upon relations between Moscow and Beijing, given that in the future the interests of the two forces can come into conflict, especially when it comes to energy segment of security. Russia, in terms of export of its energy resources, is more oriented towards Europe, because in this direction Russian infrastructure is more developed, and price of energy products which can be achieved is higher, so there is no reason for Russia to give up profits. In addition to energy, Russia's most successful export industry refers to the field of armaments. On the other hand, China, due to increasing volume of production in all areas has increased its demand for energy and in this respect it is turned towards the vastness of Siberia, while it successfully conquers the technology of weapons production.

One should not forget the interests of other countries in the region and the fact that a large portion of them belongs to the nuclear club, and the least ignored should be the interest of the North Atlantic Alliance and its creators whose presence near Russia's soft belly is of vital importance.

²⁷ "Russia does not oppose Serbia's EU integration", B92, June 9, 2011, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=06&dd=09&nav_id=74834, 20/03/12.

At first glance, it can not be perceived to what extent the previous achievements of security integration processes on the Eurasian territory affect the security in the Balkans. Specifically, most Balkan countries are fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, and those that are not, are on a good path to do it. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect, as a reflection of the wishes of one part of Serbian public or in the function of altered Russian security strategy, that in the near future certain installation of weapon systems in Serbia and deeper involvement in the Eurasian security integration might happen.

Bibliography

1. Denis Sinor, "Introduction: the concept of Inner Asia", in: Denis Sinor (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Early Inner Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.
2. Dragan Petrović, *Integracioni procesi na postsovjetskom prostoru*, Pašić i sinovi, Beograd, 2010.
3. *Information on Georgia's withdrawal from CIS*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Press and Information Department, 18 August 2009, Internet, http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=95&info_id=10783, 10/03/12.
4. *Договор о коллективной безопасности*, Содружество Независимых Государств, 15 мая 1992 г, Internet, http://www.businesspravo.ru/Docum/DocumShow_DocumID_40703.html, 15/01/12.
5. Vladimir Socor, "Uzbekistan accedes to Collective Security Treaty Organization", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 3, Issue: 124, June 27, 2006, Internet, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=31820](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=31820), 10/03/12.
6. Pan Guang, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", in: Wang Gungwu, Zheng Yongnian (eds.), *China and the New International Order*, Routledge, New York, 2008.
7. Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang, Mikhail Troitskiy, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17, SIPRI, Stockholm, 2007.
8. Marc Lanteigne, "Security, strategy and the former USSR: China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation", in: Shaun Breslin (ed.), *Handbook of China's International Relations*, Routledge, London, 2010.
9. *Pakistan Nudges Afghanistan Away From U.S. Towards Asian Bloc*, June 16, 2011, CNS News, Internet, <http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/pakistan-nudges-afghanistan-away-us-towa>, 17/03/12.
10. *Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности*, Интернет, <http://www.odkb.gov.ru/b/azg.htm>, 17/03/12.
11. *Коллективные силы оперативного реагирования Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности*, ПЕСС-РЕЛИЗ 2010, Internet, http://www.mamf.ru/odkb_mamf/ksor/ksor.pdf, 21/06/11.
12. "Karzai's brother shot dead in Kandahar", *Aljazeera*, 12 Jul 2011, Internet, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2011/07/20117127299662659.html>, 15/03/12.
13. Thomas S. Wilkins, "Building Regional Security Architecture: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation from an Organisational Theoris Perspective", in: M. Parvizi Amineh (ed.),

- State, Society and International Relations in Asia: Reality and Challenges*, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2010.
14. Bertil Nygren, *The Rebuilding of Greater Russia: Putin's Foreign Policy Towards the CIS Countries*, Routledge, New York, 2008.
 15. Filip Ejodus, *Vojno neutralna Srbija i „nova” evropska bezbednosna arhitektura*, Internet, http://www.filipejdus.net/2009_11_01_archive.html, 20/03/2012.
 16. Aleksandar Fatić, "A Strategy Based on Doubt: Russia Courts Southeast Europe", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (December 2010).
 17. U.S. Geological Survey, 2010, Area Reports — International — Europe and Central Eurasia: U.S. Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook, 2008, v. III.
 18. Jeffrey Mankoff, "Eurasian energy security", *Council Special Report No. 43*, February 2009.
 19. Sergej Mahnovsky, "Natural Resources and Potential Conflict in the Caspian Sea Region", in: Olga Oliker, Thomas Szayna, (eds.), *Faultlines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army*, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003.
 20. "Russia and Serbia. Base camps", *The Economist*, Feb 4th 2010, Internet, <http://www.economist.com/node/15464941>, 20/03/12.
 21. "Russia, Serbia ready emergency situations center", B92, October 21, 2009, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2009&mm=10&dd=21&nav_id=62504, 20/03/12.
 22. "South Serbia 'center not military base'", B92, October 20, 2011, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=20&nav_id=76950, 20/03/12.
 23. *The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, Internet, http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010, 20/03/12.
 24. Sergei Blagov, "The CSTO Seeks Stronger Security Arrangements", *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 8 Issue: 98, Internet, [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=37951](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37951), 20/03/12.
 25. "Russia does not oppose Serbia's EU integration", B92, June 9, 2011, Internet, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=06&dd=09&nav_id=74834, 20/03/12.

UDK: 327.1(47+57)
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 83–105
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Stevan Rapačić*¹

Democratisation and Cultural Differences in the Former Soviet Union

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the process of democratization in post-Soviet space (valued primarily through achieved level of civil liberties and political rights) and attempts to answer the question how much was this process determined by cultural and civilization differences, in the way in which Huntington defines them. Considering that the very process of democratization in the former Soviet Union is characterized by the conflict between two civilizational and ideological approaches, where the first one is personified in universalist ideas of liberal (Western Christian) democracy, and second one, the Russian concept of sovereign democracy, the author explains U.S. actions in an attempt to export democracy to the area of the former USSR, as well as Russia's response towards the restraint of so-called "fourth wave of democratization".

Key words: democratization, Samuel P. Huntington, cultural identity, USA, NATO, Russia, human rights, clash of civilizations, the colour revolutions, Freedom House, fourth wave.

Instead of introduction

The creation of the cultural identity of countries and nations in post-Soviet space occurred in parallel with the third wave of democratization, therefore, if we want to understand the processes of democratization in the countries arising

¹ Stevan Rapačić MA, Research Associate at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, E-mail: stevan@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs. This paper is part of scientific research involvement of researchers in the project: "Serbia in Contemporary International Relations: Strategic Directions for the Development and Strengthening the Position of Serbia in the International Processes of Integration – Foreign Policy, International, Economic, Legal And Security Aspects", funded by the Ministry of Science and Technology of the Republic of Serbia, Project No. OI179029, and implemented by the Institute for International Politics and Economics in the period 2011-2014.

from the Soviet Union, in order to explain why in some countries this process is successful, while in others stopped or has not even started, it is necessary to integrally observe these two processes which are intertwined and strongly affect each other.

The basic starting hypothesis of this paper is that civilizational differences in the way defined by Samuel P. Huntington, are also the important factor of democratization in post-Soviet space, and that the Orthodox and Islamic civilizations, in contrast to the West, proved as unproductive soil for consolidation of democracy. We should add that even though they pose significant barrier, cultural differences are not decisive limiting factor of democratization in post-Soviet space.

Bearing in mind the given hypothesis, aspirations of this paper are not in finding of a single factor responsible for the success or failure of the consolidation of democracy in post-Soviet space and the eventual emergence of a reverse wave of democratization. We claim that no such individual factor can be regarded as sufficient for explanation of the success or failure of democracy in certain countries, but that democratization in each country is a result of specific combinations of causes. Therefore, the central theme of this paper is the role of cultural (civilizational) identity in the process of democratization in Post-Soviet region, and the impact of strengthened Russia on this process on one side, and the United States, as a “beacon of democracy” on the other.

1. Cultural identity as a factor of democratization in Former Soviet Union

For the needs of this paper, at the very beginning it is necessary to clearly define what we imply under democracy in the modern sense. We must limit the number of definitions which provide us philosophical and historical meaning of the term and remain within the framework of practical or political. Therefore, we use a minimal definition of democracy as a form of governance observed in relation to procedures for the constitution of government, while not ignoring the fact that every form of repression against the opposition and citizens (which may be reflected in the control and censorship of the media and NGOs, fixing elections, persecution and imprisonment of political opponents, restricting and endangering actions of the opposition, threats to physical integrity and human dignity, political opponents, etc.) is irreconcilable with democracy. This bare-boned democracy we define as a institutional arrangement “in which the most powerful ones, share decision-making, elected in a fair, honest and periodically kept elections in which the candidates freely compete for votes and voting rights have almost all adult

citizens.”² Non-democratic regimes on the other hand, can exist in many forms, but primarily come down to authoritarian and totalitarian types. Totalitarian regimes imply the existence of only one party, one leader, the actions of powerful secret service, highly developed ideology that preaches the ideal society, government control of media and communications, as well as most of the social and economic organizations. Authoritarian regimes assume leadership of one person or a small number of people, without a developed ideology and a strong party in which the political pluralism, freedom of expression and media, as well as many other civil liberties are limited.³

“In the post-Cold War world, the most important differences between people are not ideological, political or economic, but cultural”.⁴ In this way, Huntington characterized the state of the new world order, arguing that cultural identity, on the broadest level, represents civilizational identity, which is often determined in relation to others. Basic values, philosophical assumptions, customs, traditions and overall view on life, are significantly different from civilization to civilization, and their basic characteristic in the post-Cold War world is the religion. The civilization and cultural identity is confirmed in the integration processes, which have divided the world between the West, so far the most dominant civilization, and many non-Western civilizations, that are becoming more powerful, which makes the multi-polar and multi-civilizational global politics. Cultural identity, and therefore civilization (according to Huntington, which represents nothing but a pronounced culture), is defined by common objective elements such as language, history, religion, customs and institutions, as well as subjective self-identification of people. In simple terms, nations and countries with similar cultures are involved with each other, while the people and countries with different cultures keep apart. In such global political conditions, according to Huntington, all countries, especially emerging ones, the former communist ones, must discover and strengthen their cultural identity, and accurately determine their place in world politics in which we distinguish seven – eight civilizations: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Latin American, Sinic, Hindu, Buddhist, Japanese and eventually African.⁵

George Kennan has already claimed that cultures can be seen as one of the most important factors of democratization, that is that the largest global civilizations are so different in their beliefs, values and principles, that some are

² Samjuel P. Hantington, *Treći talas*, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2004, p. 15.

³ Ibid, p. 19.

⁴ Samjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, Cid, Podgorica, 2000, p. 21.

⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

incompatible with the principles of a democracy, while others favour the development of democracy. Huntington states Kennan's ideas and adds that the thesis that the culture is a factor of democratization occurs in two possible versions.⁶ First one, according to which Western culture is only suitable for the development of democratic institutions and the second, which assumes that one or more cultures represent particularly undue environment for the consolidation of democracy. Some deeply anti-democratic cultures are restraining the spread of democratic norms in society and argue the legitimacy of democratic institutions. Bearing in mind that modern democracy arose in Western Europe, that most democratic countries are in Western civilization, and that those outside the boundaries of Western civilizations democracy are most common in former British colonies, we claim that a significant number of compelling evidence are in favour of this thesis.

The thesis of Western culture as the most favourable for democratic form of government has direct implications on the democratization process on post-Soviet space. With the collapse of communism and Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was a primary centripetal and stabilizing force in USSR, strong identity crisis in this region occurs. Valid social norms, value system and the basic principles of the previous society, and even the social structure are discarded, and the long-term sources of identity and authority of the system are destroyed. The gap between state and society, which originated in the collapse of the communist system, has created the need for rapid discovery of new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and moral regulation. The sense of meaning and purpose that was provided by the ideology, is replaced by cultural identification which is primarily determined by religion. Only religion was able to quickly and adequately meet the needs of citizens, to give them direction and a sense of belonging to a particular community (which is different and better than others), to provide them with direction and find meaning in the collapse of the state and society, as well as to clearly separate them from others, and strengthen their cultural identity.

In the post-Soviet space, which includes the former USSR with its boundaries it had continuously since the World War II until 1992, new civilizational boundaries emerged, which inclined Catholic and Protestant people towards Western civilization, separating them from the Orthodox and Islamic people. The desire of the Baltic countries to confirm their Western identity and civilizational distance themselves from Moscow, actually caused their hatred and discrimination against the Russian minority, and their identification with Western civilization. On the other hand, the passionate

⁶ Samjuel P. Hantington , *Treći talas*, loc.cit., p. 282.

desire of the Russian people for identity, self-assertion and the sense of superiority, caused the revival of the Orthodox Church, which was the only link with the imperial Russia and thousand years of history. If we add to this that the Islamic nations of Central Asia tended to assert their religious identity, which has been disputed for decades to them in post-Soviet space, we find the borders of the fifteen countries that are in most cases inadequate in terms of the existing civilizational divisions. The existence of civilizationaly inappropriate borders or state borders that were not drawn so that they match cultural boundaries, pose a potential threat to peace and the consolidation of democracy.⁷

Many will agree that Huntington was right when he predicted that the eastern border of Western civilization will divide areas in which democracy will consolidate from those in which will not. This boundary line descends to the south by borders of Finland and Russia, the eastern borders of the Baltic republics, crosses Belarus, Ukraine and Romania and goes to Serbia, separating its central part from Vojvodina.⁸ Baltic countries in Post-Soviet space, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that are located on the western side of the border, according to Huntington, belong to Western civilization with a strong Western orientation, belonging to the Protestant-Catholic group of nations and are members of the European Union and NATO. Their democratization has flowed in relatively stable orbit, and membership in NATO and EU is for now an isolated case in the entire post-Soviet space. In XVI century, during the Reformation, most of the Estonians and Latvians moved to Protestantism with ethnic Germans, while Lithuanians in the highest percentage remained loyal to Catholicism.⁹ Today, the main obstacles to full democratization of these countries alleges to the Russian minority status, to which is in substantial part, denied the right to language and citizenship. The Constitution of Estonia does not provide special representation of minorities, and as important data, only 80% of the population has the citizenship of Estonia while as many as 12.4% have no nationality, and 6.3% are citizens of Russia.¹⁰

Despite the fact that discrimination against minorities in Estonia is implemented in all elements of the electoral system, the organization *Freedom House* has awarded the highest average rating (1) to the Baltic countries of Post-Soviet Region in 2007, which has introduced them into the line of free

⁷ Samjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, op. cit., p. 154.

⁸ Ibid., p. 117.

⁹ Dragan Petrović, *Geopolitika postsovjetskog prostora*, Prometej, Novi Sad i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2008. p. 19.

¹⁰ Milan Jovanović, *Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država*, Službeni glasnik SCG, Fakultet političkih nauka, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2004, p. 303.

states.¹¹ Each year this organization gives a numerical value of the states, by analyzing the level of democratization in two categories: political rights and civil liberties, on a scale of one to seven (from 1 to 2.5 – free states, 3 to 5 – partly free, and from 5.5 to 7 – not free). The same organization considers as a *free country*, the one in which there is an equal political competition, the prevailing climate of respect for civil liberties, a developed and an independent judiciary, civil society and independent media. *Partly free countries* are those in which a respect for political rights and civil liberties is limited, with widespread corruption, a weak rule of law, often characterized by the existence of ethnic and religious conflicts, and where usually one party dominates the political scene, despite a certain degree of pluralism. On the other hand, *not free countries* are totalitarian autocratic entities in which there is no respect for basic political rights, and basic civil liberties are systematically violated.¹²

In the latest report by Freedom House of 2012, none of the of the former Soviet countries which belong to the Islamic civilization did not receive a passing grade, i.e. status of a free country. Among the countries with the least democratic potential, as the most authoritative, dictatorial regimes in the Post-Soviet space, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were emphasized. These two countries were given the worst rating (7), in terms of both political rights and civil liberties. According to the report of Freedom House, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan represent dictatorships which have their roots in the Soviet period.¹³ Uzbekistan in particular became known to the general public as dictatorial and oppressive regime after the massacre in Andijan in 2005, when security forces brutally killed between 300 and 500 civilians, which was followed by the months of arrests and other forms of political persecution of citizens.¹⁴ Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan with grade 5.5 are still listed as not free countries, while Kyrgyzstan only received a passing grade 5, which puts it in the group of partly free countries.¹⁵ On the other hand, the same report listed Russia in the group of not free countries of the Orthodox civilizations, with a score of 5.5, as well as Belarus, as still the least free country in Europe, whose regime was rated 6.5. The remaining countries of the Orthodox

¹¹ Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash – Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2009, p. 29.

¹² *Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprising and Their Global Repercussions*, Freedom House, 2012, Internet: www.freedomhouse.org, 22/1/2012, p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁴ *Preliminary Findings on Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005*, OSCE, ODIHR, Internet: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/15653>, 1/2/2012, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Freedom House*, Internet: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/central-and-eastern-europeeurasia>, 10/2/2012.

civilization, Ukraine (3.5), Georgia (3.5), Armenia (3.1) and Moldova (3) are also classified as only partly free countries.¹⁶

Table 1. Freedom House indicators, average (former Soviet countries, 1991-2007)

	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Armenia	5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4.5	4.5	4	4	4	4	4	4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Azerbaijan	5	5	6	6	6	5.5	5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Belarus	4	3.5	4.5	4	5	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5
Estonia	2.5	3	2.5	2.5	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1	1
Georgia	5.5	4.5	5	5	4.5	4	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	4	4	3.5	3	3	3
Kazakhstan	4.5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Kyrgyzstan	4.5	3	4	3.5	4	4	4	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
Latvia	2.5	3	3	2.5	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1	1	1
Lithuania	2.5	2.5	2	2	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	2	1	1	1
Moldova	4.5	5	5	4	4	3.5	3.5	3	3	3	3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5
Russia	3	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4.5	5	5	5	5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Tajikistan	3	6	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	6	6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5
Turkmenistan	5.5	6.5	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Ukraine	3	3	4	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	4	4	4	4	3.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Uzbekistan	5.5	6	7	7	7	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	6.5	7	7	7

Source: Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash - Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2009, p. 218.

If we value the process of democratization on the basis of the achieved level of civil liberties and political rights in a country, Huntington’s thesis according to which democratization and development in the societies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are shaped by their civilizational identity, can hardly be argued. “Those (the society, author’s note) with the legacy of Western Christianity reach towards advancing economic development and democracy, the prospects for economic and political development in the group of Orthodox countries are uncertain, the prospects in the group of Muslim republics are bleak.”¹⁷ However, we believe that although the development of democracy in the post-Soviet space is shaped by civilizational identity, it is not determined. What is the range of cultural obstacles to democratization, i.e. what is the impact of culture on the democratization of the post-Soviet space, cannot be clearly quantified, nor is it possible to prove the hypothesis according to which Islam and Orthodox Christianity are incompatible with democracy.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Samjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, loc. cit., p. 29.

2. United States of America and the export of democracy to the Former Soviet Union

Sudden change in the world with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the transition from bipolar to a unipolar world order, imposed new challenges and responsibilities onto the United States as the only world power and global “beacon of democracy”. The cultural identity of the U.S. as one of the leading countries of Western civilization, is closely tied to the principles of liberal capitalism and democratic freedoms, thus this wave of democratization is inseparable from the U.S. national interest. This is why the U.S. was not a mere witness of the third wave of democratization, but has used various means of action, in order to promote, and even impose democracy, all through the advocacy of human rights.

In foreign policy of the United States, human rights were not important determinant until the early 1970s. At that time the report of the Subcommittee on International Organisations and Movements of the U.S. Congress, expressed the need for promotion of human rights and proposed it to be one of the main goals of U.S. foreign policy.¹⁸ Even during the Carter administration, human rights have become one of the basic factors in U.S. foreign policy. It was followed by the suspension of economic assistance to several countries, adoption of numerous laws that allowed conditioning of help for those countries that violate human rights, and introduction of economic sanctions. The Reagan administration went a step further, selectively interpreting this foreign policy goal as an excuse for the destruction of the communist regimes. The decade that followed was marked by Reagan Doctrine, which obliged the U.S. support to anti-communist rebels who were trying to overthrow regimes supported by the Soviet Union. Huntington says: “Support of President Reagan to ‘Project Democracy’ in the first year of his reign, his speech in the Parliament in 1984, his message to the Congress in March 1986 and the activities of American diplomats in many countries helped the democratization to remain in the focus in international affairs during the 1980s, and to strengthen the overall global environment inclined to democracy.”¹⁹

Collective unconscious of the American people has been deeply defined by Western Christianity, Judeo-Christian heritage and Protestantism, and thus its missionary work represents a significant part. The very beginning of the United States is tied to freedom of religion and the human rights and individual freedom for the American people are the basic determinant of democracy, and therefore the process of democratization. American public was concerned about

¹⁸ Samjuel P. Hantington , *Treći talas*, loc.cit., p. 95.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

the fate of democracy in the world, because it is concerned about the freedom, as the highest civilizational value. Therefore, Washington believes that people of other civilizations should devote themselves to Western values of democracy, free market, limiting government, human rights, rule of law and culture of individualism. These are universal values for the creators of American foreign policy, seeking to export to other civilization. We may say that global democratization of governing from Washington represents a specific form of political missionary. Walter Mondale, U.S. Vice President under President Carter, criticizing the neoconservatives who directed the U.S. foreign policy during the administration of G. Bush Sr., and then G. W. Bush, states: "We have also often had the opportunity to hear phrases like 'you're either with us or against us' or 'good vs. evil'. They wanted to destroy evil, and similar arguments had often carried in religious connotations. If you would criticize them, or you would not agree with their conclusions, you could often stand as accused for the lack of clear moral principles."²⁰ Quite often has this universality of the United States sounded like imperialism.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as if the assumptions and hopes of ideologists of the global democratic revolution came true. Washington believed that throughout the World the idea of human rights will soon prevail and thus democratic governments in a Western form shall be installed. Driven by the enthusiasm of victory, the United States had, as a primary goal of its foreign policy, set expansion of democracy. The Clinton administration has even officially announced the expansion of democracy as the pillar of U.S. foreign policy, by tying their national interests for the future of the world democracy.²¹ In 1990 Huntington wrote: "the future of freedom, stability, peace and the United States to some extent depends on the future of democracy".²²

Export of democracy to the former Soviet Union has not proceeded as smoothly as expected. Democratization in the former communist countries includes the replacement of the basic roles of the state. It is not enough to create an efficient government, the success of democracy depends on how the government perceives itself, but also how its citizens and the international community feel about it. In the Soviet Union, as well as in other communist countries, there was expressed belief in the omnipotence and omnipresence of secret police, a culture of secrecy and mystification of power included the emphasis on authority, at the expense of individual freedom and loyalty, all at

²⁰ Jevgenij Primakov, *Svet bez Rusije?*, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2010. p. 23.

²¹ Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Facts On File, Inc., New York, 2004. p. 122.

²² Samjuel P. Hantington, *Treći talas*, loc.cit., p. 36.

the expense of the rule of law. Democratization is required to create conditions that favoured the development of previously non-existent civil society.

The active role of the United States as an external factor in the process of democratization and the creation of civil society in the former Soviet Union was reflected in three important factors: the policy of conditionality, the integration into international organizations and regional trends of democratization.

3.1. Policy of conditioning

Policy of conditioning is reduced to political, economic, moral and cultural activities, of one or more countries in relation to that country in which the regime is wanted to be democratized. A basic tool of the policy of conditioning is reward and punishment, or threat of punishment. If an authoritarian regime starts to act in the direction of liberalization and democratization, countries interested in creating changes create stronger diplomatic ties, provide economic assistance and loans, enter into bilateral trade arrangements, liberalize customs and non-tariff barriers etc. On the other side, if the authoritarian regime make steps toward further isolation or stays on the line of denial of political rights and civil liberties, the interested nations confront this regime through diplomatic channels, through activities in international organizations, the denial of economic aid, political and economic isolation and sanctions, as well as the provision of logistical support and by providing material resources to opposition groups.

At the post-Soviet space sanctions were used as well as the rewards, as a form of policy of conditioning of the United States and the European Union. Although the European Union refrained itself from imposing sanctions, and its policy of conditioning was limited mainly to the possibility of reward, the United States had frequently used sanctions and other forms of punishment. In 1994, Clinton introduced the term “rogue state”, which were later connected to “failed states” as entities that the United States must help, but also must be protected from.²³ Unfortunately the U.S. has often selectively applied the classification and punishment of these “failed states”, and after the aforementioned massacre in Uzbekistan in 2005, failed to punish regime of Islam Karimov. The British Ambassador to Tashkent Craig Murray, claimed in 2002 that the security forces of Uzbekistan cooked alive two members of Islamic movement Hizb ut-Tahrir and brutally tortured prisoners, in cooperation with agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).²⁴ In addition to these charges, while still

²³ Naom Chomsky, *Failed States*, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2006., p. 107.

²⁴ Craig Murray, *Joint Enterprise on Torture*, Internet: <http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/26,15/1/2012>.

Ambassador in Tashkent, Murray, in 2002 and 2003, in an official dispatch to London, said: “The U.S. conceal the real situation of human rights in Uzbekistan ... Viewed from Tashkent, U.S. policy is not focused much on democracy and freedom. This is because of oil, gas and hegemony. In Uzbekistan, the United States seeks these goals, by helping the ruthless dictatorship.”²⁵ In a strictly confidential letter to London of 18 March 2003, Murray wrote: “Last year the U.S. gave half a billion dollars of help to Uzbekistan, out of which a quarter was intended for military purposes. Bush and Powell have repeatedly extolled Karimov as a friend and ally. This regime has at least seven thousand prisoners on its conscience: it is a one-party state where no freedom of speech exists, nor free press, freedom of movement, right of assembly, nor the right to free exercise of religion.”²⁶ The situation is similar with U.S. policy in relation to Azerbaijan, through whose territory pipeline “Nabucco”, on which Washington insists, has to cross, as well as Turkmenistan, for which *Human Rights Watch* claims to be one of the most repressive regimes in the world.²⁷

3.2. Policy of integration

As the second most important international factor of the democratization of post-Soviet space, policy of integration is pointed out. It can be argued that this policy is extended hand of policy of conditioning, as it includes certain economic and political benefits that follow the democratization of the state and membership in international organizations. Thus, the possibility of joining the European Union for the Eastern European countries of the former Soviet Union, represented the most significant motive for the implementation of broad social and political reforms. International institutions like the European Union, NATO, the Council of Europe, the World Trade Organization and others, have imposed to these countries strict requirements of harmonization of its politics with their basic principles, which coincide with the values of liberal democracy. In this way, the promotion of democracy got its institutional forms, which have, by the claims of many scientists, directly contributed to the reform of the former communist societies and their economies.²⁸ Perceived benefits of membership in these organizations exceeded all other alternative forms of political existence in a given area that borders with Western civilization. This particularly refers to membership in the European Union and the World Trade Organization, for

²⁵ Naom Chomsky, *Failed States*, loc.cit. p. 141.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash – Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, loc. cit., p. 15.

which was thought that shall directly affect the increase in real income of citizens and improvement of the economy.

The U.S. role in this process was reflected primarily in the expansion of NATO into post-Soviet space, but also in the strong influence in determining international economic and financial organizations like the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank etc. In contemporary literature, is often stated that NATO has never been solely a military organization which dealt with issues of defence and security, but it was a political coalition, led by the United States, whose work is based on common ideological postulates.²⁹ In 1999, at the NATO summit in Washington, it was concluded that “the common democratic values, human rights and rule of law are the foundation of the Alliance” and the expansion of democracy was listed as one of its basic tasks.³⁰ The membership in this organization shall be permitted only to those countries that advocate the basic values of liberal democracy. All NATO members are secular democratic states, with a multiparty system, and officially liberal democratic system.

The Baltic countries of the former USSR, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of NATO in 2004. It is no coincidence that the NATO summit of 2006 was held exactly in Riga, where the strategic document was adopted which states that the main threats to NATO members in the coming years are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, regional crises, misuse of new technologies and disruptions in the supply of basic resources.³¹ By this the U.S. has, in public discourse of one of the most important international organizations of predominantly Western civilization, crammed, among other things, the notion of failed states. At the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, the United States had withdrew the proposal to include Ukraine and Georgia closer in NATO. This proposal was rejected primarily because of disagreements between Germany and France, which were aware of the fact that Russia cannot see NATO strategically as a friendly force. That same year, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that the Baltic states instilled a new life to NATO and that thanks to the energy acquired from new members, NATO began to participate in military operations far beyond its original sphere of responsibility. According to her, NATO needs to continue to increase the number of its members.³² Yevgeny Primakov points out that the

²⁹ Dragan Petrović, *Integracioni procesi na postsovjetskom prostoru*, Pešić i sinovi, Beograd, 2010, p. 190.

³⁰ Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash - Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, loc. cit., p. 154.

³¹ Ibid. 191.

³² Jevgenij Primakov, *Svet bez Rusije?*, loc. cit., p. 109.

NATO expansion process is designed predominantly to make Russia more indulgent, and that the U.S. did not include the extremely negative attitude of Russia towards admission of former Soviet republics into NATO. He adds: "We did not have a written agreement with the United States on this issue. However, when I was Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, several times I spoke to Madeleine Albright and Strobe Talbott and his other American colleagues, that the admission of former Soviet republics into NATO represents for us 'crossing the red line'. In response I heard that there are no grounds to believe that this will happen in the near future. And it has happened."³³

A referendum was held in Georgia where the majority of citizens voted to join NATO. It should be noted that the referendum was conducted at the time of strained relations between Russia and Georgia. Although the Georgian regime hoped that membership in NATO shall provide military support in case of further escalation of conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia continues to remain outside the organization. On the other hand, Ukraine has, in 2008, with support from the U.S., while "orange forces" were still in power, expressed its readiness to join NATO, but this idea is the one where Ukraine's leadership met with considerable opposition in Moscow, as well as from a large number of local people. In Ukraine, about 20% of the total population identify themselves as Russians, while in the whole Ukraine, Russian language is spoken by almost 50% of the population.³⁴ Most of the population of Ukraine does not approve its entry into NATO. Such a scenario would even more intensify unstable political situation in Ukraine, and put on the agenda the question of Russia's Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol. In addition, Russia would give up its military component manufacturing industry in Ukraine, which would have strong economic consequences. Primakov asks: "... whether the United States and NATO are ready, in case of Ukraine admission to NATO and the inevitable escalation of its relation with Russia, to firmly side with Kiev against Moscow, at the risk of returning Russia to the period of confrontation with the West?"³⁵ The State Department's Strategic Plan for the 2007-2012, as one of the major goals of U.S. policy lists the bringing together "the new democracies of the Community of Independent States", with European and North Atlantic structures, through support, encouragement and technical advice.³⁶ It is not necessary to be an expert in international relations to conclude that involvement of Ukraine and other republics of the former USSR

³³ Ibid., p. 110.

³⁴ Dragan Petrović, *Geopolitika postsovjetskog prostora*, loc.cit., p. 40.

³⁵ Jevgenij Primakov, *Svet bez Rusije?*, loc. cit., p. 111.

³⁶ Ibid., 120.

to NATO is unacceptable for Russia. Kremlin does not see democratization, but the broadening of U.S. armed force bases.

In 1997 United States attempted to export democracy into post-Soviet space by the establishment of an international regional organization GUAM, which is named after the first letters of the countries which have established her: Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova. This organization was supposed to represent an alternative to the CIS integration processes led by Russia, and was briefly joined by Uzbekistan, who later left the alliance. After the political changes in Ukraine in 2010, which brought to power pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych, Ukraine has distanced itself from the organization, while Moldova and Azerbaijan passived their membership.

3.3. Regional trends of democratization

Huntington vividly explains the snowball effect, which means that knowledge on important political events in the world, often in a region, affects the possibility of nearly simultaneous launch of similar events in the country. Success of democratization in a country encourages the view that democratization represents a solution to domestic problems. In the literature, this effect is also called the diffusion or domino effect and involves a situation in which authoritarian regimes are exposed to significant external pressure of “proliferation of democracy” at the very borders of their country.³⁷ Although science has not managed to reach a conclusion as to how big this snowball can grow and whether it can “skip” some states, as well as whether this phenomenon can be controlled, practice has shown that the overthrow of the communist regime in Poland in 1989, sparked a wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, which significantly influenced the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main advantage of this proliferation of democracy lies in the fact that the techniques and methods of successful termination of authoritarian systems are transferred to other countries, and as their primary carrier NGOs occur. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, United States have financed a significant number of civil society organizations in post-Soviet space, in order to promote human rights, political freedoms, and other universal values. The proliferation of techniques and methods of termination of authoritarian regimes occurred in the so-called “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space, from 2003 to 2005.

The colour revolutions are the common name for the events that occurred in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Perhaps we could also call them flower revolutions, because the events in Georgia were

³⁷ Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash – Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, loc.cit., p. 12.

called the Rose Revolution, Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and in Kyrgyzstan Tulip Revolution. It is arguable how these events can be called revolutions, because the political system after them did not fundamentally changed. What characterizes them is the change of power after elections in which, according to official information, ruling parties or its candidates won, after which the opposition organized mass protests, claiming that the elections were falsified. In this process an important role in the protests and the opposition campaign had a non-governmental organizations funded largely by the United States, with the logistical help of former members of a Serbian organization OTPOR (RESISTANCE), which was a striking fist of the opposition in Serbia in 2000, led by students and youth. Resignation of Shevardnadze in Georgia, the victory of the pro-Western candidate Yushchenko on the re-elections in the Ukraine, as well as Askar Akayev's leaving of the country in Kyrgyzstan, represented a significant success for U.S. policy of demortization in the post-Soviet space. A number of authors inspired by the enthusiasm of the new democracy in the former Soviet Union, using Huntington's concept of the third wave of democratization as basis, have described these events as a new fourth wave of democratization that has fundamentally changed the political situation in these countries primarily for the benefit of American interests.³⁸

3. Russia and restraining of the fourth wave of democratization

Colour revolutions, that within three years passed from Georgia to Ukraine, and then Kyrgyzstan, gained the character of the regional trend of democratization, which threatened the current regimes in the post-Soviet space. The power of demonstrated example in the democratization processes has already been mentioned. The fall of a regime in one country, and with it the introduction of democratic reforms, not only can initiate a wave of democratization, but can create confidence in the neighbouring countries that this process is inevitable. On the other hand, stopping this wave and setting example according to which countries in the region do not necessarily have to experience the transformation of the Western type, significantly stimulates the opposite belief. In a similar way in which the United States perceived expansion of communism in Indochina as a threat to its security and national interests, Russia saw the stopping of colour revolutions within their boundaries and starting reverse waves as an imperative. Any expansion of this "virus" outside Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, would constitute a threat to Russia's sovereign democracy. In response to external pressures, different types of opposition to the U.S. promotion of democracy in the region emerged. For the

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

purposes of this paper, we shall indicate the four most important: isolation, redefining, strengthening and undermining.

The strategy of *isolation* most often involves the ban of media and organizations financed from abroad. Russia has taken major steps that, through the isolation policy, brought in unfavourable position many non-governmental organizations accused of espionage activities and characterized as a threat to national security and sovereignty. As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, USA allocate significant funding for foreign non-governmental organizations aimed at promoting democratic values. Having realized the importance of the civil sector in modern ideological and civilizational struggle between the Western and others, the authorities in Moscow, after the colour revolutions, have decided to strictly supervise and control the activities of the organization funded from abroad. In 2004, Putin listed as the main priority of these organizations raising funds from numerous international influential foundations and serving their interests.³⁹ Under the accusation that organizations financed from abroad represent the interests of foreign powers, and act as their agents on the territory of Russia, in early 2006, Putin signed a law that significantly restricts the civil sector. Among other things, this law prohibits the registration of those organizations that “threaten the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, national unity, unique character, cultural heritage and national interests of the Russian Federation“.⁴⁰ Although the legitimacy of the state to prohibit work of all those who act against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence is not being brought into question, what represents the possibility for misuse of this law are concepts like national unity, national character, cultural heritage and national interests. This has enabled the authorities to arbitrarily decide on the existence of non-governmental sector, and to have a discretionary right to deny registration and issuance of their work license. At the end of the same year, the Federal Security Service (FSS) announced that it has registered a significant increase in the number of foreign spies working under the guise of NGOs.⁴¹ Vladislav Surkov, who in late 2011 became the Deputy Prime Minister, and is considered the main ideologue of Russian policy, in his speech in 2005, while working as the Deputy Chief of the Presidential Administration, criticized the work of the organization Freedom House: “Only an idiot would be likely to believe that the mission of that “office“ is purely humanitarian“.⁴² In the years that followed,

³⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 53.

⁴² Ibid., p. 70.

many organizations disappeared from the list of non-governmental organizations operating in Russia.

An important way of restraining the fourth wave of democratization is the policy of *redefining*, which implies the rhetorical defence and ideological support to the current political situation in the country and the course on which the regime persists. By questioning the moral superiority of the West, particularly the United States, in terms of their struggle for universal human rights, criticizing their hypocritical advocacy for civil liberties and selective democratization, Russia stepped out with its own democratic concept, representing the “sovereign democracy” as the only possible and correct theoretical basis of Russian policy. The concept of sovereign democracy is based on the idea of the political system protected from external pressures. It represents an alternative to liberal democracy, which according to the Moscow ideologues is not in accordance with the Russian political culture. According to this doctrine, the democratization from the West represents American project that seeks to weaken the sovereignty of Russia, as it was done in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan after the color revolutions. Sovereign democracy represents the right of the Russian people to persist on the unique path of democratic development, consistent with its historical, geopolitical and other characteristics. Differences in cultural and social development require a different approach to democratization in relation to the standard Western model, which is wanted to be replicated in region. For advocates of this approach, only with the leading role of the state in creating new political classes and President’s “firm hand” policy, it is possible to establish a functional model of democracy in Russia. In other words, democratization in Russia must be guided from the top, without external pressures and West’s interference in the internal affairs, which tends to destabilize the region and threaten national sovereignty.

Policy of *strengthening* implies supporting regimes that are not contaminated with the virus of democratization in the region, as well as strengthening of regional cooperation. By recognizing the impact of regional integration on the process of democratization in post-Soviet space, Russia has launched its own initiative to strengthen regional integration and international networking mainly through the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Providing support particularly refers to Belarus, with which Russia fosters special cultural, military and economic relations. Therefore, Russia is determined not to let the orange virus spread within the boundaries of Belarus. These two countries are in the state union based on the Agreement of 1999, while Belarus in terms of ethnicity, religion, history, and culture can be considered an integral part of Russian national corpus.⁴³ Although the joint

⁴³ Dragan Petrović, *Geopolitika postsovjetskog prostora*, op. cit., p. 28.

state jurisdictions of the Community created in 1999, have not yet been signed, the President of Belarus Lukashenko claims he is a supporter of cooperation and partnership with Russia. Lukashenko himself said in 2005: “Revolution in Belarus is revolution in Russia”, so that later in June 2011, during democratic protests in Minsk, he vowed there will be no colour revolution in his country.⁴⁴ Although there is political disagreement between Minsk and the Kremlin, Putin continued to support Lukashenko on the international scene by diplomatic means. Moscow does not recognize the legitimacy of the Belarusian opposition, nor in any way encouraged Lukashenko to take a step towards democratization. Only one day after American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2005 met with representatives of the Belarusian opposition, when she supported them by claiming that it is time for change in Belarus, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov dismissed her comments, adding that the process of democratic reform must not be imposed from outside.⁴⁵ Only in 2005, the United States allocated 11.8 million dollars for funding of pro-democratic parties and non-governmental organizations in Belarus, as well as various Belarusian opposition groups based outside the country.⁴⁶ In response to Washington’s actions, Russia has supported Lukashenko in the 2006 presidential elections and since then actively opposes any kind of external pressure on Belarus.

After the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and with the change of regime in Tbilisi and Kiev, the relations between these countries and Russia have deteriorated. In response to the anti-Russian policy and turning the two former Soviet republics towards Europe and Washington, that is the European Union and NATO, Russia has launched a campaign of *undermining* the consolidation of these regimes. Since 2005, the Kremlin has criticized the colour revolutions, and the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not go in favour of good neighbourly relations between Russia and Georgia. In relation to Georgia, undermining the Saakashvili’s regime manifested not only the diplomatic pressure, but also economic sanctions imposed in 2006, which included a boycott of Georgian wines, mineral water, fruit and other goods. In addition to these measures, Georgia has accused Russia of misuse of energy for political purposes, and visa regime between the two countries has also tightened. Tensions between Georgia and Russia culminated in August 2008,

⁴⁴ Lukashenko vows ‘no color revolution’ in Belarus, CNN, Internet: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-04/world/belarus.protests_1_president-alexander-lukashenko-belarusminsk?_s=PM:WORLD, 7/1/2012.

⁴⁵ Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash – Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, loc. cit., p. 111.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

when the Georgian military in quick attack occupied the capital of the unrecognized South Ossetia. By the actions of Russian military forces that were located in this territory (according to the Agreement of 1992, as a peacekeeping force) and with the help of additional troops from Russia, Georgian units were forced to withdraw. After these unfortunate events, President Medvedev officially recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Towards Ukraine as the most important country in post-Soviet space after Russia (observed by size of territory and population) Russia launched a major initiative to undermine the orange forces led by Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. It is not necessary to analyze in detail how important Ukraine is to Russia in geostrategic terms, but we would only add the fact that Huntington mentions - that Ukraine is in cultural and civilizational terms country divided into eastern pro-Russian part, contrary to the western part, which in the history has long been under the Catholic Poland and Austro-Hungary.⁴⁷ After the orange revolution in late 2004, all the way to the 2010 presidential elections, Ukraine became the main arena of political conflict of interests between Russia and the United States. Poor relations between Kiev and Moscow culminated when "Gazprom" in 2006 suspended gas supplies to Ukraine, on the grounds that Ukraine has refused to negotiate the market price calculation. In response, the Ukrainian "Neftogaz" began to take away the gas which was intended for European consumers. After Ukraine agreed to negotiations, gas supply was restored, which was supplied until March 2008, when the Ukrainian side has refused to sign the document on its debt for gas imports, which reached more than 1.5 billion dollars.⁴⁸ The situation normalized only when Ukraine signed this document under pressure from the European Union (which is highly dependent on imported oil and natural gas from Russia).⁴⁹

Orange wave was stopped in 2010, when Ukrainian former President Yushchenko won only 5% of the votes, while in the second round of voting pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovich won, with about 3.5% difference compared to Tymoshenko.⁵⁰ After taking over the power, Yanukovich freezes future relationship with NATO, develops live collaboration with Russia with frequent meetings of state leaders, enables Russian language to be used as a second official language in most of Ukraine's parts, signs a long-term agreement on gas, as well as an agreement on extension of residence of the Russian Black

⁴⁷ Samjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, loc.cit., p. 185.

⁴⁸ Jevgenij Primakov, *Svet bez Rusije?*, loc.cit., p. 92.

⁴⁹ Stevan Rapaić, "Tržište energenata u Evropskoj uniji i interesi Srbije", *Međunarodni problemi*, vol. 61, No. 4, 2009, p. 533.

⁵⁰ Dragan Petrović, *Predsednički izbori u Ukrajini 2010.*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2010, p. 103.

Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2047.⁵¹ The final blow to the forces of the fourth wave of democratization in Ukraine is the court judgement of 11 October 2011, by which Yulia Tymoshenko was found guilty of abuse of office and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The same judgment ordered her to pay about 189 million dollars in damages to the country and prohibited her participation in political life while serving a prison sentence. As a curiosity we emphasize the fact that she was convicted because of the signing of the controversial contract with the Russian side in 2009, in which the Ukrainian “Neftogaz” took over the debt repayment obligations, and by which the gas crisis ended.⁵²

It is necessary to mention here that in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, under unclear circumstances, violent demonstrations occurred in which 88 people were killed and more than 1000 wounded. After these demonstrations the regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev was destroyed, who came to power in 2005, with the tulip revolution. Bakiyev, in his first reactions, accused Russia of this overturn, primarily because of the extension agreement with the United States on the use of military air base Manas. Violence was preceded by the energy crisis in late 2009, which has hit Kyrgyzstan after the rise in heating prices by 400% and electricity by 170%. In order to decrease its dependence on Russian energy, President Bakiyev had initiated the construction of transmission lines with China, and in January 2010 signed a contract worth 342 million dollars with the Chinese company Tebian Electric. Although it is still unknown what exactly caused the riots, a few days before the revolution, Russia has imposed tariffs on exports of energy sources in Kyrgyzstan, which has caused the wave of discontent over the country in relation to the regime of Kurmanbek Bakiyev.

After the riots in Kyrgyzstan and elections in Ukraine in 2010, Georgia has remained the only country where the colour forces remained in power. Bearing in mind that the Saakashvili’s regime did not bring significant democratic progress and functioning of democratic institutions, we can claim that the democratization process led by the United States of America on post-Soviet space represented the project of limited scope.

Conclusion

Huntington’s thesis that human history is history of civilizations, that is history of culture in which religion plays a dominant role, and that the contemporary world is divided into nine civilizations in which nations and

⁵¹ Dragan Petrović, *Rusija i Evropa*, loc.cit., p. 145.

⁵² *7 years for Ukrainian ex-prime minister Tymoshenko*, Gazeta, Internet: http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/10/11/a_3797050.shtml, 17/1/2012.

countries with similar cultures merge, while nations and countries with different cultures are separating and coming into conflicts, has significant implications for the post-Soviet space. The collapse of communism caused a strong identity crisis in this region. Valid social norms, value systems and the basic principles of the former society, and even the very social structure are discarded, and the long-term sources of identity and the system of authority were destroyed. The gap between state and society, which originated in the collapse of the communist system, has created the need for rapid discovery of new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and moral regulation. Cultural and religious identity replaced Marxist-Leninist ideology, which was a primary centripetal and stabilizing force in the Soviet Union.

In the former Soviet Union new civilizational boundaries emerged, which inclined Catholic and Protestant people towards Western civilization, separating them from the Orthodox and Islamic people. Although the process of democratization in the post-Soviet space was shaped by civilizational identity and there is strong correlation between Western Christianity and democracy, we yet believe that this process was not determined by it. The range of cultural obstacles to democratization, and the impact of culture on the democratization of post-Soviet space, cannot be clearly quantified, nor is it possible to prove the hypothesis according to which Islam and Orthodox Christianity are incompatible with democracy.

In the decades after the collapse of the USSR, the United States launched a major political, economic and military campaigns of democratization in the post-Soviet space aimed at building the civil sector and strengthening universal human and political rights. However, exporting democracy to the former Soviet Union countries was not going so smoothly. Democratization in the former communist countries implies the transformation of the role and competences of a government. Democratization required creation of conditions that favoured the development of hitherto non-existent civil society.

The active role of the United States as an external factor in the democratization process in the post-Soviet space was reflected in three important factors: the policy of conditioning, the integration into international organizations and initiating regional trends of democratization. The proliferation of techniques and methods of termination of authoritarian regimes occurred in the so-called “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space, from 2003 to 2005, under the auspices of the United States. On the other hand, Russia saw stopping of these revolutions in their own boundaries and initiating reverse waves as an imperative. Any expansion of this “virus” outside Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, was a threat to the concept of sovereign democracy in Russia. In response to external pressures, different types of opposition to the U.S. promotion of democracy in the region were created.

Cultural differences in the post-Soviet space have created a clash between two concepts of democracy. The first, liberal democratic, guided by the Western Christianity of the United States, which insists on its universality and the second, the Russian concept of sovereign democracy that opposes the universal principle, questioning the moral superiority of the West. According to this doctrine, the democratization from the West represent American project that seeks to weaken the sovereignty of Russia, as was done in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan after the colour revolutions. Moscow ideologues of sovereign democracy advocate the theory according to which differences in cultural and social development require a different approach to democratization in relation to the standard Western model, which was to be literally implemented onto the former Soviet Union. Seen from the perspective of liberal democracy, the concept of sovereign democracy is nothing but a demagogic defence of the authoritarian regime, which seeks to violate human rights and limit political freedom, actively acting to undermine the democratic process in the region.

References

1. Semjuel P. Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, Cid, Podgorica, 2000.
2. Samjuel P. Hantington, *Treći talas*, Stubovi kulture, Beograd, 2004.
3. Džon Brinkmen, *Kulturne kontradikcije demokratije*, Filip Višnjić, Beograd 2008.
4. Jael Tamir, *Liberalni nacionalizam*, Filip Višnjić, Beograd 2002.
5. Naom Chomsky, *Failed States*, Metropolitan Books, New York, 2006.
6. Dragan Petrović, *Geopolitika postsovjetskog prostora*, Prometej, Novi Sad i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2008.
7. Milan Jovanović, *Izborni sistemi postkomunističkih država*, Službeni glasnik SCG, Fakultet političkih nauka, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2004
8. Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash – Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Farnham, 2009.
9. *Freedom in the World 2012: The Arab Uprising and Their Global Repercussions*, Freedom House, 2012, Internet: www.freedomhouse.org, 22/1/2012
10. *Preliminary Findings on Events in Andijan, Uzbekistan, 13 May 2005*, OSCE, ODIHR, Internet: <http://www.osce.org/odihr/15653>, 1/2/2012
11. *Freedom House*, Internet: <http://www.freedomhouse.org/regions/central-and-eastern-europeeurasia>, 10/2/2012.
12. Jevgenij Primakov, *Svet bez Rusije?*, Službeni Glasnik, Beograd, 2010.
13. Glenn Hastedt, *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, Facts On File, Inc., New York, 2004.
14. Craig Murray, *Joint Enterprise on Torture*, Internet: <http://www.craigmurray.org.uk/26/>, 15/1/2012.

15. Dragan Petrović, *Integracini procesi na postsovjetskom prostoru*, Pešić i sinovi, Beograd, 2010.
16. *Lukashenko vows 'no color revolution' in Belarus*, CNN, Internet: http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-04/world/belarus.protests_1_president-alexander-lukashenko-belarusminsk?_s=PM:WORLD, 7/1/2012.
17. Dragan Petrović, *Rusija i Evropa*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2010.
18. Stevan Rapačić, "Tržište energenata u Evropskoj uniji i interesi Srbije", *Međunarodni problemi*, vol. 61, br. 4, str. 515-535, 2009.
19. Dragan Petrović, *Predsednički izbori u Ukrajini 2010.*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2010.
20. *7 years for Ukrainian ex-prime minister Timoshenko*, Gazeta, Internet: http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/10/11/a_3797050.shtml, 17/1/2012
21. Jean Grugel, *Democratization A Critical Introduction*, PALGRAVE, New York, 2002.
22. Christian Thorun, *Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy*, PALGRAVE, New York, 2009.
23. Cameron Ross, *Federalism and democratisation in Russia*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2002.
24. John S. Dryzek and Leslie Templeman Holmes, *Post-Communist Democratization*, Cambridge University Press, 2004.

UDK: 327(560:061.1EU)
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 106–118
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Nevenka Jeftić Šarčević*¹
*Dragan Tančić*²

New Projections of the Turkish Politics in XXI century (Turkey and the European Union)

ABSTRACT

'Turkish strategic vision' is consistent project, making a unit within itself. The goals are long term. The resources are significant. The methods are conciliant. However, if the wider context of movement of power constellation is established, the issue on realism and realization of 'Vision' shall be brought.

The relations between Turkey and Europe Union within the context of the development of the European Union have two phases. The first phase includes classic Turkish foreign policy, which was characterized by the strong direction of Turkey towards European and Euroatlantic integrations. The second phase is marked by the new Turkish state policy proclaimed in the project "Turkish strategic vision". Mutual attraction between Turkey and the EU is found in the domain of energetics.

Key words: 'Turkish strategic vision', Turkey, Europe Union.

The goals of the State project of the Republic of Turkey: *Turkish strategic vision*

Turkish strategic vision is a project opening new perspectives to the Turkish country and nation in XXI century and it was represented under the supervision of the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey as the hub, i.e. centre surrounded by the greatest energetic world resources.

The Turkish strategic vision envisages the building up of Turkey: at the global actor level, democracy society and human rights as well as economically

¹ Nevenka Jeftić Šarčević, Ph.D., Professional associate in the Institute of International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, Serbia, e-mail: jeftic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

² Dragan Tančić, Ph.D., Professional associate in the Institute for Serbian Culture, Leposavić, Serbia, e-mail: dragan_tancic@yahoo.com.

and technically developed society of the high life standard in the direction of elevation of Turkey at the level of grand economic power of global proportions. Turkish is aware that for accomplishing the goals of "Vision" in reaching the prestigious actor worldwide, it is required to built itself into powerful social formation including military domain as well.

Regarding the context of global changes, geostrategy and geoeconomy: "The new circumstances set Turkey before the reconstruction challenge of geopolitical subjectivity up to overvalue of importance in relation to state and population, considering that people and national affinities extend significantly outside the borders of Turkish country."³ Geographic surrounding of Turkey is one of the main fundaments and sources of power increase for accomplishment of 'Turkish strategic vision'. The set of areas from Caucasus to Mongolia has been populated by the Turkish. There is still a strong heritage of Ottoman Empire at the Middle East and Far East, North Africa and the Balkans. At the contemporary historical area, religion and culture impose the significant place: "With Pan-Turkism in Caucasus and Middle Asia, after the breakup of Soviet Union, Turkey turned itself to the Balkans."⁴ Although 'Turkish Strategic vision' as a project of state policy was proclaimed in 2003 in the study *Strategic Depth*, by the author and politician Ahmet Davutoglu, it has a deeper time root in Turkey. Since 1991, the prime minister of Turkey of that time, Turgut Ozal specified that XXI century would be the century of Turkey on the Balkans.⁵

Analyses, projections and plans point to the geographic position within the context of geopolitical, especially geoeconomic factors: "Turkey, which is at the key location and crossroads of three continents, has the unique geopolitical identity within this region".⁶

Resources of Turkey covering the realization of the state project "Turkish strategic vision"

Demographic factor

Turkey is found in the process of the significant increase of the population. Reaffirmation of religion as the value system of the Turkish society, there shall be more convenient conditions for further and faster population development.

³ Filip Tunjić, "Europe-in-Between – Paradigm of political geography of geopolitics. Nothing New in the West, All As Usual in the East", in: Social researches – *Magazine for general social researches*, No. 4-5/2007, pg. 891-915, c. 903.

⁴ As mentioned.

⁵ As mentioned.

⁶ As mentioned.

Such condition represents the first class resource for development at the power ladder. From the period of 1981-1983, the number of population of Turkey increased from 46,800.000⁷ to 71 million in 2008.⁸ Demographic increase of Turkey is enabled by the domination of the youth population i.e. age of 56% population up to 29 years old and 78,4% population up to 44 years old. This resource of Turkey bears significant importance in relation to the European Union and Europe as a whole but it is less important towards its eastern and southern Asian surrounding, where the demographic increase is similar to the Turkish one. Population stagnation or its decrease represents the important and key barrier on the path to power increase of a country, especially the one with the ambitions to remain or become a power country.

Geographic and geoeconomic position within the context of "Turkish strategic vision"

Although there is only a little part (3%) of its territory in Europe, its geographic position still defines Turkey as Euro-Asian country. After the end of Ottoman Empire, in this way it saved "the leg in the European doors". Based on its possession of particles of Europe, Turkey obtained the right to membership in all pan-European organizations and institutions: the Council of Europe, OEBS and all European sports organizations.⁹

In geoeconomic relations, Turkey is surrounded with the greatest energetic resources making it the hub of energetic currents. Geoeconomic position of Turkey makes the first class and probably the strongest resource in accomplishing the Turkish strategic vision: a) energetic resources and sources surround Turkey from the north, east and south with % of world petrol and gas sources; b) Turkey is located between the greatest sites and emergent consumers. It is actively engaged as the bridge i.e. hub of energetic currents.^{10,11}

⁷ *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1983*, Newspaper Enterprise Association, INC. New York, p. 568.

⁸ *Time Almanac 2010*, Powered by Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago-London-New Delhi-Paris-Seul-Sydney-Taipei-Tokyo, p. 454.

⁹ As well as in political, it is in all European competitions specified as an European country. Although it has the majority of the residences and households in Asia, Turkey as an Asian country and the Turkish as Asian people have 'address of residence' in Europe. That kind of position has only Kazakhstan.

¹⁰ See: *Tyrkey's New Role In Geostrategic Landscape Of Euro-Muslim Relations – Analysis*. Written by ISN Insights by Andera Bonnzanini and Dorykhan I Aras, <http://www.eyrasia.com>, Internet: 01. Septembre 2011.

¹¹ The same author specifies in analysis that the nowadays Turkey is a transversal of petrol from the Caspian Sea and Iraq: "Two petrol lines from Baku and Kirkuk provie

Historic heritage

Historic heritage of the Ottoman Empire is a significant factor and potential of realization of the project 'Turkish strategic vision'. The political and cultural expansion of impact and domination in the surrounding is based on that factor. Implementation of the historic heritage into the aims of 'Turkish strategic vision' is directed into four routes, but with variable political ideas and content. Three main regions are in focus: the Balkans, Arabic countries and the Middle East. The fourth region are Caucasia and former countries of the Soviet Union, which Turkey is considering, but due to good neighbouring relations with Russia and crossing the various positions and impacts, that area is in wider horizon with the initial concrete activities this autumn (for example Azerbaijan and Turkey signed the contract on gas transit on 25th October 2011).¹²

In the focus of the historical heritage, the most explicit is the Balkans. The author of the "Strategic depth" with the explained elements of the 'Turkish strategic vision', Ahmet Davutoglu says for the Balkans: "We would like a new Balkans region, founded at the political values, economic interdependence and cooperation as well as cultural harmony. It was Ottoman Balkans. We shall refurbish the Balkans. People call it Neo-Ottoman. That is why I do not refer to Ottoman country as the foreign affairs political issue. What I emphasise in the

Medditeranean terminal Ceuhan with 1,3 million barrels per day. It was planned to double it in 2012 as well as connection with Samsun at the Black Sea". Besides that, Iraq is planning to increase the production from 2,4 to 12 million barrels per day in the following six to seven years and the main part of that petrol is passed to the north towards Turkey. However, currently the most significant petrol transversal through Turkey is represented by Bosphorus. More than 70 million tons of petrol per year is passed through this Turkish strait.

Turkey has been engaged not only regarding the petrol transportation from producer to consumers but also the other important emergent – gas. It is planning to impose the striking role in gas transportation from Asia into Europe. With the argument to remove the gas crises in future, Turkey offers also building of the gasline from Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Middle East across its territory. Besides its own gas operator BOTAS, Turkey advocates the building of the great gaslines. One of them is American NABUKO-gasline, which would transport gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan (the Caspian basin) and Iraq towards the southern and south-eastern Europe through Turkish territory. The other one is Russian gasline SOUTH LINE which would transport to the same area the gas from Russia and for which Russia already agreed and make its own territorial sector available.

¹² The signed contract represents the agreement prepared for the long time "on approval of transit of about 10 billion cube metres of natural gas from Azerbaijan towards Europe and solution to one of the obstacles in opening the South Corridor for transit of gas from the Caspian Sea to the EU."; *Azerbaijan, Turkey Sign Gas Transit Deal*, text in Azerbaijani media electronic network PanARMENIAN, October 25, 2011. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/25102011-azerbaijan-turkey-sign-gas-transit-deal/>.

topic is Ottoman heritage. Ottoman centuries on the Balkans are successful story. Now it should be revised.¹³

To what extent the historical heritage is important, Davutoglu explains further: “When I say strategic depth, I imply the historical heritage“ and he adds: “To sum it up, our history is mutual. Our faith is mutual. Our future is mutual. And similar to XVI century, the increase of the Ottoman Balkans, as the centre of the world politics, we shall make the Balkans, Caucaus, the Middle East, together with Turkey, the centre of the world politics in the future.“¹⁴

The project ‘Turkish strategic vision’ and Islamic world

Considering the Arabic world and the Middle East, the emphasis is put on affection to Islam as the significant potential in reaching the goals of the ‘Turkish strategic vision’. The repeated obtaining the leading role in the Islamic world would elevate Turkey highly at the ladder of global impact because it would become a spiritual leader of the great number of people and countries having at its side. Turkey, with the proclaimed “soft” appearance formulated as the “Return of old friends” to the previous region of Ottoman Empire, would represent the tolerant, generally cooperative and compatible Islam towards other nations, cultures and religions and, at the same time, advocate weakening and combat of Islamic radicalism. According to the positions of Turkey, its country in the past: Ottoman Empire lasting for several centuries, provides the proofs for abilities of Turkey in leading and managing the worlds of diverse cultures and reaching harmony within their difference.

“Zero problems with neighbours” are the beginning of accomplishing the Ottoman heritage in XXI century. By the essential process of desecuritization, Turkey primarily removed the barriers in political relations with Iran and Syria. The desecuritization process implies relativization of the secularism to Islamism, i.e. releasing the previously restrained Islamic character of the Turkish society and thus release of the deeply founded Islam as the spiritual potential of the great goals.¹⁵

Setting the Islam at the top of social values, Turkey removed the key barrier towards the Arabic world by putting secularism aside, and also changed

¹³ Prof. dr Ahmet Davutoglu is the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey: *Ottoman centuries of the Balkans are a successful story, it is needed to be renewed*, October 29, 2009 by Daily News Montenegro.

¹⁴ As mentioned.

¹⁵ See: Bylent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat: *From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran*; SAGE publications, <http://sdi.sagepub.com/> Vol.39(5): 495-515, 2008 PRIO, www.prio.no; Internet, 10.09.2011.

the relation towards truly Arabic opponent Israel¹⁶ and set the solid pro-Arabic position towards the country it used to previously support, despite the American objection.

Turkey created good neighbouring and amicable relations with Iran and Syria despite the fact that Iran is known as one side of the “axis of evil” based on the United States. “Arabic spring” offered significant prospects for the promotion of *Pax Ottomanica*. The Turkish prime minister *Tayyip* Erdogan promoted Ottoman Empire to the Arabic world as follows: “That community lived, primarily, based on Islam, but also the mutual combat against the Christian aggressors“ i.e. crusades. In Arabic countries, Erdogan has just promoted the Ottoman Empire and pretensions of Turkey for leading role in the Islamic world: “With growing economy, strong regional military power and three consecutive election win (the last one in June), Erdogan had greater legitimacy than any other Muslim leader. He did his own Arabic tour in order to empower the aims of Turkey in leading the Middle East.”¹⁷

Methods of accomplishing the project ‘Turkish strategic vision’

Methods were theoretically elaborated and are the part of “*Strategic Depth*”, such as, for example, “zero problems with neighbors”, securitization and desecuritization of the safety and value standards, etc. Securitization and desecuritization are the processes directed towards the reform of the value system, i.e. removal of the ideological barriers. In the case of Turkey, simply put, securitization means secularization, and desecuritization means desecularization.

In the scope and context of securitization and desecuritization, there are two very significant methodological and ideological starting points: panturkism and panislamism. Both of these starting points were previously devaluated. Islamism was in general considered the threat to the secular system of Turkey. Opposite to the mentioned, ‘Turkish strategic vision’ and ‘Strategic depth’ identified Turkism and Islamism as a significant developing potential of the Turkish nation and country.

Panturkism is directed towards the integration of the members of Turkish nation and revitalization of the feelings of connection of all Turkish people, especially in Asia and Europe. It may be said that panturkism represents the first and the most important factor of panislamism. Panturkism and panislamism

¹⁶ See: *Pax Ottomanica*, by John Feffer and Tom Engelhardt, June 14, 2010, <http://originalantiwar.com>; Internet, 10.09.2011.

¹⁷ Eyrasiareview: *Erdogan Shoyld Mind His Own Glass House* – OpEd, <http://www.eyrasia.com>; Internet, 10.09.2011.

clearly show the integral unity of the goals, resources and methods of 'Turkish strategic vision'.

In order to activate all factors, especially historical ones, Turkey requires the process of desecuritization. That process has brought to further root changes regarding ideological and economic plan, i.e. increase of power of the Turkish country. Desecuritization implies revitalization of the historical heritage and the approach regarding it, taking over the responsibility and authority for the surrounding areas of Asia and Europe and furthermore until the raise at the global participant level.

Regarding desecuritization as a methodological starting point towards the historical heritage, significant and even essential change is represented by the attitude that the Turkish surrounding is not a foreign affairs issue: "Erdogan pointed out in Syria that it" (the condition in Syria – a remark of the author) "is not only a regional issue, but crucial 'domestic' for Turkey."¹⁸ That methodological approach towards the surrounding of Turkey was specified by Ahmet Davutoglu in a more concise and clearer way within the context of neo-ottomanization of the Balkans: "That is why I do not refer to Ottoman country as a foreign affairs political issue..."¹⁹ Davutoglu strengthened this approach by marking the geopolitical area of Turkey: "Due to these historical relations, the foreign politics of Turkey is trying to establish an order in all surrounding regions: on the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, because if there is not an order, we shall pay the price."²⁰

The methodological changes of the previous politics should be softened in approach towards the surrounding. "Soft" approach includes Ottoman heritage as the "Return of the old friends".²¹ The syntagm of "old friends" implies the positive historical epoch of Turkey. Implication is leaning against the approach that Ottoman Empire represented the progress for all peoples as well as to the condition, that Turkey not even nowadays has negative image neither at the west Balkans nor Asian surrounding.

According to the specified theorem, methodological approach and desecuritization process in Turkey mark deblocking of the prohibition, i.e. release of the Islamic factor, which was previously postulated as the hazard to the secular Republic. Although the release of that factor in Europe is assessed as "Less

¹⁸ As mentioned.

¹⁹ Ahmet Davutoglu, "*Ottoman centuries of the Balkans are a successful story, it is needed to be renewed*", from *Daily News Montenegro*, October 29, 2009, pg. 4.

²⁰ As mentioned.

²¹ Filip Rodic, *The Return of the Old Friends: Turkey on the Balkans*, /<http://www.nin.co.rs/4.4.2010>, Internet, 26.08.2011.

Europe, more Islam”,²² Turkey further remains, but not exclusively, a secular country. Secularism remains as a value and attainment of Ataturk’s Turkey. Secularism is required also in desecularized status to ‘Turkish strategic vision’ not only in the relations and pretensions towards the multinational and multiregional Balkans, but primarily in the project of building Turkey as a significant formation of democracy, rule of law, human rights and high life standards. Those are the goals of ‘Turkish strategic vision’ specified in *Draft* document.

‘Turkish strategic vision’ is consistent project, making a unit within itself. The goals are long term. The resources are significant. The methods are conciliant. However, if the wider context of movement of power constellation is established, the issue on realism and realization of ‘Vision’ shall be brought.

There are barriers in front of the Vision. The greatest ones are in the immediate surrounding of Turkey. In the east, there is a neighbouring Iran with more than 72 million citizens (about one million more than Turkey – 2008) and double the territory, which also have pretensions to the status of the regional power, regional leader and more than it. At the northern coast of the Black Sea, there is Russia, with almost 142 million citizens (2008) and more than 20 times bigger territory, with the status of the great power, significant energetic and other resources and other ones as well as plans on formation of the great Euro-Asian community. At the western border of Turkey, there is the EU as the entity of the biggest economic power. What is even more important: the European Union, after the acceptance of the Republic of Cyprus (unlike the northern part of the island which is separated into the Turkish Republic of Cyprus outside the EU), Bulgaria and Romania, marked its territory and borders towards Turkey in relation to the pretensions of ‘Turkish strategic vision’ to the Balkans. Besides Iran and Russia, that is the third immediate factor, which is found on the path of accomplishment of ‘Turkish strategic vision’ in that region, because the European Union is decisive regarding integration of all Balkans countries and making that region inseparable. All three specified factors: Iran, Russia and the European Union question the establishment of ‘Turkish strategic vision’, especially the elements of the revitalization of the Ottoman heritage.

Turkey and the European Union

The relations between Turkey and Europe within the context of the development of the European Union have two phases. The first phase includes classic Turkish foreign policy, which was characterized by the strong direction

²² Annette Grossbongardt, *Turkey in Transition – Less Europe, More Islam*, in: Spiegel Online, 11/02/2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,446163,00.html>, Internet, 26.08.2011.

of Turkey towards European and Euroatlantic integrations. The second phase is marked by the new Turkish state policy proclaimed in the project “Turkish strategic vision“.

The beginning of the first phase started in 1949, right after establishment of Council of Europe, when Turkey, besides ten states – founding states, became the first member state before all other European countries. Its European and Euroatlantic orientation Turkey – despite the fact that with more than 95% of its territory it is an Asian country, continued intensively with further integrations which enabled its 'place of residence' in Europe. In 1952 it became a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO as the only non-Euro-American country. In 1959 Turkey applied for acceptance into European Economic Community EEC, nowadays the European Union, therefore four years afterwards (in 1963) it concluded the Association Agreement (Ankara Agreement) between Turkey and European Economic Community. Turkey is also a co-founder of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD. The European Union (then western part of Europe) in 1992 accepted Turkey as an Associate Member state of the EU.

A decade long intensive direction towards Europe, Turkey continued with the application for admission into the Euroepan Union as a full member in 1987. The competent European Commission, after many interventions of Turkey, only in 1989 approved its application. However, negotiations on admission into the European Union were delayed. European Commission insisted on reforms in Turkey, i.e. enhancement of the political and economic condition as well as enhancement of then tense relations with Greek and Cyprus (occupying the northern part of the island and recognition of independence of the northern part of Cyprus). In spite of a certain progress of Turkey (enhancement of relations with Greece), European Council in 1997 rescheduled the commencement of negotiations on membership of Turkey in the EU due to lack of high quality reforms and issue on Northern Cyprus. At the meeting of European Council in 2002, eventually the decision was made that the commencement of negotiations with Turkey on its membership would commence in 2005 if Turkey until that period met the specified requirements. However, the requirements of the European Council remained outstanding, the negotiations on access of Turkey were postponed for indefinite time, firstly until 2013 and afterwards until 2021.

The postponement of negotiations on accession of Turkey into the European Union marked the beginning of 'the second phase' of relation between Turkey and the EU with the significant changes occured. In 2001, the attack of Islamic terrorist organization Al Kaida to the USA. At the elections in 2002 in Turkey, the proislamic party of progress and development won. Both these happenings had an impact on changes of the relation between Turkey and

the EU. The further prolongation of threats and terrorist activities (Spain, the Great Britain) in relation to awakening of immigration Islam in Europe resulted in “failure (collapse) of multiculturalism“ in the countries of the European Union. Immigration and Islamic factor, especially from the vast Turkey population in Germany, an African population in France, etc. turned out to be the stumbling block as well as the threat to the citizen constitution of the society, human rights and freedoms, i.e. value system of the European Union.

On the other hand, the significant changes occurred in Turkey as well proclaimed in the state project “Turkish strategic vision until the year 2023“, where Turkey is designed as a powerful global factor providing the possibility of significant positioning. It also reflected on the relations of Turkey and the European Union. Regarding the project, at the current period, Turkey is positioning itself as a regional power. Officially, it is still directed towards the membership in the European Union, but positioning itself as a power, a future focus of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa, multidimensionality of the foreign affairs provides Turkey with the power of establishing its own conditions for accession into the European Union. One of the conditions is shown in its persistence in recognition of Northern Cyprus as a neighbouring independent Turkish state, representing direct opposition to crucial application for a membership. However, it is not only about Northern Cyprus. Basically, Turkish strategic vision represents parallel and rivalry project in relation to the European Union project. Because, as it was previously emphasized, Turkey is not inclined to be outskirts, implying EU outskirts, but the centre of Euro-Asian-African world including also the European Union.

The element of pan-Islamism of the Turkish strategic vision represents also the challenge and barrier in relations of Turkey and the European Union, especially a barrier to the membership. Directly that factor resulted in failure of multiculturalism across the European Union. The success of Islamic factor in Turkey was marked as anti-European path: “Less Europe, more Islam“.²³ Islamisation and pan-Islamism make Turkey more distant from the EU, and in the case of accession of Turkey into the EU membership in relation to citizen system.

The challenge to the relations between Turkey and the European Union is enhanced by the pretensions of Turkish strategic vision for revitalization of Ottoman heritage or, according to many, Ottoman Empire. The revitalization of Ottoman heritage includes also the Balkans peninsula excluding Croatia and Slovenia, which were not the part of the Middle Ages Turkish Empire. On the other side, the European Union admitted into its membership Greece, Bulgaria

²³ Annette Grossbongardt: *Less Europe. More Islam*, web site: Turkey in Transition, Internet: <http://www.spiegel.de/11/02/2006>.

and Romania and thus marked the EU area towards Turkey. Furthermore, unlike Turkish strategic vision, the EU is decisive to accept into its membership and integrate all remaining non-integrated countries of Western Balkans. Within this context, the call to Balkans countries that accompanied with Turkey, be the centre and not the outskirts of the EU, represents the direct challenge to the European Union.

Therefore, the European Union postponed the commencement of the negotiations on accession of Turkey until the year 2021. Will a time period of one decade be enough to make Turkey compliant with the EU requirements or the mutual compliance of the relation of two sides shall remain a stumbling block. Current government of Turkey is also aware of it: "If any member state regards that Turkey is a burden to the European Union and opposes the membership of Turkey, when the negotiation procedure comes to the end, we shall obey the decision and we shall not become a member state of the European Union", said the president of Turkey Abdullah Gul and added that "Turkey can decide not to access European Union after the finished negotiations, as Norway did it, after the finished negotiations in 1972 and 1994".²⁴ It can be concluded that Turkey is no longer single directed and that the membership in the European Union is not an absolute state priority any more. Furthermore, regarding Turkish strategic vision, the membership in the European Union would narrow the action radius of Turkey in preparation of the Project.

The current relations of Turkey and the European Union are not compliant. They include opposite attitudes as well as rivalry, especially towards the Balkans, which regarding Turkey its point of interest. However, besides everything aforementioned, they is also a mutual attraction, which might make differences less significant or level them up. Mutual attraction between Turkey and the EU is found in the domain of energetics. With this reference, two components are important regarding Turkey. Firstly, there are the biggest energy resources in the world around Turkey: the Middle East and central Asia. The second component refers to the position of Turkey as an exceptionally important transit area of energy resources, i.e. transportation loop of energy resources. Apart from this, at such position, Turkey represents one significant energetic-safety factor and subject. The EU is on the other side with extremely great and rapidly increasing energetic requirements.

The main directions of energetic resources and energy-generating products from Turkey surrounding lead towards west, i.e. the European Union. That geoenergetic map represents one of the pillars of Turkish strategic vision, i.e. it provides Turkey with possibility for development of great economic potentials

²⁴ Find on the Internet.

and increasing the lifestyles of people and simultaneously it represents the source of huge attraction between Turkey and the EU.

Turkey put on disposal its water-land area for transport of energy from its surrounding, to build petrol and gas ductlines across its territory and territorial waters of the Black Sea. It is the member of Black Sea economic cooperation and, in the wider scope, Black Sea-Caspian region – significant for findings of energy products, existing and planned energetic terminals and magistral paths. Via its member states Bulgaria and Romania, the EU is connected to those areas and directed towards the cooperative relation with Turkey in the key domain: domain of energetics. Two great energetic terminals are found at the territory of the EU: Burgas (Bulgaria) capacity of 4,6 million tons per year and Konstanza (Romania) capacity of 6,2 million tons. Significantly greatest energetic current of the region passes through Turkey. It is Bosphorus with 74 million tons.²⁵

Energetic demands of the EU enforce and provide perspective for the relations between Turkey and the EU. The EU spends 17% of energy in world proportions, but it produces only half of it. International Energy Agency – IEA estimates that in 2030, the EU shall import 70% energy products, and produce only 30%. In the specified year, the EU shall import % of the petrol demand, 70% of gas demand and 100% of coal demand.²⁶

The mutual attraction and cooperative relation, regardless the result of membership and other issues are enforced also by the circumstance that the European Union is a highly developed entity, solvent and reliable economic partner whereas the other side is regarding economy and society in its development. That relation and discrepancy provides logical perspective in the relation of Turkey and the European Union as well as permanent increase of energetic demand of the European Union.

Literature

1. Filip Tunjić, “Europe-in-Between – Paradigm of political geography of geopolitics. Nothing New in the West, All As Usual in the East“, in: *Social researches – Magazine for general social researches*, No. 4-5/2007, pg. 891-915.
2. *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1983*, Newspaper Enterprise Association, INC. New York.
3. *Time Almanac 2010*, Powered by Encyclopedia Britannica, Chicago-London-New Delhi-Paris-Seul-Sydney-Taipei-Tokyo.

²⁵ Gfristopher-Alexandre Poillard; *Go East Young European. The Black Sea is Now Yours*, in “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies“, Vol. 7 No. 2, June 2007, pp. 237-238, 242-Notes 2.

²⁶ As previously specified, p. 238.

4. *Turkey's New Role In Geostrategic Landscape Of Euro-Myslim Relations – Analysis*. Written by ISN Insights by Andera Bonzanini and Dorykhan I Aras, <http://www.eurasia-review.com>, Internet: 01. September 2011.
5. Gfristopher-Alexandre Poillard; *Go East Young European. The Black Sea is Now Yours*, in "Southeast European and Black Sea Studies", Vol. 7 No. 2, June 2007.
6. *Azerbaijan, Turkey Sign Gas Transit Deal*, the text in Azerbaijani media electronic network PanARMENIAN, October, 25 2011. <http://www.eurasiareview.com/25102011-azerbaijan-turkey-sign-gas-transit-deal/>
7. Prof. dr Ahmet Davutoglu, the minister of foreign affairs of Turkey: *Ottoman centuries of the Balkans are a successful story, it is needed to be renewed*, October 29, 2009 by Daily News Montenegro.
8. Bylent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat: *From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's Relations with Syria and Iran*; SAGE publications, [http://sdi.sagepub.com/Vol.39\(5\):495-515,2008PRIO, www.prio.no](http://sdi.sagepub.com/Vol.39(5):495-515,2008PRIO,www.prio.no); Internet, 10.09.2011.
9. *Pax Ottomanica*, by John Feffer and Tom Engelhardt, June 14, 2010, <http://originalantiwar.com>; Internet, 10.09.2011.
10. Eyrasiareview: *Erdogan Should Mind His Own Glass House – OpEd*, <http://www.eurasia-review.com>; Internet, 10.09.2011.
11. Filip Rodic, *The Return of the Old Friends: Turkey on the Balkans*, [/http://www.nin.co.rs/4.4.2010](http://www.nin.co.rs/4.4.2010), Internet, 26.08.2011.
12. Annette Grossbongardt, *Turkey in Transition – Less Europe, More Islam*, in: Spiegel online, 11/02/2006, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,446163,00.html>, Internet, 26.08.2011.
13. Daily newspaper *Politika*, 6.10.2011.
14. Dr Nevenka Jeftić-Šarčević, *Zapadni Balkan u projekciji „Turske strateške vizije“*, čas. „Međunarodni problemi“, br. 4/2010., vol LXII, ss. 691-714, izd. Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, decembar 2010.

UDK: 327(470:497.11)
Biblid 0543-3657, 63 (2012)
Vol. LXIII, No. 1146, pp. 119–127
Original Scientific Paper
2012

*Milovan Radaković*¹

Russian Foreign Policy and Serbia

APSTRACT

Russian foreign policy is based on three basic postulates. The first is a collaboration of Moscow with former Soviet republics. The second postulate is the relationship between Russia and the United States. Finally, the third is related to the Russian foreign policy toward Asia, especially Moscow's relations with China. When it comes to relations with Serbia, these relationships are part of the overall relations between Moscow— South Stream gas pipeline.

Key words: Serbia, Russia, politics, economy, gas, pipeline.

Introduction

Serbian foreign policy supports itself on four pillars — partnerships with the EU, USA, Russia and China. Relations with Russia are in most aspects unique, and they are different from those maintained with the EU, USA and China.² That uniqueness is, among other facts, based on the common Slavic origin that the peoples of the two countries share, and that includes same religion, similar languages, cooperation in the past and hopes for such cooperation in the future.³

¹ Milovan Radaković, PhD, Research Associate, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, email: mradakovic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

² Concerning the relations with the EU, there are numerous elements linked to where Serbia is located. As a modern European country, in a certain manner it (should) follow the European economic, cultural and other flows. The USA, being the only superpower, is by itself among the priorities of the Serbian foreign policy. China, at last, which is bound to become a new superpower in the near future, is a country that Serbia would like to maintain as good as possible partnership relations with, even at the present time.

³ Russia is the largest country on the globe. Russian resources are among the most significant in the world. Those resources have been mostly unexploited, thus representing an important reserve that guarantees the future not only to Russia, but to the entire humanity. Reducing the scope of any form of cooperation with Russia would have adverse effects on the country opting to do so.

The interests of great powers were intertwined as far as the Balkans is concerned. Throughout the history, all great powers pursued their own interests in the Balkan Peninsula, while the similarities with the people of Russia influenced on the Serbian thought of them as traditional protectors of interests of Serbs, who hoped this would always be the case, and Moscow would guarantee for the foreign interests of Serbia. On the other hand, Serbia experienced the most favorable turnover of its goods in Russia.⁴ This fact as well reinforced the attitude of Serbia towards close relations with Russia. In commercial cooperation of Western Europe, Serbia and Russia, there is a fact that should not be overlooked. Even in 1960s, Western Europe had a developed market where the goods from Yugoslavia (and thus from Serbia) was sold, although it could not compete with the products from Western Europe that was supported and recovered with the help of the funds as predetermined in the Marshall Plan. The situation in Russia was different. As a country that suffered the most in the Second World War, and a country without any funds apart from its own resources, Russia represented a large market for all products, including those from Yugoslavia. Products from Yugoslavia, today's Serbia, had more success on the market of the Soviet Union, i.e. Russia. Finally, the relations between Russia and Serbia carry an almost unimaginable burden when it comes to international relations, and that is a unique emotional attitude. The relations between large countries are fairly simple compared to those between the large and small ones.

Russian foreign-policy circles

After the Second World War in the period of the rise of soc-realistic systems, Moscow virtually coexisted with three borders. The first was the Russian state border; the other was the border of the Soviet Union, while the third made part of the so-called outer borders, which were in fact the state borders of socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The priority of Russia is to build fresh modern relations that may lead to a new reinforcement of the former Soviet Union core. This goal of the foreign policy identifies the first internal belt of countries, and the goal would be to form stronger bonds between Moscow and the Ukraine, Moscow and Kazakhstan and Moscow and the Baltic states.⁵ The second foreign policy "belt" refers to the relations of Russia and the US. Traditional rivals continue to lead the game of great powers, and where at one point it seemed that Washington won the global race (eras of Gorbachev and Yeltsin), the advent of Putin and Medvedev helped restore the strength of Russia as a global power, and

⁴ Formerly Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

⁵ For additional information, see Milovan B. Radakovic "Europe at Crossroads", Belgrade, 1995, pp. 6-26.

that resurgence of the country is still in progress. Another foreign policy “circle” is of great importance for the Kremlin — relations with China. Russian relations with China are a reflection of relations with Asia as a whole. The demographic factor (represented by the fact that beyond the sparsely populated Russian territories in the Far East there was highly populated, but underdeveloped China) gradually loses importance in favor of Beijing, as China experiences intense modernization. The relations that were not at their high during the Cold War now have another dimension. If the Russian diplomacy succeeds in making an ally, and not a rival out of China, we could have a powerful political, economic and military block that could turn the odds of power from the Atlantic region in favor of Asia and more specifically in favor of the Far East, particularly if India were to join that informal Asian alliance. At last, there are the relations between Europe and Russia, which require special consideration.

In the era of the Cold War, as we have already mentioned, the borders of the East European countries, or of the so-called socialist realism nations, at the same time represented the outer borders of the then Soviet Union. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and the fall of the soc-realistic systems in the East European countries, however, allowed for the market, and also for the military power of the West to come closer to the borders of Russia. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, almost every country of the Eastern Europe requested to join the EU and NATO. Nowadays virtually all EU member states have made connections with NATO and are tied together by various treaties. The growth of market relations that involves East European countries is in itself favorable for Russia, especially if we take into consideration the fact that Russia alone goes through the development stage of market economy. The advance of NATO towards the borders of Russia, however, may pose a problem in a certain manner. There is no unique pattern in the Russian foreign policy — it is not uniform. In fact, it is a complex mechanism based on various norms, with multiple dimensions. The foreign policy of Russia is different in Europe when compared to that in Asia. A logical consequence speaks in favor of this thesis, as well as a conclusion that the paradigms of its foreign policy are entirely different when it comes to South America, Africa, Middle East or the Caribbean.

Russia employs a regional approach in its policy towards Europe, which means Moscow makes slight adjustments in its relations with the Baltic, the Black Sea, Scandinavia, and the countries of Western and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

Serbia and Russia - political relations -

The relationship of the two countries extends over centuries. However, we shall focus our attention to the more recent history, commencing from the 1990s.

Considering the Yugoslav crisis and the civil war that broke out in 1992, the attitude of Russia was that the integrity of the SFR Yugoslavia should have been preserved, and that all disputes should have been peacefully resolved by political means within the UN and European institutions and organizations dealing with the security on the continent. Despite the occasional shifts in the realization of their attitudes, Russia remained consistent in its approach. As far as the analysis of the attitudes towards the regional conflict in the Balkans is concerned, the starting point should be the principle of Russia by which the conflicts should be resolved peacefully within the global organizations, although Russia actually altered its attitude adjusting it with respect of the policy of its West European partners.⁶

Thus at the beginning of 1992, Russia recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia, and by the middle of the same year, also that of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The stance at the breakout of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, when the governing political elite of Russia favored the preservation of Yugoslavia, was therefore changed. Within the political circles of the then FR Yugoslavia, such an attitude of Moscow was considered to be a letdown from a centuries-old ally, as well as an indication of deference of the Russian government to the secessionist groupings in the Balkans. In that period, many were particularly insistent in promulgating the myth of Russia as an eternal ally, which brought to life the mythical idea of the unification of Slavic peoples, as well as the role of Serbia as the ultimate wall of defense in the campaign of the West directed towards Russia etc. Such thoughts, regardless of how they appear nowadays, were far from naive, and were present both in Serbia and in certain traditionalist intellectual circles in Russia.⁷ The facts, however, were different. Having in mind the change of circumstances in Europe and a new structure of international community, as well as the efforts of Russia to set its path of development internally, it distanced itself from the Balkans.

It is an undisputed fact, however, that the Russian foreign policy maintained greater consistency as far as the problem of Kosovo is concerned. The policy is based on several key elements: (1) Russian officials and institutions believe that the former Yugoslav, now Serbian side holds the key to a more reasonable solution to the Kosovo problem than the Albanian side; (2) the anti-Serbian attitude of the countries of the West in terms of Kosovo and Metohija is unacceptable; (3) the bombing campaign of Kosovo and Metohija and other regions of Serbia was unacceptable from the position of the international law and it should not become a common practice in solving ethnic conflicts in

⁶ Jelica Kurjak, PhD, "Rusija na Balkanu" (*Russia in the Balkans*), *Helsinki sveske*, no. 3, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, Belgrade, 2000, p. 15.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 15.

Europe; (4) Russia, accordingly, intended to neutralize the unilateral approach of the Western countries and the USA, hoping to reinstate the positive dialogs between Belgrade and the other Western partners and between Belgrade and Pristina; (5) although in various situations the Russian diplomacy would take the opposite stance to that of the Western Alliance and the US, it did not risk demonstrating any fierce opposition.

Serbia and Russia - commercial relations -

One of the most important elements influencing on such a position of the Russian foreign policy towards Serbia refers to the limitations in political, economic and military resources. In the circumstances of a difficult economic and financial crisis, the fundamental problem of the Russian foreign policy is to establish and maintain financial relations with international and West European creditors.

Today, more than ever before, an important advantage that Russia has in its economic relations with the West is in form of oil and natural gas reserves. The key asset of Kremlin in committing to certain countries of Europe is the large reserve of fuels. By strategically using these resources, the Putin establishment included in its extensive energy arrangements such countries as Germany, Turkey and Italy, which are the three most significant consumers of the Russian natural gas in Europe, and with them indirectly the other West European countries as well. Having refused to sign the EU Energy Charter, which would have allowed for the penetration of foreign companies within the Russian energy sector, Russia preserved its advantage in international policy, which was the heritage of the 1990 crisis.⁸ The oil crisis in the second half of the 20th century demonstrated what importance energy has in international relations. The influence of energy treaties strongly reflected upon the signatory countries. It is a much more direct and durable effect compared to that of other forms of international agreements, and in certain cases even of military alliances.

Mutual strategic commitment of Russia and European countries in the first half of the 21st century began with gas line construction agreements in the projects of “Blue Stream”, “North Stream” and “South Stream” towards Turkey, Germany and Italy, respectively.

The “Blue Stream” is a joint project of Russian Gazprom and Italian ENI, which assumes the construction of a gas line from the coast of Russia to Turkey,

⁸ Miljan Filimonovic, “Spoljna politika Ruske Federacije” (*Foreign Policy of Russian Federation*), Infinitas, Belgrade, 2010, p. 122.

along the bottom of the Black Sea. The design length of the line is 1200 km. This project is in fact a foundation of a future strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, which involves military cooperation as well. Turkey has been waiting to join the EU for quite some time now; however, they receive no support from Brussels. In 2010, some of the Turkish officials, outraged by the response from Brussels, declared that Ankara might turn to strategic partnerships with countries in Asia, particularly Iran and Russia.

The “North Stream” is a joint venture of Gazprom company and the BASF and E.ON companies, designed to transfer natural gas over the bottom of the Baltic Sea from Vyborg, Russia to Greifswald, Germany, and further over land, by gas pipelines to the consumers in Western and Central Europe. The line is built in Russian, Finnish, Swedish, Danish and German territorial waters. It bypasses the former Soviet republics and the East European countries.

The “South Stream” — to be constructed in cooperation of Gazprom and Italian ENI — is an important energy route. This gas line is built in accordance with the agreement from 2007. It is planned for it to extend over Bulgaria and branch off in two directions. One is intended to transfer the gas over Greece and the Ionian Sea to the south of Italy, while the other should extend over Serbia and Hungary towards northern Italy, with a separate branch towards Germany. Each of the agreements signed with regard to this gas line points to the fact that the signatory countries have a certain status of autonomy (at least as far as this agreement is concerned) with respect to the international organizations they participate in.

One of the most important commercial investments in Serbia — the construction of a part of the “South Stream” — could have gone around the country. Specifically, in the April edition of Ljubljana-issued publication “Delo” in 2008, a map of the “South Stream” was published, where the line design was laid out, circumventing the territories of Serbia and Austria, and extending to the northern Italy, while passing over the Slovenian territory with its largest part (Figure 1).

If such a design of the gas line were adopted, Serbia would experience problems in gas supplying. Apart from being excluded from the transit and distribution as a country, it would depend on other suppliers as well. Such a development would cause frequent shortages of gas, which could reflect upon the neighboring countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republic of Srpska, as well as Montenegro. In that case, Belgrade would be forced most probably to order supplies of gas from Hungary, as the gas line, as we can see on the map, would come closest to the Serbian border exactly at its border with Hungary.

This, however, is not going to happen. In fact, the transit gas line, “South Stream”, shall pass through Serbia. Two routes for the gas line were planned,

one of which would go through Nis, and the other through Zajecar. In the end, the route over Zajecar was adopted.

Apart from that, Russia will help build underground gas storage facilities in Banatski Dvor, as Serbia does not have such structures in its territory.⁹ Thus the Russian energy giant, “Gazprom”, became the major owner of the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS). Obviously, a low gas supply from Hungary was the reason to turn to a more reliable and potent supplier.¹⁰ Considering that “Gazprom” is the world’s largest gas supplier, Serbia has certainly solved the market issues as regards the supply of this fuel by entering this agreement with “Gazprom”. Apart from the consumption of gas, which is ecologically the safest fuel, there will be a need to build additional facilities in form of thermal plants, which will help reduce or entirely eliminate the coal production of power.¹¹

Apart from this, a Russian loan for the reconstruction of the railroads in Serbia amounting to 800 million dollars shall be used to repair and build railroads in the length of 360 km. The largest part of the reconstruction shall take place on the Belgrade–Bar rail route. The projects to be funded by the loan from Russia include: (1) the reconstruction of the railroad between Pancevo and Belgrade in the length of 15 km; (2) the construction of a new electrified Valjevo–Loznica railroad in the length of 68 km with a projected capacity of 50 pairs of trains a day; (3) a part of the loan is intended for the reconstruction of the maintenance facility in Zemun, and the construction of two additional maintenance facilities with passenger stations in Zemun and Kijevo; (4) the reconstruction of the 455-km-long Belgrade–Bar railroad; (5) the reconstruction of Belgrade railroad network, which includes the construction of a rail terminal in Belgrade.

Conclusive observations

When estimating the development perspectives of foreign relations between Russia and Serbia, the starting point should be the unquestionable facts. One of them is that Russia is among the countries that understand national and

⁹ Construction of underground gas storage facilities in Banatski Dvor is meant to provide energy security to Serbia, as well as a possibility to export the fuel.

¹⁰ Hungary is able to transfer approximately 10 million cubic meters of gas to Serbia. However, the country’s needs are much higher, so that Serbia in the last several years had to use its reserves of fuel oil. In certain critical situations, even the supply of major consumers had to be stopped.

¹¹ For additional details on cooperation of Serbia and Russia in the field of energy, and on the “South Stream”, see Nenad Popovic, PhD; Ondrej Jasko, PhD, “Spoljnotrgovinski odnosi i perspektive privredne saradnje Ruske Federacije i Republike Srbije” deo: Energetika (Market Relations and Perspectives of Commercial Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia” part: Energy), SEC, Belgrade, 2010, p. 319.

government interests of Serbia. Moscow has understanding of our stance with regard to Kosovo and Metohija, in part due to the secessionist issues in certain regions of Russia, and it specifies in particular that Pristina may not do anything that is not a common or mutual interest arranged with Belgrade. This means in fact that Russia believes the only proper solution for Kosovo and Metohija is that which is favorable both for Belgrade and Pristina. Another political goal of Serbia, the joining of our country to the EU, is not questionable as far as Moscow is concerned. On numerous occasions, Russian officials declared that the relations between Belgrade and Moscow would not be jeopardized, if Serbia continued along its path towards the European integrations. Issues could arise, however, if Serbia were to enter NATO, although the relations with Moscow in this sense are at the highest levels of mutual understanding and friendship. Regarding the policy and the military, it would be advisable for Belgrade to consider if in the near future Moscow could help in the communication with Pristina, or particularly if Moscow could exert greater influence so as to allow for a part of the Serbian military and police forces to return to the Province or at least to some parts of it, even if their number there would be merely symbolic. Of critical importance are the activities that lead towards establishment of a Center for Humanitarian Work in Nis. This city is an important strategic center of Serbia, and the opening of the Center would affect the sensitive strategic significance of Nis, and of the entire southern Serbia as well.

In terms of economy, Serbia has a free trade agreement with Russia. Based on the current information, Serbia seems to be the only former Yugoslav country to have such a status in the Russian market. It remains unclear, however, why Slovenia, for example, has higher rates of export to Russia compared to those of Serbia. It seems that we still are incapable of benefiting from our potential and from the possibilities granted to us with that agreement. There is an express need to establish common enterprises and to jointly operate in other markets, as well as a need for more participation of Serbian companies and Serbian capital in the Russian market. Certainly, the most important aspect of the economic relations between the countries is that of energy. In that respect it is important to emphasize the participation of Serbian companies in NIS, and the commencement of construction works on the gas storage facilities in Banatski Dvor, and of course the construction of the "South Stream", which shall solve the problems of gas supplying in Serbia and in the neighboring countries.

Bybliography

1. Berđajev, Nikola, "Ruska ideja" (*Russian Idea*), Prosveta, Belgrade, 1987.
2. Bovt Georgy, *Between Europe and Russia. Europe's Eastern Partnership*, EU-Russia Centre, 2009.

3. Borger, Julian, *Moscow Signals Place in New World Order*, The Guardian, 11 April 2007.
4. Guskova, Jelena, "Jugoslovenska kriza i Rusija" (*The Yugoslav Crisis and Russia*), documents, IMPP, Belgrade, 1996.
5. Kurjak, Jelica, "Rusija na Balkanu" (*Russia in the Balkans*), Helsinške sveske, no. 3, Belgrade, 2000.
6. Kissinger, Henry, "Diplomatija" (original: *Diplomacy*), Klub plus, Belgrade, 2008.
7. Klare, Michael, *The New Geopolitics of Energy*, The Nation, May 2008.
8. Kurjak, Jelica, "Političke promene u Rusiji 1990-1996." (*Political Changes in Russia 1990-1996*), IMPP, Belgrade, 2000.
9. Lavrov, Sergey, *Russia and the World in the 21st Century*, Russia and Global Affairs, July-September 2008.
10. Luzhkov, Yuri, "Buđenje Rusije", (*Russian Awakening*) Filip Višnjčić, Belgrade, 2008.
11. Medvedev, Roy, "Putin – povratak Rusije" (*Putin – the Return of Russia*), Novosti, Belgrade, 2007.
12. Mitić, Miodrag, "Diplomatija i spoljna politika u zakonodavstvu Ruske Federacije" (*Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Legislature of Russian Federation*), SL, Belgrade, 2001.
13. Norris S. and Kristensen Hans, *Russian Nuclear Forces*, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July-August 2004.
14. Popović, Nenad, Ondrej, Jaško, "Spoljnotrgovinski odnosi i perspektive privredne saradnje Ruske Federacije i Republike Srbije" (*Market Relations and Perspectives of Commercial Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Serbia*), Newpress, Belgrade, 2010.
15. Petrović, Dragan, "Rusija na početku XXI veka" (*Russia at the Beginning of the 21st Century*), IPS, Belgrade, 2007.
16. SIPRI YEARBOOK 2002, Oxford University Press, 2002.
17. "Odnosi Rusije i Srbije na početku XXI veka" (*Relations of Serbia and Russia at the Beginning of the 21st Century*), Petrović, Žarko (ed.), ISAC Fond, Belgrade, 2010.

BOOK REVIEWS

TERRORIST FINANCING THROUGH MONEY LAUNDERING

The book by Kosta Sandić, Ph.D., “Terrorist financing through money laundering” belongs to that kind of scientific texts formed on basis of serious and extensive research in order to prepare a doctoral dissertation.

In our current scientific and methodological, politicological, security and sociological literature, there are not many comprehensive works which, such as this exclusively, comprehensively and complexly deal with issues of terrorist financing through money laundering. Majority of previously published and available information are usually partial and primarily consider only one of the aspects. The studies and conclusions in the sphere of social and political aspects are primarily reduced to assessments, evaluations and conclusions based on the social damage or potential social damage. In criminological researches, analyses and conclusions are exact, but they are also mainly oriented only towards the identification of threat and possible harm to the protected object and social values. The integral approach, which unites all aspects, is rare in the existing literature, thus essential task and goal of the author was to detect possibilities for creating a comprehensive approach for studying the phenomenon of terrorism financing through money laundering through scientific methods, as the author had accomplished. With such an approach, the author has materialized his undoubtedly original idea in the form of a book which significantly contributed to explanation of the identified scientific problem and its resolving as a social problem.

The first chapter of the book deals with the explanation of meaning of the concept of terrorism and terrorist financing. After defining the very concept of terrorism and terrorism financing, attention is paid to the importance and scope of terrorist financing. Also, the analysis of types and divisions of terrorist financing was carried out.

The second chapter of the book deals with the theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of money laundering and terrorist financing. The starting point represents the defining of the very concept of money laundering and terrorist

financing, as well as defining of social and political climate that has caused a reaction of the community in relation to the bearers of these criminal activities.

The third chapter of the book deals with global and local response to money laundering and terrorist financing. The so-called pan-European response to money laundering was clearly defined, as well as the global response of modern humanity embodied in the activities, measures and resolutions of the United Nations, the EGMONT Group, FATF and MONEYVAL. At the same time, a special attention was given to the birth, adoption and difficult implementation of the idea on confiscation of assets acquired by money laundering. No less important area of interest in this work is the global cooperation in the field of law enforcement, which represents a positive response to the increasing social threat, which this phenomenon undoubtedly entails.

The fourth chapter of the book deals with the observation of the national response to the phenomena of money laundering and terrorist financing in the Republic of Serbia, with the reference to the legal solution, the national FIU and the activity of the Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering of the Republic of Serbia.

The fifth chapter of the book examines corporate responses to the phenomena of money laundering and terrorist financing, with special emphasis on the relevant procedures, suspicious financial transactions, as well as measures taken on that issue in financial organizations.

The basic hypothesis that served as a starting point in study of the phenomenon of money laundering, terrorism and terrorist financing through money laundering is that they have a specific political-legal character. They cannot be equalized with the character of other socially harmful phenomena, bearing in mind the importance of threat to the protected object. On the other hand, these phenomena, by their nature, are not entirely independent of the environment, and are often overlapping with other related and conditioned phenomena, such as drug trafficking or illegal trading in precious stones.

While determining and analysing the relationships between money laundering and terrorist financing, the author provided analysis of their mutual relations and differences, keeping in mind the objective of the undertaken actions, the purpose and structure of financial funds, the origin of funds, techniques and channels of performing the financial transfers. Here, the author was addressing the thesis on money laundering as a derivative form of crime by its nature. More precisely, the author explained the view that there is no criminal offence of money laundering without another offence being previously committed. In fact, it was argued that the predicate offences of money laundering are supporting criminal offences, the activities that

generate income, which when laundered, result in an offence of money laundering. These activities are drug trafficking, blue collar crime, white collar crime, bribery and corruption, and of course, the terrorism itself.

The book also sets the substantiated thesis on the crucial role of the individual, the protection of his human rights and establishment of high ethical standards in the process of preventing and combating money laundering and terrorist financing through money laundering. The answer to common questions about a potential violation of human rights and freedoms arising from the fulfilment of the obligations imposed by national laws which regulates this matter was given. The role of people and their system of values was also pointed out, that is it was emphasized that they are the ones who would bring the change, and not exclusively systems or laws in their strictly bureaucratic implementation.

Also, the author has fruitfully focused his research attention on a multitude of activities of the international community, its organizations and institutions, activists for human rights protection, bar associations and organizations, financial and other economic subjects, as well as activities of state bodies and institutions of national states on the one hand, and the very members of criminal and terrorist organizations, as well as “money launderers”, on the other hand, which allowed the study of history, the current and, which is important to point out, future problems related to this phenomenon.

In order to successfully study the phenomenon of terrorism, terrorist financing and money laundering, and connections between them, it was necessary to have in mind research of motives and the development of international, state, local as well as corporate measures for combating terrorism and terrorist financing through money laundering. It was also necessary to pay a special attention to important issues such as ethics, protection from limitation of basic human rights, and organizational values.

By evaluating the results achieved, one can say that the author managed to determine, based on various indicators, what is the current capability of Serbian society, as well as international community, to cope with the mentioned phenomena and effects that they cause, and to assess their long-term perspective in this struggle. At the same time, he attempted to point out the advantages and disadvantages of existing solutions and to propose a more suitable solution. This has created a basis for the operationalisation of political and other measures in order to increase entire social security and efficiency.

Namely, during the elaboration of this paper, the author has noticed that the relations between the U.S. and the European Union, as the two most developed and the most important economic centres in the field of

contemporary economic and financial sector, had a crucial political and economical impact, as well as in the field of development of modern legal systems and standards regulating this field..

With a great skilfulness, the author observes not only deficiencies in the theoretical solutions and practice of organizing of fight against terrorist financing through money laundering in different, even a very developed countries, but also gives concrete, scientifically founded recommendations for improving them. The existing model of the fight against terrorist financing in the Republic of Serbia could be significantly strengthened in some of its segments if corrections, offered by the author in the framework of his book, were accepted .

The book by Kosta Sandić, Ph.D., “Terrorist Financing Through money Laundering” has instructive, innovative and scientific character since, in addition to containing the elements of innovation in many places, it does not represent mere identification of the state and problems of protective measures organization, but also reflects a significant achievement of the author in the field of one largely new and specific definition of both the terrorist financing through money laundering and combating terrorist financing, and their new, possibly increased importance.

By considering various and numerous theoretical options of the limits of efficiency of models of combating terrorist financing through money laundering as limits imposed by democracy, Kosta Sandić, Ph.D., has in an original way determined that some of those limits may prove to be permanent, that other, due change of circumstances, may become irrelevant, and that the most important task of science today is to recognize them, eventually offer ways to overcome them, as well as to alert on scientifically infertile attempts of politisation of this issue.

The author has arguably found that in the contemporary political science there is still no that level of generalization and synthesis that would enable it to explain the overall practice of political and legal model of combating terrorist financing through money laundering, which reduces its predictive capabilities, and thus pointed to the importance of development of political science in that direction.

Briefly, the book by the author Kosta Sandić, Ph.D., entitled “Terrorist Financing Through Money Laundering” addresses scientifically significant and complex problem, and the achieved results of the research represent a remarkable contribution in terms of proper scope of the topic on the one hand, and creating opportunities for its further and deeper insight on the other hand.

The book is written in an understandable, simple, professional language, in an appropriate style, acceptable to the reader. Evident is a clear and

systematized display of views, facts and conclusions, at the same time respecting the principle from the general to the specific and vice versa, from the broader to the narrower, in other words this work represents a series of relevant scientific and professional information, which were inductively articulated, systematized, generalized and linked in an integral whole. Therefore, this book represents a significant scientific contribution, among other things in educational terms and as a basis for the research of others.

The research results and specifically drawn conclusions could benefit all parties interested in this scientific field, particularly those engaged in the practice of combating terrorist financing through money laundering, because it can enrich their fund of knowledge and improve their practical actions. Therefore, it is highly recommended to read.

Mina ZIROJEVIĆ FATIĆ, Ph.D.

Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

COMPONENTS OF NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

In March of this year (2012), a book by Dr. Milovan Radaković titled “Components of the national and European identity” was published by the Institute for International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. The book is a result of research within the project of the Ministry of Education and Science of Serbia, “Serbia in contemporary international relations: strategic directions for development and strengthening the position of Serbia in international integration processes — foreign policy, international economic, legal and safety aspects”, number 179 029, for the period 2011-2014.

The author investigated the issues of national identity, the concept of emerging European identity and relationships of two identities. The book has five chapters and within each there are special units that address various aspects of the problem.

The author reached the following conclusions in this monograph:

Basic features of national identity are language, myth and mythology, religion, culture, history, mentality and the nation-state. The author argues that language is the fundamental characteristic of national identity. Without any other national characteristic, each group can maintain basic, minimal but fundamental character of their identity through their language;

The author believes that the First and Second World War contributed significantly to strengthening awareness of the need for intra-European integration, which have gradually led to the creation of the EEC / EC / EU. The outbreak of war and the formation of Pan-European movement before, during and after the first and second World Wars, marked the struggle between national and Euro-unitary hegemonic power (Pan-European), ideas and concepts. After World War I Pan-European ideas have been presented primarily through the Pan-European Union, but they still had no power to initiate European global processes. European globalization began immediately after World War II, in year 1950, with the formation of the European communities, represented today by the EU;

Globalization affected all continents in the last decade of the 20th century, but the European globalization, through the EU, is largely under the control of democratic institutions. Characteristics of globalization on other continents are visible in regional economic organizations such as, for example, APEC, ASEAN, NAFTA, Mercosur, ICN, AEC. However, the EU is by far the most developed European global organization. Control of its operations is carried out by Member States of the supranational institutions of the European Union.

The EU in the early 21st century no longer has the characteristics of classical international organizations. Although there are certain characteristics that states have, EU is not a state. At this stage of development, we can characterize EU as a complex supranational organization.

According to the author, European nations have their own national identities, but they could develop in the direction of creating a European identity. The creation of a European identity will develop in three directions. These are the creation of a common European cultural identity, a supranational legal system and a society that will be a Europe of citizens. European identity in the making will be based on the national identities of Member States. Further development process within the EU, with EU citizens, may lead to the creation of a specific European identity.

Radaković believes that European identity is a civilization phenomenon that is yet to develop. Its construction will move in two directions. The first is the integration of the European East and West, which will certainly be an intra-European process. The second — a European identity in relation to others. These other peoples are from other continents and in the future European identity and its characteristics can be comparable to American, Asian and other continental identities and their specific characteristics.

The author believes that foundations of an emerging European identity can be found in Greek civilization and philosophy, then the ancient Rome and Roman law, the Christian Church, Humanism and the Renaissance and the European revolutions. These foundations have helped shape the countries on the European continent. These sources were necessary to the European nations to begin to create the European spirit expressed by the European identity. Strengthening the EU does not mean that the continent will become a centralized, monolithic, uniform and homogeneous community of people, who will eventually lose their national characteristics. One could say that this stage in the development of the EU is based on authentic identities of the peoples of member states. Even if the European civilization carried through with globalization, it will not oppose the nationality at least in the same extent that nationality should not be closed in upon itself.

Radaković finally concludes that no segment of national identity can be extinguished, if the nation is determined to keep it. Which segments of the national identities will rise to the level of European identity, will depend on the importance it will have to Europe and its common values.

MSc Andrej STANIMIROVIC

DOCUMENTS*

Official Journal C 181 , 21/06/2012 P. 0021 – 0027

Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee – The Role of Civil Society in EU-Kosovo Relations

(2012/C 181/05)

Rapporteur: Mr Ionut SIBIAN

In a letter dated 22 September 2011, Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and Commissioner Štefan Füle asked the European Economic and Social Committee to draw up an exploratory opinion on

The role of civil society in EU-Kosovo relations.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee's work on the subject, adopted its opinion on the 6 March 2012

At its 479th plenary session, held on 28- 29 March 2012 the European Economic and Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 145 votes to 5 with 13 abstentions.

1. Conclusions and recommendations

The EESC's exploratory opinion on the role of civil society in EU-Kosovo relations takes into consideration the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999).

This opinion includes a set of recommendations which are addressed to both the European Commission and Kosovan authorities. The EESC is ready to support the European Commission's actions aimed at strengthening the role of civil society in Kosovo as well as the relations between the EU and Kosovan civil society.

1.1 The EESC calls on the Kosovan government to take appropriate measures for the safe and free movement of ethnic minorities throughout its territory as a precondition for reconciliation and mutual trust.

* In view of fact that the text in this section are an official nature, no alternations of any kind have been made to them by the editor of the *Review of International Affairs*.

1.2 The European Commission should work with the Kosovan government and media organisations in the country to support media freedom and the professionalization of journalism.

1.3 The EESC encourages the Kosovan government to consult civil society and social partners in the formulation of a national strategy for economic development. The Kosovan government and the European Commission should give maximum priority to the inclusion of youth and women on the labour market. A particular attention should be given to supporting rural development, sustainable agriculture and farmers' associations.

1.4 The EESC should help strengthen the Social Economic Council of Kosovo by engaging with the main social actors and by sharing its know-how and expertise. The European Commission should also provide strong support to the Social Economic Council of Kosovo. The government of Kosovo should secure a specific budget line for the functioning of the Social Economic Council of Kosovo.

1.5 The EESC recommends the Kosovan Ministry of Labour to set up a transparent and fair mechanism of funding for social partners' initiatives.

1.6 Although Kosovo's status prevents it from being a party to ILO Conventions, the Kosovan government should align its legislation and practices to them.

1.7 In the EESC's view, it is mandatory that the representatives of the social partners participate in the setting-up of an inclusive National Council for European Integration.

1.8 The Kosovan government should strengthen law enforcement on secure free access to public information.

1.9 In the context of the launch of Kosovo's National Council Against Corruption in February 2012, the EESC expresses its hope that civil society will be provided with genuine means to have an effective contribution to the fight against corruption.

1.10 The Kosovan government should take into consideration the Strategic Framework prepared by civil society and create the legal and institutional framework for a structured dialogue and its involvement in the decision making process. The Kosovan Assembly should develop an institutional platform that would allow for a regular dialogue with civil society organisations.

1.11 The European Commission should further support the creation of civil society networks in Kosovo in view of easing the dialogue with the authorities and connecting to the existing European civil society platforms.

1.12 The European Commission should support the Kosovan government to develop a legal and fiscal framework conducive to long-term sustainability for civil society in Kosovo. The Kosovan government should create transparent public funding mechanisms for civil society organizations. Additionally, the EESC recommends the Kosovan government to establish a State Fund for Civil Society.

1.13 The EESC recommends that the EC funding available for civil society under IPA be balanced between those promoting democracy and rule of law, and those promoting socio-economic development. The calls for proposal under IPA should be planned in such a way that gaps of funding can be avoided.

1.14 The European Commission should consider identifying ways to ease the access of smaller civil society organizations to its programs and to support longer-term initiatives.

1.15 The European Commission should find solutions to ease the access of social partners to the funds earmarked for civil society under IPA. Specific programmes for the social partners under the Civil Society Facility (CSF) could be created. Trade unions need to have targeted programmes under IPA that would allow them to reinforce their capacities

1.16 The EESC strongly supports the involvement of CSOs and social partners in defining the national priorities for IPA assistance.

1.17 The EESC reaffirms its interest and willingness to co-chair with the European Commission the civil society plenary meetings which take place on a yearly basis within the Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue (SAPD).

2. Background of the opinion

2.1 External actors in Kosovo

2.1.1 On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly, declared independence. Kosovo's authorities pledged to fully implement the provisions of Ahtisaari's Comprehensive Status Proposal (CSP) and adopted a new Constitution reflecting this commitment. The Assembly invited the European Union to deploy its rule of law mission (EULEX). It also invited a group of states¹ to establish the International Civilian Office (ICO) to supervise the implementation of Ahtisaari's plan. The International Civilian Representative (ICR) retains the power to override legislation and decisions deemed to be at contrary to the Ahtisaari CSP.

2.1.2 With a gradually reduced presence, KFOR, the NATO-led military presence, continues to provide security throughout Kosovo, while the Kosovo Police has taken over responsibility for the protection of most cultural and religious sites and of the largest part of the borders.

2.1.3 In July 2010, the International Court of Justice adopted its advisory opinion on the independence of Kosovo and found that its declaration of independence did not violate international law.

¹ Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

2.2 The EU approach in Kosovo

2.2.1 22 of the 27 EU Member States have recognised Kosovo's independence, but the absence of a European consensus on Kosovo's status does not prevent the EU from engagement with Kosovo. The level of engagement with Kosovo authorities of the five states who have not recognised it - Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain - varies.

2.2.2 Kosovo is part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), yet it remains the only country in the region that has no contractual relations with the EU, a status which prevents it from signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Within the SAP Dialogue (SAPD), eight meetings (seven sectoral ones followed by one plenary) were held in 2010–2011, including consultations with civil society organisations, on the main chapters of the EU acquis.

2.2.3 In line with the United Nations resolution on Kosovo that was passed in September 2010, an EU facilitated dialogue has started between Belgrade and Prishtina in March 2011. This dialogue aims at finding practical solutions on regional cooperation, trade, freedom of movement and the rule of law (see 3.3).

2.2.4 In July 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on Kosovo encouraging EU Member States to step up their common approach towards Kosovo. The European Parliament underlined that the prospect of accession to the EU is a powerful incentive for the necessary reforms in Kosovo and called for practical steps to make this prospect more tangible both to the government and to citizens.

In January 2012 the European Commission launched the visa liberalisation dialogue with Kosovo.

2.2.5 Kosovo benefits from the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), the Instrument for Stability (IfS), and the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), and other sources of funding. Kosovo is participating in the IPA multi-beneficiary programmes. The multiannual indicative planning document for 2011-2013 was adopted on 27 June 2011. In 2011, a total of EUR 68,7 million granted in the IPA annual programme for 2011 was allocated in close coordination with the Ministry for European Integration and government institutions. The EU pre-accession assistance is focusing on support for the rule of law, the economy, trade and industry, and for public administration reform.

2.3 Activities of the European Economic and Social Committee in relation to civil society in Kosovo

2.3.1 EU enlargement and the progress made by the Western Balkans countries in moving closer to European Union membership is one of the EESC's external relations priorities. The External Relations Section has developed efficient tools for meeting its main objectives to support civil society in the Western Balkans and to enhance its capacity to be a partner for governments on the road to EU accession.

2.3.2 The Western Balkans Contact Group – a permanent internal body established by the EESC in 2004 – is the main instrument for coordinating the EESC’s activities in this regard. The role of the Contact Group is also to monitor the changes in the political, economic and social situation in the Western Balkan countries and in EU-Western Balkans relations. Furthermore, the Contact Group promotes cooperation between the EESC and Western Balkans civil society organisations.

3. Political developments in Kosovo

3.1 Main facts and figures about Kosovo

3.1.1 By end 2011, Kosovo had been recognised by 86 UN Member States, including 22 EU Member States.

3.1.2 Kosovo, with a population of roughly 2 million, is one of the poorest countries in Europe. The World Bank estimates that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is EUR 1760. 45 % of the population is estimated to be living below the national poverty line, while 17 % are extremely poor, according to latest available data, of 2006. It has a large diaspora and one of the youngest populations in Europe.

3.1.3 Albanians constitute 90 % of the population, Serbs 6 % and Bosniaks, Turks, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians together the remaining 4 % of the population. The Albanian majority and non-Serb minority accept the Kosovo state as legitimate. Most of the Serbian community opposes the statehood of Kosovo. The social distance between Kosovan Albanians and Kosovan Serbs remains significant. Kosovan Serbs maintain a strong de-facto autonomy in the northern part of the country. In the other parts of Kosovo, they have become concentrated in rural enclaves. Aside from political motivations, language remains a serious cause of isolation of the Serbian community. Kosovan Serbs living in the enclaves suffer from discrimination, which affects their day-to-day life, and are missing job opportunities. Their access on an equal basis with Kosovan Albanians to Kosovan administration and various social services, such as hospitals, is precarious. Their freedom of movement throughout Kosovo is limited in practice. Serb population continues to leave Kosovo.

3.1.4 In northern Kosovo and in most Serbian populated areas, parallel institutions in health care, education, justice and social services have been functioning since 1999. They receive aid from Serbia and are largely under its control. A large part of Serbian Kosovans continue to boycott national elections and cooperation with Kosovan authorities, particularly in the north. In the rest of the country, Serbian Kosovans have shown increased participation in elections and are represented in local and national institutions (including the government and the Assembly). A decentralisation process foreseeing the creation of new municipalities in which ethnic minorities would constitute a majority with enhanced municipal powers has been boycotted in the Serbian-majority municipalities.

3.2 Relations with neighbouring countries

3.2.1 Of all neighbouring countries Kosovo maintains the best relations with Albania. Albania has been and continues to be very active in securing recognitions for Kosovo and lobbying for Kosovo's inclusion in regional initiatives.

3.2.2 Kosovo has proper relations with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The demarcation of the border has been completed and good diplomatic relations have been established.

3.2.3 Kosovo and Montenegro have agreed to complete the border demarcation process with Montenegro. Montenegro has previously requested for the Montenegrin minority to be constitutionally recognised in Kosovo before both countries exchange ambassadors and demarcation is completed. The Montenegrin community has been recognised by the Law on Communities and the two countries are expected to establish diplomatic relations in the near future.

3.2.4 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are the only neighbouring countries with which Kosovo has no formal political relations. Economic relations continue to be asymmetrical as while Serbia is the biggest exporter in Kosovo, until recently, Kosovo could not export to this country. The EU is acting as a mediator for technical negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade. The agenda of the negotiations with Serbia includes the unblocking of trade with Kosovo, the use of air space over Serbia, the transit of passengers with Kosovo passports or vehicles with a Kosovan registration, the participation of Kosovo in regional fora. At the end of February 2012, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement on regional cooperation and management of border crossings.

3.3 The current issues

3.3.1 There continue to be tensions in interethnic relations caused by the instability of northern Kosovo and the refusal of the Kosovo Serb minority and Serbia to accept the independence of Kosovo and its new institutions. There are also Kosovo Albanian groups that do not accept the international supervision of Kosovo independence.

3.3.2 At the end of July 2011, the situation escalated in northern Kosovo when Kosovo decided to impose an embargo on Serbian goods in retaliation to a Serb blockade of goods since 2008 on the grounds of the non recognition of the "Kosovo Customs" stamp. The unilateral deployment of Kosovo police at two northern border checkpoints with Serbia led to violence, resulting in the death of a Kosovo police officer. Calm was restored with the help of KFOR, the NATO-led military presence.

3.3.3 In September 2011, the issue of customs stamps was resolved in the context of the EU mediated Belgrade/Prishtina dialogue. The implementation of the agreement resulted in widespread blockades in the north. Violent incidents also occurred. In the light of the situation in northern Kosovo, Serbia interrupted

its participation in the above mentioned EU mediated dialogue at the end of September, and reverted to the negotiation table in November 2011.

4. Economic situation in Kosovo

4.1 Post-conflict state of play

4.1.1 With an official rate of over 40%, Kosovo has the highest share of unemployment in the region and it is far above European Union average. These data should be considered with cautiousness as being lower than reality, in the context of Kosovo's large informal sector of economy. The rate of unemployment is higher among women and is particularly affecting the young population. Some 30000 young people enter the job market each year, a rate which is impossible to sustain through the current economic growth. Poverty is also a critical issue, with around 20 % of the population living on less than one euro per day.

4.1.2 The economy remains largely dependent on remittances and donor aid. The economy of Kosovo is affected by post-war uncertainties, broken trade links and insufficient investment in infrastructure. Fuelled by a huge emergency and reconstruction effort led by international donor aid, economic growth was in double digits in the first years of 2000. The growth has proven to be unsustainable due to an extremely high trade deficit and lack of foreign direct investments (FDI). The amount of net foreign investments in Kosovo since 2007 has continually decreased from 19 % to 7,1 % of GDP. The informal sector is large, and tax collection is poor.

4.1.3 Although the global financial and economic crisis has had relatively little impact on the economy, due to Kosovo's limited international integration, its negative effects were transmitted mostly through a decrease in remittances, exports and FDI.

4.1.4 Kosovo's economy is overwhelmingly based on the service sector (68 %), while other fields have relatively low shares: industry (20 %), and agriculture (12 %). Most of Kosovo's population lives in rural areas. Agricultural activities are fragmented on small plots causing a mostly inefficient, subsistence farming. This situation prevents also the development of a strong and representative civil society working on agriculture and rural development issues.

4.1.5 Corruption remains widespread and is heavily influencing the economic growth prospects of the country. In the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, Kosovo is ranked 110th, assessed as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe.

4.1.6 The government lacks a national strategy for economic development that should be drafted in consultation with social partners and other actors of civil society.

5. The current state and role of civil society organisations

5.1 Social dialogue

5.1.1 It is estimated that the total number of trade unions' members is around 60000. The unionisation of the public sector is very high, with an estimated 90% of the public servants belonging to a trade union.² Now that the law allows for trade unions to be set-up in the private sector, establishing them at enterprise level is the key challenge for the trade unions in the period ahead. Surveys indicate that 5,09% of the population declare their affiliation to labour unions.³

5.1.2 The Labour Law, which came into force in December 2010, was considered in Kosovo one of the most crucial legislations that have ever been passed.⁴ Various consultations took place on the draft of this law, mainly between the associations of employers and trade unions, but also with the involvement of the specialised assembly committee and civil society organisations. The law was approved unanimously in the last plenary session of the third legislation period, the same day of the assembly's dissolution in spite of repeated opposition by the government concerned with its high budgetary burden. Trade unions threatened to boycott the election process if the law was not approved.

5.1.3 The Social Economic Council of Kosovo (SEC) was established in 2009. Since its very establishment its activity has been disrupted by the opposition of the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce and the Union of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo (BSPK) to the participation of other employers' organisations (Kosovo Business Alliance) and trade unions (Confederation of Free Trade Unions of Kosovo – KSLK). Despite internal disagreements, the SEC has held its regular meetings.

5.1.4 The Social Economic Council of Kosovo lacks the capacity and resources in order to effectively operate.

5.1.5 Social partners do not play an important role in European integration process and economic development process. The Kosovan government should create an adequate legal base in order to increase the role and representation of the social partners into the above mentioned processes.

5.1.6 The Ministry of Labour is currently funding social partners' projects but there are no transparent criteria and rules of procedure in place.

² Kushtrim, Shaipi (2011), Annual Review 2010 on Labour Relations and Social Dialogue in South East Europe: Kosovo, Regional Project for Labour Relations and Social Dialogue in South East Europe, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 2011.

³ Better Governance for a Better Impact. A Call for Citizens, The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Kosovo, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), March 2011.

⁴ Labour Law: its implementation in the first six months, GAP Policy Brief, The Institute for Advanced Studies GAP, September 2011.

5.2 Civil dialogue

5.2.1 The origins of civil society in Kosovo date back from the late 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, following the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. Due to the very specific situation in Kosovo at that time, civil society developed itself as an important part of an entire parallel system and civil resistance to the Serbian regime. Humanitarian aid and human rights protection, as well as civic movements with a widespread support from society were the main fields of activities of civil society. Following the boycott of Serbian institutions by the entire Albanian population in Kosovo and the absence of social and health services, civil society positioned itself as the main service provider.⁵

5.2.2 After the war civil society swiftly adapted in order to respond to the new needs, such as emergency aid and reconstruction, or interethnic reconciliation. In the context of large scale financial and technical support from international donors, the number of CSOs increased substantially. At present, however, from more than 6000 registered NGOs in 2010, less than 10% are estimated to be still active or partially active.⁶

5.2.3 At present Kosovo CSOs face similar challenges as in other countries of the region⁷ as most of the sector remains highly dependent on international funding (it is estimated that over 70% of CSOs' resources come from foreign donors). Consequently CSOs have become more donor driven, less responding to the needs of the community and with a questionable sustainability in a context of any future decrease of international funds for civil society. Instead CSOs are facing a problem of legitimacy as they have become less connected to their constituencies.

5.2.4 Many donors have started to withdraw from Kosovo and the total amount of the funds available for civil society is decreasing. The dominance of short-term project based support in comparison to institutional long-term support makes CSO financial and human resources sustainability a very difficult task to be accomplished.⁸

5.2.5 In December 2011, the European Commission committed to find an agreement on Kosovo's participation in EU programmes, without prejudice to Member States' positions on status. In this regard, both the EC and Kosovo government should make sure that civil society organisations are involved in developing and implementing specific projects.

⁵ Better Governance for a Better Impact. A Call for Citizens, The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Kosovo, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), March 2011.

⁶ Better Governance for a Better Impact. A Call for Citizens, The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Kosovo, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), March 2011.

⁷ The 2010 NGO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

⁸ Better Governance for a Better Impact. A Call for Citizens, The CIVICUS Civil Society Index Analytical Country Report for Kosovo, Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF), March 2011.

5.2.6 The problems with the international recognition of Kosovo have a direct impact on the international linkages of Kosovo's civil society. A number of international and EU based networks do not accept members from Kosovo. In spite of these obstacles, Kosovan civil society is represented in different regional and European platforms and forums and it enjoys a higher international exposure than any sector of the country. The participation of Kosovan civil society organisations in regional programmes should be facilitated

5.2.7 The 2008 Constitution protects freedoms of expression and the press, with exceptions for speech that provokes ethnic hostility. Civil society considers itself generally free to engage in criticism of the government, with few CSOs reporting illegitimate restrictions or attack by local or central government. Nevertheless, there are reports of media close to the government being used against civil society initiatives and individuals who criticise the government. Although a wide variety of print and electronic media operate in Kosovo, investigative journalism is rare due to fear of retribution. The media's financial dependence on government advertisement calls into question its editorial independence.

5.2.8 The basic NGO law allows for a quick and easy registration procedure and ensures the main principles of establishing, operating and dissolution of NGOs. The complementary legal framework for civil society is considered unsatisfactory: public benefit organisations have very limited benefits, there are few tax exemptions for potential donors and civil dialogue processes are still not formalised. Laws on value added tax (VAT), customs, corporate income tax and personal income tax are needed to specify the fiscal benefits for NGOs with Public Benefit Status. Local philanthropy is still in a nascent phase. Changes in the corporate culture are needed for philanthropic giving to make a real impact. There is a great need for an enabling environment for the financial sustainability of NGOs enabling them to access public funds through legislation on sponsorship, corporate income tax, and personal income tax.

5.2.9 Cooperation with civil society tends to be limited to advocacy on legislative initiatives, while attempts by CSOs to tackle transparency and corruption are less successful. Access to information remains a barrier to cooperation between NGOs and the government, mainly because of a poor enforcement of the Law on Access to Public Documents.

5.2.10 A formal dialogue between civil society and government is not happening. The European Commission should support the Kosovan government to create formal structures for cooperation with civil society. Public authorities should establish regular mechanisms and bodies for consultation with civil society and public servants should be appointed and trained to act as liaison contacts with CSOs.

5.2.11 Following efforts of civil society organizations, the government has initiated the drafting of a Strategy for cooperation between government and civil society. This process is in its early stage and is coordinated by CiviKos Platform, a civil society network.

5.2.12 There are no specific mechanisms for the government to contract with civil society and no legal framework governing selection for the few government grants given to NGOs, which are awarded on rather personal preferences. The European Commission should provide technical assistance to the Kosovan government for the creation of such mechanisms.

5.2.13 Without clear regulatory provisions providing incentives for volunteers, it is extremely difficult for NGOs to attract individuals or groups to volunteer. European models of legislation in the field of volunteering can be recommended to the Kosovan government.

5.2.14 In the field of environmental protection, cooperation between government and civil society should be strengthened and CSOs should be consulted and involved in a structured way in policy-making and public debates.

6. Civil society organisations in Kosovo and IPA

6.1 Access to IPA funds

6.1.1 Between 1998 and 2009, the EC's assistance to Kosovo totalled over EUR 2,3 billion, including the financing of the EULEX mission, the EUSR, and the International Civilian Office. The main bilateral cooperation partners of the European Commission have been Germany, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden (Sida), the Netherlands, UK (DFID) and USAID.

6.1.2 According to the Multi-annual Indicative Planning Document for 2009-2011, adopted by the European Commission in 2009, four major cross-cutting issues to be tackled in Kosovo were identified: Civil society, Environment, Equal opportunities, and Good governance. IPA funding is following three major axis: supporting the achievement of political criteria, economic criteria and European standards.

6.1.3 As the most influential donor in terms of the amount of assistance and in its funding categories, the EU has the potential to determine the focus of democracy promotion agendas and assistance. It also means that the effectiveness of the Commission's intervention is a critical driver of how international assistance in Kosovo is perceived and legitimized.

6.1.4 Under the political criteria, the IPA funding supports the improvement of administrative capacity and institution building in Kosovo, the rule of law and the fight against corruption and organised crime, promoting human rights and the protection of the Serb and other minorities, contributing to the consolidation of civil society and the public media through mainstreaming civil society issues in all programmes. For the period 2009-2011, 2–5% of the total assistance for Kosovo has been earmarked to support civil society.

6.1.5 Although the European Union funding for civil society has continuously increased, complex bureaucratic application procedures and relatively high minimum grant amounts exclude most organisations from benefiting from these funds. The same conditions have deepened the gap

between large and small CSOs. The language and the technicality of the applications remain barriers for community and grass roots CSOs to access EU funding.

6.1.6 The EC funding available for civil society is targeting actions promoting democracy and rule of law, and less those promoting socio-economic development.

6.1.7 Under IPA assistance, there are no initiatives of the social partners supported nor targeted programmes that would allow them to reinforce their capacities.

6.1.8 There are still concerns regarding the limited capacity of Kosovo authorities for the absorption of IPA funds. The government should involve the CSOs in defining the priorities for IPA assistance.

6.1.9 Taking into consideration that a structured dialogue between CSOs and the government is missing in Kosovo, the EESC welcomes the European Commission plans to finance projects in 2012 that will set-up up networks of CSOs in view of easing the dialogue with the authorities.

6.1.10 The EESC recommends that the calls for proposal under IPA be planned in such a way that gaps of funding can be avoided.

Brussels, 28 March 2012.

The President of the European Economic and Social Committee
Staffan Nilsson

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSOCIATES

The Review of International Affairs is a quarterly published in January, April, July and October every year.

The periodical publishes evaluated articles and conference and book reviews in the field of international relations, foreign policy, international public law and international economics.

In writing all contributions for *The Review of International Affairs* authors are kindly asked to respect the following rules.

Instructions for Writing Articles

1. Author contributions (articles) should not be longer than 10 single-spaced pages (single) in *Word* format (up to 28000 characters with spaces).
2. Articles should be written in *Times New Roman* font, font size 12, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.
3. The title of the article should be written in capital letters, *in Bold*, font size 14. The title is separated from the text with – *spacing before 18 pt*. Below the title is given the author's forename, middle name and surname (including his title, possibly), the name of the institutions he works for as well as its seat. These data are given in *Italic*.

Example:

Prof. Dragana Marko Mitrović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade

4. If the author has a wish to point to his readers that some of the views presented in the article express his own opinion and not the one of the institution he works for it is necessary to insert at the end of the title a special footnote with the symbol * for this remark.
5. The *Abstract* should contain not more than 100 words, presenting the most significant hypotheses the work is based upon. Below the *Abstract* the author puts up to 12 *Key Words*. Both the *Abstract* and *Key Words* are given below the title of the article and they should be separated from the rest of the text by applying the option *Paragraph-Indentation*.
6. The *Summary* written in the language of the paper (e.g. Serbian) should be placed after the text. The author should give a concise contents of the paper and the most significant hypothesis his work is based upon.
7. The basic text and footnotes should be justified by applying the option *justify*, while titles should be centred by applying the option *center*.
8. Subtitles are written in *Bold*, while sub-subtitles are in *Italic*; in both cases the font size is 12.

9. The first line in every paragraph should by no means be indented by applying tabulator – option *tab*.

10. Latin, Old Greek and other non-English words and terms in the text should be written in *Italic* (e.g. *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire*, etc.). The text should contain full names and not initials.

11. Only the following form of quotation marks should be put in the text – “ and ”. In case the additional quotation marks are to be put within these ones it should be done in the following way: “Establishing a Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community in Kosovo, as an integral part of comprehensive ‘final status’ settlement”.

12. Footnotes should be written on the bottom of the page (option *Footnote*), and their marks are solely to be put at the end of the sentence.

The details on the quoted bibliographic unit in footnotes should be given in conformity with the following suggestions:

a) *Monographs*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the monograph (*in Italic*), publisher, place of publishing, year of publishing, p. if one page of the quotation in English is cited, pp. if several pages are quoted. In case several pages are quoted En Dash is applied with no space before and after the numbers (for example 22–50).

When the proceedings in English are quoted and they were edited by more than one editor, then there should be put (eds) in brackets with no full stop after the names of the editors. If there is only one editor then (ed.) is put, including a full stop inside the brackets.

Examples:

John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 221.

Duško Lopandić (ed.), *Regional initiatives in Southeast Europe: multilateral cooperation programs in the Balkans*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 24–32.

Theodor Winkler, Brana Marković, Predrag Simić & Ognjen Pribičević (eds), *European Integration and the Balkans*, Center for South Eastern European Studies, Belgrade & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2002, pp. 234–7.

b) *Articles in Scientific Journals*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the paper (with quotation marks), the title of the journal (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, pp. from–to. The numbers of pages are separated by En Dash (–), with no space. If some data are incomplete it should be clearly stated.

Examples:

Michael Levi, “The Organisation of Serious Crimes”, in: Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 878–84. (pp. 878–9 or p. 878).

Robert J. Bunker & John. R. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences”, *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 55–76.

c) *Articles in Daily Newspapers and Journals*

There should be given the author's name (or his initials, if they are the only ones given), the title of the article – with quotation marks, the title of the newspapers or the journal (*in Italic*), date – in Arabic numerals, the number of the page/pages.

Example:

John Gapper, "Investor votes should count", *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, p. 9.

d) *Document quotation*

There should be given the title of the document (with quotation marks), the article, item or paragraph the author refers to, the title of the journal or official gazette containing the document (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, the place of publishing and year of publishing.

Example:

"Resolution 1244 (1999)", Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

e) *Quotation of sources from the Internet*

It should contain the author's name, the title of the contribution or article, a full Internet Website that enables to access the source of quotation by typing the mentioned site, the date of accession to the Web page, page number (if there is one and if presented in PDF format).

Example:

Maureen Lewis, *Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?*, IBRD & World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, Internet, [http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/\\$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf](http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf), 14/09/2004, p. 3.

f) *Repeating of the previously quoted sources*

Ibid. or ibidem is applied only if quoting the previous source in the text, with the page number, and in case the new quotation belongs to the same source (e.g. *ibid.*, p. 11)

Loc. cit. or op. cit. is applied with no page number and only for the previously mentioned source of quotation with the same page number as the previously quoted source.

13. The article may contain tables or some other supplements (such as maps, graphs, and the like). It is necessary to give their number and full title (e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy*). If the supplement is taken over from the contribution of some other author or a document its source should necessarily be given.

Instructions for Writing Book and Conference Reviews

1. Conference and book reviews should not be longer than two and a half pages in *Word* format (line spacing *singe*), or they should actually contain no more than 7500 characters with spaces.
2. The bibliographic details should be given at the beginning of the review in accordance with the rules prescribed for monographs in footnotes, and with the total number of pages given at the end (e.g. p. 345).

3. Book and conference reviews must not contain footnotes, while all possible remarks should be put in brackets.
4. The author may also write subtitles of the book or conference review in capital letters – font size 14, although this is subject to changes on the part of the editorial staff.
5. Font size, font and justification of the text should be in conformity with the previously mentioned suggestions on writing of articles.
6. The name of the author of the review is given at the end; it should be in *Italic*, while the whole surname should be written in capital letters (e.g. *Žaklina NOVIČIĆ*).

* * * * *

In case you have some dilemmas do not hesitate to contact members of the Editorial Staff.

Editorial Staff

CIP – Katalogizacija u publikaciji
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

UDK 327

REVIEW of International Affairs /
Editor-in-Chief Mina Zirojević Fatić. Mina Zirojević Fatić. – Vol. 1,
no. 1 (1950) –. – Belgrade : The Institute
of International Politics and Economics,
1950–. – 24 cm

Tromesečno

ISSN 0486-6096 = Review of International
Affairs

COBISS.SR-ID 3154178

Readership of The Review of International Affairs

In Serbia:

- Diplomatic representatives of foreign countries
- Foreign news agencies, newspaper and TV correspondents
- Government bodies, military institutions, political parties
- Business organisations and associations, banks, chambers of commerce, institutes, leading companies
- Universities, scientific institutions, libraries
- Publishing houses, the media
- Prominent political, academic, economic and cultural figures

Abroad:

- Diplomatic, business and cultural representatives of Serbia abroad
- Parliaments and governments in countries on all continents
- Leaders of prominent political and parliamentary parties throughout the world
- All major global and regional international organizations (the UN and its specialized agencies, the European Union, the Council of Europe, OSCE, etc.)
- Chambers of commerce, large companies and corporations throughout the world
- Universities, institutes, libraries
- Prominent public figures in political, business and social affairs

The journal is distributed to institutions and individuals in about 150 countries who are policy-makers at the national and international levels.

Advertising rates in the *The Review of International Affairs*:

- full page: EUR 500
- half-page: EUR 300
- inside cover: EUR 700
- back cover: EUR 800

For all additional information, please call +381 11 33 73 832 or e-mail us at:
interaff@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

From the
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
(all publications in Serbian unless otherwise noted)

JOURNALS:

The Review of International Affairs
A journal of international relations
Published quarterly in English

Međunarodna politika
A journal of international relations
Published quarterly in Serbian

Međunarodni problemi
International problems
A scholarly journal in Serbian and English
Published quarterly

Evropsko zakonodavstvo
A scholarly journal for European Union law
Published quarterly in Serbian

BOOKS:

Western Balkans: From Integration to Stabilisation,
Proceedings, Miroslav Antevski i Dragana
Mitrović (eds.), broširano, 2012, 404 str.

*Meaning of Borders and Border Issues in the Age
of Globalization: Europe and Asia*, Proceedings,
Duško Dimitrijević, Dragana Mitrović i Ivona
Lađevac (eds.), broširano, 2012, 160 str.

*Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Srbije sa pravom
Evropske unije (II)*, zbornik radova, priređivači
Duško Dimitrijević i Brano Miljuš, tvrdi povež,
2012, 886 str.

Stubovi spoljne politike – Srbija, EU, SAD i Kina,
Dragan Petrović i Dragan Đukanović, tvrd
povež, 2012, 240 str.

Milovan Radaković, *Komponente nacionalnog i
evropskog identiteta*, tvrd povež, 2012, 280 str.

*Uloga civilnog društva u promociji potencijala Po-
dunavlja u svetlu izrade Strategije EU za Dunavski
region*, zbornik radova, priređivači Edita Stojić
Karanović i Nevenka Jeftić Šarčević, broširano,
2012, 212 str.

Srbija i međunarodne organizacije, zbornik
radova, priređivači Dragan Đukanović i Ivona
Lađevac, broširano, 2011, 572 str.

*Japan and Serbia: Regional Cooperation and Border
Issues: a Comparative Analysis*, Proceedings, Duško
Dimitrijević and Ivona Lađevac (eds.), broši-
rano, 2011. 192 str.

Edita Stojić-Karanović i Dragan Petrović,
Dunavska strategija, broširano, 2011, 272 str.

*Development Potentials of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment: International Experiences*, Proceedings,
Miroslav Antevski editor, broširano, 2011, 404 str.

Stevan Đorđević, Duško Dimitrijević, *Pravo
međunarodnih ugovora*, tvrdi povež, 2011, 688 str.

Brano Miljuš, Dragan Đukanović, *Dobrosused-
ski odnosi*, broširano, 2011, 284 str.

Dragan Petrović, *Francusko-srpski odnosi 1800 –
2010*, tvrd povež, 2011, 372 str.

Pero B. Petrović, *Kapitalna ulaganja i projektno fi-
nansiranje*, broširano, 2011, 240 str.

Hasiba Hrustić, *Poreska harmonizacija u Evrop-
skoj uniji*, broširano, 2011, 248 str.

*Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Republike Srbije sa
pravom Evropske unije*, zbornik radova, prir.
Duško Dimitrijević i Brano Miljuš, broširano,
2010, 578 str.

Vladimir Grečić, *Srpska naučna dijaspora*, broši-
rano, 2010, 416 str.

Predrag Bjelić, Sanja Jelisavac Trošić i Ivana
Popović Petrović, *Savremena međunarodna tr-
govina*, broširano, 2010, 360 str.

Dragan Petrović, *Rusija i Evropa*, tvrdi povež,
2010, 348 str.

*Unapređenje turizma kao faktor razvoja privrede
Republike Srbije*, zbornik radova, Pero Petrović
i Vidoje Golubović priređivači, broširano, 2010,
500 str.

Serbia in Contemporary Geostrategic Surroundings,
Proceedings from International Conference, ed-
itor Nevenka Jeftić, 2010, pp. 468.

Srđan Korać, *Integritet nadnacionalnog službe-
nika Evropske unije*, broširano, 2010, 206 str.