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Klaus Bachmann

WHEN THE COURT REFUSES TO WRITE
HISTORY

Dragan Simeunović

VIOLENCE IN THE “OLD” (PAPER PRESS,
TELEVISION, WEB 1.0) MEDIA AND THE
NEW MEDIA (ELECTRONIC PRESS, DIGITAL
VIDEO, WEB 2.0) IN SERBIA

Marija Đorić

TERRORISM AS A FORM OF COMMUNICATION

Milica Slavković

(MIS-)REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA IN
THE WESTERN MEDIA: CRISES, CONFLICTS,
STEREOTYPES

Katarina Štrbac,
Miroslav Mitrović

ASYMMETRIC THREATS – COMMON
RESPONSE IN WESTERN BALKANS

Milovan Radaković

COUNTRIES OF WESTERN BALKANS
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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Editorial correspondence:

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E-mail: mina@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs

Makedonska 25, 11000 Belgrade, P.O. Box 413

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For the Publisher

Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D.

Director

Language editor

Aleksandra Janošević

Editor-in-Chief

Mina Zirojević Fatić, Ph.D.

Layout

Sanja Pavlović,

Snežana Vojković

For information on annual subscription please contact:

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Tel/fax: +381 11 20 84 229

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Contents

Klaus Bachmann

When the Court Refuses to Write History 5

Dragan Simeunovic

Violence in the “Old” (Paper Press, Television, Web 1.0) Media
and the New Media (Electronic Press, Digital Video, Web 2.0) in Serbia .. 34

Marija Đorić

Terrorism as a Form of Communication 48

Milica Slavković

(MIS-)Representations of Africa in the Western Media:
Crises, Conflicts, Stereotypes 63

Katarina Štrbac, Miroslav Mitrović

Asymmetric Threats–Common Response in Western Balkans 89

Milovan Radaković

Countries of Western Balkans and the European Union 106

Bojan Dobovšek

Informal Institutions and Rule of Law a Comparison
of Central Europe and Latin America 119

Ambassadors’ forum

Speech by A.V. Konuzin at Institute of International Politics
and Economics Belgrade, 27 September 2011 131

Book Reviews

Dragan Petrović, *Francuska na raskršću* 137

Dokuments

1. Commission Opinion on Serbia's Application for Membership
of the European Union 139

2. Second Africa- India Forum Summit 2011 addis Ababa Africa-India
Framework for Enhanced Cooperation 151

3. Second Africa-India Forum Summit 2011 Addis Ababa Declaration 157

4. Tripoli Declaration 3rd Africa EU Summit 164

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*Klaus Bachmann*¹

When the court refuses to write history

ABSTRACT

The following article analyzes the way, in which different ICTY trial chambers evaluated the events in Račak 1999. In order to do that, the concept of framing is used. Frame analysis is a popular approach in media research, where it serves as a tool for comparing the way, in which different media outlets present events, people and facts to their readers. In this article, frame analysis is used in order to show differences and similarities between the frames used by the ICTY prosecution teams dealing with Račak and trial chambers at one hand, and the frames used by actors external to the ICTY on the other hand. The comparisons reveal, whether the trial chambers' frames about Račak were likely to be influenced by external actors like foreign governments, international human rights organizations and influential international media. We argue, that such influence cannot be excluded, when external actors' frames are consistent with the trial chambers frames. It can be excluded, though, when the trial chambers' frames do not show any similarities or contradict the frames of such external actors.

The article provides some surprising insights. Although the ICTY judges' assessment of the events in Račak 1999 are to a large extent congruent with the frames put forward in 1999 by Western governments and international human rights organizations, they never sentenced anyone for the crimes, which allegedly had taken place in the village. This even more astonishing, if one takes into account, that immediately after the events, the Office of the Prosecutor had demonstrated a strong engagement to investigate the events. The events had been

¹ Klaus Bachmann is professor of Political Science at the Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw, Poland. He specializes in Transitional Justice and European Integration. The author is grateful for the contribution of the following Erasmus Mundus Global Studies students to this article: Divna Popov, Silke Reinhard, Ivaylo Pentchev, Barış Ari and (for the information about Akayesu) Karen Lockyer and Emelie Karlsson. Email: k.bachmann@feps.pl.

strongly politicized and by many historians are regarded as a key event which led to the Rambouillet talks and triggered the bombing of the Serbia in 1999.

Key words: ICTY, transitional justice, Račak, truth, international human rights organizations.

1. Frame analysis and the ICTY

Consumers of media outlets tend to confront narratives and opinions in newspapers and electronic media to what they perceive as true and consistent with established facts and common knowledge. Analysts of the media take a different approach, which avoids to establish a truth and then to confront the media coverage with it. Rather than assume that reporting is necessarily derived from some prior, objective and univariate reality, they ask why certain media describe things in one way, while other media do so in a different way. It is the basic assumption of this approach that every media outlet and every reporter can choose from a multitude of options when they decide to present a specific issue. Through the very act of writing about an identified issue, media draw upon and refer to cognitive schemes, called “frames,” which provide categories, order, and chronology that allow the reader (and author) to organize fragmented information and attribute meaning to it. By emphasizing certain aspects of an event and embedding its description in headlines, pictures, the structure of a page, a film or a radio program, media instruct us both what to think, and how to think about it.² Such frames act as patterns of interpretation which affect problem definition, moral evaluation, and causal interpretation and may even imply particular solutions for the identified problem. Framing usually involves strong moral judgments by journalists, which do not necessarily incline readers to share these judgments, but which enables them to take their own position. Taking such a position is much more difficult, when facts are presented without any moral embedding. Frames in popular media mostly contain very strong and one — sided moral judgments, which often include even legal assessments (for example when a tabloid media ignores the presumption of innocence and ousts a suspect as “killer”), whereas elite media tend to present more moderate frames, which partly shift the burden of finding an appropriate interpretation to the reader. In the latter case, frames may also define a problem and suggest a solution to it. This occurs rather seldom in popular media, which mostly propose simple, populist solution, which are mostly based on repression and punitive measures. Viewed through this lens, journalism appears as a far more discretionary and constructed exercise than

² Cohen refers to these two as “priming” and “framing.” Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press And Foreign Policy* 13 (1963), quoted according to Patrick Roessler, “Agenda-Setting, Framing and Priming” in *The Sage Handbook of Public Opinion Research*, Wolfgang Donsbach, Michael W. Traugott, ed., 2008.

the traditional professional image of reporting facts. The events in Račak in early 1999 also can be present as different, contradictory or overlapping frames. One possible frame could describe the events as an unprecedented and unprovoked assault of Serbian forces against an innocent and peaceful village of Kosovo Albanians, which had been staged by local police and military commanders without the assent of the government in Belgrade. Another frame could present the events as carefully planned massacre of KLA members and their supporters, initiated by the government in order to demoralize the KLA and scare the local population off from supporting the guerilla. Another frame could put forward a version, according to which the whole action was a totally legitimate police action against local criminals, who had attacked policemen and then were trying to mask their crimes as politically motivated, pretending to be some kind of freedom fighters. From the perspective of frame analysis, all these frames (and many others) are just as true or untrue as any other, since frame analysis does not deal with the veracity and truthfulness of frames, but with the reasons and consequences of framing and similarities and differences between various frames.

Each and every of these frames and others, which can theoretically be constructed about the events in Račak is potentially in contradiction to another one, though each may also overlap with one or several others. All these frames have some features in common. Each is an attempt to tell a story, to attribute meaning to the events and to place them into larger narratives. For this exercise in framing to function, certain conditions must be present. An overarching narrative must exist, in which the respective frame can be embedded; the event to be framed must possess certain features that allow journalists to ascribe meaning to it and to interpret it normatively. Events that lack these conditions tend to be neglected by journalists. The same is true for events that do not lend themselves to consistent moral judgment.

Frame analysis as a method of desegregating and comparing content has been widely used by media analysts and public opinion researchers in qualitative and quantitative research. It has seldom been applied in other fields. However, from its basic approach to text analysis, one could not only treat media content as frames, but also government declarations, press releases and NGO reports as textual products, which contain frames. If so, they also may be compared to the narratives, which emerge from juridical proceedings, like indictments and judgments. They fulfill the same requirements: Indictments and judgment have to fit into pre-existing narratives, they are strongly normative and attribute meaning and interpretation to disperse and often unrelated facts, which emerge from the investigations (in the case of indictments) and from the trial proceedings (in the case of judgments). Finally, they “tell a story”, which is ³ based on the selection

³ For detailed list of judgements see stable internet address <http://www.icty.org/action/cases/4>.

of facts. It is therefore possible, to compare, which facts from the indictment are selected in order to substantiate the arguments of a judgment and it is possible as well, to compare the narrative contained in a judgment to the one offered by an NGO report, a government press release, the speech of a minister or a press report.


2. Coding and comparing trial chambers' frames with the frames of external actors

In order to do that, we code the frames, which we encounter in these sources into a previously elaborated questionnaire according to specific criteria, which enable us to compare the frames used by different actors. We include the frames from the indictment (or, if applicable, the different amended and operational indictments), from the trial chambers' verdict and (if applicable) from the appeals chamber's verdict.⁴ For the purpose of our argument, the trial chambers' and the appeal's chamber's frames used in either judgments or oral presentations during sentencing hearings may be regarded as dependant variables, whereas the frames used by NGO's, international media and governments are treated as independent variables. Prosecutors' frames from indictments and oral presentations (opening speeches and pleas) are regarded as intervening variables, in order to show, whether, and possibly how, judges were influenced by prosecutorial frames. The underlying hypotheses of this chapter claims, that the specific incentive structure, to which judges in international criminal tribunals are exposed, renders them receptive for influences from external actors, such as NGOs, the media and governments and this influence maybe (but not necessarily needs to be) channeled through the prosecution. It is the objective of this chapter, to establish, whether such influence can be excluded. If the frames, used by judges in their oral statements and judgments differ significantly from the ones used by external actors and the prosecution, we will regard the hypothesis as falsified. If we encounter considerable similarities between the frames used by one or several external actors and frames from judges' oral statements and judgments, we will claim, that receptivity cannot be excluded. In such a case, the results of our research will not entitle us to claim such an influence. They will only prevent us from excluding it.

The main criteria, according to which frames are examined, concern the way, crimes and perpetrators of crimes are described, whether the description follows the presumption of innocence or not, how and to whom guilt is attributed and how a specific group is divided into perpetrators, victims, witnesses, bystander and collaborators, about whom is alleged to have started

⁴ When this book is being written, there is still no appeals chamber verdict available for the pros. vs. Šainović et al. IT-05-87.

Graph 2: The analytical model for excluding external influences on judges' frames



the conflict and how and when the conflict is said to have ended. Special attention is given to the causes and reasons, which frames mention in order to rationalize a conflict, for example, whether a frame merely provides a description of atrocities (“after the assault on the village, men were rounded up and shot”) or constructs causes, reasons and explanations for it (“in order to eliminate potential enemy fighters, all men were rounded up and shot”). Additional criteria refer to the use of command responsibility, aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the character of the conflict (internal, international, civil war etc.). We do not search for legal notions in media coverage. These notions should be understood in a broader meaning: “command responsibility” may be contained in a legal document (f.e. in an indictment or judgment), but it may also show up in a newspaper comment claiming, for instance, “that Slobodan Milošević cannot deny his responsibility, since he occupied the highest constitutional position in Serbia when these crimes happened.” Another important criterion is the way, perpetrators and victims are framed. For instance, armed man, trying to resisting the police entering the village, can be framed as “Muslims”, “Kosovo Albanians”, “guerillas”, “fighters”, “bandits”, terrorists”, “rebels” and in many other ways, of which each one involves different meanings, normative judgments and fits into different narratives. Whenever we find a certain frame in a judgment, which was previously used by an external actor or by the prosecution, we claim, that in such a case, it cannot be excluded, that the judges were influenced by the actors,

who used this specific frame. We acknowledge, that this method better serves as a tool to compare the strength of different external actors on judges than to analyze, whether judges were actually influenced or not. It is very important to understand the limitations of our approach. It does neither deliver any proof about bias or prejudice of judges, nor does it provide proofs for influence of a specific actor on judges. It only shows, whether frames used by judges are closer to one or several frames used by one actor or another. This comparison can, but need not be inconclusive, for example, when all frames compared do not reveal any differences, because a specific frame is so widespread and generally accepted, that it is used by all actors involved.

3. External actors' frames concerning the Račak events in Kosovo

On January 15th 1999, forces of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior advanced on Račak, a village in southern Kosovo. The village was known as a stronghold of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which had been founded during the mid-nineties by radical Albanian nationalists, who disagreed with the pacifist autonomy movement headed by Ibrahim Rugova. The attack on Račak was a reaction to KLA attacks on police stations, during which three policemen had died during the days preceding the attack on Račak. According to eye-witness accounts collected later, Serb forces shelled the village and then conducted house-to-house searches. They were accompanied by a reporter of Associated Press.

Before and during these events, a special unarmed deployment of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the so called Kosovo Verification Mission, was present in Kosovo and had been invited by the Serbian forces to observe the attack. KVM observers could observe the events only from outside; they were not allowed to enter the village before the following day. On January 16th, they were able to enter the village, inspect the scene and talk to villagers. By then, they discovered 45 bodies with numerous mutilations and wounds, including the bodies of several women and a 12-year old boy. These bodies were later taken away by a Serb forensic team to Priština and were examined by Finnish, Belorussian and Serb forensic expert teams.

When William Walker, an US career diplomat, former CIA agent and head of the KVM, arrived at the scene and had been briefed by his observers, he denounced the events as an “unspeakable atrocity” and “a crime very much against humanity”, blaming the Serb government for the killings and demanding them to be investigated and the perpetrators punished. In the tense climate of escalation which prevailed at that time in Kosovo, Walker’s words contributed to a polarization of positions between Western government and the government of Serbia under Slobodan Milošević. After the news about an

alleged massacre in Račak had reached Western media and government offices, a fierce battle concerning the interpretation of the events started, which revealed two opposite and mutually exclusive sets of frames about what had happened.

The first set, whose agenda had been set by William Walker, claimed, that in the village, unarmed civilians had been slaughtered by Serb forces, which had carried out an exaggerated and disproportional attack on a civilian settlement. The frame left open, whether the alleged massacre was due to overzealous local commanders or had been carried out in accordance with orders, which the police and military forces had previously received from Belgrade. With respect to this question, various “massacre frames” differed.

The opposite frame claimed, that Serb forces had conducted an anti-terrorist intervention, which was justified by previous KLA activities in the region and had been proportional to the threat it intended to eliminate. During the intervention, only KLA fighters had been killed and the alleged crime scene had been manipulated by the KLA, which had removed and replaced bodies in order to evoke the impression of a massacre of unarmed civilians. This “hoax frame” remained stable over time.

Supporters of both frames used extremely emotional language in their interpretations of the events. The Serb government described the events as an “anti-terrorist action” or “police operation”, and the crimes the Serb forces had allegedly dealt with as ‘acts of terrorists’. It refrained from applying precise legal notions to the alleged crimes of the KLA, opposite to William Walker, who had immediately suggested, that the crimes he imputed to the Serb forces, fell under the ICTY’s jurisdiction as crimes against humanity.⁵ “With a series of lies and fabrications he (Walker) accused our State authorities in an obvious attempt to divert the attention from terrorists, murderers, and kidnapers and to one again protect them the way he has been protecting them long ago. Ever since he came, he turned a blind eye to the crimes of the terrorists”, Serb president Milan Milutinović declared in Belgrade.⁶ In their later testimonies in the Milošević trial, high officers of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior claimed, that at the time of the incidents in Račak the village had been empty and the only casualties of the fighting had been KLA fighters.⁷ ‘Yugoslav Press Agency Tanjug quoted a

⁵ BBC: World: Europe. *NATO crisis talks on massacre*. 17.1.1999. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/256453.stm>.

⁶ AFP 1/17/1999; Tanjug 1/17/1999.

⁷ Transcript Milošević Trial, police colonels in Urosevac, Bogoljub Janicijevic, 30.09.2005. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_Milošević/trans/en/050930IT.htm.

See also: Goran Radosavljevic ‘Guri’, Serbian Special Police commander in the military operation in Račak documentary ‘Račak lazi i istine’; According to operational data of the Serbian police, the village of Račak was a KLA headquarters and had no civilians at the moment of conflict <http://www.rts.rs/page/tv/ci/story/17/%D0%A0%D0%A2%D0%A1+1/51097/>

statement of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, saying, that “an ethnic Albanian terrorist group had opened fire with automatic weapons, hand-held rocket launchers and mortars on the police. The police responded and crushed the terrorists. Several dozen terrorists were killed in the clashes with the police. Most of them were in uniforms bearing the insignia of the ethnic Albanian terrorist organization calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).”⁸

In their attempts to present the events in Račak as a justified and appropriate police intervention, which had been triggered by terrorist attacks, the Yugoslav authorities were quite isolated. The first doubts about Walker’s manichean vision of the events emerged several days after the Yugoslav authorities had already taken position and Western governments had blamed them for the alleged killing of innocent civilians. A reporter of the French daily *Le Monde* was among the first to enter the village and conduct his own research. He found the versions, which inhabitants of the village gave him about the events on January 15th “difficult to explain” and indicated that they cast doubts on the interpretation, claiming a massacre had been perpetrated in cold blood against disarmed victims.”⁹ Other reporters followed, like *Berliner Zeitung*’s Bo Adam, who went there a year later and encountered various contradictions between the official versions of Western governments and the evidence, he found on the ground. In 2005, Milošević called him as a defense witness.¹⁰

The Serb government’s version stood in strong contrast to the version Human Rights organizations and Western governments promoted during the days following January 15th. The US government issued several very emotional and accusatory statements, blaming directly the Serb government for the alleged killings. These statements were phrased in a style, which was quite unusual for official declarations made on behalf of governments, and considerably went beyond the language of diplomacy, denouncing the events as “massacre”, “murders”, “brutal murders”, and “barbaric killings”. Already on January 16th, the Press Office of the White House distributed a statement by President Bill Clinton, which condemned “in the strongest possible terms the massacre of civilians by Serb security forces that took place last night in the village of Račak in Kosovo. This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to

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⁸ Serbian Interior Ministry, press release January 16, 1999.

⁹ „La version rapportée par les habitants albanais de ce village du Kosovo comporte des éléments difficilement explicables, rapporte notre envoyé spécial, et oblige à s’interroger sur un massacre qui aurait été perpétré froidement contre des victimes désarmées”, *Le Monde* 21.1.1999. http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_breve/1,13-0,37-3599,0.html.

¹⁰ Anna Uzelac: Witness disputes Račak findings. IWPR TRI issue 391, 17 Nov 2005. <http://iwpr.net/report-news/witness-disputes-Račak-findings>.

sow fear among the people of Kosovo. It is a clear violation of the commitments Serbian authorities have made to NATO. There can be no justification for it.”¹¹

Already the following day, several members of the House of Representatives introduced a draft resolution, which was submitted to the Committee of International Relations and which requested NATO to implement its activation order from October 12th, 1998, in order to compel the Serb government to comply with the respective UNSC resolutions. The draft resolution contained a section dealing with the events in Račak: “There have been numerous reports of atrocities committed by the military forces and police of Serbia-Montenegro since the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement, including the brutal murders of at least 45 ethnic Albanians in Račak, Kosova, in January 1999.”¹²

From the retrospective, the events in Račak were a turning point in the history of the Kosovo conflict, and contributed to the hardening of the Western states’ position toward Serbia. It is difficult to say, whether they actually triggered the NATO bombing campaign, which started in March 1999, but they were often and extensively used as a justification for military intervention. In April, when the bombing campaign was already underway, Albright told the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Senate: “By opposing Slobodan Milošević’s murderous rampage, NATO is playing its rightful role as a defender of freedom and security within the Euro-Atlantic region. Because our cause is just, we are united. And because we are united, we are confident that in this confrontation between barbaric killing and necessary force; between vicious intolerance and respect for human rights; between tyranny and democracy; we will prevail.”¹³ At a meeting at Brookings Institution in Washington D.C., she explained her interpretation of the conflict: “It was Milošević a decade ago who stripped the Kosovo Albanians of the autonomy to which they were entitled; who launched last Spring a campaign of brutal repression; who violated the ceasefire negotiated last October; whose security forces committed acts of barbarism such as the massacre at Račak earlier this year; and who refused to join the leaders of Kosovo in signing the balanced and just settlement negotiated at Rambouillet.”¹⁴

¹¹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President on the Massacre of civilians in Račak. Washington, DC, January 16, 1999. http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/1999/990118_pres_Račak.html.

¹² The House of Representatives, 106th Congress, 1st Session, H. CON. RES. 13, January 19, 1999. <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-106hconres13ih/html/BILLS106hconres13ih.htm>.

¹³ Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Washington, D.C., April 20, 1999 "U.S. and NATO Policy Toward the Crisis in Kosovo": <http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990420.html>.

¹⁴ The Brookings Institution, National Issues Forum: A New NATO for a New Century Washington, D.C., April 6, 1999 As released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State. <http://1997-2001.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990406.html>.

Given the ideological differences and the conflicts of interest, which had often come to the fore between the US and France and the initially pro-Serbian attitude of the French governments during the breakdown of Yugoslavia, one could have expected the position of Paris to differ from the frames used by leading politicians in Washington. That was not the case. It strongly condemned the events in Račak. The events were labeled as “massacre”, “act of barbarity”, “horror”, “atrocities” and “crimes”. Pierre Moscovici, Minister of European Affairs spoke during a debate in the National Assembly several days after the events imement condamnées par la communauté internationale. La France a exprimé sa révolte et son dégoût et le Premier ministre a dénoncé “un acte de barbarie”. Comme lui, je pense qu'il n'y a pas de mots pour qualifier l'horreur: la révolte et le dégoût nous saisissent à la vue de ces vieillards et de ces enfants assassinés.

Les responsables de ces actes de barbarie doivent savoir qu'ils ne peuvent échapper à la justice et qu'ils devront répondre de leurs crimes.”¹⁵ As well as in the US, Račak later became the main cornerstone for explaining, why NATO had started to attack Serbia and why France had participated in the bombing. Lionel Jospin in the National Assembly on March 26th: “le massacre de 45 Albanais, un nouveau degré était atteint dans l'horreur.” (...)” Nous ne faisons pas la guerre au peuple serbe. Nous gardons en mémoire son passé héroïque dans la lutte contre l'oppression nazie. Nous ne sommes pas les ennemis de la nation serbe, qui a le droit légitime de se voir offrir un avenir dans une Europe démocratique. Mais nous devons constater qu'aujourd'hui, ce sont les autorités de Belgrade qui portent seules la lourde responsabilité de la crise actuelle. Ce n'est pas un peuple qui est visé, mais un appareil militaire et répressif. Ce n'est pas une nation qui est mise au ban, mais un régime récusant avec obstination les règles de la communauté internationale.”¹⁶

For the media, the case was initially not that clear. The day after the alleged massacre, New York Times covered the events with a report, claiming that in clashes between Serb police forces and the KLA, 15 people had been killed and, in another place in Kosovo, a KVM member had been injured.¹⁷ The article mostly concentrated on the injured observer. It was only on January 17th, when the daily started to discuss the implications of the events for the Clinton administration and possible NATO airstrikes against Serbia. Guilt and blame were no evident elements of the story and the question, whether actually a massacre had taken place was no issue. Several NATO officials and sources from the

¹⁵ Pierre Moscovici, Minister of European Affairs during a debate in the National Assembly, on January 20th 1999 <http://questions.assemblee-nationale.fr/q11/11-1036QG.htm>.

¹⁶ Lionel Jospin, Declaration of the government on the situation in Kosovo in the National Assembly, 26 March 1999, <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/11/cra/1998-1999/99032611.asp>.

¹⁷ New York Times, 16.1.1999.

administration were quoted, among them Walker, who blamed the Serbian side for the escalation, but in general, the report was more moderate and balanced than any of the official government statements preceding it.¹⁸ The same day, the New York Times published a more emotional article, which exposed some of the gruesome details of the alleged massacre.¹⁹ Now the unnamed author of the article called the events “carnage” and the overall tendency of the article made it clear, who was to blame, despite quotes summarizing the version of the Yugoslav authorities. “Many had been shot at close range, and residents of Račak village said Serbian forces had rounded up the men, driven them up the hill and shot them. Twenty-eight bodies lay heaped together at the bottom of a muddy hillside gully. All the victims were dressed in civilian clothing, despite the insistence of the Serbian police that most of the ‘terrorists’ wore uniforms of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army.”²⁰ Days later, the newspaper printed an abbreviated version of a KVM report about the events, which made it clear, that at least some of the victims there had been shot “at extremely close range”, among them a 12 year old boy who had been shot in the neck.²¹

Le Monde coverage of the events was not less emotional and colorful, but more space was dedicated to the dilemma of intervention versus non-intervention, which had gained salience after Račak. Le Monde’s titles often stipulated moral implications for Europe in case of non-intervention, calling Račak “a shame for Europe” and comparing the reluctance of Europeans to intervene in the conflict to Western countries’ failure to prevent the fall of Vukovar and Srebrenica.²² On January 20th, the French national daily published a large story of its Yugoslav correspondent, Christophe Chatelot, casting serious doubts on the interpretation, according to which Serb policemen and soldiers had carried out a cold-blooded massacre on unarmed civilians in Račak.²³ The

¹⁸ Jane Perlez: US weighs its reaction to massacre in Kosovo. New York Times 17.1.1999. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/17/world/us-weighs-its-reaction-to-massacre-in-kosovo.html?scp=2&sq=Račak&st=nyt>.

¹⁹ Mutilated Kosovo bodies found after Serb attack. New York Times 17.1.1999. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/17/world/mutilated-kosovo-bodies-found-after-serb-attack.html?scp=3&sq=Račak&st=nyt>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Charting a massacre. The Monitors’ report. New York Times, 22.1.1999. <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/01/22/world/charting-a-massacre-the-monitors-report.html?scp=1&sq=Račak&st=nyt>.

²² Jean Cot: Honte a l’Europe. Le Monde 20.1.1999 http://www.lemonde.fr/web/recherche_breve/1,13-0,37-3421,0.html.

²³ Christophe Chatelot: Rien ne va plus depuis la mort du Maréchal. Le Monde 20.1.1999 http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=3429.

newspaper printed a follow-up the next day, asking overtly whether the dead of Račak had really been massacred in cold blood?²⁴

At the end of the month, the “massacre frame” was strongly boosted by an article in the Washington Post, which revealed the content of telephone conversations between Serbian Interior Minister General Sreten Lukić and Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, indicating, that government forces had obtained orders for “going in heavy” in Račak. The paper claimed that “the calls show that the assault on Račak was monitored closely at the highest levels of the Yugoslav government and controlled by the senior Serbian military commander in Kosovo.”²⁵ The paper had already decided long before, who was ultimately to blame for Račak. It was, according to an Editorial from January 18th, “Mr. Milošević’s Massacre”. Slobodan Milošević, named “the despot of Serbia”, had been “waging war against the people of Kosovo”. In this respect, the Washington Post’s frames were much more congruent with the ones used by Human Rights Watch, than with the New York Times’ way of presenting things. A day after the Post’s leak of telephone intercepts, Human Rights Watch distributed a short and blunt press release, which solved the problem of guilt. “Human Rights Watch categorically rejected Yugoslav government claims that the victims of the January 15 attack on Račak were either Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers killed in combat, or civilians caught in crossfire.

After a detailed investigation, the organization accused Serbian special police forces and the Yugoslav Army of indiscriminately attacking civilians, torturing detainees, and committing summary executions. “The evidence suggests that government forces had direct orders to kill village inhabitants over the age of fifteen.” The release ended with an appeal to the Yugoslav authorities to allow investigations on the ground, and to the international community “to take resolute action against Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević and his government for brazenly violating international humanitarian law.” Given the ongoing debate about NATO intervention, the press release provided a strong argument for military action, although it did not specify, how such action should be carried out.²⁶ On

²⁴ Christophe Chatelot: Les morts de Račak ont-ils vraiment été massacrés froidement ? Le Monde 21.1.1999 http://www.lemonde.fr/cgi-bin/ACHATS/acheter.cgi?offre=ARCHIVES&type_item=ART_ARCH_30J&objet_id=3608.

²⁵ R. Jeffrey Smith: Serbs Tried To Cover Up Massacre; Kosovo Reprisal Plot Bared by Phone Taps. Washington Post 28.1.1999. <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/38544444.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Jan+28%2C+1999&author=R.+Jeffrey+Smith&pub=The+Washington+Post&edition=&startpage=A.01&desc=Serbs+Tried+To+Cover+Up+Massacre%3B+Kosovo+Reprisal+Plot+Bared+by+Phone+Taps>.

²⁶ Human Rights Watch press release, 29.1.1999: Human Rights Watch investigation finds: Yugoslav Forces Guilty of War Crimes in Račak, Kosovo. <http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/01/29/human-rights-watch-investigation-findsyugoslav-forces-guilty-war-crimes-Račak-kosovo>.

February 1st, the organization published another report, titled “a week of terror in Drenica” which, together with additional information about other sites with casualties, repeated the version about Račak from two days earlier.²⁷ After the start of the Rambouillet talks, the organization strongly campaigned for a settlement, which would not include impunity for perpetrators of violence in Kosovo.²⁸ Despite framing the conflict as a Serb government attack on unarmed civilians, HRW had at different occasions, also blamed the KLA for violating Human Rights and called on it to respect the Geneva Conventions. This, however, had only occupied a marginal part of its publications.

Since it is the purpose of this subchapter to find out, which of the putative actors, being interested in the outcome of ICTY decisions, exercised the strongest influence on the prosecution’s and the trial chambers’ frames, it is necessary to include an organization, which neither fulfills the criteria of a government, nor the ones pertaining to a Human Rights Organization nor one of a media outlet: The KLA. At the time of the events dealt with here, the KLA already was a strong, organized movement with a centralized command structure and considerable firepower as well as unofficial representatives in Kosovo and abroad (who took part in the Rambouillet talks). These elements later were crucial criteria for the trial chambers dealing with atrocities in Kosovo, to apply the Geneva Conventions to the conflict and to treat the KLA as an armed force according to international criminal law. KLA’s press releases, speeches of their political and military leaders, publications distributed on behalf of the KLA and actions undertaken by its followers are therefore not unlikely to influence directly or indirectly media coverage, reports of nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations (like the KVM, the OSCE, the UN, the EU or even NATO) and they are not unlikely to be channeled, in what way ever, into proceedings of the ICTY. It therefore does make sense, to include the KLA version of the Račak events in this analysis.

The KLA was consequently describing the Račak events as a ‘massacre’, ‘slaughter’ and as ‘murders’. Some KLA statements are referring to ‘massacre and terrible atrocities’. These accusations followed a twofold strategy, whose aim it was to blame the Yugoslavian Government and undermine its credibility

²⁷ Human Rights Watch: A week of terror in Drenica. 1.2.1999. <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1999/02/01/week-terror-drenica>.

²⁸ Human Rights Watch: No Kosovo Settlement Without Accountability for War Crimes. New Report Documents Yugoslav Government Atrocities. <http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/02/06/no-kosovo-settlement-without-accountability-war-crimes>. Human Rights Watch: Kosovo War Criminals May Go Free. Interim Accord Must Address Atrocities February 9, 1999. <http://www.hrw.org/news/1999/02/09/kosovo-war-criminals-may-go-free>.

in the world and at the same time to mobilize support among Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo and abroad by presenting them a common enemy. It must be kept in mind, that the KLA was far from representing the entire political specter of Kosovo and was competing with other, more moderate strands of the autonomy movement there. After Račak, the KLA accused the Yugoslav government of having launched an experiment of ‘mass destruction of Kosovo Albanians’ and of losing its mind and committing a new massacre against the Albanian civilian population. In a political declaration KLA stated that the massacre in Račak should be a last warning to the Albanians to unite and join the Kosovo Liberation Army.²⁹ The language of these declarations reveals the usage of ethnic, national and cultural criteria in attributing guilt to the Serbian state, the Yugoslav Government, president Milošević and Serbian forces, but also regional criteria by including local Serb volunteers as being responsible. In the first statements after January 15th, all victims were described as unarmed civilians, including a ‘young woman and a 12-year-old boy’. Later on, testifying at the ICTY, KLA commander Shukri Buja admitted that nine member of the KLA had been killed in fighting and eight others had been wounded by the Serbian police.³⁰ Contradicting its own claim, that the government in Belgrade had “lost its mind”, the KLA provided a relatively detailed explanation for the massacre. According to it, the massacre in Račak had been committed by the Serbian police in revenge for three Serbian policemen killed on January 8th near the village Stimlje. The others were massacred because the KLA had pushed back a force of 500 Serbian policemen and soldiers from Račak.³¹ In both cases, the alleged massacre was hence explained by referring to revenge. The president of the FRY Slobodan Milošević was held responsible for the massacre. In later statements, guilt was

²⁹ Quoted according to Croatian daily Vjesnik, 18.1.1999.

³⁰ Mirko Klarin, *The Case of the Missing Witnesses. Why are key US officials involved in the international bid to solve the Kosovo crisis absent from the witness list in the Milošević trial?* IWPR BCR Issue 342, 12.6.2002. <http://iwpr.net/report-news/case-missing-witnesses>.

According to the testimony of Shukri Buja, the KLA commander in Račak, who testified during the Milošević Trial, the KLA had 47 soldiers in Račak and on January 15, 1999 they opened fire on the Serbian police who were entering the village. See: Transcript from Milošević Trial, Shukri Buja, former KLA commander in Račak, 06.06.2002. http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_Milošević/trans/en/020606IT.htm.

Buja also told the court under cross examination from Milošević, that on January 15th, 8 of his KLA soldiers had been killed and eight others had been wounded. He admitted, that two men aged of 60 had reluctant been admitted as soldiers and had to be regarded as combattants rather than civilians.

³¹ Local KLA commander Shukri Buja told this to a reporter of the British daily The independent a few days after the events. Ryamond Whitacker: A fearful return home. The Independent 24.1.1999. <http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/a-fearful-return-home-1076022.html>.

Table 1: Frames concerning the events in Račak during spring 1999

Content of the frame	Yugoslav / Serbian government	US government	French government	New York Times	Human Rights Watch	Le Monde	Washington Post	Kosovo Liberation Army
Serbia attacks, KLA defends		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Casualties in Račak were all civilians		X	X		X		X	X
Casualties in Račak were all combatants	X							
Armed fighters were present in Račak				X		X		
Račak was „massacre“		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Račak was staged by KLA („hoax frame“)	X							
Serbian and Yugoslav authorities are blamed		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
KLA is blamed	X							
Both sides are blamed								
Serb forces acted on orders		X	X	X	X	X		
Serb forces acted on own account								X
Milošević is personally responsible		X			X		X	X
Responsibility falls on KLA alone	X							
KLA are „rebels“				X				
KLA are „terrorists“	X							
KLA are legitimate fighters					X			
Serb attack was proportional	X							
Serb attack was exaggerated		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Summary executions took place in Račak					X			
Fighting was an „internal armed conflict“ in legal terms					X			
Fighting was police action	X							
Conflict emerged from Serb oppression against Kosovo Albanian population		X			X			X
Conflict is a result of Serb oppression by Kosovo Albanians								
Conflict falls under ICTY jurisdiction		X	X		X			

extended to the whole government of Serbia and, partly, to the international community for its lack of reaction.³²

The table shows conclusively the isolated position of the Yugoslav authorities — whatever frame they used for describing the events in Račak, no other actor would agree with them, whereas the US government could be sure, that its frames would collide with practically all other frames, except for the Yugoslav and Serbian ones. Only with respect to Milošević being personally responsible for Račak, the US was a little isolated. The French government supported its claim. ICTY jurisdiction for Račak was supported explicitly by Human Rights Watch, the French and the US government, though none of the other actors rejected the idea of charging the ICTY with the case. Striking enough, it was neither a government, nor even the KLA which denounced Serb action in Kosovo in the strongest possible way. Human Rights Watch surpassed all other actors by claiming, that summary executions had been carried out in Račak and an order had been given, to kill all Albanians in the village over the age of 15. This claim was not even substantiated by the quotes, the organization mentioned in its press release. No other actor, including the KLA itself, mentioned a similar accusation. The Human Rights organization also maintained that all victims in the village had been civilians. At the same time, HRW regarded the KLA as legitimate fighters, which fell under (and had to respect) the Geneva Conventions. Opposite to many other actors involved, it looked upon the conflict as an internal armed conflict, to which the Geneva conventions could be applied (an interpretation, which differed considerably from William Walkers concept of a “crime against humanity.”) Only HRW, the US government (precisely Secretary Albright) and the KLA shared the belief, that it had been Serb oppression of Albanians in Kosovo, which had led to the conflict.

Both, the US and the French government appealed to the Yugoslav authorities, to let the ICTY investigate the events in Račak. They condemned the police and military action, but left open, whether they blamed local commanders, the military leadership, the Serb (or Yugoslav) government or Milošević personally for the alleged massacre. ICTY chief prosecutor Louis Arbour had immediately travelled to the region and attempted to enter Kosovo from the Macedonian border, in order to inspect the crime site in Račak. Yugoslav border guards refused access. After his unequivocal comments about the events, William Walker was declared persona non grata by the Yugoslav government and asked to leave the country within 48 hours.³³ In May of the same year during NATO’s bombing campaign,

³² References for the KLA frames can be found in the following sources: Transcript from Pros. vs. Limaj et al, IT-03-66, <http://www.icty.org/case/limaj/4>. During the prosecution’s case a KLA book called “Fallen Heroes” was tendered. This book, although incomplete, lists the names of KLA members who were killed during the war. The quote concerning guilt of the Serbian government and of the international community stems from Vjesnik, *ibid*.

³³ John Hagan, *Justice in the Balkans*.

Arbour submitted the first indictment against Milošević for war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed in Kosovo. She accused him together with several other prominent politicians and military leaders of Serbia, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vljako Stojiljković.³⁴

Human Rights Watch played an important role in securing evidence for the indictments concerning Kosovo. HRW researchers had travelled to Albania and interviewed refugees in provisional camps. Transcripts were given to investigators of the OTP. Before the Milošević trial started, Human Rights Watch distributed a large volume to journalists and tribunal observers, which contained many of these testimonies, an analysis of the command structure of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police and a legal assessment of the crimes described in the book. The book concentrated almost entirely on atrocities committed after the start of the NATO bombings. The events in Račak were dealt with only in a cursory way. HRW no longer claimed that only civilians had been killed in Račak; the report now spoke only about “ethnic Albanians”. HRW sustained the claim, that summary executions had been carried out in the village, quoting, as a reference, its own reports from early 1999.³⁵

By 2001, the judicial reckoning with the events in Račak in 1999 had led to several verdicts in Kosovo courts (some of which had been issued by trial chambers comprising international judges) against 3 Serb policemen and the former mayor of Oraovac. As Human Rights Watch’ “Under Orders” mentions, these trials were strongly criticized by Human Rights organizations for bias and lack of procedural fairness. The verdicts oscillated between 5 and 20 years of imprisonment.

4. The ICTY refrains from judging Račak

After Slobodan Milošević had been ousted from office in Belgrade and been transferred to the ICTY in 2001, the trial against him, based on the Kosovo indictment drafted by Louis Arbour started in early 2002 under the auspices of the new OTP chief, Carla Del Ponte. In the so called “Kosovo Indictment“ (which later would be merged into one with indictments concerning Bosnia and Croatia) the counts relating to Račak were the first cases of alleged mass murder presented against Slobodan Milošević and the only crime at the time attributed to Milošević before NATO had launched its

³⁴ Pros. vs Milošević et al. IT-99-37

³⁵ Human Rights Watch: *Under Orders. War Crimes in Kosovo*. New York, Washington, London, Brussels 2001, pp.56-57, 80, 103, 112, 157, 483.

air-strikes. It remained in the indictment after the Milošević trial had started, and became a major issue of controversy during the prosecution case.

The prosecution framed the events in Račak in the following way: “Although scores of OSCE verifiers were deployed throughout Kosovo, hostilities continued. During this period, a number of killings of Kosovo Albanians were documented by the international verifiers and human rights organizations. In one such incident, on 15 January 1999, 45 unarmed Kosovo Albanians were murdered in the village of Račak in the municipality of Stimlje/Shtime.” Further the indictment claims, that “beginning on or about 1 January 1999 and continuing until the date of this indictment, forces of the FRY and Serbia, acting at the direction, with the encouragement, or with the support of Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vljako Stojiljković, have murdered hundreds of Kosovo Albanian civilians. These killings have occurred in a widespread or systematic manner throughout the province of Kosovo and have resulted in the deaths of numerous men, women, and children. Included among the incidents of mass killings are the following.” Here the indictment specifically deals with the situation in Račak in January 1999. “On or about 15 January 1999, in the early morning hours, the village of Račak (Stimlje/Shtime municipality) was attacked by forces of the FRY and Serbia. After shelling by the VJ units, the Serb police entered the village later in the morning and began conducting house-to-house searches. Villagers, who attempted to flee from the Serb police, were shot throughout the village. A group of approximately 25 men attempted to hide in a building, but were discovered by the Serb police. They were beaten and then were removed to a nearby hill, where the policemen shot and killed them. Altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Račak.”³⁶

At the end of June 2001, the OTP submitted an amended indictment for Kosovo. In October of the same year, the indictment was altered again. But none of the changes affected the framing of the Račak case and the wording of the relevant parts of the indictment remained unaltered.³⁷ On September 5th 2002, the trial chamber separated the Milošević case from the cases against the remaining accused. Since then, Milošević was accused on the basis of a single

³⁶ The initial Milošević indictment is *Pros. vs. Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Drgoljub Ojdanić, Vljako Stojiljković IT-99-37*.

³⁷ The first amended Milošević indictment is *Pros. vs. Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Drgoljub Ojdanić, Vljako Stojiljković IT-99-37-I*, and the second amended Milošević Indictment (concerning Kosovo) is *Pros. vs. Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Drgoljub Ojdanić, Vljako Stojiljković IT-99-37-PT*.

indictment, directed only against him.³⁸ The charges relating to Račak remained in this single indictment. The other accused were indicted separately, but their indictment had to be amended a third time, because the name and charges relating to Vlado Stojiljkovic, the former Serb Minister of the Interior and Head of the police under Milošević had to be removed, since the latter had shot himself in the head on the stairs leading to the Yugoslav parliament, hours after the parliament had voted on a bill, which facilitated the surrender of suspects to the ICTY.³⁹

The third indictment against Milutinović et al. (IT-99-37-PT) comprised an altered version of the original fragment about Račak, which had been in the Milošević indictment. With respect to the earlier version, several details had been changed. Besides purely technical changes, the prosecution now no longer claimed, that the Army had shelled the village, before the police had entered it. Now the indictment avoided any specification concerning perpetrators of the shelling and mentioned only, that the village had been shelled, and had then been entered by FRY forces. In this part of the frame, the police no longer played a role. Also the fragment about the execution of 25 people from the village had been altered. In the early version, these “approximately 25 people” had tried to hide, but had allegedly been discovered by the Serb police. In the third amended indictment, it was now “the forces of the FRY and Serbia” which had discovered them. Then, according to the prosecution version, these people had been beaten, removed to a nearby hill and shot. Once again, the wording does not reveal, who exactly beat, removed and shot them, though it emerges clearly from the context, that the prosecution regarded the “forces of FRY and Serbia” as the ones to blame. The prosecution also had added the formula “and others known and unknown” into the enumeration of accused.

But the Račak case had not yet finished its odyssey through the OTP’s indictments and trials. In April 2005, General Nebojša Pavković arrived in The Hague and the OTP applied for a joinder of his case with the case of the other high ranking militaries and politicians, who had been indicted for crimes in Kosovo. The motion was granted by the trial chamber, and an amended joinder indictment was drafted. However, since Vlastimir Djordjević was still the only one of the accused, who remained at large (he finally was transferred in 2007), his case was separated from the joint cases of Milutinović et al and Pavković, and he was later tried on the basis of an indictment of his own.⁴⁰

³⁸ After the joinder decision (which merged the indictment for Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo into one joint indictment) the trial against Milošević was conducted under the case number Pros. vs. Milošević IT-02-54.

³⁹ BBC: Top Serb suspect dies. 14.4.2002. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1928491.stm>.

⁴⁰ Pros. vs. Djordjević IT-05-87/1.

In the subsequent amended indictments of Milutinović et al., the Račak case was dealt with in exactly the same way as in IT-99-37-PT.⁴¹ Members of the OTP had suspected, that Djordjević was living in Russia. However, in June 2007, he was arrested in Montenegro, where he had been hiding in the seaside town of Budva under a false name. He was transferred to The Hague.⁴² His trial started in January 2009.⁴³ However, the OTP decided to withdraw all elements referring to Račak from his indictment and to charge him only with crimes committed during and after March 1999.⁴⁴

Prosecution frames about Račak can therefore only be found in two cases — in *Pros. vs. Milutinović et al. (IT-99-37-PT)* and in the Milošević indictment (IT-02-54). Only in these two cases, we can expect the judges to give their version of the events in Račak in a judgment. Due to the death of the defendant, the trial chamber in the Milošević case never issued a verdict, neither on the indictment as such, nor specifically on the Račak case. In April 2003, after the Prosecution had rested its case, the amici curiae in the Milošević case filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the Geneva Conventions could not be applied to the situation in Kosovo in 1999 prior to NATO bombing. They argued further, the armed conflict prior to the NATO bombings had not been widespread and the KLA could not be regarded as an organization to which the Conventions could apply. The trial chamber dismissed the majority of the amici arguments, sustaining the indictment. In numerous cases, the amici brief's arguments were accepted by the judges, but they did not enter into a deeper discussion of the events in Račak and declared to be satisfied, that the conflict in Kosovo in early 1999 fulfilled the criteria for an armed conflict and that the KLA had to be regarded as an organized armed group with a unified command and considerable control over large parts of the territory.⁴⁵ For these reasons, the judges of the Milošević trial never formulated their own legal assessment of the events in Račak. But Račak remained an issue in the subsequent indictments concerning the group of high ranking suspects around Milutinović, until the issue was removed for procedural reasons. This happened, after the prosecution had filed a motion seeking to join the cases against Milutinović et al. and Pavković. The motion was granted and the

⁴¹ IT-05-87 PT.

⁴² Sense Agency, Vlastimir Djordjević arrested. 17.6.2007. http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/vlastimir-Djordjevic-arrested.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=10355B-92: „Hague indictee Vlastimir Đorđević arrested in Montenegro. 17.6.2007 http://www.6.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2007&mm=06&dd=17&nav_id=41862.

⁴³ *Pros. vs. Djordjević IT-05-87-1*. It was once amended, but the changes were minor and not connected to the events in Račak.

⁴⁴ *Pros. vs. Djordjević IT-05-87/1-PT* (operative indictment from 9.7.2008).

⁴⁵ Decision on motion of acquittal, 16.6.2004.

Trial Chamber ordered the Prosecution to file an amended joinder indictment. The redacted indictment was accepted as the operative indictment against six accused, assigning a new case, now titled Sainovic et al.⁴⁶ In July, 2006, before the start of the trial of Sainovic et al.⁴⁷ the Chamber conducted a pre-trial conference and after an oral hearing, on July 11, 2006 the Chamber issued its ‘Decision on Application of rule 73’ in which it made the following order: “Pending further order by the Chamber, the Prosecution may present evidence in relation to all crime sites and incidents listed in paragraph 72, and 75, except subparagraphs which set forth the charges in respect of Račak, Padaliste and Dubrava.”⁴⁸ This way the Chamber “refused to allow evidence to be presented in relation to (among others) Račak on the ground that what allegedly occurred there was not, unlike other killing sites, associated with locations from which persons were allegedly forcibly displaced, and thus did not fall within the ‘nature or theme’ of the prosecution case”.⁴⁹ In the very extensive judgment of Sainovic et al., Račak is no longer mentioned and the judges avoided any assessment concerning the character of the events therein 1999. This should not be understood as a decision indicating, that Račak (and the other sites) had not been crime sites or that no crime had occurred there in early 1999, since the rule 73’ bis decision was made only in order to expedite the trial and because the prosecution and the chamber agreed, that Račak and the other two sites had not been linked to deportation and forcible transfer of persons. The question, whether in Račak had taken place killings falling under the jurisdiction of the tribunal, was left unanswered for purely procedural reasons.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić, Third Joint Indictment, Case No. IT-05-87.

⁴⁷ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainovic, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić, Third Joint Indictment, Case No. IT-05-87-PT, p. 34, paragraph 75.

⁴⁸ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić, 29.02.2009. Judgement, p.11, paragraph 16 <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Milutinović/tjug/en/jud090226-e1of4.pdf>.

⁴⁹ The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor of the Tribunal against Milan Milutinović, Nikola Sainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević, Sreten Lukić, 29.02.2009. Judgement, p.12, paragraph 16 <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Milutinović/tjug/en/jud090226-e1of4.pdf>.

⁵⁰ The chamber acted in reaction to a motion of the Ojdanić defense and after consultation with the prosecution. See: pros. vs. Milutinović et al. IT-05-87-T, decision on application of rule 73’ bis, 012.7.2006. <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/Milutinović/tdec/en/060711.pdf>.

5. Incoherent Prosecution frames about Račak

It was, however, another trial chamber, which decided to give its interpretation of the Račak events. As already set out above, the OTP had decided to remove the initial murder charges against accused⁵¹ pertaining to Račak. But the events in Račak became an issue during the trial anyway, for two reasons. First, the defense called witnesses in order to prove, that Račak had not been a crime against humanity, but an armed clash between, at one hand, the Army and the police, and, on the other hand, an armed unit of the KLA.⁵² The second reason is more opaque. Although the accused was never charged with crimes linked to the Račak events, the trial chamber decided to include the events in the judgment and thoroughly analyzed the evidence from the trial in its extensive judgment. Paradoxically, those trial chambers which had been dealing with suspects, who actually were accused of crimes linked to the Račak events, never dealt with them in their verdicts, either because they never issued one (in the Milošević trial), or they ordered Račak evidence to be withdrawn from the trial (as in Sainovic et al.). The only trial chamber, which actually conducted an in-depth analysis (in a judgment whose size amounts to nearly a thousand pages!), was a trial chamber, which dealt with an accused, who had not been charged with crimes linked to Račak.⁵³

From a legal standpoint, it would be an abuse, to compare the charges against one group of accused (pros. vs. Sainovic et al.) with the judgment of another accused in another trial (pros. vs. Djordjević). From the perspective of frame analysis, it perfectly makes sense to do so, since it makes it possible to find out, in how far prosecution frames of the Račak events permeated into the frames used by judges and how far or close prosecution and judges' frames were from the ones used in public before the trial, by governments and by the KLA and nongovernmental organizations. The latter comparison allows drawing conclusions about to what extent external actors framed the prosecutors' and judges' understanding of the Račak events as set out in their documents.

As set out at the beginning of this subchapter, international media, NGOs and Western government were almost unanimous in their interpretation of the Račak

⁵¹ They had been regarded as murder as a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws or customs of war.

⁵² Sense Agency: Defense 'expands' indictment against General Djordjević. Given the tight schedule, the trial chamber tried to enforce during the trial, it already comes as a surprise, that the defense was allowed to proceed in this way, especially, because a positive outcome for the defense would still have exposed the accused to a charge of (multiple) murder as a war crime, instead of murder as a crime against humanity.

⁵³ See: Public judgment with confidential annex in the case of the pros. vs. Djordjević. IT-05-87/1-T (together with the confidential annex, the judgment considerably exceeds even a thousand pages).

events, which was largely congruent with the accusatory statements which William Walker had made in Priština the day after the events. It was generally accepted, that the events had constituted another element in the persecutions of Albanians in Kosovo by the Serb state. It was also widely accepted, that Serb forces had attacked the village and the KLA had defended it. These “Western” frames only differed with respect to the character of the victims, whether all or only some victims had been civilians and whether armed fighters (KLA rebels) had been present in the village. From the outset, the “massacre frame” also included blame for the Yugoslav and Serb authorities. The different actors using the frame differed, however, with respect to the question, who exactly was to blame, whether the alleged massacre had been ordered from above, had been a revenge action of lower ranks in Kosovo and whether Milošević was personally responsible for it or not. The notion of “summary executions”, carried out by Serb and Yugoslav forces against civilians in Račak had been forwarded only by Human Rights Watch.

The prosecution frame in both the Sajnović et al and the Djordjević indictment repeated this “massacre frame” and entirely rejected the “hoax frame” supported by the Yugoslav and Serb authorities and a part of public opinion in the former Yugoslavia. It took over from Human Rights Watch the claim concerning “mass executions”, adding the notion of “house – to house searches” carried out prior to the alleged executions. As time went by, the prosecution drafted the fragments of the subsequent indictments more prudently with respect to the involvement of the Yugoslav Army, altering the claim about the Army having shelled the village into one, which left open, who had actually shelled it and which role the Army had played in the events. This was probably due to new evidence which suggested, that the higher levels of command in the Army had not had knowledge about Army involvement in Račak. The prosecution claimed also, that Army and police members had entered the village after the shelling. The OTP incriminated both with the beatings and the execution of “approximately 25 men”.

It is worth mentioning, that despite the schedules with victims’ names, which the prosecution used to add to the various indictments involving Račak (except the pros. vs. Djordjević), there was never any precise quantification of victim numbers, neither concerning the overall number of victims in Račak on January 15th, nor of the alleged execution. Everywhere in the indictments and in the Djordjević judgment, only approximate figures are given and the name schedules do not specify who was killed during the execution and who was killed before or after it.

In the early prosecution frames about Račak, the police was blamed for the execution and no reference was made to the Army. In the updated frame of the pros. vs. Sainovic et al., the prosecution refrained from blaming a specific institution and claimed only, that the “approximately 25 men” had been shot and

killed on a nearby hill. In the subsequent sentence, the indictment claims, that “altogether, the forces of the FRY and Serbia killed approximately 45 Kosovo Albanians in and around Račak”, leaving it open, whether the Army or the police were held responsible for the execution. The question would have probably been important from a legal perspective, if Djordjević had been indicted for murder in Račak as a police superior. It would have been difficult, to hold him accountable for the executions, if they had been committed by Army members.

A comparison between the core elements of the “massacre frame” and the Šainovic et al. indictment reveals several major omissions. For example, the prosecution avoided to assess the character of the victims (by using words like “villagers” and “Albanians” instead of “civilians”, “rebels” or “KLA members”, which had been frequently used in the “massacre frames” of 1999), it did not decide, whether the village had hosted KLA-fighters at all during the events and whether the police and Army action there had evoked any armed response and whether such response had inflicted casualties on the other side.⁵⁴ The Human Rights report from January 29th had hypothesized, that KLA members could have attempted to defend the village. The prosecution frame adopted the belief, that the events had been caused by a Serb attack on the village, but it did not decide, whether the village also had been defended by someone. It added some new elements to the preexisting “massacre frame”: the intruders had shot at “villagers” in order to prevent them from fleeing and the ca. 25 men, who had gathered in one building (and then were allegedly beaten and executed) had done so in order to “hide”.

The vagueness of these allegations made it difficult to assess, whether the whole incident qualified as a war crime (if Račak was regarded as part of an internal armed conflict and in case the victims had been combatants killed after being captured or having surrendered) or as part of a crime against humanity (if no armed conflict had existed and Serb forces only had shelled a civilian target and killed unarmed villagers). The prosecution frame also failed to explain the motives of the perpetrators. Had they acted in the way alleged by the prosecution because of revenge (for the prior killings of Serb policemen by KLA members), because of orders from above, and what purpose was alleged for the whole action: punishment, ethnic cleansing, the expulsion of the villagers, intimidation?

6. The Trial chambers creates its own “hoax frame”

The picture drawn by the judges in *pros. vs. Djordjević* was much more precise and detailed than any of the previous prosecution frames from the *Milutinović et al.*, *Šajnović et al.* and *Pavković* cases. The judges put the events

⁵⁴ The trial chamber in *pros. vs. Djordjević* found in its judgment, that one person on the Serb side had suffered non-fatal injuries during the events.

into a broader framework, meticulously examined the evidence (including evidence from other trials), compared crime based and expert testimonies, and then created their own “hoax frame”, which ran opposite to the “hoax frame” of the Serbian and Yugoslav government from 1999, and was build on elements of the “massacre frame”, supplemented with elements from the Milutinović et al. and Sainovic et al. indictments. It also lacked consistence in some parts and refrained from a legal assessment of the events, but it was much more coherent than any of the prior frames.

The judges found, that the attack on the village had been a reaction to the previous murder of 4 policemen in a nearby village in early January but had many more reasons and objectives. “While there are suggestions in the evidence that the aim of this operation may have included arresting the persons responsible for the killing of the Serbian police officers a few days earlier, in the view of the Chamber, the extensive Serbian forces engaged, the size and force of the weapons used, the number and equipment of the forces involved and the casualties caused, especially the very high number of Kosovo Albanians killed, establish that the actual aim of this operation was not to carry out arrests but to retaliate against the earlier killing of police by the KLA, to punish the potential perpetrators and perceived supporters for the killing of the Serbian police officers, and to terrorize and punish the population in a village that was regarded as a KLA stronghold.”

According to the judges, on January 15th, units of the Army and the police had planned a joint action in Račak in order arrest the murderers of these policemen. In preparation of the assault, tanks and heavy weaponry had fired into the village, “thus preventing the civilians from leaving the village safely”. Then armored vehicles and infantry had entered the village and conducted “house – to – house searches” (here the judges used exactly the same wording as the prosecution in all previous indictments). According to the judges, the KLA had been present in the village before the attack, but had not fired back. During the action, high ranking members of the VKM had warned the local commanders of the Army, that the “firing of antiaircraft weapons into a village in which there were women and children could not be accepted as a police operation. General Drewienkiewicz⁵⁵ requested that this action be ceased.”

The chamber, which had previously in the indictment hailed the testimonies given by “international observers” as honest and trustworthy, shared Drewienkiewicz’s assessment of January 1999: “Even if it were accepted that the operation in Račak (sic) had a legitimate military or anti-terrorist purpose, in view of the type of weapons used by the VJ and the MUP in this operation, the lack of

⁵⁵ General John Drewienkiewicz, a British offiver, had been military advisor to the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In January 1999, he was the second in command under William Walker at the KVM.

any suggestion in the evidence about any outgoing fire from Račak, the high number of Kosovo Albanian casualties and the virtual absence of casualties on the side of the VJ and the MUP, suggest that the use of force in Račak was grossly disproportionate to any such military or anti-terrorist objective.”

The judges completely rejected the defense claims, according to which the Army had not been involved in the events, as “false”. The evidence pointing to lack of knowledge of higher levels of Army command about the events in Račak were dismissed as attempts to cover up the killings there and to keep the Army’s image untainted. They conceded that one non-fatal injury had occurred on the Serb side during the action, but failed to explain, how this could have happened, if the KLA had not fired upon the intruders, as had been earlier established in the judgment. The judges also concluded that the KLA had still been present in the village the next day (despite the house searches, the huge presence of soldiers and policemen and the executions) and had fired upon Serb investigators, who had attempted to enter the village. When these investigators finally could enter the village on January 17th, they found a crime scene, which differed considerably from the one observed by VKM members and journalists two days earlier. The judges did not dismiss the findings of the Serb investigators, but explained the difference between the two crime scenes by alleging, that the crime scene had been “staged” and “set up by the police”, in order to give “a false impression of the true events” (sic). Later in the judgment, the chamber found, that “not less than 45 Kosovo Albanians were killed in Račak on 15 January 1999, including a woman and a child. At least one victim had been decapitated. Most of those killed were over 50 years of age. Many had been shot in the head apparently at close range. Those killed were wearing civilian clothes when killed.” From the further argument of the judgment, it becomes clear, that the judges also regarded the events as planned and instigated from high above the level of local commanders. “Vlastimir Djordjević was the most senior MUP official involved in the operation. As such he had full information about the events in Račak and exercised control, or was in a position to exercise control, over the forces conducting the operation and those charged with conducting the operation. The Chamber must conclude from the known circumstances that as the most senior MUP official involved, and his two conversations with the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY responsible for Kosovo, Vlastimir Djordjević was able to inform the senior political leadership of the FRY of the progress of the operation in Račak and took an organising (sic) role regarding the actions of the police on the ground.”

It comes as a complete surprise, that despite these findings, the chamber did not convict Djordjević for any crime connected to the events in Račak. After having meticulously reconstructed the events in Račak, having reached the conclusion, that the action had been disproportionate and that evidence pointing in other directions had been fabricated, after having established, that the accused

was responsible for these actions, the trial chamber stopped short of convicting him, refrained from a legal categorization of these deeds and sentenced Djordjević to 27 years of imprisonment for other crimes, committed in other places than Račak. This might have been due to the fact, that he had no longer been indicted for the Račak events — but why then the judges dedicated so much space in the judgment to findings, which could not have any impact on the legal outcome of the trial? The trial chamber never explained its approach and even the sentencing hearing on February 23rd 2011 did not disclose anything which would elucidate the judges' reasoning.

Conclusion

It is beyond the scope of this chapter, to investigate the reasons, which might have guided the judges. It is the purpose of this chapter, to assess, in how far external factors influenced the framing of the Račak events by the judges. First, they explicitly rejected wholly the “hoax frame”. They incorporated important elements of the HRW version of the “massacre frame”, but without the claim concerning an order “to kill village inhabitants over the age of fifteen”, as stipulated in the HRW report from the end of January 1999. Their frame fits perfectly into the generally accepted narrative, which overarches the “massacre frame”, according to which Račak was another element in the assault of Serbia against the Kosovo Albanian population. The “Serbs attack, Albanians defend” — frame was a very popular one used in many indictments and the underlying argument in the construction of the JCEs, which consisted, according to the OTP, in terrorizing the Albanian population in Kosovo (and, beginning from March 1999 in ethnic cleansing Kosovo) in order to strengthen and expand the rule of Serbia over Kosovo. This frame, which runs through many more indictments than only the ones linked to Račak, is consistent with the dominant media frame (and the frames used by Western governments in 1998-99) and constitutes a part of an overarching narrative, which describes the conflict in Kosovo as a Serb struggle for power, rather than as a Kosovo-Albanian struggle for independence.

The strong congruence between the trial chambers assessment and the “massacre frame” should not overshadow the fact, that prosecutors and judges also deviated in some cases from the preexisting frames used by governments, the media and Human Rights campaigners. By avoiding to phrase their assessment in legal terms, they left open, whether the events in Račak had been “a crime against humanity” (as claimed by William Walker) or rather a “war crime” as stipulated by Human Rights Watch. They only rejected the Yugoslav version of a “legitimate police action against terrorists”. Finally, they refrained from assessing, who actually bore criminal responsibility for the events and thus left the question unanswered, whether the police command, the Army hierarchy,

the political leadership or Slobodan Milošević personally were responsible. They only excluded (by blaming, but not by convicting Djordjević) one possible frame (which no one actually invoked), according to which the whole action was a police action, which had escalated or ran out of control and had been carried out by local commanders who had been seeking revenge or had overreacted without the approval of their superiors. A similar version had been put forward by the KLA after the events in Račak. At the end of the day, the judges' frames were very close to, but not congruent with the prevailing "massacre frame" shaped in the early days of 1999. They were close to the KLA frame (but did neither endorse the claims of "Serb overreaction", nor "Milošević being personally responsible", nor did they agree with the later disproved KLA version, that all casualties had been civilians). In this case, the influence of HRW's frame is difficult to assess, because the HRW frame cannot be disentangled from the frames used by governments and the media, which all endorsed very similar versions of the "massacre frame". There was no direct attempt by NGOs to influence the prosecuting or sentencing policy at the tribunal in order to create specific outcomes. Despite the enormous attention, which the Račak events had attracted in January 1999, they became a rather minor element in both the Sainovic et al. and the Djordjević trial. More space and time were dedicated to them in the Milošević trial, but even there, they did not trigger any juridical activism comparable, for example to the NGO campaigns at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda⁵⁶, where direct and targeted legal intervention by international NGOs had led to enormous changes in indictments and directly influenced judgment. Due to campaigners' actions, the OTP decided to include rape as a count of genocide in its indictment (which was being amended during the trial) and a comparable minor suspect was finally sentenced (among other counts) for this crime, although he had never been accused of having personally raped anyone.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ In both cases, *pro. vs. Milošević* and *pro. vs. Djordjević* HRW expert Fred Abrahams appeared as a witness for the prosecution. See: Sense Agency: Police without the internet. 6.5.2009 http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/police-without-the-internet.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=11222 and

Sense Agency: Witness: Serbian authorities knew about crimes. 5.5.2009 http://www.sense-agency.com/icty/witness-serbian-authorities-knew-about-crimes.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=11221 and Fred Abrahams: face to face with Milošević. *New York Times Magazin* 21.7.2002 <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2002/07/20/face-face-Milošević>.

⁵⁷ The *pro. vs. Akayesu*, ICTR case number , ICTR-96-4-I. The case is also extensively described in: Moghalu, K. C. : *Rwanda's Genocide: The Politics of Global Justice*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 60-76 and Thierry Cruvellier: *Le tribunal des vaincus. Un Nuremberg pour le Ruanda?* Calman-Levy 2006, pp. 35–55.

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*Dragan Simeunović*¹

Violence in the “old” (paper press, television, web 1.0) media and the new media (electronic press, digital video, web 2.0) in Serbia

ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which the old and new media in Serbia after the Cold War give impetus to creating social violence. During the 1990's, civil war and conflicts were reality of Serbia and political violence in the media was the dominant phenomenon – the most influential media being television and the paper press. Radical media change came after the political revolution on October 5, 2000: social violence became a substitute for political violence. The most popular media nowadays in Serbia are the Internet and the electronic press including “modern topics” about hooligans violence, family violence, sexual violence and the maltreatment of children.

Violence is still the most dominant phenomenon in the Serbian media even though the wars are behind us because frustration and poor social standards have not disappeared. Political pluralism and a capitalist economic system in Serbia have generated a diffusion of social violence. The new media has an ambivalent relationship with the public: first, the media is responsible for the growth of social tension because of popularizing topics about violence and conflicts - as in movies, reality shows with scenes of violence etc.: and then second, the media as importantly shows the methods and institutions for preventing violence such as “safe houses” for victims of violence etc.

For some time now in Serbia there has been an action in progress, by the state as well as non-governmental organizations, against violence in the media. What is missing though is scientific and expert research which would objectively determine the level of violence present in the media, as well as the degree of its harmful influence on users of the media. This is why the Center for Security Studies and Terrorism Research, of which I am the Director, decided to start a wider and longer-lasting research of the relationship between media and violence in Serbia. This research would have had several stages and lasted over a number of years.

¹ Dragan Simeunović, Ph. D., Professor of Political science at the University of Belgrade. E-mail: dragan.simeunovic@fpn.bg.ac.rs.

In the first stage the main goal was to determine the citizens' views about the degree of violence present in the media in Serbia, through survey and directed interviews. The media were classified as “old” and “new”.

The results of this stage of research will be presented to the public for the first time now, at the IPRA Congress in Sidney. We hope that this research will answer some of the questions so often asked by various groups in Serbian society, as well as in the scientific community.

Key words: social violence, political violence, new media, terrorism.

Violence

The starting point is a definition of **violence** as a form of human endeavor in which force is directly or indirectly used. It is an endeavor by which an act, activity, operation or process is started, performed or stopped, alternatively withheld or destroyed in spite of the will and intention of interest or need fulfillment of the object of violence, if it is conscious, or in spite of inner, natural structure or processes if it is not human.²

Since the term *violence* is too wide and also encompasses acts and events that happen outside human society, operational definitions in this research are those of social and political violence. **Social violence** is a form of interaction between subject and object. Both the subject and object of social violence as use and work of force is man, or society and its institutions, while the object of violence in general can be human (individual or society), natural entities or non-living matter. The performance of social violence is always caused by different interests of the subject and object of violence.³ **Political violence** is one of the possible phenomenal variants of social violence, and can most generally be defined as direct or indirect, latent use of force in the sphere of politics and the political — in other words as direct or indirect use of force over consciousness, body, life, will or property of a real, potential or assumed political adversary.

With regard to some new researches violence is perhaps no longer an adequate heading; today, terms like “harmful media content” or “harm and offence in media content” are more in keeping with the situation.⁴

But, since the tradition of research of this topic is still a strong factor in determining an adequate heading in the research field, of media, we have chosen to use the term *violence* in the traditional and widely accepted scientific expression that forms our point of departure in this work.

² Dragan Simeunović, *Uvod u političku teoriju*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2009, p. 34.

³ Dragan Simeunović, *Političko nasilje*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1989, p. 49.

⁴ Ulla Carlsson, (Ed.), *Regulation, Awareness, Empowerment. Young People and Harmful Media Content in the Digital Age*, Nordicom, 2006.

Violence is classified according to several criteria. Here are only some of the mostly undisputed classifications and established *types* of violence.⁵

Regarding the content of violence it is possible to differ between at least two forms of violence — *physical* and *psychical*. Regarding the manner of performance, violence can be *direct* or *indirect*.⁶

Among the aspects of indirect violence, special attention of the researchers was devoted to so called *structural violence* whose perpetrator is impossible to determine *in concretum* and which should be understood exclusively as violence of various social structures over an individual.⁷

According to the protagonists, in other words the quantitative range of subjects, we can distinguish between *individual* and *collective* violence. In regard to time span we can differ between *momentary* violence as an act from *long-lasting* violence as an activity and process. Regarding the rationality of violence, as rational direction towards the object of violence and rational suitability to goals, we distinguish *rational* from *irrational* violence. As a necessary addition to this classification, the antinomy of *conscious* and *unconscious* violence is frequently mentioned. In the practice of all political systems *institutional* violence encompasses however, to very different extent, legally established enforcement of power through government by the use of force, as well as illegal involvement of institutions into various areas of human existence through different coercive measures.

As representative phenomenal *forms* of violence there are: *threat of use of force, coercion, pressure, psycho-physical molestation (torture), homicide* (basic forms) and *violent protests, rebellions, public disorders, riots, terrorism, subversion, repression, terror, uprising and war* (complex forms). Complex forms of violence are not a simple mix of several basic forms, but they are interdependent, dynamic and often a contradictory combination.⁸

The old media

The old media are books, newspapers, magazines, films, radio, tapes, records, and broadcast television familiar to the previous generation. Most of this existed for generations and their development was slow. Some of them, like newspapers, radio and television were for a long time strictly under control regarding their

⁵ Dragan Simeunović, *Političko nasilje*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1989, p. 52.

⁶ Johan Galtung, *Strukturelle Gewalt. Beitrage zur Friedens und Konfliktforschung*, Reinbek v.H, 1975, p. 23.

⁷ Johan Galtung, *Strukturelle Gewalt. Beitrage zur Friedens und Konfliktforschung*, Reinbek v.H, 1975, p. 87.

⁸ Dragan Simeunović, *Političko nasilje*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1989, pp. 57–65.

content, including the presence of violence as a potentially harmful content. They were also not exclusively oriented towards profits, but had well thought out positive social functions, as well as political roles. Media such as books and magazines, radio and television also served the purpose of education and creating an appropriate value system within the society on even a larger scale.

In this research special attention is paid to paper press, television and web 1.0, although other old media are also elaborated.

The new media

The new media are cable TV. channels, video and video games, electronic press, digital video, web 2.0 and web 3.0.⁹

Unlike the old media, the range of new media has grown rapidly. Besides the new media are harder to subject to state or any other form of control, not only because of its nature, but also because they emerged and developed in societies more democratic than those in which the old media originated.

In this research special attention is paid to following the new media: electronic press, digital video and web 2.0, but research of the presence of violence in other new media has also started and there are some results already. With an aim to clarifying more aspects of the relationship between media and violence, the Center has conducted a smaller investigation that provides some insight into children's and young people's use of mobile phones and computer games as well.

In order to avoid possible misunderstandings though not mine definitions and interpretations¹⁰ I have presented this framed very simple — Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 as follows: Web 1.0 = Websites, e-mail newsletters and “Donate Now” buttons,¹¹ Web 2.0 = Blogs, wikis, and social networking

⁹ Dragan Simeunović, *Teorija politike*, Beograd, Nauka i društvo, 2002, p. 171.

¹⁰ Trackbacks:

“TFOA 19 : No Fits All Communication for Associations” The Future of Associations in an Internet-enabled World

1. Semantic Web (Web 3.0) New Media & Technology
2. Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 Simplified for Nonprofits Static Electricity
3. Интегрирана онлајн комуникација за непрофитни организации
КОМУНИКАЦИЈИ
4. Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 Simplified for Nonprofits Nonprofit Tech 2.0 Social Media Fundraisers.

¹¹ Web 1.0 is one person or organization pushing content out to many people via websites and e-mail newsletters. The donation process is not interactive or public. You donate and then receive a “Thank You” email. It's one-way communication. <http://nonprofitorgs.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/web-1-0-web-2-0-and-web-3-0-simplified-for-nonprofits/>.

sites,¹² and Web 3.0 = Mobile Websites, Text Campaigns and Smart phone Apps.¹³

Some of the social conditions of research

The population of Serbia without Kosovo is about 8 million. The average age of the Serbian population is 40.7 years which places Serbia into fourth place on the list of oldest populations in the world. The number of TVs in Serbia on February 4th, 2010 was 3.5 million. It is estimated that at the beginning of 2010, when the research took place, there were over 11 million users of mobile telephone networks in Serbia. The number of Internet subscribers at the end of last year was 1,614,000 and it increased by 345,000 by the start of our research period. There were 856,000 cable network subscribers at the same time, and that number increased by 82,000 by the start of our research.

Findings

The survey included attitudes of 1,046 subjects of different genders, ages, educational levels and social and economic status — and the following results were obtained.

There is not a single subject who was not exposed to scenes of violence in the media, either by his own choosing or by accidental choice of a TV program, movie, or newspapers.

Most of the subjects, 64% of them, saw the presence of violence in the media as harmful, but only if it was excessive in quantity or quality. Violence

¹² At its core, Web 2.0 is the beginning of two-way communication in the online public commons. People can post comments and converse with your organization in public for all to see. It's one person or organization publishing content to many on social networking sites who then re-publish your content to their friends, fans, followers, connections, etc. Donating is a public experience. Friends, fans, followers, connections, etc. on social networking sites see your giving and fundraising activity through widgets, Apps, and peer-to-peering fundraising tools, like [fundraising pages](http://nonprofitorgs.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/web-1-0-web-2-0-and-web-3-0-simplified-for-nonprofits/). <http://nonprofitorgs.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/web-1-0-web-2-0-and-web-3-0-simplified-for-nonprofits/>.

¹³ Web 3.0 is all of the above except that the Web experience is no longer limited to desktop and laptop computers while stationary in one place. It's the Internet on the go fueled by mobile phones and tablets. [Mobile websites](#) must be designed to be easily read on mobile devices. Group text campaigns function like e-mail newsletters in Web 1.0... to drive traffic to your mobile website. Text-to-Give technology allows quick, easy donations on your mobile phone inspired by urgent calls to actions. Smart phone Apps enable content to be published and shared easily while on the go. Effectively donating via smart phone Apps doesn't exist yet, but its coming. <http://nonprofitorgs.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/web-1-0-web-2-0-and-web-3-0-simplified-for-nonprofits/>.

has obviously played an important role in the entertainment of youth in Serbia. Even 87% of male subjects admit that they watch scenes of violence “because they are interesting”. According to the opinion of the subjects, most of the scenes of violence are on TV, the Internet, in video games and in movies. Subjects younger than 25 spend the most time on the Internet (3.5 hours a day), watching TV (2.5 hours a day), playing video games (2.2 hours a day) and talking on the telephone (2.1 hour a day). Time spent watching TV and on the telephone has been intersected in tables since it is possible to do both things at the same time, which is 24%, for subjects under 25 years of age - 47%, and for subjects aged 14 to 18 – 69%. Use of SMS (text messaging) is very widespread, and they are mostly used by both male and female subjects from ages 14 to 18.

As many as 83% of male subjects under 25 sometimes search for scenes of violence on the Internet, and 12% search for such content frequently. As reasons for doing so 74% state the need for excitement, and 69% for curiosity. Only 4% of the subjects watched scenes of violence in order to learn something from them. The number of female subjects who sometimes search for scenes of violence on the Internet is 8% while only 1% of female subjects often search for such scenes.

Of the that majority of subjects, of all ages, both male and female, 82% think that scenes of violence present in the media encourage violence if they project injustice or vulnerability that could apply to the identity of the media user. Most violence-encouraging are repeated scenes of violence towards members of the collective with whom the user can completely or to a large extent identify. For example, violence performed by authorities or members of an ethnic or religious group towards members of the ethnic or religious group to which the media user belongs, violence over football fans to which he belongs etc, especially if the scenes of violence are followed by simulative written or spoken comments. (This points to the manipulative potential of the media to induce violence. The Yugoslav people experienced such media power at the beginning and through the civil war in the nineties when the media stimulated violence even more than extremist politicians themselves.) As many as 62% of the subjects would be ready to react in some way if it would be possible immediately after watching such scenes of violence, but after some time has passed that number drops to 7%.

32% of the subjects found scenes of violence relaxing, but the number is far larger in the population under 25 – 73%. Most subjects found violent scenes in video games and on television most relaxing, and far less scenes on the Internet and in the newspapers, while scenes of violence in news programs are not found relaxing hardly at all (1%).

75% of male subjects under 14 and 44% aged 14 to 18 are ready to imitate scenes of violence committed by “bad guys”. When it comes to violent scenes

committed by “good guys” situation is different. Readiness to imitate their behavior is biggest in the group aged between 18 to 25 - 82%, but it is also very high in the group between 14 to 18 - 76%. (Subjects explain this by stating that it is legal or morally justified violence, as well as violence necessary to defend themselves or others). By giving the perpetrator of violence the status of a “good guy” the media suggest to users that violent behavior and afflicting injuries to an adversary is legitimate — so think 96% of subjects.

As much as 94% of the subjects were aware of the possibilities of misuse of mobile telephones, and in the category of parents that percentage is smaller — 72%. Regarding cyber bullying the following results were obtained:

Purposely sending a virus-infected file to another person was practiced by 7%, and the number is highest for subjects between 14 to 18 – 21%.

Purposely sending many or excessively large messages to someone in order to overload their system was practiced by 3% of the subjects, and the highest number is among subjects between 10 and 14 – 19%.

Insulting or threatening behavior via mobile phone was done by or to 68% of the subjects, most of them aged from 14 to 18 (89%).

Disseminating private or embarrassing information about someone via the Internet or mobile phone (e.g. an “embarrassing” photograph) was done by or to 94% of the subjects.

Spreading rumors about someone via phone text messages was done by or to 92% of the subjects.

Happy slapping¹⁴ was done by or to 7%, and seen by 64% of the subjects aged 10 to 14, while the numbers for the group aged 14 to 18 are much higher - 26% and 92% respectively. It is interesting that female subjects aged 10 to 18 have participated to a relatively higher degree in the case of this phenomenon, compared to other examples, with 35% as perpetrators or victims and 51% of those who have seen scenes of happy slapping.

Most common scenes deliberately watched at the age from 10 to 18 are happy slapping where participants, either as victims or as perpetrators are familiar people, as well as school fights. Research has shown that very frequently violence between groups such as sport teams of different schools is organized solely for the purpose of being recorded by mobile phone cameras and distributed to others of the same age as important news, giving both perpetrators of violence and distributor's importance and status. Beating of unpopular friends (both male and female) is also highly ranked.

¹⁴ ‘Happy slapping’ — “a fad in which an unsuspecting victim is attacked while an accomplice records the assault (commonly with a camera phone)” (Wikipedia, 2006b) have emerged. New tools link camera phones to Internet publishing platforms such as moblogs (mobile blogs) and YouTube.

Serbs are heavily influenced by American movies, especially due to lower production programming. American films are ranked most violent, and are followed by domestic films. As much as 92% of films made in Serbia from 2001 to 2009 have implicit scenes of violence. 74% of the subjects regard scenes of violence seen on TV as an imposed choice, since there is the period called “watching time”. 87% of the subjects watch TV at the same time, 64% of them belonging to younger categories.

Internet users spend 2-4 hours a day online, and in the group under 18 years of age 91% of that time is spent on fun. Only 7% of the surveyed Internet users have never seen scenes of pornography or violence on the Internet. All surveyed users under 25 have seen scenes of violence, 72% of them to the extent described as “very often”. In the view of 91% of surveyed the Internet users in Serbia, Internet does not impose the choice of violent scenes like TV, but it does offer them abundantly, creating thus a prerequisite for easy access to such content.

Subjects have noticed that scenes of criminal violence once were present only in the newspapers and movies, and that today the amount of such scenes and news of violent crimes is increasing in news broadcasting, and that now they tend to have a significant and often even a central place. For most subjects (54%), both male and female, this enhances the impression of the importance of violence in social life.

In lyrics and music video there is less violence now than during the period of war, but the number of videos promoting the cult of strength and degrading members of sexual minorities has increased.

30% of the subjects under 18 play video games that could contain scenes of violence on a daily basis, and 21% play games that inevitably have scenes of violence. Only 4% of subjects over 14 are supervised by parents while playing video games. The number is much higher for those younger than 14 – 23%. As a consequence of small apartments, 55% of the subjects under 18 do not play video games in a separate room in the apartment. It is interesting that a relatively high number – 27% of the subjects aged 18 to 40 play video games that could contain scenes of violence daily. This can be explained as maintaining a habit from childhood, since video games have existed for 35 years already.

Speaking of accentuated old media, most scenes of violence can be found on the Internet (web 1.0), then on TV, and then newspapers. Regarding accentuated new media, subjects think that violence is mediated mostly through digital video, the Internet (web 2.0), and then the electronic press.

Regarding types of violence, mostly present are physical, individual and momentary violence. 83% of the subjects rate violence of the “bad guys” as irrational and violence of the “good guys” as rational.

Threat of the use of force, coercion and pressure are most frequently present on TV and in the movies, torture can most often be seen on the Internet, homicide in newspapers, while violent protests, rebellions, public disorder, riots, terrorism, subversion, repression, terror, uprisings and war are forms of violence that are, due to their political nature, “reserved” for TV news programs. Domestic violence is most commonly a topic for the newspapers, and violence against sexual minorities is, in the view of the subjects, equally elaborated by TV and newspapers, and to a lesser extent by the Internet. Terrorism is also a topic equally elaborated by newspapers and TV, and far less by other media, with the exception of the Internet.

Positive recommendations and experience

The new media has an ambivalent relationship with the public: first, the media is responsible for the growth of social tension because of popularizing topics about violence and conflicts — as in movies, reality shows with scenes of violence etc.: and then second, **the media as importantly shows the methods and institutions for preventing violence** such as “safe houses” for victims of violence etc. The new media in Serbia, especially TV, started after political revolution in 2001 to be rapidly and systematically engaged in social actions against the different kind of violence such as domestic violence, violence in sport, violence in schools etc.

Radio Television Station B92 (RTV B92) has started a campaign For Our Children (Za našu decu) that aims to attract media attention to all aspects and consequences of **domestic violence** in Serbia and also to help specific mechanisms for the protection of children and to initiate the development of educational projects. The general intention of this influential broadcasting company was to go one step beyond the usual position of a responsible media. To that end, RTV B92 is making an effort to connect state agencies and other institutions with jurisdiction and authority in this area on one side and sponsor and donors on the other through coordinated media actions targeting specific problems, in this case violence against women and children. That way, the media has a role as a carrier of **positive recommendations**. For example, there was an action for building **safe houses** as shelters for women and children, victims of domestic violence. The need for such action can be illustrated by the fact that one out of three women in Serbia is a victim of physical abuse, and one out of two is a victim of psychological violence committed by a current or ex partner. There are now seven¹⁵ safe houses in Serbia, and they are managed by

¹⁵ Three in Belgrade, one in Zrenjanin, one in Pančevo, one in Smederevo and one in Kragujevac.

Counseling Against Domestic Violence. In addition to their basic purpose of providing protection and a safe environment, more easily overcoming the consequences of violence and the normalization of life for the victims, there is also an effort, in which all of the relevant institutions are included, to prevent domestic violence. This action is still ongoing and has had good results in the domain of the suppression of domestic violence as well as reducing its consequences. New media, primarily TV stations B92 and Studio B have played a very important role in mobilizing important political circles, including the President of Serbia Boris Tadić himself, finding donors and raising awareness about the problem throughout Serbian society.

B92 went beyond the classic position of a media in dispensing information by the fact that even after obtaining construction sites and all the necessary permits it also acted as a builder of safe houses. B92 partnered with organizations and agencies who administer the programs that utilize a unique and innovative approach to education, cultural arts and other local and state programming. Some of the very active organizations cooperating with this media on violence prevention are Victimology Society of Serbia, Autonomous Women's Center from Belgrade, Incest Trauma Center, Out of Circle, Antitrafficking Center, Alternative Circle from Kragujevac, as well as ADRA Serbia.

Serbian Broadcasting Corporation (or Radio Television of Serbia) is one of the most important actors and media sponsors of the campaign **Character Against Violence** that started in 2007, with the goal of preventing violence in sports and using sports for building moral character and the affirmation of its positive values. Specifically, the objective of this action is the **prevention of all forms of violence in sports and around sports**, starting with verbal (insults, humiliation, curses, threats), physical and sexual abuse to the most brutal — physical violence with often tragic outcomes. Serbian Broadcasting Company tends to **draw the attention** of the general public to the educational potential of sports and the positive effects of engagement in sports, to put **sports** in service of **forming a moral character** of new generations through the reaffirmation of fairplay, sportsmanship and sport's character — to bring morality back to society as a whole by bringing morality to sports, to reduce all forms of violence and negative phenomena that circulate from society to sports, endangering its core values and ethical basis, to put play, entertainment, fair play, upbringing and respect for all participants, to make it safe, healthy and a fun environment in which children can grow in a better way, learn useful life skills, build character, fulfill needs for affirmation and/or friendship, learn tolerance, responsibility, honesty — and learn how to win honorably and loose with dignity.

The demands from this media directed towards government agencies and other institutions are: wider engagement of the state in removing the causes of violence (regarding violence of hooligan groups), not only suppression of its

manifestations; since penal and repressive measures are not sufficient, there is the need for synchronized action of all institutions in order to regulate numerous problems that can contribute to the emergence of violence in sports; the state should care about sports and invest in sports more than it currently does; and provide compliance to existing rules and regulations; to pass more rigorous penal measures and provide better control over its enforcement.

Specific recommendations in this area, promoted by Serbian Broadcasting Company, are also:

- Better communication between clubs and fans
- Introduction of laws regulating trainers' licences
- Providing the best and most competent trainers for the youngest sportists
- Improving the quality of refereeing
- Forming autonomous referee organizations independent from sports federations
- Permanent education of sports trainers
- Educating the parents of sportists
- Banning parents from interfering with training process and training sessions
- Establishing criteria for all trainers, especially those who work with the youngest sportists.
- Introduction of psychological tests for trainers
- Insisting on positive approach to training
- Changing the evaluation system for trainers — measuring not only results, but also educational impact
- Bringing competent people to top positions in sports federations
- Make sure that all sportist are aware of their rights
- Legally protecting the rights of sportsmen
- Introduction of code of ethics — codes of sportsmanship for all involved in sports
- Teaching sportsmen the rules of sportmanship and fair play
- Regaining the sports culture and creating a healthy atmosphere to sports
- Reaffirmation the educational value of sports
- Establishing a distinct institution — Center for Protection of Sportsmen Rights

All the above recommendations should function in the service of preventing violence in sports in Serbia.

The campaign against violence in sports, conducted by the media in Serbia, is trying to reach as many social subjects as possible and to utilize various possibilities for the education of all those engaged in sports, particularly young people. Sports federations have readily accepted to get involved in the campaign. Memorandum about cooperation and accepting Sport Codes of Conduct was signed by **70 sport federations**. The campaign was implemented through special TV shows broadcasted by stations throughout Serbia, video clips broadcasted by TV stations, audio jingles broadcasted on radio stations and TV plays.

New media in Serbia are also involved in other campaigns against violence, in cases when they are not official carriers of the campaign. For example, Serbian Broadcasting Corporation is very supportive, through its broadcasts, to UNICEF program Schools without Violence in Serbia. This program, which started in 2005, currently involves 196 schools in 64 Serbian towns, with 135.600 students. Serbian Broadcasting Corporation, being the biggest media corporation in Serbia is involved to the greatest extent, which is understandable knowing that main partners of UNICEF in this project are the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia. Its activities in this domain are educational in nature and are based on TV shows raising awareness of the Serbian society about the presence of violence in Serbian schools. And methods and institutions for violence prevention are systematically and intensively presented.

The conclusion could be that some of the new media in Serbia now do have a new course of action when it comes to addressing violence in the media. Primarily television, but also the press is increasingly trying to seriously contribute to the prevention of violence as a socially important task. This positive attitude of the media regarding violence is encouraging, but it can be noted that efforts of the media towards prevention of violence should be twofold.

On the one hand, educational and promotional activities regarding prevention of violence in the family, sports, schools and violence against all kinds of minorities should be intensified, but on the other hand it is necessary to reduce the amount of violent content in their own programs, since they contribute to maintaining and increasing violent behavior. It should also be recommended that new media should engage more in the promotion of a new positive and non-violent value system, condemnation of all kinds of violence and more intensive encouragement of necessary donations for building safe houses and implementing various programs of prevention and suppression of violence. It is also necessary to give more attention to the opinions of ordinary citizens, to establish cooperation with local governments, communities and businesses, and not only with state institutions. The new media should incorporate a cohesive strategy with NGO and community partners to facilitate sports enrichment programs that engage youth from various communities to

compete in a year round sports program that facilitates community involvement and experience based learning nonviolent opportunities. The initiative media should encourage young social entrepreneurs, partners and community members to identify an issue that has a negative impact on their community and create a social change project that has a measurable outcome.

Only in that way the role of media in Serbia, regarding the presence of violence in the media and the reporting about violence, could be more on the positive than on the negative side, if there is no possibility to completely eliminate the negative side in the near future.

Conclusion

I have attempted to conclude these research findings into a more concise form than is perhaps common.

Based on given social circumstances and definitions used for the survey conducted by the Center for Security Studies and Terrorism Research in Belgrade, in the period January-May 2010 with a representative sample of 1,046 subjects of different genders, ages, level of education and social and economic status, as well as on findings of this survey, the following conclusions can be drawn:

Violence is present to a significant extent in both old and new media in Serbia. Most consumers of violent scenes are males under 25 years of age. Most media users see scenes of violence as harmful only if they are excessive in quantity or quality. Three types of violence can be identified in the media: violence used for fun, violence produced by media users as expression of social pathology, and violence used for political education and mobilization. The largest offering of violent scenes is on the Internet. The only difference between web 1.0 and web 2.0 is in the possibility of a two-way communication and involvement of users in creating scenes of violence. Important differences between TV and the Internet are that TV imposes viewer scenes of violence by broadcasting them in a particular time. The Internet, however, does this indirectly by having an enormous and poorly censored offering of violent scenes, as well as by increasing the technical possibilities for participation of users in creating violent scenes and posting them online. Therefore most of the deliberately viewed scenes of violence are on the Internet, while most of the accidentally viewed scenes are on TV. In the sphere of electronic mediation of violence there are some changes compared to the recent past. For example, some forms of cyber bullying which were widespread (purposely sending a virus-infected file to an other person, purposely sending many or excessively large messages to someone in order to overload their system) are almost abandoned today, while other, much more violent and brutal forms of cyber

bullying are growing (happy slapping, insulting or threatening behavior via mobile phone). Movies including scenes of violence, especially American and Serbian, have completely superseded all others. Parents in Serbia are unaware, or not convinced that scenes of violence in video games are indeed harmful, which is demonstrated by the low degree of supervision over children while playing video games. The survey has also confirmed that both the accentuated old media (newspapers) and new media (electronic press) though they renounce violence as part of their content, violence is still provided to their audience for greater public consumption. Violence is obviously very attractive and lucrative as well even when it is harmful, since both sides — the media and their users have their own interests and perceived benefits.

The new media has an ambivalent relationship with the public: first, the media is responsible for the growth of social tension because of popularizing topics about violence and conflicts - as in movies, reality shows with scenes of violence etc.: and then second, the media as importantly shows the methods and institutions for preventing violence such as “safe houses” for victims of violence etc. It should also be recommended that new media should engage more in the promotion of a new positive and non-violent value system, condemnation of all kinds of violence and more intensive encouragement of necessary donations for building safe houses and implementing various programs of prevention and suppression of violence. The new media should incorporate a cohesive strategy with NGO and community partners to facilitate programs that facilitate community involvement and experience based learning nonviolent opportunities.

The initiative media should encourage young social entrepreneurs, partners and community members to identify an issue that has a negative impact on their community and create a social change project that has a measurable outcome. It is also necessary to give more attention to the opinions of ordinary citizens, to establish cooperation with local governments, communities and businesses, and not only with state institutions.

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*Marija Đorić*¹

Terrorism as a Form of Communication

ABSTRACT

Terrorism is a complex sort of violence and negative kind of communication in the world. International security in the war on terrorism should have three levels of organizations: state, regional and global levels and permanent cooperation among democratic countries. The aim of this paper is to show crucial elements of new international security and role of management of communication in building sustainable development models and defending peace. Successful management of international security can be difficult when the network crosses international borders. The Internet has become a place for terrorist groups which send their messages of hate and violence to victims. The main role in the fight against terrorism could have governments work in cooperation with communication management: to neutralize the effects of manipulations in mass media, to organize protection of communication of the staff and the target public and to organize training and education in the field of communication security.

Key words: communication, security, terrorism, internet, media, communication management.

Communication management (CM) has taken on a rising role in the world of politics today. On the other hand communication management cannot substitute political institutions and different social and cultural relations with respect to international relations. In the past a different kind of integration of communication manifested itself in the field of politics. Today, a new management — CM, has become very popular not only in business, but also in politics.

Once upon a time, the great Heraclites said: *War is the father of all*. It was philosophy during the Antique period, but considering modern society we could make the same conclusion that nothing has changed in world history for centuries. Why? We could say that mankind realized the special kind of

¹ Marija Djorić, M.A., Faculty for European Studies of Law and Political Sciences, Singidunum University, Novi Sad. E-mail: mara.djoric@yahoo.com.

communication in violence and aggressive behaviour. Conrad Lorenz² thought that fear was the strongest instinct for fighting aggression, while Freud³ emphasized that the absence of love was a motivation for aggressive behavior.

If we analyse the discussion about power phenomena in theory, we will see there exist opinions from different theories, that „violence is the most flagrant kind of manifestation of power“.⁴ Terrorism is a modern, aggressive sort of communication between people who do not share the same value system: terrorism manifests the attempt for power. A good image of the state is very important for international relationships and communication management has a respectable role in global politics. It is necessary to identify terrorism and PR (public relations) as different forms of public communication, and to identify the practical PR challenges facing governments in the warfare against terrorism.

One of the most powerful forms of mass media nowadays is the Internet. Also terrorists use of modern technology to send messages all around the world. We can say that terrorism represents a special negative, morbid form of communication. A good example is 9/11 and the violence of Al Qaida. Terrorism as a psychological weapon is very dangerous, because it uses the fear of the potential victims. “Terrorism is the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade, and gain a public tension”.⁵ Schmidt and Jongman wrote about communication theory of terrorism.⁶ The main aim of terrorists is to gain attention or recognition. Communication of terrorism is a symbolic act and consists of:

- Subject of communication (transmitter),
- Object of communication (recipient or target),
- Message (using violence).

Bruce Hoffman described violence of terrorists as a communication: “Through propaganda, terrorists seek to communicate a particular message to a particular target audience”.⁷ Hoffman emphasizes that terrorist’s organizations in the past used three kind of communicating process. First were radio stations,

² See: Konrad Lorenz, *On Agression*, New York and London, 2002.

³ See: Sigmund Freud, *A general introduction to psychoanalysis*, Washington Square Press, New York, 1967.

⁴ Hana Arendt, “O nasilju”, *Alexandria press*, Beograd, 2002, p. 45.

⁵ Stephen Sloan, *Beating international terrorism: an action strategy for preemption and punishment*, Diane Publishing, 1992, p. 3.

⁶ Alex Peter Schmid, Albert Jongman, Horowitz Irving, *Political terrorism: a new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 2005.

⁷ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside terrorism*, Columbia Univ. Press, New York, 2006, p. 199.

second were newspapers, and finally, the third was state owned mass media. But in modern society, terrorists use private radio or television stations, the Internet and their own video production and duplication processes. Propaganda can be defined as any “information ideas, doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly”.⁸ Terrorism and propaganda are similar insofar as they both want to influence the public in a way that is intended to benefit the sponsor. While propaganda serves an imaginable purpose from ideology, religion or indoctrination, the aim of terrorism is to make fear permanent in the society.

Social networks like *Facebook*, *Hi5* or *Myspace*, have a major role in communication between terrorists and criminals. *Facebook* for example, is a social networking web site initially built for college communities and founded by Mark Zuckerberg. It is organized around social networks corresponding to schools and, recently, other institutions and locales. At first, the website's membership was initially limited by the founders to Harvard students, but latter was expanded to other colleges in the Boston area, the Stanford University and Ivy League.

Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, and Morris proposed four mechanisms of *Facebook* that linked individuals to the environments that they inhabit: self-directed identity claims, other-directed identity claims, interior behavioral residue, and exterior behavioral residue.⁹ *Facebook* has been blocked intermittently in several countries including Vietnam, Pakistan, Syria, China, and Iran. In 2010, [compete.com](http://www.compete.com) study ranked *Facebook* as the most used social network by worldwide monthly active users, followed by *MySpace*. In this research *Facebook* takes over top spot with 1, 191, 373, 339 monthly visits.¹⁰ On the other hand intelligence agencies are adopting a controversial new technique to identify terrorist masterminds. “Intelligence agencies are building up a *Facebook*-style databank of international terrorists in order to sift through it with complex computer programs aimed at identifying key figures and predicting terrorist attacks before they happen”.¹¹ This doctrine is already being actively pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan where thousands of people have been

⁸ Richard John Thackrah, *Dictionary of Terrorism*, Routledge, New York and London, 2003, p. 206.

⁹ See more: Joseph B. Waltherl, Brandon Van Der Heide, Sang-Yeon Kim, David Westerman & Stephanie Tom Tong, “The Role of Friends’ Appearance and Behavior on Evaluations of Individuals on Facebook: Are We Known by the Company We Keep?”, *Human Communication Research*, Volume 34, Issue 1, 2008, p. 34.

¹⁰ See internet page: <http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-myspace-twitter-social-network/>, 01.07.2010.

¹¹ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/terrorist-facebook-ndash-the-new-weapon-against-alqaida-1774041.html>, 01.07.2010.

arrested and interrogated for information that could be fed into vast computerized databanks for analysis by social network programs.

Jihadist terrorists use the strategic communication management techniques, as well. Strategic communication management is defined as the “systematic planning and realization of information flow, communication, media development and image care in a long-term horizon”.¹² Jihad Islamism or “jihadism” is well known as an extreme interpretation of Islam and jihad as a crucial part of Islam. Their communication goals are propaganda of their movement all around the world, legitimization of their organizations and movements, intimidation of the near enemy and spreading fear. *Jihad* has a double meaning: it can be holy war by means of the sword, but it can be also the struggle for oneself against ones instinct.

In this moment, on the Internet we can find 18,600,000 web addresses about “Al Qaeda”. It means that terrorists mostly use the Internet for propaganda and communication. Terrorist sites consist of different information. They can serve as virtual training grounds, tutorials on building bombs, shooting at U.S. soldiers etc. Political manipulation plays a great role in the communication management. Eva Etzioni-Halevy made an interesting study about political manipulation and the role of elites.¹³ She researched in detail certain types of manipulations, such as: socio-cultural conditions, western-style democracies, domination etc. The point is that elites have exploited the democratic process for the purpose of domination. Terrorists use political manipulation throughout media to realize their power and domination. Terrorist sites also have messages and propaganda videos which help to raise the morale of terrorists.

Several examples of Al-Qaeda affiliated regional production centers include:¹⁴

- Al-Furquan Media (affiliated with The Islamic State of Iraq)
- As-Sahab Media (affiliated with al-Qaeda High Command)
- Media Commission or Media Committee (affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb)
- Sawt al-Jihad (affiliated with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula)

Very dangerous are individuals and groups which have tried to attack computer networks and this has become known as **cyber terrorism** or **the use**

¹² http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_20-en.pdf, 14.02.2010.

¹³ See: Eva Etzioni-Halevy, *Political manipulation and administrative power*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1979.

¹⁴ United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, *Majority & Minority Staff Report*, USA, 2008. p. 6.

of the Internet for terrorist purposes. Cyber terrorism has a great disruption potential in the world, and it could also aim at inflicting economic costs. The most important factor in war against cyber terrorism is international legal co-operation in criminal matters related to terrorism.

The main aim of cyber terrorism is to produce destabilization not only in the community, but also at the global market and to be detrimental to governments. Cyber terrorism is the terrorism of the future. Considering the prosperity of technology, we can expect grooving up of the phenomenon that includes a combination of organized crime, violence and computers. This is the dark side of welfare in 21st century. In the background of cyber-terrorism is certainly a political motivation. The conclusion will be that new, modern and easier systems of communication and media could be used for violence and crime. However, the truth is that total media silence will not stop terrorists. This fact implies that each state and government have to make a progressive and modern system of security.

The OSCE Expert Workshop on Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes held on 13–14 October 2005 in Vienna, which primarily raised awareness of participating States on terrorist use of the Internet to communicate, plan, organize, as well as raise and transfer funds.¹⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolutions, especially resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1566 (2004) co-operate in the fight against terrorism, as well as resolution 1624 (2005) which calls upon States to “prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts”.

The meaning and style of terrorism has been changed community life during history because it is a variable phenomenon. It is necessary to define the difference between terror and terrorism, because terrorism is violence used by terrorist groups against government and its institutions, while terror is violence of the State and its own government.

We should not forget that violence can ruin power very often, because „violence as a dynamic category is frequently a synonym for weakness”.¹⁶ Nowadays it is easier to speak about the context of terrorism than making a real definition of this phenomenon. It is very hard to organize suitable criteria for the classification of terrorism. We could find answers for this problem in four points:

1. Generalizations of typologies
2. Different historical, political, economic and social circumstances
3. Similar categories of labels

¹⁵ See internet page: <http://www.osce.org/atu/17702.html>, 14.02.2010.

¹⁶ See: Dragan Simeunović, *Političko nasilje*, Radnička stampa, Beograd, 1989.

4. Political manipulations and double standard in international relationship

Even UN States have debated about the definition of terrorism — it produced two kinds of opinion: some states speak about terrorists, but other states speak about freedom-fighters. The international community has a problem with double standards of this phenomenon which then produces the problem of a regular definition. Disregarding the political aims of terrorism, it is evident that this phenomenon is growing parallel with the system of democracy and nationalism.

After the 9/11 attacks, terrorism has become more powerful, and we could speak about *global* or *mega-terrorism*:

- First, — terrorism is more deadly (proliferation of weapons and nuclear weapons);
- Second, — terrorism is more dangerous for the international economy (risks for business and possibilities for economic harm);
- Third, — terrorism has the opportunity for manipulation in mass-media (because terrorists need spectacle),
- And the fourth reason is that terrorism has become more popular in achieving political changes and goals.

Terrorism becomes a political phenomenon by favor of two crucial factors — political aims and political implications.¹⁷ Walter Laqueur said during the 70s: “If somewhere social and political could be obtained justice, terrorism would not exist”.¹⁸ But he also argued thirty years later, that “terrorism interpreted as the use of covert violence by a group for political ends is usually directed against government, less frequently against another group, class or party”.¹⁹

We can expect the progress of terrorist s attacks in the future (because the view expressed in this paper is that global terrorism is an answer to globalization), but how is it possible to make the world safer from terrorist s actions and how to inhibit the same ones?

Crisis management is a regular answer to terrorism, especially today in a system of globalization, where terrorism organizes cells all around the world (a good example is Al Qaida). This kind of management contains plans and a list of aspects and effective responses from government and its institutions. Crises are a usual phenomenon for the political system in each country. That is why

¹⁷ See more: Dragan Simeunović, *Terorizam*, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2009.

¹⁸ Walter Laqueur, *Terrorism*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1977, p.5.

¹⁹ Walter Laqueur, *A History of terrorism*, Transaction, New Brunswick, London, 2001, p. 79.

international security should have three levels of organizations: state, regional and global levels and permanent cooperation among democratic countries will give satisfactorily results. On the other hand, communication management has a strategic role in modern business and politics.

Major international conflagrations “during the last two centuries have regular spawned hopes about an enhanced multilateral capacity to manage international armed conflicts. Inevitably, they were quickly dashed — after the Napoleonic Wars, after World War I, and after World War II. The end of the Cold War was no exception”.²⁰ When we are speaking about the contemporary political situation, we can say that the role and importance of communication management has seen many ups and downs since the late 1980s. This period of reach in human history is well known thanks to the tectonic and very dramatic transmutation — the end of the Cold War. Considering the end of *Cold War* as one of the most important transformations in international relations (Western ideology won, and the geopolitical picture of the world has been changed), the consequences of such developments affected not only Southeastern Europe, but also the whole world. This kind of transformation was obvious in ex-communist countries, where communism as an ideology disappeared, and they entered a painful transition.

The end of the Cold War brought about changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural structure of the world. Absent a distinct enemy and the threat of global war, the United States today faces a host of new security challenges that require policymakers to make difficult decisions with significant domestic and international results. Those changes were mostly remarkable in ex communist countries and were well known as a painful *period of transitions*.

The post-Cold War period became more unstable, than political academics (Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*²¹ or Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*²²) could imagine. “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such... That is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.²³

Nowadays, collective security management consists of military and non military activities. This kind of security will depend on the compatibility of

²⁰ Joseph Leggold, “Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics”, *SUNY Press*, 1998, p. 3 .

²¹ See: Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1991.

²² See: Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, Avon, New York, 1992.

²³ *Ibid.*

main actors in the international relationship and different standards in the international community. In theory, as principles of the UN shows — everybody is equal, but in praxis we have various criteria. Regarding modern conflicts, we are testifiers of the situation when the international community was ready to give independence to Kosovo, but on the other hand, this criteria was not acceptable with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. New states usually want to verify their international power, and this is a crucial reason why they make wars. This is not a new idea — it was born in the ancient period of world history. Hegel, as a great name in philosophy supported this kind of idea — if the state wants to present its power and identity it should make warfare.

The successful management of international security can be difficult when the network crosses international borders. We can find a number of reasons that are crucial to strategic decision — making, including the varying communications regulations, actors, and relations between different countries. The point is that good and respectable international management of security can be made only if we make an amalgam between the theory of science and intelligence in praxis. It is necessary for each democratic country to exchange valuable information about the riskiness in security with other countries in order to cooperate and to force together a safe system of *umbrella-security*.

With respect to communication, terrorists have a clear aim — to send their message all around the world and to transmit fear. The etymology of word *terrorism* (lat. *Terror* means fear), pay attention to this aim. “Terrorist activity is a form of fear because terrorists know that the media will cover sensational and tragic events. Media coverage serves as a venue for expressing not only what physically can be done, but also what will likely psychologically be able to be done, as well as what will likely psychologically be the affect on those who view the activity”.²⁴

Modern terrorism is a special, complex kind of violence and consists of bombing, suicide, homicide, threat, hijacking, etc. Each kind of political violence is a special part of the social communication between the subject and object of violence. „If we determine that social violence as a sort of interaction, then we don’t have an interaction without subject and object. The subject of social violence can be man, society or institutions; the object of violence can be, not only man and society, but also nature and material. Social violence has always been a consequence of different interests in the society“.²⁵

²⁴ Michael Ronczkowski, *Terrorism and Organized Hate Crime: Intelligence Gathering, Analysis, and Investigations*, CRC Press, Boca Raton, 2007, p.19.

²⁵ See more: Dragan Simeunović, *Političko nasilje*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1989. p. 20–1.

There is a crucial difference between the old terrorism and the new: “Until recently, terrorism by and large, discriminated in selecting its victims carefully — kings and queens, government ministers, generals and other leading political figures and officials. It was more often propaganda by deed”, but contemporary terrorism, Laqueur says, “has increasingly become indiscriminate in the choice of its victims”.²⁶ The fundamental aim of modern terrorism is to realize maximum destruction. In the past terrorism was predominantly a secular phenomena, but nowadays Islamic radicalism is the basis for contemporary terrorism.

The international system of security very often makes use of term *use of force* instead of the term *war*. This means the supporting of armed insurgents who are attacking other countries or fighting with them. The UN Charter has a problem with this constructions in warfare against terrorism, because, terrorist groups are not States. According to title 22 of the United States Code, terrorism is premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups of clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The question is: should we use just violence in communication with terrorists? There are different opinions in political theory:²⁷

1. Violence always reproduce violence;
2. Violence could reproduce violence — but this is not obliged rule;
3. Violence never reproduces violence.

Experience shows, that the answer is somewhere between these three possibilities. Expansion of violence could be explained with social or psychological factors, but in global politics, each kind of reaction is sequent to political interest. Sometimes the international community speaks about *humanitarian intervention*, but in the same similar situation, with different subjects and objects of violence, the international community speaks about war. The problem is how to find a regular criterion for the classification of violence and how to get started a useful communication as the next step?

Professor Paul Wilkinson classified terrorism in the following ways: *Repressive terror; Revolutionary terror; War terror and) Sub revolutionary terror*.²⁸ Dragan Simeunović made classification of terrorism by goals and

²⁶ Walter Laqueur, *No end to war: terrorism in the twenty-first century*, Continuum, New York, London, 2003, p. 9.

²⁷ See more: Dragan Simeunović, *Teorija politike*, Nauka i društvo, Beograd, 2002.

²⁸ D.C.Pandey, “National Law: The Lumped Element”, *World Focus*, Vol. VII, February, 1986, p.3.

motivation: Ideologically motivated terrorism, ethno-separatist terrorism and religious terrorism.²⁹

Ideologically motivated terrorism is divided into left-wing and right-wing terrorism. Communism was a fundamental ideology for left-wing terrorism (or red terrorism) and after the crash of its ideology, this kind of terrorism became less popular. The second kind of ideological terrorism is right-wing terrorism. Conservatism is a crucial ideology of right wing terrorism (black terrorism), and pretension for *status quo*. Nevertheless, the *conditio sine qua non* for either type of terrorism is extremism and “speaks of hate”. This aggressive communication implies violence and destructive behavior.

Ideas for the polarization of Left-Right started with the French Revolution in 1789 and exist even nowadays. We can say that right wing terrorism together with the new Nazi ideology is very popular today and represents the dissatisfaction with modern society. Left-wing terrorism was a serious threat to Western Europe during 60s and 80s years of 20th century. Right-wing terrorism is usually supported by the authorities (mostly informal and covert). This kind of terrorism is also frequently closely connected with religious or ethno-separatist terrorism. We can easily put the violence of the Right into the phenomena of terrorism, or state-terrorism. Sometimes terrorism and violence can present a “crisis of identity”,³⁰ as Martha Crenshaw said. Good examples are Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan etc.

Nowadays, left-wing terrorist groups, such as the *DevrimciHalk Kurtulus, Partisi / Cephesi* (DHKP-C) or *RevolutionaryPeople’s Liberation Party/Front*, want to change the political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist leftist model.³¹ Their ideology is often Marxist- Leninist.

Distinct causes and circumstances have influence on ethno-separatist terrorism. Disproportion between the number of nations and ethnic groups are one of the most important reasons for ethno-separatist terrorism.

When we are speaking about religious terrorism, we usually speak about Islamic terrorism. Money is an important factor for terrorists, but Islamist terrorist groups generate more money than non-Islamist terrorist groups. Illegal sources for the funding of terrorism appear to cover a wide range of criminal activities.

In 2010, 249 terrorist attacks were reported in nine EU Member State, while 611 individuals were arrested for terrorism related offences.³² The majority of

²⁹ See: Dragan Simeunović, *Terorizam*, Pravni fakultet, Beograd, 2009.

³⁰ Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in context*, Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, University Park, 1995, p. 328.

³¹ See: <http://www.europol.europa.eu>, 14.10.2010.

³² See internet page: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TE-SAT2011.pdf, 23.06.2011.

this attacks were in Spain and France. On the other hand 179 individuals in EU Members State were arrested for offence linked to Islamist terrorism, representing a 50% increase compared with 2009.³³ In this moment flow of immigrants originating from North Africa could have an influence on the EU security.

There are different kinds of terrorism and different kinds of criteria and classification, but the most important thing is to find a suitable strategy against terrorism and to prevent terrorist attacks. Statistic says that European nations alone have witnessed more than 7.500 terrorist incidents since 1969, representing about 27 per cent of the total incidents. The beginning of the 21st century, even in the absence of Cold War animosities, is a period of abeyance with as many threats to world security. Good example of terrorism in the Balkans is KLA — The Kosovo Liberation Army. The KLA appeared for the first time in public in June 1996, assuming responsibility for a series of acts of sabotage committed against the police stations and police officers in Kosovo and Metohija. After these bombings, Serb authorities named it a terrorist organization. This terrorist organization was a factor of unsecured investments and capital in Serbia. Nevertheless, some Western media supported the KLA and it was good communication management for the terrorists, but bad for Serbia. Over 280,000, internally displaced persons came from Kosovo-Metohija and have found their temporary accommodation on the territory of Serbia-Montenegro, outside Kosovo-Metohija, for over five years now. The results in the process of repatriation are more than sub-satisfactory. Only 11,000 people have been returned to their homes, 5,000 of whom are Serbs, while around 4,000 are still displaced and suffered exile in the March 2004 pogrom conducted by Albanian terrorists, when 900 houses were burnt down and when over 30 Serbian Orthodox churches in Kosovo were destroyed. Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security council establishes the obligation of UNMIK to administer Kosovo. One of the most important needs is the establishment of a modern and automated case management and information system, which will enhance the efficiency and capacity of the courts in dealing with cases.³⁴ It is obvious that most of the terroristic attacks in the Europe were organized by separatist terrorism, but at this moment Islamist terrorism is the most dangerous.

The role of the military and the security forces has become very important today. Terrorism has a multi-layered approach and consequences and it implies the need for modern counterterrorism. We can find today new methods of fighting in the international security, and they are sometimes more sophisticated (thanks to modern intelligence), but sometimes they are very brutal and aggressive. There

³³ See internet page: http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/EU_Terrorism_Situation_and_Trend_Report_TE-SAT/TE-SAT2011.pdf, 23.06.2011.

³⁴ See internet page: www.kim.gov.rs, 10.03.2009.

are many private military contractors today, specializes in various professions such as law enforcement, security, military training, logistics, etc.

The main role in the fight against terrorism could have governments in cooperation with communication management: to neutralize the effects of manipulations in mass media, to organize protection of communication of the staff and the target public and to organize training and education in the field of communication security.

If we support the idea that *Homo homini lupus est* (Hobbes), terrorism will be a normal aspect of modern world as a negative model of communication. However, this is an opinion of anthropological pessimism; in other word's people could make a better system for existence if they try to understand diversity between different systems of values. If we find the cause of terrorism, we will solve problem of international security. Until then, international community should try to make better system of security, and to prepare people not only for operative work against terrorism, but to produce scientists who would be able to make a better analysis of conflict and find a better strategy.

Considering the actual political situation all around the world, we could see a very important role of communication management in building sustainable development models and defending peace. When we are speaking about ex communist countries (Serbia or Soviet Union) the main problems are in regional insecurity, moving from command to free market economies and trying to make democratic governments. Another problem is real politics and its conquncences in the real world and real issues. Recently, we saw a new very important role for the EU and UN after the Cold War in conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia. This role was well known during the civil war in ex Yugoslavia, and we could say that the EU and UN (especially EU) were trying to be new factors of stability at a global level. Different criteria though and double standards make this role of international organizations very hard. The point is — if we want to build a respectable and relevant system of international security, we should have the same criteria for each State in the world.

Public relations in the sphere of politics is not just an essential part of communication management, but an important fact for countries in transition — good PR can help in the building of a democratic society. “Communication management can serve as a tool of management for both individuals and all kinds of social groups as well as government structures”.³⁵ What can we do as individuals?

³⁵ Evgeny N Pashentsev, *Communication management: today's prospects in business*, RISA, Moscow, 2008.

Our conclusion is that human beings can be senders and receivers of messages, too. Terrorists are predominantly senders of messages in so called “black propaganda”. On the other hand receivers of messages of violence are innocent people, governments, soldiers, policemen, political organizations etc. Terrorist always send a message by engaging in acts of violence. But, after 9/11, the U.S.A. organized a war on terrorism and the message was sent to Al Qaida. In this situation the U.S.A. as a state was the sender, and the terrorists were the receivers of the message. International relationships where violence is a priority is a negative and destructive kind of communication.

There were a lot of victims and receivers of messages during September 11th. For Joseph Tuman the primary audiences of violence “were the recipients of that death and destruction — those who inhabited the Twin Towers (...), the employees at the Pentagon, and the unfortunate passengers on all the flights involved in the attacks”.³⁶ He thinks that the second audience was the American public, and the third possible audiences were relevant officials in the state governments.

We can argue that new, morbid and destructive rhetoric was made by terrorists. This is not rhetoric from the ancient period where arguments consist of proofs such as: *logos*, *pathos* and *ethos*. The speech of terrorists is violence.

Weapons of mass destruction are *condition sine qua non* of modern terrorism. Nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are very important factors in the contemporary world. If terrorist try to speak through the language of weapons of mass destruction, we will have a big problem. Terrorism, as a typical political phenomenon is a topic of interesting studies and debates. To understand terrorism, modern political sciences should understand the rhetoric and the language of violence. This is not so easy, and that is why theory and praxis should make an amalgam.

Man is not just *homo symbolicum*; man is *homo communicens*, as well. Symbols and words are a way of communication for people all around the world including terrorist organisations. Governments and the international community should understand this kind of negative, morbid communication if they want to beat terrorism.

³⁶ Joseph Tuman, *Communicating terror: the rhetorical dimensions of terrorism*, SAGE, Los Angeles, 2010, p. 35.

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*Milica Slavković*¹

(Mis-)Representations of Africa in the Western Media: Crises, Conflicts, Stereotypes

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates the sources of the stereotypes and (mis-) representations of Africa in the Western media. It finds that the depiction of Africa as the “dark continent” infested with diseases, corruption, hunger and everlasting “tribal conflicts” is caused by the commercialization of the media sector, media monopoly and economic interests, as well as, old colonial prejudice and ignorance. Studying the crises and conflicts’ reporting, the paper identifies patterns that are used to create an image of Africa as if dependable on foreign funds and aid agencies. Due to the media’s partiality, the involvement of the Western political structures and multinational corporations in the exploitation of Africa’s natural resources, their common support of dictatorial regimes and weapon exports into (post-)crisis regions are deliberately left out of the reports. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the prevailing images of Africa in the Western media could ever be altered, save for the fact that African states start being regarded as equal partners in political and economic dialogue.

Key words: Africa, Western media, stereotypes, (mis-)representations, media monopoly, crises and conflicts reporting, gate-keeping.

1. Introduction

On July 13, 2011, after seven months of reports on “civil war in Libya” and the “unrests in Egypt and Tunisia”, German primetime newscast *Tagesschau*

¹ Milica Slavković, M.A., Intern at the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Serbia; E-Mail: milica_slavkovic@yahoo.com.

featured Angola as priority news. Since news from this country was rather a rarity, one might understandably fear hearing of yet another “civil war” or “humanitarian crisis”- the most common reasons why Western media mention Africa. However, this time, the reason for country’s ending in the limelight was a visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel. According to the newscast, Merkel was willing to sign an arms deal with Angola - with eight patrol boats worth €10-25 million being a part of the German export offer. Met with a lot of negative criticism back in Berlin, Merkel somewhat justified her offer by saying that the patrol boats were only meant to secure Angola’s coast. However, what was more striking was the correspondent’s accompanying report, “Angola is poor, but rich with oil. Its economic growth is with 8% the biggest in Africa. The German economy should also earn on this boom, above all by exporting into the land that was only ten years ago stuck in a civil war. [...]”²

Was the reporter ironic or just bluntly honest? Whatever the case, this exemplifies how the mass media remain unarguably only reflective of the official governmental policies. Countries and regions of the so-called South will predominantly be reported on owing to their economic and geo-political importance to the industrialised North.

In their reports, Western media depict the countries of the African continent mainly in a negative light. This is not only because news is nowadays a commodity, and bad news sells, but for much stronger reasons. There are two ideological functions of negative representations: the exploitation of “ethnocentricity in times of discontent”, which supports the idea of superiority; and a justification of the economic undertakings of the Western countries towards Africa as if being in “the best interest of Africans”.³

Ever since colonial times, Africa has been perceived through the prism of Euro-centrism. Racism, which gave way to paternalism, disinterest and neglect of the unknown ‘othered’ and disparaged African countries, peoples, cultures and traditions. Although the sources of the media biases can easily be detected, a more concerning issue is the fact that they seem not to be disappearing.

This paper aims at identifying the most common stereotypes in the Western media representations of Africa, providing an insight into their sources, often understood as justifications of these images. In search of patterns in crisis and conflict reporting, the work analyses major media outlets’ coverage of several African landmark crises such as 1984/5 hunger crisis, 1994 Rwanda genocide and Sierra Leone civil conflicts of the 1990s. The analysis of crises and conflict

² “Waffengeschäft mit Angola”, *Tagesschau*, 13. July 2011, Internet, <http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/sendung/ts27766.html>, 20/08/2011, translated by the author.

³ Cited in Leslie H. Steeves, “Commodifying Africa on U.S. Network Reality Television”, *Communication, Culture & Critique*, vol.1, no. 4, December 2008, p. 420.

coverage will be accompanied by one case study (to widen the scope of mainly English speaking media, in this instance case study is German newscast *Tagesschau*). The focus of the case study is the employment of stereotypes in the reporting on some of current Africa crises.

In its second chapter, this paper provides a general overview of the Western media's representations of Africa, with a focus on the most widespread stereotypes. The third chapter explains the causes of the stereotypical representations of the continent and gives a brief overview of the NWICO debate. Chapter four looks into various previous and current representations of crises and conflicts in Africa in search of the patterns in reporting. The last chapter concludes that the Western media remain biased in their representation of Africa and provides recommendations for the reduction of the negative images of the continent.

2. Representations of Africa in the Western media

It is remarkable to note that although it is the second largest and the second most populous continent with approximately 1.05 billion people, 55 countries and 2,110 languages, Africa has been made the most irrelevant one.⁴ The marginalization of Africa is mainly the result of the Western media's (mis-)representations and indifference towards taking on the presumed obligation of informing and often educating large numbers of people who have never visited the continent. A memorable example of the level of marginalization is a case in which during the late 1990s a group of minority journalists and editors of *The Los Angeles Times* criticized the daily's portrayal of "the world as Africa-less."⁵

If Western media are not busy neglecting Africa, then they try to present it in the most off-putting light. Criticism of these common journalistic and editorial practices is at times rather forthright, "With the stroke of a journalist's pen, the African, her continent, and her descendants are pejoratively reduced to nothing: a bastion of disease, savagery, animism, pestilence, war, famine,

⁴ For population data see: "World Population Data Sheet 2011", *Population Reference Bureau*, <http://www.prb.org/Publications/Datasheets/2011/world-population-data-sheet/world-map.aspx#/table/population>, 20/08/2011.

The African Union has 54 members; all states in Africa apart from Morocco are AU members, therefore 55 states. For details see: <http://www.au.int/en/content/au-adds-54th-star-its-flag-0>, 20/08/2011. For languages see: "Statistical Summaries", *Ethnologue: Languages of the World*, http://www.ethnologue.com/ethno_docs/distribution.asp?by=area, 20/08/2011.

⁵ Asgede Hagos, *Hardened Images: The Western Media and Marginalization of Africa*, Africa World Press, Trenton, 2000, p. 3.

despotism, primitivism, poverty, and ubiquitous images of children, flies in their food and faces, their stomachs distended.”⁶

Such images are further called, “‘universal’ but powerfully subliminal”, they seek to imply that the subject is something bad, unworthy, appalling, sinister etc.⁷ A study on Africa’s depiction on television in the UK, similarly concludes that Africa is predominantly shown as “a land of war, violence, and disease, and which suffers from outbreaks of famine and drought”.⁸ Therefore, the conclusion of the majority of studies is that the common Africa coverage upholds negative stereotypes. These are characterised by sensationalism, tendency towards catastrophes, oversimplification of the crisis causes such as ‘tribalism’ and “focusing on non-Africans as victims or helpers”.⁹ The said stereotypes can be classified as following.¹⁰

2.1. Common Stereotypes

Exemplifying on the movies *The Air Up There* and *Endurance* about the Ethiopian runner Haile Gabrselassie, one of the most common stereotypical perceptions of Africa can be identified, namely, that of Africa as a homogenous entity. It is said that in these movies, any conversation or singing not in English was characterized as a conversation or singing “in African language”, which would further implicate a perception of Africa as a single country.¹¹ That the media often overlook the fact that Africa is comprised of 55 independent states, most of which have been living in peace and enjoyed steady progress, is noticeable when, “the problems of a few are used to project and determine the overall image of the continent.”¹² Television audiences are gripped by news

⁶ Rod Chavis, “Africa in the Western Media”, Paper presented at the Sixth Annual Studies Consortium Workshop, 2. October 1998, *African Studies Center*, University of Pennsylvania, Internet, <http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Workshop/chavis98.html>, 30/07/2011.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Frances Harding, “Africa and the Moving Image: Television, Film and Video”, *Journal of African Cultural Studies*, vol. 16, no. 1, 2003, p. 73. Stable URL, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3181386>, 28/06/2011.

⁹ Mai Palmberg, “Introduction”, in: Mai Palmberg (ed.), *Encounter Images in the Meetings between Africa and Europe*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala, 2001, p.9. Stable URL, <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:nai:diva-220>.

¹⁰ The paper will base its stereotypes’ classification on James Michira’s work on media images of Africa.

¹¹ James Michira, *Images of Africa in the Western Media*. Teaching Literature. 2002. Internet, http://www.teachingliterature.org/teachingliterature/pdf/multi/images_of_africa_michira.pdf, 28/06/2011.

¹² Raymond Tarek Belleh, “The Western Media and Its Exploitation of Africa”, *African Events*, 2006, Internet, <http://www.africanevents.com/Essay-RaymondTB-WesternMedia.htm>, 28/06/2011.

captions like “‘AIDS is killing Africa’ or ‘Where have all the parents gone’.”¹³ The *BBC*, *CNN* and *SKY News* are named permanent contributors to this kind of despairing overview of Africa.¹⁴

Similarly, a long ago established understanding in the West that Africa had no history before colonisation and that all traditions and practices that do not follow in the European ones are backward, contributed to the creation of another stereotype — that of Africa as “the dark continent”. In 2001, for example, reports about very controversial, but nevertheless community-specific practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) were made into the top news.¹⁵ There was no background information on where it is being practised or what could be done to educate the practitioners about the procedure’s severe consequences, so the end result of the entire media hype was just another contribution to the perception that the whole of Africa is engulfed in superstitions and heathen rituals.

Remaining within the frame of exoticising and “othering” of Africa, another media phenomenon was first seriously discussed in 1992. That year, in the period of severe drought and starvation *The New York Times* published five consecutive stories on the topic, three of which were devoted to dying animals.¹⁶ Stories about the suffering peoples were not made into a priority due to what is often called the “animalization” of Africa, based on a stereotypical perception of Africa as the Wild Jungle. In 2009, another severe drought hit East Africa. *The New York Times’* articles followed in the previously set pattern of prioritising the loss of animals over that of human lives with observations such as, “A devastating drought is sweeping across Kenya, killing livestock, crops and children.”¹⁷ Above all, the “animalization of Africa” is supported by the broadcasting material of the *Travel Channel*, *Animal Planet*, *Discovery Channel* and *National Geographic*. Their documentaries and travel shows exclusively devoted to wildlife, national parks and safari tourism, create the impression that Africa is really nothing else, but a gigantic jungle.

Referring to abovementioned drought coverage, starting with the enormous publicity of the 1984 Ethiopian famine, news about hunger, famine and starvation has prevailed in the media coverage of Africa. Without looking into the sources, such as natural causes, failed early-warning systems and armed

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Daniel Mengara (ed.), *Images of Africa: Stereotypes and Realities*, Africa World Press, Trenton, 2001, p. 249.

¹⁶ James Michira, *Images of Africa in the Western media*, op. cit.

¹⁷ Jeffrey Gettleman, “Lush Land Dries Up, Withering Kenya’s Hopes”, *The New York Times*, 7 September 2009, Internet, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/08/world/africa/08kenya.html>, 20/08/2011.

conflicts which are often stirred by the Western interests, images of hopeless and helpless Africans relying on food donations from abroad create another common media stereotype.¹⁸

What was classified as the fifth stereotypical image of Africa is that of endemic violence, conflict, war, political instability and the coup cycle.¹⁹ Instigated by the crisis-driven coverage, these stories immediately become top news often with the undertone that implies Africans are naturally warlike and unable to sustain democracy. The Rwanda genocide of 1994, civil wars in Angola and Congo often materially and military supported by the West were selectively reported on so as to comply with the general negative view of the continent.

Finally, the last most common media stereotype of Africa presents the continent as if plagued with diseases; in the last couple of decades mostly HIV/AIDS. Here, poverty and little or no access to medical care are rarely mentioned reasons for the fast spread of diseases, since the fore-grounded explanations are, “ignorance, reluctance to change sexual behaviour, as well as backward cultural and religious traditions that make talking about sexuality and AIDS taboo”.²⁰

As evident, the images of Africa in the Western media are generally negative and continuously viewed through the prism of Euro-centrism. Due to the urge of presenting the news items “that are commercially viable”, rarely or almost never is a challenging report broadcast.²¹ In order to discern what makes some news items more viable than the others, the examination of the sources of misrepresentations and biased reporting is therefore made inevitable. Additionally, a failed call for the New World Information Order will be addressed.

3. Sources of Media Stereotypes and a Failed NWICO Debate

International communication scientists and academics who have researched on media representations of Africa in the West agree that the media are impartial and selective. Reporting is spotty and tends to overemphasize negative news. The sources of such representations, or, as often called, justifications of media images, can be divided into historical and contemporary.

¹⁸ Detailed analysis follows in Chapter 4.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Bosah Ebo, “American Media and African Culture”, in: Beverly G. Hawk (ed.) *Africa's Media Image*, Praeger, New York, 1992, p. 16.

3.1. Historical Factors

An investigation into Africa-related stories that appeared in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* in March-August 2000 showed that “all 89 articles lacked context”. The news referred to “tribal conflict” and used “imagery of ‘savages’ and ‘beasts’”.²² The articles, “are not given historical context to avoid linking the West to the problem. After all, much of the political strife in Africa results from the collision of distinct cultural groups arbitrarily thrown into political entities by colonizers in their scramble for Africa.”²³

The legacy of the slave trade and colonialism is the “historical baggage” the Western media seem not to be willing to drop in the 21st century.²⁴ Speaking of the first encounters between Europeans and Africans on the African continent, paradoxically as it may be, some studies show that in the period of the slave trade, the Europeans were, in fact, not superior to Africans. Slaves were captives who were sold by African chiefs and combatants, and there was no use of arms that would show European superiority.²⁵ However, in the 19th century, as the slave trade was being abolished, technology (arms and weapons included) was on the rise, and the doctrine of racism, “which declared ‘other races’ inferior”, became the official ideology of colonialism.²⁶ As the power relations changed, the first misrepresentations of Africa consequently appeared. The initiators were early European missionaries. “In order to justify their conquest of the continent” missionaries and colonial administrators presented Africa in their works as, “a land of civilization devastation that needed European enlightenment if it were to be saved from the spiritual obscurity and its continental darkness.”²⁷ Nowadays, with the intention of conveying the African story comprehensively and in a reduced space, the media have been employing the “colonial metaphor” familiar to the audience.²⁸ It refers to “the dark continent” with “tribal conflicts” and culturally, technologically and even intellectually inferior societies. *The Economist*’s May 13, 2000 front cover story on Africa, titled “The Hopeless Continent”, demonstrates that no media company, even the one which labels itself “the ‘house journal of globalisation’”, is immune to the colonial-metaphor rhetoric.²⁹

²² Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate: Image of Africa in the Western Media*, Internet, <http://web.mit.edu/cms/Events/mit2/Abstracts/TOjo.pdf>, p. 8. 20/07/2011.

²³ Bosah Ebo, cited in: Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁴ Baffour Ankomah, “Reporting Africa”, *Global Media Journal –Africa Edition*, vol.2 no.2, 2008, p. 143.

²⁵ Lasse Berg, cited in: Mai Palmberg, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁶ Mai Palmberg, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁷ Daniel M. Mengara, *Images of Africa: Stereotypes and Realities*, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁸ Beverly G. Hawk (ed.), *Africa’s Media Image*. Praeger, New York, 1992, p. 7.

²⁹ Baffour Ankomah, “Reporting Africa”, op.cit., p. 144.

Historical reasons are just one source of the current stereotypes in media representations of Africa. To these, various contemporary sources need to be added.

3.2. *Contemporary Sources*

3.2.1. Commercialisation of the Media Sector

Similar to other businesses and services, the driving force behind Western media sector is profit. The law obliges media companies to generate profit for their shareholders, since in the opposite case they may face lawsuits.³⁰ Consequently, the reporting has nowadays become a selection of commercially viable images. “The media select stories that they can sell and omit those that cannot; then they report those selected in a way that makes them sell well.”³¹

When it comes to Africa reporting, the media obviously (over-)emphasise the level of poverty on the continent, but do not investigate into how the countries which are abundant with natural resources can at the same time be amongst the poorest in the world. This type of investigation would lead to the Western banks, corporations, property and estate companies which do business in Africa or with African leading figures. The exposing of moot operations of these institutions would mean the loss of revenue from advertising for the media corporations. Additionally, the editors, program directors and other media top executives are shareholders of the same banks and property companies, meaning they would not want to endanger the source of their own wealth.³²

The U.N. panel of experts and independent agencies published the information about the US companies which armed rebels in DR Congo and collaborated with them so as to traffic diamond, gold and coltan — the core element of cell phones and laptops. There are reports about environmental damage caused by Shell, BP and other conglomerates in Nigeria, or by some European companies which (after bribing the Somalia transitional government) were able to dispose toxic waste in the waters of Somalia.³³ These are some of the stories the Western media would not report on, so as not to fall from the shareholders’ grace.

On the other hand, in order for more profit to be acquired, the tendency towards crisis-driven journalism — with not properly briefed journalists

³⁰ James Michira, *Images of Africa in the Western media* op. cit.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid. Lord Aikins Adusei provides details of banks and corporations suspected of bribery and corruption.

“parachuting” into the areas often producing mixed-message reports — is on the rise. The mass-production of reports which are superficial, lack context and focus on dramatic, sensational or odd are necessitated by this type of journalism, at the expense of Africa and its inhabitants.

3.2.2. Media Monopoly

Ever since the early 1970s, the scientists have been warning about the media monopoly, mostly that of the news agencies *Reuters* and *Agence-France Press (AFP)*. In the 1950s, in Africa, these two, then colonizers’ news agencies, had absolute monopoly of the mass media communications.³⁴ Although other media companies have entered Africa, the said two have remained influential until today, controlling up to 93% of the news flow into the continent.³⁵ Interestingly, the British *Reuters* and the French *AFP*, the US *Associated Press (AP)* and the *United Press (UP)*, together with the British *BBC* and the US *CNN* control about 80% of the international news items that flow through newsrooms globally.³⁶

It appears, therefore, that in times of globalization, the mass media industry becomes utterly centralized. What Africans are to learn about the world, and about Africa itself, will be decided by a single editor in the West. This brings us to a phenomenon known as “gate-keeping”, first used in the 1950s. Gate-keeping is a process of selection of news items that are going to be presented to the audience.³⁷ The first scholar who studied the concept, in relation to decisions made by newspaper wire editor about what stories should be published, found that most decisions were based on subjective reasons, including personal opinions.³⁸ Since then, various studies on gate-keeping have combined the individual and institutional factors that influence news selection into the “news value” factors. These factors are, among others: impact (number of people affected), proximity (geographical closeness to the target audience), timeliness (the newness of the story), prominence of the subjects, presence of the conflict, novelty and community interest.³⁹

³⁴ Olav Stokke, “The Mass Media in Africa and Africa in the International Mass Media — An Introduction”, in: Olav Stokke (ed.), *Reporting Africa in African and International Mass Media*, Uppsala, The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1971, p.12, Stable URL, <http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:nai:diva-782>.

³⁵ James Michira, *Images of Africa in the Western media*, op. cit.

³⁶ Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op.cit., p. 1.

³⁷ Dan Teng’o, *More of the Same: The Flow and Framing of African News on the Web sites of Five Western News Organizations and an African News Aggregator*, Kent University and Ohio Link ETD, 2008, pp. 22–23, Stable URL, http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1217576335, 20/08/2011.

³⁸ White, cited in Dan Teng’o, *More of the Same*, op. cit., pp. 22–3.

³⁹ Harrigan and Dunlap, cited in Dan Teng’o, *More of the Same*, op. cit., p. 23.

The problem that arises from the gate-keeping concept is the fact that news values cannot be made universal. Regrettably for African countries and their citizens, they are, since the media select reports according to the Western values. “As a result, African successes measured according to African values are never reported. Although a water pump in a rural area may transform a community and its economy, it hardly makes good copy. Coups and wars make better copy and can be succinctly communicated to a reader. Press coverage of Africa in the context of the world events marginalizes things uniquely African.”⁴⁰

Referring back to the list of news value factors, it seems rather rational that, for the Western media, conflict would be more “valuable” than a technical contribution to a community. The understanding of the media monopoly combined with the empirical data that confirmed the imbalance in reporting and the news flow between more and less industrialized states were main postulations for the NWICO-debate in the 1980s – further discussed in this chapter.

3.2.3. Political and Economic Interests of the West

Needless to say, the countries of the West generate their wealth and power mostly by exploiting African natural resources. Since their own economies depend on Africa, they would not want the continent to develop to the extent where it could start using the same resources itself. The US national security document NSM 200 from 1974, compiled under Henry Kissinger endorsed the control of African population so as to secure American economic interests. The Western nations whose economies are dependent on Africa’s resources, were concerned that if African population was allowed to grow unrestricted, “‘Africa may use its natural resources for itself or ask for better terms of trade.’”⁴¹

Until today, this is considered to be one of the reasons why Africa has always been portrayed as “dependable”, “hopeless”, “at raging civil war” and “overwhelmed by corruption”. With such negative publicity, even the most persistent potential investors may abandon the idea of starting their business in any of the African countries.

However, apart from economic, there are other Western interests that determine the type of reporting on Africa. Very often, Western governments may use media reports on conflicts and crisis as a rationale for military intervention. That was the case in Somalia in 1991/2, and it turned out to be a military failure. Consequently, in 1994, the same governments decided to ignore the warning crisis reports from Rwanda, and claiming the protection of national

⁴⁰ Hawk, cited in: Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴¹ Baffour Ankomah, “Reporting Africa“, op. cit., p. 146. For details on the document see also, <http://wlym.com/text/NSSM200.htm>.

interest only reported on the evacuation of their own nationals. Evidently, media can form opinions only to a certain extent, as when the foreign policy decides not to intervene, the reporting on the crisis is soon made irrelevant.

On the other hand, should the Western aid agencies decide to intervene the reports would simply shift from the front lines and battle zones to the refugee camps and hospitals. This type of reporting is then labelled “humanitarian crisis reporting”, with main subjects being the Western doctors and aid workers. Although their help is at times crucial, it is the over-use of the image in which Africans are not given their voice, but are spoken for, that the media scientist are arguing about. Some call this image “‘the comfort zone’ used by the West to calm down their restless masses.”⁴² The people in the West should be able, thankful to the media reports, to compare their living conditions to those of the “pitiable” Africans and come to the conclusion that they are much better off. Additionally, even at times of peace, so as not to disturb the “comfort zone”, the Western media will prefer to show village huts and city slums (such as Kibera), than the big modern cities.⁴³

It is a mixture of historical and contemporary factors that creates the imbalance in the reporting and the news flow between the “developing” and “developed” countries. The negative image of Africa in the 1970s and 80s, initiated a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) debate. This was the first serious attempt at challenging the Western media monopoly of ideas; however, it failed.

3.3. *NWICO Debate*

In a meeting in Montreal in 1969, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) experts observed that, on the global level, the free flow of information had become one way.⁴⁴ The clear hierarchy between more and less developed countries reflected on the type of news that was being produced about each of the groups. Studies show that there was an overemphasis on crises, conflicts and disasters in reports about “developing countries”, which were not contrasted with any positive news as it was the case in the reporting on “developed countries.”⁴⁵ The Western media were said to be unconcerned about the problems and goals of the less developed countries, exercising through their reporting a type of economic, cultural and political colonialism.⁴⁶

⁴² Baffour Ankomah, “Reporting Africa”, op. cit., p. 145.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁴⁵ Giffard, cited in, Den Teng’o, *More of the Same*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁴⁶ Masmoudi, cited in Den Teng’o, *More of the Same*, op. cit., p. 12.

The strong criticism of the imbalance in the news flow resulted in a call for the New World International and Communication Order (NWICO). Upon numerous meetings, conferences and debates, under UNESCO auspices, Media Declaration was adopted in 1978, calling for changes in the international communication scheme.⁴⁷ At the same time, in 1977, the commission headed by an Irish diplomat Sean MacBride was formed so as to review the international communication problems and provide recommendations. The so-called MacBride report named “Many Voices, One World” was submitted in 1980.⁴⁸ The report pointed to the “[d]istortion of news” that appears when “untruths replace authentic facts; or when a slanted interpretation is woven into the news report”, most often “through the use of pejorative adjectives and stereotypes”.⁴⁹

Whereas the report justified the demands of the less developed countries, the debate itself turned to be a failure. It is said that the implementation of the NWICO was not properly defined; the censorship and media liability charges were imprecise, and the demands were deemed to reflect only the views of the so-called South’s elites.⁵⁰ In light of this criticism, and supported by the President Ronald Reagan’s statement to *The New York Times* in which he said NWICO was an attempt to control media and promote censorship, Britain and the United States withdrew their membership from the UNESCO and abandoned the NWICO debate.⁵¹ With the two biggest UNESCO financers gone, the organisation weakened and the debate’s potential faded. The West concluded that NWICO was an attack on the freedom of speech.

Not much has changed since the failed NWICO debate. In the reports on Africa, the same stereotypes and pejorative adjectives have been prevalent until today, and due to the aforementioned historical and contemporary factors, there are no clear prospects of their disappearing. The biased reporting continues, and it is especially noticeable when conflicts and crises are the subjects.

4. Reporting on Crises and Conflicts in Africa

4.1. Crises and Conflicts Reporting — An Overview

Prior to the analysis of the reporting on crises in Africa, theoretical framework will be introduced. To explain the media’s substantial interest in

⁴⁷ Dan Teng’o, *More of the Same*, op. cit., p.13.

⁴⁸ Angela Osarieme Igbinoba and Stella Ebube Emenike, “A comparative analysis of Channel TV and CNN’s coverage of World News”, *Journal of Public Affairs*, vol. 11, no. 1, February 2011, p. 4.

⁴⁹ MacBride Report, cited in Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁵⁰ Tokunbo Ojo, *Post-NWICO debate*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* pp. 4–5.

conflict, one view suggests putting news production and distribution in historical context. It is, namely, said that international news was created to provide shareholders in Europe with information on conflict regions. Conflict and crisis reporting seems therefore to be the essence of news making. This explains why today, news about catastrophes still presents important incentive for the news production.⁵²

Another important journalistic feature is the issue of objectivity. Edward Said argued that all knowledge about human society is historical knowledge resting therefore on interpretation and judgement.⁵³ It would further imply not that facts are “nonexistent”, but that they acquire their importance through interpretation. With this understanding, news and news reports can be looked into more critically. “Facts” presented in the news are selected, shaped and re-shaped as a part of the larger representation debate.

As there is no “objective news”, as traditionally understood, there is consequently no objective reporting. All reporting goes through the process of reduction, alteration and selection, and should not strive to be objective, but balanced.⁵⁴ Whereas the conflict and crisis reporting has a long history, the crisis-driven, so-called “parachute reporting” is a relative novelty. Journalists can only report what their companies would broadcast. Industrialization of news brought a lot of pressure on reporters. As the news programmes are flourishing, the number of journalist and specialist is being reduced.⁵⁵ News is produced by more general reporters. “They know less, they cost less, but they produce the news that is disseminated more powerfully than ever before.”⁵⁶ Some news companies, such as *CNN* and *News Corporation*, benefit from this type of reporting. They implement a minimalistic approach to analysis and avoid criticism of powerful governments, so as not to endanger their own interests. “Rapid-fire, bullet-point summaries of events, combined with images that are heart-rending, but sanitized, ‘real time’ but manipulated, have become the dominant model.”⁵⁷

⁵² Mai Palmberg, “Introduction”, op. cit., p. 9.

⁵³ Cited in Beverly G. Hawk (ed.), *Africa's Media Image*, op. cit., p. 3.

⁵⁴ Colin Legum, “Some Problems Confronting a Correspondent Specializing in Reporting Africa”, in: Olav Stokke (ed.), *Reporting Africa in African and International Mass Media*, op. cit., p. 206.

⁵⁵ Jean Seaton, “The New ‘Ethnic’ Wars and the Media”, in: Tim Allen and Jean Seaton eds., *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence*, Zed Books, London, 1999, p. 57.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁵⁷ Tim Allen, “Perceiving Contemporary Wars”, in: Tim Allen and Jean Seaton eds., *The Media of Conflict*, op. cit., p. 38.

A study on Western media war coverage identified two different reporting modes: evocative and diagnostic. Evocative reporting is said either to view the conflict from a national and geo-political perspective of the Western media's home lands, or to provide a humanitarian outlook of the news with the aim of sensitising public opinion. In contrast to this, diagnostic approach to reporting, also provides national, geopolitical and humanitarian side of the crisis, but concentrates much more of the analysis of the political context.⁵⁸ The second mode is today almost non-existent. Instead of providing a detailed analysis of the crisis situation before the escalation of the conflict; the reporters nowadays usually "parachute" in the crisis region, couple of days into the conflict. "When reporters in a conflict situation cannot make out what is happening, a noted journalist explained, they call it anarchy. Since they have usually arrived in town only a day or two before, this is quite often."⁵⁹

When unable to understand and explain complex political and socio-cultural conditions in which they find themselves, reporters employ clichés and stereotypes. "Tribal" or "ethnic" conflicts, "war-like nature", "innate savagery" are some of the common simplistic conflict situation explanations. These images are widely accepted by the Western media editors and would unquestionably "fit the box".⁶⁰

As this paper already argued, crisis belongs to the category of commercially viable images. However, not all crises coverage is equal and depends on the Western countries' interests. Overview of some of the crisis coverage landmarks starts with 1984.

4.2. The Western Media Coverage of Crises and Conflicts in Africa

The main patterns in the Western media's coverage of crises and conflicts in Africa will be identified on the examples of the 1984/5 famine, Sierra Leone conflict of the 1990s, and Rwanda 1994 genocide. In 2011, African crises, mostly North African uprisings and famine in Somalia, received substantial media attention. Due to the fact they are still ongoing, there is a lack of comprehensive studies on their media coverage. However, not to exclude them from the overview of the crisis reporting, this paper will provide a case study in which the employment of stereotypes in the reporting of 2011 crises will briefly

⁵⁸ Valentina Bau, "Media and Conflict in Sierra Leone: national and international perspectives of the civil war", *Global Media Journal — African Edition*, vol. 4, no. 1, 2010, p. 23.

⁵⁹ Tim Allen, "Perceiving Contemporary Wars", op. cit., p. 38.

⁶⁰ The *New African* editor revealed that "the British media report into a box". Box is comprised of pre-set ideas, and if a report from Africa does not fit the box, it is either edited to fit the box, or discarded. See further Baffour Ankomah, "Reporting Africa", op. cit., p. 145.

be analysed. The case study (German primetime newscast *Tagesschau*) has no attempt at generalisation on the media coverage in Germany or on the media in the year 2011, but solely to demonstrate that the common stereotypes and previously identified patterns in crisis reporting can also be detected in this media format's 2011 African crises reporting.

4.2.1 The Western Media Coverage of the 1984/5 Famine in Africa

The general characteristic of the Western media coverage of the 1984/5 famine is the lack of quality information. Although the West gave lengthy coverage of the crisis, the reports were rather descriptive and focused on three basic issues: the aid delivery; internal political frictions – especially if European citizens were involved, as in the case of kidnappings in Mozambique and Ethiopia; and state visits between African and the European authorities.⁶¹ To comply with Western audiences' expectations, there was never any mentioning of the role of the grassroots NGOs or African governments in resolving the food shortage problems.

The main Western media objective was to portray Africans as completely dependent on foreign aid and unable to take any initiative. The concentration was on Ethiopia and Sudan, without taking into consideration either other affected countries or the causes of the famine. The reports were abundant with generalisations and stereotypes, “the ‘rebels’ had no voice, were represented as ‘uncivilized’ or ‘primitive warriors’, while the Europeans involved in the disturbances were ‘innocent victims’ or ‘hostages’.”⁶² Not surprisingly, the photographic depiction was highly emotive showing all too known images of “a mother and a child” at the verge of collapse, implying the level of starvation and despair.

Regarding the cause of famine, the explanations were drought and failed crops. Rather rarely, some reports mentioned the cereals surplus within the European Economic Community (EEC), implying that the real problem was the uneven distribution of goods and the necessity for redistribution of surpluses.⁶³ Generally, all reports tended to avoid any mentioning of the Western governments' involvement in the hunger crisis and there was never any reference to the historical or cultural connection stemming from the colonial period.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Claude Ake, „Images of Africa: Special Report“, *African Journal of Political Economy*, vol. 2, no. 4, 1989, p. 84, Internet, <http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/AfricanJournals/pdfs/JournalofPoliticalEconomy/ajpev2n4/ajpe002004006.pdf.26/7/2011>.

⁶² Ibid. p. 85.

⁶³ Ibid. pp. 85–6.

⁶⁴ Ibid. pp. 85–98.

Finally, the Western media focused on the role of the Western humanitarian and development agencies, completely neglecting the work of African NGOs and peasant associations which showed high level of solidarity. It is not the role of the Western agencies that is brought to question, but the media partiality in the reporting. Whereas the Western aid organisations provided extensive and valuable help and support, their work was well documented, which was not the case with the local African aid groups. The media were more concerned with appealing to their viewers' expectations by showing only Western aid workers providing "assistance and salvation" to Africans.⁶⁵

The 1984/5 famine reporting implemented many of the stereotypes mentioned in the Chapter 2 of this paper. The general rhetoric was that of dependence, apathy and despair which could only be improved through the activities of foreign governmental or non-governmental donors.

4.2.2. The Western Media Coverage of Sierra Leone Conflict in the 1990s

In 1992, a group of military officers launched a coup to overthrow the dictatorial All People's Congress (APC) and established a rule of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). At first promising to fight corruption, NPRC soon followed in the steps of the previous regime. The freedom of speech and the free press were once again suppressed.⁶⁶ In 1997, another coup followed, launched by an alliance called Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) which ousted Sierra Leone first democratic government after 30 years. This instigated nine-month regime, under which raiding, killings and mutilations took place. The AFRC military, known as the "junta", was one of the fiercest military commands in Africa.⁶⁷

A very brief introduction in the Sierra Leone conflicts was provided before the paper dwells on the Western media representation of those events. In the light of the paper's main objective of researching into stereotypes and patterns in reporting, Sierra Leone coverage makes good case study.

It is common knowledge that humankind tends to deem unimportant that what it does not understand. The same theory applies to the war and conflict reporting. Reporters, aid personnel and some academics often refer to war as pointless. Nowadays, wars are commonly named "ethnic", and when they are located in Africa, depicted as "an eruption of the mindless violence often stemming from 'ancient tribal hatreds'."⁶⁸ This rhetoric was used in Robert

⁶⁵ Ibid. pp. 85–98.

⁶⁶ Gordon, Cited in: Valentina Bau, "Media and Conflict in Sierra Leone", op. cit. p. 22.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ David Keen, "'Who's it Between?' 'Ethnic War' and Rational Violence", in: Tim Allen and Jean Seaton eds., *The Media of Conflict*, op. cit., p. 81.

Kaplan's article "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet", where most of the examples referred to the war in Sierra Leone. His portrayal of the war as savage and anarchic is the exemplification of a "new barbarism" theory which implies that "parts of the world are populated by irrationally violent and uncivilized peoples."⁶⁹ In wealthy countries which are on various levels involved in conflicts world-wide, this depiction of war — when the war causes are deliberately not explained — is used to support the idea of non-reaction and isolation.

This kind of Africa's wars' depiction became common practice. If Sierra Leone or Rwanda are not considered economically or geo-politically important, in a certain period or generally, media will either be disinterested or portray the war as savage tribal conflict that was caused by ancient hatred. As it would later become clear, on the examples of Libya and Ivory Coast, different rhetoric is used when the Western foreign affairs departments have already decided to intervene — for the protection of their interests.

The "new barbarism" theory has not only been used to justify military or peace-making non-involvement, but also to draw attention away from an unofficial involvement of the West, which is almost inevitable in every conflict. This is usually achieved by focusing on internal factors as war causes. A study on British media coverage of Sierra Leone civil war found that the most often employed factors are: "corruption, state collapse, tribalism, poverty and underdevelopment. Little attention was paid to external elements like the exploitation of the natural resources by Western multinationals, unfair trade and harsh regulation set up by Western financial institutions."⁷⁰

The British media focused on two events: the liberation of foreign soldiers kidnapped by rebels and the British authorities' assistance with the mercenary company Sandline's violation of the UN arms embargo in order to supply pro-governmental troops to remove AFRC and restore elected government.⁷¹

Generally, media coverage was scarce and biased, confronting images of "savagery" with that of European hostages and humanitarian workers, who in Sierra Leone again acted as unchallenged source of information. Similar was the case of Rwanda genocide in 1994.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Valentina Bau, "Media and Conflict in Sierra Leone", op. cit. p. 25.

⁷¹ Ibid.

4.2.3. The Western Media Coverage of the 1994 Rwanda Genocide

Although media presented Rwanda genocide as a sudden outbreak of mass killings; what happened in that African country was neither sudden nor anarchic, and not everybody was uninformed that it may happen. There are reports that prove that France had for some time been able to trace the Hutu extremists' behaviour in and out of Rwanda, but this information had never left the French intelligence service offices.⁷² Not much media attention had been paid to Rwanda prior to the plane crash that killed Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana on April 4, 1994. The fragile power sharing peace-accord between major Hutu and minor Tutsi (represented by rebel Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)) was signed in 1993 in Arusha.⁷³ The Hutu extremists opposed the agreement and immediately after the plane crash, using the private radio station RTLM, proclaimed Tutsis responsible for the President's death and argued further that Rwanda would be more contented without them. In the night of 6-7 April the killings of the Tutsi and the "disloyal" Hutu started.

Misunderstanding the nature of the conflict, most international media depicted the killings as tribal warfare and not as genocide. Media attention was directed towards the evacuation of foreign nationals, before, following the death of ten Belgian soldiers, even the media evacuated. At the time of the most severe mass murders there were only couple of reporters left in Rwanda. Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR mission in Rwanda, mentions witnessing the dichotomy of media. On the one hand, RTLM was encouraging the killings, whereas on the other hand Western media ignored or misunderstood the situation.⁷⁴ What both had in common is the role of agents of their governments' policies. Dallaire also quotes the representative of one major power who said that Rwanda had no strategic value. Geographically, it meant nothing to the West, and apart from tea and coffee, it had no other resources, so it was economically not important. The US did not want to interfere in light of the previous disastrous mission in Somalia, when 18 American soldiers were killed in 1993. Following in these decisions, the media corporations also turned their back on Rwanda.⁷⁵

Mark Doyle, *BBC* correspondent, often the only reporter in Rwanda in the first three weeks of the genocide, said that his reports on organised and

⁷² David Keen, "Who's it Between?' 'Ethnic War' and Rational Violence", op. cit., p. 94.

⁷³ Allan Thompson, "Introduction", in: Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁴ Romeo Dallaire, "The Media Dichotomy", in: Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, pp. 12-3.

⁷⁵ Ibid. pp. 12-6.

systematic killings of Tutsi by the rebel militia and government forces contradicted the general understanding at the *BBC* headquarters that it was the case of tribal warfare and chaos. The fact that editors in London often asked from him to provide the other side of the story, shows that there was a lot of disbelief in the possibility of systemic killings without any form of retaliation (as there was no retaliation in the first weeks of the genocide).⁷⁶

In the years that followed, there was a lot of discussion in the West on whether the media or the journalist failed in Rwanda. Most of the studies point out that the media companies' policies, their search for profit and cost-cutting could be held responsible for the failed representation of genocide. Even the word "genocide" was never published in reports unless the reporter quoted another source. The reason lies in the fact that the characterisation of the situation as genocide would have necessitated political action, under the genocide convention (UN1951).⁷⁷ Since the international community had already decided not to interfere, the media task was to avoid using the term.

It was only with the arrival of the French troops, who launched an operation to create a safe zone in the south of the country for 10-15,000 Tutsis to leave to the neighbouring DR Congo (then Zaire), that large numbers of reporters arrived. The international community and the international media ignored the death of 937,000 people, but swarmed in to report on the "refugee crisis".⁷⁸ The media surge to cover the refugee story was best summed up by an *AFP* reporter Anne Chaon, "It became worse in mid-July, when a million of Hutus crossed the border into Zaire and cholera flared up in the camps. The humanitarian catastrophe overwhelmed the real story of the genocide. Everybody ran to Goma, because the story there was so easy to cover. After months of genocide, the issue of good guys and bad guys disappeared completely. The enemy was cholera, but no political issue surrounded the cholera in the camps. It seemed as if journalists were more comfortable covering cholera than genocide."⁷⁹

Although the use of "good guys and bad guys" in the context of genocide seems misplaced, Chaon does present the core of the problem with the media coverage of Rwanda genocide. It was dangerous and costly, there was no

⁷⁶ Mark Doyle, "Reporting Genocide", in Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, p. 146.

⁷⁷ Anne Chaon, "Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?," in: Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, pp. 161-5.

⁷⁸ Gerald Caplan, "Rwanda: Walking the Road to Genocide", in: Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 2007, pp. 20-37.

⁷⁹ Anne Chaon, "Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media", op. cit., p. 164.

interest because the governments had already decided not to intervene, and at the same time media were more concerned with the war in Bosnia. However, when the situation turned into a refugee crisis, it was easier for the media to generate profits on this kind of reporting. The coverage was highly emotional, and there were at that time no scenes of violence. Western humanitarian agencies and donors could again be fore-grounded in the coverage and, in the end, similarly to the previous cases this paper presented, Africans would be shown as if saved by the West.

The overview of some of the landmarks in crisis coverage from Africa demonstrates that the media tend to oversimplify crisis they do not understand. “Tribal conflicts”, “savagery” and “chaos” are some of the stereotypes that characterise crisis coverage. The reporting on aid work is imbalanced, since African aid agencies’ efforts are never reported on, so as to create the impression of Africa’s dependence.

To complete the study of the crisis and conflict coverage, the paper turns to some of the current crises in Africa and looks into their representation in one case study.

4.2.4 Coverage of 2011 Africa crises — Case study: ARD newscast “Tagesschau”

The time frame of the study ranges from January 21 until August 20, 2011. The newscast in question is highly reputable with an average of 9.14 million viewers in 2010.⁸⁰ It is broadcast daily between 8pm - 8:15pm. Due to its short format, news items are sometimes rather too brief, creating thus a difficulty for the viewer to always grasp the context. However, as this study will show, as in any reporting in the West, the length and depth of the news story will depend on the country’s economic and geo-political importance.

In the seven months covered by the study, ten African countries were featured in the news: Tunisia, Egypt and Libya — uprisings and demonstrations; Ivory Coast — post-election violence; Somalia — pirates and famine; Morocco — terrorist attack and constitutional reform; Nigeria — elections, terrorist attack and Chancellor Merkel’s visit; Kenya — refugee crisis and Chancellor’s visit; Angola — Chancellor’s visit; South Sudan — referendum and independence.

The first observation is that almost all Africa coverage is at the same time crisis coverage. However, to be able to identify the patterns in reporting by

⁸⁰ See: <http://www.ard.de/intern/presseservice/-/id=8058/nid=8058/did=1823332/13gifru/index.html>, 21/8/2011.

comparing current crisis coverage with the one previously examined in this chapter, only a very brief overview of the coverage of North Africa uprisings, Ivory Coast post-election crisis and Somalia famine will be provided.

Tagesschau was closely following the developments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya in which the citizens were demanding regime changes. Reports appeared regularly during the whole seven months of the study, mostly, as the main news. However, what differentiates this crisis coverage from the previous ones is the employment of another type of vocabulary. There were “protests”, “demonstrations”, “mass protests” and “unrests” in the reporting, and there was no employment of the stereotypical vocabulary such as “tribalism”, “chaos” or “viciousness”. The countries were referred to as the Arab World and there was a visible disconnection from Africa at all levels of reporting.⁸¹ In the previous African crisis reporting the focus was always on the foreign nationals and their “rescue”, upon which the reporting would notably decrease. In the coverage of the North African countries, this was not the case.

Interestingly, there is a clear partiality in the newscast’s depiction of Libya uprisings later turning into a civil war. The general characteristic is a lack of background information on the origin of the protests. As the news first broke out it was rather brief, informing about the number of casualties during the protest against the President. Only four days later, there were stories about the possibility of the outbreak of the civil war against the “*Machthaber*” (Ruler) Gaddafi.⁸² His opponents, “the rebels”, were not portrayed in the negative light, and there was again no rhetoric that has generally been used in rebellion reporting. It is possible that any negative connotations were to be avoided in light of the NATO air strike support to the rebels. Not to forget, being an oil-rich country, Libya is very important in terms of the Western economic interests, so the media companies have to adapt their reporting so as not to jeopardise their own and their governments’ interests.

In March, *Tagesschau* reported on the violence in Ivory Coast. It is said to be ongoing since the elections in November the year before. Media had no interest until the forces of the officially elected Alassane Outtara were close on winning the fight against the supporters of the ex-President Gbagbo, who refused to accept the election results and hand in his power. The correspondent reported on the power struggle, which was soon to end in that West African country, from a studio in Nairobi in East Africa. It is again, most likely, the cost-cutting that made reporting from Ivory Coast so scarce in the long months of conflicts. The newscast only reported that the civil war was coming to an end

⁸¹ For details see: ARD Mediathek, www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/videoarchiv2/html.21/8/2011.

⁸² See: *Tagesschau*, 21. February 2011, in ARD Mediathek, op. cit.

and that the UN combat helicopters and French special units took part in the attacks on the presidential palace, due to the President's use of heavy weaponry against civilians.⁸³ This time reporting from Abidjan, the *ARD* correspondent announced the ex-President's arrest and the estimation that 1 million people took refuge from one of the most stable countries in Africa. As there was no reporting on the country during the time of the conflict and no background information on how the UN and French forces intervention was approved, the news story leaves room for further questioning. Although the reports were lengthy at times, they were rather descriptive and lacked contextual analysis. With regards to the Western intervention, it is presumably a deliberate decision, as many times before, not to over-expose the — Western — interest — prone activities in Africa.

Reports on the famine in Somalia revoked all – too – known cataclysmic vocabulary. It was the “drought of the century”, the “worst drought in 60 years”, and “the hunger crisis”. The coverage was prompted by a large number of refugees moving from Somalia into the Kenyan refugee camp Dadaab. The cause was said to be drought. However, scientists have for long been warning about the famine being, “actively intended by those seeking to secure access to one set of scarce resources (minerals, land etc.) by creating an artificial scarcity of another resource (notably food).”⁸⁴ Instead of researching in this direction and exposing the situation to the viewers, *Tagesschau* decided to keep to the descriptive and humanitarian crisis — oriented reporting. After it was acknowledged that the drought was not the only source of the crisis, one report said that it was “a dangerous mixture of hunger and violence” that caused the refugee movement out of Somalia.⁸⁵ However, as in all humanitarian crises reporting, the focus was again only on Western donations, aid organisations and the dangers they are facing while attempting to distribute food. The efforts of the Kenyan and other African agencies, in whose territory most of the refugees have fled, have only rarely been mentioned. However, notably, this was the case when German minister for development, expressed his concern for the living conditions of the equally poor local communities who do not receive any help, and are also affected by the drought.

This short overview of the current crisis reporting reveals not many changes in the way media depict African crises. Reporting is generally ambiguous and driven by Western geo-political and economic interests.

⁸³ See: *Tagesschau*, 11. April 2011, in *ARD Mediathek*, op. cit.

⁸⁴ David Keen, “‘Who’s it Between?’ ‘Ethnic War’ and Rational Violence”, op. cit., p. 89. For detailed explanation of Somalia famine see an article by Somalia’s ambassador to Kenya, Mohamed Ali Nur, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201108160082.html>. 21/8/2011.

⁸⁵ See: *Tagesschau*, 19. July 2011, in *ARD Mediathek*, op. cit.

5. Conclusion

It is mostly the global hierarchy, the division between the “Western World” and the “Third World”, and all its political and economic implications that create the imbalance in reporting. More than ever before, the media sector has been driven by profit. The commercialisation of the media, the monopoly of several news wire corporations and media conglomerates have made reporting biased and superficial. Instead of striving to provide accurate and in-depth information, the media are preoccupied with securing their economic and ideological interests.

In this type of media environment, Africa has largely been marginalized and stereotyped. Two thirds of the continent have never been mentioned in the news, mostly because there are no crises or conflicts to report on. Steady progress and development do not fit into the “editorial media box” of preconceived ideas. Africa is “dark” and “at war” and media would use all their resources so as not to refrain from this image. Finally, this is what sells in the West. Diseases, armed conflicts, famine and backward rituals and practices belong to a well know colonial metaphor and are therefore appealing to the Western audiences.

Commonly, the Western media report on Africa only when there is an ongoing crisis (political or humanitarian) or a conflict. Researching into crisis and conflict reporting, this paper challenges the notion of the so-called “*CNN* effect”. For some time, influential belief was that media have the power to influence foreign policies. Many studies wanted to prove that Rwanda genocide may have not had to happen had it been for the live coverage of the killings. The understanding is that the more media expose certain topic, the more it would influence public outrage and call the government to react. However, this paper demonstrates that, in reality, it is much more the opposite. In their drive for profit, the media corporations, with their editorial policies, have made the diagnostic approach to journalism and the investigative journalism almost nonexistent. Just as the foreign policy so are the media companies guided by interest. Reporting on an issue which is of no official interest to authorities is a waste of resources. Exposing an unofficial, moot dealing of the Western governments and big corporations might have even more devastating consequences on the media company. Unfortunately, all of this is actually at the expense of African countries. As the West continues to exploit their natural resource the media send negative images of them to the world. Consequently, there are no direct investments and Africa remains closed in a vicious circle of dependence on the West.

Is there anything that could be done so as to improve the media image of Africa? In light of the aforementioned dependence, it is very difficult to imagine that the Western media misrepresentations of Africa would come to an end in near future. What is needed are strong leaderships in Africa that would demand

equal negotiating and decision-making rights in all international institutions. Only with the removal of the burden of dependence could Africa possibly be portrayed in a more positive light.

In the meantime, it is highly advisable to consult more sources when watching or reading the news from Africa. Several African news agencies and media companies have taken on the responsibility of providing a fuller picture of the continent. The Pan African News Agency *PANA Press* which provides the most comprehensive outlook on the continent has been joined by an independent news service provider *A24* and a South African *Africa the Good News*. A trace of hope for a more positive and balanced reporting on Africa could be achieved through strengthening of these and possibly some new independent African news agencies. This would disrupt the media monopoly of *Reuters* and *AFP*, and once the African media start using sources other than the Western ones, it is possible that the news wire agencies may alter their editorial policies so as to win back their customers. With regards to superficial and biased Africa coverage, even a small change in Western editorial policies would mean a big media victory for Africa.

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*Katarina Štrbac and Miroslav Mitrović*¹

Asymmetric Threats-Common Response in Western Balkans

ABSTRACT

In the last decade of the 20th century, the Balkans featured in the critical events of the century, such as the dissolution of the Former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Block, the transition of the former socialist, state-run economies into market-oriented economies, the great shift in understanding security concepts, as well as in many other events, which had significant impact on the countries in the Region and resulted in pacification of a very volatile area in Europe. On one hand the Region was calming down, on the other, new, asymmetric threats emerged, and they are not exclusive to the countries in the Region, they pertained to world-wide trends threatening global security. Global threats require global response. It is very often the case that regional organizations are not enough. They, however, may be a solid starting point or foundation for boosting security in certain areas. In order to strengthen regional security, some common activities should be undertaken, and they are: common definition of asymmetric threats, regional vulnerability assessment, and establishment of common regional mechanisms in response to the common threats.

Key words: asymmetric threats, regional security, common security approach, security integration.

Preface

Balkans area is bounded from North by: Bay of Trieste — river Vipava, rivers Krka and Danube, and from West, South and East by Adriatic, Ion, Mediterranean and Black seas.² Balkans area is occupying 1,545,241 square kilometres, with over 140 million inhabitants. It takes 6% of European space. This area was named in 1808, thanks to German geographer August Zeune, who named this geographic area according to the central mountain range — the Balkans.

¹ Katarina Štrbac, PhD col, and Miroslav Mitrović, PhD LTC, are currently employed at the Strategic Research Institute, Sector for defence policy, Ministry of Defence of Republic of Serbia; mail: katarina.strbac@mod.gov.rs., miroslav.mitrovic@mod.gov.rs.

² Stanko Nišić, *Velike sile i Balkan*, VIZ, Beograd, 1999.

In historical sense, only in the 20th century, the region was battle ground for 10 (ten) wars, out of which two were world wars, which significantly influenced social situation in these countries. As Churchill said: The Balkans produces more history than they can consume.³ Thus, even today the region faces many challenges in its development which are the result of unresolved issues from the past. It is difficult to speak about the progress of a region which still contemplates on winners and losers from the Ottoman war against the rest of Europe in 14th century. It can often be perceived that the entire region is a hostage to its history, and that it will move towards progress once it replaces discussions on history with strategies for the future.

In political sense, the Balkan countries are on different levels of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which could be both a difficulty and a driving force for further efforts in stabilizing political, economic, social and other circumstances. Stabilization conditions in the area should be one of priorities in achievement of national interests.

Western Balkans is part of Balkans and composed of countries which have been established after dissolution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia minus Slovenia and plus Albania.⁴

The Balkans is also called “the Gate of Europe”.⁵ The Region deserved this name due to its geographical position, through which 3 trans-European strategic corridors are passing: seven, eight and ten. Due to this fact, it can be said that the Balkan countries have a very favourable geo-strategic position. Importance of the above-mentioned corridors will be reflected in the future through an intensive commercial, infrastructural, IT and all other forms of development. Apart from the strategic trans-European road corridors, the Balkans is increasingly becoming an important transit route for the trans-European gas and oil pipe-lines, which are connecting energy suppliers with the end users.

Current Situation in the Balkans Region

Analysis of the current situation in the Balkan region, requires a detailed approach to geopolitical, economic, cultural and security issues. General

³ Winston Churchill quotes, Internet: http://thinkexist.com/quotation/the_balkans_produce_more_history_than_they_can/170108.html, 21/09/2011.

⁴ Western Balkans is common name for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and FYROM and was mentioned for first time at EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, Greece, on 21st of June 2003 held in effort to reiterate support to the European perspective of the Western Balkans countries.

⁵ International Balkan Congress “Interaction among the Balkan Nation”, 24–26 April 2008 Istanbul <http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/news/TASAM%20programme.pdf>.

conclusion suggests that the Balkan countries are striving to become an integrated part of the European Community. The path towards the realization of this idea and contribution to achieving the European Union as a free and mature security community, requires from the states which strive for integration, to comply with the standards in the understanding of security challenges, threats and risks. As an initial hypothesis regarding the situation in the Balkans, the following questions may be used, and the answers will per se give an analysis of current state of affairs.

1. Are we economically developed?
2. Is democracy on a suitable level?
3. Is there rule of law in our countries?
4. Are we safe?

Even a cursory approach in response to the posed questions, give “no” as an answer to all the questions. Common characteristics of the states in the region are: inadequate efficiency of state institutions, insufficient economic stability (even the states from the region which are already the EU member states, best illustrated by the example of Greece), high percentage of unemployment, with particularly worrying unemployment rate among young people, low quality of citizens’ living standard, significant level of organised crime, problem of corruption on all levels of government, symbiosis of large businesses and political stakeholders, and unresolved problems from the past.

In addition to the above, challenges of social and democratic development in the region are:

- Social instability,
- Uneven regional development and migration from the rural to urban centres, leading to uncertainty of the long term sustainability of significant number of rural communities,
- Demographic disproportion, with most of the region characterised by the negative birth-rates and increasingly aging work-force. Birth-rates and number of young people are highest in those parts of the region with lowest levels of education and employment,
- Illegal immigrations,
- Huge number of refugees and IDPs,
- Unsatisfactory state of human and minority rights, including the rights of ethnic and religious communities,
- Need for reconciliation among different ethnic and religious communities, minority and majority populations, and

- Possibility of re-escalation of ethnically and religiously motivated violence.

Transition of formerly state controlled economies into market economies, is not supported with an adequate protection mechanisms for the “transitional losers”. In addition to the above, region is challenged with inadequate emergency management, industrial pollution, inadequate management of drinking water, collection and processing of waste, as well as soil degradation.

These challenges are at the same time possibilities for the countries of the region to cooperate and contribute to the well being of their states and peoples by undertaking joint actions. The region also faces problems in controlling basic macro-economic factors, instability of foreign investment, irregularities in privatization processes, as well as the “brain-drain”.

The region is at the moment divided according to several criteria: members and non-members of EU⁶ and NATO,⁷ those who are getting closer to the EU membership and those who are not, those who have declared NATO membership as their national political priority and those who are trying to reach national consensus on that issue or have declared military neutrality, those who have recognised self-declared independence of Kosovo and those who have not.

Although there is never a good moment for a crisis, economic crisis has hit Balkan countries in the worst possible moment. Its occurrence found countries of the region in unfinished process of transition, with high level of political instability, weak economies, insufficiently strong state institutions, and already high unemployment rates and existence of “illegal markets”. It is important to underline that the economic crisis can induce traumas, hatred and conflicts in this part of the world, particularly due to the fact that there are still unresolved issues, such as years long disputes, ethnic conflicts, aspirations for state borders’ changes, and selective approach to EU accession of the countries from the region.

According to the World Bank report on economic recovery after the financial crisis, Turkey recovers fastest, with yearly economic growth of 6.3%, while other countries from the region have either negative or economic growth of up to 3% — certainly not enough for rapid economic recovery. Furthermore, countries’ dependence on foreign economic aid is very questionable, because it creates dependence from international financial institutions which results in dysfunctional management of national budgets.

Although countries of the region are in different stages of the EU accession process, it is certain that economic stabilisation of the region depends most of all on the development of the state institutions, development and creation of safe

⁶ Greece, Romania and Bulgaria are members states of EU.

⁷ Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece and Turkey are members states of NATO.

environment for investments, respect of European standards, human rights, rights to property. Security instability factors in the Balkans region are defined by certain parameters, and surely cannot be classified as military, as the probability of inter-state conflict in the region is very low.

Asymmetric Threats and Present Security Concept

Twentieth century was a century of military conflicts, while due to the intensive technological progress, in the twenty-first century fights are led in other fields and countries are more vulnerable from other forms of attacks, which can all be defined as asymmetric threats.

There are many definitions of what constitutes an asymmetric threat, none of which holds sway in defense planning and policy making circles. In general, the term is used to describe forms of attack against which the state has no defenses. "Asymmetry" or "asymmetric" has many definitions and is used to describe many things, from weapons systems and tactics, through strategy and worldviews, to comprehension of what is sanctioned by morality or international law. But, the term is a modifier and is often used subjectively. As Alan Beyerchen suggests, "Like other members of a large class of terms, 'nonlinear' indicates that the norm is what it negates. Words such as periodic, asymmetrical, disequilibrium or non-equilibrium are deeply rooted in a cultural heritage that stems from the classical Greeks. The underlying notion is that 'truth' resides in the simple (and thus, the stable, regular, and consistent) rather than in the complex (and therefore the unstable, irregular, and inconsistent)".⁸ Phrases such as "linear and nonlinear asymmetrical strategies and operations" do little to further our understanding of the situation.

There are many different definitions concerning asymmetric threats, it is necessary to find one which can describe:

- New, unorthodox, surprising, urgent, and unfamiliar threats;
- The historically unique security circumstances facing the institution of security governance;
- Organization vulnerabilities, or lack of defences;
- Institutional weaknesses in executing responses to threats; and,
- New tactics and operations available to potential enemies.⁹

⁸ Beyerchen, Alan, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security*, 17:3 (Winter, 1992), pp 59–90.

⁹ Steven Lambakis, James Kiras, and Kristin Kolet, *Understanding "Asymmetric" Threats to the United States*, Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2002, VII, Internet: <http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/Asymmetry%20%20final%2002.pdf>, 21/09/2011.

From US perspective, the term “asymmetry” captures several elements that both define the current security environment and highlight U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Chief among these elements is the unique position of the United States – a political entity possessing unsurpassed resources and capabilities. The reality of moral and political self-restraints, preferences for and belief in the due processes of domestic and international law, and a global cultural, economic, and military profile paradoxically make the United States a tempting target worldwide to states and groups that oppose:¹⁰

- U.S. (or western) ideas (to include ideas of progress and capitalism);
- U.S. ideals (to include such principles as freedom of speech and belief in the general benefits brought about by openness in society, democratic political processes, free trade, and borderless information transfer); and
- U.S. international engagement and national and strategic goals.

From the EU perspective, we can conclude „*EU soft power excellence*“. Namely, over the academic security discourse, during the last decade, is mainly developed opinion, that, the EU “is supposed to be a more or less harmonious super-national concept of states with the exclusive powers of soft security policy initiative and approval resting with the member states, but their policy is envisaged as being developed entirely on the basis of intergovernmental decision-making, principally through the Council of the EU”.¹¹

Soft security threats are sensitive not just because they threaten the everyday security of European citizens in ways reaching far beyond the limits of the other security, threat, but also because the methods used to address soft security issues, such as the prodigious use of intelligence agencies, may in themselves.

The soft security issues, could be confined within the area cored by three dominant security threats, which are not directly connected with the traditional military structures: terrorism, organized crime, and ethnic unrest or conflict. Ethnic unrest in traditionally poor society is more often fed by traditional criminality, and its modus operandi almost regularly includes some of the terrorist tactics designed to induce fear and mobilize the international community to become involved. This has been the case in almost all cases in the, so called, Yugoslavia succession wars.

The priorities of the EU security policy towards the Western Balkans (WB), including the application of European conditionality, the pace of the integration of the WB, and the European posture towards the resolution of the territorial disputes in the region, should, all be lined up with a sober and constructive

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

¹¹ Martin Elvins, *Europe's response to the transnational organized crime – Perspectives on global security*, London, UK: Routledge, 2003, p. 39.

estimate of the nature and volume of the security threat arising from the region. Globalization of contingency, which concept was introduced by David Campbell,¹² could be recognized as today asymmetrical threats regarding global security governance issues. Response on the global level, is attempt of establishing the global security governance (G8 group, United Nations, European Union, NATO). Characteristic of this attempts, was that that organizational form does not have linear approach. Other words, they do not use only one kind of “tools” (military, monetary, police, judiciary, etc.), then try to play with different roles (political, financial, economic, military, police, justice, etc), on the different levels (regionally, sub-regionally, bilateral, multilateral), and try to achieve goals against asymmetric threats. This approach necessarily means functional and flexible development of various “tools” (working groups, association, forums, committees), which make “products” such as economic pressure, sanctions, declarations, agreements, to the “hard” things as military mission. Regarding past and present situation and future perspective of the Western Balkans countries, question could be raised: What are the most dramatic asymmetric threats in the Western Balkans region? The fact is that we have got different methodology in approach of asymmetric threats analysis in the region. Main challenges are gathering through asymmetric approach, but we have potential collision in understanding, because some of the countries, after, for example, terrorism, calculate again asymmetric threats, as separate, different concept of term, and somewhere, even, do not recognize terrorism as potential risk, threats or crises generator. That could be path to potential misunderstanding of terms and possible different approach. This is not supporting tool for building of security governance — what Balkan countries intend to be in future. So, the conclusion would be that it is necessary to educate and find common approach to define asymmetric threats. If we look at the possible asymmetric threats from the joint standpoint, we might develop effective crises management approach, free of political influence.

Western Balkans and the Asymmetric Threats

Western Balkans region is consolidated in security sense, meaning that there is no immediate threat of another large-scale armed conflict. But, several facts have to be observed.

1. Only term Western Balkan has been created by international community in order to exclude South East Europe countries, which are already in security and EU integration forms (Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania).

¹² David Campbell, *Writing Security: The United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, University of Minnesota Press (revised edition), Minneapolis, 1992, p. 17.

2. The problem of Kosovo has not been solved yet, and dispute regarding that issue make strong pressure.
3. Countries of the region are in the different stages of the Euro-Atlantic integration.
4. Different status regarding security integration. In same region, different type of status regarding to the NATO could be recognized: member states (Albania, Croatia), Member Action Plan (MAP) states (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia), Partnership for Peace (PfP) countries (Serbia).

Taking into account the difference in the degree of integration and adoption of security standards in the state of the Balkan region, we observe a phenomenon that countries that are realized by process integration, have a different approach to identifying asymmetric threats.

However, there is need of a separate approach in countries that have completed the process of integrations into EU and NATO (Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria), and states that this process is not implemented and are at different levels of integration. On this basis, we have to take into consideration the correlation between the Balkans and asymmetric threats.

Regardless to different approaches, the fact is that Balkans suffering from various asymmetric threats such as:

- Inequality and poverty,
- Transnational organized crime,
- Limited energy resources, unstable energy supplies and vulnerability of infrastructure,
- WMD proliferation,
- Terrorism,
- Migrations,
- Financial crime and corruption,
- Economic crisis and inadequate economic development,
- Cyber crime,
- Environmental devastation,
- Disease outbreaks.

If we carefully analyse the threats jeopardising the Balkans countries the most, we can conclude that threats' generators are often outside of region's borders and require a broader action. Geostrategic position of the Balkans region makes it very vulnerable for all asymmetric threats, thus it can colloquially said that insecurity is imported in the region. Deepening of

interdependence of different world regions does not mean higher security and there are no guarantees that the increased level of economic, financial or energetic common interests can be a certain solution for distrust and rivalry existing in the international arena. From the security point of view, unlike the past, leading aspect of our age is that it is far more probable that events occurring in one part of the world will have consequences on other places.¹³

Due to the known negative effects of globalisation, we cannot observe Balkans separately from other regions in the world. More or less, we are all hit with the same threats. Global network, which allows collection, keeping and processing of various data, is a potential threat to countries' security. In addition to this, let us not forget vulnerability due to the insufficient energy supplies, as well as extreme devastation of the environment. As previously said, economical problems can have certain security implications: history teaches us that causes of many conflicts laid in the insufficient economic development and poverty.

Transnational organised crime is a real global threat, not only in the developed democracies, but also in transitional countries, such as those in our region, where organised crime already reached huge proportions. Special importance of this threat lays with the nature and diversity of links between organised crimes actors in all Balkans countries.

Organised crime in the region appears in following forms: corruption; money laundering; narcotics trade; illegal organised trade of goods already in legal trade, with tax and customs evasion, thus causing serious damage to the national tax systems; cooperation of criminal groups from the region for the execution of joint criminal acts, protection of perpetrators, and hiding of evidence; illegal immigration; usurers under control of criminal syndicates; trade in protected flora and fauna; human and human organs trafficking, etc.

In this part of the world, illegal immigrations are persistent and complex problem always related to other criminal groups' activities. It can be called "high risk" crime, not only in the region, but on the whole Europe. There are numerous reasons for illegal immigrations: disintegration of multi-cultural states often connected with ethnic and religious conflicts, political instability, armed conflicts and pore economic situation. Although there are a certain number of illegal immigrants from the region, the region is more commonly a

¹³ Considering the conclusions from NATO Strategic concept adopted by Heads of States and Governments in Lisbon, November 2010, security has wide range of possibly devastating impacts, from conventional threats, over terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass distraction, since cyber-criminal and health security issues, arises from all parts of globe, making the world closer in security area. Internet: (Whole text of "Strategic Concept For the Defence and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" is available on the Internet: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf>), 21/09/2011.

transit route for the third countries' immigrants. Biggest regional problem lies with still inadequate capacities for the control of illegal border crossings; transport terminals; illegal hotels; and connections between the states control authorities and criminal groups; etc.

Having in mind the connections of organized crime groups with possible terrorist activities, Balkan countries are possibly a long-term and stable logistics, recruitment and financial support for many forms of terrorism and extremism in Europe. In the previous period, certain extremists' and terrorists' activities aiming at strengthening of mutual relations and coordination of activities were registered, as well the activities aimed at establishing communication among these groups. Extremists' aim is to create a network of associates which would enable transfer of terrorists from Western Europe to Middle East (and *vice versa*).

Production and smuggling of narcotics is on of the basic activities of criminal groups from the region today. South-East Europe is primarily a transit route for illegal narcotics trade from Asia to Western Europe; however, certain capacities for production of mostly synthetic drugs were also found in the region. According to Europol data, Afghanistan is the main producer of heroin for the European market. Heroin produced in Afghanistan passes the so called "Balkans route" towards Western Europe.

The region holds significant stocks of conventional weapons, thus making lower armament level and verification through arms control conventions one of possible ways for solving this problem.

In social sense, asymmetric threats can cause humanitarian consequences for the population, caused by mass destruction due to natural disasters or technological accidents.

In the area of environmental protection, Balkans faces the same challenges as the whole planet: global warming, damage of the ozone layer, natural disasters, technical accidents, ecological degradation, and possible outbreak of contagious diseases. In addition, the region has its specific challenges, such as inadequate emergency management, industry based on outdated technologies without the necessary level of ecological protection or even hazard, water pollution and inadequate drinking water management, collection and storage of waist, soil degradation and coastal waters management.

At this moment, one could ask if all mentioned security threats are specific only to the Balkans (consequences of transition, political instability, insufficiently strong national economies, or insufficient security), or is it possible to say that all countries of the world, with similar characteristics, face the same problems, thus not making the Balkans a unique case.

Is it Possible to Create a Common Response to Asymmetric Threats?

The bulk of the Balkan states common problems and potential risks, threats and challenges, lead to the conclusion that the most effective and rational approach to a mutual response to the current asymmetric threats. The question is whether it is possible to achieve a common approach and in what form. In broad terms, a common approach depends on each nation and gives effective and long-term results. But, do all the Balkan countries share the same approach to understanding the threats, risks and challenges? Is there a need to reach a consensus on the list of asymmetric threats at the regional level, and would that help the region to provide an adequate response to the threats? Is there agreement on the sources and causes of risks and ways to prevent them? The answer can be found in some of the research works. In a survey released by the Centre for Civil-Military Relations in the Western Balkans,¹⁴ the summary indicators of understanding the challenges, threats and risks, point to differences in identifying the causes of asymmetric threats, as well as to different levels of risk categorization. This suggests that such a small area that shares all the features characterizing asymmetric threats should work towards developing common response concept to all forms of security threats, including asymmetric threats. Table 1 gives attitudes of the Western Balkans states towards the challenges, risks and threats to national safety. (Table 1.)

Right away, it is noticeable that there is different methodology in approach to analysis. Main challenges are gathered through asymmetric approach, but we have potential confusion in understanding the issue, because some of the countries do not recognise, for example, terrorism, as a threat, at all. Again asymmetric threats, as separate, different concept of term, and somewhere they do not even recognize terrorism as potential risk, threats or crises generator. That could be path to potential misunderstanding of terms and to possibly different approach. This is not supporting tool for building security governance, what WB seems to be in future. So, conclusion is that it is necessary to disseminate the common value system approach. If we look at possible asymmetric threats from the joint point of view, we will develop effective crises management approach, free of daily political influence.

Possible answer to the question of how to establish a unique relationship to asymmetric threats in the Western Balkans can be found in the integrations and regional cooperation. It may be observed in the aspirations of all the countries of the region towards the EU. It means that all the countries of the region are urged

¹⁴ Table was created according to data which were collected and systemized from collection of papers *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Belgrade, 2010).

Table 1.: Situation in Western Balkans state towards the understanding of challenges, risks and threats to national safety and level of impact.

No	Title	Category			Level					Nation
		Crises	risk	threat	global	regional	national	Sub national	individual	
1	WMD proliferation		+		+	+				Albania
2	Organized crime			+	+	+	+	+	+	
3	Terrorism		+		+					
4	Domestic transition		+				+	+		
5	Technological accident			+			+	+	+	
6	Natural disaster		+		+	+	+	+	+	
7	Epidemic and infections		+		+	+	+	+	+	
8	Information, communication cyber crime		+				+	+	+	
1	WMD proliferation	+			+					BaH
2	Organized crime	+			+					
3	Terrorism	+			+					
4	Domestic transition	+				+	+			
5	Technological accident									
6	Natural disaster	+		+	+		+			
7	Land mines	+		+			+			
8	Corruption	+		+			+			
1	WMD proliferation	+			+	+				Croatia
2	Organized crime	+				+	+			
3	Terrorism			+	+					
4	Domestic transition		+				+			
5	Technological accident		+			+	+	+	+	
6	Natural disaster		+			+	+	+	+	
7	Epidemic and infections		+		+	+	+	+	+	
8	Information, communication cyber crime		+				+	+	+	
1	WMD proliferation			+		+	+			Macedonia
2	Organized crime			+			+			
3	Terrorism			+		+	+			
4	Domestic transition	+				+	+	+	+	
5	Technological accident									
6	Natural disaster			+			+	+		
7	Epidemic and infections		+				+	+	+	
8	Information, communication cyber crime			+			+	+	+	

No	Title	Category			Level					Nation
		Crises	risk	threat	global	regional	national	Sub national	individual	
1	WMD proliferation		+	+	+	+				Montenegro
2	Organized crime		+	+	+					
3	Terrorism		+	+	+					
4	Domestic transition									
5	Technological accident		+	+			+			
6	Natural disaster			+	+		+			
7	Epidemic and infections									
8	Information, communication cyber crime			+			+			
1	WMD proliferation			+	+	+	+			Serbia
2	Organized crime			+		+	+			
3	Terrorism		+	+	+	+	+			
4	Inappropriate economic/demographic development		+			+	+			
5	Corruption	+	+	+		+	+			
6	Natural disaster/global warming		+		+	+	+			
7	Epidemic and infections		+		+	+	+			
8	Information, communication cyber crime		+		+	+	+			
1	WMD proliferation									UNMIK
2	Organized crime	+		+	+	+	+			
3	Terrorism									
4	Domestic transition-corruption	+					+			
5	Economic instability	+	+		+	+	+			
6	Natural disaster	+	+		+	+	+			
7	Weak rule of law	+					+			
8	Information, communication cyber crime									

to meet all the requirements for the EU accession, including the standards regarding security issues. However, in order to effectively develop security culture of the society and reach full awareness of the existing asymmetric threats, the nations in the Balkans would have to invest significant efforts in disseminating the facts and communicating them to all segments of their societies. It may, certainly, be concluded that the framework provided by the EU in the form of Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the partnership with NATO, combined with steady economic growth and the development of democratic institutions and capacity building within the countries of the Region may result in the Western Balkans becoming the region of peace and stability in future. Nevertheless, the Western Balkan countries should work together towards raising awareness of the asymmetric threats, which are common for the whole region as is their security environment. The prerequisite for transformation and improvement of the relations between all the countries of the Region is a consensus on the fact that their future wellbeing lays in common approach to common issues, and the issue of the regional security is definitely one of them. In order to achieve common grounds, the countries of the region would have to take systemic approach to raising awareness of their public regarding security issues.

Conclusion

Character and intensity of assessed challenges, risks and threats for security in our immediate environment point out that it is necessary to develop a concept of integrated security on political, economic, IT, technological, security and military level. Traditional approach that one country's security is exclusively its internal issue do not match the reality of today, particularly after the end of the armed conflicts that took place in the region during the nineties. We can say that regional security is undividable, and that instability in one of the countries of the region successively causes instability in the whole region, and even beyond.

Importance of regional security cooperation is stressed more and more, most of all through dialog and confidence building between the countries of the region. Having in mind previously mentioned challenges, risks and threats for the region, a joint action is necessary in order to prevent and stop organised crime and terrorism.

All regional countries individually, but working with each other, should develop new security culture. Such security culture should minimize influence of the negative experiences from the past, prejudices, and stereotypes, thus making the regional security one of key factors in overall regional development.

Having in mind all that has been mentioned, it can be concluded that interdependence and complexity of security challenges surpass the ability of individual countries of the region to manage them effectively. Therefore, the need for the acceptance of so called "regional approach", which minimizes or removes threats through cooperation and joint action, becomes even more necessary.

By continuing these trends, the Balkans will join the community of developed democratic states, whose relations are dominated by trust, good neighbourhood policy and cooperation. However, other/worse scenarios are also possible, for

which there are still realistic presumptions. Final look of global, European and regional security environment mostly depends on capabilities to positively direct political and security processes in this area. It seems that in spite of all efforts made so far, the Balkan countries have to do much more in the field of protection from asymmetric threats than they do today.

At this very moment, the Balkan countries need:

1. Securing a full spectre of responses to current and future security threats;
2. Democratic development and internal stability and security of all the countries in the region;
3. Contribution in the creation of stabile and safe environment;
4. Development of partnership and cooperation with all countries in the region;
5. Regional countries further accession to the EU;
6. Creation of a consultative body on the Balkans level, that would enable exchange of information, approximation of attitudes on security issues, help avoiding unpleasant surprises and help in finding clear way of successful action.

In this particular moment the Balkans must focus on five “D”¹⁵:

- Development,
- Democracy,
- Disarmament,
- Diplomacy,
- Defence.

Fulfilling our five D is possible by means of the following four tools, which every particular country should take into consideration. Development of contemporary:

- Strategic Communications Strategies;

¹⁵ Five D are applicable in all post conflict societies such as the ones in the Balkan countries. Given that the primary and most immediate experience of insecurity in troubled societies worldwide is through unmet basic needs, political exclusion, denied rights, social and political disintegration, and the criminal and political violence that invariably accompany these conditions of insecurity, the primary means of achieving security must be through the creation of favorable social, political, and economic conditions – that is, through economic development, respect for basic rights, political inclusion, control over the instruments of violence, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. Hence, Canadian support to international peace and security should be taken to include spending on the five Ds of security – development, democracy, disarmament, diplomacy and defence. More could be found in: *Reshaping the Security Envelope: Defence Policy in a Human Security Context* by Ernie Regehr and Peter Whelan, Ploughshares working paper 04–4.

- Security and Defence Strategies;
- Economic Strategies;
- Diplomatic Strategies.

Besides these four tools, our national approaches to dealing with asymmetric threats should include strategies for health, education, emergency response, resource sharing, and nation-building to counter and correct the trend of failing states. The cultures, religions, and ideals in the nations might differ, but the end goal is the same – stable nation-states with the political, economic, social, and security institutions able to provide their people with security, food, clean water, education, prosperity, and hope for the future.

These policies and strategies implemented at the national level must be integrated and synchronized, considering the application of all elements of national resources and power, including:

- Military capabilities;
- Economic capabilities;
- Diplomatic and political capabilities;
- Information and communications capabilities;
- Intelligence Community capabilities;
- Law enforcement capabilities;
- Legal frameworks;
- Scientific development;
- Educational and cultural resources; and
- All other branches of governments.¹⁶

As a general, conclusion it could be said that new security will depend on the ability of the state to protect both itself and its society against aspirants to take on the role of the state who come from ranks of organized and globalized contingency that may take the form of crime, terrorism, and merely violent dissatisfaction. In wider context, that means that state has to be part of security governance, sharing the same values and development synergy approach regarding all security aspect, especially asymmetric. Only in wider perspective, each country can recognize globalization of security issues contingency and proactively contribute against that kind of threats.

¹⁶ Conclusions pointed out that proposed security against asymmetric threats could be recognized in future approach of security issues in Balkans. Comprehensive overview of global asymmetric threats could be found in: *Dealing With Today's Asymmetric Threat to U.S. and Global Security*, An Executive Summary of the May 8th 2008 Symposium, 2008 CACI International Inc, available on Internet: http://asymmetricthreat.net/docs/asymmetric_threat_1_paper.pdf, 21/09/2011.

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*Milovan Radaković*¹

Countries of Western Balkans and the European Union

ABSTRACT

Brussels very carefully carries out the idea of accession of the Western Balkans to the EU. The reasons for this approach are two-fold. The first lies in the fact that the Western Balkans was involved in war conflicts in the last decade of the twentieth century, the largest since the Second World War. The second fact is that the U.S. and Russia are largely politically present in the Balkans. Conflicts in the Balkans were solved by NATO arbitration, and Russian presence in the Balkans is strongly felt, especially via large energy ventures. All this has undeniable effect on the efforts of the countries of Western Balkan to convince the European partners of their European orientation.

Keywords: EU, Western Balkans, Membership, Strategy, USA, Russia.

Introduction

The difficulties that followed rejection of EU Constitution by France and the Netherlands and the Lisbon Treaty by Ireland² have brought the EU expansion into question. By some estimates, a future expansion is not even possible until the Reform Treaty is ratified.³ On the other hand, global economic crisis further affected the limited capacities of the EU budget, so all that can have repercussions on the admission of new members. So the first decade of the 21st century

¹ Milovan Radaković, Ph.D., Research Associate, Institute of international Politics and Economics, Belgrade. E-mail: mradakovic@diplomacy.bg.ac.rs.

² France rejected EU Constitution in May 2005 with 55% votes against. Just days afterwards, the Netherlands rejected the constitution with 63% votes against. In Ireland, on June 12, 2008, 53.4% of citizens voted against the Lisbon Treaty.

³ See: Prof. Dr. Aleksandra Čavoški, *Enlargement of the European Union in light of the Lisbon Treaty, European Union enlargement to the Western Balkans*, Institute of international Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2009, p. 11.

crystallized the two problems within the EU. The first is the failure of the EU Constitution and its redefinition through the Lisbon Treaty, which has also been rejected on a referendum in Ireland. The second is the failure of Western Balkans to join the Union. What can slow down the admission of new members into the Union and affect the relations between Brussels and countries in the Western Balkans are two parallel processes. One process is the consolidation of conditions within the EU⁴, given the importance of the Netherlands and Denmark, and France in particular, as one of the founding states. The other is stabilization of the situation in the Western Balkans, given the fact that the countries of the region emerged from one state, in which a specific form of socialism existed, which is now replaced in all these states by the classical market system, that is region which is undergoing a process of transition.⁵

The specificity of Western Balkans

The term Western Balkans refers to Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia and Albania. This area is specific in relation to other parts of Europe. First of all it is a territory that for many years formed one country — Yugoslavia.⁶ The country had many elements which EU has or seeks to have. The country had a common market and also specific but common cultural space.⁷ Also, the country had a common military security framework, common foreign policy, common internal policies, which was determined in high bodies of the federation, a unique legal system etc. The framework of social relations was very complex. Its structure consisted of people who used three languages, official language being Serbo-Croatian, with multiple dialects, three religions, etc. The largest Republic of the state, Serbia, had the most complicated political system. Within its republican borders, two autonomous provinces (regions) were formed, Vojvodina and Kosovo and Metohija. Therefore, many elements resemble the structure and some of the goals of the EU. As Yugoslavia disintegrated, considering the fact that all former republics aspire to enter the EU, we can speak about a specific redefinition of the area, this time under the patronage of the EU.

⁴ This consolidation involves consideration of future developments within the member states, but also in third countries. It is becoming increasingly obvious that certain models are outdated and that the Union must have its own approach to modernization and search for new solutions.

⁵ These countries have to work, in addition to reform of the economic system, on building relationships within the larger processes related to human rights, respect for national minorities and the construction of neighborly relations.

⁶ Apart from Albania.

⁷ The space, which among other things, included the common education system.

The process of Western Balkans joining the EU is complex for several reasons. Wars in which Yugoslavia desintegrated significantly slowed down entry and integration of Western Balkans into the EU. In fact, all states that emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia had to start process of accession to this organization anew. Of all former Yugoslav republics, only Slovenia has so far managed to become an EU member in the first round of EU enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe.⁸ Other countries in this region are still a long way from the EU. At one time a dilemma was present, whether policies of accession should be created by the countries in the region individually or should be coordinated. Policy coordination, would obviously include simultaneous presence which could have lead to stronger economic cooperation and reactivation of common market. This again raises suspicion and resistance in some circles from all these countries towards a “new Yugoslavia“ for which, clearly at this point, no one is ready.

The views of EU

EU very carefully implements its policy towards Western Balkans. Reasons for this approach to the countries of this region by the Brussels are twofold. The first is definitely the fact that Western Balkans in the last decade of the twentieth century was affected by the conflict largest after the Second World War. These conflicts are resolved mainly through U.S. policy and actions of NATO forces. That is why in the Western Balkan region U.S. interests are present. Besides Washington, the Balkans are increasingly feeling the presence of Russia, whose symbolic return to this region is crowned by energy agreements and strong

⁸ The turning point in EU policy towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is set in Copenhagen in year 1993, when for the first time an EU institution received official support for the admission of new countries in this organization. Such support, however, was conditional on fulfilling appropriate criteria by all countries that have declared candidacy to join the Union. The criteria for accession (Copenhagen criteria were based on the constitutive Treaties and the EU concerning the legal, economic and political preconditions that a country must fulfill to become a potential candidate to join the Union. These criteria are as follows: 1) stability of democracy and institutional stability (existence of the rule of law, multiparty democracy, pluralism, human and minority rights, etc.), 2) functional competitive market economy, 3) the ability and capacity to undertake the rights and obligations of the Community acquis, 4) compliance with EU policy objectives, as well as economic and monetary union. In order to join the EU, the twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe joined the so-called Europe Agreements. The negotiations were conducted with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Malta and Slovakia. Negotiations were conducted within the 31 areas that represent the community acquis. Membership of the Western Balkans is identical to the reception of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but is conditioned by specific political events in the Balkan region.

energy infrastructure. For these and many other reasons, governments in this area must make extra efforts to convince the European partners that they are willing to respect human rights, building democratic institutions, market economy, cooperation and that they are committed to building a strong European policy where there is no place for Balkan disputes.

Stabilization and association process for Western Balkan countries in many respects is identical with the agreement that was in force for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, it has some differences that are primarily concerned with the rights and obligations of states to the EU. Specifically, the Western Balkans are taking on the obligation to cooperate at the regional level, considering the conflicts that lasted over the last decade of the twentieth century. This collaboration is to provide stability in the region.⁹ EU on the other side is willing to provide financial assistance to such regional processes and to open its market. So Brussels is ready for new types of associations, but with monitoring of the stabilization of the region. The process of accession of the Western Balkans to the EU has a double character. On the one hand, the countries of the region are forced to consistently respect the Dayton peace agreement and fulfill its international obligations towards the Hague Tribunal. Both obligations are fulfilled by the countries of the region, but with difficulties and often with indignation of public opinion. On the other hand, the EU provides financial assistance to the region (CARDS program, etc). The Union insists on regional cooperation, but at the same time the process of stabilization and association has a clear attitude towards each of the countries that want to join the organization, in relation to the implementation of reforms and fulfilling the criteria related to the EU.¹⁰

Political elites in the Western Balkan countries insist that joining the European Union is their primary goal. This goal should still, when the time comes, be checked in referenda in each of these countries. In this way, political elites would demonstrate the democratic nature of the system they are heading and respect for the citizens in whose name they rule. Throughout the region

⁹ This implies that a state can not make progress in EU accession faster than the good-neighborly cooperation in the region and regional integration.

¹⁰ The Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, confirmed the view that the process of stabilization and accession leads to the EU. This process was in the first half of 2003 supplemented by the so-called European Partnership. This meant that no matter at what stage the individual countries are in the Stabilisation and Association Process, it will have signed an agreement on the European partnership. European partnership involves concrete commitments of the Western Balkans and the European Union. Unlike the previous phase when only the reforms needed for regions to get closer to the European Union were stipulated, now short and medium term measures to be implemented are enumerated. European Partnership, designed for each Western Balkan country separately, according to their needs, should accelerate further the development of legal, institutional and administrative capacity — the basis for the adoption of European codes and standards.

there is still a lot of work related to the functioning of democratic institutions, separation of powers at all levels, full respect for human and minority rights.

EU high representatives expressed most clearly their attitude towards the accession of Western Balkans at their meeting in Sarajevo on June 2nd, 2010.¹¹ The meeting also confirmed the EU support to Western Balkan countries with their reforms. It was noted that Western Balkan countries joining this European organization is one of the last challenges in building a democratic and united Europe.

Security aspect

The Western Balkans and also the wider area of Balkan peninsula are still a zone of potential conflict. This is true of the countries outside the EU as well as for those already in the EU. There is still a problem between Hungary and Romania in Transylvania, between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, between FYR Macedonia and Greece, occasional tensions in Bosnia and the Balkans biggest problem, the problem of Kosovo and Metohija, in which it should not be allowed *that one side win everything and the other side to lose everything*. In addition to the Western Balkan countries undergoing transition, they are burdened by economic and other crime, are on the pathway of narcotics trade and so on.

In the Western Balkans, the consequences of war are still present. To a greater or lesser extent, foreign military bases are also present. In Bosnia, NATO forces have played an active role. After signing of Dayton Accords in 1995, it was decided that NATO be stationed in the newly formed state. In BiH, bases have been formed in the Posavina region and the wider Tuzla area. The largest military base was set up at the "Dubrava" airport in Tuzla. Two helicopter squadrons equipped with "Apache" helicopters were placed there, until close-down in mid 2006. In Bosnia today at least two bases exist, "Mekgraven" and a military base "Butmir". Currently the largest military base in the Balkans is in Kosovo and Metohija. At 35 km south of Pristina, at Uroševac, is "Bondsteel" military base, with the area of 75 hectares. NATO troupes moved from Western Europe to the Balkans are largely stationed here. In addition to this, there are bases "Montif" near Gnjilane, with the capacity of 2,000 troops and base at Vitina, with capacity of 3,000 soldiers. For the needs of NATO, Germans have

¹¹ In addition to delegations from the EU, meeting in Sarajevo was attended by delegations from the region, representatives of international organizations, the Council of Europe, NATO, USA, Russia and Turkey. 29 Foreign Ministers of EU and Western Balkans arrived in Sarajevo, four deputy ministers and seven general secretaries of the EU institutions.

built in Kačanik a large artillery center, intended to cover the area of Prizren. In the Italian sector, in the region of Peć and Đakovica, a base is built in which an intelligence-security center is located. In the village Balovac near Podujevo, the British have built a base for 1,000 troops, and on the mountain Kopaonik, on the Kosovo side, there is a helicopter base. In Macedonia, the foreign military presence is active since the end of year 1992. A NATO base was formed at the airport „Petrovac“ near Skopje in 1994. With the arrival of troops from KFOR, the capacity of the base was increased. A new heliport was built and the base was equipped for air defense, radars and observation system and “Hawk“ anti-aircraft missile systems. NATO capacities in Macedonia also include military training range “Krivolak“, where training of NATO and Partnership for Peace units is performed occasionally. A satellite base and logistics center of KFOR were formed in Kumanovo, but have been moved after the outbreak of the conflict with the Albanians in the spring of 2001.

When it comes to Greece, today there is only one U.S. military base on the island of Crete in the Aegean Sea. The “Suda Bay“ base is the last of four former U.S. Army Base Operations, which remained operational after closing the remaining three in the early nineties of 20th century. The “Suda Bay“ base was built in year 1953. to support U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean. In this database houses 200 troops. A runway for takeoff of reconnaissance planes was made. NATO maintains in its composition the air base “Larisa“, which was modernized in 2002. with the construction and modernization of underground caponiers and runway. NATO has moved part of its command for this part of Europe there. Recent members of the EU, Romania and Bulgaria also have NATO forces on their territories, which have replaced Russian military capabilities in these countries. With the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into NATO, our eastern neighbors offered to NATO forces Black Sea ports of Constanca and Varna, as bases for NATO fleet. Bulgarians have also permitted the use of their air-base Graf Ignatieff near Plovdiv, to which a significant military capacity of the U.S. Army in Germany is to be transferred. Bulgaria is ready to give NATO forces three other possible bases: Yambol, Sliven and Veliko Trnovo. The Pentagon plans to invest a certain resources into the modernization of the bases, so that they become operational by the end of year 2012. 1600 soldiers are to be placed in Romania, 2500 in Bulgaria.

It is obvious that the concentration of NATO bases in the Balkans is considerable. A significant part of the alliance forces in Germany have been moved into the region. On the other hand, Russia is very present in this region, economically and in particular through energy. So one might wonder what is the security future of the Western Balkans? Russian position is quite clear. Whoever has missiles installed on their territory, aimed at Russian territory, can expect the same. This raises several questions. One would certainly be whether in the

foreseeable future NATO forces in Europe could be replaced by some joint military forces of Europe? Would they be more acceptable to Russia? The EU set a condition, to all the Western Balkan countries in the region, to have a stronger regional cooperation. This of course means stronger activity of some initiatives such as the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SPSEE), or the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC).¹²

European military forces

To understand the philosophy of the military security of Europe, one must first examine the complex relationship between NATO and the EU. Namely, the relations within NATO were always determined by decisive events on the line of relations of US on one side and Western Europe, on the other. Joint actions of Western Europe, the US and Canada, and common goals expressed when designing foreign policy actions at the international level, especially in relation to the former Soviet Union, were never sufficient to conceal or eliminate differences in interpretation of international events. These differences were not always equally pronounced, but the relations within NATO were thus determined. Unlike the US, as a global power with global aspirations and global role in world affairs, and in proportion to the global role, to international relations, the EU was in a different way interested in the regulation of European affairs. EU interest is much more specific to regional criteria and aspirations — to find solutions to problems that concern the European continent as a whole, in the immediate European environment. In this context, the role of NATO military forces and potential EU military may be considered.

It should be noted that the military forces of NATO member states are either “assigned forces“, i.e. those that are under the operational leadership of regional commands, and “earmarked forces“, which will be placed under the leadership of these commands in the event of war. However, although subject to the operational management of regional commands, troops remain basically national military units subordinated to local authorities, and their use can be decided only by the Council of the Organization by unanimous decision.

Political reform in the East of Europe could result in EU military forces smaller in number, but strategically more mobile and militarily more lethal. The objectives of European military forces would also be significantly different

¹² See: Prof. Dr. Zlatko Isaković, “Past, Present and Future of the European Union, the Western and other parts of Balkans. (future relationship of Europe and the Balkans)”, *Proceedings, EU enlargement to the Western Balkans*, Duško Dimitrijević and Ivona Lađevac, editors, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2009. p. 76. and p. 82.

from the objectives of NATO, which is primarily aimed at the protection of military, primarily economic, political and ideological interests of the Western world. European military forces would, due to circumstances and the political developments in the east of the continent, be primarily aimed at preventing conflicts within individual European countries with their consent, and prevention of possible conflicts between European countries. The second goal, certainly not less important, would be the protection of European states and points of strategic importance for Europe, which are outside the European continent. Taking into account these objectives, the issue of creating so-called EU military rapid reaction force, has been discussed in the EU twenty years ago. It is, above all, related to air-assault and airborne units composed of brigades and divisions, special purpose units and naval landing units included in their composition.¹³

The formation of such units, consisting only of soldiers from European countries, would necessarily impose the issue of NATO transformation, as well as the expediency of stationing US troops in the European military bases. So, the strengthening of European global processes, could in the near or distant future, raise questions about the appropriateness of the U.S. military presence on the European continent as a military and political superpower.

Immediately after the Second World War, such forces were envisioned and called the Western European Union forces. The creation of the Western European Union was preceded by the formation of "European Union" by so-called Treaty of Brussels of March 17th, 1948. The agreement was signed by Britain, France and the three Benelux countries. The organization was thus created with multiple goals.

The first group of the proclaimed goals consisted of those which were associated with the liberal concept of society, the fight for human rights, constitutional tradition, respect for the law and everything that belongs to the common heritage of the countries which signed it.

The second group of goals of the organization included: commitment to peace and international security, and efforts to ban war as a means of resolving international disputes.

The third, very important goal, was the collective opposition to aggression, with an eye toward potential German revenge above all.

¹³ Unlike the EU, whose military forces for rapid intervention are in the „formation“, NATO has such a unit for Europe. It is a part of land forces, which are intended for emergency response. The units are equipped, and manned, have high mobility and preparedness. The units are transported by air and use coalition air bases. Ground forces normally consist of seven specialized battalions, and seven air squadrons of fighters bombers, reconnaissance planes and more than five squadrons of transport aviation.

The fourth complex of the objectives of the European Union, was to solve the current economic issues.

By creating the Atlantic Alliance in year 1949., the military aspect of the European Union virtually ceased to exist because NATO took it over. But agreement on the European Union remained legally in force until 1954., when it was revised by the agreement on the creation of the Western European Union, thus preserving legal continuity. The establishment of the WEU was preceded by the National Assembly of France refusal to ratify the Treaty on European defense community, on August 30th, 1954. This attitude imposed the need to seek a new formula that would provide arming of Germany, which is at an extremely sensitive strategic location, and also a formula for arming of Germany which would not jeopardize the political and military sovereignty of France. The then President of the French government Mendes-France, on 20 September 1954. put forward a proposal before the European Council on the possible enlargement of the European Union and the formation of the Western European Union. A few days earlier, a group of nine senior officials who worked to draft a new contract, met in London. A total of eleven agreements have been made, including an agreement that will allow Italy and Germany to join newly established Western European Union as full members, subject to restriction on Federal Republic of Germany to produce certain types of weapons, and the obligation not to force the reunification of Germany. These contracts, called Paris agreement, were signed on October 24th, 1954. in Paris.

he importance of the Paris Agreement, among other things, is that they allow the establishment of the sovereignty of Germany. Also, through the application of these agreements, the Commission of arms control was formed and its competencies extended to the Brussels Agreement.

The most significant provision, however, is a change in EU objective. While the Brussels agreement stated as a commitment of the signatory countries to “take necessary measures in case of renewal of aggressive policy of Germany”, new Paris contracts state that signatory countries are “persuaded that access of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to the EU represents a new and significant contribution to the unification and further integration of Europe”.

Relationship of the WEU and the European Union

Adoption of the Platform of European interests in security, on October 27th, 1987., is a significant phase of the revitalization of the organization and significant confirmation of the specific context of European defense in the Western alliance. The platform is based on the fact that the countries of the WEU are members of the European Union, which is engaged in the unique European act to build the European Union. The belief is expressed, however,

that the construction of an integrated Europe would be incomplete if it does not include security and defense. In this connection it is stressed that the Treaty of Brussels is the first stage of European unity, because it provides for other European countries progressively joining. Therefore, the ratification of the WEU is considered an important contribution to the wider process of European unification. As a target, the development of European identity in defense is indicated, that would be more coherent and efficient, which would reflect the solidarity provided by the modified Brussels Treaty and North-Atlantic Treaty. Relating thereto, the emphasis is on continuous engagement of the WEU Assembly, which is the only European parliamentary body that is authorized by the agreement to engage in all aspects of security and defense.

Declaration of Rome stipulates that members of the WEU, among other things, orient their actions and develop its policy. In doing so, the WEU Council shall pay attention not to interfere in matters which are treated within the Union, because in these cases it operates as a communitarian political cooperation within the authority provided by the Single European Act. However, the aspect of security within the EU is not sufficiently homogeneous, so duplication of administration is avoided by coordination of institutions.¹⁴

Balkan Energy Corridors

Strategic geopolitical engagement of Russia and European countries is unimaginable without the Balkans and countries in the area. Specifically, mutual strategic engagement between Russia and European states in the first half of the 21st century began by contracts for pipeline construction project “Blue Stream”, “Nord Stream” and “South Stream”, and routes to Turkey, Germany and Italy.

“Blue Stream“ is a joint project of Russian Gazprom and Italian company ENI, which involves the construction of gas pipeline from Russia to the shores of Turkey, along the bottom of Black Sea. The pipeline is 1200 km in length. It should have been used in full profile by year 2010. This project actually represented the foundation of the future strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, which would include military cooperation. Turkey has long requested admission to the EU, but Brussels support is missing. As a result, in year 2010., some Turkish officials, disappointed by the messages from Brussels, noted that Ankara could turn to a strategic partnership in Asia, primarily with Iran and Russia.

“Nord Stream“ is a joint venture company of Gazprom, BASF and E:ON, designed to carry natural gas along the bottom of the Baltic Sea from Viborg in

¹⁴ For example, in meetings related to the political cooperation of the EU countries, General Secretaries of the WEU are usually involved.

Russia to Graifsvald in Germany and by overland pipeline routes to consumers in Western and Central Europe. The pipeline is being built in Russian, Finnish, Swedish, Danish and German waters. The pipeline bypasses the former Soviet republics, former real-socialist countries.

“South Stream“ pipeline to be realized by cooperation of Gazprom and the Italian ENI is also an important energy route. This pipeline will be implemented under the agreement of year 2007. It is designed to go over Bulgaria in two directions. One direction would transport gas via Greece and the Ionian Sea to southern Italy and the other through Serbia and Hungary to Northern Italy, with a separate arm to Germany. Each of the agreements related to the pipeline indicates that the signatory countries have autonomous status (at least in terms of this Agreement) in relation to international organizations to which they belong.

Conclusion

Western Balkan countries tread a difficult path to full EU membership. The first reason for such difficulties are the wars that raged in these countries during the nineties. Later came the transition period which is still not over. These countries with different economic strength were once in a common state of Yugoslavia, which was economically dominated by Slovenia, so it is no wonder that this country has already entered the EU.

Beside Slovenia, two more countries from the Balkans have entered the EU, Romania and Bulgaria. So now a total of three Balkan nations are in the EU: Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. The membership of these countries brought the Balkans significantly closer to the EU and broke through a “psychological barrier“ between Brussels and the Balkan region countries. Connecting of other Balkan states will be less dependent on EU “capacity overload“, and more on the states in the Balkans. Their efforts to overcome corruption, respect human and minority rights, build good neighborly relations, establish the overall rule of law, improve the status of their own institutions, adapt to the legal and economic systems of the EU and prepare their societies to enter new phase of European processes.

More broadly, Turkey also gravitates towards the Balkans and desires reception to the EU. Brussels still does not open the possibility of accession to Ankara. Despite this, Turkey poses for many in the EU very interesting question and a challenge of the enlargement process, despite the resistance of some European Union countries.¹⁵ Attitudes of European public in member states on

¹⁵ See: Ms. Ana Jović-Lazić, Dragan Đukanović, “Cooperation with new EU eastern neighbors”, p. 143, (The process of enlargement and the new borders of the EU, p. 144). Proceedings, EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, Duško Dimitrijević and Ivona Lađevac, editors, IMPP, Belgrade, 2009.

enlargement of this organization are different. Most interested in the Western Balkans joining the EU are the Greeks, among other things because of their isolation in relation to other Member States.¹⁶ The Austrians have the most negative attitude, despite strong economic ties with the Western Balkans. One reason for this attitude of Austrians are the major allocations of Austria to the EU budget. However, the prevailing view is that the entry of new countries into the EU, mostly depends on the state itself or on its internal situation.

On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine the Balkans without a strategic presence and influence of Russia. Energy corridors of this country mainly go through the Balkans, and connection of these corridors to the EU countries it is difficult to imagine without the participation of countries in this area. Thus, the image of the Balkans in the future can be a combination of factors. Economic impact of the EU will be the largest, the military factor will have a preponderance of NATO and the United States, and the energy factor, in which clearly Russia and its energy sector have a great geostrategic and geopolitical importance.

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¹⁶ During January 2010, the Greek Prime Minister and Foreign Minister George Papandreou told a session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, that Greece supports the so-called "Agenda 1914" on reception of the Western Balkan countries on the anniversary of the beginning of World War I. During his speech he pointed out the problems facing the modern Balkans. First of all, the Kosovo issue and the issue of divided Cyprus. Regarding the name dispute with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Papandreou expressed the following attitude: he believes that the time had come to the issue a decision which is acceptable for both Greece and the Macedonian side. If the issue is resolved satisfactorily, Athens will support efforts of Skoplje to join the EU.

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*Bojan Dobovšek*¹

Informal Institutions and Rule of Law a Comparison of Central Europe and Latin America

APSTRACT

Paper presents research project which analyses the impact of informal institutions on the rule of law in Central Europe and Latin America. That's why main ideas of researchers Hans-Joachim Lauth, Wolfgang Muno, Peter Thiery, Petra Guasti, Andraž Teršek and Bojan Dobovšek are presented in the paper. Project investigates the relationship between informal institutions and rule of law in new democracies of the "third wave" and it the analysis builds on a broad concept of institutions. It focus how far factual behavior such as corruption and clientelism, defined as informal institutions, are compatible with those norm expectations related to the formal institution of a state under rule of law, or in how far they are opposed to it. The main question is, which governance options exist to reduce the power of opposed informal institutions and to foster stability and quality of rule of law and hence of democracy. The empirical part of the study compares, initially on regional level, three countries of Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe respectively according to the emergence, development and impact of their informal institutional structures. The compared cases have high (Chile, Slovenia), middle (Mexico, Poland), and low quality of rule of law (Argentina, Romania).

Key words: Rule of Law, Informal Institutions, Corruption, Central Europe, Latin America.

1. Introduction

Paper imply main ideas of research project of professors on Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security and University of Würzburg, Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung.² Project investigates the relationship

¹ Bojan Dobovšek, PhD, Associate Professor, Vice Dean, Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security. Email: bojan.dobovsek@fvv.uni-mb.si.

² More on professors and project: http://www.politikwissenschaft.uni-wuerzburg.de/lehre/bereiche/vergleichende/forschung/rechtsstaat_und_informelle_institutionen_dfg/mitarbeiter4/.

between informal institutions and rule of law in new democracies of the “third wave” and it. The analysis builds on a broad concept of institutions. It combines a neo-institutionalist perspective with the notion of institutions of older traditions in Political Science, in order to examine in how far factual behaviour such as corruption and clientelism — here defined as informal institutions — are compatible with those norm expectations related to the formal institution of a state under rule of law, or in how far they are opposed to it. The main question is, which governance options exist to reduce the power of opposed informal institutions and to foster stability and quality of rule of law and hence of democracy.

The empirical part of the study compares, initially on regional level, three countries of Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe respectively according to the emergence, development and impact of their informal institutional structures. The compared cases have high (Chile, Slovenia), middle (Mexico, Poland), and low quality of rule of law (Argentina, Romania). A following supra-regional comparison aims to explain why informal institutions play an important role for rule of law in some countries and to a lesser extent in others. The evolving central question is, in how far the extent of interfering informal institutions can be influenced by political action (constitutional reforms). The aim is to identify those factors necessary for effective constitutional reforms.

2. On the relationship between the Rule of Law and Informal Institutions in New Democracies³

This part of paperper investigates the relationship between informal institutions and rule of law in new democracies of the “third wave”. The analysis builds on a broad concept of institutions. It combines a neoinstitutionalist perspective with the notion of institutions of older traditions in Political Science. The aim of the research is to examine how far is factual behaviour such as corruption and clientelism — defined as informal institutions — compatible with or opposed to the norm expectations, which types of behavior are related to the formal institution of a state under rule of law. The main question is which governance options are suitable to reduce the power of bad informal institutions and to foster stability and quality of rule of law and therewith of democracy. The paper presents the hypotheses of a project comparing six countries of Latin America and Central-Eastern Europe according to the emergence, development and impact of informal institutional structures. The central question is, in how far is it possible to influence the extent of interfering informal institutions by political action and which factors

³ Prof. Hans-Joachim Lauth, Ph. D.

are necessary for effective constitutional reforms. The hypotheses are based on different schools of New Institutionalism, transformation theory and compliance research.

The relation between informal institutions and rule of law in young democracies of the “third wave” is an area of research that is not yet fully explored. The main reason being, it is not easy to examine, due to the abstract nature of the concepts employed as well as due to the characteristics of informal institutions and their functioning mechanisms. Nonetheless it is of high relevance for scientific understanding of the functioning of young democracies as well as for practical oriented policy recommendations. The presented research approach combines a neo-institutional perspective with insights from transformation and compliance research. Based on this recognition, hypotheses on the question, in how far the state (or the society) can regulate informal institutions which undermine the rule of law, were developed. In how far they can be confirmed has to be shown in the case studies we will conduct in Central Eastern Europe and Latin America.

With this approach it should be able to answer the following research questions:

1. How do bad informal institutions affect the Rechtsstaat?
2. What factors are responsible for the dynamics and stability of BINIs?
3. How can we influence these processes? Can we steer it? (Governance of the BINIs)

3. Conceptualizing and Measuring Informal Institutions⁴

In 1996, the *Journal of Democracy* published a controversy between Guillermo O’Donnell and Gunther/Diamandouros/Puhle about the relevance of informal institutions. O’Donnell stressed the importance of informal social norms in many countries, a topic which was so far widely underestimated in research about democratization. As a consequence, several studies analyzed informal institutions, defined as “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels”. These studies picked up the suggestion already formulated 20 years ago by Douglass North, one of the founding fathers of new institutional analysis: “Informal constraints matter. We need to know much more about culturally derived norms of behavior and how they interact with formal rules to get better answers to such issues. We are just beginning the serious study of institutions”. Despite this debate, our knowledge of informal institutions is still

⁴ Wolfgang Muno, Ph. D.

very limited. Many studies concentrate on only one institution, often in one country, for example corruption in Mexico. Comparative, systematic analyses of informal institutions are rare. In the course of this paper, first, I will shortly introduce the idea of informal institutions. Second, we will introduce different approaches of studying and measuring bad informal institutions.

4. Governing Informal Institutions and the Evolution of the Rule of Law in Latin America⁵

The main topic of this part is to analyze the governance of so-called bad informal institutions which undermine the functioning of the rule of law in third-wave democracies, and thereby keep democratic consolidation in permanent danger. As bad informal institutions we conceive basically four types of informal institutions — corruption, clientelism, “perverse” elite agreements, and the threat of violence — which not only resist elimination but are also a virtual source of impairing the rule of law. In sum, bad informal institutions represent the “dark side of the power” present in most third wave democracies, and their governance results as a major task to secure and consolidate democracy itself.

While installing electoral democracy seems to be an easy endeavor nowadays — even in Middle East and North Africa — the consolidation of democracy by securing the rule of law is surprisingly far out of sight. Serious measures of the rule of law show that significant improvements over time are scarce, and if they occur, they are exposed to dangers of reversal even in some East European countries now members of the EU. A kind of structural reason of this malaise may be that installing the rule of law is by far a more complex task than supervising free and fair elections, allowing for strategies of established powers to circumvent formal rules and playing their own game behind the scenes.

With its focus on informal institutions — or in other words: on existing alternative rules of the game — our research has its focus not so much on material and human resources but on deficiencies which often seem to escape reform. By comparing two Latin American cases, Argentina and Chile, this paper tries to answer three questions: How do bad informal institutions affect the rule of law? Which factors are responsible for the dynamics and stability of Biis? How can bii be influenced by political steering (governance of the biis)?

⁵ Peter Thiery, Ph. D.

5. After the EU Enlargement: Changing Roles of Informal Institutions, Corruption and Clientelism in Central and Eastern Europe⁶

Scholars such as O'Donnell include rule of law among the key dimensions in the study of foundations of democracy and the implicit preconditions for democracy. Informal institutions among which we include corruption and clientelism establish main obstacle in establishing the rule of law thus fully and firmly establishing democracy in transition countries. In the Central and Eastern Europe, the most important factor accelerating the changes in the rule of law, initiated in the transition, was the EU accession process — EU together with other international organizations fostered major changes in the judiciary sector — concentrating mainly on the reforms in judiciary sector and 'various anti-corruption. However, the EU conditionality, as well as the leverage varied across the region, depending on contextual factors such as 1) cultural heritage; 2) institutional factors such as institutional set-up especially the functioning of the checks and balances system; and 3) actors — constellation as well as willingness of actors to implement proposed changes. The proposed paper seeks to fill the gap in existing research by 1) analyzing the interplay between rule of law and compliance in the CEE region in the context of EU accession process; 2) identifying key reform measures taken against corruption and clientelism in the CEE accession process and 3) outline the factors that played crucial role in this process and affect the quality of the rule of law in the CEE region.

In all countries under study informal institutions play an important role in a number of policy areas, however, the health care, together with judiciary was ranked as the most affected by the majority of respondents. The role of BINIs in the form of corruption and clientelism as well as elite agreements is evident in health care system on all levels. Thus the most imminent problem is the lack of will, inability to find solutions and lack of political consensus for a large scale reform. Regarding the typology of the three subtypes of deficient Rechtsstaat proposed by Lauth and Sehring we can conclude, that none of the countries under study established one clear type. In Poland, Romania and Slovenia, all three types of factors occur simultaneously (albeit with different strength). Their impact can be summed up as follows.

Regarding lack of capacities the factors contributing to this type of weaknesses are i.) the rushed, compromised or unfinished constitution-making — number of judges among our respondents attributed their difficulty in applying the law, to the lack of underlining constitutional principles; ii.) lack of coherent reform strategies; as well as iii.) the need for long term strategies as

⁶ Petra Guasti, Ph. D. and Bojan Dobovšek Ph. D.

well as structuring the reform into individual tangible steps; and iv.) sequencing and prioritizing; last but not least, the lack of coherent training and educational programs shapes and undermines the quality of law in the countries under study and in the CEE region as a whole.

In respect to interests, we find, first, that in number of occasions, limiting the rule of law reforms as well as preparing laws with internal formal issues and lacunae is in the interest of powerful actors, who are aware, that they do not comply with these laws. Hence, the gaps in laws provide them with insurance against possible future prosecution and application of sanction mechanism. Secondly, the political actors tend to prioritize their own interest.

As for alternative norms, we find dominance of informal and traditional over formal rules; lack of domestic actors of change and the lack of political will and compromise as the most crucial factors undermining the quality of the rule of law in the countries under study. In terms of the varying strength of these factors, we can note, that structural, cultural and contextual issues (both exogenous and endogenous) play key role in determining the impact of these factors on the rule of law in newly established democracies under study.

Furthermore, our field-work detects only limiting change in the situation over time. While World Governance Indicators of the World Bank, Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International and the Bertelsmann transformation Index all detect improvement over time, none of the countries under study has so far achieved fully functioning rule of law.

6. The rule of law and informal institutions: Active social responsibility. Nothing less, nothing more⁷

It might seem excessive, if one would claim that in Slovenia there is not a single *Rechtstaat*. Surely there are at least several different shades of one, formally alleged *Rechtstaat*. Namely, people with different privileges in society usually have a different position in the operation of the legal system in practice. Especially when compared with people from the middle spheres or from the sole margin of society. Sometimes they might even stay out of reach of the legal system and its punitive mechanism. Legal system can also be more indulgent towards them. For example with enabling them to faster achieve or exercise their rights or interests. Some of them also have a direct influence on the legislative process. Plausibly there are even more angles of this issue.

But even if it seemed excessive to speak of the simultaneous existence of several *Rechtstaats*, no one could argue that the formal establishment of the

⁷ Andraž Teršek, Ph.D. Constitutional scholar, University of Primorska.

Rechtstaat in our country does not also mean the actual and genuine Rule of Law. And this is not just because of the general conduct of members of Slovenian network of privileged people and acquaintances with the greatest social impact (s.c. the elite), which usually don't contribute or even try to contribute to the moral quality of the operation of the State. The general legal awareness and legal culture, especially pragmatic technical relationship towards the law and legal ignorance in general prevent the development of the actual and genuine Rule of Law. Representatives of public institutions and public officials also share quite low awareness of the importance and role of the concept of political responsibility. These people often feel like they own their public position, and refuse to admit guilt or even take responsibility even in the most obvious cases of wrongdoing.

Daily politics is too often legally ignorant in the law creating process. Clearly unconstitutional solutions in legal texts nearly became the commonness of the legislative process. The same is true for the too often quite unreasonable or simply impractical legislative solutions. Slovenian legislative practice is also amazing when it comes to the number of revisions of the legislation shortly after its adoption. "Intervention" changes in legislation often follow high profile media stories. And it is frequently ignored that in general such cases indicate that there is a systemic legal problem, not an isolated one. This is also the reflection of improperly understanding of the law as such, its nature and its social function. Shifting responsibility to the allegedly inadequate law in such cases often shows that those who are entitled and obliged to carry out the public work aren't quite up to the task. In this context we live in a society of constant denial and shift of the responsibility. It is especially discouraging when these facts involve members of legal profession.

Still, the rule of law is not disabled only by Parliament, Government, public administration and daily politics. It is also disabled by the major regulatory institutions, responsible for the effective functioning of the system of checks and balances. This is also (and sadly) true as far as the judicial branch is concerned. The rule of law in Slovenia is much more effective and determined in monetarily filling of the State's budget by punishing small traffic offenders than from the prospect of fighting against corruption and widespread phenomena of socially most important wrongdoings and crimes. The rule of law as laid down in legal theory and legal science is often different from the one created in practice of ordinary courts. Relationship of the judiciary towards constitutional foundations of legal science and legal system is fully visible as being sustainably inappropriate. Even so inappropriate that the case law of the ordinary courts is too often in obvious and major contradiction with constitutional alphabet.

The representatives of the legal profession and law teachers do not meet the legitimate expectations when it comes to the question of their contribution to the rule of law as a quality of social system. In other words, these people don't always meet the legitimate expectations of their social responsibilities as the representatives of informal control mechanism of the social system and public institutions. The degree of rule of law in Slovenia is not so much the result of persuasive institutionalization of the power of argument, but, in contrary, the effect of dominant logic and argument (policy) of power. Meaning, it is much more important who are the people publicly expressing their positions, giving expertise and forming opinions on social issues, but it is much less important what is the content of their views, quality of their professional expertise and general substantial credibility of their arguments. This is clearly visible in the daily public appearances of some of the most publicly recognizable and consequently influential legal experts.

It should also be mentioned there are several aspects and elements of the curriculum at the faculties of law (substantively and operationally) which no longer correspond to social development and lack the harmony with a modern legal science. As a result too many graduates of law faculties are rightly considered to be mere legal formalists. Many of them decide to start their careers in public administration. Bare bureaucratic and formalistic approach towards the law prevails over general and legal logic, reasonableness and effective clearness of the binding law. Thus educational institutions may be criticized for not corresponding to their responsibility arising from being an important, possibly vital element of the social mechanism for informal control over the social system and public institutions. Slovenia therefore needs a radical and immediate change in the legal and political culture. The path to it can only be secured by the public work of new and different-minded people who will be the new professional and political elite. Representatives of "work and knowledge", academics and intellectuals, sovereign representatives of different professions, advocates of humanism and ethics have to strengthen their civil courage, organize themselves and get actively involved in the political process. It is their social responsibility.

Public media could have an important role in this process. They should assist with a proper attention given to "people of work, knowledge and ethical integrity". The lack of media coverage of the actions of this group of social activists would mean the lack of influence and effectiveness. An important contribution to this would also be a change in the attitude of the public media to daily politics and politicians. Public media must be determined in functioning as an informal control mechanism of the holders of social power. They have to secure a critical and comprehensive control over the work and self-observation of public officials. Public media must not allow, or even facilitate the politicians

and other public officials to simply and easily promote themselves, to appear publicly as a special type of media stars and to enjoy an unlimited expansion of the role of modern machos. Instead, public media must secure strict assessment of the substantial legitimacy of political activity. Immediate public action of all of these guardians of informal mechanism of social control must rise up to the higher level of social responsibility. Increase of general social responsibility is a necessity of social present. Nothing more, nothing less.

7. Corruption and Clientelism as an Informal Institution and Rule of Law⁸

The purpose of this part of research was to identify and analyse corruption patterns in the Republic of Slovenia — if and how such actions affect the rule of law, the country and its people, with the intention to help the experts to prepare the basis for the better methods of prevention. A phrase state capture is a new expression, which causes a lot of difficulties to the scientists to define it. It has been tried to translate this expression only for a few times in Slovene scientific literature. For our analyse we define the term state capture with three entities. First one, who is taking over in private or public sector, second, what was taken over, as laws or state and the last one the public who loose and suffer. We enlightens some of the specific characteristics of the transition countries (especially post-communist countries) and gives the reasons why the widely acceptance of the concept of state capture is necessary for studying non-transparent activities in this countries. We also present a BEEPS researches (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey), which was made by World Bank and expose some individual entities which are included in this phenomenon. We criticised the model state capture which already exists and is not suitable for transition countries. At the end we emphasises the importance of the reforms in transition countries and open some questions about the results of this researches as well as in Slovenia as in other countries.

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AMBASSADORIAL FORUM

SPEECH BY A.V. KONUZIN

at Institute of International Politics and Economics
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Dear colleagues, friends,

As a man who has devoted many years of his life to foreign policy activities, I can assure you that the profession of a diplomat and generally an expert in international relations has never before been so interesting and responsible as it is at present. The complexity of issues that are part of international relations have increased many times and they have also become more diverse. Today, it is difficult to assess the significance of a deep analysis of the tendencies in the global surroundings, the ability to predict several moves in advance and to generate new ideas.

Russia continuously broadens the circle of its relations deepening the nature of its communications at the world stage. Integration projects on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are being carried out. The modernisation and foreign policy co-operation within its strategic partnership with the EU is being deepened. Russia has made important agreements with the USA that concern the whole world. Its strategic co-operation with China, India as well as with BRIC countries is being deepened. The number of its partners in the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa is rising. Russia strengthens its activities in the UN, taking initiatives for the development of international law. It also participates in numerous multilateral mechanisms of co-operation that strengthen the structure of diplomacy network within the context of establishing of a more just and democratic polycentric world order.

This year, the processes in the Middle East and North Africa have been the most prominent. Their driving force lies in the aspiration of the Arab peoples to live a better life through the restoration of their countries and the reorganisation of the political systems that were established in some other epoch. Russia supports all these aspirations that are directed towards seeking to establish a democratic model, which would be appropriate for the civilisational traditions and the level of social development relying on the rule of law and the interest of

ensuring social and economic progress and the freedoms and political rights of citizens.

The role of foreign “players” is especially important here too as well as their ability to show that they are responsible and that they can help the parties settle their internal conflicts peacefully by negotiations and with the participation of all relevant political, confessional and ethnic groups. There must not be applied “double standards” that would be dictated by the political conditions or the subjective preferences of these or some other states.

Of course, the use of force against civilians is unacceptable and inadmissible. Besides some other occasions, we also clearly took this position by adopting a special statement on the Syrian issue and the two resolutions on Libya within the UN Security Council. However, the way in which the NATO members and some other states have implemented the “Libyan” resolutions was a flagrant violation of principles of the rule of law, disregarding the initiatives of the African Alliance and the UN, thus making the number of civilian victims even bigger. And, it is the protection of civilians that was the most important task set by the SC resolutions. However, the North Atlantic Alliance took to implement them itself ignoring other countries. One should not do justice by applying unlawful means.

This fully applies to the present situation in Kosovo. No unilateral acts should be taken in such cases. Only a dialogue between the interested parties as well as reaching of a compromise can enable finding of a long-term solution and prevent re-emergence of the conflicts, “freezing” them in that way. Unfortunately, Priština and some other capitals do not wish to participate in an open and constructive discussion with Belgrade. I am deeply convinced that for reaching any promising solution for Kosovo that it would be fundamental to respect norms and principles of international law.

The respect of democracy and the rule of law principles should be re-affirmed not only by states but at the international level as well. One should say that this is an obvious thing. However, one can wonder whether the leading world factors are willing to respect norms of international law and rules of conduct, which are equal for all.

When we mention unilateral acts, we cannot skip NATO and the way this alliance conceives its mission in the contemporary world. We appreciate the NATO’s position that international law should be respected. It is worked out in its strategic conception and affirmed by its leaders. We also appreciate the prerogative reserved by the UN Security Council. At the same time, the NATO’s acts in practice are not always in accordance with this principle, what has everybody become convinced by “the Libyan experience”. In a broader sense,

the problem is manifested in the continued discussions on a new mission the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to find in international relations.

In its report entitled “Assured Access to the Global Commons” the NATO considers (truly, only theoretically, for the time being) the possibilities for its acting that would directed towards ensuring its interests in the world sea, “open sky”, space and cyber space. But, these are spheres of interest not only of the NATO member states but of the world community that should be jointly resolved in order to regulate them. Today, stability is absolutely necessary as well the ability to create the conditions for stable and progressive development.

The philosophy of common work lies in the foundation of the modern Russian diplomacy. Russia has clearly determined its foreign policy that should serve the purpose of attaining long-term development and comprehensive modernisation of the economy and the society. We are establishing mutually beneficial partnerships of modernisation — both on the bilateral and multilateral bases — with CIS, Europe, the USA, Asia-Pacific countries.

In 2008, President D.A. Medvedev presented an idea on concluding an Agreement on European Security that would be legally binding; the objective would be to codify the political declarations that had been adopted ten years before by the OSCE and Russia-NATO Council. They all pointed out that no Euro-Atlantic country would ensure its security on the account of security of other states. During the past time, this initiative has remained fully topical.

The task of ensuring — not verbally but in practice — equal and indivisible security is topical not only in the Euro-Atlantic, but also in the Asia-Pacific region. The question to be resolved concerns the arrangement of the comprehensive architecture of security and co-operation that is based on legal and non-block principles containing legitimate interests of all countries. A common initiative is directed towards achieving this goal and it was taken by the leaders of Russia and China in September 2010. We are of the opinion that it is more plausible that such an objective would be attained if a partnership network is created with the participation of various organisations and fori, what was supported by the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

The Russian initiative for working out the Convention for Ensuring International Energy Security is based on the logic of strengthening legal principles in the international life as well as on inducing collective rights. This Convention would ensure the balance of interests of all parties concerned — exporters, importers and countries in transition. It seems that Serbia should minutely study this issue. We think that it is time to take up substantial negotiations, especially for the fact that experts point to instability of energy commodity prices as one of the threats that inhibits the revival of the world economy.

Participating actively in various *fori* and making efforts to normalise the situation in the world economy Russia devotes special attention to the work in integration groupings in CIS, and above all in Eurasian Economic Community, Customs Union and the Single Economic Space that is being established. By all this, we fully consider that the development of integration processes in different regions in the world proceeds upon the same principles — free movement of capital, goods, services and labour. Bringing into accord these processes would organically fit into an objective tendency of establishment of “construction blocks” of the future restored construction of global management. For this reason, one can only be amazed by the attempts to present the CIS-European Union integration programmes as incompatible. When our neighbours are asked to say which one they would support — Moscow or Brussels — this creates the ideological stereotypes from the last century and is opposite to the common documents adopted by Russia and EU on complementarity of integration processes in the whole Europe.

Within global specialisation, Russia plays a special role in the energy sphere, which is a driving force in the world and any national economy.

Russia possesses large reserves of energy resources, a solid industrial base and infrastructure as well as appropriate industrial and intellectual potentials in this field. Objectively, it is playing a more and more important role in the world politics and in ensuring global energy security. One of the priorities of our foreign policy is to further broaden and deepen mutually beneficial co-operation with other countries and to give support to carrying out big investment projects in the energy field.

Great changes have recently occurred in the energy field. There have emerged new threats to stability of energy markets. Considering this Russia addressed the international community pointing to the necessity to create a new architecture of energy co-operation that would meet the interests of all its participants.

Russia sets much store by the implementation of the St Petersburg Global Energy Security: Plan of Action. As it is well known, this document provides for attraction of new big investments for the development of energy sector, broad exchange of contemporary technologies among countries, comprehensive introduction of technologies for achieving energy efficiency and energy saving, diversification of use of energy sources including the development of its new and renewable forms, stamping out of energy poverty in developing countries, and some other issues.

Russia is an active participant in the energy dialogue in G-8 and it is one of the founders of the new international organisation — Forum of Gas Exporting Nations. A Russian representative was appointed Secretary General of this organisation. We actively take part in all relevant international organisations.

We set much store by Russia-EU co-operation in the energy field that is based on the common interest in strengthening of energy security, carrying out big investment projects, exchange of technologies and experiences. In our opinion, the process of further integration of Russia and EU in the energy field presumes the creation of a single economic and technological space.

It is interesting, among others - and for Serbia, too, the experience with ensuring mutual energy security in Europe. Russia and the European Union have worked out basic elements of “early warning mechanisms” for possible breaks in the functioning of the energy system. With the aim of reducing transit and non-profit risks, we work on diversification of the routes for the transportation of hydrocarbon to the EU countries. The main criterion for choosing some route is its economic efficiency, reliability and environmental security.

The EU energy market is becoming bigger and bigger and more and more integrated. It makes it even more attractive for exports of Russian energy commodities and derivatives. Russia intends to take a prominent position on this market that suits its potentials.

I wish to stress that we regard the project for building of the “South Stream” gas pipeline as an important element of diversification of routes for the transportation of the Russian gas to European countries, which contributes to strengthening of the infrastructure of Russia-EU energy co-operation as a whole. We are convinced that this is the right step towards ensuring energy stability in Europe. We reckon on establishing very close co-operation with the Serbian part on this matter.

We assume that the project is economically justified since it fulfils the following conditions: profitability, guaranteed supplies, stable gas demand to be delivered and investment components. Besides, the new gas pipeline system will be compatible with the latest environmental and technological demands, what will considerable increase security in energy supply of the whole Europe. We are content with the fact that several European countries, including Serbia, intend to participate in the project. In this regard, we have signed bilateral agreements with those countries on this matter. For all this, we can say that “South Stream” is becoming a more and more significant project for Europe.

One should point out that in December 2008 the agreement on the basic conditions concerning co-operation in building of the Serbian part of the “South Stream” gas pipeline was signed. The feasibility study on the transit of natural gas on the territory of Serbia was completed in 2010 including the set deadlines for building of the Serbian part of the gas pipeline. A number of other, accompanying documents were signed, too.

We disagree with the statements made by representatives from some European states that the “South Stream” project would be a kind of rival to the “South Corridor” and “Nabucco” projects, which are promoted by the European Union. In our opinion, as well in the opinion of numerous European experts these rather “virtual” projects are not based on stable elements, above all, for their resource base. Besides, even in case they are hypothetically carried out, gas that would be delivered both through “South Stream” and the gas pipelines mentioned above, will be in demand in European states.

In the conclusion, I would like to stress that Russia continuously tries to find mutually acceptable approaches for the purpose of achieving continued energy supply and of course, ensuring energy security in Europe. We expect that our partners will show understanding and give support to our position as well as to our efforts. We also advocate a broad exchange and comprehensive introduction of technologies designed for achieving energy efficiency and energy saving, including the development of its new and renewable forms. The conditions on the future energy markets will depend on the progress made in these fields. By all this, it also includes stability of the whole world economy. Carrying out the set plans in this sphere will largely contribute to the revitalisation of the Serbian economy. It will exert an impact on the employment growth and the budget revenues. We shall keep being available for the establishment of mutually beneficial co-operation with your part.

BOOK REVIEWS

FRANCE AT THE CROSSROADS

The book *Francuska na raskršću* deals with a political scientific analysis of France in international relations. The first part studies the historical positions of France that for centuries was one of the greatest and most important European and world powers. The book presents the factors, which in various epochs determined the position of France in international relations, the power of its state and building of its national identity. The next part of the book presents the picture of present France that is at some crossroads concerning the foreign policy strategic positions it could take in the future. That choice is greatly determined by the international surroundings where important changes occur. This is for the fact that after the period of unipolar order dominated by a super power — USA, the world enters an epoch of multilateralism with several great world powers existing at the same time.

Roughly speaking, it is in this direction that three main hypothetical models of future foreign policy positions of France could be singled out. One of them would be a close connection with the NATO and the USA where in a strong Western coalition they would attempt to obtain as many as possible privileges from other countries by making military and political pressures, and they would above all, include natural resources Western countries are increasingly deficient in. At the same time, as for the world economic institutions such as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank, they would also obtain privileges owing to the influence of the Western coalition. This concept implies a number of armed conflicts and interventions as is Libyan case. In internal policy, preference is given to neoliberalism that has been only partly corrected by Sarkozy after the neoliberal collapse in 2008 in the world.

The representative of such a political doctrine on the practical political field of France is present President Nicolas Sarkozy: Anglo-american capital and its representatives in France, a part of the globalised elite and French big business who by all this, can count on control of the most important media in France they have taken partly due to the fact that they have been privatised in recent years.

The second model is based on the postulates of the Fifth Republic that had been established long ago by de Gaulle and were followed by the next presidents and politicians including those from the Left, whose most prominent representative was Francois Mitterand. Basically, this is an independent position of France in international surroundings that is based on the advantages in the elements of hard and soft power, this implying the elements which are

characteristic for a world power that the French still have. These are one's own nuclear weapons, a permanent member of the OUN Security Council and the reformed French community and Francophonie. This should be added the leadership in the European Union together with Germany and it is not conceived as a supranational creation but an economic and political alliance of interest for sovereign states that would develop European armed forces in time, which would complement the NATO or even become its counterbalance. Within this trend Russia is regarded as a strategic collaborator and historical friend.

Adherents of various modalities of this strategic option on the French political scene are leaders of the Left, centrist Francois Bayrou and the separated fraction of the leading UMP headed by Dominique de Villepin. Representatives of the Left such as Hollande and Segolene Royal, and even Strauss-Kahn support the hybrid option of this strategy, which to a lesser extent supports friendly relations and the USA, while they advocate development of a more considerate relationship with Moscow. On the other hand, it seems that the formal leader of the Left Aubry is to a lesser extent close to the postulates mentioned above in their full meaning unlike centrist Francois Bayrou and former Prime Minister and de Gaullist Dominique de Villepin who are closer to them. In the French society, adherents of this option are practically present in all classes and mostly in the middle and lower classes, this partly including migrants.

Finally, there is a strategic option that supports a full distance to the NATO and the USA, conditional membership in a very loose EU as a union of sovereign states and the establishment of a strategic relationship with Germany. At the same time, a strategic alliance with Russia would be developed bearing in mind not only its natural resources but also security co-operation with this country. In internal policy, emphasis is put on the synthesis of state capitalism and some elements of social state with restricted migrant policy favouring the French national identity that is being opposite to the supranational and globalist trends.

The National Front and its leader Marine Le Pen are political adherents of this option. In the French society, this concept is supported by all classes of the society, but mostly by the middle and lower classes and however, not by migrants.

Serbian-French relations were traditionally friendly and alliance ones. However, in the several past years, as perhaps never until now in the last two centuries, there has been a sort of crisis in those relations, particularly for the issue of Kosovo. From this research we can see that completely turning geopolitical allies of France to the Atlantic's has a negative effect against the Serbian national interests, primarily in Kosovo and Metohija, but also and in the region of the Western Balkan. Based on the analysis, it seems that for the Serbian interests in the future orientation of France all options of its foreign policy strategy would be more favourable than the current one, which is represented by Nicolas Sarkozy.

dr.sci Vladan STANKOVIĆ, Institute for political studies, Belgrade

DOCUMENTS*

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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Commission Opinion on Serbia's application
for membership of the European Union
{SEC(2011) 1208 final}

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

**Commission Opinion on Serbia's application for membership
of the European Union**

A. INTRODUCTION

a) Application for membership

Serbia presented its application for membership of the European Union on 22 December 2009. Subsequently, on 25 October 2010, the Council of the European Union requested the Commission to submit its opinion on this application, in line with the procedure laid down in Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which states that *“Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union. The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of this application. The applicant State shall address its application to the Council, which shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after receiving the consent of the European Parliament,*

* In view of fact that the text in this section are an official nature, no alternations of any kind have been made to them by the editor of the *Review of International Affairs*.

which shall act by a majority of its component members. The conditions of eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be taken into account”.

Article 2 states that *“the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail”.*

This is the legal framework within which the Commission submits the present Opinion.

The Feira European Council in June 2000 acknowledged that Western Balkan countries participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process were ‘potential candidates’ for EU membership. The European perspective of these countries was further confirmed by the Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 which endorsed the ‘Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans’. This agenda remains the cornerstone of EU policy towards the region.

The European Council of December 2006 renewed the EU’s commitment *“that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union”* and reiterated that *“each country’s progress towards the European Union depends on its individual efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process. A country’s satisfactory track record in implementing its obligations under a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), including trade-related provisions, is an essential element for the EU to consider any membership application”.* At the Sarajevo EU-Western Balkans ministerial meeting on 2 June 2010, the EU reiterated its unequivocal commitment to the European perspective of the Western Balkans and that the future of these countries lies in the European Union.

In line with the Treaty requirements, the current assessment is made in terms of the conditions of eligibility laid down by the European Council. In Copenhagen in June 1993, the European Council concluded that:

“Accession will take place as soon as a country is able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required.

Membership requires:

- that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;*
- the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;*
- the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union”.*

The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is also an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries.

In December 1995, in Madrid, the European Council referred to the need *“to create the conditions for the gradual, harmonious integration of [the applicant] countries, particularly through the development of the market economy, the adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary environment”.*

The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) conditionalities were defined by the Council on 31 May 1999. They include cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and regional cooperation. As a fundamental element of the SAP, these conditions are integrated into the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia, currently under ratification, and also into the Interim Agreement (IA) on trade and trade-related matters, which entered into force on 1 February 2010.

In December 2006, the European Council agreed that “*the enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality and communication, combined with the EU’s capacity to integrate new members, forms the basis for a renewed consensus on enlargement*”.

In the present Opinion, the Commission analyses Serbia’s application on the basis of the country’s capacity to meet the criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council of 1993 and the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Serbia’s track record in implementing its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters is also examined.

The Opinion was prepared following a methodology similar to that used in previous Opinions. The Commission organised a number of expert missions to Serbia concentrating mainly on the fields covered by the political criteria. This approach allowed an assessment of the administrative capacity of Serbian institutions and of the way legislation is implemented. It also helped to better identify remaining challenges and priorities for future action. The Commission has analysed both the present situation and the medium-term prospects. For the purpose of this Opinion and without prejudging any future date of accession, the medium-term perspective has been defined as a period of five years.

The detailed analysis on which this Opinion is based is contained in a separate document *Analytical Report accompanying the Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union*.¹ In line with the renewed consensus on enlargement, the analytical report provides initial estimates of the impact of the future accession of Serbia in some key policy areas. The Commission will provide more detailed impact assessments for these policy areas at later stages of the pre-accession process. In addition, the EU accession treaty for Serbia would involve technical adaptation of the EU institutions in the light of the Treaty on European Union.

b) Relations between the EU and Serbia

Relations between the EU and Serbia have developed since the democratic changes of 2000, initially with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and then, from 2003 onwards, with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The EU continued its relations with the Republic of Serbia, as the successor of the State Union, when Montenegro became independent in 2006.

Serbia is participating in the Stabilisation and Association Process. The **Stabilisation and Association Agreement** provides a framework of mutual commitments on a wide range of political, trade and economic issues. It was signed, along with the **Interim Agreement** on trade and trade-related matters, in April 2008. EU ministers agreed to

¹ SEC(2011) 1208.

submit the SAA to their parliaments for ratification and the EU agreed to implement the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters as soon as the Council decided that Serbia was fully cooperating with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Serbia started on 1 January 2009 to implement the Interim Agreement. The Interim Agreement entered into force on 1 February 2010. At the 14 June 2010 Foreign Affairs Council, ministers agreed to submit the Stabilisation and Association Agreement to their parliaments for ratification. The process is still under way. In general terms, Serbia has built a positive track record on implementing the obligations imposed by the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement. Whenever problems arose, Serbia took a constructive and transparent approach to resolve them promptly and effectively.

A **European Partnership** with Serbia was adopted by the Council in 2004 and updated in 2006 and 2008.²

Political dialogue meetings at ministerial level have been held since 2003. Policy dialogue between the European Commission and the Serbian authorities has been taking place in the framework of the Enhanced Permanent Dialogue (EPD) since 2003. Inter-parliamentary meetings between representatives of the European Parliament and of the Serbian parliament have been held annually since 2006. The Interim Committee under the IA and a number of sub-committees meet annually, notably on the internal market, competition, transit traffic, trade, customs, taxation, agriculture and fisheries. Several sub-EPD meetings are covering all sectors of the SAA that are not included in the Interim Agreement, such as energy, the environment, social policy, justice, freedom and security.

Serbia participates in an economic dialogue with the Commission and the EU Member States.

In this framework, Serbia presented in January 2011 an update of its annual Economic and Fiscal Programme (EFP).

Visa liberalisation for Serbian citizens travelling to the Schengen area was granted by the Council, after consultation with the European Parliament, as of 19 December 2009. This decision was based on substantial progress in the areas of justice, freedom and security and fulfilment of the specific conditions set out in the roadmap for visa liberalisation. The rules for visa-free travel have been respected by the vast majority of travellers. To ensure the continued implementation of the commitments, a post visa liberalisation monitoring mechanism was established in view of increased numbers of asylum seekers from the region. The Commission presented its first monitoring report to the European Parliament and the Council in June 2011. An agreement on readmission between the European Union and Serbia has been in force since January 2008.

Serbia signed the Energy Community Treaty in October 2005 and the European Common Aviation Area (ECAA) agreement in June 2006.

In October 2008, the government of Serbia adopted the National Programme for the Integration of Serbia into the European Union for the period 2008-2012. A revised and updated version was adopted in December 2009. In December 2010 the government adopted an Action Plan on fulfillment of priorities set in the European Commission's 2010 Progress Report, with the aim of increasing focus and achieving additional results on the reform agenda, ahead of the present Opinion.

² OJ L 80, 18.3.2008, p. 46.

Serbia has been receiving **EU financial assistance** since 2001. Overall, between 2001 and 2011, the EU committed over €2 billion to Serbia in the form of grants and €5.8 billion in the form of soft loans. From 2001 to 2006, Serbia benefited from EU CARDS assistance worth €1,045 million. Since 2007, CARDS has been replaced by the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), under which Serbia received assistance worth €974 million between 2007 and 2011. The assistance under the IPA is designed to support the reforms undertaken as part of the European integration process, with a focus on the rule of law, institution-building, approximation with the EU *acquis*, sustainable economic and social development and support to civil society.

Serbia participates fully in a number of EU programmes under the financial perspective 2007-2013: the 7th Framework Programme for research and technological development, PROGRESS, the Competitiveness and Innovation Programme, the Information and Communication Technologies Policy Support Programme, the Culture Programme, the Customs Programme and the Fiscalis Programme. IPA funds are used to meet part of the costs of participation in these programmes.

B. CRITERIA FOR MEMBERSHIP

1. POLITICAL CRITERIA

The present assessment is based on the Copenhagen criteria relating to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, as well as on the conditionality of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

Serbia is a parliamentary **democracy**. Its constitutional and legislative framework is largely in line with European principles and standards and its institutions are well developed. Serbia is committed to its objective of membership of the European Union and since 2008 has increasingly focused its efforts on the EU-related reform agenda. The government has upgraded some of its procedures and parliament has become far more effective in its legislative activity under the current legislature. The legislative process would benefit from more thorough preparation and greater emphasis on consultation of stakeholders. Capacity for parliamentary oversight and governmental policy planning, coordination and implementation remains to be further developed. Serbia has set up all the necessary independent regulatory bodies. The rules governing the parliamentary review of their annual reports have been clarified even though the follow-up of recommendations by independent and regulatory bodies needs to be strengthened. The public administration is in general well developed, in particular at central level. The principle of a merit-based career system needs to be fully implemented. Serbia has established a Statute for the Province of Vojvodina and has undertaken to transfer some competences to the municipal level.

Since 2001, elections have been consistently conducted in Serbia in accordance with international standards. The electoral legislation was recently brought into line with European standards. It now provides that the appointment of MPs follows the order of the lists presented to the voters and it puts an end to the practice of 'blank resignations', by which MPs were tendering resignation letters to their parties at the beginning of their mandate. This consolidates the free exercise of parliamentary mandates, a principle which needs, in due course, to be fully enshrined in the Constitution.

The legal and institutional framework for the **rule of law** in Serbia, including the fight against corruption and organised crime, has been enhanced, particularly following substantial reforms in the judiciary, the setting-up of the Anti-Corruption Agency and the stepping-up of international cooperation in criminal matters. This has led to initial results. The main challenges remain in the areas of the judiciary, the fight against corruption and the fight against organised crime. In particular, a proactive approach in the fight against corruption leading to a credible track record of opened investigations and final convictions remains to be built up. An extensive framework for civilian control of the security forces is in place.

Substantial reforms of the judiciary were pursued in Serbia following the adoption of the national strategy in 2006 and intensified in 2009 and 2010. Independence and self-administration were strengthened with the establishment of the new High Judicial and State Prosecutorial Councils, which have been functioning in their permanent compositions since April 2011. A re-appointment procedure for all judges and prosecutors was undertaken in December 2009, aiming in particular at raising their professional and integrity standards. The initial significant shortcomings identified in that procedure are in the course of being addressed by a review process for which there are clear guidelines. The review process remains to be satisfactorily completed, in a transparent manner, in line with these guidelines. A revision of the role given by the Constitution to parliament on appointments and dismissals in the judiciary will need to be undertaken in due course, to further reduce the risk of undue political influence. Several steps have been taken to increase the efficiency of the judicial system. The court network was restructured and the number of courts reduced, leading to a better distribution of workload. An Administrative Court was set up and a Law on enforcement of court decisions adopted in May 2011. Further efforts are still needed to improve the functioning of the judiciary, reap the full benefits of the restructured network of courts and ultimately increase public trust. Efforts to strengthen the execution of judgments and further reduce the important backlog of pending cases are to be pursued.

The legal and institutional framework for fighting corruption is, overall, in place in Serbia. An Anti-Corruption Agency was established and is competent in the areas of integrity of public officials and control of party funding. Its resources were recently further increased. An enhanced framework for controlling financing of political parties' activities and electoral campaigns has been established in line with European standards. The Minister of Justice was appointed coordinator for the fight against corruption. The authorities have launched a review of the outdated strategy and action plan for the fight against corruption. The State Audit Institution has started to play a useful role in controlling public expenditure and uncovering irregularities. The customs administration and the police have stepped up their internal controls resulting in a greater number of cases being investigated and sanctioned. Steps have also been taken towards specialisation of the law enforcement agencies and a greater number of cases have been prosecuted. Corruption remains prevalent in many areas and continues to be a serious problem. Stronger political will is essential in order to significantly improve performance in combating corruption. Enhanced investigation capacity and coordination of law enforcement bodies are indispensable. The track record of investigations, prosecutions and final convictions in corruption cases at all levels needs to be gradually and significantly built up. There are also concerns regarding supervision of public procurement, privatisation, spatial planning and construction permits.

In the fight against organised crime, the legal framework developed by Serbia is generally adequate and capacity has improved, including on international cooperation. This has led to significant results, such as the dismantling of a major international drug-trafficking ring. Money laundering and drug smuggling are key areas of concern and the track record of investigations and convictions needs to be built up further. Capacity for proactive and better coordinated investigations and enhanced cooperation at regional and international levels also remain to be further developed. Technical capacity to carry out special investigative measures should be developed within the law enforcement bodies, under the direct control of the judiciary.

The legal and policy framework for **human rights and the protection of minorities** in Serbia is, overall, in line with European standards. The Constitution guarantees a wide range of human rights and fundamental freedoms and recognises the possibility of filing a Constitutional appeal as the final remedy for protection of human rights. However, implementation of the legislation needs to be stepped up. Advanced training of the administration, the police and the judiciary remain to be developed to ensure more active and consistent application of standards in this field.

Human rights are generally respected in Serbia. The Ombudsman and the Commissioner for access to information and data protection are playing an increasingly effective role in the oversight of the administration. The legal framework to combat discrimination has been substantially improved and mechanisms have been set up to oversee its implementation, which is at an early stage. The authorities have also been paying growing attention to safeguarding the respect of the freedom of assembly and freedom of association and the role of civil society. The newly adopted media strategy aims at substantially clarifying the legal and market environment in which media outlets are operating. More comprehensive and proactive action is expected from the relevant institutions in cases of threats and violence against journalists and media, emanating notably from radical groups. The current prison conditions are a matter of serious concern. A long awaited law on restitution as well as a new law on public property were adopted. Transparent and non discriminatory implementation of both laws has to be ensured and further measures taken to fully establish legal clarity over property rights. The Commission will monitor the implementation and application of these laws.

The legal and institutional framework for respecting and protecting minorities in Serbia is in place. The Constitution guarantees specific rights to members of national minorities in addition to the rights guaranteed to all citizens and provides a legal basis for the National Minority Councils. Political representation of minorities is ensured. At State level, the Ombudsman and the Commissioner for Equality are exercising their prerogatives in this area. Serbia has established a comprehensive strategy for the integration of Roma and is currently progressing in its implementation. Active social inclusion measures have been taken, in particular in the fields of health, education and housing. Measures have recently been taken to alleviate obstacles to the registration of 'legally invisible persons' which will improve their access to basic rights. Further serious efforts, including financial resources, are needed in order to improve the status and socio-economic conditions of the Roma, who continue to be the most vulnerable and marginalised minority, as illustrated by the high number of illegal settlements. The situation of refugees and internally displaced persons remains a concern, even though significant progress was achieved in recent years in reducing the number of collective centres.

Serbia generally fulfils the conditions of the **Stabilisation and Association Process**. Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has greatly improved since 2008 to a now fully satisfactory level, as best illustrated by the arrests and transfers to the Hague tribunal of Radovan Karadzic in 2008, Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic in 2011. Serbia is committed to pursuing this cooperation at the same level. It participates actively in regional initiatives and has taken significant steps to foster reconciliation. The agreement reached with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro in the Sarajevo Declaration Process on durable solutions for refugees and IDPs is a major achievement. Serbia has made good progress in its bilateral relations with other enlargement countries, particularly Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, while continuing to maintain good relations overall with neighbouring EU Member States. A number of outstanding bilateral issues remain with its neighbours, in particular regarding border demarcation.

Serbia does not recognise Kosovo's³ unilateral declaration of independence. It maintains its structures in Kosovo and organised parallel municipal by-elections in May 2008, which is inconsistent with UNSCR 1244/1999. On the basis of the UN General Assembly resolution adopted on 9 September 2010, which had been tabled jointly by Serbia and the 27 EU Member States, a process of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina started in March. It has been conducted in a generally constructive spirit until September and it has led to agreements on several issues: free movement of goods and persons, civil registry and cadastre. The agreements reached to date need to be implemented in good faith. Further results remain to be achieved to implement, as a matter of priority, the principles of inclusive and functioning regional cooperation and to provide sustainable solutions on EU acquis-related matters in sectors such as energy and telecommunications. All sides need to play their part in defusing the tension in northern Kosovo and allow for free movement of persons and goods, for the benefit of the people of the region.

2. ECONOMIC CRITERIA

The present assessment is made on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria related to the existence of a **functioning market economy**, as well as the capacity to cope with **competitive pressure** and market forces within the Union.

There is a broad political consensus in Serbia on the fundamentals of a market economy as well as a track record in the implementation of economic reforms. Serbia achieved a degree of macroeconomic stability that allows economic operators to make decisions in a climate of predictability. The economic policies of the past decade supported steady growth of close to 5% on average, gradually declining inflation and a general improvement of living standards. However, the global financial and economic crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of a growth paradigm, which was based on domestic demand financed largely by borrowing abroad, as well as the ensuing limitations of the policy mix to respond effectively to adverse external shocks. Recently, substantial progress has been made towards strengthening the financial framework and the quality of public finances, which would underpin a shift to more sustainable and balanced growth, driven by exports and investment. The free interplay of market forces has developed, albeit at a slow and uneven pace, through privatisation and liberalisation of

³ Under UNSCR 1244/1999.

trade and prices. Progress has been achieved in facilitating market entry and exit. Economic integration with the EU is high.

A number of structural weaknesses persist and hamper the economic performance. The state influence in the economy has remained high due to the slow progress of privatisation and price liberalisation. In spite of the steps towards establishing legal predictability and removing red tape, the business environment continues to be constrained by legal uncertainty. Lengthy enforcement procedures for court decisions undermine trust in the legal system. Lack of competition in certain sectors and significant infrastructure bottlenecks are a further drag on the economic potential. Foreign direct investment was relatively strong prior to 2008 and, following a substantial drop during the economic crisis, has started to slowly recover, but Serbia needs to further improve the investment climate. Against a modest economic recovery, unemployment remains high and the social situation strife. Serbia needs to urgently address structural rigidities on the labour market, including the mismatch between demand for and supply of skilled workforce. The informal economy remains an important challenge.

3. ABILITY TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP

The ability of Serbia to assume the obligations of membership has been evaluated on the basis of the following indicators:

- the obligations set out in the Stabilisation and Association Agreement;
- progress with adoption, implementation and enforcement of the EU *acquis*.

Overall, Serbia has smoothly implemented its obligations under the Interim Agreement and is generally respecting its commitments under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement.

In 2008 Serbia adopted a National Programme for Integration into the European Union, which is a comprehensive and ambitious plan for the period 2008-2012 providing for approximation of its national legislation to the EU *acquis*. Since then, significant progress has been made with adopting legislation aligned with the EU *acquis*, particularly on the internal market, statistics, trade-related provisions, customs and taxation. Administrative capacity is overall well developed and the judiciary is undergoing a significant overhaul. However, the country faces challenges in implementing and enforcing legislation. Particular and continued attention

to the fight against corruption will be expected over time. The country will need to make additional efforts in order to assume the obligations of membership in the medium term.

If it continues its efforts Serbia should, in the medium term, have the capacity to comply with the requirements of the *acquis* in the following fields:

- Company law;
- Fisheries;
- Taxation;
- Economic and monetary policy;
- Statistics;
- Enterprise and industrial policy;
- Science and research;

- Education and culture;
- Customs union;
- External relations;
- Foreign, security and defence policy;
- Financial and budgetary provisions.

Serbia will have to undertake additional efforts to align with the *acquis* and to implement it effectively in the medium term in the following fields:

- Free movement of goods;
- Freedom of movement for workers;
- Right of establishment and freedom to provide services;
- Free movement of capital;
- Public procurement;
- Intellectual property law;
- Competition policy;
- Financial services;
- Information society and media;
- Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy;
- Transport policy;
- Energy;
- Social policy and employment;
- Trans-European networks;
- Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments;
- Consumer and health protection.

Further adjustments of the legal and institutional framework, in particular strengthening of administrative and implementation capacity are needed in the above areas.

Serbia will have to make considerable and sustained efforts to align with the EU *acquis* and to implement it effectively in the medium term in the following fields:

- Agriculture and rural development;
- Judiciary and fundamental rights;
- Justice, freedom and security;
- Financial control.

Considerable adjustments of the legal and institutional framework and significant strengthening of administrative and implementation capacity are needed in these areas.

Regarding the environment and climate change, further coordinated and sustained efforts will be needed to align with the EU *acquis* and to implement it effectively. These should include substantial investments and strengthening of the administrative capacity for enforcement of legislation in order to achieve compliance on the most important issues, including climate change, in the medium term. Full compliance with the *acquis* could be achieved only in the long term and would necessitate higher levels of investment.

C. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

In the light of substantial reforms over the last years, Serbia has considerably progressed towards fulfilling the political criteria related to the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, as well as the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process. Serbia has a comprehensive constitutional, legislative and institutional framework which overall corresponds to European and international standards. Parliament has become far more effective in its legislative activity under the current legislature. The legal and institutional framework for the rule of law is comprehensive, including in the areas of the fight against corruption and organised crime where initial results were achieved. The legal framework for the protection of human rights and minorities is well developed and has started being implemented. Serbia has reached a fully satisfactory level in its cooperation with ICTY and has taken an increasingly active role in fostering reconciliation in the region. Serbia has agreed to and participated in a process of dialogue with Kosovo to facilitate the lives of the people which has led to several agreements (free movement of persons and goods, civil registry and cadastre) and Serbia has taken initial steps for implementation.

As regards the economic criteria, Serbia has taken important steps towards establishing a functioning market economy and achieved a certain degree of macroeconomic stability in spite of the global economic and financial crisis. However, further efforts will be necessary for restructuring the economy and improving the business environment, in particular by strengthening the rule of law and removing red tape, enhancing competition and the role of the private sector as well as tackling rigidities on the labour market. In order to enable it to cope in the medium term with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, Serbia needs to pursue structural reforms to upgrade the productive capacity of the economy and create a climate conducive to increased foreign investment.

Serbia has built up a positive track record in implementing its obligations under the Stabilisation and Association Agreement and the Interim Agreement.

Serbia would be in a position to take on the obligations of membership in the medium term, in nearly all *acquis* fields, provided that the alignment process continues and that further efforts are made to ensure the implementation and enforcement of legislation. Particular attention needs to be paid to the areas of agriculture and rural development, judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and security and financial control. Full compliance with the *acquis* in the field of the environment and climate change could be achieved only in the long term and would necessitate increased levels of investment.

Based on preliminary estimates, Serbia's accession would have a limited overall impact on European Union policies and would not affect the Union's capacity to maintain and deepen its own development.

The Commission recommends that the Council should grant Serbia the status of candidate country, taking into account progress achieved so far and on the understanding that Serbia re-engages in the dialogue with Kosovo and is moving swiftly to the implementation in good faith of agreements reached to date.

Serbia is well on its way towards sufficiently fulfilling the political criteria set by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and the conditions of the Stabilisation and

Association process, provided that progress continues and that practical solutions are found to the problems with Kosovo.

The Commission therefore recommends that negotiations for accession to the European Union should be opened with Serbia as soon as it achieves further significant progress in meeting the following key priority:

- Further steps to normalise relations with Kosovo in line with the conditions of the Stabilisation and Association Process by: fully respecting the principles of inclusive regional cooperation; fully respecting the provisions of the Energy Community Treaty; finding solutions for telecommunications and mutual acceptance of diplomas; by continuing to implement in good faith all agreements reached; and by cooperating actively with EULEX in order for it to exercise its functions in all parts of Kosovo.

The Commission will present a report on Serbia's implementation of the above key priority as soon as sufficient progress has been achieved.

Serbia is encouraged to maintain the momentum of reforms in pursuing the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria, with particular attention to the rule of law, and to continue its constructive engagement in regional cooperation and in strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries. Implementation of the Interim Agreement, and from its entry into force, the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, are expected to continue. The Commission will continue to support these efforts through the IPA financial instrument.

SECOND AFRICA-INDIA FORUM SUMMIT 2011 ADDIS ABABA DECLARATION

1. We, the Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegation representing the Continent of Africa, the African Union (AU) and its Institutions, and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, have met in Addis Ababa, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, from 24 to 25 May 2011, to continue our dialogue, deepen our friendship and enhance our cooperation, under the theme: Enhancing Partnership: Shared Vision.

2. We recall the Delhi Declaration adopted during our First Summit in New Delhi in April 2008 and the Framework of Cooperation and the associated Plan agreed upon thereafter as providing a concrete foundation for the consolidation of our strategic partnership and also reviewed the progress made in this regard since the First Summit. We also recall that Africa and India have been fraternal partners and allies in the struggle for independence and achievement of self-determination. We reaffirm that our partnership remains based on the fundamental principles of equality, mutual respect, mutual benefit and the historical understanding amongst our peoples.

3. We further agree that this partnership will continue to be guided by the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of States; commitment to deepen the process of African integration, dialogue among our civilizations to promote a culture of peace, tolerance and respect for religious, cultural and human rights, as well as gender equality, with a view to strengthening the trust and understanding between our peoples; recognition of diversity and levels of development between and within regions; collective action and cooperation for the common good of our States and peoples and our desire to nurture harmonious development in our plural, multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies through the consolidation and development of our plural democracy.

4. We welcome the continuing transformation of the political, economic and social environment in Africa. Economic growth in Africa has revived to levels that existed before the financial crisis and many African countries are progressing rapidly, opening greater avenues for economic cooperation. Similarly, India's economy continues to develop into one of the world's growth nodes and has withstood the impact of the global recession well. Both Africa and India have young, dynamic populations with great expectations, drive and initiative. We recognize that their aspirations and vigour provide a concrete basis for expanding the frontiers of this partnership as an agenda for development. Africa and India therefore, have today a good platform to expand our partnership for development on the basis of these fundamentals.

5. We have thus decided to enhance our partnership with new initiatives for the mutual benefit of Africa and India. In recent years, this has included substantial financial flows from India to Africa in terms of grants, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and concessional loans that continue to contribute to capacity building in the socio-economic sectors, particularly in the human resource development, the development of the private sector, increasing support to infrastructure, agriculture and SMEs, leading to a substantial expansion of Indian investment in Africa and of trade between Africa and India. We agree, to build upon this by assisting each other to achieve inclusive growth, socio-economic development and self-reliance. Areas for such cooperation will include sharing strategies for sustainable development, poverty alleviation, healthcare and universal

education, and sharing appropriate technologies. These new avenues for cooperation will enable us to add strategic depth to our partnership.

6. Our partnership enhances our ability to work together and address the global challenges of our times. In addressing these challenges, Africa and India continue to reiterate their intention to ensure that the interests of developing countries are safeguarded and that socio-economic development requirements of our various countries are guaranteed.

7. We urge the developed countries to take ambitious actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and also provide adequate financing and transfer of technology to support developing countries' efforts to effectively address the impact of climate change. We reaffirm the importance of reaching an agreement on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol as an indispensable step to preserve the integrity of the international climate change regime. We stress the importance of the Bali Action Plan of 2007 worked out under the aegis of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in this regard. We notice the positive aspects of the Cancun Conference Climate Change negotiations in December 2010 and appeal to the developed countries to operationalise all the institutional arrangements included in the Cancun decisions. We express our firm commitment to a balanced outcome from the climate change negotiations which are commensurate with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities on the basis of respective capabilities, in the process of COP17 which will be held in Durban, South Africa.

8. We take note of the African common position on Climate Change and support efforts towards combating drought and desertification in Africa, as well as support for Africa's Great Green Wall Project.

9. We affirm the critical importance of South-South cooperation as an instrument that can effectively supplement existing international efforts and lead to tangible and real benefits for developing countries. We stress that South-South Cooperation should be a supplement to North-South Cooperation and not a substitute for it. We recognize that significant diversity prevails among individual countries in Africa, about thirty three (33) of which are listed among the Least Developed Countries. Collectively, these countries confront some of the most persistent, pervasive and complex development challenges. Accordingly, we will explore new and innovative ways to supplement the mainstream effort to assist these developing countries and look for out-of-the-box solutions.

10. We remain concerned with the recurrent trend of increasing global crisis that are of economic nature, such as the global food, energy and financial crisis. While recognizing the current economic recovery, we are still concerned with its sustainability. We underline the importance of supporting stable, long-term capital flows to developing countries to stimulate investment, especially in infrastructure. This will help enhance global demand, thus securing the long-term sustainability of the recovery and address developmental imbalances.

11. We urge major economies to work together and enhance macro-economic policy coordination. In this context, we acknowledge the G20 process as an important forum for international economic cooperation, and request fair representation of Africa in the evolving architecture of decision-making process in the global economic system.

12. We reiterate the importance of the UN Millennium Declaration and the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We reaffirm our commitment to achieving the MDGs by 2015, including through technical cooperation and financial

support. Sustainable development models and unique paths of development in developing countries should be respected, including by guaranteeing the policy space of developing countries. We urge that aid commitments for developing countries must be fulfilled and that development assistance should not be reduced. We urge the developed countries to fulfill their obligations of achieving the target of 0.7% GNI as official development assistance (ODA) to developing countries. We also support African economic programmes within the context of Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

13. We underscore the need for a comprehensive and balanced outcome of the Doha Round, in a manner that gives weight to its mandate as a "development round", based on progress already made. We reiterate the need for continuing solidarity between developing countries in this regard. We affirm the importance of ensuring that an acceptable agreement adequately protects the concerns of developing countries with regard to livelihood, food security and rural development. Equally, concerns need to be addressed on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) services and rules. We urge all parties to oppose all forms of protectionism and trade distorting domestic support. We remain concerned that no significant progress has been achieved in key issues of interest to developing countries including India and those of Africa and therefore call, once more, on key players in the Doha Round to give priority to resolving all issues of critical concern to developing countries, especially regarding negotiation on agriculture.

14. We affirm our commitment to multilateralism and to strengthening the democratic structure of the United Nations (UN) to increase the participation of developing countries in decision-making processes. We emphasize the need for enhanced Africa-India cooperation at the UN, the G-77 and other multilateral fora, to foster common purpose in addressing areas of mutual concern. In the context of issues relating to international peace and security. We commend efforts made by the African Union Peace and Security Council in maintaining peace in Africa. Africa recalls, with appreciation, India's principled support to and continuing involvement with UN peacekeeping operations, especially in the African continent. India appreciates the role of African countries in maintaining peace and security in the Continent and their participation in peace keeping missions in other parts of the world. It also commends Africa on its development of the African Standby Force, which will enhance the continent's capacity to maintain peace and security.

15. We take note of UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya and stress that efforts to implement them should be within the spirit and letter of those resolutions. In this regard, we call for an immediate cessation of all hostilities in Libya and urge the parties in the conflict to strive towards a political solution through peaceful means and dialogue. We express support for the African Union High-Level Ad Hoc Committee initiative and the African Union roadmap for the peaceful and consensual resolution of the conflict.

16. Based on the strong partnership between Africa and India on international issues relating to peace and security, Africa welcomes India's election to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council for the years 2011-2012. India expresses its appreciation for the support of African States in this election in October 2010. The African members of the UN Security Council and India affirm their commitment to coordinate closely during India's tenure in the Council.

17. In this context, we underscore the imperative of urgent and comprehensive reform of the UN system. We share the view that the UN should function in a transparent, efficient and effective manner and that the composition of its central organs must reflect contemporary realities. The expansion of the UN Security Council, in permanent and non-permanent categories of membership, with increased participation of developing countries in both categories, is central to the process of reform and for enhancing the credibility of the United Nations.

18. India notes the common African position and the aspirations of the African countries to get their rightful place in an expanded UN Security Council as new permanent members with full rights as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus. Africa takes note of India's position and its aspirations to become a permanent member with full rights in an expanded UN Security Council. We emphasize the need for Member States to exert utmost effort on the United Nations' Security Council reform during the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

19. We recognize that the security of all nations would be enhanced by a global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We reaffirm our commitment to the consensus in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on Disarmament, which accorded priority to nuclear disarmament. We also express support for an International Convention Prohibiting the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Nuclear Weapons, leading to their destruction. We call for negotiating specific steps to reduce and finally eliminate nuclear weapons, leading to a world free from all weapons of mass destruction as envisaged in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan of 1988. We also look forward to the commencement of negotiations on the Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear Explosive Devices in the Conference on Disarmament.

20. We welcome the entry into force in July 2009, of the Africa Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty) of 1995 and the efforts towards the operationalisation of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (ACNE) in November 2010, which, among others, will promote the peaceful application of nuclear energy and technology within Member States.

21. We stress the importance of addressing the threat posed by illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons through full implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALWs and welcome the African Union's efforts towards that end.

22. We unequivocally condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. An act of terrorism anywhere is a threat to the entire international community. We recognize the need to further strengthen international cooperation to combat global terrorism and for compliance of all member states with all international terrorism conventions and related protocols and UN Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism. We call on all States to cooperate with each other in prosecuting, extraditing and rendering legal assistance with regard to acts of international terrorism. In this connection, we deplore the tragic losses arising from terrorist attacks and call for the active prosecution of the authors of such crimes and their accomplices, and urge that they be brought to justice expeditiously. We further call on all countries to ensure that acts of cross-border terrorism do not occur, and that their territories are not made a base for terrorists. We strongly condemn kidnapping and hostage taking as well as the demands for ransom and political concessions by terrorist groups. We express serious concern at the increase in such incidents. Taking note of the African position on the condemnation of the payment of

ransom to terrorist groups, we call for the urgent need to address this issue. We also agree to work to expeditiously finalize and adopt, a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN. We underscore the need to strengthen the implementation of AU mechanisms to prevent and combat terrorism.

23. We further stress the importance of addressing the threat posed by piracy off the Coast of Somalia and suffering caused by taking of hostages, and call on all States to cooperate in combating and eradicating the menace of piracy. In this context, Africa welcomes India's support to efforts to safeguard shipping in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean from piracy.

24. We also pledge to work to eradicate drug trafficking, trafficking in human beings, especially women and children, organized crime and money laundering. In this regard, we call on all States to ratify and implement all relevant International Instruments relating to these crimes.

25. We have reviewed, with satisfaction, the progress made in the implementation of the Africa-India Framework of Cooperation and note in this regard, the four-year Plan of Action adopted in March 2010. Work is moving apace on the various elements of this Plan of Action, including the establishment of 21 capacity-building institutions in various countries of Africa. India is committed to substantially contribute to building African capacities through supporting education and capacity building institutions and in enhancing value addition and processing of raw materials in Africa. Africa appreciates the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme offered by India and believes it has the potential to increase African exports to India.

26. We stress that cooperation between Africa and India, as emerging from the First Africa-India Forum Summit, has been a true manifestation of South-South Cooperation. Our endeavour to find new ways of energizing our partnership by taking into account the emerging capabilities in Africa and India has found sustenance in the implementation of the Action Plan of our Framework of Cooperation. We deeply appreciate the implementation of the initiatives that Africa and India took since the first India - Africa Forum Summit in April 2008, in New Delhi. We also laud the further initiatives that have been announced by the Prime Minister of India at the Second Africa-India Forum Summit in Addis Ababa in May 2011. India, on the other hand, welcomes the new spirit of association that has facilitated these initiatives.

27. Our Agreement that Africa and India will go beyond bilateral linkages to strengthen partnerships with the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities of Africa, have borne fruit. The level of interaction between India and the African Union has increased manifold, particularly with the implementation of new AIFS initiatives after the success of the Pan- African e-Network Project. The relationships with the Regional Economic Communities have also been strengthened and India's initiative to invite Africa's Regional Economic Communities for a meeting in November 2010 was appreciated. The multi-tiered functional engagement which India has with Africa is a model for multilateral engagements around the world.

28. We also welcome the positive results of efforts to promote trade and investment, human resource development and infrastructure development in Africa. We commit ourselves to involving the private sector and civil society in Africa and India to widen the scope of our partnership.

29. We note with satisfaction that Trade Ministers from African countries and India met on 21 May, 2011 in Addis Ababa and take note of the Joint Statement issued by the

Trade Ministers and lend our support to the ideas enunciated therein as indicators of our future cooperation. We appreciate that the Ministers had an in-depth discussion on the economic engagement between Africa and India, including the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme of India, cluster development initiatives and the identification of priority sectors of partnership. We also note with satisfaction the initiatives taken by the Trade Ministers in the establishment of Trade and Investment linkages between India and Africa and welcome the constitution of the India-Africa Business Council as well as the constitution of the annual India-Africa Trade Ministers' Dialogue. We acknowledge the common platform shared by India and Africa in the WTO Doha Round and reiterate the core principles of Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment and obtaining more preferential treatment for all LDCs.

30. We recognize that this Second Africa-India Forum Summit will help to realize our common vision of a self-reliant and economically vibrant Africa and India. We are committed to work together towards a peaceful and more egalitarian international order, where the voices of Africa and India can be heard to pursue their desire for inclusive development, both internationally and domestically. Africa is determined to partner in India's economic resurgence as India is committed to be a close partner in Africa's renaissance.

31. We agree to add further substance to our Framework of Cooperation and to broaden exchanges to cover all facets of our relationship. We adopt, in this context, the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation to supplement the existing Framework. We agree to institutionalize this Summit process. Accordingly, we agree that the next India - Africa Forum Summit will be held in 2014 in India.

32. The Prime Minister of India expresses his appreciation to the African Union Commission for hosting the Summit and to the Government and people of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the hospitality extended to his delegation and to all participating leaders. The African leaders also express their appreciation to the Prime Minister of India for his participation.

Issued at Addis Ababa on May 25, 2011

SECOND AFRICA - INDIA FORUM SUMMIT 2011

ADDIS ABABA

AFRICA-INDIA FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED COOPERATION

The Heads of State and Government and Heads of Delegations of Africa, representing the Continent, the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), along with the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, noting with satisfaction the progress made in the implementation of the Africa-India Framework of Cooperation and its Plan of Action of March 2010, and agreeing to give additional substance to the partnership and to widen its scope, decide to adopt this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation between Africa and India.

Africa and India agree to continue their cooperation in the areas enumerated below:

1. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Africa and India reiterate the mutual desire to expand economic cooperation and trade and investment linkages between them. Recognizing that trade and investment between Africa and India have increased, both Africa and India agree to take further measures to continue to create a positive ambience for such enhanced flows. Africa has also effectively utilized concessional financial flows from India to Africa for supporting the development of its infrastructure, industry and services. Both sides agree to further expand cooperation and sharing of experiences to increase trade, investment and financial flows between India and Africa as they provide a common paradigm of cooperation in the true spirit of South-South engagement.

i. Agriculture

Africa and India reaffirm their commitment to cooperate for increasing agricultural output and achieving the Millennium Development Goal of halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and malnutrition by 2015. They emphasize the importance of harnessing the latest scientific research for raising productivity and for the conservation of land and the environment in order to ensure food security for their people and to bring down the currently rising cost of food prices so as to make food affordable for all. In this respect, they agree to collaborate in the implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP).

ii. Trade, Industry and Investment

Africa and India recognize that enhanced trade and economic linkages would further contribute to sustainable growth and economic development in both Africa and India and welcome the contribution by India to build value addition and processing facilities in Africa.

Africa values private investment and financial flows on a concessional basis, which have been received from India and wishes to enhance their usage for building its infrastructure and enhancing the capacity of Africa to increase its exports. The value addition provided by Indian investment in Africa contributes to Africa's exports to third countries and to the development of intra-Africa trade. Both Africa and India will continue to work together to take these initiatives further.

Africa has also welcomed the Duty Free Tariff Preference Scheme for Africa's LDCs unilaterally announced by India at the time of the first India - Africa Forum Summit in 2008. It has significantly contributed to the ability of African countries to access the growing Indian market and contributed to the creation of complementarity in their export baskets. Africa and India will together endeavour to increase awareness and usage of this Scheme.

In the Action Plan of the Framework of Cooperation of IAFS-I, several initiatives were taken to build African capacities so that African human resources could join the process of industrialization and development of the services sector. Africa and India propose to continue to develop more such initiatives so that the growing young population of Africa finds suitable training and integration into the increasing economic opportunities in Africa.

Support to the legal and regulatory environment for public private partnerships, particularly in infrastructure, operationalisation of bilateral agreements on investment promotion and protection between India and African Countries and support to the development of capacities in the Chambers of Commerce in Africa, would be among the new priorities to be pursued.

African countries have found the India-Africa Project Partnership Conclaves to be useful vehicles for bringing Indian and African entrepreneurs and decision makers together. These would be continued.

iii. Small and Medium Enterprises

As Africa moves towards more rapid industrialization, there is a growing recognition that small, medium and micro enterprises offer significant avenues for supporting industrialization, generating employment and enhancing local capacities. Institutional support for the development of SMEs in Africa will be provided through the vocational training centres offered by India and the linkages between SMEs on both sides through the Conclaves and other activities by Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Africa and India will continue to work together on such initiatives, particularly to support the creation of entrepreneurship development and business incubators in Africa. It is the common endeavour of both that in the capacity building initiatives to be undertaken in the future, support to the private sector would be an integral part of the new efforts.

iv. Finance

One of the salient features of the first Africa- India Forum Summit and its Action Plan was the commitment by India for new financial flows to assist African countries in the true spirit of South-South Cooperation. Besides the grants for establishing capacity building institutions in Africa, there was an important commitment for concessional lines of credit to support the economic development of African countries and for regional integration. These have been augmented by significant private sector flows through FDI into Africa. Both Africa and India will work together to enhance the efficacy and spread

of these financial flows so that the common objectives are fully met. India remains committed to supporting Africa with concessional lines of credit and suitable grants for mutually beneficial projects. Greater efforts will be made to utilize these flows for regional integration projects.

There would be an increasing focus to enhance engagement between African and Indian financial institutions and an encouragement for closer relationship between commercial banks in Africa and India. Encouragement will be provided to the opening of branches of Indian banks in Africa and African banks in India to participate in the growing matrix of financial flows between Africa and India.

v. Regional Integration

Africa and India reiterate the importance of the Regional Economic Communities in Africa and their contribution to economic integration within themselves and in Africa. India has an important engagement with the Regional Economic Communities of Africa as part of its multi-tiered cooperation. Both Africa and India recall the first ever meeting of India with the African RECs held in November 2010. In recognition of this, both Africa and India agree to build capacities for effectively carrying out the implementation of the integration agenda among the Regional Economic Communities, including in providing financial support to regional integration projects and capacity building programmes among the RECs.

2. POLITICAL COOPERATION

Africa and India are conscious of the important role they play in the world and agree to intensify political cooperation. Their common endeavour will be to continue to strive for peace and security as such harmonious policies will allow the fructification of the enhanced agenda of cooperation currently agreed upon. In this respect, the African Union would consider, as soon as possible, the establishment of an office in New Delhi, India, as recognition of the close partnership that exists between Africa and India .

i. Peace and Security

Peace and Security are essential to progress and sustainable development, which are common goals for Africa and India. Both Africa and India will continue their close cooperation, including through regular consultations at the United Nations, at the African Union and in New Delhi. Both will work towards an early operationalisation of the African Standby Force through special training programmes.

ii. Civil Society and Governance

Africa and India recognize the importance of democratic governance and of promoting and protecting human rights. They also recognize the importance of decentralization, the promotion of local government and the need to strengthen the institutions of parliamentary democracy and elections. They agree to enhance cooperation by sharing of experiences and capacity building, where necessary, among Election Commissions, the institutions of parliamentary democracy and media organizations. They also agree to cooperate in the strengthening of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights through sharing of best practices and capacity building of the court. Africa and India will also encourage interaction of legal experts/lawyers through

the Bar Associations. They will also exchange experiences on best practices, research and human resources within the framework of decentralization and local governance alongside the Conference of Ministers of Public Services and Administration and ECOSOCC.

3. COOPERATION IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

The development of science & technology and research capacities is an integral part of the process of development. Africa greatly values the progress made by India in its scientific and technological development and believes that it can engage with India in these sectors, especially knowledge and technology transfer for mutual benefit. Africa and India are convinced that harnessing the knowledge economy can make hunger and want things of the past. They agree to intensify cooperation in the following areas:

i. Science and Technology

Africa welcomes the establishment of the Special Agricultural Scholarship Scheme and the Special Science & Technology Fellowship Scheme (CV Raman Fellowships) under the provisions of IAFS-I and looks forward to continuing this engagement to build scientific and technological human resource in Africa, including through the Pan-African University for which Africa has requested India, to be the Lead Partner in the Life and Earth Sciences segment. Management of natural disasters, combating desertification and support to scientific institutions in Africa would continue. Initiatives to enhance linkages between scientific institutions in Africa and India would be undertaken and training on health related issues like HIV, TB and Malaria will be explored. The African-Indian Science and Technology Conference will also be organised.

ii. Information and Communication Technology

Africa has immense regard and admiration for the strides made by India in the development of its information and communications technology. The contribution of the Government of India towards developing the infrastructure and the resourcefulness of the private sector and India's scientific and technological manpower in allowing this sector to make important contributions to the growth of GDP in India, are well recognized in Africa. Africa and India recognize the importance of an early introduction of information and communication technologies as key enablers of capacity building for youth and for poverty eradication and accelerated growth. Africa recognizes the important contribution made by the Pan-African E-Network Project to African countries in achieving these objectives and both Africa and India commit themselves to taking the lessons of the implementation and efficacy of the Pan-African E-Network Project further, so that the digital divide can be bridged and the socio-economic benefits of ICT can be harnessed for their mutual objectives.

4. COOPERATION IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Africa and India both recognize the importance of capacity building, particularly as both are young societies and want to translate the demographic dividend into effective growth. The successful utilization of the ITEC programme offered by India has been a

manifestation of the South-South Cooperation that effectively exists between Africa and India. The enhancement of scholarships and training positions under the ITEC programme, as well as the creation of new courses for training of African nationals in specified areas, all emerge from the Action Plan of the Framework of Cooperation of IAFS-I. Africa and India would endeavour to continue to take these important initiatives forward together. India is committed to their enhancement.

Africa has been appreciative of the 21 new capacity building institutions which India is in the process of establishing in Africa in diverse sectors. These will greatly assist African human resource development for the development of industries and the service sector to contribute to growth. Both India and Africa will continue to strive to have an early conclusion of the implementation of the process to establish these new institutions in close collaboration between the Indian implementing agencies, the host governments and the African Union. They will make efforts to have effective governance strategies and business plans for these institutions to make them sustainable. India remains committed to further enhancement of this approach of building African capacities in Africa.

Pan-Africa E-Network Project: Africa and India have both recognized the successful implementation of this visionary project. It has added capacity and value in the critical fields of education and health care in African countries. Its fulsome utilization will remain one of the major objectives of the Framework of Enhanced Cooperation and efforts will be made to enhance its utilization, widen its scope and increase its success rate so that the true objectives of assisting Africa in meeting its millennium development goals on education and health could be achieved.

Africa and India will continue to work together to increase exchanges in education, health, water and sanitation, culture and sports and poverty eradication through innovative new programmes as well as commit themselves to effective implementation of programmes agreed upon earlier in the Action Plan for the Framework of Cooperation. Special care would be taken to encourage greater investment in some of these sectors as well as to increase financial flows from the government sector to achieve these objectives. India is committed to continue with increasing number of scholarships both for under-graduate and post-graduate studies including in specialized areas like agriculture, science & technology and other priorities listed in this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.

5. COOPERATION IN HEALTH, CULTURE AND SPORTS

a) Health

In the area of health, Africa and India reiterate their conviction that the promotion of health is critical in the development of the human capital necessary to drive socio-economic growth. They look forward to the outputs and recommendations of the India-Africa workshop on Traditional medicine to be held in India and undertake to implement the outcome. They reaffirm their commitment to enhance collaboration in the application of advancement in science, technology, research and development to training in the area of HIV, TB and Malaria; the provision of basic medical services in rural areas, the deployment of Telecoms and ICTs in support of tele-medicine and e-health applications; strengthening of public-private sector collaboration in the areas of pharmaceutical and procurement in Africa and India in the framework of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa, the fight against counterfeit medicines.

They also undertake to pursue dialogue on intellectual property rights and access to medicines; research and development in traditional medicine and practices in Africa and India; sharing of experiences, specialized expertise and best practices in healthcare systems development and community health programmes; support for Africa's Campaign on Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA); and training and continuing education for health professionals;

b) Culture

Noting the role that Culture can play in the development and integration of their societies, specifically through the use of creative and cultural industries, Africa and India agree to collaborate in the development of cultural policies and will undertake the following: Exchange of experiences in the area of the development of creative industries and cultural goods so as to increase the contribution of culture to the development of their nations and collaborate in the organization of international training for trainers in the field of cultural goods protection.

c) Sports

Considering the paramount role that sports can play in the development and integration of their societies, specifically through the use of sports as a tool for development and desirous to advocate for well-designed sports and play programmes, as powerful tools for fostering health, child and individual development, teaching positive values and life skills, strengthening education and improving health and well being; Africa and India agree to collaborate in the development of sports policies; exchange of experiences in the area of the development of sports and the training of trainers in the field of qualified sports personnel;

5. COOPERATION IN TOURISM

Africa and India are deeply conscious of their age-old ties at the people to people level. As neighbors across the Indian Ocean, Africa and India are in favour of providing greater connectivity between the countries of Africa and India and to increase the level of popular exchanges. Tourism and connectivity remain important areas which could provide economic benefits and also contribute to enhance mutual understanding. Africa and India therefore, agree to strengthen partnership with the private sector especially, travel agencies, hotels, airlines and other tourism related establishments, as well as the media, and take other necessary steps that will enable harmonization of policies and norms in tourism with a view to advancing tourism development between the two sides.

6. COOPERATION IN INFRASTRUCTURE, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

Africa and India, fully cognizant of the immense requirements of dealing with issues pertaining to infrastructure, energy and environment, reiterate their commitment to focus on these areas, particularly in the context of sustainable development as important areas of cooperation. They dedicate themselves to fulfilling programmes established under the Action Plan and to look at enhanced engagement in areas such as the continental NEPAD-Identified infrastructure projects and PIDA, particularly with regard to increasing financial flows to these sectors. This will provide a better environment for

greater investment in these sectors. They agree to work closely together in the interest of developing countries to set an appropriate international agenda to benefit the development of both Africa and India. Efforts will be made to give more attention to new areas like new and renewable energies through training programmes and capacity building as well as in sustainable environmental practices. The concessional credit flows from India would be channeled in a wider manner into infrastructure projects. They agree to cooperate in the area of environment, including desertification and support for Africa's Great Green Wall project.

7. COOPERATION IN THE AREA OF MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

The successful implementation of the decisions of the first Africa-India Forum Summit emanating from the Framework Cooperation and its Action Plan have brought qualitative change into the existing relationship between Africa and India. The depth and diversity of the relationship has significantly altered and the traditional engagement has successfully moved towards a modern functional partnership. However, there remains an uneven recognition of this, particularly in the public mind which requires to be addressed. At the same time, Africa needs greater opportunities to bring its own media and communications to an independent growth path in recognition of its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic identities.

Africa and India therefore agree to promote a larger number of visits between African and Indian editors and journalists, academicians, scholars and civil society representatives, so that closer interaction envisaged in this Framework for Enhanced Cooperation can be suitably disseminated. In this respect, consideration will be given to the training of African media personnel with a view to capacity building and improving their skills.

Without prejudice to India's ongoing and future programmes at the bilateral, REC and other levels, it is agreed to jointly revise, within a period of six months, the Joint Plan of Action to fully reflect the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation. This Joint Plan of Action will also incorporate a follow-up mechanism which will ensure the effective implementation of programmes and activities agreed in the Plan.

Done at Addis Ababa, this 25th day of May 2011.

Tripoli Declaration

3rd Africa EU Summit

(Tripoli, 29/30 November 2010)

We, Heads of State and Governments of Africa and the European Union, representing more than 1.5 billion citizens have gathered in Tripoli on 29 – 30 November 2010 determined to seize together new opportunities for broader and mutually beneficial initiatives.

The Partnership between Africa and the European Union is one of the most enduring global relationships and is of strategic significance to both sides. We will continue the work launched at the Cairo Summit in 2000 and Lisbon Summit in 2007, where we decided to put our relations on a new, equal and strategic level. We confirm the Joint Africa –EU Strategy as the framework for our future cooperation and adopt the Action Plan 2011 – 13 as our new commitment to the realisation of this Partnership.

With many states celebrating fifty years of independence, Africa is more than ever on the eve of a fundamental evolution offering new opportunities and perspectives towards enhanced integration and improved sustainable development, within the framework of the African Union that aspires for a united, peaceful and prosperous continent. At the same time, the Treaty of Lisbon marks a new phase for the European Union. Both developments further enhance and strengthen the Africa –EU partnership.

Since we met 3 years ago, the world has undergone an accelerated process of globalisation and faced an unprecedented financial and economic crisis. This requires our Partnership to be more responsive and to take an increasing part in the reform of the global governance system, including availing wider opportunity for Africa and the EU to be fairly represented. Our partnership should guide the transformations the world needs: tackle the effects of climate change, conflict prevention, good governance, achieve a sustainable energy market including investment particularly in renewable energy resources, develop infrastructure, provide food security, achieve the Millennium Development Goals, combat HIV/AIDS, address the realities and challenges of migration and its links to development, as well as to promote gender equality. We step-up our joint efforts especially in encouraging investment growth, creating employment and work for the young generations entering the labour market, notably in Africa.

Spreading the success of entrepreneurship, we are committed to promoting the private sector as a key driver of inclusive and sustainable economic growth and an important actor in providing for more equal and balanced development. To flourish, this private investment needs, a transparent and well-governed business environment, partnerships with the public sector, better productivity, social protection of workers both in formal and informal economies, together with reinforced efforts of education and technology transfer in order to promote a knowledge based Society. We recognize the equally important dimension of regional integration for growth and development and commit to conclude Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) that support socio-economic development, regional integration and the integration of Africa into the global economy.

Mindful of the additional efforts needed to reach the Millennium Development Goals in Africa by 2015, we will reinvigorate our concerted efforts to address all MDG

targets, taking account of those countries and targets most off track and paying particular attention to the most vulnerable and marginalised people. We consider that all available financing for development, both domestic and external, traditional as well as innovative, need to support sustainable economic growth and employment in Africa which are key for achieving the MDGs.

2010 being the African year of peace and security, we attach utmost importance to all efforts of conflict prevention, reconciliation, justice and post conflict reconstruction and development for the sake of people undergoing conflict. As the international community marks the 10th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, both sides stressed the role of women in efforts to achieve sustainable peace and security. Peace and security remain a cornerstone of our cooperation. We are committed to making the African Peace and Security Architecture fully operational in close collaboration with the regional organizations. As regards AU lead Peace operations, it was agreed to work towards ensuring flexible, predictable and sustainable funding.

We will continue our concerted efforts to bring the Somali conflict to an end, to stabilize the internal situation and to promote timely post-conflict reconstruction and development efforts. To these ends, we will continue working together in support of a strengthened AMISOM, as well as of the Somali Security Forces, extending support to the TFG in the framework of a reinvigorated comprehensive political strategy. On Sudan, we emphasise the urgency and importance of ensuring that all elements of the CPA, including those concerning Abyei, South Kordofan and Blue Nile, are implemented in a timely, peaceful and credible manner, in particular the referendum on South Sudan whose results should be accepted by all. Furthermore, we encourage all parties to progress with the post referendum issues. In this context, we welcome the leadership of the AU in close cooperation with the UN as well as the support provided by the AUHIP led by President Mbeki, and by IGAD. We welcome in particular the progress made and agreements reached on the framework regarding outstanding CPA issues.

Our cooperation will continue to build on our common values and goals in pursuit of good governance, democracy and the rule of law. We firmly condemn all unconstitutional changes of governments which, alongside bad governance, are one of the main causes of instability. We are united in the fight against impunity at national and international level and the protection of human rights on both continents. We emphasize the need to strengthen national legal systems and the international cooperation in the pursuit of justice, peace and reconciliation, including the prosecution of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, taking into cognizance the positions of the African and the European Union. We condemn all forms of terrorism and will cooperate closely in addressing this international threat and its various sources of financing. We also condemn intolerance in all its forms and will address this phenomenon as well as cooperate closely, including in the UN, in addressing trans-national threats of, inter-alia, piracy, dumping of toxic waste, organized crime and illegal trafficking, including human trafficking. We jointly agree to address Maritime security challenges of particular concern to both continents including pollution of seas and oceans.

Africa and the EU will work together to ensure more effective participation and improved cooperation in international bodies, including the United Nations General Assembly, and the G20. We will further strengthen our high level political dialogue aiming at a better coordinated approach and joint positions in international negotiations. We emphasize the importance of an effective multilateralism and reaffirm our determination to ensure that multilateral institutions are the main fora for international

cooperation on peace and security, human rights and democracy and on global governance. In this context, we recognize the need to pursue the reform of the main UN bodies with a view to making the overall UN system more effective and transparent and which should be reflective of the substantial changes the international community and UN membership have undergone.

We welcome the results of the numerous side-events which have contributed to the success of this Summit and which demonstrate the dynamics of our Strategic Partnership and the effective involvement of a broad range of stakeholders. We also take careful note of recommendations from these events.

We positively note that the EU accounts for more than a half of global ODA and reaffirms its commitment to increasing its aid spending to reach the collective target of 0.7% of Gross National Income by 2015. We also welcome, based on the average flow of EU ODA for Africa per year, both by Member States and the EU, and following existing commitments for the period of the next three years, that more than € 50 billion of ODA will be made available to support the overall objective of this Partnership.

We express our gratitude to the Leader of the Revolution and people of the Great Socialist Peoples' Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the care, hospitality and attention extended to the participants of this Summit.

We decide to reconvene in Brussels in 2013.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSOCIATES

The Review of International Affairs is a quarterly published in January, April, July and October every year.

The periodical publishes evaluated articles and conference and book reviews in the field of international relations, foreign policy, international public law and international economics.

In writing all contributions for *The Review of International Affairs* authors are kindly asked to respect the following rules.

Instructions for Writing Articles

1. Author contributions (articles) should not be longer than 10 single-spaced pages (single) in *Word* format (up to 28000 characters with spaces).
2. Articles should be written in *Times New Roman* font, font size 12, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.
3. The title of the article should be written in capital letters, *in Bold*, font size 14. The title is separated from the text with – *spacing before 18 pt.* Below the title is given the author's forename, middle name and surname (including his title, possibly), the name of the institutions he works for as well as its seat. These data are given in *Italic*.

Example:

Prof. Dragana Marko Mitrović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade

4. If the author has a wish to point to his readers that some of the views presented in the article express his own opinion and not the one of the institution he works for it is necessary to insert at the end of the title a special footnote with the symbol * for this remark.
5. The *Abstract* should contain not more than 100 words, presenting the most significant hypotheses the work is based upon. Below the *Abstract* the author puts up to 12 *Key Words*. Both the *Abstract* and *Key Words* are given below the title of the article and they should be separated from the rest of the text by applying the option *Paragraph-Indentation*.
6. The *Summary* written in the language of the paper (e.g. Serbian) should be placed after the text. The author should give a concise contents of the paper and the most significant hypothesis his work is based upon.
7. The basic text and footnotes should be justified by applying the option *justify*, while titles should be centred by applying the option *center*.
8. Subtitles are written in *Bold*, while sub-subtitles are in *Italic*; in both cases the font size is 12.

9. The first line in every paragraph should by no means be indented by applying tabulator – option *tab*.

10. Latin, Old Greek and other non-English words and terms in the text should be written in *Italic* (e.g. *status quo*, *a priori*, *de facto*, *acquis communautaire*, etc.). The text should contain full names and not initials.

11. Only the following form of quotation marks should be put in the text – “ and ”. In case the additional quotation marks are to be put within these ones it should be done in the following way: “Establishing a Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community in Kosovo, as an integral part of comprehensive ‘final status’ settlement”.

12. Footnotes should be written on the bottom of the page (option *Footnote*), and their marks are solely to be put at the end of the sentence.

The details on the quoted bibliographic unit in footnotes should be given in conformity with the following suggestions:

a) *Monographs*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the monograph (*in Italic*), publisher, place of publishing, year of publishing, p. if one page of the quotation in English is cited, pp. if several pages are quoted. In case several pages are quoted En Dash is applied with no space before and after the numbers (for example 22–50).

When the proceedings in English are quoted and they were edited by more than one editor, then there should be put (eds) in brackets with no full stop after the names of the editors. If there is only one editor then (ed.) is put, including a full stop inside the brackets.

Examples:

John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 221.

Duško Lopandić (ed.), *Regional initiatives in Southeast Europe: multilateral cooperation programs in the Balkans*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 24–32.

Theodor Winkler, Brana Marković, Predrag Simić & Ognjen Pribičević (eds), *European Integration and the Balkans*, Center for South Eastern European Studies, Belgrade & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneva, 2002, pp. 234–7.

b) *Articles in Scientific Journals*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the paper (with quotation marks), the title of the journal (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, pp. from–to. The numbers of pages are separated by En Dash (–), with no space. If some data are incomplete it should be clearly stated.

Examples:

Michael Levi, “The Organisation of Serious Crimes”, in: Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 878–84. (pp. 878–9 or p. 878).

Robert J. Bunker & John. R. Sullivan, “Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences”, *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 55–76.

c) *Articles in Daily Newspapers and Journals*

There should be given the author's name (or his initials, if they are the only ones given), the title of the article – with quotation marks, the title of the newspapers or the journal (*in Italic*), date – in Arabic numerals, the number of the page/pages.

Example:

John Gapper, "Investor votes should count", *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, p. 9.

d) *Document quotation*

There should be given the title of the document (with quotation marks), the article, item or paragraph the author refers to, the title of the journal or official gazette containing the document (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, the place of publishing and year of publishing.

Example:

"Resolution 1244 (1999)", Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

e) *Quotation of sources from the Internet*

It should contain the author's name, the title of the contribution or article, a full Internet Website that enables to access the source of quotation by typing the mentioned site, the date of accession to the Web page, page number (if there is one and if presented in PDF format).

Example:

Maureen Lewis, *Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?*, IBRD & World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, Internet, [http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/\\$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf](http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf), 14/09/2004, p. 3.

f) *Repeating of the previously quoted sources*

Ibid. or ibidem is applied only if quoting the previous source in the text, with the page number, and in case the new quotation belongs to the same source (e.g. *ibid.*, p. 11)

Loc. cit. or op. cit. is applied with no page number and only for the previously mentioned source of quotation with the same page number as the previously quoted source.

13. The article may contain tables or some other supplements (such as maps, graphs, and the like). It is necessary to give their number and full title (e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy*). If the supplement is taken over from the contribution of some other author or a document its source should necessarily be given.

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1. Conference and book reviews should not be longer than two and a half pages in *Word* format (line spacing *singe*), or they should actually contain no more than 7500 characters with spaces.
2. The bibliographic details should be given at the beginning of the review in accordance with the rules prescribed for monographs in footnotes, and with the total number of pages given at the end (e.g. p. 345).

3. Book and conference reviews must not contain footnotes, while all possible remarks should be put in brackets.
4. The author may also write subtitles of the book or conference review in capital letters – font size 14, although this is subject to changes on the part of the editorial staff.
5. Font size, font and justification of the text should be in conformity with the previously mentioned suggestions on writing of articles.
6. The name of the author of the review is given at the end; it should be in *Italic*, while the whole surname should be written in capital letters (e.g. *Žaklina NOVIČIĆ*).

* * * * *

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