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ABSTRACT

The authors argue that diplomacy as a higher-order cooperative activity is possibly only against the backdrop of assumptions about a prior disposition of those taking part in it to reach out to their counterparts not only rationally, but also emotionally. While the traditional, negotiations-based model of diplomacy continues to be verbally depicted as the generic model for diplomacy as a whole, it is essentially a negative stereotype that portrays diplomatic relations as compromise-seeking efforts between otherwise entrenched opposed positions. Modern diplomacy transcends this traditional model and can thus be called "integrative diplomacy": it arises from broadening perceptions of common identities and similarities between the various communities, and thus rests much more on empathy, sympathy and solidarity than the negotiations-based model. It is thus not surprising that the integrative methodology of diplomacy makes it predominantly multilateral, as opposed to structurally fundamentally bilateral traditional negotiations.

Keywords: diplomacy, internationalisation, conflict-resolution, empathy.

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Controversies and pleasantries: A parallelism

Modern diplomacy in Europe is faced with a paradox. It takes place in an enlarged diplomatic arena with an increased number of highly diverse actors, who all wish to take part in a common cooperative effort, yet it deals with more regional conflicts than ever in the history of the Cold War. Diplomatic pleasantries are exchanged at the same time as tough negotiation efforts take place. The frameworks of loyalties are no longer clear, because they shift from case to case. Traditional loyalties are often in collision with current circumstances and national interests, and new cooperation drives are frequently soured by the resentment of a party's role in regional conflicts. The pressure that is placed on diplomacy is increasing. The ability of diplomatic negotiators, backed but not always totally covered by strategic advantages of their national assets, or those of the alliances on whose behalf they act, has become the deciding factor of successful conflict-prevention, management and, eventually, resolution.

The game of diplomatic negotiation takes place in a multi-polar world, with a plurality of major strategic interests, in a united Europe and a strengthened trans-Atlantic security partnership, against the backdrop of an increasingly widening rift between those who wish to see the joint European ideal fully realised, and those who want to place the unification process under their strategic control.[3] The pleasantries remain the essential part of the game that makes contact possible, but the controversies are the substance of modern European diplomacy as much as they have ever been.

In this sense, the countries undergoing a period of social and political transition are finding themselves in a new context. Their interdependence is increasing, and the globalization of trade, mutual military assurances and cooperation, cultural contacts and exchange, is reflecting on modern diplomacy as well. Cross-cultural dimensions of diplomacy are an integral part of today's diplomatic skills. Ever more diplomatic efforts, especially those aimed at tackling regional crises, take place under the legitimisation umbrella and sometimes operational coordination of large international organizations, which during the Cold War had played only a minor part in world affairs. Diplomatic bodies decide the fates of nations that are not used to taking those bodies seriously, and are only learning to do so now. Some more stable countries compete for membership in major global decision-making bodies, and sometimes face rejection in the face of their own self-perception as increasingly important for their regions and for the world.

The training of diplomats in this new age must change substantially. The so-called "people skills" will play a much more important role in that training than the traditional disciplines such as history, politics and ideology.

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[3] See Aleksandar Fatić, "Russia courts Southeast Europe", *Contemporary Security Policy*, vol. 31, no. 3, December 2010, pp. 441–64.

The internationalisation of local controversies and conflicts creates the need for a virtual space of diplomatic activity. Modem information technology is taking an increasing slice of modern diplomacy away from the embassies, and consultative decision-making is replacing the traditional "top-to-bottom" negotiation. Regional integration makes national specificity less relevant as a hindrance to cooperation, and more perceivable as an objective variable that is merely to be taken into account in the execution of communal decisions and policies. This seriously questions the traditional sentiments of sovereignty and self-sufficiency, which are facing the necessity of being seriously revised, Conflicts in diplomatic practice thus increasingly emanate from the convulsions of an old era faced with an increased globalization and internationalisation, and less so from differences in the interpretation of what laws and norms say. The phrase "international community" is indicative of this conflict, because it denotes a collective of consultative decision-makers with a substantial clout in military, economic and diplomatic terms, which often tramples the sovereignty of nations undergoing troublesome transitions marked by a lagging back in fully comprehending the new world realities.

The whole picture thus created is additionally complicated by short-term benefit-seeking behavior of specific members of the international community, who take advantage of their cutting-edge positions in certain areas, and impose one-sided decisions on the consultative collectives. This, in turn, leads to a perception of inconsistency of principles within the international community by those "outside it", and makes the job of diplomats dealing with crises "on the ground" more difficult.

Empathy, conflict-resolution

A personal element of modern diplomacy consists of the key role played by more or less charismatic elected officials, whose personal preferences and taste often decide the fate of many negotiations at least as much as "national interest" objectively perceived. This makes for an increasing significance of new methodologies, including inter-personal relations and the ability to put the message across to the interlocutor without eliciting defensive posturing. Such interpersonal dynamics require a number of psychological and emotional pre-requisites, arguably the most important of which is empathy. Without the ability to effectively and transparently empathize with a different community and their political representatives many disputes just cannot be solved without violence. The contemporary situation with terrorism is a poignant example: the principle of "no negotiations with terrorists", while seemingly rational, is in fact a classic case of failed understanding of what terrorism stands for. People willing to commit grave crimes against civilians because they feel that their political or

religious cause has no realistic chance of being effectively addressed through the existing institutions have become so fundamentally alienated from mainstream politics because of the complete lack of empathy for their cause, which is often quite legitimate in itself. Aspirations to autonomous self-governance in an own state can hardly be considered illegitimate, yet if they are systematically blocked throughout the institutional system, some groups will resort to terrorism in order to draw attention to their cause and force the relevant decision-makers to yield to their demands. A global marginalization of certain religious groups may reach the same outcome. While structural violence against groups is not always the motive for terrorism, it usually is: all major terrorist groups, apart from the various sects and Islamic religious zealots, tend to be connected with a political movement that addresses otherwise legitimate interests and right: the Shinn Fein in the Northern Ireland, the Basque movement in Spain, or the Palestinian groups in the Middle East. All of these groups try to address their national cause or their aspiration to a stable statehood through terrorist activity, which they themselves consider a forced strategy that they resort to in the absence of legitimate avenues to address their cause.

Empathy is a crucial element of diplomacy aimed to prevent conflict because it allows us to cross the cultural and geographic divide through an emotional reaching out to the other party: while we may not sufficiently understand the worldview of the Palestinians in Jericho, and may not know enough about their political and religious leaders, their current state of institutional relations with Israel, and the perceptions of political violence within the otherwise gentle and inclusive Palestinian community, a visit to Jericho will do enough to trigger empathy for the people who are above 80% unemployed, forced to cross borders with barbed wire and machine guns pointed at them while they undergo strip search every day, just in order to get to their jobs. We may not understand the rational aspects of the Palestinians' worldview; still, we are able to empathize with them on an emotional level. A diplomacy based on empathy is more likely to generate consensus and compromise than a large degree of rational understanding without the ability to self-identify with the plight of those who we negotiate with.

Generally speaking, our attitudes are shaped as much by emotional as they are by rational considerations. Even the liberal views of justice, which are extremely rationalised in the legion of literature that is being produced constantly about the topic, remain squarely based on emotions: repugnance to crime, corruption and violence, and a feeling that reciprocity is called for in the treatment of those who commit them.[4]

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[4] Robert Solomon, *A passion for justice: Emotions and the origin of the social contract*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1990.

Techniques of conflict-resolution: de-escalation, confidence building, mediation, and economic encouragement

There are 4 basic principles of conflict-resolution, namely de-escalation, confidence building, mediation, and economic encouragement. De-escalation implies efforts aimed at reducing the emotional potential of the conflict to lead to a lasting falling apart of the parties. In cases of ethnic conflict, de-escalation cannot be achieved without establishing an effective control of hate-mongering media.

Confidence-building is closely linked to *de-escalation*, and includes setting up decision-making bodies of mixed ethnic, ideological or racial composition, disseminating information relating to the real problems the communities have, and proposing and supporting projects by local actors aimed at invigorating the collective practical spirit, while ignoring the mutual differences that have, as a rule, been blown out of every proportion by national elites. Confidence-building also includes the setting up of judicial and conflict-prevention institutions and forces that practically warrant to all those who feel that they are in weak and vulnerable positions that no aggressive action will be taken against them by the other sides.

Mediation involves efforts by credible and impartial international actors aimed at facilitating reconciliation and resolution of disputes in an optimally mutually satisfactory way. This, as a rule, excludes the possibility of any maximum solutions from the point of view of any side, and thus promotes the culture of compromise and conciliation.

Finally, *economic encouragement* is essential if a culture of conflict and, for the elites, of gain from the conflict, is to be replaced by a culture of economic welfare and legitimate economic gain. This is especially important in post-autocratic or formerly racially divided states, where the need to secure a lasting cooperation is coupled with the need to promote a peaceful transition to a tolerant society. Economic incentives include international grants and joint ventures with local partners that will create short- and medium-term economic effects to stimulate authentic local economic rationalism and growth. The creation of jobs is a crucial part of economic encouragement, because former soldiers and veterans of social conflicts (including hooligans) tend to become a source of political violence if they remain as disenchanted social stratum of the long-term unemployed, an unwanted legacy of a social conflict that most citizens would rather forget.

One way to understand the role of economic incentive and empathy in resolving social conflicts is to contrast it with the sole use of repression to putatively "stamp out" societal violence. An example of social conflict in some countries is the violence that arises from an intolerance of minority social groups,

such as the gay and lesbian communities. In a recent outbreak of street violence on the occasion of a gay parade in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2010, it became apparent that the group leading the violence was an organization called "Obraz", including mainly young people with strongly heterosexual views who considered the gay community to be based on unnatural and socially unacceptable aspirations to equalise the homosexual and the heterosexual orientation as constructive for the prospects of a society. Subsequently the leader of "Obraz" a young man in his 20s, with no prior criminal record and with a pregnant wife, was convicted of "planning the violence" (although he had been arrested prior to the parade and the violence taking place) and sentenced to 2 years in prison, although the law allows all sentences up to 3 years in duration to be converted to parole. His pregnant wife was sentenced to one year of house arrest. At the same time, a process against the wife of one of the most notorious wartime criminals and assassins from the ranks of the Serbs, the late Željko Arnatović Arkan — Svetlana Ražnatović, known as a popular folk singer, was abruptly finalized by a deal between her and the prosecution. Svetlana Ražnatović, charged for grand corruption because she had illegally sold football players from her late husband's football club, confessed guilt in exchange for one year house arrest and a fine of a million and a half euro.[5] Thus a situation in the public was created where a notorious criminal is sentenced in much the same manner as a young person with no criminal record, guilty of inciting violence out of conviction. The balance of justice, disturbed as it has been by these two verdicts, triggered serious objections to the Serbian judicial system, which is currently under EU review due to irregularities in the appointment of judges and prosecutors.

Clearly justice would have been served better by "social diplomacy", as violence out of conviction is most effectively addressed by mapping out the convictions and their limits, and establishing a dialogue to ensure the recognition of another's conviction or lifestyle. Equally clearly, repression is bound to generate new divisions and reinforce the old ones, especially when sentences are passed flying in the face of other, obviously unjust judicial outcomes, such as that for Svetlana Ražnatović.

Solidarity, trust, and back to empathy

Much has been written about solidarity as the glue of society, or "the social tissue" that allows the smooth running of social interactions and transactions.[6]

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[5] *Pressonline*, Belgrade, 21 April 2011, http://www.pressonline.rs/sr/vesti/vesti_dana/story/ 158650/Vo%C4%91i+%27Obraza%27+dve+godine+zatvora!.html, accessed 23 April 2011.

[6] E.g. Aleksandar Fatić, *Freedom and Heteronomy: An essay on the liberal society*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2009, pp. 5–41.

According to Ian Macneil, solidarity is an element of group dynamics that does not necessarily presuppose trust:

Solidarity or social solidarity is a state of mind or, rather, a state of minds. It is a belief not only in future peace among those involved but also in future harmonious affirmative cooperation. (An equally good word for solidarity is „trust".) Solidarity by no means requires liking the one trusted nor is it dependent upon a belief that the other is altruistic; nor does solidarity necessarily imply friendship, although friendship often is a manifestation of solidarity. From the viewpoint of an individual, he may sacrifice solidarity, enhance it, or even, in theory, maximise it if he has no conflicting goals.[7]

The strictly rationalistic concept of solidarity, while perhaps sufficient to explain why solidarity is desirable, or even necessary, unavoidably leaves out the emotional aspects of why solidarity ought to exist in a society, even if it had no instrumental value. The positive value of a community as opposed to a discrete, a-social individual, which is inherent in Aristotle's infamous definition of man as a "political animal", carries a particular emotional load, and is closely connected with trust. In fact, there are ways to perceive trust as a moral imperative, even in situations where it is exhibited without prior experience. In his *The moral foundations of trust*, Eric Uslaner argues that there is a legitimate moral expectations that we extend to other members of our community that they will trust us, even if they had no prior experience with us, unless, or until, they gain sufficient evidence that we are *not* trustworthy.[8]

The entire argument on whether trust is required for solidarity or not depends on the way one perceives the morality of trust and solidarity. If solidarity is seen as merely desirable for the effective conduct of transactions, which is Macneil's view, then trust, as a partly emotional relationship, may not be part and parcel of solidarity. However, if solidarity is seen as an essential moral requirement in an organic community, which is a view shared by us, and one with a long philosophical history at least from Aristotle onwards, then it includes trust as an emotional and moral relationship that makes solidarity morally desirable; it would be contradictory to claim that solidarity is morally required, while trust is morally neutral, because that would mean that positive moral worth would be attached to solidarity with people of whose actions one disapproves and whom one finds untrustworthy. Morally required solidarity entails that the efforts with which one shows solidarity are in themselves subject of positive moral evaluation. In other words, the subjects of actions that command solidarity are

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[7] Ian R. Macneil, "Exchange revisited: Individual utility and social solidarity", *Ethics*, vol. 96, no. 3, April 1986, pp. 567–93.

[8] Eric M. Uslaner, *The moral foundations of trust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

morally positive characters, thus necessarily trustworthy. Solidarity with an untrustworthy or bad person would not *necessarily* carry a positive moral worth. (It would not necessarily carry a negative moral worth either, and would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but our point is that solidarity as a generally desirable element of social dynamics can only be based on the presupposition of a general trustworthiness of the people with whom solidarity is shown. Some people who are not trustworthy might deserve solidarity due to various considerations, such as our willingness to sacrifice our reputation or interests to help such people, but the principled meaning of solidarity is that of enhancing activities that in themselves are socially constructive: solidarity with those in need means giving, with the courageous ones, acting courageously, with successful athletes, supporting them; however, solidarity with criminals is generally considered a crime in itself, and solidarity with adulterers is considered morally reprehensible. One might show solidarity with a repentant adulterer, in supporting him rather than punishing him, however solidarity in itself as an active principle is then tied to the act of repentance, and not to adultery itself. Thus, once solidarity is seen as a morally tilted relationship, namely as one with positive moral worth, trust is also seen as an inclusive and equally morally worthy relationship.

Let us look, however, at why solidarity and trust are morally worthy. Both relationships ultimately depend on one's ability to identify with another, to share in another's predicament as a human being and as a member of the same political community. Such sharing has cognitive and value-laden aspects: it is easier for us to share the views and predicament of some people than that of others; this cognitively depends on our experience and imagination. In some basic human situations, such as those of the Palestinians in Jericho, however, the cognitive requirements are so low (it is so clear to everyone that the people are suffering) that the emotional aspect of solidarity becomes particularly apparent: the sharing in the easily understandable *emotions* of grief and deprivations. In other words, the emotional side of solidarity is empathy.

Diplomacy, as opposed to conflict, is a cooperative activity aimed at achieving optimum outcomes with the optimum expenditure of resources and within acceptable bounds of social cost. Such parameters clearly require the same dynamic pre-requisites as any other cooperative social activity, including both trust and solidarity. While the diplomatic game, coated in pleasantries, but based on controversies, is far less transparent than many ordinary social interactions and transactions, its effective conduct depends heavily on unsaid norms of honesty: modern diplomacy, due to its dynamism and wide reach, does not tolerate lies. The modern "non-papers", "off-the-record" conversations and diplomatic consultations rest on a clear expectation of truthfulness and confidence; once a diplomatic actor abuses this expectation, he loses credibility

in the long term and sacrifices much of his potential diplomatic effectiveness. Thus the optimum solutions that modern diplomacy seeks are likely to be most readily available in situations where solidarity with the interlocutor and mutual trust, arising from empathy, are opulent.

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3. Solomon, Robert, *A passion for justice: Emotions and the origin of the social contract*, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1990.

4. Macneil, Ian R., "Exchange revisited: Individual utility and social solidarity", *Ethics*, vol. 96, no. 3, April 1986, pp. 567–593.

5. Uslaner, Eric M,. *The moral foundations of trust*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.

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A Scenario of The Development of Organised Crime

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this paper is the evaluation of the development and measurement of organized crime. So far, initial steps have been taken in the measurement of organized crime. We would like to contribute to a more detailed examination of the topic. At the same time, the purpose of the paper is also the study of two comparable projects, OCA and EDGE. The methods used were: a review of domestic and foreign literature, the analysis of the projects OCO and EDGE. We have used the following research methods: an analysis of secondary sources, descriptive method, comparative method, and historical development method. We came to different yet interesting findings in our analysis of the topic: we cannot speak about certainty when we talk about scenarios, we can only talk about likelihood, which is why I turned to the essence of the research carried out — to the problems of methodology. The findings depend on what kind of methodology one chooses for the planning of future trends. The opinion of experts is that the most appropriate methodology and the optimal choice for predicting trends in the future are scenarios. For a description of the situation, and a measurement in the field of organized crime there are number of problems. We have highlighted the following: an inconsistent definition of acquired data and its relevance, the differences in judicial systems and police registers, the impact of social and political factors and the measurement at an international level. It is important to mention that in the past there was a focus on obtaining quantitative data, and that conclusions were made in relation to this data. Today the emphasis is on quantitative data, but still not to a sufficient degree. Much has already been written about scenarios in different areas of science, unlike in research and the forecasting of organized crime, where scenarios are just coming into

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use. This paper deals with the comparison of two important projects in the field of organized crime, OCA and EDGE. We are trying to answer the question of which direction we should go from our situation to secure a successful policy in the area of organized crime and its rapid and effective solution in today's dynamic environment.

Key words: scenarios, organized crime, problems of measurement, project OCO and project EDGE.

1. Introduction

Organized crime is not only a problem of modern society, but it has appeared as a problem since ancient times. In modern society organized crime is looking for and paving the space for its survival — if we understand how it works, we can prepare more effectively and prevent the development of organized crime, as well as try to restrict its operations. We have to ask ourselves if our new way of life (the integration of the EU, liberalism, democracy), together with the freedom of the market, goods and people, is giving more opportunities to organized crime — or can we utilize such a situation and improve our fight against organized crime through a more effective approach. The state, through its repressive apparatus, is trying to do everything in its power to limit organized crime. In searching for solutions we must identify and include possible scenarios of the development of organized crime. If these scenarios are successful, they will lead to an optimal division of resources while at the same time the legislature will be ready to act quickly, possibly even foreseeing a planed scenario and preparing an answer against it.

It is important to understand the history of forecasting trends in organized crime and the parallel history of the development of scenarios. Previously, it was assumed that the future follows the present in a more or less linear line. Now scenarios have begun to be included in the evaluation of the future and my article includes an assessment of the effectiveness and comparability of this tool.[2]

Assuming that the future is a linear continuation of current events is similar to investigating a crime and only assuming one version of the transpired events. According to today's data we can suggest a future trend of organized crime, but with putting fourth this thesis we also have to have an antithesis (and even better would be to include additional changes of variables). With this we can gain a greater range of potential outcome, and by using it in the context of organized crime, we can say that this approach can improve and speed up the planning policies for the repression of organized crime.

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[2] Tom Vander Beken, (co-ordinator), Kristof Verfaillie, Melanie Defruytier, *Draft Methodology: Preparatory Document for the Second Research Group Meeting: Project OCO*, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy – Ghent University, Brussels, 2005, p. 4.

Forecasting future trends in organized crime is very important for the work of security agencies. Security agencies have to defend the values of society and help establish order, which is essential for the survival of the system and also of society. Any study or research on security helps to improve the practical and operational work. Organized crime is particularly dangerous to the values of society, as it is trying to establish a system based on ethically questionable methods, which lead to chaos and disintegration. Emphasis is being put on the multidimensional assessment of threats to national security, where the cooperation between state and non-state organizations must be reached.[3] With the thought of forecasting the development of organized crime, we will turn to the current projects OCO and EDGE, and we will try to evaluate the work and findings obtained by the researchers.

1.1. Defining the concept of project OCO and edge

As the name suggests, the Organized Crime Outlook project aims to identify future trends in organized crime. As a measurement of organized crime, the OCO project is crucial, as it represents the beginning of the use of the tool of the methodology of scenarios at the EU level and three European countries.

Since 1993, the EU members are obliged to send an annual report on organized crime to Europol. The consequence is the OCO project, which not only estimates the current situation in the field of organized crime, but also notes how the situation is going to turn out in the future. As defined in the OCO project itself, it is a part of the joint action plan of the European Union and Europol for the prevention of organized crime and their response to it.[4] The survey was carried out in three countries (Slovenia, Sweden and Belgium) and at the EU level. Expectations of the methodology (OCO) is that it will ensure a more active and strategic planning on organized crime in the future.[5]

The pilot project in Slovenia was carried out by the Institute of Criminology at the Faculty of Law, which is a member of the University of Ljubljana, from

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[3] Iztok Prezelj (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete — omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Gorazd Meško, Bojan Dobovšek), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo. Ljubljana, 2007, p. 13.

[4] Matjaž Jager, Polona Mozetič, Bernarda Tominc, Boštjan Valenčič, Izbrani scenariji razvoja organizirane kriminalitete v Sloveniji leta 2015. *Raziskovalno poročilo: Projekt "Organised Crime Outlook" (OCO) — verzija v slovenskem jeziku.* Ljubljana, Inštitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani, 2005, p. 3.

[5] Ibid. p. 5.

6.7.2005 to 31.8.2005. The head of the group was doc. dr. Matjaž Jager, and the other representatives of the group were Mozetič Polona, uni. dipl. iur., Bernarda Tominc, uni. dipl. pol. and Boštjan Valenčič, uni. dipl. iur.[6]

The project in essence continues at the European level through the organization EDGE (European interdisciplinary analytical project) in collaboration with AGIS (the institution which made the design for the project OCO). It takes place in a context of evolving methodologies, studying the movement of criminal money. The project was divided into three phases:

1. national and international flows of criminal money — survey by European police forces,
2. national and international flows of criminal money — identifying the development by 2012,
3. assessment of the used scenario methodologies.[7]

As can be observed in these three phases of the project, all refer more or less to the financial movement of capital — they would like to find a solution to the question of the financial background of organized crime in connection with the assumption that it originates from the desire of profit and that, consequently, this forces organized crime onto the laundering of illegally obtained money.

The whole project lasted 18 months, from 1.12.2005 to 31.5.2007. The first phase was carried out in the first half of 2006, the second in the end of 2006, and the third during the first half of 2007.[8]

2. Problems of measuring organised crime

The fact that organized crime groups operate in secrecy is a big problem for the detection of the said groups, so the first problem can be defined as the perception of the range and quantity of illegal activities by criminal organizations. In this area we could add crimes that at first glance and given the data collected do not fall under organized crime, therefore operational experts are grouping them behind other offenses.

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[6] Matjaž Jager, Polona Mozetič, Bernarda Tominc, Boštjan Valenčič, Izbrani scenariji razvoja organizirane kriminalitete v Sloveniji leta 2015. *Raziskovalno poročilo: Projekt "Organised Crime Outlook" (OCO) – verzija v slovenskem jeziku.* Ljubljana, Inštitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani, 2005, p. 3.

[7] Tom Schulte, (leader of the project), Boberg, M., El-Samalouti, P., Mähs, S., Mönnikes, M., Mückenhausen, F., Velten, T. *Project documents: Criminal Money Management: Project outline and Questionnaire*, A European Interdisciplinary Analysis Project – EDGE, 2007, p. 6.

[8] Ibid. p. 11.

Significant difficulties in obtaining quantitative data by the police are well defined by the Canadian research, which highlighted the following:

– a characteristic of organized crime is its hidden operation (resulting in more difficult detection);

– a link between the participants usually means a lower possibility of reporting a crime (in prostitution, drugs, betting ...);

– the first details of an investigation do not suggest that it is about organized crime, so it is not defined as such;

– policing priorities are dependent on resources which are normally intended for the search and detection of the organized crime which is the most problematic in a specific area for the society at a given time.[9]

If we look at the problem of the gathered data, the measurement of organized crime is, according to the authors Meško and Dobovšek faced with the following problems:[10]

– different definitions of organized crime,

– the adequacy of the acquired data,

– the differences in judicial systems and police registration methods

– the impact of other socio-political factors (media, politics, business, etc.)..

Now we will try to describe each of the following problems of the gathered data and try to critically evaluate the findings. Later on we will try to determine how the OCO project responded and tackled these problems.

2.1. Defining the concept of organised crime

The authors Meško and Dobovšek deal with the problems of measurement of organized crime — they point out the challenges and limitations in measuring.[11] They deal with the problem of the definition of organized crime and expose that there were attempts at a uniform definition, but that these attempts were quite unsuccessful – or they conveyed a definition which was too general. The problem of the definition is that it should cover a wide range of

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9 Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, *An investigation into the Feasibility of Collecting Police-Level Data.* Organised Crime in Canada, 2008. Available at: http://dsp-psd.tpsgc.gc. ca/Collection/Statcan/85-556-X/85-556-XIE2002001.pdf (accessed 8 January 2009), p. 22.

10 Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 103-31.

11 Ibid. p. 103.

criminal activities, which vary according to time and place. In finding the most appropriate definition, it is necessary to define the criteria which will encompass a description of organized crime in its entirety. There is also the problem of too broad a definition of organized crime, so it is assumed that it would be better to talk about its characteristics.

Klaus von Lampe warns us about the various definitions and lists more than 100 different definitions of organized crime worldwide.[12] The problem is all the more striking because the definitions vary according to international safety authorities, who should solve this problem as soon as possible for security reasons. Cross-border cooperation is quite dependent on the effective international perception of crime.

For comparison, let us examine the definition of Interpol and the definition of the United Nations.

Interpol defines organized crime as "Any group having a corporate structure whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption."[13] The United Nations determines an organized criminal group as "a structured group of three or more persons who, over an extended period of concerted action, commit one or more serious crimes that are defined in the Convention, directly or indirectly, in order to gain a financial or other material benefit."[14] When one country is working by the definition of Interpol and another by the definition of the United Nations, the problem may be that organized crime figures vary, and there may be operational problems in communications between different security agencies.

Lilijana Selinšek gives good explanation of the separation between crime and criminality.[15] She says that the definition of crime is "an activity which covers offenses." Criminality covers a broader scope, which qualifies as "any crime committed, (or more detailed) any crime committed over a particular time and executed in a particular area."

For economic criminality, different authors have the following to say:

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[12] http://www.organized-crime.de/.

[13] Klaus Lampe, von, *Definitions of Organised Crime*. Organised Crime Research, 2008. Available at: http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm#interpol (accessed 8 January 2009), p. 1.

[14] Matjaž Jager,. Polona Mozetič, Bernarda Tominc, Boštjan Valenčič, Izbrani scenariji razvoja organizirane kriminalitete v Sloveniji leta 2015. *Raziskovalno poročilo: Projekt "Organised Crime Outlook" (OCO) – verzija v slovenskem jeziku.* Ljubljana, Inštitut za kriminologijo pri Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani, 2005, p. 5.

[15] Lilijana Selinšek, *Korporacijska delinkvenca s poudarkom na posebnem delu Kazenskega zakonika,* Doktorska disertacija, Pravna fakulteta, Maribor, 2005, p. 29.

– the basic thrust of this type of crime is to achieve large (illegal) gains with relatively low risk and

– that there is a wide range of phenomena that can not be covered by a single definition.

This indicates that both organized crime and economic crime are facing similar problem of a non-uniform definition.

The definition of organized crime is important for the separation of different types of offenses. At the same time, according to a standard definition, measurement and comparisons can be established on both a national and an international level. These cannot be comparable if there is no unified definition. The problem arises in collecting data on organized crime, since the data is normally collected according to the needs of a specific (operational) body.[16] A definition is much more difficult, since the phenomena of organized crime is a rather intangible concept. Lampe talks about construct rather than the subject of study.[17]

2.2. Acquired data and its relevance

Data analysis may be based on official statistics, victimological studies, the subjective assessment of risk to citizens or on assessment of non-governmental organizations.[18] The author Duyn believes that we have obtained a large amount of statistics, but the quality of these depends on the selected methodology and definitions of organized crime.[19]

Depending on the source of the obtained data there are differences in the conclusions and findings of an investigation. If the data is based only on official statistics, the problem will be in the dark and gray areas, since there is a large

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[16] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, p. 104.

[17] Klaus von Lampe, "The Interdisciplinary Dimensions of the Study of Organised Crime", *Trends in Organized Crime,* 9(3), 2006, pp.77−95. Available at: http://www.organized-crime.de/kvlInterdiscDimStudyOC-TOC-9-3-2006.pdf (accessed 8 January 2009), p. 6.

[18] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete — omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 103-4.

[19] Petrus C. von Duyne, Almir Maljević, Maarten van Dijck, Klaus von Lampe, James L. Newell, *The Organisation of Crime for Profit: Conduct, Law and Measurement,* Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, p. 2.

unexplored (so-called "gray") area of crime. Combining data from different sources would be optimal, since only then can we obtain as accurate data as possible.

So far, official police data is the primary source for research on organized crime. The EU gives priority to quantitative statistics gained by the police. Based on this data, the EU and other countries are preparing further strategies of fighting organized crime.[20]

For analytical processing, operational data is not the most appropriate, as it is usually collected for short-term action and rapid response. Operative agents who collect information are driven by the legal code, where the primary objective is to collect data quickly and efficiently. The operative agent will perceive much of the information as arising from suspicious circumstances which he will not include in the pooled data, since this will lead to a heuristic truth, which is less important than legal action. For "the truth of law", evidence and facts are what lead to charges against a suspect. The sanctions and legal definition of a criminal act will depend on this data — as will the trial case. Because of this, we can be more skeptical towards data collected for the purpose of law, at least when it comes to analytical findings. In its essence, the gathering of quality analytical data sometimes a large amount of data which may be unconventional in terms of a trial case or establishing the truth (for example — we can take a confirmed suspicion by a witness who refuses to testify in court, etc.).

2.3. Differences between the judicial systems and police registers

Both the judicial system and the official police register affect the statistical analysis of organized crime. The various definitions that have been made in Slovenia by police or judiciary after the year 2000 testify to the importance of the definition in different types of crime (see Table 2.3). As can be seen from the table, organized crime has been growing since the year 2000, but then fell when a different definition of a crime was accepted — from 1116 to 898 cases. The change is more than 10%, which significantly affects the timeliness of the repeated analytical processing of this data. These changes should be considered and noted in later processing.

Looking at table 2.3 and monitoring data from 2000 onwards, we are surprised by the downward trend in organized crime. Experts believe that this

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[20] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, p. 105.

reflects the increasing emphasis on organization and the complexity of organized crime, which affects the detection and statistical monitoring.[21] Classic crime is rising sharply, while organized crime is in a sharp decline — in this we can see an ambiguity concerning the representativeness of this data. In the processing of data, we must rely on the information obtained, and if this is our only resource, we can come to incorrect conclusions.

Table 2.3: Different types of crime in numbers during
the years 1991–2004.

Type of crime Year	Classic crime	Economic crime	Organized crime
1991	40 086	2 164	/
1992	51 209	2 876	/
1993	41 725	3 235	/
1994	38 864	4 771	/
1995	34 016	4 162	735
1996	31 611	4 976	1 263
1997	32 313	4 860	1 038
1998	49 754	5 719	1 136
1999	57 914	4 922	1 116
2000	61 280	6 337	898
2001	67 580	7 215	924
2002	68 691	8 527	551
2003	69 475	7 168	388
2004	80 743	5 825	225

Source: Poročilo o organiziranih kriminalnih združbah v RS (1998) in organizirani kriminaliteti (2004, 2003, 2002, 2001)[22]

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[21] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 106-10.

[22] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete — omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, p. 109.

Anželj notes that the trend of organized crime is not in a decline but is in fact increasing.[23] Not only is there an increase in the number of offenses committed, but also that there are new manifestations of structural shifts in the direction of an increase of serious and violent crimes, as well as an increased level of professionalism in crime. Change is also seen in organized crime, where the perpetrators are becoming more organized, equipped and armed, in the Slovenian environment there is a notable occurrence of foreign criminal groups, etc.. Anželj disputes the data collection of today, as the procedures are suited to the monitoring of conventional crime. We can only determine indirectly from the investigated cases whether they are about organized criminal activity.

Information on organized crime in Slovenia reflects the subjective opinion of a large number of people. First, there are criminal investigators who are directly confronted with the crimes themselves. In the second row there are analytical services, which are aimed primarily on assessing the state of organized crime. Finally, there are experts who decide whether organized crime is increasing or decreasing.[24] For the information obtained, this means the transition of information through the layers of views of different people with different intentions and capabilities. For the final analysis, which receives this information enriched and to some extent subjective, it is important that this information is be taken with caution.

2.4. The impact of social and political factors

In society there is a considerable pressure from the public and politics that security institutions should be effective on their field of operation. This leads to a so called adjustment of data by the institutions, because they want to keep a positive image of their organization. On the other hand, the police and judicial register depends on the willingness of the people to comply or work with certain bodies. Such cooperation is dependent on factors such as confidence in the authorities in providing effective protection against criminals, etc.. In the field of policy there is an importance in the integration and connection of safety authorities on a global or a European level, since the information obtained is dependent on the definition of organized crime, which means it is easier to

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[23] Darko Anželj, "Slovenska policija v procesu prilagajanja Evropski uniji", *Teorija in praksa*, No. 39(4), 2002, p. 715.

[24] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, p. 110.

compare data among different organizations.[25] Any connection between the countries is a step forward towards a more effective and speedier investigation, and subsequently to a better comparison of data.

The authors Morash, Haarr and Kwak have dealt with stress in police work and found that the police work is affected by different social factors: the level of crime, the size of the community which the police covers, a perceived value of the police in society, etc.[26] All of these factors consequently affect the detection of crime and the collection of data on crime. For example, high levels of crime will affect officers who will have a more negative view of the situation than they otherwise would. Thus any crime committed will be seen by officers as much worse than it actually might be, this will mean that crimes will be reported more seriously than they normally might be.

2.5. The problems of measuring on an international level

The latest information on organized crime and a greater attention to monitoring of it in the Western world is reflected in the understanding of experts that the new global way of life means not only greater mobility of people, goods and services, but also of modern crime.[27] Today, when we talk about organized crime, we are talking about transnational crime, as most of it is based on international integration, which does not look at national boundaries.

Moore points out that we recently witnessed a trend where crime is increasingly more organized and internationalized. As an example he gives the drug trafficking which takes place in several countries simultaneously. For example, processing takes place in one country, production in another, and sales in a third. Therefore more problems are mentioned in international police cooperation:

– a country wants to maintain its own sovereignty in police matters,

– the phenomenon of competitiveness and competition between police forces,

– different structure and jurisdiction of various police forces,

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[25] Iztok Prezelj, (ur.), Andrej Anžič, Ljubica Jelušič, Merjenje organizirane kriminalitete – omejitve in izzivi (avtorja Meško, Gorazd, Dobovšek, Bojan), *Model celovitega ocenjevanja ogrožanja nacionalne varnosti Republike Slovenije,* Ministrstvo za obrambo, Direktorat za obrambne zadeve, Sektor za civilno obrambo, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 104-5.

[26] Merry Morash, Robin Haarr, Dae-Hoon Kwak, "Multilevel Influences on Police Stress", *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice,* 22 (1), 2006, p. 26.

[27] Robert Hornsby, "Book Review: Adam Edwards and Peter Gill (eds). Transnational Organised Crime: Perspectives on Global Securtiy. London: Routledge, 2006", C*riminology and Criminal Justice*, No. 8(1). 2008, p. 111.

– different interests and distrust.

These problems hinder the optimal conditions for obtaining information. It appears that the trend of integration in the field of organized crime is faster than the trend of integration between police forces.

Duyne addresses researchers and points out that they have a task of not only measuring organized crime, but also of assuming the interpretation of the data obtained.[28] He believes that researchers focus on the more difficult problem of definition and, consequently, reach results which are not comparable with data from other surveys. If every study has its own definition, it is difficult to talk about measuring the same phenomenon.

If we turn to the OCO project, we can see that the problem does not occur only with the definition of organized crime, as detailed examination indicates that the source of the problem is already a non-uniform definition of both security and the reduction of security.

In a summary view of the topic, I believe that the problem is a lack of a uniform definition of organized crime, for some time now, this has been the crucial problem of its measurement. The solution should be sought in a greater integration of countries in the field of security. Cooperation between security services would bring more urgency and motivation towards a common definition of organized crime. For the relevance of the data I see a solution in the secondary analysis of the data, and a greater emphasis on qualitative data, this is also highlighted by some authors. Our current focus on quantitative data is not optimal or sufficient due to problems concerning the definition. The differences in judicial systems and police registers are considered part of the problem of definition — because there is no common definition, the data obtained in not comparable. It would help if countries came to a consensus on the definition. As long as there are different definitions there will be differences in the final data gained during the measurement of the same phenomenon, even from the individual security authorities in one country. The problem effecting social and political factors will, in my view, be resolved with the opening of borders and exercising of the principles of the EU, yet there are still some mental limits which must be overcome at different levels of social and political life. In conclusion, I have to add that the measurement problems will improve with international integration, as new links will solve some problems, which even now look insurmountable. The more connections that exist between authorities and countries in the field of organized crime, the more institutions will be obliged to maintain and improve the contacts.

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[28] Petrus C. von Duyne, Almir Maljevic, Maarten van Dijck, Klaus von Lampe, James L. Newell, *The Organisation of Crime for Profit: Conduct, Law and Measurement,* Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, p. 2.

3. The comparison of projects

3.1. Problems of measurement of organised crime and project OCO

The Slovenian OCO project was faced with the problem of a definition of organized crime and gave the solution of giving different definitions for different security bodies. It notes that the definitions remain on quite a general level. The criticism of such a design is that it does not consider giving one single definition. Nor does it consider which of these definitions would be most appropriate for empirical research. It only partially touches the problem of definition, which should play a more central role in the measurement of organized crime.

In a study where 66 different definitions of organized crime were analyzed, the authors point out the constant problems of definition:[29]

– the majority of texts in this study had superficial content-formulated definitions (in the form of associations);
– usually it is difficult to separate the definition as a phenomenon and an empirical definition of the author (suitable for measurement);
– is not known whether the definition quoted is also subject to the author's opinion.

The last exposed problem occurs in a Slovenian project which sets out four different definitions, but does not specify what would be optimal, and which would be adequate for empirical measurement (or why).

The author Vettori addresses the benefits that would result from a single definition of organized crime.[30] The Slovenian project OCO does not point out the benefits of such a definition, as there are more definitions already in use in the territory of Slovenia, let alone the European Union. The author gives two of the most probable advantages:

1. More favorable security policy planning, both in the EU than in other countries. The adopted policy would be tested with the result and only the effective policies would remain, the inefficient would be withdrawn. The great flexibility of organized crime is the main reason for a common definition and operation of the safety authorities throughout the EU.

2. A more favorable position for security authorities of each member of the EU to obtain high-quality internationally comparable data for the fight

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[29] Petrus C. von Duyne, Almir Maljevic, Maarten van Dijck, Klaus von Lampe, James L. Newell, *The Organisation of Crime for Profit: Conduct, Law and Measurement,* Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, p. 27.

[30] Ibid, p. 44.

against organized crime. Such a system would tend towards integration and the joint operation of security authorities across Europe and would facilitate the work of the police and criminal justice.

The OCO project seeks to assess the situation in the field of organized crime in Slovenia, but this project does not expose the problems of measurement, which are key in defining such an assessment. The way in which the project is designed means that it is incorrectly facing the problem of inadequate data. It includes the historical information as a good representation of the past in organized crime in Slovenia. It assumes the present states without taking into consideration the inadequacy of the data collected and as such believes the present state to be well-defined. Without warning the reader, it relies on the data of the official statistics, which are (due to the problems outlined above) of very questionable significance when determining the level of organized crime.

The differences in judicial systems and police registers were pointed out by Dobovšek in 1996.[31] He notes that Europe must come to a similar definition of the same criminal offense. As long as this is not in place, the same offense can easily be considered criminal in some countries and legal in others. The OCO project indirectly avoids this problem by highlighting a wider concept of organized crime. It gives findings, which are not burdened with the differences in the systems, as they are very broad and generalized.

The impact of social and political factors is included in the OCO project through scenarios (when it talks about the integration of policy or countries). In different scenarios there are different reflections of social factors — of both positive and negative effects.

Quite naively, the project addresses the assessment of the situation of organized crime in Slovenia, where it only points out that there is less of a problem in the definition. It goes on to say that for their assessment of current events, as well as their assessment of trends in the future, the problem of definition not very important.

3.2 A comparison of project OCO done in Slovenia and Sweden

Given the number of interviews, the survey covers a number of Swedish experts who have been enriched with a broader knowledge in various fields. The Swedish study had a greater number of seminars and brainstormings. One criticism of this would be that eventually the question of what will be included in the scenarios is largely dependent on single leading figures. That being said, we could say that the Swedish researchers have taken a greater range of angles, but ultimately, this is not necessarily an advantage, since it increases the range of expectations.

The study itself points out that they had ruled out certain ideas of some of the experts because they were set too contradictory. The researchers in both Sweden and Slovenia set themselves the challenging task of going through different domestic and foreign literature, as well as resources and references from the Internet which deal with the field of organized crime. They started from the same methodology as was used in the same project at the EU level, the methodology of the AGIS Project 2004.[32]

In regard to the quantitative data it is commendable that the survey offers a greater emphasis on expert assessment and qualitative data, though there are many other recommendations mentioned above which would lead to an even better qualitative presentation of the data.

3.3. Comparative findings of scenarios

When creating scenarios, researchers need to always bear in mind what they are researching and what impact the final result is going to have on the practical work in the field. They must reach conclusions which are comparable and useful. The added value of scenarios comes from the evaluation of the future in order to assist in better decision-making both today and tomorrow.[33]

One thing which could bother us both in the "risk based" methodology and in the scenarios is the non-critical views towards these two selected tools. The Slovenian project relies on putting forth findings which are no doubt the result of hard work done by large numbers of people. However, in their mission, they can not see the opportunity to criticize the tools which they use.

Keough and Shanahan agree that, in practice, there are several models of designing scenarios.[34] In their study, they are devoted to determining what the various models have in common and finding the best method. They reached the conclusion that there should be one unified single model of scenarios. From this perspective, the OCO project managed to finish this task, because in three different countries one comparable model of a scenario was used. Thus, the projects are easier to empirically compare with one another.

The design of the scenarios by the OCO project is questionable to the same extent as it is questionable at the European level or in the other two countries

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[31] Bojan Dobovšek, Organised Crime — Can We Unify the Definition? Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Comparing Firsthand Knowledge with Experience from the West, College of Police and Security Studies, Slovenia, 1996. Available at: http://www.ncjrs.org/policing/org323.htm (accessed 8 January 2009).

[32] Tom Vander Beken (co-ordinator), Kristof Verfaillie, Melanie Defruytier, *Draft Methodology: Preparatory Document for the Second Research Group Meeting: Project OCO*, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy — Ghent University, Brussels, 2005.

where the project took place. It is difficult to contest the fact that the methodology was, at least to some extent, determined.

Until now, there was relatively little research done on the effectiveness of scenarios, but on the other hand, a tool has not yet been developed which could scenarios.[35] Therefore, experts sticking with scenarios which have already proven valuable and have so far proved to be the best tool for researching the future.

In the application of scenarios, we must mention that one should not only take one version (or the most likely scenario) and hope that it will materialize in the future. The effectiveness of scenarios is provided only if the given versions are taken into consideration while planning and creating prevention strategies. The added value of these scenarios is precisely to avoid today's logic of forecasting the future through following a linear mindset. It takes into account the different versions of a possible future, which makes security organizations more dynamic in both thinking and planning. In short, a key asset of these scenarios is that they allow us in part to know how today's decisions will effect tomorrow.[36]

Improving the efficiency of crime prevention is possible because scenarios point to initial changes in the system. The findings of scenarios are not designed as completed research, because they give added value to researchers and planners only under the assumption that the work will continue. Constant evaluation and feedback means that the monitoring of such scenarios will remain effective and that they can be adapted to new variables.[37] The authors Vander Beken, Verfaillie and Defruytier also notice the problem of no supervision in the scenarios which were a part of project OCO.[38] They recommend the establishment of surveillance systems, which would be based

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[33] Ibid. P. 5.

[34] Shawn M.Keough, Keough J. Shanahan, "Scenario Planning: Toward a More Complete Model for Practice", *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, 10(2), 2008, pp. 166, 176.

[35] Thomas J. Chermack, Susan A. Lynham, "Definitions and Outcome Variables of Scenario Planning", *Human Resource Development Review*, No. 1(3), 2002, p. 379.

[36] Tom Vander Beken (co-ordinator), Kristof Verfaillie, Melanie Defruytier, *Draft Methodology: Preparatory Document for the Second Research Group Meeting: Project OCO*, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy — Ghent University, Brussels, 2005, p. 5.

[37] Schulte, T. (leader of the project), Boberg, M., El-Samalouti, P., Mähs, S., Mönnikes, M., Mückenhausen, F., Velten, T. *Project documents: Criminal Money Management: Project outline and Questionnaire*, A European Interdisciplinary Analysis Project – EDGE, 2007., p. 66 – Volume 3).

[38] Tom Vander Beken (co-ordinator), Kristof Verfaillie, Melanie Defruytier, *Draft Methodology: Preparatory Document for the Second Research Group Meeting: Project OCO*, Institute for International Research on Criminal Policy — Ghent University, Brussels, 2005, p. 17.

on observations of the change in key factors in each scenario. Depending on the change in circumstances, we can see the direction in which the system is heading and which scenario is taking place. The process of creating scenarios may come with new information and variables, which means more practical added value for its users.

Neither the project OCO or EDGE have the requirements for a continued evaluation. It seems to me that this is a big minus for both of these studies.

3.4. The comparison of project OCO and edge

Concerning the methodology in the project scenario of OCO and EDGE, we can say that the Slovenian researchers were in now way left behind their Swedish colleagues of project EDGE. The conceptual design of all of these projects is based upon the AGIS institution, so it is difficult to talk about radical independence of execution. On the other hand, in each of the projects various experts from different countries were involved. This gives us hope in the variation of knowledge and differences in the design, thinking, knowledge, etc..

In the project EDGE, the measurement of organized crime was done through a financial point of view, this is done so as to eliminate the problem of methodology. One criticism could be that the financial aspect is only one of the aspects of organized crime. As a phenomenon, it is easier to measure money laundering than to measure organized crime, but even there we can come to partial conclusions in our assessment of organized crime.

The project EDGE, as opposed to the project OCO, intervenes in the area of the development of scenarios and a critical view of such a methodology. It is difficult to define a tool as being effective if we are not critical towards it.

In my study, the key issue is the transfer of findings into practice, which the Slovenian project does not seen as an essential element of the research. There is no tendency of writing a manual for the police or security authorities based on the findings; only a more theoretical implementation is mentioned.

4. Considerations of the future

Despite criticisms, the OCO project gives a good direction for the future in what is for now a quite problematic measurement of organized crime. Much can be learned from the project, however there are things which can be further improved in the future.

The problem of the definition should be (as has already been said) taken care of on the international level, but there could also be more of an initiative for a single definition in the Slovenian area. The study comparing data on

organized crime in EU countries has suggested that countries are very diverse in terms of definitions, methodology, etc.[39] Vettori gives suggestions on what could be or should be done at the EU level to measure and to standardize data that would make it comparable. He talks about the invitation for Member countries to:

– assume a common definition of organized crime in order to collect data;
– use an "offender-based" system of data collection (regardless of the person crimes, and regardless of criminal acts);
– to set up data collecting on organized crime
– to measure the same variable, or at least the same set of variables for measuring organized crime;
– to collect data on the financial impact of organized crime on the economy;
– to try to establish a bridge between official and private data collection;
– provide feedback to the safety authorities who collect data.

Linked to the problem of definition is the problem of consistency of data and its relevance. Collecting for operational purposes is a problem of freshly acquired data, this could be resolved by regarding information obtained by the private sector, information obtained from relatives, friends of the victims, secondary analysis of already collected data, etc. After all, everything can be solved, but it is necessary to work towards the solution.

Scenarios have established themselves in the army and in the business world, so it can be assumed that they will become well established in the area of organized crime. So far this tool is instrumental in identifying the future situation and adopting strategies and policies to help combat organized crime. The future will show how effective this device will remain.

Europe is following the conceptual idea that organized crime exists for profit. At the level of money laundering it is trying to establish the most accurate measurement, the assessment of future trends and making the gathered data easily available to the relevant organizations. This would be, after the project EDGE, the center of research and prevention of organized crime in the future.

The future will show how good the instrument that is project OCO is, and if it can withstand rapid changes. A key focus is on the comparability of data, which is, due to the lack of a uniform definition of organized crime, a rather controversial topic. When the subject of measurement is only partially defined, the solutions remain to some extent superficial. There is a greater variation in

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[39] Petrus C. von Duyne, Almir Maljevic, Maarten van Dijck, Klaus von Lampe, James L. Newell, *The Organisation of Crime for Profit: Conduct, Law and Measurement,* Nijmegen, Wolf Legal Publishers, 2006, pp. 63-5.

findings and conclusions than with a single definition. Project EDGE replies to this issue by measuring and forecasting the situation of money laundering, which is considered a more uniform phenomenon.

5. Conclusion

It seems to me that we have come to interesting findings in the article regarding the development of organized crime scenarios. In the filed of scenarios we can not talk about certainty, we can only speak of likelihood, so we turned to the key aspect in the studies conducted ─ the problems of methodology. The findings depend on what method someone will choose for planning future trends. An optimally chosen methodology is the key to finding effective solutions, but there is still the question of which methodology is (at present) the most pertinent and useful. So far, it is the opinion of experts that the methodology most appropriate is the use of scenarios, and that this is the optimal choice for predicting future trends.

As is reminded in the article, the current state of organized crime says a lot and is very important, because with it, we can put forth expectations in future trends. The specifics of today's situation in all areas of life are very apparent ─ the fast, dynamic process of change effects both crime and security authorities. The changes are first noticeable in crime, which has quicker acceleration in adapting to new situations and striving for rapid earnings. How much social and moral damage is done depends on the effectiveness of the security authorities. The security authorities must apply the correct strategy, which depends on the correct approach in planning this strategy. Here scenarios come to the forefront as tools which help with faster and more effective actions from security authorities (policy makers, police).

We focused on the critical analysis of the implemented project OCO and the continuation of the project EDGE, respectively AGIS as well. The critical assessment of both projects is the cornerstone of our article, where we try to analyze the findings of the current situation and the appropriateness of the methodology for forecasting trends in the future.

We found that the key problem of measurement is in the lack of a uniform definition of organized crime. The solution is simple in the sense that one definition could be put forth, which would be held by all. The diversity among countries in criminal justice law, the variation in the operational activities of the police and the specific environments make it difficult to generalize the definition of organized crime.

On the relevancy of information which is provided for the processing and drawing conclusions, we came to the conclusion that the situation of crime

today is highly questionable. Various experts highlight the adverse conditions of data collection, where it is mostly collected for operational purposes. The solution is in the detailed secondary analysis of the data acquired and in more importance being given to qualitative data.

The problem of the definition of organized crime is tackled by project EDGE through measuring the financial aspects of organized crime. For the unit of measurement it gives money laundering, and it is pointed out that the definition is internationally comparable and it is therefore less difficult to collect and interpret data.

For the OCO project we highlight the various problems of measurement, the diversity of judicial systems and police registers related to a non-uniform definition. The first proposed step towards a common definition would for the EU Member States to agree to a common definition of various criminal offenses. This in turn implies much work in the field of security, but would lead to many solutions in the area of the prevention of international crime.

The impact of social and political factors is resolved gradually through globalization. The free movement of goods, people, also means a greater transfer of cultural homogeneity and social norms — at least to some degree. For politics we can say that the impact of the EU is noticeable, as it seeks to gradually effect the organizations and institutions into becoming more connected. Transnational crime has exploited the benefits of the EU's border-less area, now is the time for safety authorities and other relevant institutions to do the same.

An international level of measurement also highlights the problem of reluctance by the police and the search of police forces for independence in their field. The mental limits of human institutions and organizations will be shaken through a unified approach to the problem. The more integration that happens, the more effective the solutions will become, and when people will see these solutions, they will be compelled to participate.

The methodology of scenarios is currently (based on the studied literature) an optimal planning tool for the future, not only in business but also in predicting the development of criminality. Determining social factors which influence the development of criminality is important, since we can use this knowledge for preparing a defense strategy. It should be noted that the scenarios can be very different from one to the next. They depend on the interpretation of data and the knowledge of participants in the investigation. The project highlights the issue of EDGE experts that have been too radical in their interpretation of the future. These are therefore omitted and only partially included in the final findings of the survey. The problem is how to include a

sufficient amount of findings so that the project is not going to be too overwhelming, but still remain manageable.

With the project OCO we have our first comparable assessment tool for determining the social factors of organized crime. With this Slovenia has proved to be a highly advanced EU member in the creation of the scenarios of organized crime. Although the article has exposed some criticism, at the end we must point out that the OCO project illustrates our priority and is a breakthrough in the measurement and prediction of the trends in organized crime, at least at a European level.

List of abbrevations:

EDGE – An European Interdisciplinary Analysis Project
EU – European Union
EUROPOL – The European Police Office
OCO – Organised Crime Outlook
RS – Republic of Slovenia
UN – United Nations

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The Position of the Non-aligned Movement in the Current Foreign Policy of the Republic of Serbia

ABSTRACT

In this paper, the authors analyse the position of the Non-Aligned Movement in the current foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia. They firstly present the chronology of relations between the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned Movement, this including the newly created republics in its territory. With the exception of Slovenia and Macedonia, all post-Yugoslav republics enjoy observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement. As the authors point out, apart from the support to maintain its territorial integrity in Kosovo, the Republic of Serbia could also gain economic benefit from establishing co-operation with non-aligned countries.

Key words: Serbia, Yugoslavia, Non-Aligned Movement, foreign policy, Third World, Kosovo, economic co-operation.

Introduction

Since the First Summit of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned (NAM) countries that took place in Belgrade from 1−6 September 1961 till the Ninth Summit of the Movement, which also took place in the capital of Yugoslavia from 4−7 September 1989 non-alignment had featured the foreign policy of the

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former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[2] The focus of the new elites that spurred and started the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia with the aim to establish nation states also caused a drastic shift in their foreign policy conceptions.[3] Thus, after the end of the Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) the Non-Aligned Movement became less significant in the foreign policy conceptions of all states created in the territory of the Yugoslav federation.[4]

With the exception of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia all states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia enjoy observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement. However, their basic foreign policy documents do not put emphasis on their more active engagement in its work.[5]

During the Yugoslav crisis (1991–1999), two summits of the Non-Aligned Movement took place — one in Jakarta in 1992 and another in Cartagena in 1995.[6] The final documents adopted at these conferences pointed to the necessity to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to reach a compromise over a peaceful solution under the auspices of the United Nations.

After the process of democratisation of the post-Yugoslav states commenced (after 2000) their primary foreign policy priorities have been directed towards full membership in the EU, balancing of relations with great powers (above all, with the United States of America and the Russian Federation) and normalisation of relations with the so-called new neighbours.[7] At the present moment, the re-establishment of closer inter-state relations with the so-called Third World is of greatest significance for the Republic of Serbia

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[2] On history of the Non-Aligned Movement see: Leo Mates, *Nonalignment: Theory and Current Policy*, The Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Oceana Publications, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1972, pp. 74–92.

[3] See: Dragan Đukanović, *Institucionalni modeli i demokratizacija postjugoslovenskih država*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beogradu, 2007, pp. 40–56.

[4] Ranko Petković, *Jugoslavija i svet u postbipolarnoj eri*, IP „Međunarodna politika", NIU „Službeni list", Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, Institut ekonomskih nauka, Beograd, 1998, pp. 371–8.

[5] See: „Spoljnopolitički prioriteti Republike Crne Gore", Vlada Republike Crne Gore, Podgorica, 23. novembar 2007; and „Odrednice vanjske politike Republike Hrvatske", Internet, http://rs.mvp.hr/?mh=335&mv=1933, 15/02/2009.

[6] See the integral final documents of those two NAM summits in: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u posthladnoratovskoj eri*, IP „Međunarodna politika", NIU „Službeni list", Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, Fakultet političkih nauka Univerziteta u Beogradu, Institut ekonomskih nauka, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 1996, pp. 9–240.

[7] See: Dragan Đukanović, „Spoljnopolitički prioriteti Republike Srbije u bilateralnim i multilateralnim odnosima sa susedima", u: Edita Stojić-Karanović i Slobodan Janković (urs.), *Elementi strategije spoljne politike Srbije*, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2008, pp. 85–104.

in its foreign policy strategies. The support of the Non-Aligned Movement to the Republic of Serbia in maintaining its territorial integrity in Kosovo has directed numerous foreign policy activities towards the intensification of relations with this grouping of countries.[8] Moreover, a breakthrough in the market of non-aligned countries would be very important for the Republic of Serbia.[9]

Non-aligned countries and the Yugoslav crisis

Immediately before the outbreak of the armed conflicts that followed the dissolution of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the domestic public had first shown a scornful attitude towards the Non-Aligned Movement, what was followed by numerous assessments of expert circles. On one hand, the Non-Aligned Movement was considered a relict of the Cold War that had not any significance after the fall of the Berlin War.[10]

At the same time, in all foreign policy activities of the newly created states in the territory of the former Yugoslavia the solution of the so-called national question, or actually the creation of ethnic nation states was given a primary priority.[11] In order to achieve such goals, they were to address the leading factors of the international community and not any more the so-called Third World. In that sense, for most of the states that had been created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia it was of primary significance to establish as good as possible relations with the United States of America as well as with the European Union administration in Brussels. It was just in the late previous and early present decade that the establishment of more intensive relations commenced between the post-Yugoslav states and the Russian Federation. The contemporary liberally-oriented politicians continually criticised the Non-Aligned Movement for some of its member states whose political systems could not be regarded as democratic, but on the contrary, authoritarian.[12]

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[8] Remarks to the 20th Anniversary Conference Celebrating the Ninth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement – "History and Legacy for the Peaceful World", Mr Vuk Jeremić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 7 September 2009, pp. 3–4.

[9] See: „Srbiju za Pokret nesvrstanih vezuje – antiamerikanizam", *Borba*, Beograd, 15. jul 2009, p. 3.

[10] See: Ranko Petković, „Predgovor", u: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u posthladnoratovskoj eri*, op. cit., pp. 3–4.

[11] Vladimir Pavićević, „Dvadeset godina od pada Berlinskog zida: slučaj Srbija", *Međunarodna politika*, Vol. LX, broj 1135, Beograd, juli–septembar 2009, pp. 5–20.

[12] Ranko Petković, „Predgovor", u: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u posthladno-ratovskoj eri*, op. cit., p. 3.

The Ninth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Belgrade from 4–7 September 1989 was the first summit, which was held at the time when such drastic changes occurred in Europe. However, 102 countries took part in this conference, as well 10 observers and 19 states as guests.[13] The final documents from the summit showed a strategic turn that followed the post-Cold War period. Actually, instead of clearly disassociating from the Western and Eastern block, what had been characteristic for the previous period, it was pointed out to the necessity for non-aligned countries to join the new processes of economic and social development. In that sense, the concept of human rights and environmental protection was emphasised.

However, the bloody break-up of the Yugoslav federation that commenced only two years later in the states that were created in its territory made them give up the foreign policy course that had been characteristic for the previous socialist period. As early as at the Tenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Jakarta from 1-6 September 1992 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended from membership in this organisation. The state comprised of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, and it had been created just a few months before (on 27 April 1992). However, although the newly created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considered itself a successor of the former SFR Yugoslavia it was suspended from membership in the Non-Aligned Movement as demanded by a large number of Muslim countries for the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as for the previously imposed sanctions by the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, the Final document adopted at the Tenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement expressed a great concern over the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[14] Within this context, member states condemned the ethnic cleansing, the deportation of population, the formation of concentration camps, etc. The above mentioned document also pointed out the necessity of respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, supporting all peace efforts to stop the conflict in this country as soon as possible.[15]

At the Tenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Republic of Croatia gained observer status. Representatives of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its headquarters in Sarajevo also participated in the summit but with guest status as also did representatives of the Republic of

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[13] See: Branislav Milinković, „Istorijski razvoj ideje Pokreta nesvrstanosti 1956–1996", u: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u posthladnoratovskoj eri*, op. cit., pp. 267–81.

[14] „Poruka iz Džakarte: poziv na kolektivnu akciju i demokratizaciju međunarodnih odnosa", Džakarta, 1–6. septembar 1992. in: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u post-hladnoratovskoj eri*, op. cit., pp. 11–128.

[15] Ibidem, Glava III, Politička pitanja, Politički komitet, Bosna i Hercegovina, p. 40.

Slovenia. All until 1 May 2004 when it acceded the European Union the Republic of Slovenia had participated in the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement as a guest.

At the Eleventh Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Cartagena (Columbia) from 18–20 October 1995 when the consolidation of the situation in the Balkans and the end of the armed conflicts was coming in sight the Final Act pointed to the necessity to stop the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[16] It supported the Accord on Fundamental Principles of Peace Agreement adopted in Geneva on 8 September 1995 and in New York on 28 September 1995, respectively. It also invited the United Nations Security Council to fully implement its resolutions concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was destroyed by the war.[17] At the same time, it supported numerous conclusions of the Contact Group, which had been made by the USA, Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany and Italy with the aim of ending the war conflicts as successfully and rapidly as possible.

The next summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Durban from 2–3 September 1998 did not mention the problems in the post-Yugoslav territory although the conflicts in Kosovo already started. In respect of the following NATO military intervention against FRY, it is important to notice that these countries have explicitly rejected the idea that with the intervention any broader precedent was being set.[18] The Western Balkans were neither mentioned in the Final Acts of the summits of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Kuala Lumpur from 20–25 February 2003, in Havana from 15–16 September 2006 and the Fifteenth Summit of the Non-Alignment in Sharm-el-Sheikh from 11 to 16 July 2009.

The former Federal Republic Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement with observer statues on 14 November 2001, what was almost a year after the power had changed in Belgrade. Since then Serbia's officials have participated in the summits of the

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[16] „Završni dokument XI Konferencije nesvrstanih zemalja u Kartaheni", Kartahena, 18–20. oktobar 1995. in: Branislav Milinković (ur.), *Nesvrstanost u posthladnoratovskoj eri*, op. cit., pp. 131–263.

[17] Ibidem, Prvo poglavlje: Opšta pitanja, Bosna i Hercegovina, p. 144.

[18] "Final Document of the NAM XII Summit", Durban, 2–3 September 1998, Internet, http://www.nam.gov.za/xiisummit/finaldocument.txt, 12/09/2009. By consensus, the final communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of the Delegation of the 113/member Non/Aligned Movement, held in New York, on September 23, 1999, stated: "We reject the so/called ʹright of humanitarian intervention' which has no legal basis in the UN Charte or in the general principles of international law." (See: Final Communique,par. 171; available at: http://www.nam.gov.za/minmeet/newyorkcom.htm)

Non-Aligned Movement. After the Republic of Montenegro had separated from Serbia, it gained similar status and its President Filip Vujanović and Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Roćen took part in the Fifteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Sharm-el-Sheikh.[19]

In the meantime, previously being a guest Bosnia and Herzegovina gained observer status after 2000. Since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and since it gained sovereignty out of all former Yugoslav republics the Republic of Macedonia has been least interested in the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement.[20] As late as at the Fifteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Sharm-el-Sheikh in 2009 it gained guest status.

The non-aligned movement in the foreign policy of Serbia

Until the change of power in Belgrade in October 2000, the authorities of the Federal Republic Yugoslavia had not show that they were much interested in returning the country to the Non-Aligned Movement as a full member. Moreover, they had gradually neglected the so-called Third World and the Non-Aligned Movement both bilaterally, or actually, the leading states of the Movement as well as multilaterally. The normalisation of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the cessation of the conflicts in this country made, however, establish intensive relations with these countries in the 1996–2000 period, above all in the economic sphere as well as with the intention to alleviate a sort of lack of interest in the activities of the Non-Aligned Movement.

In the statement made at the session of the Federal Assembly on 24 October 2000 Goran Svilanović, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, pointed out that since the country was undoubtedly oriented towards the integration to the European Union it would not be possible for FRY to actively participate in the work of the Non-Aligned Movement.[21] For this reason, Yugoslavia requested from South Africa that chaired the Non-Aligned Movement at that time to ensure observer status for the country, Svilanović emphasised. At the same time, Svilanović announced that "this...

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[19] "Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Roćen participated at the Ministerial meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Sharm El Sheikh", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Podgorica, 14 July 2009, Internet, http://www.mip.gov.me/en/index.php/Press-Releases/pressrelease-175313.html, 15/09/2009.

[20] See: Vladimir Radenović i Aleksandar Pisarev, „Nesvrstani vraćaju duh Jugoslavije", *Dan*, Podgorica, 24. avgust 2009, p. 4.

[21] See: „Ekspoze saveznog ministra za inostrane poslove Gorana Svilanovića u Saveznoj skupštini Savezne Republike Jugoslavije", Beograd, 24. oktobar 2001, Internet:// http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Srpski/spopol/Ministar/Govori/241001_s.html, 15/08/2009.

does not mean that we shall break off our co-operation with this important group of countries, taking into consideration our close views and interest in mutual co-operation."[22]

When resolving of the final status of Kosovo was actualised after 2005, the foreign policy activities of the Republic of Serbia have focused on its relationship with the Non-Aligned Movement. This was clearly seen at the Fifteenth Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place in Tehran on 29 July 2008.[23] At this meeting, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia Vuk Jeremić managed to convince non-aligned countries to support Serbia's initiative to address the International Court of Justice that should give its advisory opinion on the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo on 17 February 2008. This was re-affirmed by the decision of the United Nations General Assembly made on 9 October 2008 to support Serbia's initiative. Non-aligned states greatly contributed to adopting of such a decision on the part of the General Assembly. At the conference celebrating the twenty first anniversary of the Ninth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement that took place on 7 September 2008 the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that in spite of striving towards EU membership Serbia "will keep strengthening and deepening our ties with NAM member states".[24] As Minister Jeremić said, it was of great importance to strengthen the relations between the Union and the Non-Aligned Movement with the objective of reaffirming their traditional partnership and friendship.

However, apart from this, presenting Serbia's foreign policy priorities in their statements since the beginning of 2009 President Boris Tadić and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jeremić have never mentioned that possible membership in the Non-Aligned Movement would be a real position in the country's foreign policy conception.[25] However, considering the support to the Republic of Serbia concerning the status of Kosovo and its clear support to the initiative to be submitted to the International Court of Justice to give its opinion on the unilateral proclamation of independence of Kosovo the Non-Aligned

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[22] Ibidem.

[23] „Vuk Jeremić na konferenciji nesvrstanih", Radio Televizija Srbije, Beograd, 29. jul 2009. Internet, http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Srbija/8245/Vuk+Jeremi%C4%87+na+konferenciji+nesvrstanih.html, 15/09/2009.

[24] Remarks to the 20th Anniversary Conference Celebrating the Ninth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement – "History and Legacy for the Peaceful World", Mr Vuk Jeremić, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 7 September 2009, p. 3.

[25] See: „Tadić: za Srbiju važni odnosi sa EU, Rusijom i SAD", BETA, Beograd, 12. januar 2009. and „Tadić: Kina četvrti stub srpske spoljne politike", TANJUG, Beograd, 20. avgust 2009.

Movement has become a kind of "reservoir" of votes in international organisations and fora that could contribute to a better international standing of the country and regaining of its reputation.

Since the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement and due to the fact that in the period since its creation (1956) till the break-up of the state (1991)[26] it played a key role in the Movement what had enabled it to be a significant factor in international relations it is necessary to strengthen its co-operation with the Movement as a whole as well as with its leading countries. Thus, future Serbia's Foreign Policy Strategy, as the document of the highest priority for pursuing international activities, should surely include tactical and operational plans for strengthening of its influence in the so-called Third World, especially taking into consideration a large number of Non-Aligned Movement member states.[27] (See map No. 1). This does not must to imply a strategic shift towards full membership in the Movement that would be incompatible to the European Union membership. But, it should be noted, e.g., that after acceding the European Union Malta and Cyprus had given up on their full membership in the Movement but in the meantime, they gained observer status. In this way, they have kept participating in its work. Map No. 1: Member states and observed countries of the Non-Aligned Movement (2007)

Member states of the Non-Aligned Movement – dark blue. Light blue states have observer status. Source: Internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-Aligned_Movement, 15/09/2009.

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[26] See: Predrag Simić, *Tito i NATO*, Biblioteka „Sedma sila", Kompanija „Novosti" AD, Beograd, 2008, pp. 92–3.

[27] See: Dragan Đukanović i Ivona Lađevac, „Prioriteti spoljnopolitičke strategije Republike Srbije", *Međunarodni problemi*, Vol. LXI, broj 2, Beograd, 2009, pp. 343–64.

Another thing one should keep in mind is the fact that Byelorussia is the only European country that is a member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Apart from Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina it is only Ukraine as a European country that enjoys observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement. On the other hand, the principles that the Non-Aligned Movement has proclaimed since its establishment as are mutual respect of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and sovereignty and security (the term that it has used since its establishment — "peaceful co-existence")[28] are not becoming less important in the contemporary world. These are the values that the Republic of Serbia takes as its starting point in pursuing of its foreign policy activities. Undoubtedly, the Non-Aligned Movement has been the greatest peace movement in the 20th and 21st centuries that emerged from the constant tensions produced by the Cold War. It was a response to the constant provocations and tensions in the relations between the two opposite blocks and it primarily promoted the principles of peaceful settlement of conflicts and strengthening of co-operation. Even today, the Non-Aligned Movement has not lost its significance within the global scale. On the contrary, its summits and ministerial conferences point to numerous and very topical problems of the contemporary world — human rights, environmental problems, the status of women and children in society, the position of refugees and displaced persons, etc. Thus, the Non-Aligned Movement was created as an emancipatory movement striving to improve the status of persons who are deprived of their rights and are discriminated as well.

Thus, in its future foreign policy conception the Republic of Serbia should strive towards strengthening of economic co-operation with the leading Non-Aligned Movement member states. It should focus attention on strengthening of its relations with India, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Bolivia, Peru, Columbia, etc. Also, it is possible to establish intensive forms of co-operation in the fields of education (e.g. exchange of students), culture, science (carrying out of joint projects) and environmental protection.

Making attempts not to usurp the legacy of the successful foreign policy the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia pursued in the early 2009 the Republic of Serbia made an initiative to hold a jubilee summit in Belgrade in 2011 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Non-Aligned Movement.[29] The conference would be jointly organised by all states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia under the chairmanship of Egypt.

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[28] See: Velibor Gavranov i Miomir Stojković, *Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije*, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1972, pp. 101–16; Vojin Dimitrijević i Radoslav Stojanović, *Osnovi teorije međunarodnih odnosa*, „Službeni list SFRJ", Beograd, 1977, pp. 329–36.

[29] „Tadić: Jubilej nesvrstanih u Beogradu", BETA, Beograd, 16. jul 2009.

This manifestation would be significant mostly in a symbolic manner since the states in the region refer to the heritage of once very successful Yugoslav foreign policy. On the other hand, the jubilee Belgrade summit would also show that there are numerous opportunities for all states in the region to individually establish co-operation with Non-Aligned Movement member states. This, actually, implies that the consensual orientation of all states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia towards EU membership does not *a priori* exclude strengthened co-operation with the Third World.

Conclusion

Considering the fact that together with the end of the Cold War the Non-Aligned Movement has become less significant at the global level the values it upholds have surely not become less important. These are, above all, the promotion of peace, mutual co-operation, human rights and economic development. The mankind keeps on facing numerous risks related to endangering of the above mentioned values in the global geostrategic game that has obviously been continued after the fall of the Berlin wall with other/similar factors. It is just for this that the global role of the Non-Aligned Movement, which gathers around 118 countries from Central and South America, through Africa to East and South Asia will be reaffirmed in the future.

Although the conception of non-alignment had been the leading determinant in the Yugoslav foreign policy since 1956 after the collapse of the idea on the Balkan Alliance[30] relying on the West right before the break-up of Yugoslavia a drastic shift occurred in this field. Today, when all former Yugoslav republics are independent and sovereign states that are distinctly oriented towards the integration to the European Union, it becomes clear that in their foreign policy conceptions they do not wish to neglect the significance of co-operation with the so-called Third World. This is the way one can interpret the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia that has for the time being been supported by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, respectively, to celebrate in Belgrade in 2011 the fiftieth anniversary of the First Conference of Heads of States or Governments of Non-Aligned Countries. Another important fact is that central South Slavic states — Montenegro, Croatia, BH and Serbia are observers in the Non-Aligned Movement, while since 2009 Macedonia has gained guest status.

As for the Republic of Serbia, it does not only see its co-operation with the Non-Aligned Movement as a response to the recognition of independence of

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[30] See: Velibor Gavranov i Miomir Stojković, *Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije*, op. cit., pp. 215–8.

Kosovo, or actually merely as a support to the endeavours to maintain its territorial integrity and sovereignty. In a strategic sense, apart from the future membership in the European Union, the Republic of Serbia together with the other states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia could be a kind of bridge between the Brussels administration and the Third World with their observer status in the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, there is a realistic opportunity for the states created in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to make individual or common access to the markets of Non-Aligned member states.

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Željko Dj. Bjelajac[1]

Prostitution as a Controversial Social Phenomenon from History to Modern Age

ABSTRACT

It is difficult to determine the moment of the establishment of prostitution. This complex phenomenon appeared at the initial phases of social development and subsequently modified and adapted to the historical and social changes. This phenomenon is highly adaptive and due to its specificity it is resistant to numerous socio-economic and political variations. There are multiple causes for this deviant behavior, ranging from the socio-economic ones on the macro level, to endogenous ones characterized by individuals' susceptibility and tendency. Nowadays, this phenomenon undertakes new forms, types and methods of expression. Prostitution as a deviant socio-pathological behavior exhibits multi-level associations with crime and thus requires suppression in order to be reduced to a socially acceptable level. The importance of youth education in terms of prevention of prostitution and raising collective awareness regarding its negative consequences represents an obligation of both state and family.

Key words: prostitution; characteristics of prostitution; causes of prostitution; classification of prostitution; web prostitution; human trafficking; prevention of prostitution.

Introduction

Prostitution is often labeled as 'the oldest craft' in the world. It represents controversial social phenomenon with a number of complex attributes. The term prostitution comes from the Latin word *"prostitutere"*, which means 'expose publicly'. Its roots come from the early period of slave-owning society,

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ancient Greece, Rome, India, German empire, capitalism as a new social epoch, to modern times where it takes on specific forms and contents.

Regardless of the diversity of arguments and regimes, that is, conceptual, substantive and contextual difficulties which in certain segments hinder the approach to a precise, universal, commonly accepted conceptual determination of this phenomenon, prostitution can be generally defined as: selling of 'female sex' to men in exchange for money, food, material goods or protection, and therefore represents a form of sexual exploitation, where female body becomes a product for purchase or sale.

Prostitution is a deviant social phenomenon, a form of socio-pathological behavior and as such, it represents a serious social problem. In spite of this common standpoint, this phenomenon continues to cause contradictor reactions. Modern views are pretty polarized. They range from the notion that wage sex is a type of provision of services, to a criticism and judgment that it degrades women as human beings.

The causes of this phenomenon were previously associated with individual psychophysical traits of the prostitutes. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the society becomes increasingly emphasized. Socio-economic factors, the role of social environment, family milieu, are only partial causes of this deviancy which is closely related to other forms of social pathology, such as crime, drug and alcohol misuse.

There are numerous classifications of prostitution and prostitutes in the literature. Commonly used is the one that utilizes the forms and methods of engaging in prostitution as the basic criteria, distinguishing two types: unorganized and organized. In regards to the forms and contents, prostitution can be classified as heterosexual and homosexual. In regards to the types of prostitutes, the model of organization may also be applied, discriminating two basic types: organized and unorganized prostitutes.

Due to the complex socio-economic circumstances, Serbia became a fertile ground for the growth and the diversity of forms of prostitution. Similar to other states, common forms of prostitution with slight variations are present in Serbia as well.

Modern times introduced new, more dangerous forms of prostitution and unfortunately, mainly youth is exposed to them. Internet pornography, pedophilia, or web prostitution secretly moved into numerous homes, so children become seduced and started living parallel virtual life without parents' knowledge and control. Therefore, the importance of educating youth about the negative consequences related to this deviant phenomenon should become an imperative of family and society as a whole.

1. Concepts, features and etilogical characteristics
of prostitution

1.1. Concept of prostitution

Prostitution as a form of deviant behavior has been present throughout the whole history of human society. In fact, it represents a historical category that modified its forms during evolution aligning them with the class character of society. Prostitution is considered to be 'the oldest craft' and it usually served as the final means of desperate women and girls who often recklessly engaged into the vicious circle of the sex industry as it was presumably the only way to improve their material status, position and gain easy and quick income. This general determining characteristic led them into a mutual dark position in the edge of society.

The term prostitution comes from a Latin word *"prostitutio"*, which could be translated as fornication or *"prostitutus"*, which means expose, show. Throughout the development, this term implied several synonyms, such as harlot, implying a promiscuous woman who disregards social norms and rules of behavior in order to satisfy personal sexual tendencies.

Prostitution is a very complex phenomenon which can not be perceived as exclusive but viewed through the prism of philosophical, sociological, economic and legal aspects. In this context, it is necessary to ensure homogenous existence of several elements in order to develop a single operational definition acceptable for lawyers, sociologists, psychologists and theorists. That is, although we define prostitution as legally untenable, we can not ignore its devastating social character that by inertia implies numerous social side effects, such as: lack of education, heavy material position, inadequate parental relationships, etc. Moreover, the violation of social, psychological or moral integrity itself is parallel to defining prostitution as not only criminal, but also psycho-pathological phenomenon which, besides taking or obtaining compensation, includes the animal satisfaction that should not be disregarded. Thus, the conceptual determination of prostitution has numerous elements difficult to fit together, since socio-economic as well as legal and political milieu place this concept into a cause-and-effect framework of violation of social conventions, disregard of law, decrease of general social discipline, etc. According to the presented views, the diversity of theoretic perceptions is ubiquitously present in regards to the concept of prostitution.

Professor Lazarevic supports that there is a common standpoint that "it is the renting of one's own body to others, for money or other benefits, to use it for satisfaction of personal sexual tendencies".[2] Under the broader concept of

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[2] Ljubiša Lazarević, *Yugoslavian criminal law – special part*, Belgrade, 1995, p. 475.

prostitution, Stojanovic implies any sexual relationship performed with a certain compensation that does not necessarily involve money. Under the narrow concept, he implies disposal of one's own body for the purpose of performing any sexual act with financial compensation, with an intention to repeatedly use this action to provide income to one's self or others.[3] Prostitution is performed by women, as well as men, who for financial or other reward, fornicate with an indefinite circle of individuals. It can be homosexual and heterosexual.[4]

Prostitution implies provision of certain sexual services to others who may be the same or the opposite sex. That is why prostitution can be heterosexual prostitution of woman and man or a man with a woman, or female homosexual or male homosexual prostitution.[5]

"Commercialized sexual tribute, which is temporary or permanent, voluntary or forceful selling of one's body for sexual satisfaction of others, as a vocation (profession), as a single or additional source of income; sexual behavior that involves something outside of the framework of the moral norms; involves also moral evaluation that can not be disregarded since it includes human relationships".[6]

The UN Convention that provides the elimination of all forms of sexual exploitation, defines prostitution as utilization of female body as a product that is sold, exchanged (not for money solely), and involves occasional prostitution, street prostitution, socio-culturally sanctioned prostitution, pornography, sex tourism and brides market through mail.

The analysis of these definitions and sublimation of their content leads to the conclusion that prostitution (male or female) represents a propensity to use sexuality as the means to directly or indirectly achieve the goals of material or non-material benefits. It is also evident that these definitions include both men and women who can be engaged in prostitution, which somewhat denies the widespread views that only women can engage in prostitution. Modern perceptions determine prostitution as sexual relationship that involves payment (usually in money) extreme promiscuity and emotional indifference towards the sexual act and the partner.

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[3] Zoran Stojanović, *Commentary on Criminal law*, Belgrade, 2006, pp. 457-8.

[4] Duško Modli & Nenad Korajlić, *Criminalistic vocabulary*, Cultural Center Tesanj, Belgrade, 2002, p. 521.

[5] Jelena Džinić Spadijer, *Social pathology*, Belgrade, 1988, p. 84.

[6] Olga Petak, *Social and psycho-social factors of recruiting street prostitutes*, Faculty of Philosophy, Zagreb, 1980, p. 21.

Performing an in-depth analysis of this phenomenon, it may be perceived that it contains three key elements. The first element in conceptualizing prostitution is the link or the association of every sexual relationship with money. Certainly there are valid perceptions that payment can also be performed through presents or rewards, or the acquisition of material benefits that are equivalent to the money value. Thus, in such cases, sexual relationship becomes commercial, that is contractual relationship in which one person, seller of sexual services, sales these services to another person who finds pleasure and satisfaction of sexual urges in them.

The second key element emphasizes extreme sexual promiscuity (a great number of different and unknown partners). The third element of prostitution is characterized by the sense of emotional indifference, not only towards the partner but the sexual pleasure as well. In modern social conditions that are not loaded with patriarchal moral views, coupled with increased crisis of the institution of marriage, the second and third element apparently drop their importance. On the other hand, essential bond between money and sexuality definitely remains the most significant and obviously enduring primary feature of prostitution.

In the context of defining prostitution, it is important to consider a perception by Skulic that each definition has its good and bad sides and can be more or less complete, clear and valid. Definitions are mainly theoretical, which implies that they often result from the scientific approaches of those who propose them.[7]

1.2. Historical reviewon development of prostitution

It is difficult to determine when prostitution appeared as a controversial social phenomenon with complex features, attitudes and prejudices, but it certainly dates back to ancient times.[8]

From a historical perspective, prostitution developed concurrently with socio-economic development and it is parallel with social inequalities that provide dominance to males. It has also been associated with the establishment of private property i.e. material inequality expressed at a higher degree of barbarity. Engels posited that professional prostitution of free women represents a necessary correlate of wage and slave labor.[9]

In the early period of the slave-owning society, before 1500 B.C., a particular form of prostitution had established, so called temple or sacred

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[7] Milan Škulić, *Criminal procedural law*, Belgrade, 2009, p. 2.

[8] Elisabet Abot, *The history of lovers*, Geopolitics, Belgrade, 2007, p. 24.

[9] Fridrih Engels, *Origins of family, private property and state*, Culture, Belgrade, 1950, pp. 67-8.

prostitution, as a form of communicating with higher powers during religious festivities and other ceremonies at temples and other religious shrines. The concept of these festivities was the scarification of young girls' virginity as a sanctification of certain divinities, which was carried out by using symbolic items decorated for this purpose followed by a natural method performed by priests as God's representatives.

In ancient Greece prostitution was particularly tolerated. Athenian law allowed both male and female prostitution. Men who were engaged in prostitution could live ordinary social life, but they were not allowed to be present at councils or to perform some public affairs. The first brothel was founded in 594 BC., and these institutions were tax payers that provide services according to the established price list. Numerous 'employees' were female slaves and they worked in rather difficult conditions. Free prostitutes could organize their working hours and earn more, but due to permanent exposure they were in bigger danger. Three types of prostitutes were discriminated: heteras (higher class prostitutes), who enjoyed wealth and often became one's concubine. They had good education to upgrade their seductive power and they were trained in social skills; auletride, including entertainers, dancers, players and dikteriade or ordinary public women who were at the lowest hierarchical level.[10]

Prostitution was known and tolerated in ancient Rome. It represented a part of social life and it was regulated in detail in the legal system. The norms stipulated that registered prostitutes should be dressed differently, their hairs should be painted in yellow or red, they should wear purple color and shoes, they shall not cease working until the end of their working life, they will regularly inform competent authorities about their income, etc. Free Romans were not allowed to marry procuress or liberated slave of a procuress or brothel owner.[11] Women who were previously engaged in this profession were also considered prostitutes and their name was stigmatized forever, even though they ceased prostitution (Paragraph from the first book Lex Julia et Papia).

In German empire, the relation towards prostitution was different, as a number of German tribes strongly opposed deceit and manifested negative attitudes towards prostitutes. In case they were discovered, women engaged in prostitution were punished physically and mentally. For instance, they were punished by 300 lashes and hair cutting and those who were disobedient and continued to do that job, were sold as slaves. The judges who accepted bribe from prostitutes in those cases would be punished by 100 lashes.

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[10] See more on prostitution in Ancient Greece, Fernando Henriques, *History of prostitution, prostitution of primitive, classical and eastern peoples*, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 36-81.

[11] Fernando Henriques, Ibid. p. 124.

In ancient India, documents indicate that supervisors of prostitutes existed, who were officially responsible to hire prostitutes for the needs of the king, to determine their income and criteria. The law stipulated the respect of rights of the prostitutes and penalties for potential breaching. Men paid financial fine in case of the relationship with a prostitute against her will or in case of a minor prostitute, whereas in case of abduction or physical harm, the fines were doubled. The prostitutes were also obliged to respect the law. Obviously, the relation towards prostitution in ancient India overcame the religious prohibition framework, which is also indicated by the presence of prostitution in the whole territory regardless the governing religion.

Prostitution is expanded in the feudal society, together with the development of cities, in particular unregulated and uncontrolled forms of prostitution. Concurrently, a social dilemma came up, whether this phenomenon should be suppressed by social norms of repression or somewhat tolerated and legally regulated. This dilemma remained for a long time, and prostitution was differently treated from place to place even in the same country, depending on the rulers or city administration. Numerous middle age cities in 15th century developed legal framework regarding regulation of prostitution. Brothels were placed at the specific sites, with prominent and recognizable features. Frequent crusades contributed to the development of prostitution. Special prostitute squads followed the warriors in raids, but the warriors were also returning with slaves who were consequently becoming prostitutes. One of the particularities of prostitution in feudal society was its specific form such as court prostitution, which were more or less present at all European courts.

Nevertheless, during reformation (15th–16th century), old German laws and moral principles were re-adopted, perceiving that body unrestraint is a fundamental problem in the traditional church and one of the causes of social unrest, which resulted in legal control of public prostitution. Even with such social attitudes towards prostitution, it continued to spread primary due to increased class differentiation.

The development of new socio-economic relations reinforced by renaissance and general social development, during 15th and 16th century created a fertile ground for further growth of prostitution. It is considered that during 16th century in Vienna, around 50.000 prostitutes were registered, around 30.000-40.000 in Paris, similarly in London, without counting the mistresses.[12]

The phenomenon of prostitution becomes increasingly prevalent in capitalism as a new social epoch. The transference of the labor power into a

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[12] Eduard Fuchs, *Illustrierte Sittengeschichte-Die Galante Zeit*, Verlag Albert Lang, München, 1910, pp. 404-5.

product, contributed by deeper class differences, led to the transformation of women into goods. This social system initiated numerous negative consequences, unemployment, bad working conditions, which increased the number of prostitutes and due to bigger competition the price of the services declined. Furthermore, both world wars contributed to growth and expansion of prostitution, which increasingly took form of business and became criminalized. As prostitution expanded, it became one of the most significant social problems in the 19th century. Its business and functional organization changed. The role of pandering developed, not only to search new women but also as an intermediate between the prostitute and the client. This phenomenon appeared as a supportive activity in many professions such as tourism, entertainment, provision of services, resorts, etc. Due to the world wars in Europe, prostitution became massive in accordance with growth of human misery and poverty, while in the U.S. mainly in the big cities it advanced in organizational terms, through categorization and organization of brothels.

Nowadays, prostitution is a part of international sex industry that implies mass distribution of pornography books, movies, existence of a large number of striptease bars and clubs, promotion of sex tours for men in the 'third world' countries, etc. The total and widespread exposure of female bodies and genitals, whether as pictures or living beings, apparently leads to the conclusion that prostitution is a simple phenomenon, but not completely understood and clarified. This is further complicated by the diversity of discussions and difficulties in analyses that express variety of the approaches regarding which activities can be considered prostitution. Scientific and technological development created a completely new world today, the world of internet. A limitless and uncontrolled space. The world web provides major advantages, but also has a negative side that by a single click leads into the unpredictable world of pornography, sex, internet pedophilia, and web prostitution, with the victims often being the most sensitive and vulnerable part of the population i.e. children.

The fact is that prostitution has been stigmatized long time ago as an inappropriate social phenomenon and it was legally regulated. However, not a single class society managed to suppress it. Its development has always been reinforced by different facts associated with permanent social differences, which led to the inconsistency of legal frameworks, penal policies, and the attitude of church towards this phenomenon.

Nowadays, there are three types of legal regimes utilized by the states to regulate and define the problem of prostitution.

- Prohibitionist regime treats prostitution as misdemeanor. Prostitute, pimp and the client can all be prosecuted (certain states in the U.S.);

• Reglementarism perceives prostitution as the 'necessary evil' that can be controlled as a regulated public service (e.g. Germany, Holland);
• Abolitionism involves legalization of prostitution. This regime prohibits and punishes pimping and procuring (e.g. France).

1.3. Common features and causes of prostitution

Prostitution represents a specific and complex phenomenon. It appeared during the initial phases of social development and afterwards modified and adapted in accordance with social and historical changes. It is routed in religious rituals at temples and other sanctuaries. Since Babylon, girls had relationship with foreigners in exchange for reward and respect. Concubines, heteras and mistresses not only belonged to the top cultural elite, but they were also dedicated numerous philosophical, literal and music acts. In the following period, prostitution has been perceived as a harmful social phenomenon, symbol of immorality, judgment, sin, stigmatization to normative sanctioning and punishment.

Prostitution is a negative social phenomenon and a serious social problem. Previous views of this issue were based mainly on the individual psychophysical traits of the prostitutes, as some analysts propose, in order to avoid social responsibility for their existence. However, it is evident today that this is a deviant socio-pathological phenomenon caused by social conditions. It is not only a social deviation, but a type of sexual deviation as well, essentially associated with weird sexual preferences.

Evidently, prostitution has always caused and will continue to cause numerous contradictory reactions from the social environment, mainly due to the fact that sexual urges represent important human needs and are under strict social regime of socialization and social control.

Contemporary discussions on moral status of prostitution are pretty polarized between the notions that wage sex as a type of provision of services should not be judged, limited or prevented, since it is legitimate, to the notions that criticize and judge prostitution since it degrades women as human beings. Factors that degrade women refer to:

• Wage sex is faceless;
• Prostitute is treated solely as a tool to be used;
• Sexual relationships are intimate; and
• Prostitutes sell their body or themselves.[13]

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[13] Igor Primorac, *Ethics and sex*, Belgrade, 2007, n. 11, p. 685.

Followers of the idea that prostitution should be legalized support their claims by the fact that legal sanctioning of prostitution can not effectively suppress this phenomenon; hence it should be allowed and legally regulated. In this way, conditions of certain degree of control could be established and negative consequences of this phenomenon could be limited, while prostitution would be fought by non-repressive measures: preventive, educational, economic, medical, promotional, etc.[14]

The phenomenon of prostitution has been and will continue to be subject of numerous researches, analyses, different theoretical interpretations and conceptualizations. Nevertheless, despite these conceptual inconsistencies, there is a common perception that that this phenomenon is highly adaptive, and that due to this specificity it resisted the ages of different socio-economic and political variations.

The analyses and research on prostitution determined a variety of causes for this deviation. Some of them are particularly striking i.e. material factors, childhood abuse, parental alienation, family problems, family milieu and endogenous factors, social environment. According to the American sociologist Davis, the main function of prostitution is related to the prevention of marital tensions. Another sociologist, Thomas, perceives prostitution as a consequence of week social control and distortion of the woman's traditional position in the society. Examining this phenomenon, Ricklens proposed that it represents one of the ways for girls at lower social status to gain income.

Contemporary research in the field of prostitution, despite objective difficulties (prostitutes avoid discussing their lives due to negative public attitudes), could focus on cause-and-effect relationships, such as: interaction with the environment, predisposed tendencies, the association of crime and prostitution, education, material and marital status, consequences of family violence and sexual abuse, etc.

Lesbians and other *queer* women expelled and stigmatized by the society often had limited options to support themselves. Having nothing to lose, many have chosen or have been forced to make income by providing sexual services to men. These services vary from striptease to exotic dancing, phone sex and *peep show*, oral sex to sexual contact. Discussing the sex industry, it is important to discriminate between coercion and choice and admit that there are numerous ways to force women and girls to prostitution. Women trafficking groups worldwide force women and children to live in sexual slavery where escape is hard and almost impossible. Even when there is no slavery, poverty

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[14] Veljko Delibašić, *In the strains of prostitution – criminal and procedural aspects of prostitution*, Čigoja print, Belgrade, 2010, p. 9.

and hopelessness can lead women into prostitution equally likely as the most organized human traffickers.[15]

In the conditions of unemployment and poverty, women are not offered many choices to work. They feel discriminated, with no protection or resources for life and the realistic impression of being marginalized. In contrast, in richer countries with more liberal approach to prostitution, work in the sex industry brings large incomes, which leads women to choose this industry over another one such as merchandise or provision of services, due to greater profits.

According to Boskovic, despite specificities of prostitution, its causes are associated with socio-economic and political changes, social stratification, as well as subjective elements typical for prostitution. Some of the personal-level factors that may appear as causes of prostitution involve: bad family relationships manifested as violence, abandonment of children, child neglect, lack of parental affection and love, different types of sexual abuse including incest, as well as drug use initiation during youth. In case these conditions are accompanied by poverty and problematic peers, there are greeter possibilities of engaging in prostitution.[16]

2. Clasification of prostitution – forms and types of prostitutes

Women who enter the world of prostitution are primary conditioned by the unfavorable socio-economic situation, unemployment, low social status and lack of alternatives for better and safer life conditions. Socio-economic factors, as driving mechanisms, lead or force the majority of women, to see light in the end of the tunnel in prostitution. In that sense, the engagement of women in prostitution contains certain elements of coercion, i.e. it becomes forced. The process of engaging in prostitution or the process of forming prostitutes usually has several phases:

– First phase: Gradual transition from promiscuous behavior to the first act of prostitution. The characteristic of this phase is that such behavior in most of the cases begins from adolescence, usually in a family milieu in which one parent is lacking, or in dysfunctional families that lack adequate family control;

– Second phase: In this phase, certain knowledge and skills related to the provision of sexual services are acquired, and 'education' is performed through daily contacts with co-workers, members of the same 'craft'. Also, prostitutes become acquainted with side effects of their vocation (contagious diseases, arrest, punishment, moral judgment, alcoholism, drug addiction, psycho-physical abuse, etc.).

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[15] Internet page http://www.labris.org.rs/istorija/rad-u-industriji-seksa-i-prostitucija, 20.04.2011.

[16] Mićo Bošković, *Transnational organized crime*, Police Academy, Belgrade, 2003, p. 170.

– Third phase: Commercialization or financial profits become the primary and exclusive motive to engage in prostitution. Selling one's body becomes a profession, in which the individuals accept all the disadvantages of this work, absolutely subjecting their own psycho-physical being to it. Adopting the typical rules of behavior in this work, individuals concurrently absorb them into their own identity, where there are no moral prejudices to reach the goal, i.e. profit.

Prostitution as a deviant phenomenon appears in three forms: overt, covert and latent. Dominant features of overt prostitution involve: payment, promiscuity and emotional disregard among individuals of the same or opposite sex. Prevalent forms of prostitution include female heterosexuality and male homosexuality.

On the overt level, types of prostitution include: unorganized (street), organized (brothels), intermediate houses and escort services (call girls). At this level, individuals engaged in prostitution perceive themselves as deviant, as they have previously gone through a deviant experience. Deviancy is exhibited through the relation towards the work, the way of dressing, entertainment with values. This type of prostitution is socially organized (prostitute-pimp-institution) and visible.

Covert prostitution differs due to its invisibility. Individuals engaged in this type of prostitution do not perceive themselves as deviant, as they are usually in the beginning of deviant carrier, so conformism is present. The engagement in prostitution is rationalized in numerous ways, mainly by material causes. Covert prostitution is common in certain professions such as maids, waitresses, singers, models, secretaries, escort girls. The characteristic of this form is the lack of social organization, individuals engage in prostitution occasionally or rarely. The sexual relationship is a feature of this form of prostitution; however, the profit is not necessarily money, but other services, rights or benefits. On the level of latent prostitution, goals are achieved by the utilization of feminity and sexuality, but with no sexual contact. The profit is usually non-material in nature.[17]

In modern society, these are common situations where the actors are not even stigmatized in contrast to 'real' prostitutes and users of their services.[18]

From the perspective of sexual morality accepted by society, even when individual has sexual relations in marriage in order to ensure economic benefits of the married status, it is no less trade than sex sold on the street to anyone who appears and thus it is no less wrongful or immoral.[19]

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[17] Zoran Gavrilović, "Definition of prostitution", www.ZaMirZine.net/spip.php?article6682 /19.08.2008 / 18.05.2011

[18] Milan Škulić, *Minors as perpetrators and victims of criminal acts*, Belgrade, 2003, pp. 476-7.

[19] Igor Primorac, Ibid, pp. 122-3.

Evidently, among the aforementioned types of prostitution, the most perfidious is the latent. It is less visible and its forms are easily justifiable in the state of general social apathy and unrestraint. Even the society itself accepted a term 'dolls' for this type of prostitutes. However, it implies nothing more than a modern alternative to the term prostitute. The consequences of this type of prostitution are equally fatal as in the other two types, overt and covert.

3. Interaction among prostitution and other forms of socio-pathologiccal behaviors

The phenomenon of prostitution represents an important segment of social relations. It expresses social dysfunction with a similar cause-and-effect relationship as socio-pathological behaviors or "social disorders".

Prostitution is associated with crime at multiple levels, whereas incitement to crime is performed by blackmail, coercion or for the purpose of achieving material benefits. The link of prostitution with crime exists independently of the fact that it is normatively allowed or prohibited.[20]

According to Tomislav Marković (1965), there is a correlation between prostitution and criminal intent, demonstrated by:
  – Prostitutes are a part of the social circle of the criminal;
  – Prostitutes are often involved in concealing crime;
  – Prostitutes appear as an accessory or accomplice in crime;
  – Prostitutes often represent incendiary to crime and other antisocial activities;
  – Prostitutes appear as direct perpetrators of crime.

Prostitution is a very dangerous criminal activity of transnational organized crime, as it also involves corruption of authorities who are engaged in suppression of prostitution, which provides criminal organizations with more freedom to openly commercialize this criminal activity.[21]

Crime and prostitution are inter-related in all of their associations, which makes it difficult to briefly describe the causes of such direct relations. However, it is acknowledged that prostitution serves as an indirect reinforcement of crime. Additionally, significant amount of resources from crime are invested in prostitution, as the organizational scheme of prostitution entails one of the common forms of professional and organized crime. In fact, prostitution provides existential resuorces not only to the prostitutes, but also to a whole team of pimps and criminals, and other 'parasites' of prostitution.

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[20] Milan Milutinović, *Criminology, Contemporary Administration*, Belgrade, 1985, p. 37.

[21] Bošković, Ibid., p. 171.

Furthermore, prostitution has always been under the overt or covert protection of police and local authorities.

Youth delinquency is a very sensitive and painful category for the society. It implies antisocial activities by minor individuals (in most of the states between ages 18-22). Involvement of the most vulnerable population i.e. youth in prostitution creates conditions for their engagement in youth delinquency. That is, a number of times it has been reported in practice that prostitution and youth delinquency are mutually connected and inter-related.

Alcoholism and substance misuse represent a common factor of criminal behavior. These phenomena coupled with prostitution have devastating effects to an organism, as they cause neutralization of consciousness and raise suggestibility levels. Lately, the 'menu' of organized prostitution involves opioid use as a ritual of client bonding and improvement of the whole environment expressed by more beautiful 'virtual' reality. Concurrently, there is a great prevalence of substance dependent prostitutes, increasing the risk of spreading AIDS, Hepatitis and other contagious diseases.

The concept of armed peace, frequently used to describe the participation of armed forces in peace operations, as well as region militarization contributes to the growth and diversification of the forms of prostitution. Wars in certain territories initiated a large flow of refugees who were used for recruitment of numerous prostitutes who perceived this as an exit from humiliating and difficult living conditions. These circumstances were particularly apparent in the territory of former Yugoslavia, where the members of the so-called 'bleu helmets' used cheep offers of various prostitutes, satisfying their urges against the principles of their mission.

Nowadays, there is a variety of approaches regarding the issues of women trafficking and prostitution. Some support the notion that these phenomena are inseparable, based on the perception that prostitution essentially can not be voluntary, therefore implying women trafficking. This domain primarily refers to marginalized and disempowered position of women in the society, which leads them to sell their bodies to men against their own will.[22]

To summarize, there is a close, in-depth unbreakable relation of sex industry and prostitution with women trafficking. It is also apparent that mutual dependence of prostitution and other socio-pathological behaviors implies strengthening of the modalities of social pathology and creates diverse phenomena and contexts of criminal character.

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[22] Željko Bjelajac, *Human trafficking: causes and consequences*, Belgrade, 2005, p. 25.

4. Brief review on prostitution in Serbia

In Serbia, as well as other states in transition and structural reforms, the factors of growth of prostitution are identical. However, Serbia also had other complicating factors related to: war environment, large number of refugees and internally displaced persons, unemployment, financial crisis, political problems and general state instability.

Investigating the forms of prostitution in Serbia, common forms of prostitution may be perceived, such as: street, hotel, agency, apartment prostitution, night clubs and bars prostitution, elite prostitution, as well as an additional form that is in particular expansion and involves occasional or temporary prostitution for the purpose of fulfilling a household budget.

The problem of prostitution in Serbia before 1941 was examined in detailed and resulted in organized prevention programs. Even in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the "Female movement" was established in order to provide re-socialization of prostitutes through specific vocational programs and treatment focused on rehabilitation and social re-adaptation.

As reported in one of the latest Serbian researches on prostitution conducted by the professor Dragan Radulović, the average age of prostitutes is 18-35, however, during the last years the number of young prostitutes intensified. "The majority of prostitutes come from villages, but they live in cities or come from the working class families. Around 30% has no profession and has only basic education, 19% are students, etc. In the period between 1950 and 1980, prostitution initially decreased, afterwards started growing, decreased during the 70s until the beginning of the 80s, when it recorded repeated growth. A general tendency in this period is the growth of prostitution. Prostitutes are ranked in three types: lower class (street prostitution), middle class (hotel and tourist prostitution) and high class (call girls). In regards to the customers, they are about 35 to 40 years old, have lower socio-economic and educational status, 70% of men had at least one relationship with a prostitute, whereas 20% had five or more of such relationships per year. Men who appear as customers include sailors, merchants, workers, soldiers, drivers, men with physical disabilities, season workers and men with special requests".[23]

Engagement in prostitution in Serbia is sanctioned by the Law on public order and peace as misdemeanor. Article 14 of this law provides that a person engaged in prostitution or a person who provides premises for prostitution shall be punished by 30 days of prison. Paragraph 2 of the same article provides serious form of offenses and as qualifying circumstances determines the age of

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[23] Internet page: attachments.wetpaintserv.us/ItQQOhuqymr21F6VVJvp1NQ==69632, 9.05.2011.

the person who is provided the premises for the purpose of prostitution. A person who provides premises to a minor for the purpose of prostitution shall be punished with 60 days of prison.

In terms of criminal law protection, the law stipulates criminal act of mediation in prostitution. This act can be performed by a person who recruits, leads, encourages, entices, or participates in the submission of a female individual to another person for the purpose of prostitution. Also, serious form of this act is provided in case it is performed towards a minor or by the use of force, threat or deception.

One of the particular forms of prostitution refers to prostitution for the purpose of fulfilling a household budget. Customers are provided the services by married women, single mothers, students from rural areas who require funds for housing, food, clothes, cosmetics, etc.[24]

It is acknowledged that prostitution is a social phenomenon with numerous harmful consequences. Since it can not be eradicated, it should be realistically decreased to a level acceptable for a society. Nevertheless, the alarming fact is the prevalent sense of social apathy, lack of interest of those figures in the state who are engaged in suppression of this deviant behavior that contains elements of violence and young women exploitation, where many live under the forceful regime and blackmail as victims of modern slavery. How we could interpret otherwise free publications of thousands of daily classifieds (invitations with phone numbers for clients) in printed and electronic media, in which an assumed relax-massage in fact represents a facade for prostitution. This fact can be easily and quickly examined by calling the provided phone numbers at which a rich menu of sexual services can be heard.

The traditional character of society remains emphasized in Serbia. However, in practice, such principles are impaired, as there is a constant presence of a vacuum of values, double morale, marginalization and inferior position of women in society. Concurrently, feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, isolation and pointlessness are expressed. We should not close our eyes before the phenomenon of prostitution. Therefore, the standpoints supporting that this phenomenon should be kept under control i.e. legalized have realistic and serious grounds. This would be useful from the perspective of public order and peace, for the suppression of human trafficking for sexual exploitation, as well as from a public health perspective for both prostitutes and clients in order to prevent spreading sexually transmittable diseases as AIDS.

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[24] Željko Bjelajac, Ibid, p. 198.

5. Youth and prostitution: the impportance of education and prevention of prostitution

Modern times created new forms of prostitution such as internet prostitution, pornography, e-mail trafficking, child pornography, etc.

One research introduced horrible fear among parents: in Novi Sad dozens of girls at the age 10 voluntarily placed their naked images on the internet in order to make money. This example of web prostitution brings into question whether parents are aware of the lives their children are living. To what extent children should be independent and when parents need to see their daily life.[25]

Internet entered all the spheres of society by opening a completely new virtual world, unlimited and uncontrolled space that provides numerous positive opportunities. Concurrently, the world computer network has numerous negative sides and represents a source of various abuses and distress. Sometimes, even a single click can lead to a pornography site. Boys and girls influenced by peers create their facebook profiles even at very young age. This behavior is considered normal in Serbia and it is regularly supported by parents. In contrary, the world practice is that children under the age of 12 are not allowed to use internet alone. Discussions on the growth of internet pedophilia are reasonable. This is supported by the data provided by the NGO "Astra" that created a virtual profile of a 15-year old girl on the internet for the purpose of research. Within about 40 hours in the chat room, around 500 older individuals contacted her with pedophile tendencies and extremely impolite vocabulary.

There is a tiny line between prostitution and human trafficking that presumably separates them. In fact, it appears to be as if you were walking on a wire where at any moment you could slip and fall into the vicious circle of painful mental and physical torture and become a slave – a product with no elementary human rights and freedoms.

Every second identified victim of human trafficking in Serbia is a child. Increased number of children as victims of this type of crime has been reported in the last few years. Contrary to the previous periods, children are targeted by individuals and not organized groups, whereas Serbia ceased to be a transit state or a temporary or permanent destination, but became a state with internal human trafficking. According to the Ministry of Interior, around ¼ of the minors as victims of human trafficking are children under the age 14, out of which 6 are boys and 9 girls. From the overall number of children ages 14 to

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[25] Internet page: http://serbianforum.org/kutak-za-roditelje/189676-veb-prostitucija-kako-otkriti-da-dete-vodi-paralelni-zivot, 20.04.2011.

18, 24 are female victims, while 9 are male. The largest number of children has been exploited in prostitution, and these were girls under 18 years old.[26]

Student prostitution is particularly expanding and most of the clients are found at internet. The memoirs of a young girl who was forced to prostitution have shaken France.

"My name is Laura, I am 19 years old, I study foreign languages and I need to sell myself in order to pay for my studies. I am not the only one, I believe that around 40.000 other girls must resort to this type of income", she reveals in the book "My expensive studies – A student, 19 years old, profession – prostitute". "I was not born with a silver spoon in my mouth and I don't know about luxury and simplicity. My desire for learning persuaded me that studies are wonderful and worry-free. I never thought that my first year at the university would be hell", rights Laura. "There is no other option when you can't survive", Laura shares, whose mother is a medical nurse and father a worker. They live in a same city but are unable to assist her financially, nor can she receive social assistance as both parents are employed. "I decided to respond to an internet add in which 'a 50 year old guy' requested massage. From that moment, everything started, straight I was engaged in prostitution".[27]

This is an experience described by Laura, who has admitted that she acquired the degree in Italian and Spanish by selling her own body. In her memoirs, she also describes details such as that her client on the first 'massage' gave her 250 euro only for watching, while the next time she got a laptop as an exchange for a sadomasochistic game. This girl who opened her soul noted that clients usually tend to be married, older and wealthy men.

Police estimates that in France there are currently around 20.000 cases as Laura. Besides her memoirs, a startling insight of this phenomenon is also provided by the study "Student prostitution" by Eve Clue who is only four years older than Laura.[28] Unfortunately, these are not isolated stories, as there are certainly thousands and most likely in the close environment. Even though it is a fact that prostitution as a historical category can not be eradicated, principally it should be decreased to an acceptable level, despite socio-economic crisis and the general crisis of morale that contribute to its growth and establishment. Prevention programs must exist at the state level, in terms of raising collective awareness regarding the harmful consequences of this deviant

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[26] Internet page: http://www.politika.rs/Hronika/Deca-sve-češće-žrtve-trgovine-ljudima, 20.04. 2011.

[27] Internet page: http://znanje.infostud.com/vesti/studentska--prostitucija-u-procvatu, 19.04.2011.

[28] Ibid.

phenomenon. Educative contents should be an integral part of the educational system, through introduction of sexual education as a subject of study. In addition, primary form of protection must be established in the basic cell of the society i.e. family.

Parents should carefully observe behavioral changes of children, as even the slightest change could be an indicator that there is something wrong. It is justifiable perception of psychologists and pedagogues that children under 18 for safety reasons should not be allowed independent and uncontrolled internet access, particularly in 'inappropriate contents'. In this context, it is necessary to educate youth about the dark sides of the internet, that is, what may be harmful for them or unconsciously hurt them. In this way, they could recognize and discriminate inappropriate internet pages from the appropriate ones.

In regards to prevention, it is necessary to identify the causes of this phenomenon and acknowledge the health-related consequences (sexually transmitted diseases, HIV infection), negative effects to the reproductive system, the danger of human trafficking, etc. It is equally important to provide information about where and in what way an individual may seek help and protection. Printing and publishing brochures, flyers, advertisements, using the SOS phone, web page, videos, represent just a segment of the necessary activities in the field of prevention of prostitution. Therefore, all measures and actions must be focused on the suppression of this phenomenon, which can contribute to saving human lives that represents the most important social need and value.

Conclusion

Prostitution is a deviant social phenomenon that belongs to the domain of social pathology. It involves behaviors that environment perceives as inappropriate, immoral and antisocial. This phenomenon has always been labeled 'the oldest craft' in the world, 'the necessary evil' and it has been existing in different forms since ancient Greece, when in the 6th century B.C. dikterioni were founded as antecedents of today's brothels, the Roman empire, Japanese concubines, harems of Indian rajah etc., until today when it is characterized by a variety of contents and forms. These trends are apparent in Serbia and other states worldwide.

Omnipresent and constant exposure of female bodies and genitals either as images or living beings, suggests on the one hand that prostitution is a relatively simple phenomenon, but on the other hand still lacks consistency and clarification. Despite different conceptual approaches, a general notion is that prostitution represents selling of 'female sex' to men in exchange for money,

food, material goods or protection, where the female body becomes a product for purchase and sales.

Contemporary attitudes towards this highly adaptive phenomenon that obviously resists diverse socio-economic and political variations through different historical periods are divided and range from approval do judgment. Nevertheless, considering the criticism of those who perceive this 'craft' through the prism of female degradation as human beings, the viewpoints that this phenomenon should be legalized gain increased support. This stems from realistic social circumstances that reflect concrete life situations. Therefore, legalization appears appropriate as prostitution can not be suppressed by repressive solutions and measures. In contrast, it should be legally regulated and adequately controlled. Concurrently, educational preventive programs dedicated primarily to youth should constantly indicate negative consequences associated with this phenomenon. This framework should also be acceptable in our society, even though it formally cherishes traditional social values and virtues.

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BOOK REVIEWS

DILEMMAS ABOUT EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Jeffrey T. Checkel and Peter J. Katzenstein (eds.), *European Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 265 pp., ISBN 9780521709538 (pbk),

What is Europe and who are the Europeans? These two questions have secured significant space in current debates about the European Union and its future. Accordingly, a complex puzzle about the identity of Europe has inspired numerous academic and non-academic writings. This book brings experts in the field together aimed at defining and discussing developments of European identity from different perspectives. Jeffrey Checkel and Peter Katzenstein, editors of the volume, adopt a multidisciplinary approach comprising political science, history, sociology and anthropology. Having consulted various academic contributions about European identity, the editors note that many authors "constantly underplay the importance of politics and processes of politicization" (p. 9) – two aspects thoroughly addressed throughout this book.

Dario Castiglione examines European political identity which does not fully correspond to a definite understanding of what it is to be European. Admittedly, having in mind the complexity of the topic, he offers two significant explanations: one related to the change of the perception of political identification with one's own society in modern world, and the other to the growing heterogeneity of the European Union. As he puts it, "the different kinds of motivations and cultural and psychological constructions may be irrelevant, as long as political identity helps to bring the members of a community together" (p. 29). However, this normative approach is prone to dispute if we consider two failing conceptions: nation-based which lacks appreciation for the changing trend of political identity in a more globalized world and post-national which fails to comprehend the mixed composition of the European Union and the significant differences characterizing the European polity. Indeed, the situation in post-Maastricht Europe has confirmed so. Douglas Holmes examines this period and concludes that the term 'identity' has a twofold nature: on the one hand, it is relevant for discourses about both the past and the future and, on the other, it is a common denominator of the citizens of an enlarged and multicultural Europe (p. 52). For example, various ideas

such as European 'integralism,' monetary issues, Catholic dimension of the EU and citizenship are all interlinked by the very basic notion of identity. Accordingly, people are involved in numerous processes across Europe. Still, their interconnectedness, encompassing different aspects of collective idioms, has often been characterized by a questionable behavior capable of affecting supranational politics.

Discourse about the public sphere is further developed by Juan Díez Medrano. While positioned between the cosmopolitan and nationalist alternatives, he explores the situation following the 2005 EU referendum which confirmed that the Europeans have "strong national or subnational identities and a weakly developed sense of being European" (p. 85). The public sphere is "a key setting for the examination of the elites' European political identity projects" (p. 89). In fact, this became obvious by the 'No' votes in the French and Dutch referenda which surely brought a period of post-referenda uncertainty across the EU. Still, the author is very critical by placing greater importance on the role played by political elites who "like to invoke citizens when justifying their positions on European integration, and they tend to blame them when explaining crises in the integration process" (pp. 105-106).

Previously discussed arguments certainly leave some space for the examination of relations between East and West. While relying on a historical perspective, Holly Case insists that European identity derives from national experience and, accordingly, the opposition between East and West is a false concept. This is a valid point if structural similarities which shaped European identity are taken into account. More importantly, it can be argued that with further enlargements of the EU, European identity will become even more obvious regardless of the institutions of the EU: "[A] crisis of legitimacy looms among 'old' EU member states as it becomes increasingly clear that elite European institutions neither attract the interest nor share the views of the majority of the population" (p. 130). But, what does political support for a more united Europe look like? While this kind of support has failed to bring individuals together due to unequal integration, it has benefited managers and professionals who got involved in powerful associations across European market and contributed to the creation of European civil society. Neil Fligstein, while offering rather insightful data, notes: "Now with enlargement of twenty-seven countries, a whole variety of people are entering the EU without a history of interacting with their counterparts across countries" (p. 157). Having said this, Fligstein's point could be understood as a warning as how to approach the idea about European identity if the final outcome is expected to be positive rather than negative.

Of course, migration has inevitably contributed to the concept of European identity. Adrian Favell examines the three kinds of migration: first, the current

or traditional 'ethnic' immigrations of non-Europeans into European nation-states – "immigrations [that] have visibly put black, brown, and yellow faces in white Europe" (p. 174); second, the emergence of new intra-European 'elite' migrations supported by European free movement laws which date back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (p. 177) ; and third, the flows of East-West migrants – "generation of new Europeans [who] are ambitious, dynamic movers ready to get what's theirs from the West, while benefiting from ease of mobility back and forth from West to East" (p. 183). All these waves of migration contribute to the European mosaic. Still, having in mind that there are some Europeans who would like to restrict (im)migration, the author correctly questions what the situation will look like one day when the EU27 becomes EU45 or EU55. This question is justifiable as the EU45 or EU55 could challenge the process of politicization of the EU. Hartmut Kaelble examines the situation from the 1980s onwards and distinguishes between five ways of identification with Europe. First, the author talks about a liberal identification with Europe as a superior, inferior or global actor. Second and third identifications regard European internal diversity, thus its lifestyles and values. Last two identifications cautiously explore restrained identification whereas the final section is about distinctive identification with Europe. Put together, these five aspects clarify the process of politicization of the EU which has certainly penetrated European politics during the last three decades.

The book concludes with Peter Katzenstein and Jeffrey Checkel's review of the main concepts developed in the volume. As it becomes clear, the authors suggest that we should better talk about various European identities than about one European identity. Accordingly, they note that identity "matters crucially, both to the future of the European project centered on the EU, and to a set of identity processes and European politics more generally" (p. 226). Indeed, the book's primary merit lies in the complexity of issues it seeks to address. Equally, the editors encourage new examinations in the field. This is especially relevant if we take into consideration that current candidate countries (Croatia, Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) will eventually become members of the EU, thus shift its borders and possibly challenge some of the existing perceptions about European identity.

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DOCUMENTS[*]

ADDRESS TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE ADRIATIC-IONIAN INITIATIVE BY H.E. MR. VUK JEREMIĆ

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia,
Brussels, 23 May 2011

Mr. Chairman, Mr. President of the EU Committee of the Regions, Mr. Secretary General, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

At the onset of my remarks, I would like to congratulate Milan Roćen, the Minister of External Affairs of Montenegro, on a successful and dynamic twelve months in office as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative.

I would also like to underline the importance we attach to the hard work of the Initiative's Permanent Secretariat, headquartered in Ancona. I thank our outgoing Secretary General, ambassador Alessandro Grafini, for his singular contribution to our organization, and wish his successor, ambassador Fabio Pigliapoco, all the best in the carrying out of his important duties.

Lastly, I take this opportunity to express, once again, my deep gratitude to Foreign Minister Franco Frattini and the Italian Government, as well as to the Marche region, for consistently supporting the work of this Initiative.

Excellencies,

For the first time under the auspices of this Initiative, we have chosen to meet in the capital of the European Union, Brussels.

In my view, this symbolizes a heightened awareness—by all stakeholders—of the fact that the promotion of regional cooperation in our part of the world is inseparable from the promise of a clear European perspective to the Western Balkans, first made at the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003.

It is this strategic vision that has enabled Serbia to pursue its European agenda with confidence and determination.

Building a European society is the way our country will prosper in peace and security. We will focus on fighting corruption, enforcing the rule of law, protecting human and minority rights, and ensuring a free and independent media continues to thrive.

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[*] In view of fact that the text in this section are an official nature, no alternations of any kind have been made to them by the editor of the *Review of International Affairs*.

We see these and the many other measures we have undertaken as being foremost about modernization and standards. This has driven us to reinvigorate the spirit of reform that sees responsibility, transparency, and accountability as indispensable to the long-term health of our nation—and, ultimately, to the whole of Southeast Europe.

A critical part of this process is reconciliation—working in concert with one another to remember the past by honoring the victims, while ensuring that yesterday's tragedies don't circumscribe our ability to reach out and work together for a better tomorrow.

This much-needed contribution to the European transformation of the Western Balkans has opened the door to making Belgrade the symbolic capital of regional cooperation in 2011. This year, we preside over the Central European Initiative, the Migration Asylum and Refugees Regional Initiative, the South East European Cooperation Process, and, of course, the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative—before taking over the chairmanship of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization in 2012.

A common theme driving all our activities will be fighting organized crime. Serbia's zero-tolerance policy on this transnational scourge will continue unabated. However, ultimate success cannot come without a much stronger and more coordinated effort by the member states.

When it comes to the issue of organized crime, as well as every other topic of regional cooperation, Serbia will work hard to strengthen existing partnerships and create more interaction between the various platforms. By streamlining and—where necessary—even restructuring the way all these mechanisms work, we will increase inter-functionality, reduce political risk, increase our credibility, and, in the end, secure our long-term prosperity through sustainable economic development.

Excellencies,

The Serbian chairmanship of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative will maintain the successful project-oriented approach. We will host a series of roundtables on cooperation in fields such as tourism and inter-university cooperation; small- and medium-sized enterprises; archaeological and cultural heritage protection; safeguarding the environment; scientific and technological research; rural development; as well as transportation and maritime industries.

We will also devote special attention to deepen parliamentary cooperation between the national assemblies of the member states.

Furthermore, the Serbian chairmanship will seek to function in tandem with European Commission-sponsored programs. In this context, I emphasize our preparedness to share our experience with other member states on harmonizing their respective fluvial management policies with the EU Strategy for the river Danube.

Lastly, we will engage with Brussels and encourage the Union to define our geographic space as an EU macro-region—that is, to adopt an official EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region.

Excellencies,

Our Initiative is unique amongst the panoply of regional organizations. It is the only one to focus exclusively on the Adriatic and Ionian area, the cradle of European civilization.

Almost everything that defines the Old Continent's contemporary way of life—our classical heritage and respective national cultures, ethical norms and forms of government, even our alphabets—traces back their origins to our shores.

Paradoxically, a subset of our region—the Western Balkans—is the last part of European geography proper where integration remains incomplete.

By common agreement, this feature is only a temporary one, denoting that our Initiative is well-positioned to play an active role in bringing this transformation to a successful conclusion.

For that to happen without a loss of momentum, the upper hand will have to be regained from the skeptics and naysayers. A complication is the fact that this will likely be done under suboptimal, perhaps even adverse circumstances mostly not of our making.

But the truth is that we will have to work very hard to harness the 21st-century potential of the Balkans. The resulting peace dividend will undoubtedly create a better, more inclusive era for all in a free and integrated Europe.

I conclude by recalling what one of founders of modern-day Europe, Paul-Henri Spaak, said on the very day the Treaty of Rome was signed: "The men of Europe must never again lack audacity or act with delay. This must now become the spirit of our times: to begin from a profound appreciation of a civilization burdened by the riches of its glorious past, and then to transform it somehow in order to be able to channel so much hope towards a future in which society operates according to the rules set by Justice and Fraternity, that it truly and actually comes to pass."

Thank you for your attention.

ADDRESS AT THE J. DENNIS HASTERT CENTER FOR ECONOMICS, GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY AT WHEATON COLLEGE BY H.E. MR. VUK JEREMIĆ

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia,
17 March 2011

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It's a distinct honour and privilege to be a guest of the Hastert Center, named after the longest-serving Republican House Speaker in history.

I would especially like to thank President Ryken and Professor Norton for the invitation to address you here tonight, at the premier liberal arts college of evangelical Christianity.

I would like to begin with a reading of Psalm 74:

"Turn your steps towards these everlasting ruins, all this destruction the enemy has brought on the sanctuary. Your foes roared in the place where you met with us; they set up their standards as signs. They behaved like men wielding axes to cut through a thicket of trees. They smashed all the carved panelling with their axes and hatchets. They burned your sanctuary to the ground; they defiled the dwelling place of your Name. They said in their hearts, 'we will crush them completely!' They burned every place where God was worshipped in the land."

The plaintive words of the psalmist bring to life the images that were just shown. I think now, the tragedy of what happened seven years ago in Kosovo is more real to you even if you knew nothing about it until a few minutes ago.

From March 17th to March 19th, 2004, over 50,000 Kosovo Albanians participated in an orchestrated and organized campaign of ethnic cleansing. In less than 72 hours, 35 churches and monasteries, many dating back to the 14th century or earlier, were set ablaze and lost to humanity. Dozens were killed. Hundreds were injured. Thousands of homes and business were burned to the ground. And more than eight thousand Kosovo Serbs were ethnically cleansed from their homes.

Within hours of the pogrom's instigation, busloads of ethnic Albanians were being transported to more than 30 locations throughout Kosovo. One UN worker exclaimed: "Kristallnacht is under way in Kosovo."

Instead of stopping the violence, some local Kosovo Albanian police units joined right in. "It was planned in advance," said the UN's spokesperson in Kosovo. Human Rights Watch concurred, stating in its July 2004 report, that "large ethnic Albanian crowds acted with ferocious efficiency to rid their areas of all remaining vestiges of a Serb presence."

In the ancient Serbian capital Prizren, for example, thousands set fire to about a dozen Christian holy sites that ennobled the city's old quarter. The church of the Holy Virgin of Ljeviska, a UNESCO World Heritage Site built in the 11th century, was burned

with the help of car tires, resulting in the permanent loss of its invaluable frescoes. You saw those pictures just now.

This took place in what had been the most religiously free and tolerant city in Kosovo. More than 9000 Serbs lived there just a few years ago. By the pogrom's conclusion, there were fewer than twenty left.

Let me share with you the personal experience of the Rev. Michael Faulkner, pastor at the New Horizon Church in Harlem. Some of you may know him as the man who ran against Charlie Rangel for Congress last year.

In August 2004 just a couple of months after the pogrom he travelled to Kosovo, together with a few other American Christian leaders. When he spoke about his impressions, he kept coming back to how Kosovo Albanians reacted to his Serbian friends, who were accompanying the group. He said, "During my walk through Prizren, for the first time in my life I saw racism towards people of the same skin colour. I've just never experienced that kind of intense hatred before."

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One of the lessons of the Book of Job is that even in times one could call 'beyond despair,' faith and hope must never leave our side. We should always remember that the Lord does not abandon us.

Our hope is driven by our memory, but so is our despair. Our Christian faith tells us to reject despair in favour of hope. So we remember the pogrom, we remember what you just saw: the man who worked so hard to tear the cross down from that church; and we also remember the crowd that applauded his success. But even as we remember, we must still hope we must still believe that the dawn will break, and that the darkness will recede.

This is the splendour of faith: to know in one's heart that suffering is temporary, whereas hope is eternal. It is not the ruthless who shall inherit the Earth, but the meek.

Once we recognize God's image in ourselves, we must also recognize it in every other human being. Even in our sworn enemy.

The commandment to "love your enemy" is the moral centre of the teachings of Jesus. No matter what that enemy does, however dreadful his crimes may be, he is also made in the Lord's image. And just like He loves you and me, God loves him, too.

In the wake of the terrible pogrom of March 2004, we decided to put a stop to the cycle of violence.

This wasn't only a choice about how to deal with the other side. It was also about healing our own heart. Hate distorts the hater most of all. It perpetuates itself, and becomes a vicious circle a self-fulfilling prophecy of unending strife and conflict. After a while, one can't walk or see straight anymore, bowing at the altar of retaliation.

That's how Kosovo has been for as long as anyone can remember. I hit you, you then hit me, I hit you back and you hit me back again.

One can then go on to destroy homes and burn churches and one doesn't see anything wrong with that. One is putting all his strength into breaking off that cross. One starts to say, 'this land is mine and mine alone.'

Ladies and Gentlemen,

To destroy what others have built, in the conviction that one thereby erases the truth of it ever having been there, is an act of supreme inhumanity a horrendous crime of cultural cleansing.

At its very core, that's what the struggle over Kosovo is about. It's a struggle for identity. Well, for us Serbs, Kosovo is like the very air we breathe. It's the beating heart of our culture and home to our most sacred shrines. Kosovo is the land where hundreds of thousands of Serbs gave their lives for their country and the cause of freedom.

Here's a story from the First World War. When the Serbian Army was forced to retreat across Kosovo and into Albania as a result of a combined German and Austrian offensive in the winter of 1915 they found it tactically necessary to traverse the very plain on which the battle of Kosovo against the Ottoman Turks had taken place, back in 1389. This exhausted army, led by our ailing, seventy-two year old king, Peter the First, took off their boots, and walked silently across the frozen field, in quiet respect for our fallen ancestors who laid buried in unmarked graves for miles in every direction.

We have an unbreakable bond with Kosovo. Here's what Patriarch Pavle who led our Church for almost twenty years before recently passing away at the age of 95 said about Kosovo: "It is the wellspring of the Serbian spiritual tradition, and of our statehood; the heart and soul of our nation indivisible and essential. That is why our forefathers consecrated its soil with thousands of beautiful garlands: adorning the land with magnificent churches and monasteries dedicated to the glory of God."

Kosovo is our Valley Forge and Yorktown, our Alamo and Gettysburg, our Pearl Harbour and Iwo Jima all rolled into one.

It is in our dreams at night, and in our prayers in church. It is the 'apple of our eye.' It is our Jerusalem.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The March 2004 pogrom constituted a political turning point in the struggle over Kosovo.

For close to five years, the international community had been acting as the interim administrators of Kosovo, in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999). This resolution, which is still in force, explicitly reconfirmed our territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo. It also established the "Standards Before Status" policy, which forbade discussions about Kosovo's legal 'status,' until good governance 'standards' had been met. These explicitly included religious freedom and implementing the human rights of the Serbian community such as the right of return for more than 200,000 of them displaced by the conflict.

But only a few months after the pogrom, the "Standards Before Status" policy was abandoned. It degenerated into Status and no Standards.

'No Standards' explains why not a single individual remains behind bars for killing Serbs or burning down those churches during the March pogrom. 'No Standards' meant that aggressive behaviour was de facto rewarded. And the ultimate result was the February 17th, 2008 unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo's ethnic Albanian authorities.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For three years, democratic Serbia has been working very hard to oppose the UDI using exclusively peaceful and diplomatic means.

This was a paradigm shift in favour of peace in the Balkans. For the first time in the history of our region, an issue of such fundamental importance and complexity passionately involving all at once identity, boundaries, communal rights, opposing historical narratives was steered clear of resorting to the force of arms.

We did not opt for any punitive countermeasures. But what we said was this: we will never recognize UDI, explicitly or implicitly.

This was essentially an attempt to forcefully change Serbia's constitutional, internationally recognized borders. No proud and democratic country be it African, European, Asian or American; be it small or large, rich or poor would act differently, if it ever found itself in our situation.

With the strength and conviction of a unified nation, we affirm: this shall not stand. And neither will any other attempt to impose a one sided, illegitimate outcome. No one can ever make us accept that—in this present, or in any future, generation.

The truth is, the UDI has not lived up to its promise. By every conceivable measure, the residents of the territory are not better off today than they were three years ago.

The economy has sharply contracted, with unemployment over fifty percent and rising especially amongst the young and educated. Corruption is out of control, and public finances are in disarray. The judicial system is highly dysfunctional, and a culture of impunity dominates the society.

Serbian property continues to be usurped; our homes stand empty from looting; and our churches and graveyards keep getting desecrated.

Freedom House does not classify Kosovo as an "electoral democracy." This was even before the recently held elections where fraud was rampant, and multiple re-votes and re-counts were required prompting the European parliament's election monitoring delegation to Kosovo to state that "serious shortcomings underscored insufficient political will, including at the grass root level, to conduct a genuine election in line with [contemporary] standards and good electoral practice."

Kosovo's international position is precarious. It failed to accede to any regional or international political organization.

In short, Kosovo is stuck in a legal, political and economic limbo as a result of the attempt to unilaterally break away from Serbia.

Lincoln said it best: secession is the "essence of anarchy."

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The past three years have taught us that there is simply no sustainable alternative to a negotiated solution. Dialogue is the only road to peace in Kosovo.

It is the only way to ensure the 'axes and hatchets' are laid to rest for good.

The talks that finally got under way a few days ago are a good start. They could help to put aside the fear that stands at the foundation of unilateralism.

There will be many issues to discuss, and some of them will be complicated. As we move forward, we should strive to build trust and understanding. Results will come, if the parties demonstrate good faith, working hard to achieve constructive arrangements, leading to a mutually-acceptable, comprehensive settlement.

A just compromise is what we're after and that's the only way. It's what the dialogue should ultimately produce: a transformative peace between Serbs and Albanians, predicated on the completion of a process of genuine reconciliation.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Without reconciliation, there can be no stable and secure future for our part of Europe. It's the only way to ensure all of us are able to reach our full potential.

But that's not all reconciliation is about. It's a call we must answer, because it rests on the immovable foundation of faith. With reconciliation, enmity and estrangement are no longer; it abolishes what the apostle Paul called the "barrier, the dividing wall of hostility" between nations.

True reconciliation is based on forgiveness, repentance, and contrition. It is about forsaking vengeance, so one can begin anew.

But true reconciliation is not about pretending that things are other than they are. It exposes the awfulness, the abuse, the pain, the hurt. It retains all the complexity, and brings the full truth to light.

That's how it makes a 'new beginning' possible but only if both sides are ready to make the transformation.

Our two nations, Serb and Albanian each as valiant and proud as they are set in their respective ways have travelled through recent periods of tragedy.

Sometimes it is tragedy that produces the opportunity to achieve 'the new beginning.'

In my view, working towards it requires honouring everyone's identity, not denying it. This means one has to know the past, of course, but one must not let this circumscribe his ability to reach beyond the present. That's an impossible task if one persists in trying to falsify the historical record.

One mustn't downplay the significance of terrible crimes, or say they didn't even happen. That just hardens souls. It entrenches opposing positions. It gets people thinking about reinforcing the "wall of hostility" Paul writes about, instead of taking it down.

Unfortunately, that's what the authorities in Kosovo appear to be doing.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Some of you may have heard about the recent allegations that leading public figures in Kosovo are involved in organized crime specifically, money laundering, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking.

That they are responsible for kidnapping hundreds of Serb civilians before, during and after the 1999 conflict and that these abductees were sent from Kosovo to secret detention camps in the Republic of Albania.

Once there, they were undergoing forced surgery, before getting murdered. Their internal organs were being extracted, and then sold on the international black market a uniquely monstrous practice in the voluminous annals of brutal warfare in Europe.

These disturbing claims are summarized in a recent report that was adopted by the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, entitled "Inhuman Treatment of People and Illicit Trafficking in Human Organs in Kosovo."

The report explicitly identifies Hashim Thaqi, Kosovo's current 'prime minister,' as the leader of the group responsible for these atrocities, the Kosovo Liberation Army. It also categorizes Xhavit Haliti, right now 'deputy speaker of the assembly,' as a key personality of organized crime in Kosovo, and names one of Hashim Thaqi's advisors, Shaip Muja, as an apparently "leading co-conspirator" in the trafficking of human organs.

Those dreadful contentions have shocked the conscience of the world. Obviously, we must to get to the bottom of them as soon as possible. The truth has to be revealed.

We need a serious criminal investigation to ascertain the veracity of these charges.

To be effective and comprehensive in scope, this investigation has to be internationally mandated, as well as internationally accountable. It must also be able to provide an effective witness protection and relocation program, in order to guarantee credible testimony by all without fear of retribution.

That is why Serbia has asked for the establishment of an ad hoc investigating mechanism created by and accountable to the UN Security Council. A single authority must ultimately coordinate the investigation process, manage the jurisdictional issues, and ensure the proper administration of justice.

We have made it clear that uncovering the facts about these terrible crimes should not be portrayed as an attempt to assign communal blame. There is no such thing as the guilt or innocence of an entire nation. Guilt, like innocence, is not collective, but personal.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I come to the end of my remarks with a passage from the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly report. It applies equally well to the March 2004 pogrom, as it does to the allegations regarding the trafficking of human organs.

Let me quote it to you: "international actors chose to turn a blind eye to the war crimes of the Kosovo Liberation Army, placing a premium instead on achieving some degree of short-term stability."

It goes on to say that "certain crimes committed by members of the KLA, including some top KLA leaders, were effectively concealed and have remained unpunished."

This must stop. It is high time that everyone makes a pledge to tell the whole truth about what took place in Kosovo.

Such is my prayer for tonight.

That we all start making right choices that we all allow our hearts to soften, and let the spirit of reconciliation take hold.

That we all work to tear down the 'wall of hostility,' and build in its stead a house we can share a house founded on a just compromise, one that balances the desires and interests of both Serbs and Albanians.

That, as Martin Luther King said, we come together to write a creative psalm of peace.

And that we finally get to that day when in the Balkans, 'justice will roll down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream.'

Thanks for coming to hear me, and God bless you all.

JOINT AFRICA EU STRATEGY
ACTION PLAN 2011-2013

Introductory Part

(1) On the basis of the Joint Strategy, the Summit meeting adopted the Action Plan 2011-2013, welcomed the major achievements which have been realized since the previous Summit (Dec. 2007) and recognized the Joint Strategy's potential to deliver more and better results.

(2) In view of the overarching Summit theme "Investment, economic growth and job "creation" the meeting underlined the essential link between a reinvigorated economic cooperation and regional integration via different sectors, including the private sector, with a reinforced cooperation in the thematic partnerships under the Joint Strategy: peace and security, democratic and economic governance and respect for human rights are prerequisites of development. These assets are essential for the creation of an investment-friendly environment that makes best use of domestic resources and attracts investments. The development of Africa's vast human capital requires a focus on skills-development, innovation and entrepreneurship, which should be complemented with a comprehensive approach to social and labour market policies. Without a food-secure, educated and healthy population, both economic growth and poverty reduction remains elusive. Regional Integration, trade, migration and mobility, adaptation and mitigation regarding climate change together with sustainable investment in key sectors such as ICT, energy, raw materials or Science and Technology, agricultural research can build on these foundations to foster sustainable, knowledge-generating and competitive economies.

(3) In view of these interdependencies, the Action Plan 2011-2013 will focus on the following partnerships:

Partnership 1: Peace and Security

(4) The Summit welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and agreed to build upon the operationalisation of APSA to address peace and security challenges in the African continent. Further work will build on ongoing cooperation with the African regional organizations, the results of AU-conducted APSA assessment and the AU/RECs/RMs indicative APSA Road Map, which will, once finalized, serve as a reference document for future support to APSA by the EU and other partners.

(5) The Summit stressed importance of the follow-up given to the Prodi-Panel Report on predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Peace-support operations. Future capacity building measures, including a new cycle of Amani Africa will be priorities with the objective to fully integrate the actual requirements of ongoing conflict prevention initiatives and crisis management operations. The accompanying political dialogue will be reinforced, including with the UN.

(6) The Summit expressed its firm determination to stand united in the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including children, following up on 1674 and UNSC-R 1894. Particular attention should also be paid to women, peace and security, following up on UNSC-R 1325 and UNSC-R 1820, ensuring the equal participation and full involvement of women in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, including peacebuilding.

(7) Furthermore, it agreed to pursue cooperation with a view to building up local resilience capacities to address the transnational security threats posed interalia by Climate Change, crime and terrorism in an integrated and comprehensive manner.

Partnership 2: Democratic Governance and Human Rights

(8) The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central objective of the Africa-EU partnership. In this respect, the newly established Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights should enable Africa and the EU to jointly address key issues of common concern with a view to formulate shared governance agendas and recommendations and to enhance the Africa -EU Partnership. This should include coordinated action in responding to political crises, support for the African Governance Architecture and economic governance. In this context, the AU decision to dedicate the January 2011 AU Summit to Shared Values was welcomed.

(9) The Summit emphasised the importance of an effective multilateral system and reaffirmed the joint determination to strengthen their cooperation in these multilateral fora. In this context, both sides have committed to work together to ensure a better African and European cooperation in relevant international bodies, including the UN.

(10) The Summit confirmed the joint determination to strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation.

Partnership 3: Regional integration, Trade and infrastructure

(11) Regional Integration, Trade and Investment are vectors of economic stability and inclusive and sustainable growth. Well integrated regional markets with efficient infrastructure will attract investment and facilitate business, enhance employment creation and revenues, and improve access to better and more goods and services. The Summit agreed to engage in political dialogue at the appropriate level with a view to finding solutions to common concerns on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as well as to exchange views and information on the development dimension and the impact on African economies of EU-Africa trade agreements. This includes the strengthening of the cooperation in the fields of internal markets and financial services, including the sharing of experiences.

(12) Building on the ongoing dialogue regarding cooperation on raw materials, the Summit agreed to cooperate on issues such as capacity building, governance, infrastructure and investment and geological knowledge and skills, and transparency of mining contracts.

(13) Recognising the crucial role of infrastructure development in regional integration, focus will be on areas such as energy, transport, agriculture health, water and ICT infrastructure development in Africa, reinforcing the necessary interconnections within Africa and between Africa and Europe. There is a shared and clear commitment to strengthen the policy and regulatory dialogue in this domain, and enhance concrete cooperation, notably as regards the policy and regulatory framework to attract and to facilitate African and European private direct investment and the development of private-public-partnership (PPP) schemes.

(14) Both sides were committed to intensifying the cooperation on information and communications technologies and space applications with the objective to strengthen Africa's participation in the Information Revolution.

Partnership 4: MDGs

(15) The Summit underlined the need to live up to the respective commitments taken at the UN High Level Event on the MDGs in September 2010 in New York to mobilize the necessary resources, actors and policies, with the aim to accelerate progress towards the attainment of all the MDGs in Africa by 2015. They are all interlinked, mutually dependent and reinforcing and thus require a holistic, rights-based approach which addresses the impact of off-track MDGs on the achievement of progress in all areas. Priority was set to achieving the MDGs in promoting gender equality, health, food security, education and to accelerate progress on underlying policy and structures, including statistics. The implementation of the 2nd Action Plan will be instrumental in this regard, including its specific activities on maternal, newborn and child health, gender, primary and secondary education, land policy and sustainable development, access to water and sanitation and people with disabilities.

(16) In this context, the Summit agreed to further align initiatives of EU and AU Member States behind the CAADP processes for food security and agriculture and to foster the cooperation on accelerating the implementation of the African Land Policy Guidelines.

(17) The Summit recalled the role of agriculture as a dominant economic sector in which Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) standards are central and agreed to work together towards the harmonization and enhanced capacities of SPS frameworks in Africa, with reference to international food safety, animal health and plant health standards. Capacity building in SPS standards is of great importance for African agricultural sector. In this regard, the Summit agreed to promote intensive cooperation in this area with a view to enhance African capacities. The EU could provide assistance to the African countries in this area.

Partnership 5: Energy

(18) Access to sustainable and affordable energy and energy services is a key issue for African and European citizens. With its vast and untapped natural resources, Africa is an ideal place to develop new technologies and renewable energies, while the EU is particularly well equipped to support capacity building and provide renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies and assistance for the establishment of an adequate regulatory- and investment framework.

(19) The Summit fully supported the implementation of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme and the political targets agreed at the Vienna High Level Meeting on Energy in September 2010, to be reached by 2020, including to bring access to modern and sustainable energy services to an additional 100 million Africans; to double the capacity of cross border electricity connections both within Africa and between Africa and Europe; to double the use of natural gas in Africa as well as to increase African gas exports to Europe; to increase the use of renewable energy in Africa and to improve energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors.

Partnership 6: Climate change and Environment

(20) Sustainable inclusive growth and development requires strategies that address economic, social and environmental challenges. The development of a 'Green Economy' provides both Africa and the EU with opportunities for new jobs and growth. To this end, cooperation on climate friendly technologies will be intensified and CDM and new emerging mechanisms utilized to the greatest possible extent. In this perspective, the

meeting reaffirmed the shared post-Copenhagen objective to finalize an ambitious, legally binding post-2012 agreement.

(21) Having aligned their positions in the preparatory phase, the EU and Africa will unite their efforts for a successful outcome of Cancun, underlining the need of a balanced approach as regards adaptation and mitigation; of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to prioritise adaptation funding on the most vulnerable developing countries, particularly in Africa, including through the implementation of the 2nd phase of the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI) and the ClimDev initiative.

(22) The Summit recalled the commitment made by European leaders to make available 7.2 bn € in 2010-2012 for fast-start Climate Change projects and initiatives, out of which a significant part will be available for Africa.

Partnership 7: Migration, Mobility and Employment

(23) The Summit stressed the need to facilitate mobility and better manage legal migration in order to enhance the development impact of migration. The importance of eradicating the trafficking in human beings was underlined. Particular emphasis was put on illegal or irregular migratory flows and the further reduction of them, including through application of existing readmission provisions. The need to ensure the human rights of migrants, and strengthen protection for asylum seekers and refugees was also underscored.

(24) The Summit confirmed the commitment of all partners to create more and better jobs through the promotion of sustainable and inclusive growth, acknowledging the role of all stakeholders, including social partners and the private sector. It agreed to further intensify dialogue and cooperation in this area, focusing in particular on questions related to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

(25) With respect to the mobility of students and academics, it was agreed to reinforce existing programmes such as Eramus Mundus, Edulink and Nyerere, together with initiatives such as the Pan-African University and Tuning Educational Structures and Programmes.

(26) The Summit emphasized the need to strengthen the role of Diasporas in the African development process, and maximize the development benefits of remittances.

Partnership 8: Science, Info Society and Space

(27) Actions under this partnership, including capacity building, will leverage faster inclusive economic growth and social development in Africa. The resulting knowledge-generating/knowledge based economy will help address more efficiently the major common problems and global challenges, and will be able to compete more effectively in rapidly evolving world markets. The Summit therefore welcomed progress thus far and encouraged all stakeholders to contribute to the timely implementation of the Second Action Plan for Science, Information Society and Space.

(28) The Summit agreed to launch a high-level Science and Technology policy dialogue at Senior Officials- and at Ministerial level to strengthen the Science and Technology cooperation framework and to ensure the necessary guidance in the pursuit of agreed objectives.

Delivering Results: from commitments to joint action

(29) The Summit recalled some of the deliverables achieved under the JAES so far, including the € 1 billion to support the African Peace and Security Agenda and Architecture, the 1bnFood Facility, the training for Election observers, the € 168 million in grants which have mobilised a total financing of about €2 billion for infrastructure projects in Africa, the creation of a Diaspora Network, the access to sustainable energy services for 2.5 million people, the Joint Climate Change Declaration endorsed at this Summit meeting, and the African Research Grants and awards to promote science and technology in Africa. These demonstrate the ability of the two continents to produce visible results that benefit African and European citizens and the potential of the Joint Strategy to deliver more and better in the future.

(30) With respect to the implementation of the Action Plan 2011-2013, the Summit confirmed the principles of shared efforts and responsibilities, and underlined the readiness to cooperate with all committed African and European stakeholders (civil society, parliaments, private sector, local authorities) and with interested international partners.

(31) As a driving force behind the development of African and European economies and translating the above mentioned political objectives into a partnership of concrete results, a stronger engagement of the private sector will be essential. It will be equally important to establish closer relations with EU and International Financial institutions (EIB, WB, AfDB and BADEA). Moreover, following the recent AU Summit in Kampala, both sides agree to further engage in the discussions on the African proposals to jointly establish an African Integration Facility to support the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan.

(32) The Summit agreed to examine flagship initiatives in each of the five African regions as soon as they are jointly identified on the basis of existing instruments; NPCA was identified as a key instrument to support and coordinate such agreed initiatives. There was agreement to build future implementation activities on a reinforced cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities concerned.

(33) Finally, the Summit urged all stakeholders to deliver concrete results which will positively and directly affect people's life. Each partnership should be assessed on this basis. With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, relations with Africa have become an integral part of the EU's overall political, economic, social and humanitarian agenda. This will ensure greater consistency and coherence between the EU's Africa policy and its overall interests, ambitions and policies. It will also offer Africa, which is consolidating its institutional architecture, a chance to better engage with the EU on a strategic level, and allow both partners to coordinate or align their positions in the run- up to major international events and ensure greater impact.

JAES Action Plan 2011-13:
Cross-cutting issues

Both sides agree on the following options on cross-cutting issues to enhance the effectiveness of the Action Plan and to improve its working methods.

Introduction

The Action Plan 2011-2013 provides a framework to implement JAES priorities collectively agreed upon and adopted at the Summit in November 2010 by the African and European Heads of State and Government. The AU and EU Commissions will continue to play an active role in the implementation, but cannot deliver alone on the Action Plan's ambitious commitments. Therefore, priority will be given to better define how activities implemented at the national, regional and continental levels by African and European Member States, RECs and other key stakeholders including the private sector will contribute to deliver on the collective commitments and improve the impact and visibility of the Action Plan 2011-2013.

I. JAES: enhanced political dialogue and coordination

Political and policy dialogue:

Currently, African and European Heads of State and Government meet every three years at Summit level to take decisions concerning relations between the two continents, embedded within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. In between Summits, six-monthly Ministerial meetings carry the political dialogue forward, review the implementation of the Joint Strategy / Action Plans, and provide political guidance as necessary. Recently, these dialogues of Foreign Ministers have started to be complemented by sector-specific Ministerial or Senior Officials meetings and which were prepared by experts, taking into account inputs from JEGs and the Joint Task Force.

1. Political dialogue at the level of Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers: Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU side, the representation of the EU in Political Dialogue meetings at Summit and Foreign Ministers level has changed. The African side will decide on its mode of representation at a later stage. Both sides agree to seize the opportunities offered by the EU's new institutional arrangements to further intensify the formal and informal contacts between European and African Leaders and their respective services on regular and ad hoc basis.

2. Sectoral political / policy dialogue: Africa and EU have agreed to enhance the frequency, scope and effectiveness of their thematic policy dialogue in key priority areas. Joint Experts Groups and other competent African and EU bodies will assess the possibility of holding sectoral Ministerial / SOM meetings, including in the margins of African, European or international high level events, which need to be adequately prepared by the competent bodies on both sides. The AU and EU Commissions will seek to enhance the effectiveness of sectoral policy dialogue in the annual College-to-College meetings, including through broader participation of their respective line DGs, departments and services in the preparation and follow-up.

3. Dialogue at national and at regional level: The Joint Strategy and the implementation of the Action Plan 2011-2013 will be systematically included in political dialogue meetings between African regions and countries and the EU.

4. Cooperation in the UN, in international financial institutions and in other international fora: Dialogue and cooperation between African and European Heads of Missions (HoMs) and experts in New York, Geneva and elsewhere will be systematically strengthened, notably with a view to better understand respective positions, to define and defend common approaches, and to follow-up initiatives in the various partnerships. EU Delegations and the AU representations and other African counterparts will engage on a more systematic basis, including through the setting up of appropriate flexible EU-Africa dialogue- and coordination arrangements.

Coordination

5. AU and EU Commissions: The two Commissions will further strengthen their respective internal coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the Joint Strategy.

6. Coordination of European partners:

   a. EU Coordination in Brussels: Efforts will be made to strengthen the coordination between capitals and Council working groups in Brussels to ensure coherence and complementarity between bilateral initiatives and collective EU commitments, and to ensure stronger coordination and collaboration between the different geographical working groups dealing with Africa, in line with the principle of treating Africa as one.

   b. EU Delegations: With the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the role of EU Delegations in African capitals has been strengthened. All EU Delegations in Africa, but more particularly the EU Delegations to the AU and in RECs capitals, will play an important role in ensuring effective EU coordination and in promoting awareness and ownership among Member States.

   c. EU coordination in Addis: The coordination between the EU Delegation and Member States' representations will be strengthened with a view to enhancing coherence and visibility of EU positions, including within the AU PG.

7. Coordination of African partners:

   a. AU coordination in Addis Ababa: steps will be taken to strengthen the coordination between the AU-PRC and its relevant sub-Committees on the one hand, and the African capitals and Group of African Ambassadors in Brussels on the other hand;

   b. Coordination with RECs: efforts will be made to systematically address all JAES-related issues within the framework of the 6-monthly AU-RECs coordination meetings;

   c. AU Delegation to the EU: The AU Permanent Mission to the EU and the ACP Group follows the Africa-EU cooperation, the coordination of the group of African ambassadors in Brussels and the implementation of the Cotonou ACP-EU partnership agreement, and represents the AU in the 27 EU Member States. The role of the AU Mission in the effective implementation of the Strategy and the Action Plan will therefore be enhanced. If need be, its capacity will be further strengthened to enable it better perform this role.

8. Synergies and coordination between the Joint Strategy / Action Plan and other EU-Africa cooperation frameworks: Both sides agree to strive for more synergies and better coordination between the Joint Strategy and other existing cooperation

frameworks and – instruments between the EU and African Partners (Cotonou-Agreement for sub-Saharan countries, ENP/Union for the Mediterranean for Northern Africa, TDCA/DCI for South Africa), notably through coordination meetings in the margins of the meetings of the respective joint cooperation meetings and institutions.

II. JAES institutional architecture and working arrangements

9. Joint Expert Groups (JEGs): Guidelines defining the mandate, composition and working methods for JEGs have been endorsed by the 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika[1] as a living document to steer the Joint Experts Groups in their work. The Ministerial Meeting on 26.04.2010 endorsed a joint paper with options to improve the implementation of the Joint Strategy. JEGs will actively re-examine these options and implement the necessary arrangements to improve their functioning. Such arrangements could include an agreement of internal working guidelines or on handing over responsibilities for coordinating the implementation of specific aspects of the partnerships to other existing bodies such as the African Peace Facility JCC or the Steering Committee of the Infrastructure Partnership.

10. While avoiding a "one size fits all approach, JEGs will also address, in addition to the specific proposals to enhance the effectiveness of their individual work, the following cross-cutting issues:

   a. Co-chairs and the two Commissions will consult their respective constituencies ahead of JEG meetings, by convening coordination meetings;

   b. JEGs will seek a better connection of their work with the political decision making process, and will examine possibilities to provide inputs to and to receive the necessary guidance from competent political bodies, sectoral Senior Officials or Ministerial meetings (cf. para.2 above).

11. Both sides will seek to involve the African Development Bank (ADB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and national or regional development finance institutions more actively in the implementation of the Partnerships.

12. Africa-EU Joint Task Force (JTF): The participation in the JTF has been enhanced to allow stakeholders to contribute more actively to the implementation of the Joint Strategy. The JTF will improve coordination between the key actors for the Action Plan's implementation, namely the two Commissions, the EU External Action Service, the two Parliaments, African and EU JEG co-chairs, chefs de files, RECs, private sector and civil society representatives (for the African side through AU-ECOSOCC). The JTF will address the cross-cutting issues and difficulties, and identify synergies across partnerships. The JTF will also contribute to preparing the JAES-related decisions, which will continue to be taken at the political level in Ministerial meetings.

III. JAES financing

13. The Strategy's success is a joint Afro-European responsibility and requires significant political and operational resources to deliver on the ambitious agendas. The implementation, including financing of the JAES, is a joint task for all

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[1] http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/20081121_final_jeg_guidelines_and_mandate_1.doc.

stakeholders: European and AU Commissions, Member States, Financing Institutions, RECs, as well as private sector and civil society on both sides. It is essential that European and African actors engage at continental, regional, national levels to provide the necessary inputs. This will require in particular the continuing mainstreaming of the JAES in existing instruments. The EU and Africa will therefore cooperate closely to secure the appropriate funding to implement the Action Plan 2011-2013. To this end, the JAES will be mainstreamed and promoted in all relevant instruments, be they managed by the EU institutions (EDF, ENPI, DCI, IfS, EIDHR, EIB instruments…), EU Member States' bilateral instruments, or African contributions. In the same vein, both sides agree to further engage, without delay, in the discussions on the African proposals to jointly establish an African Integration Facility to support the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan. These discussions should be concluded as soon as possible.

14. As a Joint political framework, the JAES shall steer policy choices and improve the coherence and complementarity of the EU's and Africa's action. <u>The Joint Strategy will be used to orient the programming of existing instruments,</u> and the priorities of this Action Plan shall be consistently integrated in relevant (African) Strategic Plans and (joint) programming processes of relevant instruments, according to their respective scope and general objectives. Both sides will make further progress to make the relevant financial instruments supportive of the Action Plan. Existing joint programming mechanisms (such as the dialogue between the EU and African National and Regional Authorising Officers and the ACP Secretariat) will be more efficiently used by both sides to ensure JAES priorities are adequately reflected.

15. Both sides will also pursue efforts to <u>translate the Lisbon commitments to treat Africa as one into a reality</u>. All involved actors will work to reinforce synergies between the various policy frameworks and accompanying financial instruments, to increase efficiency in dealing with pan-African challenges. Existing bridges between cooperation instruments will be used to support the continental dimension of the Action Plan activities.

16. <u>Efficiently use capacity building programmes to enhance AU capacities to implement the JAES</u>: Through the EDF's Institutional Support Programme for the AU and similar bilateral initiatives, the EU will continue to provide an integrated and comprehensive support to strengthen the financial, administrative management and the policy making capacity of AU institutions, and to enable the AU Commission to play an effective role in the implementation of the Strategy and the Action Plan, notably through the support of its institutional transformation process. Under the 10th EDF Intra-ACP envelope, the future capacity building programme will ensure continuity with the current initiatives under the 9th EDF. Both sides agree to use this programme to support the capacities of the African Union and its organs to implement the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the 8 thematic partnerships of the Action Plan 2011-2013, in particular through a strengthening of the necessary competencies in the field of policy-making, programme design and implementation, monitoring and follow-up (but excluding the possibility of supporting operational costs of specific projects). This will include in particular a better integration and streamlining of the 8 thematic JAES partnerships in the AUC's structures and work programmes. Finally, cooperation with other international partners supporting the AU capacities will be sought.

17. <u>Set-up the complementary support mechanisms for specific needs / technical support</u>: Based on the experience of the JAES Action Plan 2008-10, both sides will examine the possibility of establishing a small, flexible and demand-driven assistance mechanism to address implementation difficulties and to provide the necessary technical, administrative and secretarial support for the implementation of the JAES Action Plan 2011-2013. Such a mechanism should support, on a demand-driven basis, the functioning of the thematic partnerships (notably the expert groups and their co-chairs in preparing and following-up their meetings, and in facilitating communication and continued work between meetings), and facilitate the engagement of Non-State Actors. The support mechanism should also assist the preparation of bankable projects, for example through the preparation of feasibility studies and other project-preparation activities, provided that the necessary resources are being made available.

18. Both sides agree on the need to communicate better and to increase the visibility of the JAES both in Africa, EU and internationally. The media is a key multiplier of information and can contribute to enhance the people centred dimension of the Africa-EU Partnerships. Both sides agreed to continue implementing communication activities so far undertaken, including the joint JAES website (www.africa-eu-partnership.org), on-line since 1 October 2008.

19. <u>Explore innovative financing options</u>: Both sides agree to explore innovative financing mechanisms such as "Auction Floors" and Public Private Partnerships to reach out actively to the private sector as an essential stakeholder of this Action Plan, and to put in place the conditions to foster more effective participation of the private sector, particularly in the areas of transport, energy and infrastructure. Innovative approaches should be developed to better engage with the private sector and leverage funding, skills and competences, which can contribute to more sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

IV. A people-centred partnership

20. Last, but certainly not least, both sides agree to support the active involvement of the European and Pan-African Parliaments (EP, PAP) in the implementation and the monitoring of this Action Plan, in line with the principles agreed in Lisbon and the arrangements endorsed by the Ministerial Troika of 28 April 2009.

21. Both sides also agree to support the active involvement of the Civil Society (including through ECOSOCC on the African side) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Peace and Security

Overview

Progress has been achieved throughout the implementation of the first Action Plan in the three main areas of focus:

Political dialogue has grown and continues to grow, in order to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges and security in Africa, Europe and globally, at two levels: The structural and systematic linkages between decision making organs, such as the EU PSC and the AU PSC, the EUMC and the AU MSC, Crisis management teams on both sides, have been strengthened. African and EU heads of delegations in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York are in regular consultation. Nevertheless, these exchanges of mutual understanding need to be extended into a more technical and operational cooperation.

The substance of the dialogue has been globally organised around conflict situation and crises. However, thematic issues such as terrorism, and its various sources of financing, disarmament, post conflict reconstruction and development, already listed under this chapter in the first action plan, should become more prominent areas of dialogue and cooperation. New thematic issues such as cross border cooperation and maritime safety and security are added to make this dialogue more comprehensive and sustainable. The EU and the AU will review progress annually in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1894.

Progress has been made in the **operationalization of the APSA**. However much remains to be done in order to sustain and consolidate this progress and to achieve a functional Architecture including smooth and effective interaction between all components of the APSA. EU funding for the next three years Action Plan will be jointly articulated on the basis of an AU-RECs-EU operational Roadmap.

Finally, good progress was made to ensure **predictable funding** for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority. Within the framework of the UN Security Council responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and in light of the role of Regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, a dedicated dialogue has been pursued through the Prodi Panel Report on support to Africa-led peace keeping operations and subsequent elaboration of the UN Secretary-General's Reports on its implementation. Within the framework of this Partnership, through the 1st and 2nd African Peace. Facility, predictable support to Africa-led peace support operations has been largely provided for, in parallel with efforts to support AU and RECs Capacity Building programmes. However, the initial objective "to financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations" has not been fully achieved. Further exchanges are required on AU efforts to mobilise additional resources from within the continent, including through the AU Peace Fund. There furthermore remains an acute need for more concerted action between the AU, the EU and the UN to move forward the process of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Prodi Panel's and subsequent UNSG Reports.

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVES

1. <u>Political</u> <u>Dialogue</u>:

1) To jointly contribute to the global security related governance in Africa, Europe and world-wide, and make the dialogue more effective.

2) Address crises and challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and elsewhere and capitalize on commonalities of positions.

Expected results:

- Reinforced structural interaction on conflict situations and crises between the EU, the AU and the RECs;
- Building upon the APSA pillars and the African security agenda, policies such as, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Antipersonnel Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War, Counter-Terrorism, Mediation, Protection of Civilians (UNSCR 1894), Women Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820), and issues related to Children in Armed Conflicts (UNSCR 1675) will be considered under a more comprehensive approach to contribute to eliminate root causes of conflict, conflict prevention, crises management and resolution, long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building;
- The cooperation aspects of the security-development nexus are systematically assessed;
- Enlarged political dialogue to include RECs/RMs, in the light of the provisions of the EU and AU protocols and MoUs;
- Strengthened dialogue and coordination of positions within the UN framework by respective groups, including jointly sponsored UN Resolutions addressing global risks such as terrorism, Chemical-Biological-Radiological and Nuclear threats and the illicit spread and accumulation of firearms;
- As part of African and European regional organisations' contributions to effective multilateralism, the AU- and EU will work with the UN to address global threats to peace and security as well as the financial and operational capacity of the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct peace support operations;
- Comprehensive and co-ordinated responses to regional security threats, involving political, operational and financial stakeholders and partners;
- Enhance conflict management cooperation and EU support to Peace and Security initiatives undertaken under the auspices of the AU.

2. <u>Operationalization of APSA</u>

Effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security challenges in Africa.

Expected Outcomes:

- Building upon progress already achieved by APSA structures at continental and regional level, and new evolutions, well reflected by the AU-RECs APSA assessment and by the outcome of Amani Africa, adoption of a comprehensive AU-RECs Roadmap for the operationalization of the APSA;

- Establishment of a EU-AU-RECs APSA operational programme based on the comprehensive AU-RECs APSA Roadmap in line with the Protocole establishing the Peace and Security Council and the AU-RECs MoU;
- Implementation of the EU-AU-RECs programme, leading to a coherent support by the EU institutions and EU MS to different components and policies;
- This operational programme will be developed taking into account other capacity building programmes, including support provided by the UN and other partners;
- A coordinated and concerted partner support for AU and RECs/RMs including a consolidated and institutional liaison mechanism. (e.g. replicate at RECs/RMs level the Addis Ababa based AU Partner Group).

3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority

Make available adequate resources (financial, material, human resources, etc) to plan, equip, deploy, and support, African led peace support operations.

Expected results:

- In view of 2011 UNSG Report on predictable, flexible and sustainable funding of Africa-led Peace Support Operations, based on the EU involvement, on the experience with the APF, and lessons learned from a number of peace support operations so far, elaboration of practical ways ahead on the implementation of the Prodi Panel and UNSG Reports suggestions;
- In view of the elaboration and adoption of a programme under the APF 3, the AU will make efforts to mobilise increased resources from within the continent, including the AU Peace Fund.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

1. Political Dialogue

Initiative 1) Completion and implementation of the **political dialogue** framework by establishing systematic and structural linkages between EU COPS-AU PSC, EU and AU Chiefs of Staff, and between the new EU (EEAS) structures, the AUC and RECs Peace and Security Departments. The objective is to increase the involvement at this political level in reviewing actions already undertaken, and on providing increased political guidance for the future.

Initiative 2) Consultations between the Africa Group and the EU will be established in New York on the basis of major global challenges discussed in UNSC and UNGA (e.g. conflicts, terrorism, CBRN proliferation and conventional disarmament). Programmes and agenda for such consultations will be established on a yearly basis and be reviewed every six months in order to allow adequate preparation of the meetings at Headquarters levels.

Initiative 3) Exert coordinated and concerted efforts to combat piracy, including in the framework of the UN; and consider the elaboration of legal instruments which may be deemed appropriate to enhance cooperation on all piracy related issues.

Initiative 4) In addressing crises and challenges to P&S in Africa, Europe and elsewhere, specific Africa-EU ad hoc thematic teams will be established in order to ensure co-ordination and co- operation. To this effect, the added value of these teams might be particularly beneficial for tackling post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and development, and strengthening the role of women in all stages, to consolidate the progress made in resolving conflicts in Africa and take advantage of the experience and capabilities of Europe. These teams will involve the International Community stakeholders as appropriate, and will optimize the follow-up to the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). In this regard, the African Union will complete a study on the establishment of a Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre.

Initiative 5) Thematic cluster sessions with experts from AU/RECs/RMs/MS/EU will be created on operational objectives in areas such as climate change and security, AU border programme, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation, development of legal instruments, and disarmament issues (including Explosive Remnants of War), or focusing on geographical areas. These initiatives could lead to the organization of Europe-Africa conferences on these themes.

Initiative 6) Informal consultations between the AU, EU and UN, to follow-up the recommendations of the AU/UN Report chaired by Mr. Romano Prodi, and the UN Secretary General Report of September 2009, should enable the three organisations to advance their respective agendas. Practical suggestions from experts should help to make progress in providing sustainable, flexible and predictable support for peacekeeping operations launched within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and undertaken by the AU or under its authority with the consent of the UN Security Council.

Initiative 7) Building on the AU Border Programme, as well as on the rich experience of the EU in this field, we will programme activities to be undertaken together, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation and development of legal instruments. This initiative could also be extended, through the support of EU Member States, to exchanges of experience on delimitation and demarcation of borders.

Initiative 8) In pursuit of the reinforcement of the Preventive, Peace Building and Post Conflict policies and measures of the APSA at continental and regional levels, plans of action will be drawn up and implemented so as to deal with thematic issues such as: SSR, DDR, AU Border programmes, Early Warning systems, Women Peace and Security, Mediation-Negotiation capacity, and Counter-terrorism.

Initiative 9) The ongoing co-operation to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW will be reinforced through a comprehensive and concrete Plan of Action in support of the implementation of the AU SALW Strategy, in co-ordination with the IC. Similarly, an Action Plan will be drawn up to support the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and of the three additional protocols, notably the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. Adoption and implementation of a comprehensive AU-RECs strategic Roadmap for the **operationalization of the APSA** in the long term, reflecting regional, continental, and global security priorities of the AUC, RECs and AU MS and capable of ensuring coherence of purpose across the different policies addressed.

Initiative 1) As a follow-up to the first action plan and of different evaluations regarding African training needs and capacities for ASF, implement operational and

concrete AU/RECs/EU agreed measures to improve the required capacities and capabilities of African training centres.

Initiative 2) Adoption of an APSA AU-RECs Strategic Roadmap consisting of an articulated long- term perspective of the APSA goals and processes through which to achieve them. This AU roadmap, which the EU will support will ensure coherent, co-ordinated and concerted decisions and priorities between the regional and continental levels of the APSA and EU's continental, regional and country instruments. A strengthened framework for a follow-up assessment of the interaction between the different components of the APSA and respective responsibilities will be made available and will give clear indications for further operational support.

Initiative 3) Identify and set priorities and strict timelines for the short-term implementation phase (three-years) of the AU-RECs Roadmap. This short term phase, which covers the period of the second action plan, will build on the conclusions of the APSA needs assessment, lessons learned from the AMANI Africa training cycle, including regional training exercises, and the draft of the AU African Standby Force 3rd roadmap, and will address the APSA policies (captured in the AU- RECs MoU on APSA). The prioritised activities and the sequencing of the steps required to achieve the operational objectives will be assessed on a regular basis to ensure a functional APSA consisting of components that interact in a coordinated way. This plan will become the trilateral AU-RECs-EU APSA Roadmap detailing EU support for envisaged activities.

Initiative 4) Further develop and endorse concepts, doctrines and procedures related to ASF in general (including rapid deployment capabilities, logistics, and maritime components), to APSA (functional connections between Early Warning and Planning Elements at regional and continental level and decision making bodies, training, mediation) and to other security issues (SSR, DDR, SALW, counter-terrorism).

Initiative 5) Develop human rights and gender training programmes for peace keeping missions in Africa, as requested by the EU-AU human rights dialogue agenda.

Initiative 6) Organise a second training cycle of the APSA structures, according to the AU-set main objectives for the short term (three years) and taking into account lessons learned from the first AMANI AFRICA cycle.

3. **Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations** undertaken by the AU or under its authority.

Initiative 1) The issue of predictable funding for Africa-led PSOs will also be integrated under the relevant initiatives in the first and second priority areas of this Action Plan. In this context and in view of the elaboration and adoption of a programme under the APF 3, a dedicated political and technical forum on the AU Peace Fund will need to connect African political and financial decisions in this area with EU engagements.

Initiative 2) Launch a dedicated, albeit informal, UN-AU-EU dialogue within the UN framework to propose practical steps forward to the Prodi Panel and UNSG Reports.

Initiative 3) Based on to the AU-RECs-EU operational Plan for the APSA operationalisation and on the African Peace and Security Agenda and on the progress under Initiative 1, the EU, AU and RECs will work together in defining the 3rd APF programme.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights

Overview

Democratic Governance and Human Rights are key for sustainable development and for cooperation between partners, and are an integral part of both the EU's and AU's core values. The Africa-EU Partnership on Governance and Human Rights will enable a comprehensive continent to continent dialogue and cooperation on aspects and concepts such as local capacity strengthening, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, democratic principles, the rule of law and equitable access to legal systems, management of natural resources, the fight against corruption and fraud, accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, global governance and security sector reform.

I. Overall Objectives

• To strengthen the open and inclusive Africa-EU dialogue on democratic governance and human rights. This shall also contribute to enhancing the joint influence of Africa and the European Union in international fora and at global level in these fields;

• To contribute to the establishment and strengthening of the African Governance Architecture with coordinated EU support;

• To strengthen the close cooperation between Africa and the EU in the area of cultural goods and other cultural activities;

• To strengthen synergies and linkages between human rights and democratic governance in its political, economic and social dimension and other areas of the Africa/EU partnership.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013
    by priority area

Priority 1: Enhanced dialogue and cooperation at the global level
and in international fora

Activities

1. The Africa-EU DGHR Platform for Dialogue will act as an open and inclusive forum on governance with a view to promoting dialogue and contributing to the formulation of shared governance agendas and recommendations that can feed the political dialogue between Africa and the European Union and deepening their partnership.

2. Exchange views and best practices on matters of joint interest within international fora, including NY, Geneva, Vienna and Paris, in particular on UPR, rights of the child, rights of persons with disabilities, economic and social rights and combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and incitement to hatred and other areas of mutual interest.

3. Continue a dedicated AU-EU Political Human Rights Dialogue in Troika format, flanked by the Africa-EU Civil Society Human Rights Seminars.

4. Cooperate with other thematic partnerships to promote sectoral governance and strengthen synergies to cover cross-thematic issues.

Expected Results

• Open and regular dialogue which builds trust, mutual understanding and contributes to developing common agendas and approaches that feed into the political level and decision making process;

• Extended dialogue to issues where diverging views prevail;

• Enhanced coordination and cooperation on issues of common interest in international fora such as the 2nd and 3rd Committee of UNGA, the UN Convention against Corruption and the Human Rights Council;

• Increased awareness of the importance of the relevant governance and human rights dimensions in the other partnerships.

Actors

• African States, AU Commission/NPCA, Pan African Parliament, African Court of on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, other Pan- African Institutions, RECs, African think tanks;

• EU Member States and Council, European Commission, European Parliament, other EU Institutions and Agencies, European Court of Justice;

• Decentralized authorities, Parliaments, and Civil society organizations;

• UN agencies and programmes and specialised international organisations including the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Priority 2: Cooperation in the area of Governance Initiatives

Activities

1. Strengthen and increase intra-African dialogue on AU principles and issues of shared values.

2. Step up and coordinate support to the African Governance Architecture, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in line with Africa's priorities.

3. Strengthen the dialogue on the APRM process and the cooperation on the implementation of its recommendations.

4. Strengthen cooperation with and among Parliaments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector.

5. Strengthen capacities of the AU, regional, national institutions and public authorities in the field of election organisation/observation and of civil society and media in election observation.

6. Support the role of public and private media to foster democratic governance.

Expected Results

• The African Governance Architecture is consolidated and operational;

• Coordinated EU actions to support pan-African governance initiatives;

- Balanced and effective support to the APRM at the continental and national level, including to the implementation of the national plans of actions;
- The core International and continental instruments related to Governance and Human Rights are ratified, domesticated and implemented;
- A structured dialogue about the role of media with a view to strengthening the regulatory framework for the development of free and independent media.

Actors

- African States, AU Commission/NPCA, APRM Secretariat, Pan African Parliament, other Pan-African Institutions, RECs;
- EU Member States and Council, European Commission, European Parliament, other EU Institutions and Agencies;
- Local and decentralized authorities;
- Civil society actors, universities and research institutes;
- UN organizations and specialized international organizations.

Priority 3: Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation

Activities

1. Finalize and validate the outcomes of the inventory of cooperation in the area of cultural goods and identify consequent priority actions of cooperation between African and the EU.
2. Conduct an effective dialogue and cooperation in the area of the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural goods in line with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and other relevant international conventions, including the exchange of experiences on the return of illegally exported or acquired goods to their countries of origin and encouraging setting up relevant mechanism for sharing best practices including on addressing archives issues.
3. Facilitate the access to information on important African cultural goods in EU and African countries.
4. Identify pilot Museums and cultural institutions in Africa and EU and facilitate the establishment of cooperation, twinning and capacity building agreements on cultural goods including inventory systems, security and safety systems, sites management.
5. Extend and institutionalize joint cultural events and cultural exchange programmes between Africa and EU, such as the Africa-EU Cultural week.
6. Develop and launch joint advocacy and communication campaign for the ratification and implementation of cultural goods related international instruments and conventions in Africa and in Europe, as well as the introduction of these commitments within national legislations.

Expected Results

- Enhanced cooperation to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and cultural diversity as well as intercultural dialogue;

- Common positions on policies, strategies and cooperation in the area of cultural goods;
- Progress in the implementation of relevant international instruments to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural goods, and in the joint fight against illicit trafficking of cultural goods.

Actors

- AU Commission/NPCA, African States, Pan African Parliament;
- European Commission, EU Member States, European Parliament;
- UNESCO and other international organisations;
- Civil society actors in the field of culture and sports;
- Museums, Universities and Research institutions.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Regional Economic Integration,
Trade and Infrastructure

This Partnership comprises three components, namely Regional Integration, Trade and Infrastructure.

I. Overall Objectives:

Support of African economic integration and development agenda in line with the Abuja Treaty and its implementing strategies, notably the African Minimum Integration Programme and Action Plan (MIP), Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) Action Plan, the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

Support to the AUC, RECs and African States efforts for rationalising and harmonizing trade and investment laws, regulatory frameworks and procedures with a view to improving the investment climate.

With respect to Infrastructure:

a. Pursue priority regional and continental-level infrastructure (transport, energy, ICT, water sectors) for increased interconnectivity through continued project development, reinforced coordination and advocacy for backbone infrastructure;

b. Promote safe and efficient transport services through application of modern technology and support for harmonisation and enforcement of policies and regulations, notably in air and maritime sectors;

c. Support institutional reinforcement and capacity building in continental and regional- level institutions;

d. Promote digital infrastructures as multi-purpose platforms for safe and efficient regional service delivery including appropriate interconnections and support coordination with capacity development on innovative technologies and applications implemented in sectors such as health, environment or education.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013
   by priority area

A. Regional integration:

Priority 1: Dialogue on the political dimension, policies and experiences on regional integration in Europe and in Africa and on integration in the global economy, including on:

Activities:

1. exchange of information between the EU, AU and RECs on integration processes;

2. the development dimension and impact on the African economies of existing (EU-MED, TDCA, African regional economic agreements) and up-coming (EPAs) trade agreements to which African States are parties;

3. the impact of the implemented agreements on the Africa overall integration agenda;

4. the EU experience of developing and implementing common institutions and policies;

5. Cooperation on liberalisation of Trade and services;

6. The findings of the all-ACP study on regional integration monitoring and the AUC study on the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) and follow-up to be given.

Expected Results: Platform for policy and political dialogue and exchange of information on the regional integration process in Europe with the view to assisting regional integration process in Africa is established

Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC (DG DEV, TRADE, MARKT) and concerned International Organisations.

B. <u>Trade</u>

Priority 2: Customs and Trade Facilitation:

Activities:

1. Facilitate cooperation between EU and African customs administrations on customs reforms to conform to internationally agreed standards, in particular in the context of supply chain security as well as on the current African process for development of common Transit procedures, on training and capacity building, including the organisation of Customs Blueprints seminars.

2. Exchange of information with a view to support the interconnectivity of computerized Customs systems within Africa, taking into account existing customs computer projects, e.g.UNCTAD Asycuda.

Main actors: EC (TAXUD; DEV), the AUC, African and EU Member States, African business community and concerned donors or international organisations such as the World Customs Organisation.

Financing: Different sources can be considered within the European Development Fund (e.g., depending on commitments already made, AUC support programme; ongoing regional or all-ACP programmes with trade, customs, fiscal or capacity components; regional technical cooperation facilities (TCF) or within the cooperation or training programmes of EU Member States.

Expected Results: Creation of efficient customs systems in Africa, enhanced dialogue on NTB issues and improved trade within Africa and between Africa and EU.

Priority 3: Improve the competitiveness and the diversification of African agriculture and industry notably by strengthening African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control:

Activities:

1. As far as agriculture and agro-industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and strengthen harmonization of SPS frameworks within Africa.

2. As far as industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and support development of quality infrastructure in Africa.

3. enhance competitiveness of African agriculture and agri-food industry through particular attention to Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary standards (SPS).

4. follow up to the 2010 pre feasibility study on TBT.

Expected Results: Improved competitiveness and diversification of African agriculture and industry.

Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC, UNIDO.

Priority 4: Operationalization of Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) Plan of Action in cooperation of UNIDO, RECs and other institutions:

Activities:

1. Support the implementation of the Accelerated Industrial Development Plan of Action to facilitate, among others, the upgrading of productive and trade capacities.

2. Discussion on the African Agribusiness and Agro-industry development initiative (3ADI) and explore possible avenues for cooperation.

3. Discuss a policy framework on an enabling environment for promotion of industrial SMEs and explore possible avenues for cooperation.

Expected Results: Progress towards the operationalisation of AIDA.

Main actors: AUC, RECs, EC, UNIDO, Africa and EU Member States.

Priority 5: Raw materials

We should work toward a coherent vision on development, mining and raw materials, to support African capacity at the appropriate national, sub-regional or continental level and within the available cooperation instruments, in particular:

Activities:

1. <u>On governance:</u>
   - Promoting natural resources governance including increasing revenue transparency(e.g. implementation of EITI and AMV), applying appropriate fiscal regimes and involving relevant stakeholders including the civil society;
   - Promote and provide training on best practices to negotiate mineral contracts;
   - Assist in developing policy scenarios for promoting trade and the sustainable development of the mining sector.

2. <u>On investment:</u>
   - Help develop analytical tools for mapping mining development corridors for investment promotion, consistently with any general investment promotion strategy in place;
   - Cooperate to assess opportunities for increasing local content and value- added through local processing of African mineral resources, particularly by SMEs;
   - Assist in improving mineral policy and related regulatory frameworks including on land use planning for minerals and authorization process in order to promote the investment climate;
   - Promote Corporate Social Responsibility.

3. <u>On geological knowledge and skills:</u>
   - Facilitate exploring mineral resources potential in Africa;
   - Foster further co-operation between African and European geological surveys;

• Support capacity building to help improve material stewardship, meaning the responsibility for environmental quality shared by all those actions affect the environment, including on rehabilitation of mining sites and management of secondary raw materials (recycling).

Expected Results: Improved governance, infrastructure and investment and geological knowledge and skills.

Main actors: DG ENTR; TRADE; DEV, EIB, the AUC, UNECA, Africa and EU Member States, geo-surveys, civil society, private sector and concerned donors or international organizations.

Priority 6: Improve the investment climate

Activities:

1. Facilitate the exchange of best practices in the area of regional investment codes with a view to supporting harmonization, as foreseen in the Africa Action plan
2. Strengthen the African regional and continental private sector and Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) networks, such as AfrIPAnet, and create links with European partners building on solid business data and tools.
3. Strengthen the Africa-EU business forum as a platform to promote business between Africa and Europe.

Expected Results: Improved investment climate.

Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC, UNIDO, Regional investment agencies.

Priority 7: Support quality statistics in Africa

Activities:

1. Support the provision of quality statistical services in Africa through the Implementation of the Charter on Statistics and of the strategy on the harmonization of statistics in Africa (SHaSA);
2. Strengthening the AUC capacity in statistics, notably transforming the Statistics Unit into a Division as decided by the AU Executive Council.

Expected Results: Improved quality statistics in Africa.

Main actors: AU statistical unit (also called AUSTAT), Eurostat, in particular the ACP section of unit D2 (International Statistical Cooperation), statistical services of RECs and Africa and EU MS.

C. Infrastructure

The EU and the AU established a partnership on Infrastructure (Energy, Transport and Telecoms/ICT) to raise awareness and encourage participation with regard to the aims and roles of the Partnership.

The EU – Africa Partnership for Infrastructure aims at becoming the EU's response to the infrastructure gap that hinders Africa's economic development. It should be implemented by the RECs and come under the EU - Africa Strategy. The EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructures will continue to be managed and implemented according

the institutional architecture approved by both parties through the Steering Committee assuming the role of the Joint Working Group.

Priority No 1: Support to AFUR and African Power Pools

Activities :

• Institutional reinforcement and capacity building (training, exchange programs) in energy market trading and management;

• Transmission grid development, including grid connections in Africa and between Africa and EU;

• Environment and social assessments;

• Project packaging and financing and governance (policies, codes and standards).

Expected Results:

• Increased capacity of AFUR and African Power Pools to sustain and further develop their activities and support their increased role as trade facilitators and coordinators and as main planners of regional energy infrastructure programmes.

Actors: AUC, AFUR, Power Pools, RECs, AFREC, AFSEC, EU related institutions.

Priority No 2: Support to Air Transport Sector and Satellite Navigation

Activities:

• Harmonisation of aviation policies and regulations,

• Support for aviation safety and security, surveillance and certification of air traffic management (ATM) activities and single sky for Africa and

• Technical assistance for implementation of new satellite based technologies for communication, navigation and surveillance and associated ATM procedures.

• For SBAS, setup and activity of Working Groups, staffing of African GNSS programme management entity, training of African experts, preliminary backbone infrastructure development and initial operations.

Expected Results:

• Strengthening of African continental and regional entities in charge of aviation legislation, regulation and enforcement, promoting liberalisation and improving air traffic management and air navigation services.

• Building of core technical capacity for SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation Service) within relevant African organisations in each region and implementation of preliminary backbone infrastructure.

Actors: AUC, RECs, UNECA, ASECNA, AFCAC, ACAC, EU related institutions (ESA, EASA, SESAR).

Priority No 3: Maritime Transport Sector: enhancement of Maritime administration and Safety

Activities:

In West African region:

• Strengthening port state control regimes and coast guard service capability and sub-regional maritime educational institutions and

• Enhancing vessel traffic monitoring and information.

  In Horn of Africa region:

• Support to implementation of maritime projects comprising capacity building, technical assistance and resource strategic planning and coordination,

• Implementation of plan of action, establishment of coast guard network and institutional strengthening.

Expected Results:

• Enhancing maritime security, safety, environment protection and strengthening law-enforcement capability in West Africa and Horn of Africa regions.

Actors : AUC, RECs, IMO, EU related institutions.

Priority No 4: Transport Sector Development

Activities :

• Selection and appointment of TAH Corridor Coordinators and support team at AUC, strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors, including RECs.

• Support to transport policy development and related studies, including trade facilitation.

• Technical support for project preparation and monitoring, training activities to project stakeholders (AUC, RECs, specialised organisations and national bodies, where appropriate).

• Coordination with PIDA programme and support for Steering Committee of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership.

Expected Results:

• Appointment of TAH Corridor Coordinators,

  • *Updated policy for transport and improved sector governance, including study of new areas,*

• Strengthened institutional coordination structures,

• Capacity building with African actors, including RECs, revised transport policy framework.

• Support to the coordination activities related to the PIDA programme in line with its road map and the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership agenda.

Actors : AUC, RECs, UNECA, SSATP, ICA, EU related institutions.

Priority No 5: Establishment of a geo-database

Activity:

• Initiate and coordinate the establishment of a database with other stakeholders, notably ECA, RECs, and Specialised Institutions, and with respect to actions planned under PIDA.

Expected Results:

• Established geo-database.

Priority No 6: Support to Improving water governance for trans-boundary water resources in Africa through promoting Integrated Water Resource Management

Activities:

• Institutional reinforcement and capacity development of ANBO and RBOs, information and knowledge management,

• Development and implementation of IWRM plans linked to national and regional development plans, resources mobilisation.

Expected Results:

• River Basin Organisations in Africa have developed and are implementing basin wide Integrated Water Resource Management and Development (IWRM&D) Plans.

• African Network of Basin Organisations (ANBO) has facilitated the integration of water aspects into national and regional planning, and ANBO/AMCOW effectively participate in the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

Actors: ANBO, AMCOW, RBOs, AUC, RECs, GWP

Priority No 7: Support of PIDA programme

Activity:

• Assignment ongoing; Sector studies, validation workshops and sector regional meetings.

Expected Results:

• Summary prospects and Program Outlines,

• regional and continental policy proposals and program orientations,

• Formulation of Strategic Framework and Programs

Financing: Various sources including contribution of 9th EDF

Priority No 8: Strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors including RECs

Activity:

• Review of institutional arrangements and recommendations for coordination and dialogue mechanisms;

• Communication, consultations and workshops with the different stakeholders to assign roles and functions on a consensual and participative basis and

• Preparation of the terms of reference for the rest of the process;

• Creation of an enabling platform for planning, implementation and delivery of PIDA;

• Building capacity for programme planning, implementation, monitoring and delivery;

• Setting clear mechanisms and platforms for technical cooperation and resource mobilization with a focus on indigenous resources and the enhancement of the role of African Regional Banks;

Expected Results:

• Improvement of institutional architecture structures which will increase regional integration.

Priority No 9: Improving regional connectivity and basic access to infrastructure services through the implementation in Energy, Water, Transport and ICT sectors of the EDF and other instruments and institutions: National Indicative Programmes, Regional Indicative Programmes, EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, Port Moresby and Energy and Water Facilities; as part of the integrated strategic framework under this Partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on the Millennium Development Goals

Overview

It has been agreed that the MDG Partnership should focus on a limited number of areas where we think that it can really add value and make a difference. Specific Task Groups will take forward work in the agreed areas – initial suggestions are outlined below. We would expect these groups to be time-bound. Therefore, new areas could be selected on a rolling basis. The same overarching themes of Policy, Education, Health and Food Security will remain.

There is a cross-over in some of the areas below, which are naturally cross-cutting. There is also the potential to set up joint Task Groups with other Partnerships.

We do not downplay the importance of other areas not outlined here. Where they are not included this is likely to be because there is intense work already happening in other fora or we think that more can be achieved by concentrating initially on these areas. There is also a working document for the MDG Partnership which contains other options and for which Task Groups could be established providing the criteria are met.

A Task Group will only be established where the following criteria are met:

• A number of participants on both the African and European sides expressing an interest in being part of a Task Group in a particular area.

• Willingness of Member States or Commissions to lead the Group.

• Commitment to resource (not necessarily financial) and to regular and active participation of specific experts.

• No duplication of the activities of other fora.

• The Task Group can achieve specific objectives that add value.

I. Overall Objectives

i. Increased commitment among EU and African Member States to meeting the MDGs.

ii. Take forward concrete activities, initially in the areas of health, gender, education, agriculture, water and sanitation and disability.

II. Specific Initiatives

The suggested areas are not set in stone for the three-year period, but must be responsive to the latest developments. If an issue arises where a Task Group can perform a genuinely useful role, then this can be taken forward. This could be raised initially through any participant/stakeholder in the Partnership, though the Co-chairs and the Steering Group (see structure below).

The Task Groups will establish the activities, objectives/outcomes expected, participants and timescales in more detail. However, based on the initial suggestions, specific activities are likely to include, but are not limited to, the following:

Priority Action 1: Health
Activities

1. Launch the Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) in the AU Members States where it has not yet been launched and

provide guidance and technical support for implementation of the strategy in accordance with the ICPD Programme of Action.

2. Facilitate integration of the CARMMA strategy into national health strategies in accordance with the ICPD Programme of Action.

3. Collect and disseminate through a forum convened at regional or continental level best practices on Maternal, Infant and child Health

4. Assess the impact of CARMMA, including collection of statistical data.

5. Advocacy for and support Member States' improvement of human resources for health capacity through development of policies /strategies and plans of action where these don't exist and support their implementation where they exist.

6. Monitor the progress of the implementation of the Maputo Plan of Action.

7. Collect and Disseminate best practices and Support Member States in their implementation of the 'Abuja Call' with its new set of indicators as aligned to MDG6.

Expected results

• By 2013 the Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) which covers the Maputo Plan of Action to have been launched in all 53 AU Members States and its strategy which includes child health, implemented in at least 25 Members States.

• By 2013 to have More Member States with improved access to HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria services by implementing the 'Abuja Call' with its new set indicators aligned with those of MDG 6.

• By 2013 to have more Member States to have strengthened their health systems through improved Human Resources for Health.

• **Main actors**: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN.

Priority Action 2: Gender

Activities

1. Develop a medium-term strategy of cooperation on gender equality and women's empowerment.

2. Identify and take forward specific measures, including empowering women with disabilities.

3. Work with other Partnerships to include gender equality in their activities.

4. Establishment of gender observatory for collection and reporting of data on gender.

Expected results

• By 2011 EU and AU have developed a medium-term strategy of cooperation on gender equality and women's empowerment.

• The medium-term strategy foresees measures for empowering the poorest and most disadvantaged women and girls including those with disability.

• Specific outcomes in 2012 linked to the strategy.

• Increased number of girls that pass secondary education.

• Increased number of women holding seats in parliaments.

• Provision of data on gender.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

Priority Action 3: Education

Activities

1. Work with the International Task Force on teachers in the framework of its plan of action and develop networking and sharing information.
2. Work towards establishing centers and enhancing regional networks to strenghten teachers training on disability issues.
3. Encourage use of FTi Equity and inclusion guidelines in education sector planning and reviews.
4. Pilot approaches to making teaching and learning materials available in accessible formats.
5. Take forward activities to strengthen science teaching, including establishing regional centre and enhancing regional networks.
6. Take action to accelerate the implementation of the AU's 2nd Decade for Education, in particular work with the Association for Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) in the preparation of the next ADEA's trienale in Ougadougou - Dec-2011- to "promote critical skills for sustainable development in Africa";
7. Work on methods for monitoring the Plan of Action.
8. Institutionalize actions (notably school feeding programs in the framework of national education plans) aimed at encouraging school attendance and learning performance in coherence with health and nutrition programs.

Expected results

• Accelerated implementation of specific actions under the AU's 2nd Decade for Education: establishment of the Education Observatory for monitoring the progress made in the implementation of the Plan of Action.
• Regional centres established and regional networks enhanced for the teaching and learning of Science and Mathematics (possible linkages with the International Teachers Task Force created in 2008 and working to address the teacher gap, particularly in Africa).
• Increased awareness of disability issues.
• Enhanced levels of government incentives to reduce economic barriers to education at all levels, such as school fees.
• Increased numbers of children that pass secondary education.
• Literacy for adults, particularly women, which leads to reduced poverty.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, ADEA, IPED, CSO, Private sector, PAP, UN.

Priority Action 4: Agriculture

Activities

1. Increase political support for African agriculture, improve CAADP implementation, produce quality CAADP Round Table Processes at national and regional levels, and mobilize resources to fund CAADP Compacts/investment plans.

2. Promote the Protocol for African common market and its implementation in order to increase the development of regional value chains for strategic commodities (rice, maize, cotton, cassava, and livestock) and regional integration in food and agriculture;

3. Improve the policy and regulatory environment for enhanced sustainable and responsible investments in agriculture through :

   a. Accelerated integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes to preserve the capacity of ecosystems to provide ecosystem services and accelerate reduction of biodiversity loss;

   b. Accelerated implementation of the Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, trough notably enhanced capacity building of stakeholders in land policy development, and improved land information systems, increased networking, lesson learning and knowledge sharing among practitioners in land policy;

4. Jointly explore ways to facilitate the sustainable intensification of smallholder agriculture, including through efficient input provision. In this connection also jointly assess the opportunities offered by the African Fertilizer Financing Mechanism

5. Support the Panafrican Farmers Forum and more generally facilitate an increased participation of civil society and farmers' organisations, representing both male and female farmers, in policy making, implementation and evaluation.

6. Promote demand-led agricultural research for development, extension and innovation and strengthen the capacity (financial, human, and institutional) of research institutions. Work jointly on the development of agriculture and food security information systems at national, regional and continental level.

Expected results

- Increased financial support for African agriculture by national Governments, development partners and private sector as well as increased number of African countries allocating at least 10 percent of the national budget to agriculture and developing and implementing CAADP Compacts and investment plans.

- Improved access to markets for small-scale farmers.

- Development has taken into account principles of sustainable development.

- Accelerated implementation of the African Land Policy Guidelines, involving national stakeholder platforms to disseminate their content at country level.

- Sustainable intensification of smallholder agriculture facilitated through targeted initiatives.

- Greater participation of civil society and farmers' organisations, representing both male and female farmers, in policy making, implementation and evaluation.

- Enhanced levels of financing of demand-led agricultural research for development, extension and innovation, involving coordination by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), sub-regional research organisations and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and sub-regional research organisations.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN.

Priority Action 5: Water & sanitation

Activities

1. Accelerate the work of the Africa-EU Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation as a Task Group of the MDG Partnership.

2. Take action on the AU 'Commitments for accelerating achievement of water and sanitation goals' (Sharm el Sheik 2008).

3. Support the EU Water Initiative's Africa Working Group and African partners by profiling its work and encouraging broader participation and catalysing financial contributions, with the aim to progress towards strategic objectives and annual work plans of the Africa-EU Partnership on water affairs and sanitation (in coordination with UN).

4. Strengthen capacities of AMCOW to provide leadership and of civil society to contribute to progress and to hold governments and development partners to account.

5. Enhance efforts by EU and AU Member States to implement the AU 'Commitments for accelerating achievement of water and sanitation goals' (Sharm el Sheik 2008), including the agreement of a joint action plan under the EU-Africa Partnership for water affairs and sanitation, by 2011.

6. To ensure that by 2013 the majority of countries have developed and adopted national water, sanitation and hygiene policies, strategies and implementation plans based on broad stakeholder participation (SWAP), sustainable use of resources (IWRM) and realistic financial planning (SFP) and are transforming those plans into actions

7. To reduce the number of 'off track' countries for MDG-7, with a specific focus on sanitation being the most off-track MDG in Africa, by increasing domestic financial resources and better targeting of aid where it is most needed.

8. Development and promotion of common views and understanding on the role of water supply, sanitation and hygiene and integrated water resources management for public health and economic development based on multi-sectoral dialogue.

9. In relation to the above outcomes, particular attention to be given to the challenges of urbanisation, fragile states and better development partner coordination around country led plans.

Expected results

• By 2013 the majority of countries have developed and adopted national water, sanitation and hygiene policies, strategies and implementation plans based on broad stakeholder participation (SWAP), sustainable use of resources (IWRM) and realistic financial planning (SFP) and are transforming those plans into actions.

• The number of 'off track' countries for MDG-7 have reduced.

• Increased knowledge generation and exchange among regional actors leading to better governance and informed decision making, including support to the development of early warning systems and collaboration with the African Water Centres of Excellence.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN.

Priority Action 6: Disability
**Activities**

1. Establish collection of statistics in a coherent manner to enable baselines and measures of disabled people's access to services.

2. Joint advocacy to promote inclusion of sex disaggregated information on disability in new statistics initiatives.

3. Support the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) to monitor the implementation of the AU programme on disabilities.

4. Support implementation of AU strategy on people with disabilities.

5. Inclusion of people with disabilities across sectors.

6. Engagement of African CSOs in the JAES. Active participation of disability CSOs including attendance of both EU and African civil society at JEGs/Task groups (as appropriate).

7. Disseminate WHO guidelines and report on progress.

8. Information and good practice sharing.

9. Joint advocacy for disability to be included as part of the overall effort to achieve the MDGs from 2010-2015 (particularly in light of two African-sponsored resolutions on people with disabilities).

10. Encourage EU and AU member states sign and ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

11. Establish a system to address the rights of persons with disabilities and vulnerable groups in interventions to achieve the MDGs.

Expected results

• By 2013 more EU and AU Member States have signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

• More national and international statistical data sets contain disaggregated information about people with disabilities.

• More girls and boys with disabilities have access to education.

• African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) is able to monitor and implement the AU programme on disabilities.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN.

PROPOSED MDG PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE

Ministerial/Political Discussions

Co-Chairs

Other Partnerships

Advice/areas to consider

Recommendations/ reports/prep for events

Discuss cross-overs

Direct input on own area including identification of funding / arrange high level meetings where appropriate

MDG STEERING GROUP

EC, AUC, 2 EU/African MS (including the 2 Chefs de file)

Direct input on own area including identification of funding / arrange high level meetings where appropriate

Update on progress

ID of task group. Political feedback

Update on progress

Task Group 1 (Regular identified leads from EC, AUC and MS)

Task Group 2 (Regular identified leads from EC, AUC and MS)

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Climate Change and Environment

Overview

The first Action Plan (2008-2010) for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in Lisbon Summit on December 2007 identified two priority actions in Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change:

- Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation; and
- Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Great Green Wall for the Sahel and Sahara Initiative.

The first joint work undertaken by the Joint Expert Group (JEG) of this partnership in November 2008 was the development of an Africa-EU Joint Declaration on Climate Change specifying the context, the framework of work and the 13 priority areas of the Partnership. The roadmap for the implementation of the 1st Action Plan adopted in April 2009, identified among the 13 priority areas five components on Climate Change partnership: *Capacity Building of African countries, RECs and AUC for climate change; Strengthening African capacities to better exploit opportunities under the carbon market; Water resources management and adaptation in the field of agriculture; Sustainable land management, fight against desertification and avoid deforestation; and Implementation of the Global Climate Change Alliance in Africa (GCCA).*

Deliverable initiatives from the five components have been identified and prioritized. The first priorities concern the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI); the CLIMDEV and AMESD programs; the activity of building and enhancing African negotiators' capacity in negotiations under the UNFCCC; the GCCA and the fight against deforestation.

The other components of the Joint Declaration including the 13 priority areas remain valid and are still part of the overall objectives of the second Action Plan. The latter will focus on the initiatives identified below.

I. Overall Objectives

- To strengthen African capacities for climate change adaptation and mitigation including for reducing disaster risk and for combating desertification and deforestation.
- To work towards reaffirming and reinforcing our common positions on climate change issues namely our attachment to the principles and priorities of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
- To reinforce coherence between the international climate change negotiations carried out under the aegis of UNFCCC and the Africa/EU partnership.

Expected outcomes

- Improved integration of climate change/desertification/deforestation issues into African national and regional development strategies as well as in Africa-EU development cooperation.
- Concrete initiatives in enhancing Africa's capacity to adapt and mitigate to adverse effects of climate change through:

o Capacity building of the national delegations for climate negotiations.

o Improved access to the carbon market including capacity building.

o Operationalisation of the CLIMDEV Africa Programme.

o Fight against deforestation and soil degradation through the implementation of GGWSSI and similar initiatives.

o Enhanced implementation of Climate adaptation measures including through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA).

o Capacity building for planners and policymakers on the use of earth observation data for planning and policy makers.

• A strengthened Africa-EU dialogue on climate in particular linked to the other two Rio conventions (the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification).

• Harmonised approaches to adaptation and mitigation in order to efficiently coordinate actions aimed at reducing the negative impacts of Climate change.

• Integration of earth observation data in national development processes is facilitated.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

Priority Action 1: Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative

The GGWSSI was conceived and launched by African political leadership. The first Action Plan identified the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative as the pillar of one of the two priority actions of this partnership: "Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative". In the future, the initiative could be extended to other areas in Africa affected by desertification. It is progressively strengthening its impact by building on and cooperating with all key related initiatives and actors, such as the Panafrican Agency of the Great Green Wall and the Terr'Africa initiative.

During the first Heads of States and Governments Summit on the Great Green Wall which took place in N'Djamena on 17 June, 2010 in the presence of four Heads of State (Senegal, Chad, Mauritania and Djibouti), of the Vice-president of Nigeria, the Prime Minister of Niger, the Secretary of State to the agriculture and the Sustainable Development of Ethiopia and of the Ambassadors of Sudan and Chad, a convention creating a Pan-African Agency of the Great Green Wall was signed.

For the implementation of the initiative, two phases are foreseen: an initial phase (2 years) which will put in place an institutional and financial environment facilitating the implementation of the Great Green Wall program and to initiate a certain number of activities in some pilot countries and a second phase of implementation which could be spread out over a longer period split into project phases of ten years.

The GGWSSI targets the arid ecosystems of the Sahara and the Sahel and covers issues related to sustainable management of soils (including the three interdependent factors: desertification, climate change and deforestation). The GGWSSI should not be regarded as a separate and new program it should rather be seen as a federated platform, making it possible to link sustainable development, reduction of poverty and integrated land anagement. The objective of the priority action is to assist the countries concerned with the GGWSSI in the development of their national action plans, to support the development of

trans-border programs and to bring support to the development of the capacities of the sub-regional organizations such as IGAD, UMA, ECOWAS, CILSS and CENAD.

Activities

- Support the development of a regional harmonized strategy for the implementation of the GGWSSI and the mobilisation of the resources for this purpose;
- Support the concerted formulation of national plans of implementation of the GGWSSI;
- Support the identification and the development of trans-border projects;
- Develop a program for reinforcement of the capacities of the various actors involved in the implementation of the Great Green Wall (in particular for the planning and the coordination of the initiative at the regional level);
- Develop and run a network and a platform to exchange information to reinforce shared knowledge between the various stakeholders of the GGWSSI.
- Support the implementation of the GGWSSI and clearly identify issues and areas where there is a need for action at trans-border level and for coordination. Formulation of thirteen National Action Plans.[2]

Expected Results

This first phase will lead to the formulation of a financing program of greater width to implement the actions identified.

- National action plans by the countries concerned are developed;
- Trans-border programs are identified and implemented;
- Enhanced capacity of sub-regional organizations, such as IGAD, UMA, CILSS and CEN- SAD to clearly identify issues and areas where there is a need to mobilise action at trans- boundary levels and for the coordination of those actions.

Actors: EU and African Member States and other development partners, AU Commission and European Commission, FAO, CENSAD, ECOWAS IGAD, UMA, CILSS, OSS and Regional centres of excellence, national GGWSSI focal points, civil society experts working in this field, including farmers and women organizations.

Priority Action 2: CLIMDEV and Climate Information Services using Earth Observation data

Climate Information for Development in Africa Program (CLIMDEV Africa) is a joint initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Development Bank (AfDB), that seeks ways of overcoming the lack of necessary climate information, analysis and options required by policy and decision-makers at all levels. The project is supported by various EU Member States and by the European Commission through the GCCA, AUC, ECA and AfDB, and is currently ongoing.

Both African and EU partners endeavor to construct a solid foundation in Africa for the response to climate change, building on solid science and observational

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[2] An existing FAO project foresees the preparation of five National Action Plans: Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Niger and Mali. A complementary EU project aims at preparing a further eight National Action Plans: Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt.

infrastructure, enabling strong partnerships between government institutions, private sector, civil society and vulnerable communities, and creating and strengthening of knowledge frameworks to support decision-making and integrate the actions required. Likewise, the AMESD program has been involved in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure for climate information services.

Activities (CLIMDEV)

• Further operationalise the CLIMDEV Fund at the African Development Bank;

• Support to the operationalization of the African Climate Policy Centre, the CLIMDEV capacity hub;

• Support the coordination capacity of the AU Commission in the area of climate change and desertification;

• Contribute to a coherent framework for coordination of climate activities at African continental level, with a strong capacity building function.

Expected results

• African Climate Policy Centre fully operational;

• CLIMDEV Special Fund at the African Development Bank fully operational;

• Enhanced AU Commission coordination capacity for Climate Change and Desertification;

• A coherent African climate change strategic continental approach.

• The structure of CLIMDEV would facilitate the launching of other initiatives such as access to Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and capacity building regarding access to Carbon Markets.

Actors : AUC, EC, RECs, UNECA, Regional centres of Excellence, EU and African Member States, civil society experts working in this field.

Activities (AMESD)

The AMESD project (African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development**)** currently implemented by the African Union Commission (Phase I, 2007-2012) is strengthening the capacities of African institutions to use satellite-based Earth Observation information for decision- making in various environmental themes that are impacted by climate change (agriculture, land degradation, water management, etc.). AMESD is since its inception a major contributor to the objectives of the partnership in general.

• Enhancing the African capacities for the operational monitoring of climate change and variability, vegetation, water resources, land degradation, carbon dioxide emissions, etc., in support of decision-making processes in this area.

• A coherent African continental approach, including in international negotiations.

• Facilitate the integration and institutionalization of earth observation data and AMESD products and services into national and regional development processes.

• Support programs of the post AMESD (Phase II) within the framework of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Africa as adopted in the Ouagadougou Declaration in September 2010.

Expected results

• Improved quantity and quality of earth observation data.

- Improved decision making by key policy makers.
- Empowerment of the five regional implementation centers and associated regional networks and the development of infrastructure for environmental monitoring and strengthening of African capacities to exploit Earth Observation data for continental and regional decision- makers.

Actors: AUC, EC, RECs, UNECA, WMO, EUMETSAT, UNEP, EU and African Member States, civil society experts working in this field, Regional Implementation Centres (RICs).

Priority Action 3: Strengthening climate adaptation

Enhanced action on climate adaptation is a key priority area of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which was launched at the end of 2007 in the margin of the UN negotiations on climate change in Bali. This initiative aims to enhance the policy dialogue between the EU and developing countries most affected by climate change and to step up financial and technical cooperation. Adaptation support builds on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action or similar programmes when these are available and covers in particular agricultural improvements and water management. Special attention is given to integrate adaptation into wider development strategies. In addition to adaptation, the GCCA also supports capacity building for climate negotiations, reducing deforestation and enhancing participation in the carbon market.

In 2008-2009 the GCCA entered its implementation phase. Ongoing work in Africa includes €21 M support earmarked for six African countries: Tanzania, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, and Seychelles). Programming work is advanced for two additional African countries: Mozambique and Ethiopia, and four more should be included soon. In 2009 a regional GCCA support programme was decided under the 10th European Development Fund intra-ACP budget covering a) €8 M support for CLIMDEV and capacity enhancement of the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (climate change and desertification coordination), and b) €8 M support programme for COMESA and ECOWAS/CILSS.

Activities
- Implementation of the EU Global Climate Change Alliance at country and regional level.
- Continued activities with the following priority axes:
  o Adaptation to the impact of climate change in most relevant sectors (agriculture, water, etc.).
  o Reduction of emissions from deforestation.
  o Improved access to investments through the Clean Development Mechanism.
  o Increased capacity for integrating climate change challenges in national development strategies.
- Strengthen the involvement of the African Union Commission in the implementation of GCCA in Africa.

Expected results
- Adaptation to climate change increasingly mainstreamed in national development strategies.
- Six to eight additional GCCA country interventions designed and implementation started in three to four countries.

• Enhanced capacity of COMESA and ECOWAS to deal with climate change adaptation.

Actors : African and EU Member States, European Commission, AU Commission, development partners, Regional Economic Communities, civil society organizations experts working in this field.

Priority Action 4: Fight against deforestation

Progress has been achieved under the UNFCCC negotiations on the issue of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD-plus) the follow-up of Copenhagen included the Paris and Oslo Conferences (February and May 2010 respectively)that led to the creation of the REDD+ Partnership involving more than 60 countries including the major African forest countries. Its core objective is to contribute to the global battle against climate change by serving as an interim platform to scale up REDD+ actions and finance. This partnership will support and contribute to the UNFCCC process. It will also promote transparency around international financing initiatives to reduce deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Globally, around 4 billion USD will be made available for measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and partners have expressed their willingness to substantially scale up financial support after 2012.

Improved forest governance is a key element of reducing emissions from deforestation. Therefore, it is important to exploit the synergies between the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative and REDD+ as well as the link with sustainable forest management.

The fight against deforestation is also an aspect of the GGWSSI (to counter the progress of desertification) that could be implemented in African countries not already covered.

Activities
• Facilitate actions that would qualify African projects as REDD+ projects; help definition and implementation of pilot projects in Africa.
• Continue FLEGT negotiations with the major African forest countries.
• Underline and strengthen the links between REDD+ and FLEGT in Africa.

Expected results
• Africa to be an active partner in the interim REDD+ Partnership, and to benefit from the REDD+ financing coherent with the magnitude of the deforestation and forest degradation issues that the continent is facing.
• Conclude negotiations on FLEGT in several countries.
• Coherence between REDD+ and FLEGT initiatives in concerned countries.

Actors: AU Commission and European Commission, European and African countries members of the Partnership, RECs, UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, African Development Bank, and regional development banks.

Priority Action 5: Enhancing African negotiators' capacity in negotiations including the UN Framework of the Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol

The complexity of the climate negotiations calls for a wide range of expertise to be available in the participating countries. Lack of negotiating capacity is one of the

constraints faced by African countries in the UNFCCC. There are a number of initiatives including the Global Climate Change Alliance that involve training to upgrade climate negotiation capacities.

Activities

- To provide the opportunity for African negotiators to be trained in climate change negotiations possibly in liaison with Universities.
- To provide short or long term training for practical experience in EU environmental services and African-based climate institutions e.g. African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), AGHRYMET, SADC Drought Monitoring Centre, RECTAS etc.
- To identify selected African countries, representing the five regions and representatives from RECs, especially those involved in the international negotiations in need of building and strengthening their capacities in the concerned areas.

Expected results

- Strengthened capacity of African negotiators in negotiations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

Actors: European Commission, African Union Commission, selected African countries, RECs and Africa-based climate institutions.

Priority Action 6: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

(1) There is a close link between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR), both aiming at reducing people's vulnerability. There is an increase in climate-related disasters that affect the African continent. On-going discussions between the two Commissions are looking at priority areas to support Africa in line with the Programme of Action for the implementation of the Regional Strategy on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (2006 – 2015). This discussion falls within the EU Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for Developing Countries.

Activities

- Support African Member States and RECs to establish multi-sectoral national platforms on DRR.
- Support preparatory work enhancing national and regional capacities to mitigate exposure to disasters.
- Support the creation and the networks of five regional centers of excellence for DRR.

Expected results

- DRR becomes a regional, sub-regional and national priority, with strong institutional frameworks, adequate resources and multi-stakeholder participation.
- DRR institutions have the requisite authority and capacity to coordinate across relevant sectors and from national to local levels.

Actors: EU and African Member States, the European Commission, the AU Commission, NPCA, RECs, civil society experts working in this field.

Priority Action 7: Biodiversity Conservation Initiatives

Healthy ecosystems and biodiversity are crucial for the livelihood and food security of African populations. The successful conclusion under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing will contribute to fair and equitable sharing of benefits of ecosystems. Ecosystem conservation also contributes to climate adaptation and reduced deforestation. The Nagoya Conference also agreed on new targets for protected areas.

Activities
• Enhance the understanding of the economics of ecosystem services and biodiversity.
• Promote the integration of biodiversity frameworks in national development and planning processes.
• Support African countries with implementation of the Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) and with the targets on protected areas.
• Promote participation and potential accession of the AU Commission in the processes of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
• Assist the AU Commission in coordinating African negotiators on bio-diversity and the regional, continental, and global fora.

Expected results
• Better understanding of the economic importance of ecosystems and biodiversity.
• Biodiversity frameworks and programs into national development and planning processes.
• Increased capacity to deal with ABS and with protected areas targets.
• Enhanced participation of the AU Commission in CBD processes
• Enhanced support for African negotiators on biodiversity supported

Actors: European Union and African states, RECs, UNEP, AMCEN, African negotiators.

III. Specific suggestions to improve the functioning of the Climate Change Partnership

• Encourage a stronger engagement of African and EU States in the climate change partnership.
• Strengthen the links between the partnership and various international, continental and regional climate conferences inter alia UNFCCC, CAHOSCC and AMCEN e.g. for the UNFCC Conferences in Cancun and South Africa in December 2010 and 2011 respectively; publish on the Africa-EU partnership website, the UNFCCC side events related to the priorities of the climate change partnership and vice-versa.
• Ensure that the partnership meetings benefit from support and dedicated resources for their smoother functioning. This includes interpretation, translation services and secretariat support to ensure and enhance effective participation of all concerned stakeholders and encourage sub- regional representation.
• Organise monthly "update" meetings through video conferences bringing together the JEG co- Chairs, the EC, the AUC, the AU Permanent Mission to the EU and the EU Delegation to the AU to facilitate a regular information flow.

- Enhance and diversify resource mobilization mechanisms including the translation of multilateral and bilateral financial pledges into concrete actions.
- Promote coordination and exchange of information among relevant stakeholders to enhance aid efficiency
- Strengthen synergies with the Africa-EU partnerships relevant to climate change such as those on Energy, Migration, Peace and Security; Science Information, Society and Space and MDGs
- Ensure regular participation of representatives of RECs, NPCA Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), UNECA and regional financial institutions such as the AfDB and other regional and pan-African organisations, including African-based climate institutions such as the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), AGHRYMET, SADC Drought Monitoring Centre, RECTAS etc. Research and private sectors also need to be increasingly involved.
- Integrate the work and objectives of the Africa-EU Partnership on Water and Sanitation launched in Johannesburg in 2002 in coordination with other partnerships and the Africa Working Group of the EU Water Initiative and building on the commitments of the 2008 Sharm el Sheikh Declaration.
- Link and further strengthen synergies with various activities of relevant stakeholders that could enhance the work of the partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Energy

Overview

The AEEP is a long-term framework for structured political dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU on energy issues of strategic importance, reflecting African and European needs. Through the Partnership, Africa and Europe will work together to develop a shared vision and common policy answers, and to stimulate specific actions that address the energy challenges of the 21st century.

The first Ministerial High Level Meeting of the AEEP held on 14 September 2010 in Vienna,[3] Austria, agreed on political targets to be achieved by 2020. The implementation of these targets is the joint responsibility of Africa and the EU. The monitoring of implementation of the targets will be undertaken by the Joint Experts Group (JEG) which brings together the African and EU Implementing Teams and their co-chairs. The Implementing Teams comprise of the AUC, EC, interested African countries and EU member states, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Power Pools and specialized institutions. The details of implementation will be agreed by the JEG during the AEEP 2nd Action Plan (2011-2013).

The Expected Results of the 2nd Action Plan will contribute to the achievement of the AEEP targets for 2020. At the end of the 2011-2013 period these outcomes will allow the monitoring of progress towards the realisation of the political targets.

I. Overall objective

The overall objective of the AEEP is improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, cost-effective, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents, with a special focus on achieving the MDGs in Africa.

In order to achieve its Overall Objective, the AEEP will focus its efforts on concrete, realistic, visible targets, to be attained by 2020, as agreed by the Ministerial High Level Meeting held in Vienna on 14-15 September 2010. Action will contribute to the realisation of existing national, regional and continental energy objectives and strategies in Africa, and will take into account the necessary social and environmental standards.

II. Specific Initiatives

Priority 1: Energy Access
Activities

1. Continue to implement 64 projects in 34 African countries under the first ACP-EU Energy Facility, benefiting more than 6 million people, with a total budget of €400 million, including a contribution of €180 million from the EC.

2. Start to implement 60 energy access projects in 35 African countries under the second ACP- EU Energy Facility with a total EC contribution of around € 180 million

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[3] The HLM of the AEEP brought together over 300 participants, including ministers, ambassadors and other high-level decision-makers from 21 European and 23 African countries, and commissioners from the AU and the EU, as well as academics, business leaders and members of civil society from across Africa and Europe.

3. Further implement and expand bi-lateral energy access initiatives and projects such as the Dutch-German Energising Development (EnDev) programme.

4. Create adequate political and regulatory frameworks to achieve regional and national energy access goals.

5. Develop innovative, sustainable financial schemes to implement access to energy programmes in Africa; and assist African countries to reform their electricity tariff systems ultimately aiming for cost-recovery.

6. Support the creation and/or operationalization of rural electrification funds and other African energy funds contributing to access.

7. Develop biomass energy strategies, covering all forms of biomass, including for improved traditional cooking, as well as the sustainable production of modern solid, liquid and gaseous fuels.

8. Support efforts to make energy programmes gender sensitive, taking into account the preponderant role of African women in producing and consuming energy.

9. Support sharing of best practices and peer-learning from countries with high levels of energy access through African institutions and networks in the energy sector.

Expected Results

Increased access to modern and sustainable energy services in Africa, focusing on sustainable models: to provide energy for basic services (health, education, water, communication); to power productive activities; and to provide safe and sustainable energy services to households.

This result is a contribution to the AEEP Political Target for 2020 to bring access to modern and sustainable energy services to at least an additional 100 million Africans, focusing on sustainable models: to provide energy for basic services (health, education, water, communication); to power productive activities; and to provide safe and sustainable energy services to households.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

Priority 2: Energy Security
Activities

1. Support regional energy master plans, policies and strategies on access, electricity and regional infrastructure through the "Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa" (PIDA).

2. Further implement regional interconnection projects agreed and ongoing under the EU- Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund and other instruments that strengthen African regional power pools.

3. Support priority projects on electricity and gas interconnection infrastructure of regional power pools and RECs that will be jointly agreed and selected according to criteria of bankability and contribution to energy access to meet the 2020 political targets.

4. Support and promote the implementation of the "Hydro 2020 Initiative" aiming at increasing the production capacity, interconnections and energy trade.

Expected Results

Increased capacity of cross border electricity interconnections, both within Africa and between Africa and Europe, thus increasing trade in electricity while ensuring adequate levels of generation capacity.

Increased use of natural gas in Africa, as well as African gas exports to Europe, by building natural gas infrastructure, notably to bring currently flared gas to market.

These results are a contribution to the AEEP Political Targets for 2020 to double the capacity of cross border electricity interconnections, both within Africa and between Africa and Europe, thus increasing trade in electricity while ensuring adequate levels of generation capacity; double the use of natural gas in Africa, as well as doubling African gas exports to Europe, by building natural gas infrastructure, notably to bring currently flared gas to market.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

Priority 3: Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

Activities

1. Develop subsequent phases of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) and support management, coordination and monitoring of the start-up phase.

2. Implement support to renewable energy policies and development of markets.

3. Support capacity development for project preparation and mobilization of financing.

4. Promote renewable energy applied research, development and technology transfer.

5. Support existing and new regional centers for renewable energy and energy efficiency to aid in formulating and disseminating policies promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency and to provide a platform for the regional exchange on policy issues and technological questions.

6. Further the creation and support existing funds or facilities to strengthen the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to stimulate the market for decentralized, renewable energy

7. Develop joint approaches to support and facilitate implementation of regional and continental priority projects jointly agreed on renewable energy (in hydropower, solar and geothermal).

8. Develop a programme on increasing energy efficiency in the electricity systems (supply and demand sides) and support existing regional energy efficiency initiatives such as SAPPs "demand-side management virtual power station".

Expected Results

Increased use of renewable energy in Africa: by building new and/or rehabilitating existing hydro-power, wind power and solar energy facilities and other renewable facilities, such as geothermal and modern biomass.

Improved energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors, starting with the electricity sector, in support of Africa's continental, regional and sectoral targets.

These results are a contribution to the AEEP Political Targets for 2020 to increase the use of renewable energy in Africa: by building 10 000 MW of new hydro-power

facilities; by building at least 5 000 MW of wind power; 500 MW for all forms of solar energy; and by tripling the capacity of other renewables, such as geothermal, and modern biomass improve energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors, starting with the electricity sector, in support of Africa's continental, regional and sectoral targets.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 4</u>: Institutional Capacity Building

1. Strengthen existing and launch new capacity building initiatives and activities for national, regional and continental institutions in Africa with a focus on coordination, information systems, databases, planning, standardisation, innovative financing mechanisms to leverage local and international finance.

2. Intensify efforts to facilitate cooperation among African and European private sector investors, with particular focus on attracting European and international investment to Africa.

3. Intensify cooperation with research institutions and civil society in order to improve their ability to engage in energy issues.

4. Develop a distributed AEEP Monitoring and Evaluation tool. The tool will have a double purpose: retrospective, to measure the impact of AEEP efforts in view of realizing our common targets; prospective, to benefit from experience gained in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public intervention in the energy sector. The efforts to monitor AEEP activities will focus on access to energy for basic needs, for social services and for productive activities.

Expected Results

Improved institutional capacity for national, regional and continental institutions in Africa (RECs, regional power pools, specialized institutions, etc.) on coordination, information systems, databases, planning and standardization

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 5</u>: Scaling up Investment

1. Support regulatory reforms and good governance in the energy sector to provide for an enabling environment.

2. Mobilize internal resources for increased access to services, e.g. by making utilities more effective and efficient.

3. Focus on using available public resources to attract private capital for energy access activities.

4. Support public and private investment in grid and off grid power.

5. Support efforts to better identify barriers for project financing, and to make recommendations on how best to mobilize private and public resources for investment in the energy sector.

Expected Results

Increased investment in the energy sector (public and private).

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 6</u>: Dialogue

1. Africa and the EU will strengthen dialogue at multiple levels on energy issues of mutual interest, including research institutions, the private sector and civil society.

2. Specific events - including broad representation of the private sector, civil society and research institutions – will be organised on key issues of the AEEP:

   • Continental and intercontinental infrastructure: a tool for energy security;

   • Governance of the energy sector: a tool to achieve universal access;

   • Renewable energy and energy efficiency: keys to access and energy security.

Expected Results

On the basis of the monitored results of the Action Plan the above-mentioned targets will be reviewed and updated, also in the light of new political developments and joint agreements.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

JAES Action Plan 2011–2013
Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment

I. Overview

The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment aims to provide comprehensive responses to migration and employment challenges, in the interest of all partners, and with a particular focus on creating more and better jobs for Africa, on facilitating mobility and free movement of people in Africa and the EU, on better managing legal migration between the two continents, on addressing the root causes of migration and refugee flows, on the conditions of and access to employment, on the fair treatment of all migrants under applicable international law, on finding concrete solutions to problems posed by irregular migration flows and trafficking of human beings and to ensure that migration and mobility work for development. All these orientations should be addressed in a balanced and comprehensive way. These objectives were already set out in the Action plan 2008-2010 and will continue to steer this Partnership, also in the Action plan 2011-2013.

Following the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU on migration, mobility and employment issues have intensified. Yet actual results are uneven and scattered, depending very much on the political interests and institutional capacities of the concerned African and EU States. Both in Africa and in the EU, competences and responsibilities for migration and employment policies are still very much at the national level, with the regional and continental dimensions being recognised, but not yet encompassed.

II. Overall objectives

The new Action Plan will further strengthen inter-regional, continental and inter-continental dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, mobility and employment among countries of origin, transit and destination. In addition, higher education appears as a more visible and integrated part of this partnership. Through this Action Plan Africa and the EU renew their commitment to the implementation of (a) the Declaration of the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, (b) the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, and (c) the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

The new action plan will have two main strands: (1) enhancing dialogue, and (2) identifying and implementing concrete actions, both of them encompassing the inter-regional continental and inter- continental dimension of the partnership.

The major challenge for the period 2011-2013 will be to **further strengthen and enrich the political and policy dialogue** on migration, mobility and employment as well as tertiary education issues between the two continents, whilst encompassing dialogues and cooperation taking place on national and regional levels.

In the area of **migration and mobility** this dialogue will be informed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreed in Lisbon in December 2007,[4] as well as the Declaration of the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, the EU-Africa

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[4] In particular paragraphs 68, 69 and 70.

Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, and the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

For the period 2011–2013 the agenda for the dialogue between Africa and the EU on these topics will be comprehensive and balanced, taking into account concerns of countries of origin, transit and destination. It will include topics such as

a. diasporas, remittances, brain drain, migrant rights, social consequences of migration;

b. regular migration, including circular migration, mobility, visa issues,

c. illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, readmission and return, and

d. refugees, asylum and protection.

Both parties will deepen their political dialogue on the human rights, including social, economic and cultural rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in this partnership and in other relevant fora. In the framework of this dialogue, both parties will notably exchange views on lessons learnt and best practices on the implementation of existing instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Convention on refugees, the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 2009 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, and other relevant human rights instruments as well as international humanitarian law instruments. This dialogue will also address issues related to sex trade, sex tourism and cheap labour. The dialogue on visa issues will look at conditions and procedures for delivery of visa, and facilitating mobility for commercial, professional and study reasons.

In the area of **employment**, the dialogue will focus on strategies and initiatives targeting job creation and sustainable and inclusive growth, acknowledging the role of relevant stakeholders, including social partners and the private sector. Furthermore, the dialogue will focus on the questions related to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan and the global 'Decent Work Agenda' with special emphasis on the *creation of more*, *more productive and better jobs* in Africa and the link to *social protection* as well as to the *informal and social economy*.

In direct relation to strategies on employment, mobility and the harnessing of brain drain the parties will extend their dialogue to the area of **higher education**. This dialogue will look, inter alia, at ways of supporting the *mobility of students and scholars* and the realisation of the *African higher education harmonization process*.

Dialogue on all these topics will in particular focus on the question of how to enhance coherence and synergies between migration, mobility, employment, education policies and *development/ poverty reduction strategies*.

It is envisaged that the dialogue process will yield ideas for further concrete actions that may be added to the Action Plan in the coming years.

III. Specific initiatives and activities

The second strand of the Action Plan 2011–2013 consists of a number of **concrete actions**. Some of these were already initiated or launched under the Action Plan 2008-2010 and are reaching their implementation stage under the next Action Plan. Several of the employment related initiatives that have been identified and discussed at the June 2010 AUC-EC Workshop on Employment, Social Protection and Decent Work in Dakar will inform the relevant employment initiatives of this Action Plan.

At the moment the following initiatives are envisaged for the Action Plan 2011-2013:[5]

1: ***Facilitation of the dialogue***. To organise and facilitate the Africa – EU dialogue a € 3 million support project has been launched in 2010. The project will engage in the organisation of *workshops and meetings, information exchange and capacity building*. The project is implemented by a consortium of three organisations (ICMPD, IDEP, FIIAPP), under the responsibility of a Steering Committee led by AUC and EC, and a consultative role of the Joint Expert Group (JEG).

2: ***African Remittances Institute***. The preparatory phase project (technical and consultative) designed to facilitate a structured and deepened reflection on all aspects of the prospective establishment of the African Remittances Institute (ARI) was launched in 2010, involving the World Bank in association with AUC and EC, as well as IOM and AfDB. The Steering Committee that has been established is led by the AUC Preparatory activities will encompass, consultations research, capacity building and networking. It is envisaged that the Institute, once established, will facilitate better, more effective and safer remittances' transfer system, which will fully take into account the specificities of African countries.

3: ***Human Trafficking Initiative***. The AUC, in partnership with the EC, will assist RECs in developing and implementing regional action plans to strengthen protection, prevention and prosecution of trafficking in human beings, in line with the Ouagadougou Action Plan and AU.COMMIT, that cover countries of origin, transit and destination. Furthermore a *monitoring and evaluation tool* will be designed and implemented at regional level to enable measurement of implementation and impact as well as to assist in the *identification of best practices* for the African Continent.

4: ***Diaspora Outreach Initiative***. The Partners will establish an Africa–EU Diaspora cooperation framework, with the objective of engaging the Diaspora in the development of Africa and to build capacity and transfer skills, knowledge and technologies from the Diaspora to the African continent. This cooperation framework will be built on the AU Diaspora Initiative, and create synergies between the following three existing programmes: (a) Global Mapping of Africa Diasporas (AUC – WB), (b) Capacity building for Diaspora ministries in Africa (NL/DE), (c) EU-wide networks of African Diaspora organisations working in the field of development.

Priority actions that will be developed are: (1) Mapping of African Diaspora organisations in the EU, (2) Programmes addressing specific sectoral needs, such as a Diaspora Health Network, (3) AU regional network on African diasporas in Europe.

5: ***Observatory on Migration***. The ACP Observatory on Migration will create a network of researchers and research centres to provide policy makers, civil society and the public at large with reliable and harmonised data on migration. In order to achieve this objective it may establish links with other relevant observatories. It will run a website, and publish research studies and papers. It will furthermore function as an exchange platform for migration research papers and expertise. The Observatory initiative will be launched in October 2010. This initiative could serve as a starting point to develop future activities covering all the African continent.

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[5] For each initiative a fiche has been prepared, indicating the objectives, activities, funding and actors involved.

6: ***Decent Work Initiative***. AUC and EC will jointly launch a project with the objective of extending social protection coverage in particular in the informal economy. The two Commissions will organize an event to allow the exchange of experiences between relevant experts and other key stakeholders including governments, private sector, social partners, civil society and international organisations. Furthermore, the AU Programme on Upgrading the Informal Economy and the Productivity Agenda for Africa will continue to provide support to a multi-level dialogue and policy development on the informal economy (mainstreaming of the informal economy, empowerment and social dialogue, productivity improvement, knowledge and data base management, etc). This dialogue may also involve Asian and Latin American countries.

7: ***Labour market governance and capacity building***. This initiative aims at strengthening the institutional capacity of the labour market institutions in Africa, so that they can play effectively their role in the social and economic development in the continent. The initiative will target public employment services and labour administrations. It will aim to harmonise and coordinate labour market information systems (also in connection to the network of Employment and TVET[6] Observatories currently implemented in African countries). Support will be provided at national, regional and continental level. The initiative furthermore aims at the mapping of skills required and available at national, regional and continental level, identifying the gaps and working for the improvement of employment opportunities and employability.

8***: Regional and sub-regional fora on employment, labour, social protection and labour migration***. In cooperation with RECs, fora will be strengthened to allow organizing consultations on thematic policies of common concern, and to contribute to enhancing the functioning of the labour market, supporting the harmonization processes of the labour and social protection frameworks at regional levels. Furthermore, partners will establish a platform for social dialogue between the African Union and the European Union including an effective representation of all stakeholders, including non-state actors such as representatives of civil society, the private sector, trade unions and parliamentarians, with a particular focus on the informal economy.

9: ***Access to finance and guarantees***. The European Union and Africa will intensify their cooperation in the area of job creation, building on the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. Special attention is devoted to improve the access to financial services for the poorest and underserved, through support of the microfinance sector and through enhancing the small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) access to long term finance.

One such initiative is the progressive development of the African Guarantee Fund (AGF) supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB), Denmark, and Spain. Access to finance and guarantee will be developed taking into account existing guarantee schemes, including at regional level and in close cooperation with other donors as well as with the European Investment Bank (EIB). The potential for co-guaranteeing SME-portfolios in Africa will be systemically explored.

10: ***Nyerere Programme***. This programme was initiated by the AUC in 2005. Its aim is to contribute to high level African human resource development and retention; while supporting intra- African academic mobility, and thereby mitigate the effects of brain drain. This enhanced scholarship programme will be launched in November 2010. Under

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6 TVET: Technical and Vocational Education and Training.

the scheme, African students, scholars and academic staff will receive scholarships for master and PhD level studies and to allow exchange of academics and university administrative staff. Overall, it is expected that over the five consecutive rounds of selection more than 2000 participants will benefit from the scheme.

11: ***Pan-African University***. The Pan-African University is a project by the African Union, aiming to exemplify excellence, relevance and global competitiveness of African higher education and research. It is a network of African higher education and research institutions, with thematic hubs in each of the five geographic regions of Africa (Eastern, Western, Central, Southern and Northern Africa). It is expected that the first four thematic institutes will be launched in 2011.

12: ***African Higher Education Harmonisation and Tuning***. This initiative aims to review the state of implementation of mutual recognition of higher education certificates and qualifications in Africa. It will involve assessment of the potential of using the European approach of 'Tuning'.[7] The initiative includes the implementation of the African Quality Rating Mechanism, the popularisation of the revised Arusha convention, and the development of a roadmap for the harmonisation of higher education in Africa. A pilot phase on the potential of using this tuning approach is expected to begin in 2011.

The above initiatives may be further developed and strengthened during the course of implementation of this Action Plan. Other initiatives might be jointly identified and agreed throughout the period of validity of the Action Plan if specific needs are identified by the partners.

As for thefinancing of these initiatives the Partnership will continue to rely on resources available in the EU, the AU as well as in African and EU States. Partners agree to make efforts to increase the *visibility, transparency and accessibility of these resources*, including through enhanced coordination in the framework of this MME Partnership. The two Commissions will conclude the examination of the feasibility of setting up a fund as provided for in the outcome document of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development of November 2006.

The joint experts group will monitor the implementation of this action plan and will evaluate the progress made.

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[7] "Tuning" is a methodology which allows universities to understand and fine-tune curricula and make them comparable on a transnational basis. It focuses on a specific subject area's generic competences or transferable skills, subject specific competences, learning outcomes, credits, approaches to learning, teaching and assessment, quality assurance and employability.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013
Partnership on Science, Information Society and Space

I. Overall Objectives

This Partnership interlinks three Priorities for development policy, which singly and in conjunction with one another can leverage faster socio-economic development in Africa: science, information society and space applications. By strengthening their cooperation to produce knowledge-based societies and economies, Africa and the EU recognise that:

- the development of science, technology and innovation, as well as the spreading of the digital era to all sections of society are key motors of socio-economic growth and sustainable development;
- competitiveness in the world economy rests increasingly on knowledge and application of modern technologies and:
- attainment of the MDGs requires a general effort to raise S&T capacities in Africa and enable widespread use of ICTs and related services.

In that respect, this Partnership is cross-cutting in nature, contributing to the attainment of all other development objectives. For optimal effectiveness, there should therefore be close coordination with other JAES Partnerships (particularly infrastructure, climate change Migration Mobility and Employment(MME) and MDGs); In addition, clear articulation with the formal institutional apparatus governing EU-Africa relations should be developed.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013
by priority area

PRIORITY ACTION 1: S&T capacity building for the implementation of Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA)

Objectives: To strengthen African Capacities in the area of science and technology, in order to enhance the use of science and technology and to improve S&T cooperation.

Expected outcomes
- Strengthened African S&T capacities and EU capacities for working with Africa to enhance coherence of cooperation;
- Improved training, and hence increase the quality and number of African and EU scientists, technicians and engineers;
- Improved training and exchange programmes for African and EU scientists, technicians and engineers;
- The mainstreaming of S&T into REC's sectoral programmes and projects, including those in EDF RIPs;
- Improved pan-African infrastructure and facilities for R&D;
- The active pursuing of AU-EU high-level policy dialogue;
- Enhanced S&T cooperation at all levels (bilateral, bi-regional, bi-continental, REC-level) in key areas of the CPA;
- Enhanced innovation capability of African and European SMEs;

- Development of STI evidence–based AU EU policy making, including support to the Africa STI observatory.

Activities

- Awareness-raising at all levels (policy makers/government; parliament; local stakeholders/communities; private sector; civil society) on the opportunities for S&T to contribute to national/regional/pan-African development and to respond to major challenges that both Africa and Europe are faced with

- Consolidate and implement national/regional/pan-African S&T policies consistent with regional or continental social and economic development agendas. This will include supporting the AU objective of designing a multi-annual African Research Framework, inter alia by implementing the African Research Grants Initiative, as well as providing the AUC with the requisite experience and management capacity;

- Enhance EU (Commission and Member States) cooperation, in partnership with RECs (through a well-defined framework with the AU) on mainstreaming science and technology for socio-economic sustainable development and support the strengthening of their capacities in this area;

- Complete formulation of the *Science and Technology for the development of African Small and Medium Enterprises and Business Incubators network* Lighthouse project and seek its financing by mobilizing further European (EC; Member States; Private sector and Local authorities) and African national, regional and continental financial instruments, the Private Sector, NGOs and any other interested stakeholder organisations;

- Explore all possibilities for Africa to support the deployment of regional, global and high quality research infrastructures;

- Set up an adequate mechanism to promote an African brain-gain programme;

- Cooperate in capacity building in R&D and R&D policy in Africa and the EU;

- Stimulate and support collaborative research in the areas of the CPA. This will be done by exploiting opportunities of new programmes focused on developing bi-regional funding frameworks;

- The S&T related activities will be implemented in line with the CPA with a focus on the grand challenges Africa and Europe are faced with. Priority will be given to joint strategic initiatives where a particular impact of S&T is expected, for example, Climate hange/Energy, Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security and Global Health (emphasis on Maternal and Child Health and Infectious Diseases). Strategies will be developed to further adapt and open the existing 7th FP instruments to African scientists;

- Pursue the EUC–AUC Exchange programme, extend it to Member States and include RECs, following the development of an exchange strategy by the AUC-EC;

- Seek active coordination and cooperation with university related activities in order to improve the value of S&T within national policies including budget allocation to science and research;

- Ensure coordination with the proposed new high-level AU-EU science and technology policy dialogue.

Actors

AU Commission/NPCA; RECs; African States; AfDB and associated Economic Blocs European Commission; EIB; EU Member States and associated economic regions

Private Sector; universities; science and technology institutions and associated research centers International Finance Institutions UNESCO, UNECA and other UN agencies.

Finance

Dedicated financing tools 10th EDF; DCI; FP 7; ENPI; EIB; AfDB Bilateral contributions from EU and AU Member States, from the RECs and the European regions and from local authorities Multilateral cooperation between MS, eg. a grouping of African and European MS, who initiate and finance joint projects of mutual interest Private Sector and Foundations that support R&D.

PRIORITY ACTION 2: Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa

Objectives: Complement and develop new strategies to support investments made on ICT infrastructures deployment, as planned in the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructures. This will be done by exploiting synergies between the EU 2020 Digital Agenda and the AU ICT development frameworks as well as with support to capacity-building initiatives for mass diffusion of ICTs and related services considered as key enablers for poverty reduction, economic growth, social development and regional integration.

Expected Outcomes

• A successful implementation of the AU ICT development frameworks including ARAPKE (the African Regional Action Plan for the Knowledge Economy), the Reference Framework for ICT Policy Harmonization and the 2010 Addis Ababa AU Summit Declaration on ICT for Africa's development;

• A more inclusive and affordable access to ICT applications and services and widespread use of ICTs (e.g. the internet and mobile applications), across all socio-economic sectors in order to fast-track the MDGs objectives, notably in health (e.g. use of telemedicine and the creation of bio-data banks) and the education sector;

• Stronger cooperation regarding the digital economy and the reduction of the digital divide, including private sector, international financial institutions and UN agencies;

• A more competitive African economy through ICT uptake and innovation;

• Consultation on African-EU positions and approaches in international and regional ICT fora to enhance mutual understanding;

• Mutual beneficial economic collaboration for AU-EU industries and SMEs involved in ICTs.

Activities

• Set up an AUC-EC Information Society Dialogue, in partnership with Member States, addressing all ICT-related cooperation issues in a comprehensive and integrated way, with the view to better bridge policies, programmes and practices related to the implementation of the EU 2020 Digital Agenda and AU ICT development frameworks, and to coordinate EU and African positions in global ICT fora. These can include e.g. enhancement of digital literacy, skills and inclusion, skills for research and technological development, regulatory issues, infrastructure deployment with promotion of the use of e-applications in various sectors of governance.

• Establish a multi-stakeholders implementation group, co-chaired by the AUC and EC and gathering ICT representatives from European and African Member States, RECs, research community, private sector, civil society and NGOs, international financial institutions and international organizations in order to facilitate cooperation and better coordination of national and regional programmes, as well as to identify concrete initiatives of mutual interests in support of EU and AU priorities and mobilize funds accordingly. The implementation group will notably focus on the following activities:

o Build on the current *Harmonisation of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa* (HIPSSA) initiative to ensure the full participation of African non ACP member states and to further support implementation of ICT regulatory and policy reforms and regional harmonization in view of creating the right enabling environment to foster private investment and market development while ensuring affordable service costs and the widest diffusion of ICTs and e-services.

o Promote the diffusion and sharing of ICT best practices and successful public-private partnerships, notably by establishing close interaction with the EU-Africa Business Forum and support for Africa EU networking platforms as well as linking national initiatives to existing regional and global platforms and networks, notably to those provided by international financing institutions and private sector fora.

o Design appropriate e-skills and digital literacy initiatives, supporting the development of local digital content and applications of high socio-economic impact, notably in the fields of health and education in order to fast-track attainment of the MDGs.

o Upgrade ICT research cooperation, local ICT innovation and entrepreneurship, exploiting in particular the potential of mobile and fixed wireless technologies as well as promoting ICT business incubators and living labs, including notably the *Africa Incubators Network and the European Network of Living Labs*.

Promote cooperation in Research and Education Networking by exploiting interconnection between the European GEANT network and established African regional networks and supporting the development of an integrated pan-African Research and Education Network.

Actors

• AU Commission/NPCA; RECs; African States;
• European Commission; EIB; EU Member States; Regions;
• Research Community;
• Private Sector;
• Civil Society and NGOs;
• Local Authorities;
• International Financing Institutions;
• UN specialized agencies and international organizations.

Finance

• Dedicated financing tools and appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their

specificity and eligibility criteria, such as the 10th EDF; ENPI; DCI; EU-Africa Infrastructures Trust Fund and FP7;

• Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African States;

• Private sector; NGOs; local authorities; financial institutions.

PRIORITY ACTION 3: Enhance Cooperation on Space Applications and technology.

(2) OBJECTIVE: ENHANCED COOPERATION IN THE USE OF SPACE APPLICATION AND TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Expected outcomes

• Strengthening and developing of Pan African Institutions;

• Integration of Space-related issues fully in specific dialogues and cooperation initiatives in areas such as navigation, telecommunications and Earth observation for the environment and resource management, climate change, peace and security;

• Development of specific projects (such as telemedicine), based on existing space infrastructure to achieve regional and global development goals.

Activities

• **GMES and Africa** : Pursue the process initiated in 2007 at the Lisbon Summit, taking into consideration the on-going deliberations and guidance on the process.

Finalise, expedite and implement the Action Plan on GMES and Africa, in particular:

• establish a secretariat to drive the GMES and Africa Initiative;

• Complete the identification of user communities and validation of requirements;

• Complete the mapping of contributing organisations, projects and activities;

• Promote harmonisation and prioritise future actions;

• Fully integrate Earth-observation data, products and methodologies in support to policies in areas such as climate change, food security, water management, monitoring of natural resources, peace and security, etc.

• Allocate adequate (approx € 20 million) for the preparatory phase of the GMES and Africa;

• Fully exploit synergies with relevant GMES-Europe Services and other established European missions such as Meteosat and Envisat among others;

• Take full benefit of the current programme and cooperation in earth observation, including research projects;

• Identify adequate funding mechanism (FP; EDF; ENPI; African institutions etc) and kick-off priority projects.

Identify, develop, finance and pursue the necessary capacity building efforts at continental, regional and national level so that the African technical and policy institutions have the necessary resources to fully exploit available Earth observation-based information and products in support of the establishment and monitoring of their policies by identifying, developing and financing the capacity building programmes.

Design and implement the appropriate coordination and governance mechanisms aiming at a long-term cooperation in the area by developing frameworks to:

- Ensure adequate mechanism for coordination between continental, regional and national level;
- Ensure adequate representation of user communities in the governance mechanism to ensure that GMES and Africa is being developed in response to user and development needs;
- Implement adequate and inclusive monitoring mechanisms to assess impact on development policies and compliance with user requirements;
- Estimate resources needed up to 2020 based on current level of investments and priority actions reflecting the conclusions of the "GMES and Africa" Action Plan;
- Promote dissemination of information and transparency through Workshops and other suitable information mechanisms.
- **Reformulate and support the implementation of the African Geodetic Reference Frame (AFREF)** to establish a foundation for space applications in Africa by providing an essential element for regional and multinational projects requiring precise positioning and geo-referencing.
- **On the basis of appropriate African initiatives, jointly develop the concept and establish a strong African institutional and policy framework for:**
  o **Promoting the exploitation of space-based applications** and technologies in support of development goals;
  o **Assess the feasibility of an autonomous African Space Agency** to assist the continent to coordinate continental space activities in an integrated and sustainable way, drawing on the expertise of the European and African Commissions, ESA, EUMETSAT and committed African States (such as Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and others).

Actors
- AU Commission/NPCA; UNECA and UN agencies; African States; RECs and other existing African regional space technology organisations, agencies and facilities;
- European Commission, EU Member States;
- European agencies such as the European Space Agency (ESA) and EUMETSAT;
- Research institutes and organisations;
- Private Sector, NGOs and other related organisations and Development partners.

Finance
- Identification of dedicated financing instruments;
- The 10th EDF, ENPI, DCI;
- EU Framework Programme for RTD;
- Complementary programmes managed by other European actors (e.g. ESA; EUMETSAT);
- Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African States;
- Private sector.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR ASSOCIATES

The Review of International Affairs is a quarterly published in January, April, July and October every year.

The periodical publishes evaluated articles and conference and book reviews in the field of international relations, foreign policy, international public law and international economics.

In writing all contributions for *The Review of International Affairs* authors are kindly asked to respect the following rules.

Instructions for Writing Articles

1. Author contributions (articles) should not be longer than 10 single-spaced pages (single) in *Word* format (up to 28000 characters with spaces).

2. Articles should be written in *Times New Roman* font, font size 12, with page numbers on the right side of the bottom of the page.

3. The title of the article should be written in capital letters, *in Bold*, font size 14. The title is separated from the text with – *spacing before 18 pt*. Below the title is given the author's forename, middle name and surname (including his title, possibly), the name of the institutions he works for as well as its seat. These data are given in *Italic*.

   Example:

   Prof. Dragana Marko Mitrović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade

4. If the author has a wish to point to his readers that some of the views presented in the article express his own opinion and not the one of the institution he works for it is necessary to insert at the end of the title a special footnote with the symbol * for this remark.

5. The *Abstract* should contain not more than 100 words, presenting the most significant hypotheses the work is based upon. Below the *Abstract* the author puts up to 12 *Key Words*. Both the *Abstract* and *Key Words* are given below the title of the article and they should be separated from the rest of the text by applying the option *Paragraph-Indentation*.

6. The *Summary* written in the language of the paper (e.g. Serbian) should be placed after the text. The author should give a concise contents of the paper and the most significant hypthesis his work is based upon.

7. The basic text and footnotes should be justified by applying the option *justify*, while titles should be centred by applying the option *center*.

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11. Only the following form of quotation marks should be put in the text – " and ". In case the additional quotation marks are to be put within these ones it should be done in the following way: "Establishing a Serbian Orthodox Monastic Community in Kosovo, as an integral part of comprehensive 'final status' settlement".

12. Footnotes should be written on the bottom of the page (option *Footnote*), and their marks are solely to be put at the end of the sentence.

The details on the quoted bibliographic unit in footnotes should be given in conformity with the following suggestions:

a) *Monographs*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the monograph (*in Italic*), publisher, place of publishing, year of publishing, p. if one page of the quotation in English is cited, pp. if several pages are quoted. In case several pages are quoted En Dash is applied with no space before and after the numbers (for example 22–50).

When the proceedings in English are quoted and they were edited by more than one editor, then there should be put (eds) in brackets with no full stop after the names of the editors. If there is only one editor then (ed.) is put, including a full stop inside the brackets.

Examples:

John Gillingham, *European Integration 1950–2003*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 221.

Duško Lopandić (ed.), *Regional initiatives in Southeast Europe: multilateral cooperation programs in the Balkans*, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2001, pp. 24–32.

Theodor Winkler, Brana Marković, Predrag Simić & Ognjen Pribićević (eds), *European Integration and the Balkans*, Center for South Eastern European Studies, Belgrade & Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, Geneve, 2002, pp. 234–7.

b) *Articles in Scientific Journals*

The author's full forename and surname, the title of the paper (with quotation marks), the title of the journal (*in Italic*), the number of the volume, the number of the publication, pp. from–to. The numbers of pages are separated by En Dash (–), with no space. If some data are incomplete it should be clearly stated.

Examples:

Michael Levi, "The Organisation of Serious Crimes", in: Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan & Robert Reiner (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp. 878–84. (pp. 878–9 or p. 878).

Robert J. Bunker & John. R. Sullivan, "Cartel Evolution: Potentials and Consequences", *Transnational Organized Crime*, vol. 4, no. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 55–76.

c) *Articles in Daily Newspapers and Journals*

There should be given the author's name (or his initials, if they are the only ones given), the title of the article – with quotation marks, the title of the newspapers or the journal (*in Italic*), date – in Arabic numerals, the number of the page/pages.

Example:

John Gapper, "Investor votes should count", *The Financial Times*, 17 April 2006, p. 9.

d) *Document quotation*

There should be given the title of the document (with quotation marks), the article, item or paragraph the author refers to, the title of the journal or official gazette containing the document (in *Italic*, the number of the volume, the number of the publication, the place of publishing and year of publishing.

Example:

"Resolution 1244 (1999)", Security Council of the United Nations, 10 June 1999.

e) *Quotation of sources from the Internet*

It should contain the author's name, the title of the contribution or article, a full Internet Website that enables to access the source of quotation by typing the mentioned site, the date of accession to the Web page, page number (if there is one and if presented in PDF format).

Example:

Maureen Lewis, *Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?*, IBRD & World Bank, Washington D.C, 2000, Internet, http://Inweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Who+is+Paying+for+Health+Care+in+Eastern+Europe+and+Central+Asia/$File/Who+is+Paying+text.pdf, 14/09/2004, p. 3.

f) *Repeating of the previously quoted sources*

Ibid. or ibidem is applied only if quoting the previous source in the text, with the page number, and in case the new quotation belongs to the same source (e.g. ibid., p. 11)

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13. The article may contain tables or some other supplements (such as maps, graphs, and the like). It is necessary to give their number and full title (e.g. *Table 1: Human Development Index among EU members* or *Figure 2: State-Building or Sovereignty Strategy*. If the supplement is taken over from the contribution of some other author or a document its source should necessarily be given.

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2. The bibliographic details should be given at the beginning of the review in accordance with the rules prescribed for monographs in footnotes, and with the total number of pages given at the end (e.g. p. 345).

3. Book and conference reviews must not contain footnotes, while all possible remarks should be put in brackets.

4. The author may also write subtitles of the book or conference review in capital letters – font size 14, although this is subject to changes on the part of the editorial staff.

5. Font size, font and justification of the text should be in conformity with the previously mentioned suggestions on writing of articles.

6. The name of the author of the review is given at the end; it should be in *Italic*, while the whole surname should be written in capital letters (e.g. *Žaklina NOVIČIĆ*).

* * * * *

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Published quarterly in Serbian

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